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PETITIONER: RAILWAY BOARD, REPRESENTING THE UNION OFINDIA, NEW DELHI AND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NIRANJAN SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/02/1969

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  966            1969 SCR  (3) 548  1969 SCC  (1) 502  CITATOR INFO :  D          1972 SC1792  (14)  RF         1972 SC1975  (9)  R          1973 SC  87  (32)  F          1975 SC2151  (22)  F          1989 SC1185  (25)  RF         1989 SC1854  (20)

ACT: Constitution  of  India,  Art.  226-Whether  High  Court  in exercise  of  certiorari  jurisdiction  can  interfere  with finding  of disciplinary authority-Art. 19(1) (a),  (b)  (c) and   (3)-If   violated  by  General  Manager   of   Railway prohibiting meetings of employees on Railway premises. Removal-Order  of-Based on a number of grounds of which  one not sustainable-If order liable to be struck down.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  was a permanent employee  of  the  Northern Railway  and  was served with a charge  sheet  in  November, 1956,  which  levelled  two charges  against  him.   He  was accused of having been instrumental in compelling the  shut- down  of  an  air  compressor and,  in  contravention  of  a direction given by the General Manager, Northern Railway, on June  19,  1956, of having addressed a  number  of  meetings within  the  Railway premises.  An enquiry  committee  after investigating  the charges came to the’ conclusion that  the respondent  was not proved beyond all reasonable  doubt  but that  the ’respondent was guilty of the second charge.   The General  Manager, who was the disciplinary authority,  after examining the report of the committee, accepted its findings on  the second charge but differing from its  conclusion  on the first charge tentatively came to the conclusion that the respondent  was  guilty of that charge as well.   After  the issue  of  a  show-cause notice to the  respondent  and  the ’rejection of his explanation, the General Manager directed, by  an  order  of August 20, 1957, that  the  respondent  be removed from service. The  respondent  challenged the order of his removal by  a writ petition.  The petition was allowed and an appeal to  a Division Bench was dismissed. The questions for decision  in

