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PETITIONER: RAJ KANTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER, PUNJAB AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1980

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1464            1980 SCR  (3)1006  1980 SCC  (3) 589

ACT:      Punjab Security  of Land  Tenures Act,  1953, Section 9 interpretation-Words  and   Phrases,  meaning  of  the  term ’regularly’ in Section 9(i)(ii) of the Act-Whether a ’single default’ in  payment of rent would attract the provisions of Section 9(1) (ii).

HEADNOTE:      Pera Ram,  Ganga Ram,  Bhago  and  Kalu  Ram  were  the tenants of  agricultural land  owned by  Mrs. Raj Kanta, the appellant. The  tenants  made  separate  applications  under section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, on September  4, 1961  for purchasing  the land held by them from the  land owner. These applications were allowed by the Assistant Collector  on October  31, 1961.  Accordingly, the tenants deposited  the first  instalment in  November  1961. Ultimately, however, the tenants did not pay the rent of the respective holdings  for Kharif  1961. It  is common  ground that the  last date  by which  the rent  for Kharif 1961 was payable by  the tenants  to the  land owner  was January 15, 1962 and  that the  tenant did  not pay the rent and did not show sufficient  cause for the same. In view of the default, the land owner filed separate applications under s. 9(1)(ii) of the  Act on  the ground that as the tenants had failed to pay the  rent regularly  without sufficient cause, they were entitled to  be ejected  by the land owner. The applications for ejectment  were, however,  dismissed but  on appeal  the Collector allowed  the appeals  by his  order dated  May 31, 1962.  Second  appeals  preferred  by  the  tenants  in  the ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order dated 5-11- 62  of   the  Commissioner  and  ultimately  upheld  by  the Financial Commissioner by his Order dated December 21, 1962.      Having failed  before the  Revenue courts, the tenants- respondents filed  a writ  petition in  the High Court which was heard by a single judge. But in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for  his ejectment  by the  land owner as a result of which the  land owner  filed a  writ petition  in  the  High Court.  All   the  petitions  were  consolidated  and  heard together, by  the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the  tenants and  quashed  the  order  of  the  Financial Commissioner directing  ejectment of  the tenants.  The writ

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petition of  the land  owner against  Kalu Ram was, however, dismissed. Hence,  the  four  appeals  by  the  land  owner- appellant to this Court.      Allowing the appeals, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  The Punjab  Security of Land Tenures Act 1953 is a piece of social legislation meant to ameliorate the lot of the  tenants by  conferring  on  them  the  status  of  a permanent tenancy  or the  rights to  purchase the  land  on payment of  instalments. At  the same  time,  the  landlords within a very limited sphere have been assured protection in respect of  the rights  which they  possess in  the land and have been  given the right to eject the tenants on specified grounds which  are contained  in the  various sub-clauses of section 9  of the  Act. Sub-Clause  (ii) is  one  such  sub- clause. This right was absolute and could not 1007 be curtailed  by interpreting clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act  through a  process of  twisting the  law and  doing violence to  the language of the section, especially when it admits of no ambiguity. [1010 A-C, 1011 A-B]      Bhagirath Ram Chand v. State of Punjab and Ors., A.I.R. 1954 Punjab 167: referred to.      2. The  word ’regular’  which is  derived from the word ’regula’ which  means ’rule’,  means in  a  regular  manner, methodically,  in  due  order  and  postulates  a  state  of symmetry,  consistency   and  uniformity.  In  other  words, ’regular’ means  a consistent  course of conduct without any break or breach.                                      [1011 B, D, F & 1012 A]      Arab Bank  v. Ross,  [1952] 2  Q.B.D. 216;  Hammond  v. London County  Council, [1931]  Chancery  540;  quoted  with approval.      3. Although  the Act is heavily loaded in favour of the rights of  the tenants  so as  to  confer  on  them  several important  benefits   and  privileges  yet  as  the  Act  is confiscatory in nature, so far as the landlord is concerned, it should  be strictly  construed within  the limited sphere inasmuch as  the landlord  is conferred  limited grounds  on which ejectment  is permissible  under s. 9 of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with  the landlord under the Act. In order therefore to advance the  object of  the Act  so as to assure the limited protection to  the landlord,  the language  employed in  the various clauses  of s.  9 has  to be construed so as to give real benefit  to the  landlord within the limited range that the section operates. [1012 D-F]      A correct  interpretation of the plain language and the words and phrases used in clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act would  be that  the word ’regular’ connotes a consistent course of  conduct without  any  break  or  breach  and  the ’regular payment of rent’ would mean that the rent should be paid  punctually   without  any   default  or   laxity.  The Legislature clearly  intended to use the word ’regularly’ to mean payment  of rent  in this manner. The Legislature never contemplated that  a single  default could  be condoned. The word ’regularly’  has been  used immediately after the words ’fails to  pay the  rent’  and  is  followed  by  the  words "without sufficient cause". The Legislature clearly provided that if  the tenant had committed a default whether one, two or more, the same could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise.                                                   [1012 A-D]      4.   The words  "failure to  pay rent regularly without sufficient cause"  in Section  9(1)(ii)  of  the  Act  cause

