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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8263 of 2001

PETITIONER: Rai Vimal Krishna & Ors.                                         

RESPONDENT: Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.    

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/07/2003

BENCH: Ruma Pal & B.N.Srikrishna.

JUDGMENT:

                                        J U D G M E N T

RUMA PAL, J      

This case relates to the assessment of the appellants’  holdings in Patna under the Patna Municipal Corporation Act,  1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act is  necessary before considering the facts of the case since the  appellants’ grievances are that the provisions of the Act have  not been followed in assessing the appellants’ properties to tax.

       The Act, which came into force on 15th August 1952, was  passed to consolidate and  amend the law relating to the  municipal affairs of the town and suburbs of Patna.  Section  123 of the Act allows the Corporation, with the previous  approval of the State Government, to impose various taxes and  fees.  We are concerned with clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section  123 which provide for the imposition of property tax, water tax  and latrine tax on holdings situated within Patna - the tax being  assessed on the annual letting value.  Section 130 provides  that the annual value of a holding shall be deemed to be the  gross annual rental at which the holding may reasonably be  expected to let.  This however is subject to rules that may be  prescribed by the State Government.  Any tax which is  assessed on the annual value of a holding, other than the  latrine  tax or drainage tax, is payable by the owner of the  holding within the Corporation.  The latrine or drainage tax is  payable by the persons in actual occupation of  such holdings.    (Section 132 (1), (2)).

Section 133 provides for the preparation of a Valuation  List in four stages: -- (I) determination to impose a tax to be  assessed on the annual value of holdings (II)  inquiry to be held  by the Chief Executive Officer (III) the determination of the  annual value of all holdings and (IV) the entry of the value in a  valuation list.  The percentage at which tax is payable is fixed  under section 136 by the Corporation on the basis of reports  submitted by the Chief Executive Officer and the Standing  Committee.  This relates to stage (I) of section 133.       For the  purposes of stage (II) the Chief Executive Officer may require  owners or occupiers, or both, of holdings to furnish him with  returns of the rent or annual value thereof and such other  particulars as he may require for the preparation of the  valuation list.  The Chief Executive Officer is also empowered to  inspect or cause any holding to be inspected and measured, if

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necessary,  after giving notice to the occupier.  (Section 134).               The preparation of the Assessment List follows  the Valuation  List.  This is done under section 137 which also sets out the  particulars which must be contained therein namely: (a)     the name of the street in which the  holding is situated.

(b)     the number of the holding on the  register;

(c)     a description of the holding;

(d)     the annual value of the holding;

(e)     the name of the owner and occupier;

(f)     the amount of tax payable for the year;

(g)     the amount of quarterly instalment; and

(h)     if the holding is exempted from  assessment, a notice to that effect.

 Both the Valuation and the Assessment Lists should  ordinarily be prepared once in every five years under section  138 (1).  In terms of the proviso to section 138 (1) "in between  the two general assessments, the State Government may, on  the recommendation of the Corporation, authorise it  to prepare  a fresh assessment list in respect of any specified area within  the Corporation".  Every valuation and assessment list is, under  Section 138(2), valid "from the date on which the list takes  effect in the Corporation and until the first day of the quarter  next following the completion of a new list".  This is subject to  any alteration which may be made under Section 139 and to  the result of any objection to the valuation or assessment by  any person under section 150.          The next relevant provision is section 149.  Since the main  plank of the appellants argument is based on this section it is  quoted verbatim:  "149. Publication of notice of assessment -  (1)  When the assessment list mentioned in  section 137 has been prepared or revised, the  Chief Executive Officer shall sign the same,  and shall give public notice, by beat of drum  and by playcards posted in conspicuous  places throughout Patna, or when any part of  Patna has been assessed, then in that part of  Patna, where the said list may be inspected.

(2)  The Chief Executive Officer shall also in  all cases in which any property is for the first  time assessed or the assessment is increased  give notice thereof to the owner of the  property."