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the appeal to this Court were (i) whether the High Court was within its jurisdiction in the exercise of its powers  under Art.  226  of the Constitution to set aside  the  conclusion reached  by  the General Manager on the first  charge;  (ii) whether the appellate court was right in its view that if an order  of removal is based on number of grounds and  one  or more  of  those grounds are found to be  unsustainable,  the order  is  liable to be struck down; and (iii)  whether  the direction issued by the General Manager on June 19, 1956 was violative of Art. 19(1) (a) to (c) and (3). It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the  rights guaranteed  under Art. 19(1) (a), (b) & (c)  are  inviolable and they cannot be interfered with except in accordance with sub-articles  2, 3 & 4 of Art. 19; that the Railway  workers had  a right to assembly in any place they chose  and  could express  their views so long they did not disturb  the  work going on in the premises. HELD : Allowing the appeal and dismissing the writ  petition : (i) The High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the General Manager on the first charge.  It was open to the General Manager to accept the evidence which the, Enquiry Committee had rejected on the first charge  and he was not bound by the conclusions reached by the corn- 549 mittee. On  the facts in the present case it could not  be said that the finding ofthe disciplinary authority was  not supported  by  any  evidence nor could it be  said  that  no reasonable person could have reached such a finding.   Hence the  conclusion reached by the disciplinary  authority  must prevail and the High Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction could not have interfered with its  conclusion. [552 A-C] Union  of  India v. H. C.  Goel, [1964] 4 S.C.R.  718;  Syed Yakoob v. K.   S.  Radhakrishnan & Ors., [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64; relied on. (ii)There   was  no  force  in  the  contention  that   the punishment  imposed  could not be sustained if it  was  held that  one  of the two charges on the basis of which  it  was imposed,  was  unsustainable.  If the order  in  an  enquiry under   Art.  311  can  be  supported  on  any  finding   as substantial  misdemeanor for which the punishment    imposed can  lawfully be impose it is not for the Court to  consider whether  that  ground  alone would  have  weighed  with  the authority in imposing the punishment in question [552 G] State  of  Orissa v. Bidyabhan Mohapatra, [1962]  Suppl.   1 S.C.R. 648; followed. (iii)The  General Manager’s direction  prohibiting  the holding  of  meetings within the Railway  premises  was  not violative of Art. 19(1). The  Northern  Railway  was the owner  of  the  premises  in question and was entitled to enjoy its property in the  same manner  as  any  private individual  subject  to  only  such restriction  as  the law or the usage, may  place  on  them. There is no ’fundamental right for any one to hold  meetings in  Government  premises.  Freedom of  speech,  freedom,  to assemble peacefully and the freedom to form Associations  or Unions  does not mean that these rights can be exercised  by the citizens in whatever place they please.  The exercise of those  freedoms will come to an end as soon as the right  of some  one  else  to hold his property  intervenes.   Such  a limitation is inherent in the exercise of those rights.  The validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the tests prescribed by Sub-Arts. (2) and (3) of Art. 19. [554 D] Marsh  v. Alabama, 90 Law Edn.  P. 265, Tucker v.  State  of Texas. 90 Law Edn. p. 274); distinguished.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1206 of 1966. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated, January 14,  1963 of  the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.  36-D of 1962. G.  R.  Rajagopaul, A. S. Nanbiar and s. P. Nayar,  for  the appellants. R. K.  Garg and S. C. Agarwal, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde,  J This appeal was brought after obtaining  from  the High Court a certificate under Art. 132 and 133(1)(c) of the Constitution  before  formulating  the  points  arising  for decision,  it would be convenient to set out  the  necessary facts. 550 The respondent was holding a permanent post in the  Northern Railway.  He was a Trade Union worker.  On November 7,  1956 a  charge-sheet  was  served on him  levelling  two  charges against  him.   Under the first charge, he  was  accused  of having  been instrumental in compelling the  air  compressor being  shut down at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956.   Under the  second charge he was accused of having contravened  the direction given by the General Manager, Northern Railway  as per  his  letter  No. 961/E/O(Evi) dated June  19,  1956  by addressing meetings with in the railway premises on June 23, 1956,  June 25, 1956, July 24, 1956, July 25, 1956 and  July 27, 1956.  On these charges he was called upon to show-cause why he should not be removed from service under Rule 1708 of the  Indian Railway Establishment Code Vol.  1  or  punished with  any  lesser penalties specified in Rule  1702.   After receiving his explanation an enquiry committee consisting of three  officers was appointed to enquire into  the  charges. The  said  committee came to the conclusion that  the  first charge was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt but he was guilty  of  the second,charge.  The  Disciplinary  Authority i.e.  the  General  Manager remitted the case  back  to  the enquiry  committee  for  submitting  a  fresh  report  after examining the witnesses mentioned in his order.  Even  after examining  those witnesses the enquiry committee adhered  to its earlier conclusions.  After examining the reports of the enquiry  committee, the General Manager as per his order  of May  25, 1957 accepted its finding on the second charge  but differing   from  its  conclusion  on  the   first   charge- tentatively  came to the conclusion that the respondent  was guilty  of  that  charge as well.  As a  result  thereof  he ordered  the issue of ’a notice to the respondent  to  show- cause  why  he  should not be  removed  from  service.   The respondent  submitted  his  exPlanation  to  the  show-cause notice.  The General Manager did not accept his  explanation and  by his order of August 20, 1957 be ,directed  that  the respondent   be  removed  from  service.    The   respondent challenged that decision before the High Court of Punjab  by means of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The  single judge of the High Court who heard  the  petition opined that the General Manager was not right in holding  on the material on record that the first charge is  established and on the second charge he held that the General  Manager’s direction  as  per his letter of June 19, 1956  is  void  as being  violative  of  Art. 19(1) of  the  Constitution.   On appeal  the  appellate court upheld the  conclusion  of  the learned  single judge on the first charge but it was  unable to accept his finding that the order of the General  Manager