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postulate the following conditions:           1.   there must  be a  failure on  the part of the                tenant to pay rent;           2.   such failure  must be  to pay rent regularly,                that is  to say,  the  rent  should  be  paid                punctually consistently  without any break or                breach;           3.   if there  is any  default ranging from one to                several,  the   tenant  has   got   to   show                sufficient cause  if his  case is to be taken                out of  the mischief of s. 9(1)(ii). [1012 F-                H]      5. It  is well  settled that  the Legislature  does not waste words  and every  word that  is used  by  it  must  be presumed to  have some  significance. The  function  of  the Court is  ’jus decere’  not ’jus  dare’. The  Court  cannot, therefore, in 1008      order to  promote its  social philosophy turn and twist the plain  and unambiguous  language of  the law  so  as  to ascribe to  it a  meaning different from the one intended by the  Legislature.   The  words  ’without  sufficient  cause’ clearly indicate  that in  order to  escape  ejectment,  the tenant must  at least  be regular in payment of the rent and if he  wants to  get rid of the consequences of his default, he must prove sufficient cause. Reading the entire sentence, the cumulative  effect thereof  unmistakably is that the Act includes even  a single  default and  that is why instead of using the  word ’default’,  the  word  ’regularly  has  been employed which is immediately followed by the words ’without sufficient cause’. If the legislature intended that a single default would  not entitle  a landlord  to eject  the tenant under the  Act, then  it would have said so expressly either by way  of an  explanation or otherwise in clause (ii) of s. 9(1) of the Act.                                                   [1013 C-F]      6. While  the Explanation  to section  9(1) of  the Act takes care  to define as to when a tenant would be deemed to be in  arrears and  fixes a  period of two months, indeed if the intention  of the  legislature was that a single default in payment  of  rent  could  be  condoned,  it  should  have included  this   incident  also  in  the  explanation.  This provides   therefore,    the   most    important   intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation of clause (ii) of section 9(1) of the Act.                                                   [1014 A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1270 & 1317-1319 of 1970.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  5-2-1970  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court in  L. P.  A. Nos.  96-99 of 1966.      Kapil Sibal,  J. B.  Dadachanji and Shri Narain for the Appellant.      S. Manchanda,  Mrs.  Shobha  Dikshit  and  Mrs.  Urmila Kapoor for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI, J.-These appeals by certificate are directed against a  Common judgment  dated February  5, 1970  of  the Punjab and  Haryana High  Court by  which a  Letters  Patent Appeal against a decision of the Single Judge was dismissed.      The facts  of the  case lie within a narrow compass and