This section envisages that the assessment list which has  been prepared or revised, must be signed by the Chief  Executive Officer.  After this the Chief Executive Officer is  required to give public notice of the Assessment List.  The  mode of giving public notice is "by beat of drum" and "by  placards", the latter of which is required to be posted in  conspicuous places throughout Patna.  It needs to be  emphasised that the section also provides for  assessment of a  part of Patna, in which case the placards are required to be  posted in conspicuous places in that part.  The object of the

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publication appears from the last part of sub section (1) of  section 149 and that is so that "the said list may be inspected".   We may mention here that the question which arises for  consideration in connection with this section is whether the  mode of giving public notice of the assessment list is mandatory  or directory.  According to the appellant the mode is mandatory.  They have sought to buttress their argument by referring to  section 150 which reads: "150. Application for review.- (1) Any person  who is dissatisfied with the amount assessed  upon him or the valuation or assessment of  any holding, or who disputes his occupation of  any holding, or his liability to be assessed,  may apply to the Chief Executive Officer or an  officer empowered in this behalf by the State  Government to review the amount of  assessment, or valuation, or to exempt him  from the assessment or tax.

(2)  All such applications containing objections  shall be made in writing within thirty days after  the publication of the notice referred to in sub- section (1) of section 149, or after receipt of  the notice referred to in sub-section (2) of that  section, if such notice is received after the  publication of the notice referred to in sub- section (1) of the said section.  

    Provided that the Chief Executive Officer  may, if he thinks fit extend the said period of  thirty days to a period not exceeding sixty  days".

        It is pointed out that the period of limitation for filing an  application for review under this section is computed from the  date of publication of the notice.  An owner gets an extended  period of limitation provided he receives the notice under sub  section (2) of section 149 after the publication.  Thus,   publication must take place.           If objections to the valuation and assessment lists are  filed under Section 150, they are required to be disposed of by  the Chief Executive Officer after giving the objector an  opportunity of being heard under section 151.  Sub-section (3)  of section 151 requires that when the objection has been  determined, an order passed on such objection shall be  recorded in the  register and, if necessary, an amendment  made in the assessment list in accordance with the order  passed on the objection.  This order of the Chief Executive  Officer may be appealed from by any person who is dissatisfied  with it, under section 152.  The appeal lies to the District Judge  whose decision under section 152 (1) "shall be final".  During  the pendency of the appeal, the tax payable in terms of the  order appealed against may be levied and realised.  However if  ultimately the District Judge decides in favour of the objector,   the chief executive officer "shall refund to the person from  whom the same has been levied or realised, the amount of  tax  or instalment, or the excess thereof over the amount properly  leviable in accordance with such final decision, as the case may  be, or adjust such excess amount against any future demand".          Every valuation made by the Chief Executive Officer   under section 153 is final subject to the provisions of sections  151 and 152.  In other words until and unless an order is  passed under section 151 (3) by the Chief Executive Officer or  under section 152 by the District Judge, the valuation made by

