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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5634 of 2006

PETITIONER: Raghunath Rai Bareja and another

RESPONDENT: Punjab National Bank and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2006

BENCH: S. B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of Special Leave Petition(Civil) Nos. 22058-22059/2005)

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

       Leave granted.

       This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order  dated 26.5.2005 of the  Punjab & Haryana High Court in Execution Petition  No. 1-L of 1999 by which the execution proceeding was transferred to the  Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (hereinafter referred to as the  ’Tribunal’), for being disposed of in accordance with law.

       Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

       The facts of the case are that on a Company Petition No. 57 of 1983 \026  M/s. S.P. Nagrath & Co. vs. M/s. Bareja Knipping Fasteners Ltd., the High  Court vide order dated 23.10.1983 ordered winding up of the Company and  an Official Liquidator was appointed who took over possession of the  properties of the Company.

       The respondent-Bank filed a Suit (Company Petition No. 46 of 1984)  for recovery of  Rs. 14,53,577/- with pendente lite and future interest.

       A preliminary decree for recovery of Rs. 19,07,800/- with future  interest @ 12% per annum was passed by the High Court in favour of the  decree-holder Bank, the respondent herein, on 2.12.1985 in Company  Petition No. 46 of 1984.   

       Ultimately, a decree was passed in favour of the Bank on 15.1.1987 in  Company Application No. 115 of 1986.

       The aforesaid final decree dated 15.1.1987 stated as under:

"It is hereby ordered and decreed that the  mortgaged/pledged/hypothecated properties in the aforesaid  preliminary decree mentioned or sufficient part thereof be sold,  and that for the purpose of such sale the plaintiff/petitioner shall  produce before the Court or such officer as appointed, all  documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgage  properties.

And it is hereby ordered and decreed that the money realized by  such sale shall be paid in the Court and shall be duly applied  (after deduction therefrom of expenses of the sale) in the  payment of the amount payable to the plaintiff/petitioner under  aforesaid preliminary decree and under any further orders that

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may have been passed in this petition and in payment of any  amount which the Court may have adjudged due to the  plaintiff/petitioner for such costs of the petition including costs  of this application and such costs, charges and expenses as may  be payable under Rule 10 together with such subsequent  interest as may be payable under Rule 11 of Order XXXIV of  the first Schedule to Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and that the  balance, if any, shall be paid to the defendants/respondents or  other persons entitled to receive the same."

       Under Article 136 to the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 the  period for applying for execution of any decree is 12 years from the date  when the decree becomes enforceable.  Since in the present case the final  decree was passed and became enforceable on 15.1.1987, the period of  limitation for filing an execution application expired on 15.1.1999.

In the present case, the Bank filed three Execution Petitions.  The first  one, being Execution Petition No. 14-L of 1987, was dismissed on 8.11.1990  by the following order:

"No list of the property sought to be attached has been filed.   This application is dismissed.  The petitioner may, however,  file a fresh execution application in accordance with law."

It appears that a second Execution Petition thereafter was filed in  1994 being Execution Petition No. 3-L of 1994 by which the decree holder  bank sought attachment and sale of properties which did not belong to the  judgment debtors.  After contest by the objectors, this second Execution  Petition was dismissed  by a Learned Single Judge of the High Court on  18.8.1994 holding that the decree passed against the Company cannot be  satisfied by attachment and sale of properties belonging to other Companies,   as these other Companies are different and distinct juristic personalities with  different set of shareholders.

Thereafter on 4.9.1998, the respondent-bank filed another Company  Petition No. 236 of 1998 under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956  read with Rule 117 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959  seeking leave of  the Company Court to commence the Execution proceedings before the  Tribunal which had come into existence in 1993 under the Recovery of  Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter  referred to as ’RDB Act’).  That petition was allowed by the Company Court  vide order dated 18.12.1998 stating "Learned counsel for the parties are  agreed that petitioner be granted leave to file execution petition in this  Court."  

The decree-holder Bank (respondent in this appeal), then filed a third  Execution Petition No. 1 of 1999 dated 11.01.1999 against M/s. Bareja  Knipping Fasteners Limited through the Official Liquidator, without  impleading the appellants and Shri K.M.Bareja as parties to the Execution  Petition.  On this third Execution Petition, the High Court on 1.4.1999  passed the following order:

"Nobody is present on behalf of the petitioner.  Counsel for the  Official Liquidator submits that the decree has already been  executed against the assets and properties of the Company.  He  further submits that no assets of the Company, moveable or  immoveable, are available with the Official Liquidator.  As  such, there can be hardly any execution against the Company.

