22 April 1955
Supreme Court








DATE OF JUDGMENT: 22/04/1955


ACT:        Constitution of India, Arts. 19(1)(g), 73 and  162-Printing,        publishing and selling of text books for recognised  schools        in  the  State  of  Punjab taken  by  the  State  Government        exclusively in their own hands-Whether any fundamental right        of the private publishers who were ousted from the business,        contravened-Art.  19(1)(g) of the Constitution-Arts. 73  and        162-Whether  contain any definition of  executive  function-        Union  executive or the State executive-Whether  legislation        by  Parliament  or State Legislature on  certain  items  ap-        pertaining to their respective lists, a condition  precedent        to  the Union or State executive functioning in  respect  to        them.

HEADNOTE:        For  a long period of time prior to 1950 the text books  for        recognised  schools in the State of Punjab were prepared  by        private publishers with their own money and under their  own        arrangements and they were submitted for the approval of the        Government.   The  Government approved some  books  on  each        subject  as  alternative  text  books,  leaving  it  to  the        discretion  of  the  Head Masters of  different  schools  to        select  any alternative book on each subject.  In  May  1950        books on certain subjects (like agriculture, history, social        studies, etc.) were prepared and published by the Government        themselves without inviting offers from private  publishers.        With  respect  to other subjects, offers were  invited  from        "publishers and authors".  The alternative method was  given        up  and  only one text book on ,each subject  was  selected.        The  Government charged as royalty 5% on the sale  price  of        all  the  approved text books.  In 1952 a  notification  was        issued by the Government which omitted the word "Publishers"        altogether  and invited only "authors and others" to  submit        books  for  approval by the Government.   The  "authors  and        others"  whose  books were approved, had to  enter  into  an        agreement  in  the  form prescribed by  the  Government  the        principal  term of the agreement was that the  copyright  in        these  books  would vest absolutely in  Government  and  the        authors  and others" would get a royalty of 5% on  the  sale        price  of  the  text  books.   It  was  contended   that-the        publishing,  printing  and selling of text  books  was  thus        taken  by the Government exclusively into its own hands  and        the  private  publishers  were altogether  ousted  from  the        business.   The  petitioners, who purport to  carry  on  the        business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling text        books for recognised schools in the Punjab, pro29        226        ferred   the   present  petition  under  Art.  32   of   the        Constitution  praying  for writs of mandamus  directing  the



      Punjab Government to withdraw the notifications of 1950  and        1952  on  the ground that they contravened  the  fundamental        rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution.        Held that the action of the Government, whether it was  good        or bad, does not amount to an infraction of the  fundamental        right  guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.   In        the  present case no fundamental rights of  the  petitioners        were  violated  by  the notifications and the  acts  of  the        executive   Government  of  the  Punjab  done  by  them   in        furtherance  of their policy of nationalisation of the  text        books for the school students.        A  more  chance or prospect of having  particular  customers        cannot be said to be a right to property or to any  interest        or  undertaking  within  the meaning of Art.  31(2)  of  the        Constitution and no question of payment of compensation  can        arise  because  the petitioners have been  deprived  of  the        same.        Articles  73 and 162 of the Constitution do not contain  any        definition  as  to what the executive function is  and  what        activities  would legitimately come within its scope.   They        are  concerned primarily with the distribution of  executive        power  between the Union on the one hand and  the  component        States on the other.  They do not mean-that it is only  when        Parliament  or  the  State  Legislature  has  legislated  on        certain  items appertaining to their respective  lists  that        the Union executive or the State executive, as the case  may        be,can proceed to function in respect of them.  On the other        hand,  the language of Art. 162 Clearly indicates  that  the        powers  of  the State executive do extend  to  matters  upon        which  the State Legislature is competent to  legislate  and        are not confined to matters over which legislation has  been        passed already.  The same principle underlies Art. 73 of the        Constitution.        The  Commonwealth  and  the Central Wool  Committee  v.  The        Colonial  Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (31  C.L.R.        421), Attorney-General for Victoria v. The Commonwealth, (52        C.L.R.  533) and Motilal 1. The Government of the  State  of        Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 257), referred to.