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the Chief Executive Officer must prevail.  Finally when the  objections have been determined, and appeals  disposed of,  the assessment list shall be authenticated by the Chief  Executive Officer in the manner specified.  The importance of  the authentication lies in the fact that under subsection (2) of  section 154, the assessment list shall be "conclusive evidence  of the amount of holding tax leviable on each holding within  Patna in the financial year to which the list relates".                    This, in brief, is an overview of the provisions which are  relevant for the disposal of this appeal.    The  undisputed factual situation is that an assessment  list was prepared for the year 1978 -- 79.  The appellants  objected to the assessment list under section 150.  The  objections were rejected by the Chief Executive Officer under  Section 151. The appellants preferred appeals before the  District Judge under section 152.  The appeals are pending.   During the pendency of the appeals, the Corporation has been  realising or at least seeking to realise the taxes  from the  appellants on the basis of the order of the Chief Executive  Officer.    With effect from 13th October 1993, in exercise of  powers conferred by section 227 read with sub-sections (1) and  (2) of section 130 of the Act, the Government  of Bihar made  the Assessment of Annual Rental Value Of Holding Rules, 1993  (hereinafter referred to as the Rules).  By the Rules, the method  of determining annual rental value in connection with each  holding separately was done away with.  Holdings in the  Corporation were classified on the basis of situation, use and  type of construction.  For the purpose of calculation of annual  rental value of holdings, the method was simplified so that it  was computable only on the measurement of the carpet area.   In addition  the percentage at which holding tax, water tax and  latrine  tax is to be levied, has also been specified.  After the   publication of the Rules, the Corporation issued two  notifications pursuant to Rules 3(2) and 5(1).  By the first  notification, the Corporation classified the several roads in  Patna city  into three categories.  It is not necessary for us to go  into details of this notification or the second notification which  was issued soon thereafter by the Corporation which specified  the rates of rental value per sq ft depending upon the situation,  use and nature of construction of the holdings.    These Rules  and the two notifications were the subject matter of challenge  under Article 226 before the High Court.  The Rules and the  notifications were struck down by the High Court as being  unconstitutional.  The decision of the High Court was reversed  by this Court in State of Bihar V. S.K.P. Sinha: (1995) 3  Supreme Court Cases 86.  This Court while upholding  the  constitutional validity of the Rules also upheld the two  notifications.   As a result of the 1993 Rules, the provisions of sections  130 and 136 are no longer relevant for our purposes as they  have laid down a different method of valuation and assessment.   There is no dispute that the Corporation followed the Rules and  the notifications issued thereunder in preparing Valuation and  Assessment Lists thereby revising the holding tax for the first  time since 1978-79.  However, the process was not  completed  in respect of the entire area covered by the Act at the same  time, but in three phases.  According to the Corporation, this  was because they were understaffed and were otherwise  administratively handicapped.  Three notices were published  under section 149 (1), not by way of "beat of drum" nor by  posting placards at conspicuous places, but by publication in  the newspapers.  Each of the three notices referred to separate

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areas of Patna and were dated 26 December 1993, 1st   October 1995 and 30th December 1995 respectively.  In  addition separate notices were issued to the owners of holdings  as and when the area in which a particular holding was situated  was notified.  The appellants also received notices under  section 149 (2).  In 1995, they filed objections under Section  150.  The objections have not yet been disposed of by the Chief  Executive Officer.  However, the Corporation has continued  to  realise tax from the owners  on the basis of the assessment list   as published. The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court in  which they claimed: first, that the provisions of sections 133,134  and 137 of the Act had not been followed by the Corporation in  the matter of preparation of the valuation and assessment list;  second, that publication of notice of assessment had not been  done in the manner prescribed by section 149 (1) of the Act;   third,  that the assessment list could not be prepared piecemeal  at different times for different properties in a discriminatory  manner and, fourth that the new rate of tax could take effect  only after the objections under section 150 had been decided  by the Chief Executive Officer.  They accordingly prayed, inter  alia, for a direction on the Corporation to prepare an  assessment list in accordance with the provisions of sections  133,137,138, 149,150,151 and other provisions of the Act and  to levy, assess and recover the tax only after the disposal of the  objections under section 150.  The appellants also sought the  quashing of notices dated 26th  December 1993, 1st  October  1995 and 30th December 1995. As far as the first submission was concerned, the High  Court rejected it saying, "â\200¦. It is not disputed that those steps  are now required to be taken as per provisions laid down in the  1993 Rules and such steps have been taken by the Corporation  accordingly".    The High Court accepted the second contention of the  appellants  that the mode of publication of the assessment list  prescribed under section 149 (1) of the Act was mandatory.   Nevertheless, since the appellants had admittedly received  notices under section 149 (2) and had filed applications for  review under section 150, the  High Court held "in the facts of  the case the irregularity in publication of notice under section  149 (1) of the Act is not of any consequence so far as the  petitioners are concerned, so as to warrant any interference in  the matter by this Court and at this stage."   The third submission was not accepted as  the High  Court held that section 149 (1) itself provided for area-wise  assessments in respect of parts of Patna.  The High Court also  accepted the explanation given by the Corporation that they  had given different publications for different areas since they  did not have sufficient working hands and because of other  administrative difficulties.  Further, it held that since there was  no allegation of any mala fides, "the action of the respondents  is saved in this case but keeping in view the spirit of Article 14  of the Constitution of  India in any view they would be well  advised to take prompt steps in advance so that a general  assessment for the entire area under the Corporation may be  made effective from one date".   The fourth submission of the appellants was not  considered.  However the High Court directed "the concerned  authority "to dispose of the petitioners’ applications  expeditiously and in any case within three months from the date  of production/communication of a copy of this order". Each of the four submissions made by the appellants  before the High Court have been reiterated before us.           The submission of the appellants that the Corporation  was bound to comply with the provisions of the Act for valuation