Petition stands disposed of.  Liberty to file proper petition  against the other judgment debtors in accordance with law is  granted as they have not been impleaded as parties in the Memo  of Parties either of the execution petition of that of the

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application."  

Thereafter, on 7.4.1999, the Bank instead of filing a petition as  directed by the High Court, filed Company Application No. 173 of 1999 for  restoration of the Execution Petition No. 1 of 1999 along with a fresh Memo  of Parties  before the High Court.  The High Court issued notice on this  Application and then on 22.7.1999 recalled the order dated 1.4.1999.

On 3.1.2005, the decree-holder Bank filed Company Application No.  55 of 2005 under Rule 9 of the Company (Court) Rules, 1959 read with  Sections 17 and 18 of RDB Act for transfer of the Execution Petition to the  Tribunal.  The appellant filed a reply stating that the High Court  has no  jurisdiction to entertain this Application.  However by the impugned order  dated 26.5.2005 the High Court transferred the Execution Petition pending  before it to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh.

In the aforesaid order dated 26.5.2005, the High Court observed:

"No doubt, procedure for transfer of execution proceedings as  mentioned in the RDB Act is applicable only with regard to  proceedings pending on the relevant dated i.e. 24.6.1993 and  there is no provision for transfer of application filed after the  said date.  There is, however, order dated 18.12.1998 on record  whereby the parties consented that the petitioner may be  allowed to file execution petition in this Court.  In view of  judgment of the Apex Court in Allahabad Bank (supra), this  Court has no jurisdiction to deal with the application for  execution.  The question is whether in exercise of inherent  jurisdiction of this Court, execution petition could be  transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, as  prayed for by the decree-holder.

       Inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the  powers specifically conferred.  The same can be exercised for  advancing ends of justice, subject to the condition that exercise  of such powers is not in conflict with express provisions of the  statute.  Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor is unable to  show any decision or principle as to why inherent power cannot  be invoked in the present case, to achieve the ends of justice.   There is no express or implied provision against exercise of  such a power, in a situation which has arisen in the present  case.  

       Accordingly, C.A. No. 55 of 2005 is allowed and  execution proceedings are transferred to the Debt Recovery  Tribunal, Chandigarh for being disposed of in accordance with  law.  Learned counsel for the decree-holder has made a  statement that he wishes to proceed against the guarantors in  execution proceedings.  C.A. No. 415 of 1999 seeking dismissal  of execution application, is accordingly, dismissed."

Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the aforesaid order  was wholly without jurisdiction.

Learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to Sections  17, 18, 24 and 31of the RDB Act.  These provisions are as follows:

"17.  Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. \026 (1) A  Tribunal  shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the  jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide  applications from the banks and financial institutions for  recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions.  

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(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the  appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to  entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have  been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.

18.  Bar of jurisdiction. \026 On and from the appointed day, no  Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise,  any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme  Court, and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Arts. 226  and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to the matters specified  in Section 17.

24.  Limitation. \026 The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963,  shall, as far as may be, apply to an application made to a  Tribunal.    

31.  Transfer of pending cases. \026 (1)  Every suit or other  proceeding pending before any court immediately before the  date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit  or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such  that it would have been, if it had arisen after such  establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall  stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal.                         Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to  any appeal pending as aforesaid before any Court.   

       (2)     Where any suit or other proceeding stands  transferred from any court to a Tribunal under sub-section (1), -

(a)     the court shall, as soon as may be after such transfer,  forward the records of such suit or other proceeding  to the Tribunal; and  

(b)     the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed  to deal with such suit or other proceeding, so far as  may be, in the same manner as in the case of an  application made under section 19 from the stage  which was reached before such transfer or from any  earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem  fit."

Admittedly, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was established  in 1993 and hence after 1993 the exclusive jurisdiction regarding recovery of  debts pertaining to which the RDB Act applies is with the Tribunal.