JUDGMENT:        ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 652 of 1954 and 71  to        77 and 85 of 1955.        Under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement  of        fundamental rights.        G. S. Pathak, (P.  N. Mehta and G. C. Mathur, with     him)        for the petitioners in Petition No. 652 of 1.954.        P.  N.  ˜Mehta and G. ˜0.  ˜Mathur, for the  petitioners  in        Petitions Nos. 71 to 77 and 85 of 1955.                                    227        S.M. Sikri, Advocate-Generalfor the State of Punjab  (Jindra        Lal  and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for the respondent in  all        petitions.        1955.  April 12.  The following Judgments were delivered.        PETITION NO. 652 OF 1954.        MUKHERJEA  C. J.-This is a petition under article 32 of  the        Constitution, preferred by six persons, who purport to carry        on  the  business of preparing,  printing,  publishing  and,        selling  text books for different classes in the schools  of        Punjab,  particularly  for the primary and  middle  classes,        under the name and style "Uttar Chand Kapur & Sons".  It  is        alleged   that  the  Education  Department  of  the   Punjab        Government  has  in pursuance of their so-called  policy  of        nationalisation   of   text  books,  issued  a   series   of



      notifications since 1950 regarding the printing, publication        and  sale  of  these  books  which  have  not  only   placed        unwarrantable   restrictions   upon  the   rights   of   the        petitioners to carry on their business but have  practically        ousted  them  and  other fellow-traders  from  the  business        altogether.   It  is  said that  no  restrictions  could  be        imposed  upon the petitioners’ right to carry on  the  trade        which   is   guaranteed  under  article  19(1)(g)   of   the        Constitution   by  mere  executive  orders  without   proper        legislation  and that the legislation, if any, must  conform        to  the  requirements  of clause (6) of article  19  of  the        Constitution.   Accordingly, the petitioners pray for  writs        in the nature of mandamus directing the Punjab Government to        withdraw the notifications which have affected their rights.        To  appreciate the contentions that have been raised by  the        learned  counsel who appeared for the parties before us,  it        will be necessary to narrate certain relevant facts.  In the        State  of Punjab, all recognised schools have got to  follow        the  course of studies approved by the Education  Department        of  the Government and the use, by the pupils, of  the  text        books  prescribed or authorised by the Department is a  con-        dition precedent to the granting of recognition to a        228        school.  For a long period of time prior to 1950, the method        adopted by the Government for selection and approval of text        books  for  recognised  schools was commonly  known  as  the        alternative  method and the procedure followed  was  shortly        this:  Books  on relevant subjects, in accordance  with  the        principles  laid  down  by the  Education  Department,  were        prepared  by the publishers with their own money  and  under        their own arrangements and they were submitted for  approval        of  the Government.  The Education Department  after  proper        scrutiny  selected books numbering between 3 and 10 or  even        more  on each subject as alternative text books, leaving  it        to  the  discretion  of the Head Masters  of  the  different        schools,  to  select any one of the alternative books  on  a        particular subject out of the approved list.  The Government        fixed  the  prices as well as the size and contents  of  the        books  and  when these things were done it was left  to  the        publishers  to  print,  publish and sell the  books  to  the        pupils of different schools according to the choice made  by        their  respective Head Masters.  Authors, who were not  pub-        lishers, could also submit books for approval and if any  of        their books were approved, they had to make arrangements for        publishing the same and usually they used to select some one        of the publishers already on the line to do the work.        This  procedure, which was in vogue since 1905, was  altered        in  material particulars on and from May 1950.   By  certain        resolutions of the Government passed on or about that  time,        the whole of the territory of Punjab, as it remained in  the        Indian Union after partition, was divided into three  Zones.        The  text  books  on  certain  subjects  like   agriculture,        history,  social  studies,  etc.  for  all  the  zones  were        prepared  and published by the Government  without  inviting        them  from  the publishers.  With respect to  the  remaining        subjects,  offers  were still invited from  "publishers  and        authors"  but the alternative system was given up  and  only        one text book on each subject for each class in a particular        zone  was selected.  Another change introduced at this  time        was that the Government charged, as royalty, 5% on the  sale        price of all the                                    229        approved  text  books.  The result therefore  was  that  the        Government at this time practically took upon themselves the        monopoly of publishing the textbooks on some of the subjects