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and assessment before publishing the assessment list is  unacceptable in view of the promulgation of the 1993 Rules,  and the notifications issued thereunder, the validity of all of  which has been upheld by this Court.  It is not in dispute that  the valuations have been made and assessments have been  prepared strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed  by the 1993 Rules read with the two notifications. The next submission of the appellants that the  Corporation does not have the power to issue separate  assessment lists in respect of different kinds of properties in  different areas is also not tenable.  The 1993 Rules and the  notifications issued thereunder clearly provide for assessment  based on the localities as well as different kinds of properties,  classified according to its user and the type of construction.   Additionally, the proviso to section 138 (1) expressly indicates   that assessment lists may be prepared in respect of a specified  area within the Corporation. Finally, Section 149 sub-section (1)  itself shows that  assessment lists may be made in respect of  "any part of Patna". The decision of this Court in Shibji Khestshi Tacker v.  The Commissioner of Dhanbad Municipality and Others  1978 (2) SCC 167 has taken a similar view while interpreting  Section 106 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipalities Act, 1922  which has been replaced by Section 138 of the present Act.   Section 106 of the 1922 Act provided: "(1)  New Valuation and assessment list shall  ordinarily be prepared, in the same manner as  the original lists, once in every five years.

(2)  Subject to any alteration or amendment  made under Section 107 and to the result of  any application under Section 116, every  valuation and assessment entered in a  valuation or assessment list shall be valid  from the date on which the list takes effect in  the municipality and until the first day of the  April next following the completion of a new  list".

The owner of the particular  holding in that case had been  assessed to tax under an earlier assessment list.  In the  subsequent list, the holding had not been mentioned.  It was  contended that since  assessment lists have to be prepared  once in every five years, the owner could not be assessed to  tax on the basis of the old assessment list.  It was also  contended that only one assessment list could be prepared in  respect of the entire area covered by the 1922 Act.  The  submission was rejected by this Court  holding that the owner  continued to be liable under the earlier list and that: "The language of Section 106 is flexible  enough to enable the Commissioners to leave  out for some good reason, any holding from  the revision of the valuation and assessment  lists.  The word ’ordinarily’ tones down the  force of ’shall’ which immediately precedes it,  and indicates that the requirements with  regard to revision of the assessment in every  five years and to include all the holdings, are  not absolute but only directory and can be  departed from in extraordinary circumstances,  or in the case of particular holdings for good  reasons.  This being the correct import of the  word ’ordinarily’, it follows therefrom that in the  case of a holding which is excluded from the

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quinquennial revision of assessment, the old  valuation and assessment lists do not lapse  but continue to remain in force till they are  altered or amended in accordance with the  procedure laid down in the Act.  This position  of the law is clear from a reading of the last  clause of sub-section (2) of Section 106,  which provides that every valuation and  assessment entered in a valuation or   assessment list shall be valid from the date on  which the list takes effect in the municipality  and until the first day of April following the  completion of a new list.  The key word  repeatedly occurring in the sub-section is ’list’  which appears to have been advisedly used in  singular, in contradistinction to ’lists’ employed  in plural, in sub-section (2).  Such distinctive  use of the word ’list’ in these sub-sections,  puts it beyond doubt that in respect of a  holding which, for some reason is not included  in the five yearly revision, the old valuation or  assessment list continues till a new list is  completed and the 1st day of April following  such completion is reached."     