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of  June  19,  1956  was violative  of  Art.  19(1)  of  the Constitution.   AR the same it affirmed the decision of  the learned single judge with these observations               "It is by now a generally recognised principle               that  where  an  order such  as  an  order of               detention or removal               551               from service is based on a number of  grounds,               and one or more of these grounds disappear  it               becomes difficult to uphold the order when  it               is  not clear to what extent it was  based  on               the ground found to be bad." The  findings  of the learned single judge as  well  as  the judges  of the appellate court were challenged before us  by the appellant.  It was urged on its behalf that the  finding of  the General Manager on the first charge being a  finding of fact, the same not having been held either not  supported by any evidence. or as perverse, it was not open to the High Court to review the evidence afresh and come to a conclusion of  its  own.  It was further urged on its behalf  that  the opinion  of the Appellate Court that if one of  the  several charges  on  the basis of which a punishment is  imposed  is held  to be unsustainable, the punishment imposed should  be set  aside  as  it is not known  whether  the  authority  in question would have imposed the impugned punishment  without that charge having been established, does not represent  the correct  legal  position as expounded by  this  Court.   The learned  Counsel for the respondent not only  supported  the conclusions  of  the  appellate  court,  he  also   strongly commended  for  our acceptance the finding- of  the  learned single  judge that General Manager’s direction contained  in his letter- of June 19, 1956 was violative of Art. 19(1) (a) to (c). The questions that arise for decision in this appeal are (1) whether  the High Court was within its jurisdiction  in  the exercise of its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution to set  aside the conclusion reached by the General Manager  on the  first charge, (2) whether the direction issued  by  the General Manager on June 19, 1956 is violative of Art.  19(1) a  to (c) and (3) whether the appellate court was  right  in its  view that if an order of removal is based on number  of grounds  and  one or more of those grounds are found  to  be unsustainable, the order is liable to be struck down. Now coming to the first charge, we may first set out the un- disputed  facts.   On May 31, 1956, the Union of  which  the respondent  was the Vice-President declared a token  strike. The strike in question was declared by the respondent and he took  a leading part in it.  During the time of  the  strike the  compressor was not worked.  The enquiry committee  came to the conclusion and that conclusion was neither challenged before  the  High  Court  nor before  this  Court  that  the compressor  driver must have started the compressor  in  the East Compressor House at 8-00 hrs. and there must have  been certain  circumstances which made the driver to shut it  off at 8-15 hrs.  The only question for decision is whether  the respondent  was responsible for shutting it off.   Two  wit- nesses namely Subrati, the compressor Driver and  Rameshwar, his  Assistant  emphatically  stated-  before  the   enquiry committee 552 that  it was the respondent who led a group of strikers  and compelled  them to close down the compressor.   The  enquiry committee felt that their evidence cannot be accepted at its face value as they were not able to name any other person in the  group.  But the General Manager did not agree with  the

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enquiry  on that point.  He fully accepted: their  evidence. It  was  open to the General Manager to do so.  He  was  not bound  by the conclusions reached by the enquiry  committee, see  Union  of India v. H. C. Goel(1).  This is not  a  case where  it can be said that the finding of  the  Disciplinary Authority  is  not supported by any evidence nor can  it  be said  that  no reasonable person could have reached  such  a finding.   Hence the conclusion reached by the  Disciplinary Authority should prevail and the High Court in the  exercise of  its  Certiorari jurisdiction could not  have  interfered with its conclusion, see Syed Yakoob v. K. S.  Radhakrishnan and Ors.(2). It was next contended that in arriving at his conclusion  on the  first  charge  the General Manager had  relied  on  the hearsay evidence given by De Mellow and hence his conclusion is vitiated.  The evidence of the witnesses examined  during the  enquiry is not before us.  Hence it is not possible  to accept the contention that De Mellow’s evidence was hearsay. In  this  view it is not necessary to go into  the  question whether  hearsay  evidence  can be relied ow at  all  in  an enquiry  under Art. 311 and if so within what limits.   Some of the inferences drawn by the General Manager were objected to  by the learned Counsel for the respondent.  They  appear to be inferences of fact, evidently drawn from the  material before  him and as such cannot be properly objected to.   It Was open to him to draw those inferences. For  the  reasons mentioned above, we hold  that  the$  High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the finding of the General Manager on the first charge. Before  we take up for consideration point No. 2  formulated above,  it would be convenient to deal with point No. 3.  It was  not disputed before us that the first  charge  levelled against the respondent is a serious charge and it would have been  appropriate  for  the General Manager  to  remove  the respondent from service on the basis of his finding on  that charge.   But  we were told that we cannot assume  that  the General Manager would have inflicted that punishment  solely on  the  basis  of that charge and  consequently  we  cannot sustain  the punishment imposed if we hold that one  of  the two  charges  on  the  basis of  which  it  was  imposed  is unsustainable.   This contention cannot be accepted in  view of  the  decision  of  this Court  in  State  of  Orissa  v. Bidyabhan Mohapatra(3) wherein it was held that if the order in an enquiry under Art. 311 can be supported on any finding as substantial mis-                                      (2)[1964] 5 S.C.R. 64. (1)  [1964] 4 S.C.R. 718. (3) [1962] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 648.                             553 demeanour  for which the punishment imposed can lawfully  be unposed  it  is not for the Court to consider  whether  that ground  alone  would  have’ weighed with  the  authority  in imposing the punishment in question. Now  we come to the second charge.  In order to examine  the contentions  of  Mr.  Garg,  the  learned  Counsel  for  the respondent relatingto  that charge, it is necessary to  set out the circular issued by theGeneral  Manager on  June 19, 1956.  That was a circular issuedto all the heads  of the departments.  It reads :               "It  has  been  brought to notice  that  in  a               number  of cases railway employees  have  held               meetings  inside  railway  premises  such   as               inside  workshops,  inside stores  depots  and               within  office compounds.  It may  be  pointed               out   that   this   practice   is    extremely