      and  with  regard  to  the  rest  also,  they  reserved  for        themselves a certain royalty upon the sale proceeds.        Changes  of  a  far  more  drastic  character  however  were        introduced  in  the  year  1952 by  a  notification  of  the        Education Department issued on the 9th of August 1952 and it        is  against  this notification that the  complaints  of  the        petitioners are mainly directed.  This notification  omitted        the  word  "publishers"  altogether  and  invited  only  the        "authors  and  others" to submit books for approval  by  the        Government.   These "authors and others", whose  books  were        selected,   bad  to  enter  into  agreements  in  the   form        prescribed by the Government and the principal terms of  the        agreement were that the copyright in these books would  vest        absolutely  in the Government and the "authors  and  others"        would  only get a royalty at the rate of 5% on the  sale  of        the text books at the price or prices specified in the list.        Thus the publishing, printing and selling of the books  were        taken  by the Government exclusively in their own hands  and        the  private  publishers were altogether  ousted  from  this        business.   The  5% royalty, in  substance,  represents  the        price  for  the sale of the copyright and it is paid  to  an        author or any other person who, not being the author, is the        owner  of  the copyright and is hence competent  in  law  to        transfer  the same to the Government.  It is  against  these        notifications  of  1950 and 1952 that the  present  petition        under  article  32 of the Constitution is directed  and  the        petitioners  pray for withdrawal of these  notifications  on        the  ground that they contravene the fundamental  rights  of        the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution.        The  contentions  raised  by Mr.  Pathak,  who  appeared  in        support  of the petitioners, are of a three-fold  character.        It  is  contended  in the first  place  that  the  executive        Government  of  a State is wholly incompetent,  without  any        legislative  sanction,  to engage in any trade  or  business        activity and that the acts of        230        the Government in carrying out their policy of  establishing        monopoly  in  the business of printing and  publishing  text        books for school students is wholly without jurisdiction and        illegal.   His second contention is, that assuming that  the        State could create a monopoly  in its favour in respect of a        particular trade or business, that could be done not by  any        executive  act  but by means of a proper  legislation  which        should  conform to the requirements of article 19(6) of  the        Constitution.  Lastly, it is argued that it was not open  to        the Government to deprive the petitioners of their  interest        in  any  business or undertaking which amounts  to  property        without authority of law and without payment of compensation        as is required under article 31 of the Constitution.        The first point raised by Mr. Pathak, in substance,  amounts        to this, that the Government has no power in law to carry on        the  business of printing or selling text books for the  use        of  school  students in competition  with  private  agencies        without  the sanction of the legislature.  It is not  argued        that the functions of a modern State like the police  States        of  old  are  confined  to  mere  collection  of  taxes   or        maintenance  of  laws  and  protection  of  the  realm  from        external  or internal enemies.  A modern State is  certainly        expected  to  engage  in all activities  necessary  for  the        promotion  of  the  social  and  economic  welfare  of   the        community.   What Mr. Pathak says, however, is, that as  our        Constitution  clearly recognises a division of  governmental        functions into three categories, viz., the legislative,  the        judicial  and the executive, the function of  the  executive        cannot but be to execute the laws passed by the  legislature



      or   to  supervise  the  enforcement  of  the   same.    The        legislature  must first enact a measure which the  executive        can then carry out.  The learned counsel has, in support  of        this contention, placed considerable reliance upon  articles        73 and 162 of our Constitution-and also upon certain decided        authorities  of the Australian High Court to which we  shall        presently refer.        Article  73  of the Constitution relates  to  the  executive        powers of the Union, while the corresponding                                    231        provision  in regard to the executive powers of a  State  is        contained in article 162.  The provisions of these  articles        are analogous to those of sections 8 and 49 (2) respectively        of  the Government of India Act, 1935 and lay down the  rule        of  distribution of executive powers between the  Union  and        the  States, following, the same analogy as is  provided  in        regard  to  the distribution of legislative  powers  between        them.  Article 162, with which we are directly concerned  in        this case, lays down:        "Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Constitution,   the        executive power of a State shall extend to the matters  with        respect  to which the Legislature of the State has power  to        make laws:        Provided  that  in  any matter with  respect  to  which  the        Legislature  of  a State and Parliament have power  to  make        laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject  to,        and  limited by, the executive power expressly conferred  by        this Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon  the        Union or authorities thereof".        Thus under this article the executive authority of the State        is exclusive in respect to matters enumerated in List II  of        Seventh  Schedule.   The  authority  also  extends  to   the        Concurrent  List  except  as provided  in  the  Constitution        itself  or in any law passed by the Parliament.   Similarly,        article  73 provides that the executive powers of the  Union        shall extend to matters with respect to which the Parliament        has  power to make laws and to the exercise of such  rights,        authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Govern-        ment of India by virtue of any treaty or any agreement.  The        proviso  engrafted  on  clause (1) further  lays  down  that        although  with regard to the matters in the Concurrent  List        the  executive  authority shall be ordinarily  left  to  the        State it would be open to the Parliament to provide that  in        exceptional  cases  the executive power of the  Union  shall        extend  to  these matters also.  Neither of  these  articles        contain any definition as to what the executive function  is        and  what  activities  would legitimately  come  within  its        scope.  They are concerned primarily with the distri-        232        bution  of the executive power between the Union on the  one        hand and the States on the other.  They do not mean, as  Mr.        Pathak seems to suggest, that it is only when the Parliament        or  the  State Legislature has legislated on  certain  items        appertaining  to their respective lists, that the  Union  or        the  State  executive, as the case may be,  can  proceed  to        function  in  respect  to  them.  On  the  other  hand,  the        language of article 162 clearly indicates that the powers of        the  State  executive do extend to matters  upon  which  the        State Legislature is competent to legislate and are not con-        fined  to  matters over which legislation  has  been  passed        already.   The  same principle underlies article 73  of  the        Constitution.    These   provisions  of   the   Constitution        therefore   do  not  lend  any  support  to   Mr.   Pathak’s        contention.        The Australian cases upon which reliance has been placed  by