In our opinion, the impugned order of the High Court dated  26.5.2005, transferring the Execution Petition pending before it to the Debt  Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was clearly beyond the scope of Section 31  of the RDB Act because Section 31 states that only suits or other proceeding  pending before the Court immediately before the establishment of the  Tribunal under the Act, stand transferred to the Tribunal.  Since, admittedly  the Tribunal in the present case, had been established in 1993, and no  proceeding was pending before it on the date when it was established, no  transfer could take place under Section 31 of the RDB Act.  At any event,  the third Execution Petition which was transferred by the impugned order  was filed by the respondent-Bank on 11.1.1999, i.e. much after the Tribunal  had been established.  Hence obviously there could be no such transfer to the  Tribunal under Section 31 of the RDB Act.  Apart from Section 31, there is  no other provision for transferring a suit or other proceeding pending before  any Court to the Tribunal.  Hence, the impugned order dated 26.5.2005 was  clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.

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In this connection learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the  decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr. 2000(4)  SCC 406.  In the aforesaid decision this Court observed that the word  ‘proceedings’ in Section 31 of the RDB Act includes ‘execution  proceedings’ pending before a civil court before the commencement of the  Act.  In para 50 of the aforesaid decision this Court observed that the RDB  Act, 1993 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Debt Recovery Tribunal both  at the stage of adjudication of the claim under Section 17 of the Act as well  as execution of the claim.  The Court observed that the provisions of the  RDB Act, 1993 are to an extent inconsistent with the provisions of the  Companies Act, 1956, and the latter Act has to yield to the provisions of the  former.  This position holds good during the pendency of the winding-up  petition against the debtor company and also after a winding-up order is  passed.  The Court further held that no leave of the Company Court is  necessary under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 for initiating or  continuing the proceedings under the RDB Act, 1993.

In the aforesaid decision this Court also upheld the view of some of  the High Courts that the Company Act is a general statute, and hence the  RDB Act which is a special Act, overrides the general statute.  At any event,  in view of Section 34 of the RDB Act, the said Act will prevail to the extent  of inconsistency over the Companies Act.

Since in the aforesaid decision this Court has held that even with  regard to execution the jurisdiction under the RDB Act is exclusive, we  cannot agree with the view taken by the High Court merely because the  appellant had given his consent to the transfer of the Execution Petition to  the Tribunal.   It is well settled in law that consent cannot confer jurisdiction.

In  Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra) (vide para 23)  this Court observed : \005\005\005\005."In our opinion, the prescription of an  exclusive Tribunal both for adjudication and execution is a  procedure clearly inconsistent with realization of these debts in  any other manner."  

Since Section 24 of the RDB Act applies the provisions of the  Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since  Article 136 of the Limitation Act  provides a period of limitation of 12 years  for filing an Execution Petition, hence now no such application can be filed  since that period of 12 years expired on 15.1.1999.  Hence, in our opinion  the debt became time barred after 15.1.1999.

Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank relied on Section 446(1) of  the Companies Act which states that when a winding-up order is passed or  the official liquidator is appointed as a provisional liquidator, no suit or other  legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the  winding-up order, shall be proceeded with against the company, except by  leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.

Learned counsel for respondent-Bank relied on Sub-section (3) of  Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, which states : "(3)    Any suit or proceeding by or against the company  which is pending in any Court other than that in which the  winding up of the company is proceeding may, notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,  be transferred to and disposed of by that Court."

 In this connection, it may be mentioned that Section 446(3) of the  Companies Act was omitted by Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002  and evidently the High Court has overlooked this Amendment.  As a result  in our opinion the High Court has no power to transfer the Execution  Petition to the Debts Recovery Tribunal.  At any event as held in Allahabad

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Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra), Section 446 has no application once  the RDB Act applies because Section 34 expressly gives overriding effect to  the provisions of the RDB Act.  Also, the RDB Act is a special law and  hence will prevail over the general law in the Companies Act as held in  Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra).

In this connection, we may mention that in the impugned order dated  26.5.2005 the High Court has, while admitting that in view of the decision of  this Court in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra), it had no  jurisdiction to deal with the execution application, it has, however, in the  same order relied on the so called "inherent powers" of the Court.  In our  opinion there are no such inherent powers of the Court of transferring the  Execution Proceedings to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh.   Whatever powers there are of transfer of proceedings to the Tribunal are  contained in Section 31 of the RDB Act, and no transfer is permissible de  hors Section 31.  Hence, we respectfully disagree with the High Court that it  has inherent powers apart from Section 31 for transferring the Execution  Petition to the Debt Recovery Tribunal.       

Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submitted that it will be  very unfair if the appellant who is a guarantor of the loan, and director of the  Company which took the loan, avoids paying the debt.  While we fully agree  with the learned counsel that equity is wholly in favour of the respondent- Bank, since obviously a Bank should be allowed to recover its debts, we  must, however, state that it is well settled that when there is a conflict  between law and equity, it is the law which has to prevail, in accordance  with the Latin maxim ’dura lex sed lex’, which means ’the law is hard, but it  is the law’.  Equity can only supplement the law, but it cannot supplant or  override it.    

Thus, in Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. vs. Muthaluru Bojjappa  AIR 1963 SC 1633 (vide para 12) this Court observed :          "\005\005\005\005what is administered in Courts is justice according to  law, and considerations of fair play and equity however  important they may be, must yield to clear and express  provisions of the law."\005\005..

       In Council for Indian School Certificate Examination vs. Isha  Mittal & Anr. 2000(7) SCC 521 (vide para 4) this Court observed :          "\005\005\005\005Considerations of equity cannot prevail and do not  permit a High Court to pass an order contrary to the law."

       Similarly in P.M. Latha & Anr. vs. State of Kerala & Ors.  2003(3)  SCC 541 (vide para 13) this Court observed :          "Equity and law are twin brothers and law should be  applied and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot override  written or settled law."\005\005..

       In Laxminarayan R. Bhattad & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra &  Anr.  2003(5) SCC 413 (vide para 73) this Court observed :          "It is now well settled that when there is a conflict  between law and equity the former shall prevail."\005\005..

       Similarly in Nasiruddin & Ors. vs. Sita Ram Agarwal  2003(2) SCC  577 (vide para 35) this Court observed :          "In a case where the statutory provision is plain and

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unambiguous, the court shall not interpret the same in a  different manner, only because of harsh consequences arising  therefrom." \005\005..

       Similarly in E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors.  2003(1) SCC 123 (vide para 5) this Court observed :          "\005\005\005\005Equitable considerations have no place where the  statute contained express provisions."\005\005..

       In India House vs. Kishan N. Lalwani  2003(9) SCC 393 (vide para  7) this Court held that :          "\005\005\005\005The period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to  be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed from by  equitable considerations."\005\005..

                                                       (emphasis supplied)  

In the present case, while equity is in favour of the respondent-Bank,  the law is in favour of the appellant, since we are of the opinion that the  impugned order of the High Court is clearly in violation of Section 31 of the  RDB Act, and moreover the claim is time-barred in view of Article 136 of  the Limitation Act read with Section 24 of the RDB Act.  We cannot but  comment that it is the Bank itself which is to blame because after its first  Execution Petition was dismissed on 23.8.1990 it should have immediately  thereafter filed a second Execution Petition, but instead it filed the second  Execution Petition only in 1994 which was dismissed on 18.8.1994.   Thereafter, again, the Bank waited for 5 years and it was only on 1.4.1999  that it filed its third Execution Petition.  We fail to understand why the Bank  waited from 1990 to 1994 and again from 1994 to 1999 in filing its  Execution Petitions.   Hence, it is the Bank which is responsible for not  getting the decree executed well in time.

Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank then submitted that a  purposive interpretation should be put on Section 31 of the RDB Act so that  the bank can recover its dues.   He  relied on the decisions of this Court in  Hindustan Lever Ltd. vs. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others 1995 (6) SCC 326  (vide para 41 & 42), Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur  vs.  Dattatraya Dahankar and another  1992 (1) SCC 361 (vide para 4),  Directorate of Enforcement vs. Deepak Mahajan and another 1994 (3)  SCC 440 (vide para 31), etc.  We are afraid we cannot accept this  contention.  In fact, in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank (supra), the  argument that a purposive interpretation should be put on the provisions of  the RDB Act has been specifically rejected (vide para 34).   

In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO, AIR 1973 SC 1034, this Court  observed:   "In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule  of construction is the literary construction.  All that the Court  has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say.  If  the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the  legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the  other rules of construction of statutes.  The other rules of  construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent  is not clear."