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all the appeals involve a short point of law relating to the interpretation of s.9 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ’Act’).  The history of the case has been detailed in the judgment of the High Court  and it  is not  necessary for  us to  repeat the same. Shorn  of unnecessary details the appeals arose out of applications made by Pera Ram. Ganga Ram, Bhago and Kalu Ram who were  the tenants of agricultural land owned by Mrs. Raj Kanta, the  appellant in  these appeals.  The  tenants  made separate applications under s. 18 of the Act on September 4, 1961 for  purchasing the  land held  by them  from Mrs.  Raj Kanta  (hereinafter   called  the   ’land   owner’).   These applications were  allowed by  the  Assistant  Collector  on October 31, 1961. Accordingly, the tenants deposited the 1009 first instalment  in November 1961. Ultimately, however, the tenants did  not pay the rent of the respective holdings for Kharif 1961. It is common ground that the last date by which the rent  for Kharif  1961 was payable by the tenants to the land owner  was January 15, 1962 and that the tenant did not pay the rent and did not show sufficient cause for the same. In view  of the  default,  the  land  owner  filed  separate applications under s.9(1) (ii) of the Act on the ground that as the  tenants had failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause,  they were  entitled to  be ejected by the land owner.  The applications  for ejectment  were, however, dismissed but on appeal the Collector allowed the appeals by his order  dated May  31, 1962.  Second appeals preferred by the tenants  in the  ejectment proceedings were dismissed by an order  dated 5.11.62  of the  Commissioner and ultimately upheld by  the Financial  Commissioner by  his  Order  dated December 21, 1962.      Having failed  before the  Revenue courts, the tenants- respondents filed  a writ  petition in  the High Court which was heard by a Single Judge. But in the case of Kalu Ram the Financial Commissioner allowed the petition and rejected the prayer for  his ejectment  by the  land owner as a result of which the  land owner  filed a  writ petition  in  the  High Court.  All   the  petitions  were  consolidated  and  heard together, by  the single Judge who allowed the writ petition of the  tenants and  quashed  the  order  of  the  Financial Commissioner directing  ejectment of  the tenants.  The writ petition of  the land  owner against  Kalu Ram was, however, dismissed. Hence,  the  four  appeals  by  the  land  owner- appellant in this Court.      The only  point that has been canvassed before us is as to whether  or not  the High Court was right in interpreting s.9 of  the Act by holding that the term ’regularly’ used in s.9(1) (ii)  would not  include a  single default. While the Revenue courts  had held that the mere fact that the tenants made a  single default  in payment  for the  rent for Kharif 1961 was  sufficient to  attract the  penalty  of  ejectment envisaged by  s. 9(1)  (ii) of  the Act, the High Court took the view  that  on  a  proper  interpretation  of  the  term ’regularly’ it  will appear  that the  legislature  did  not contemplate that  ejectment should  be ordered  straightaway even if  a single  default, though unexplained, is committed by the  tenant which  interpretation would  run against  the avowed object  of the  legislation which  was to advance and ameliorate the  lot of  the  tenants.  The  High  Court  had considered the matter at very great length and placed a very wide interpretation  on the  term ’regularly’  so as  not to include within  its ambit  one single  default. It  has also referred to a number of authorities and Dictionaries to 1010

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show that  the  word  ’regularly’  does  not  mean  absolute symmetry. Having  gone through the reasons given by the High Court we  are unable  to agree with the view taken either by the single  Judge or  the Division  Bench of the High Court. There can  be no  doubt that  the Act  is a  piece of social legislation meant  to ameliorate  the lot of the tenants and to further  the rights  of the tenants by conferring on them the status  of a permanent tenancy or the rights to purchase the land  on payment  of instalments.  At the  same time, we cannot overlook  the fact  that the  landlords within a very limited sphere  have been  assured protection  in respect of the rights  which they  possess in  the land  and have  been given the  right to  eject the  tenants on specified grounds which are  contained in  the various  sub-clauses of s. 9 of the Act.  One such sub-clause is sub-clause (ii) which falls for interpretation in the instant case. Section 9(1) as also clauses (i) and (ii) may be extracted thus:-           "9. Liability of tenant to be ejected:-      1.   Notwithstanding anything  contained in  any  other      law for the time being in force, no land-owner shall be      competent to eject a tenant except when such tenant-           (i)  is a  tenant on  the area reserved under this                Act or  is a  tenant of  a small  land-owner;                (or)           (ii) fails   to   pay   rent   regularly   without                sufficient cause; ..  ..  .."      While interpreting  the word ’regularly’ the High Court seems to have overlooked two important circumstances. In the first place,  the word ’regularly’ has been used immediately after the  phrase ’fails to pay rent’ and is followed by the words ’without sufficient cause’. Secondly, there is nothing in the  section to indicate that the legislature intended to exclude one  single default.  The High  Court  attempted  to supply words to the section which are not there. In doing so it has  failed to consider that if once the court was to lay down a  particular line  of  demarcation  by  extending  the connotation of  the word ’regularly’ to exclude one default, it is  difficult to explain why the legislature contemplated only one default and not two or three for that matter.      In order  to construe the plain language of s.9(1) (ii) which admits of no ambiguity, it may be necessary to look to the object  and the  purposes of  the Act.  In the  case  of Bhagirath Ram  Chand v.  State of Punjab & Ors. a full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the Preamble of the Act  stated that  it was  intended to  provide  for  the security of land tenure and other incidental matters. It 1011 is no  doubt true  that the main thrust of the provisions of the Act  are directed  towards preventing the landlords from ejecting their  tenants except  on the  grounds mentioned in s.9, but  at the  same time,  it cannot  be denied  that the legislature undoubtedly  provided  some  protection  to  the landlords by  conferring on  them a  limited right  to eject their tenants  and within this limited sphere, the right was absolute and  could not  be curtailed by interpreting clause (ii) of s. 9(1) of the Act through a process of twisting the law and  doing violence  to the  language of the section. To begin with,  the word  ’regular’ is  derived form  the  word ’regula’ which  means ’rule’  and its  first and  legitimate signification, according  to Webster,  is ’conformable  to a rule,  or   agreeable  to   an  established  rule,  law,  or principle, to  a prescribed mode. In Words and Phrases (Vol. 36A, p.241)  the word  ’regular’ has been defined as ’steady or uniform  in course,  practice or  occurrence,  etc.,  and implies conformity  to a  rule, standard, or pattern’. It is