      the learned counsel do not, in our opinion, appear to be  of        much  help  either.   In the first(1) of  these  cases,  the        executive   Government  of  the  Commonwealth   during   the        continuance of the war, entered into a number of  agreements        with a company which was engaged in the manufacture and sale        of  wool-tops.  The agreements were of different types.   By        one  class of agreements, the Commonwealth  Government  gave        consent  to the sale of wool-tops by the company  in  return        for  a share of the -profits of the transactions (called  by        the  parties "a licence fee").  Another class provided  that        the business of manufacturing wool-tops should be carried on        by   the   company  as  agents  for  the   Commonwealth   in        consideration  of the company receiving an annual  sum  from        the  Commonwealth.   The  rest  of  the  agreements  were  a        combination  of these two varieties.  It was held by a  Full        Bench  of  the  High Court that  apart  from  any  authority        conferred  by  an  Act  of  Parliament  or  by   regulations        thereunder, the executive Government of the Commonwealth had        no  power  to make or ratify any of these  agreements.   The        decision,  it may be noticed, was based  substantially  upon        the  provision of section 61 of the Australian  Constitution        which is worded as follows:        (1)  The Commtmonwwealth and the  Central Wool Committee  v.        The  Colonial Combining, Spinning and Weaving Co.  Ltd.,  31        C.L.R. 421.                                    233        "The  executive power of the Commonwealth is vested  in  the        Queen  and  is  exercised by the   Governor-General  as  the        Queen’s  representative  and extends to  the  execution  and        maintenance  of  the  Constitution and of the  laws  of  the        Commonwealth",        In  addition to this, the King could assign other  functions        and  powers to the Governor-General under section 2  but  in        this particular case no assignment of any additional  powers        was  alleged or proved.  The court held that the  agreements        were not directly authorised by the Parliament or under  the        provisions  of  any  statute and as they were  not  for  the        execution  and maintenance of the Constitution they must  be        held  to be void.  Isacs, J., in his judgment, dealt  elabo-        rately  with the two types of agreements and held  that  the        agreements, so far as they purported to bind the company  to        pay  to  the  Government money, as the  price  of  consents,        amounted  to the imposition of a tax and were  void  without        the  authority of Parliament.  The other kind of  agreements        which purported to bind the Government to pay to the company        a remuneration for manufacturing wool-tops was held to be an        appropriation   of   public  revenue   and   being   without        legislative authority was also void.        It  will be apparent that none of the  principles  indicated        above could have any application to the circumstances of the        present  case.   There is no provision in  our  Constitution        corresponding  to  section 61 of the  Australian  Act.   The        Government has not imposed anything like taxation or licence        fee  in  the  present case nor have we been  told  that  the        appropriation  of public revenue involved in  the  so-called        business in text books carried on by the Government has  not        been sanctioned by the legislature by proper Appropriation        Acts.        The  other case(1) is of an altogether  different  character        and arose in the following way.  The Commonwealth Government        had  established  a clothing factory in  Melbourne  for  the        purpose  of  making  naval and military  uniforms  for  the-        defence forces and        (1)  Vide Attorney-General for Victoria v. The  Commonwealth        52 C.L.R 533