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             objectionable and has to be stopped forthwith.               AR staff may be warned that if any one of them               is  found  organising or attending  a  meeting               inside railway premises or at places of  work,               he  will  render  himself  liable  to   severe               disciplinary action as such action on his part               will  amount  to  misconduct  arising  out  of               violation   of  administrative   instructions.               Meetings  of  workers  can  be  held  on  open               grounds  away’  from places of work  with  the               permission   of   the   railway    authorities               concerned  if  such open grounds  fall  within               railway boundary.               You  are  to  note  these  instructions   very               carefully   and   to   ensure   their   strict               compliance in future.               Please acknowledge receipt." The direction with which we are concerned in this appeal  is that  which  prohibits the holding of  meetings  within  the railway  premises  including open grounds  forming  part  of those  premises.   That  direction  does  not  deprive.  the workers  any of the freedoms guaranteed to  them  under-Art. 19(1).  It merely prohibits them   from  exercising  any  of them within the railway premises. What is    prohibited   is the holding of meetings for any purpose within thethe railway  premises. The question is whether such a  direction is violative-of Art. 19(1) ?  In the instant casewe     are concerned  with  the  meetings held outside  the  main  time office and it was not denied that that place formed part  of the railway premises. It  was strenuously urged on behalf of the  respondent  that the rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (a), (b) and (c)  are inviolable  and they cannot be interfered with excepting  in accordance  with  sub-Arts.  2, 3 and 4  of  the  said  Art. According  to Mr. Garg the railway workers have a  right  to assemble  in  any place they choose and give  expression  to their views so long as they do not disturb the work going on in  the premises and that right is guaranteed to them  under our Constitution. 554 It  was not disputed that the Northern Railway is the  owner of  the  premises  in question.  The fact  that  the  Indian Railways are State Undertakings does not affect their  right to enjoy their properties in the same manner as any  private individual  may do subject only to such restrictions as  the law or the usage may place on the.  Hence unless it is shown that  either under law or because of some usage the  railway servants  have  a right to hold their  meetings  in  railway premises,  we  see no basis for objecting to  the  direction given by the General Manager.  There is no fundamental right for  anyone to hold meetings in government premises.  If  it is otherwise there is bound to be chaos in our offices.  The fact  that  those who work in a public office can  go  there does  not confer on them the right of holding a  meeting  at that  office even if it be the, most convenient place to  do so. It   is  true  that  the  freedoms  guaranteed   under   our Constitution are very valuable freedoms and this Court would resist  abridging the ambit of those freedoms except to  the extent  permitted  by the Constitution.  The fact  that  the citizens of this country have freedom of speech, freedom  to assemble  peaceably  and freedom to  form-  associations  or unions  does not mean that they can exercise those  freedoms in  whatever  place  they please.   The  exercise  of  those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the ’right of  some-