To put it differently, there could be several assessment  lists operating in respect of different holdings in the municipal  area.  The position has been clarified by the introduction of the  proviso to section 138(1) of the present Act, as we have already  noted.               The third submission of the appellants,  relates to the  mode of publication of the assessment lists.  That the mode of  publication is a procedural provision is self-evident.  But is it a  mandatory provision? The High Court’s finding as to the nature  of the provision for publication under sub section (1) of section  149 is somewhat contradictory.  While holding that the manner  of publication was mandatory and had to be complied with in  terms thereof, in a subsequent  portion of the judgment, it was  held that it was a mere irregularity which could be waived.  As  we read sub-section (1) of section  149, the Chief Executive  Officer is bound to give public notice of the assessment list.   The word "shall" makes that clear.  However the word "shall"  does not qualify the next phrase which is separated from the  words "public notice" by a comma. The phrase separated is "by  beat of drum and by placards posted in conspicuous places  throughout Patnaâ\200¦â\200¦â\200¦.. â\200¦". Generally speaking  the object of  giving a notice  is to draw the attention of the persons sought to  be affected to the matter notified.    The purpose of specifying a  particular mode of giving  notice is to raise a legal presumption  against such person of knowledge  of the subject of the notice.   In other words, once the mode specified for giving notice is  complied with, the onus is on the persons notified to prove that  they were not aware of the subject matter of the notice.  There  is otherwise no special sanctity given to the mode of service of  notice.  The appellants have contended that even though  owners were served with individual notices under section  149(2), unless publication was made in the manner provided in  section 149(1) the occupants who were liable to pay water tax  and latrine tax would be seriously affected and would not have  an opportunity of challenging the imposition of the tax on them.   Incidentally, in the objections filed by the appellants their  contention is that the holdings owned by them were not liable to  payment of latrine tax or water tax because neither of the  services were available.   However, the matter has to be  decided as a principle and not with reference to the appellants’

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case.             Nobody disputes that publication and the giving of notice  to persons likely to be affected by the assessment list is a must.  The appellants have admitted publication of the assessment  lists in three newspapers.  It is not their case that such  publication did not serve the purpose of notifying those who  might be affected by the assessment lists, of their existence.  Indeed it appears to us that the requirement to notify people by  beat of drum is an anachronism which appears to be  inappropriate in the present day and age in a large city like  Patna.  The High Court’s apprehension that "holding this  provision as directory is likely to cause confusion and mischief  in future and it is not for this Court to substitute the wisdom of  the legislature with its own by holding that notice by newspaper  will be sufficient in place of notice of the spot by beat of drum  and placards" is  unfounded both in law and in fact.  It is an  elementary principle of interpretation that words in statutory  provisions take their colour from their context and object,   keeping pace with the time when the word is being construed.   When or where no other means of effective publication is  available, no doubt, announcing the assessment list by beat of  drum and by displaying  placards would have to be complied  with.  Where equally efficacious,  if not better, modes of  publication are available, it would be ridiculous to insist on an  obsolete form of publication as if it were a ritual.  Had the High  Court found that publication by newspapers was not effective  enough to notify the public, the assessment list could not be  given effect to unless publication were properly made. There is  no such finding.  On the other hand publication through  newspapers  is  now  an  accepted   form  of  giving general  notice.   Therefore,  we  have  no  hesitation  in holding that the                