      30        234        postal  employees.  In times of peace the operations of  the        factory   included   the  supply  of  uniforms   for   other        departments of the Commonwealth and for employees in various        public  utility services.  The Governor-General deemed  such        peace-time  operations of the      factory necessary for the        efficient  defence  of  the  Commonwealth  inasmuch  as  the        maintenance intact of the trained complement of the  factory        would  assist in meeting wartime demands.  A question  arose        as to whether operations of the factory for such purposes in        peace:-time  were  authorised  by  the  Defence  Act.    The        majority   of  the  court  answered  the  question  in   the        affirmative.  Starke, J. delivered a dissenting opinion upon        which  Mr.  Pathak mainly relied.  The  learned  Judge  laid        stress  on section 61 of the Constitution Act  according  to        which  the executive power of the Commonwealth  extended  to        the  maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of  the        Commonwealth  and  held  that  there  was  nothing  in   the        Constitution  or any law of the Commonwealth  which  enabled        the   Commonwealth  to  establish  and   maintain   clothing        factories   for  other  than  Commonwealth  purposes.    The        opinion,  whether right or wrong, turns upon the  particular        facts  of the case and upon the provision of section  61  of        the  Australian  Act and it cannot and does  not  throw  any        light on the question that requires decision in the present        case.        A  question  very similar to that in the  present  case  did        arise for consideration before a Full Bench of the Allahabad        High  Court  in Motilal v. The Government of  the  State  of        Uttar Pradesh(1).  The point canvassed there was whether the        Government  of a State has power under the  Constitution  to        carry  on the trade or business of running a bus service  in        the absence of a legislative enactment authorising the State        Government  to  do so.  Different views  were  expressed  by        different Judges on this question.  Chief Justice Malik  was        of  opinion  that in a written Constitution  like  ours  the        executive power may be such as is given to the executive  or        is implied, ancillary or inherent.        (1)  A.I.R. 1951 Allahabad 257.                                    235        It must include all powers that may be needed to carry  into        effect  the aims and objects of the Constitution.   It  must        mean more than merely executing the laws.  According to  the        Chief  Justice the State has a right to hold and manage  its        own  property  and  carry on such trade  or  business  as  a        citizen has the right to carry on, so long as such  activity        does  not  encroach  upon the rights of  others  or  is  not        contrary to law.  The running of a transport business there-        fore  was  not  per se outside the ambit  of  the  executive        authority  of the State.  Sapru, J. held that the  power  to        run a Government bus service was incidental to the power  of        acquiring property which was expressly conferred by  article        298  of  the Constitution.  Mootham and  Wanchoo,  JJ.,  who        delivered  a common judgment, were also of the opinion  that        there  was no need for a specific legislative  enactment  to        enable  a  State Government to run a bus  service.   In  the        opinion  of these learned Judges an act would be within  the        executive  power of the State if it is not an act which  has        been  assigned  by  the  Constitution  of  India  to   other        authorities or bodies and is not contrary to the  provisions        of  any law and does not encroach upon the legal  rights  of        any  member of the public.  Agarwala, J. dissented from  the        majority  view  and held that the State  Government  had  no        power  to run a bus service in the absence of an Act of  the