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further stated  in the said Book that ’regular’ means steady or uniform  in course,  practice, or occurrence; not subject to unexplained  or irrational  variation. The word ’regular’ means in  a regular  manner,  methodically,  in  due  order. Similarly, Webster’s  New World Dictionary defines ’regular’ as ’consistent or habitual in action, not changing, uniform, conforming to  a standard or to a generally accepted rule or mode of conduct:      In the  case of  Arab Bank Ld. v. Ross while construing the words  ’complete and  regular’,  Romer  LJ  observed  as follows:-           "It wold  accordingly follow,  in my  judgment, in      the  present   case  that  the  omission  of  the  word      "company" from  the endorsement  would reasonably  give      rise to  a doubt  whether in  point of  personality the      payees and the indorsers were necessarily the same; and      if so  the bills  cannot, as  I think,  be said  to  be      "complete and regular" on their face." The view  of the  Judge  clearly  indicates  that  the  word ’regular’ postulates  a state  of symmetry,  consistency and uniformity.  In  Hammond  v.  London  County  Council  while construing  the   term  "regularly   employed",  Farwell  J. observed as follows:-           "It is  of course  a question of fact in each case      whether a  man was  regularly employed  or not,  but in      this particular  case I  think that  the plaintiff, who      was employed  for the five years and paid his wages day      in and  day out  during that  period as  a  servant  or      officer of the defendants’ predecessors, was "regularly      employed" during that period." 1012 This interpretation  also supports  our view  that the  word ’regular’ means  a consistent  course of conduct without any break or breach.      On a  consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it seems  to us that the legislature clearly intended to use the word  ’regularly’ to  mean payment  of rent in a uniform and consistent  manner without  any breach  or default.  The legislature never  contemplated that  a single default could be condoned.  This  inference  is  fortified  by  the  words "without sufficient  cause". In other words, the legislature clearly provided that if the tenant had committed a default, whether one, two or more, the same could only be condoned if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise. If, however, we accept the  interpretation of the High Court, then the words "sufficient cause" becomes, absolutely redundant.      On an  overall consideration  of the  matter, a correct interpretation of  the plain  language  and  the  words  and phrases used in clause (ii) of s.9(1) of the Act seems to us that the  word ’regular’  connotes a  consistent  course  of conduct without  any break  or breach and the words ’regular payment  of   rent’  mean  that  the  rent  should  be  paid punctually without  any default  or laxity. Although the Act is heavily  loaded in favour of the rights of the tenants so as  to   confer  on  them  several  important  benefits  and privileges yet  as the Act is confiscatory in nature, so far as the landlord is concerned it should be strictly construed within the  limited  sphere  inasmuch  as  the  landlord  is conferred limited  grounds on which ejectment is permissible under s.9  of the Act which appears to be a safety valve for the limited rights that are left with the landlord under the Act. In  order therefore to advance the object of the Act so as to  assure the  limited protection  to the  landlord, the language employed  in the  various clauses of s. 9 has to be construed so  as to give real benefit to the landlord within