portion of section 149 (1) which deals with the manner of  publication, as opposed to the requirement for publication per  se, is directory.  Since there has been sufficient compliance in  effecting the intention of the legislature to give notice to the  public at large in the city of Patna, we cannot hold that the  assessment lists prepared on the basis of the 1993 Rules are  required to be set aside.         This view finds support from the decisions of this Court,  decisions which were, in our opinion, wrongly brushed aside by  the High Court.  In the Municipal Council, Khurai Vs Kamal  Kumar and another reported in (1965) 2 SCR. 653, on which  the High Court has relied, there was no publication of the notice  at all.  An assessment list had been prepared and published on  6 March 1963.  There were several objections lodged against  the assessment list.  The rate of assessment was however  subsequently revised.  On the basis of the revision, a  subcommittee appointed by the Municipal Council, considered  the objections and completed its revision.  The final list was  published.  There were further complaints.  The final list was  suspended.  The Municipal Council then decided to amend the  list.  This amendment was not published.  Nor was the final list  as amended published.  This Court held that as no opportunity  had been granted to the assessees to object to the   assessment lists as amended, the assessment list had not  been prepared in accordance with law.  The decision is  factually distinguishable. Since in that case there was no  publication at all, the Court was not called upon to consider the  question whether an alternative and equally effective mode of  publication would have sufficed. This in fact was the exact question which had been  decided by a bench of five judges in the case of Raza Buland  Sugar Co.Ltd.   Vs. Municipal Board, Rampur  reported in  1965 (1) SCR. 970.  In that case municipal water tax was

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sought to be levied under section 131 of the U. P. Municipalities  Act, 1916.  In terms of section 131 (3), the Municipal Board was  required to publish its proposal relating to the tax and the draft  Rules in connection therewith along with the notice in the  specified format. Section 94 (3) provided for the manner of  publication of the resolution of the municipal board.  The  method of publication prescribed was "in a local paper  published in Hindi and where there is no such local paper, in  such manner as the State Government may, by general or  special order, direct".  The publication was made in a local  paper published in Urdu.  Wanchoo, J., speaking for the  majority held that the provision for publication contained in  section 131 (3) was mandatory but the mode of publication  provided in section 94 (3) was not.  Therefore the publication in  an Urdu newspaper was held to be sufficient and in substantial  compliance with section 94 (3).  This conclusion was arrived at  despite the use of the word "shall" in section 94 (3).  This is  what the Court said: "The question whether a particular  provision of a statute which on the face  of it appears mandatory, inasmuch as it  uses the word "shall" â\200\223 as in the present  case â\200\223is merely directory cannot be  resolved by laying down any general  rule and depends upon the facts of each  case and for that purpose the object of  the statute in making the provision is the  determining factor.  The purpose for  which the provision has been made and  its nature, the intention of the legislature  in making the provision, the serious  general inconvenience or injustice to  persons resulting from whether the  provision is read one way or the other,  the relation of the particular provision to  other provisions dealing with the same  subject and other considerations which  may arise on the facts of a particular  case including the language of the  provision, have all to be taken into  account in arriving at the conclusion  whether a particular provision is  mandatory or directory.

â\200¦.. As we have said already the  essence of s. 131 (3) is that there  should be publication of the proposals  and draft rules so that the tax payers  have an opportunity of objecting to  them, and that is provided in what we  have called the first part of s.141(3); that  is mandatory.  But the manner of  publication provided by s.94(3) which  we have called the second part of  s.131(3) appears to be directory and so  long as it is substantially complied with  that would be enough for the purpose of  providing the tax payers a reasonable  opportunity of making their objections.   We are therefore of the opinion that the  manner of publication provided in  s.131(3) is directory."

   Again in 1996  this Court in State Bank of Patiala and

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others Vs S.  K.  Sharma (1996) 3 SCC. 364 had to interpret a  regulation framed in connection with a departmental inquiry.   The regulation required that the inquiring authority "shall also  record an order that the officer may for the purpose of preparing  his defence : "(3) be supplied with copies of  statements of witnesses, if any,  recorded earlier and the inquiry officer  shall furnish such copies not later than  three days before the commencement of  the examination of the witnesses by the  inquiring authority".