      legislature authorising the State to do so.  The opinion  of        Agarwala  J.  undoubtedly  supports the  contention  of  Mr.        Pathak   but  it  appears  to  us  to  be  too  narrow   and        unsupportable.        It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition  of        what  executive function means and implies.  Ordinarily  the        executive   power  connotes  the  residue  of   governmental        functions   that  remain  after  legislative  and   judicial        functions  are taken away.  The Indian Constitution has  not        indeed  recognised the doctrine of separation of  powers  in        its  absolute  rigidity but the functions of  the  different        parts  or branches of the Government have been  sufficiently        differentiated  and  consequently it can very well  be  said        that our Constitution does not contemplate        236        assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of  functions        that-essentially  belong to another.  The  executive  indeed        can  exercise  the  powers of  departmental  or  subordinate        legislation  when  such powers are delegated to  it  by  the        legislature.   It  can  also, when  so  empowered,  exercise        judicial   functions  in  a  limited  way.   The   executive        Government, however, can never go against the provisions  of        the  Constitution  or of any law.  This is  clear  from  the        provisions  of  article 154 of the Constitution but,  as  we        have  already stated, it does not follow from this  that  in        order  to enable the executive to function there must  be  a        law  already  in  existence  and  that  the  powers  of  the        executive  are limited merely to the carrying out  of  these        laws.        The  limits  within  which  the  executive  Government   can        function  under the Indian Constitution can  be  ascertained        without  much  difficulty by reference to the  form  of  the        executive   which   our  Constitution  has  set   up.    Our        Constitution,  though federal in its structure, is  modelled        on  the British Parliamentary system where the executive  is        deemed   to   have  the  primary  responsibility   for   the        formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into        law  though the condition precedent to the exercise of  this        responsibility  is  its  retaining  the  confidence  of  the        legislative  branch  of the State.  The  executive  function        comprises  both the determination of the policy as  well  as        carrying  it  into execution.  This evidently  includes  the        initiation  of  legislation, the maintenance of  order,  the        promotion  of social and economic welfare, the direction  of        foreign  policy, in fact the carrying on or  supervision  of        the general administration of the State.        In India, as in England, the executive has to act subject to        the  control  of the legislature; but in what  way  is  this        control  exercised by the legislature?  Under article  53(1)        of  our  Constitution, the executive power of the  Union  is        vested in the President but under article 75 there is to  be        a  Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the  head        to  aid  and  advise the President in the  exercise  of  his        functions.   The  President has thus been made a  formal  or        constitutional                                    237        head  of  the executive and the real  executive  powers  are        vested in the Ministers or the Cabinet.  The same provisions        obtain  in regard to the Government of States; the  Governor        or the Rajpramukh, as the case may be, occupies the position        of  the  head  of  the executive in  the  State  but  it  is        virtually  the  council  of Ministers  in  each  State  that        carries   on  the  executive  Government.   In  the   Indian        Constitution,   therefore,  we  have  the  same  system   of        parliamentary  executive  as in England and the  council  of



      Ministers  consisting,  as it does, of the  members  of  the        legislature  is, like the British Cabinet, "a  hyphen  which        joins,  a buckle which fastens the legislative part  of  the        State  to the executive part".  The Cabinet enjoying, as  it        does,  a majority in the legislature concentrates in  itself        the virtual control of both legislative and executive  func-        tions;  and as the ’Ministers constituting the  Cabinet  are        presumably  agreed on fundamentals and act on the  principle        of  collective responsibility, the most important  questions        of policy are all formulated by them.        Suppose now that the Ministry or the executive Government of        a  State  formulates a particular policy in  furtherance  of        which  they  want  to  start a trade  or  business.   Is  it        necessary   that  there  must  be  a  specific   legislation        legalising  such  trade  activities  before  they  could  be        embarked  upon?   We  cannot say that  such  legislation  is        always  necessary.   If  the  trade  or  business   involves        expenditure   of  funds,  it  is  certainly  required   that        Parliament should authorise such expenditure either directly        or  under  the provisions of a statute.  What  is  generally        done  in such cases is, that the sums required for  carrying        on  the  business  are  entered  in  the  annual   financial        statement which the Ministry has to lay before the House  or        Houses  of  Legislature in respect of every  financial  year        under article 202 of the Constitution.  So much of the esti-        mates  as relate to expenditure other than those charged  on        the  consolidated fund are submitted in the form of  demands        for  grants to the legislature and the legislature  has  the        power  to assent or refuse to assent to any such  demand  or        assent to a demand subject to reduc-        238        tion  of  the  amount (article 203).   After  the  grant  is        sanctioned,  an Appropriation Bill is introduced to  provide        for  the appropriation out of the consolidated fund  of  the        State of all moneys required to meet the grants thus made by        the  Assembly (article 204).  As soon as  the  Appropriation        Act is passed, the expenditure made under the heads  covered        by it would be deemed to be properly authorised by law under        article 266(3) of the Constitution.        It  may be, as Mr. Pathak contends, that  the  Appropriation        Acts  are  no substitute for specific legislation  and  that        they  validate  only the expenses out  of  the  consolidated        funds  for the particular years for which they  are  passed;        but nothing more than that may be  necessary for carrying on        of the trade or business.     Under  article 266(3)  of  the        Constitution no moneys   out  of the consolidated  funds  of        India  or  the  consolidated  fund  of  a  State  shall   be        appropriated  except  in  accordance with law  and  for  the        purposes  and in the manner provided in  this  Constitution.        The  expression  "law" here obviously  includes  the  Appro-        priation  Acts.   It  is true that  the  Appropriation  Acts        cannot be said to give a direct legislative sanction to  the        trade  activities  themselves.  But SO  long  as  the  trade        activities  are carried on in pursuance of the policy  which        the  executive  Government  has formulated  with  the  tacit        support of the majority in, the legislature, no objection on        the  score  of  their  not  being  sanctioned  by   specific        legislative  provision can possibly be  raised.   Objections        could be raised only in regard to the expenditure of  public        funds for carrying on of the trade or business and to  these        the Appropriation Acts would afford a complete answer.        Specific   legislation  may  indeed  be  necessary  if   the        Government  require certain powers in addition to what  they        possess  under  ordinary  law  in  order  to  carry  on  the        particular trade or business.  Thus when it is necessary  to