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one else to hold his property intervenes.  Such a limitation is inherent in the exercise of those ’rights.  The  validity of  that  limitation  is  not to  be  judged  by  the  tests prescribed  by Sub-Arts. (2) and (3) of Art. 19.   In  other words  the  contents of the freedoms guaranteed  under  cls. (a),  (b)  and  (c), the only freedoms  with  which  we  are concerned  in  this  appeal,.do not  include  the  right  to exercise them in the properties belonging to others.  If Mr. Garg  is  right in his contentions then a  citizen  of  this country in the exercise of his right under cls. (d) and  (e) of Art. 19(1) could move about freely in a public-office  or even  reside  there unless there exists  some  law  imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights. In support of his contention Mr. Garg strongly relied on the decisions  of the Supreme Court of United States of  America in  Marsh  v.  Alabama(1) and Tucker v.  State  of  Texas(2) Tucker’s case was decided on the basis of the rule laid down in  Marsh’s case.  Hence it is not necessary to consider  it separately.   In  Marsh’s case the Supreme Court  laid  down that the constitutional ,guarantees of freedoms of press and of  religion  precludes  the  enforcement  against  one  who undertook to distribute religious literature on a street  of a  company-owned town, contrary to the wishes of the  town’s management, of a state statute making it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been (1) 90, Law ed. p. 265. (2) 90, Law ecd. p. 274. 555 warned not to, do so.  In order to appreciate this  decision it is necessary to  bear in mind the facts of the  case. The appellant thereinwas  a  Jehovahs Witness  who  came into the sidewalk of a privatetown  situate  near   the post   office   and  undertook   to   distribute   religious literature.   In  the  store the corporation  had  posted  a notice which read as follows:-               "This Is Private Property and Without  Written               Permission, No Street, or House Vendor,  Agent               or   Solicitation   of  Any   Kind   Will   Be               Permitted." The appellant was warned that she should not distribute  the literature without a permit and told that no permit would be issued  to her.  She protested that the company  rule  could not  be constitutionally applied so as to prohibit her  from distributing  religious  writings. )When she  was  asked  to leave the sidewalk and Chicka-saw she declined.  The  deputy sheriff arrested her and she was charged in the state  court for violating the law.  The town in question is described in the judgment thus:               "The town, a suburb of Mobile, Alabama,. known               as  Chicka-saw,  is  owned by  the  Gulf  Ship               building Corporation.  Except for that it  has               all the characteristics of any other  American               town.   The property consists  of  residential               buildings,  streets, a system of "  sewers,  a               sewage disposal plant and a "business block on               which business places are situated.. A  deputy               of  the  Mobile County Sheriff,  paid  by  the               company,  serves  as  the  town’s   policeman.               Merchants  and  service  establishments   have               rented  the stores and business places on  the               business block and the United States uses  one               of the places as a post office from which  six               carriers   deliver  mail  to  the  people   of               Chickasaw and the adjacent area.  The town and               the surrounding neighborhood, which cannot  be

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             distinguished from the gulf property by anyone               not  familiar  with the  property  lines,  are               thickly   settled,   and  according   to   all               indications  the  residents use  the  business               block as their regular shopping center.  To do               so,  they  now, as they have for  many  years,               make  use of a company-owned paved street  and               sidewalk located alongside the store fronts in               order  to enter and leave the stores  and  the               post office.  Intersecting company-owned roads               at each end of the business block lead into  a               four-lane  public highway which runs  parallel               to the business block at a distance of  thirty               feet.   There  is  nothing  to  stop   highway               traffic  from coming into the  business  block               and upon arrival a traveller may make free use               of  the facilities available there.  In  short               the   town  and  its  shopping  district   are               accessible to and freely used by the public in               general and there is nothing to distinguish               556               them  from any other town and shopping  centre               except the fact that the title to the property               belongs to a private corporation."               From  the above description it is  clear  that               the roads and sidewalks in that town had  been               dedicated  for  public  use.  It  is  in  that               context Justice Black observed:               "The  more an owner, for his advantage,  opens               up  his  property  for use by  the  public  in               general,  the  more  do  his  rights,,  become               circumscribed    by    the    statutory    and               constitutional rights of those who use it."               The learned Judge further observed :               "We  do  not think it-makes,  any  significant               constitutional    difference   as    to    the               relationship  between the rights of the  owner               and  those of the public that here the  State,               instead  of  permitting  the  corporation   to               operate  a  highway, permitted it to  use  its               property  as  a  , town  operate  a  ’business               block’ in, the town and a street and  sidewalk               on that business block. . . .               As  we  have heretofore stated,  the  town  of               Chickasaw  does not function differently  from               any  other town.  The "business block"  serves               as the community shopping centre and is freely               accessible and open to the people in the  area               and  those  passing  through.   The   managers               appointed  by the corporation  cannot  curtail               the  liberty  of press and religion  of  these               people  consistently with the purposes of  the               constitutional guarantees and a state statute,               as the one here involved, which enforces  such               action  by  criminally  punishing  those   who               attempt  to distribute  religious literature               clearly  violates  the  First  and  Fourteenth               Amendments to the Constitution." In  our opinion the rule laid down in Marsh’s case does  not apply to the facts of this case.  ’Me premises with which we are concerned in this appeal unlike the roads and  sidewalks of  Chickasaw  town  were not open for use  of  the  general public.   They  were intended for certain  specified  public purposes.   They  could not be used for  any  other  purpose except with the permission of the concerned authority.

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Neither the language of Art. 19(1) nor the purpose behind it lend  support to the contentions of Mr. Garg.  On the  other hand their acceptance might lead to the confusion in  public offices.  Hence we are unable to accept them. In  the result the appeal is allowed and the  writ  petition missed  but in the circumstances of the case we  direct  the parties to bear their own costs throughout. P.K.P.S.                                Appeal allowed. 557