Copies of the statements of the witnesses were not  supplied to the charged officer.  However the officer had been  permitted to inspect and take notes of the statements of the  witnesses more than three days prior to the examination of the  witnesses.  The entire inquiry was challenged by the charged  officer as being vitiated, by reason of the non-supply of the  statements in compliance with the regulation.  The challenge  was rejected by this Court by holding that the provision was not  of a mandatory character and that it had to be examined from  the standpoint of substantial compliance and unless prejudice  had been caused by the non-compliance, the action would be  sustained.  (See also Venkataswamappa V. Special Deputy  Commissioner (Revenue 1997 9 SCC 128). With the greatest respect, we would adopt the reasoning  of the aforesaid two decisions of this Court in rejecting the  appellants’ submission that the mode of publication prescribed  in section 149(1) as opposed to publication itself, was  mandatory and hold that the publication in the newspapers was  in substantial compliance with the requirements of the sub- section. Apart from any other consideration, it certainly did not lie  in the mouth of the appellants to contend that adequate notice  was not given.  They were admittedly given notice under  section 149 (2) and they have also filed their objections under  section 150 to the assessment list. This brings us to the last submission of the appellants that  there cannot be any recovery of the tax on the basis of the  assessment list so published unless the appellants objections  were disposed of under section 151.  We were at first inclined  to hold in the appellants favour.  But  a closer scrutiny of the  provisions of the Act has persuaded us to reject the  submission.  Once we have held that the assessment list had  been properly prepared in the sense that there had been no  legal flaw in its preparation and publication, the valuation as  mentioned in the assessment list must be given effect to till the  time it is revised or amended under sections 151 or 152. In  Shibji Khestshi Tacker v. The Commissioners of Dhanbad  (supra) it was said that valuation and assessment lists remain  in force  until they are altered or amended in accordance with  the procedure laid down in the Act.  Alteration or amendment  can take place pursuant to an order under sections 151 or 152.   This is also clear from section 153 which says that "every  valuation made by the Chief Executive Officer -- -- shall, subject  to the provisions of sections 151 and 152, be final".  The phrase  ’subject to’  means that until and unless the assessment list is  revised or amended under section 151 or 152, the assessment  list would continue to be final.  This reading is in keeping with  sub section (2) of section 138  which provides that every  valuation and assessment list shall be valid from the date on  which the list takes effect in the Corporation  and until the first  day of the quarter next following the competition of a new list,  thus indicating that an assessment list is valid from the date of

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its completion.  Such an assessment list is subject to "any  alteration or amendment made" and to the result of any  application under Section 150.  What needs to be emphasised  is that the assessment list as prepared is valid and is   unaffected by the mere filing of an application under Section  150.  If the result  of the application is in favour of the owner,  the assessment list must be amended to give effect to such  result.  Unless the application of the appellants under Section  150 ends in a result which is  different from the assessment list,  the assessment list would continue to be operative, and the   respondent can recover  taxes on the basis of the assessment  and valuation list despite the filing of objections under Section  150.     Besides the reference to both sections 151 and 152 in  Section 153 makes it clear that the same incidence relating to  the recovery of taxes pending either the determination of the  objections under section 151 or the adjudication of the appeal  under section 152, would prevail.  If this construction is not put  on section 153, it would mean that by merely filing  an  objection, the objector would be able to effectively stop the  realisation of tax on the basis of the assessment list until such  time as his objection is heard and decided.  This could not have  been legislatively intended. As has been seen in this case that  although the appellants had filed their objections in 1995, they  are still pending.  We, therefore, conclude that it is open to the  Corporation to recover the tax as determined on the basis of  the impugned assessment lists pending disposal of the  appellants’ applications under Section 151, until and unless, by  virtue of an order under Section 151 or 152 passed thereon, the  assessment list is amended or altered. The appellants’ final grievance is in respect of the non  disposal of the objections filed in respect of the assessment  lists under the 1993 Rules.  As far as they  are concerned, the  High Court has already directed the disposal of the same by the  concerned authority within a time frame.  We see no reason to  interfere with this direction.   For the reasons aforesaid we dismiss this appeal and  affirm the decision of the High Court, albeit for reasons which  are different, with costs.