      encroach  upon  private  rights  in  order  to  enable   the        Government   to   carry  on  their  business,   a   specific        legislation sanctioning such course would have to be passed.                                    239        In  the  present  case it is not disputed  that  the  entire        expenses necessary for carrying on the business of  printing        and  publishing  the text books for  recognised  schools  in        Punjab  were  estimated and shown in  the  annual  financial        statement  and that the demands for grants, which were  made        under   different  heads,  were  sanctioned  by  the   State        Legislature and due Appropriation Acts were passed.  For the        purpose  of carrying on the business the Government  do  not        require any additional powers and whatever is necessary  for        their purpose, they can have by entering into contracts with        authors  and  other  people.   This  power  of  contract  is        expressly vested in the Government under article 298 of  the        Constitution.   In  these circumstances, we  are  unable  to        agree  with Mr. Pathak that the carrying on of the  business        of  printing  and  publishing  text  books  was  beyond  the        competence  of the executive Government without  a  specific        legislation sanctioning such course.        These  discussions however are to some extent  academic  and        are   not  sufficient  by  themselves  to  dispose  of   the        petitioners’ case.  As we have said already, -the  executive        Government  are bound to conform not only to the law of  the        land  but also to the provisions of the  Constitution.   The        Indian  Constitution is a written Constitution and even  the        legislature   cannot   override   the   fundamental   rights        guaranteed by it to the citizens.  Consequently, even if the        acts  of  the executive are deemed to be sanctioned  by  the        legislature,  yet  they  can  be declared  to  be  void  and        inoperative  if they infringe any of the fundamental  rights        of the petitioners guaranteed under Part III of the  Consti-        tution.   On  the  other  hand, even  if  the  acts  of  the        executive  are  illegal  in  the sense  that  they  are  not        warranted   by  law,  but  no  fundamental  rights  of   the        petitioners  have been infringed thereby, the  latter  would        obviously have no right to complain under article 32 of  the        Constitution  though  they may have  remedies  elsewhere  if        other heads of rights are infringed.  The material  question        for  consideration therefore is: What fundamental rights  of        the   petitioners,  if  any,  have  been  violated  by   the        notifications        240        and acts of the executive Government of Punjab undertaken by        them  in furtherance of their policy of  nationalisation  of        the text books for the school students?        The  petitioners  claim  fundamental  right  under   article        19(1)(g)  of the Constitution which guarantees, inter  alia,        to all persons the right to carry on any trade or  business.        The business which the petitioners have been carrying on  is        that  of  printing and publishing books for  sale  including        text  books  used in the primary and middle classes  of  the        schools  in  Punjab.   Ordinarily  it  is  for  the   school        authorities to prescribe the text books that are to be  used        by the students and if these text books are available in the        market  the  pupils can purchase them from  any  book-seller        they like.  There is no fundamental right in the  publishers        that  any of the books printed and published by them  should        be prescribed as text books by the school authorities or  if        they are once accepted as text books they cannot be  stopped        or discontinued in future.  With regard to the schools which        are  recognised by the Government the position of  the  pub-        lishers is still worse.  The recognised schools receive aids        of  various kinds from the Government including  grants  for