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the limited  range that the section operates. In the instant case, the  words ’failure  to  pay  rent  regularly  without sufficient cause’ postulate the following conditions:-           (1)  there must  be a  failure on  the part of the                tenant to pay rent;           (2)  such failure  must be  to pay rent regularly,                that is  to say,  the  rent  should  be  paid                punctually consistently  without any break or                breach;           (3)  if there  is any  default ranging from one to                several,  the   tenant  has   got   to   show                sufficient cause  if his  case is to be taken                out of the mischief of s. 9(1) (ii). 1013      We might  add at the risk of repetition that the use of the words  ‘without sufficient cause’ clearly indicates that the intention of the legislature was that in order to escape ejectment, the tenant must at least be regular in payment of the rent  and if  he wants to get rid of the consequences of his default, he must prove sufficient cause. If, however, we construe  the   word  ‘regularly’   as  meaning  at  regular intervals so  as to  include a single default, then the term ‘without sufficient cause’ becomes absolutely redundant. For instance, even  if a  single default  in the  payment of the rent is committed by the tenant, his case could be taken out of the  ambit of clause (ii) of s. 9(1) without insisting on the  tenant  to  prove  sufficient  cause  for  this  single default. That  would, therefore,  make the words ‘sufficient cause’ meaningless  in such  cases. It  is well settled that the legislature  does not waste words and every word that is used by  it must  be presumed to have some significance. The function of the Court, says Sir Fracis Bacon, is "jus decere and not  jus dare" (to interpret the law and not to make the law). The  Court cannot,  therefore, in order to promote its social philosophy  turn and  twist the plain and unambiguous language of  the law  so as  to  ascribe  to  it  a  meaning different from  the one  intended by the legislature. We are constrained to  observe, with due respect, that this is what the High Court seems to have done in this case by adopting a puerile  and   pedantic  process   of  reasoning.  In  these circumstances, reading  the entire  sentence, the cumulative effect thereof  unmistakably is that the Act includes even a single default  and that  is why  instead of  using the word ‘default’ the  word ‘regularly’  has been  employed which is immediately  followed   by  the  words  ‘without  sufficient cause’. Moreover,  we might mention that in the various Rent Acts passed  in the States, ejectment is permissible in some cases where  there is a single default, in other cases where there is more than one default and so on. If the legislature intended that  a single default would not entitle a landlord to eject  the tenant  under the Act, then it would have said so expressly either by way of an explanation or otherwise in clause (ii)  of s.  9(1) of the Act. Finally, we cannot lose sight of  the explanation used for the various clauses of s. 9(1) which runs thus :           "Explanation.-For the  purposes of clause (iii), a      tenant shall  be deemed to be in arrears of rent at the      commencement of  this  Act,  only  if  the  payment  of      arrears is  not made  by the  tenant within a period of      two months  from the date of notice of the execution of      decree or  order, directing  him to pay such arrears of      rent."      While the explanation takes care to define as to when a tenant would  be deemed  to be in arrears and fixes a period of two months,

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1014 indeed if the intention of the legislature was that a single default in payment of rent could be condoned, it should have included  this   incident  also  in  the  explanation.  This provides,   therefore,    the   most   important   intrinsic circumstance to support the interpretation which we have put on clause  (ii) of  s.9(1) of  the Act and which invalidates the reasons given by the High Court.      For the  reasons given above, we are satisfied that the High Court  took an  erroneous view  of law  in interpreting clause (ii)  of s.  9(1) of the Act as the tenants have been proved, in  this case,  to have  committed  default  in  the payment of  rent for  Kharif 1961, they must be held to have failed to pay the rent regularly without sufficient cause as envisaged  by   clause  (ii)  and  are,  therefore,  legally entitled to  ejectment. The  view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous  and cannot  be supported. In Civil Appeal No. 1319  of 1970,  an objection  was taken by the appellant that the appeal had abated as the heirs of respondent No. 1, Ganga Ram,  were not  brought on  record. This objection has been overruled  and we  have allowed substitution as per our separate order dated 28th April 1980. The result is that the appeals are  allowed, the  judgment of the High Court is set aside and  the order of the Collector directing ejectment of the tenants is restored. The writ petitions filed by tenants before the  High Court  stand dismissed and the one filed by the appellant  against  Kalu  Ram  stands  allowed.  In  the circumstances of  the case,  there will  be no  order as  to costs. S. R.                                       Appeals allowed. 1015