      the   maintenance  of  the  institutions,   for   equipment,        furniture,  scholarships and other things and the pupils  of        the  recognised  schools are admitted to  the  school  final        examinations at lower rates of fees than those demanded from        the  students of non-recognised schools.  Under  the  school        code,  one of the main conditions upon which recognition  is        granted  by Government is that the school  authorities  must        use as text books only those which are prescribed or  autho-        rised by the Government.  So far therefore as the recognised        schools  are concerned-and we are concerned only with  these        schools  in the present case the choice of text books  rests        entirely with the Government and it is for the Government to        decide in which way the selection of these text books is  to        be  made.   The  procedure hitherto followed  was  that  the        Government  used to invite publishers and authors to  submit        their books for examination and approval by                                    241        the Education Department and after selection was made by the        Government, the size, contents as well as the prices of  the        books  were  fixed  and it was left  to  the  publishers  or        authors to print and publish them and offer them for sale to        the  pupils.  So long as this system was in vogue  the  only        right  which  publishers, like the petitioners had,  was  to        offer their books for inspection and approval by the Govern-        ment.   They  had no right to insist on any of  their  books        being  accepted as text books.  So the utmost that could  be        said is that there was merely a chance or prospect of any or        some  of  their books being approved as text  books  by  the        Government.   Such chances are incidental to all trades  and        businesses  and there is no fundamental  right  guaranteeing        them.   A  trader might be lucky in  securing  a  particular        market for his goods but if he loses that field because  the        particular customers for some reason or other do not  choose        to buy goods from him, it is not open to him to say that  it        was  his  fundamental right to have his  old  customers  for        ever.   On the one hand, therefore, there was nothing but  a        chance or prospect which the publishers had of-having  their        books  approved  by the Government, on the  other  hand  the        Government  had the undisputed right to adopt any method  of        selection  they  liked and if they ultimately  decided  that        after  approving  the  text books they  would  purchase  the        copyright  in them from the authors and others provided  the        latter  were willing to transfer the same to the  Government        on  certain  terms,  we  fail  to  see  what  right  of  the        publishers  to carry on their trade or business is  affected        by it.  Nobody is taking away the publishers’ right to print        and  publish any books they like and to offer them for  sale        but  if  they  have  no right that  their  books  should  be        approved as text books by the Government it is immaterial so        far as they are concerned whether the Government approves of        text  books  submitted by other persons who are  willing  to        sell  their  copyrights in the books to them, or  choose  to        engage  authors for the purpose of preparing the text  books        which they take up on themselves to print        31        242        and  publish.  We are unable to appreciate the  argument  of        Mr.  Pathak  that  the  Government  while  exercising  their        undoubted right of approval cannot attach to it a  condition        which  has no bearing on the purpose for which the  approval        is made.  We fail to see how the petitioners’ position is in        any way improved thereby.  The action of the Government  may        be  good or bad.  It may be criticised and condemned in  the        Houses  of  the  Legislature or outside but  this  does  not        amount to an infraction of the fundamental right  guaranteed



      by article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.        As in our view the petitioners have no fundamental right  in        the present case which can be said to have been infringed by        the action of the Government, the petition is bound to  fail        on  that  ground.  This being the position,  the  other  two        points raised by Mr. Pathak do not require consideration  at        all.   As  the petitioners have no fundamental  right  under        article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution, the question whether        the  Government  could  establish  a  monopoly  without  any        legislation  under  article  19(6) of  the  Constitution  is        altogether  immaterial.  Again a mere chance or prospect  of        having particular customers cannot be said to be a right  to        property  or  to any interest in an undertaking  within  the        meaning of article 31(2) of the Constitution and no question        of payment of compensation can arise because the petitioners        have  been  deprived of the same.  The result  is  that  the        petition is dismissed with costs.        PETITIONS NOS. 71 TO 77 AND 85 OF 1955.        MUKHERJEA  C. J.-These 8 petitions under article 32  of  the        Constitution   raise   identically  the  same   points   for        consideration  as are involved in Petition No. 652  of  1954        just  disposed  of.   The petitioners in  these  cases  also        purport to be printers, publishers and sellers of text-books        for  various  classes  in the schools  of  Punjab  and  they        complain  of  infraction of their fundamental  rights  under        article  19  (1) (g) of the Constitution by  reason  of  the        various  notifications  issued  by the State  of  Punjab  in        pursuance of their policy                                    243        of  nationalisation  of  text books.   The  learned  counsel        appearing in these cases have adopted in their entirety  the        arguments that have been advanced by Mr. Pathak in  Petition        No. 652 of 1954 and no fresh or additional argument has been        put forward by any one of them.  This being the position the        decision  in  Petition  No. 652 of 1954  will  govern  these        petitions  also and they will stand dismissed but  we  would        make no order as to costs.