                                                       (emphasis supplied)  

It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost  principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the  literal rule of interpretation.  The other rules of interpretation e.g. the

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mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the  plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if  read literally would nullify the very object of the statute.   Where the words  of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to  the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish  Match AB vs. Securities and Exchange Board, India, AIR 2004 SC 4219.   As held in Prakash Nath Khanna vs. C.I.T. 2004 (9) SCC 686, the  language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative  intent.  The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake.  The  presumption is that it intended to say what it has said.  Assuming there is a  defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot  correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof  produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv  Anand 2004 (11) SCC 625.  Where the legislative intent is clear from the  language, the Court should give effect to it, vide Government of Andhra  Pradesh vs. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association 2004(6) SCC 210,  and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the grab of interpretation.    

As stated by Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court (see ’Of  Law & Men : Papers and Addresses of Felix Frankfurter’) :

"Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large.   They are confined by the nature and scope of the judicial  function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation.  They are under the constraints imposed by the judicial function  in our democratic society.  As a matter of verbal recognition  certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a  stature is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the  legislature.  To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our  democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.  The great  judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need  for discipline in observing the limitations.  A judge must not  rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.  Whatever  temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely  suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and  evisceration.  He must not read in by way of creation.  He must  not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal  contradiction."  

As observed by Lord Granworth in Grundy v. Pinniger, (1852) 1 LJ  Ch 405: " ’To adhere as closely as possible to the literal meaning of the  words used, is a cardinal rule from which if we depart we  launch into a sea of difficulties which it is not easy to fathom."

In other words, once we depart from the literal rule, then any number  of interpretations can be put to a statutory provision, each Judge having a  free play to put his own interpretation as he likes.  This would be destructive  of judicial discipline, and also the basic principle in a democracy that it is  not for the Judge to legislate as that is the task of the elected representatives  of the people. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or  inconvenience, it has to be followed (see G.P. Singh’s Principles of  Statutory Interpretations, 9th Edn. pp 45-49).  Hence departure from the  literal rule should only be done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there  should be judicial restraint in this connection.   

As the Privy Council observed (per Viscount Simonds, L.C.):

"Again and again, this Board has insisted that in construing  enacted words we are not concerned with the policy involved or  with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from

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giving effect to the language used."(see Emperor v. Benoarilal  Sarma, AIR 1945 PC 48, pg. 53).

As observed by this Court in CIT vs. Keshab Chandra Mandal, AIR  1950 SC 265: "Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the  language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear  on the face of the statute".   The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule would come into  play only if there is any doubt with regard to the express language used or if  the plain meaning would lead to an absurdity. Where the words are  unequivocal, there is no scope for importing any rule of interpretation vide  Pandian Chemicals Ltd. vs. C.I.T. 2003(5) SCC 590.                                        It is only where the provisions of a statute are ambiguous that the  Court can depart from a literal or strict construction vide Narsiruddin vs.  Sita Ram Agarwal AIR 2003 SC 1543.  Where the words of a statute are  plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them vide Bhaiji vs. Sub- Divisional Officer, Thandla 2003(1) SCC 692.

No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be made from the  literal rule of the interpretation, e.g. by adopting a purposive construction,  Heydon’s mischief rule, etc. but that should only be done in very exceptional  cases.  Ordinarily it is not proper for the Court to depart from the literal rule  as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which  is not permissible vide J.P. Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.  AIR  2003 SC 1405, State of Jharkhand & Anr.  vs.  Govind Singh  JT 2004(10)  SC 349 etc..  It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court vide  State of Jharkhand & Anr.  vs.  Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349.  In  Jinia Keotin vs. K.S. Manjhi, 2003 (1) SCC 730, this Court observed :

" The Court cannot legislate\005\005.under the grab of  interpretation\005\005".

Hence there should be judicial restraint in this connection, and the  temptation to do judicial legislation should be eschewed by the Courts.  In  fact, judicial legislation is an oxymoron.   

In Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society vs. Swaraj Developers  AIR 2003 SC 2434, this Court observed: "It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot  read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and  unambiguous.  A statute is an edict of the legislature.  The  language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of  legislative intent."

In our opinion, Section 31 is plain and unambiguous and it clearly  says that only those suits or proceedings pending before a Court shall stand  transferred to the Tribunal which were pending on the date when the  Tribunal was established.       

The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that we have to see  the legislative intent when we interpret Section 31.  In our opinion, resort  can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision  of law when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or  ambiguous or leads to some absurdity.  However, when the language is plain  and explicit and does not admit of any doubt, the Court cannot by reference  to an assumed legislative intent expand or alter the plain meaning of an  expression employed by the legislature vide Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa  Shaw, 2002 (4) SCC 539.

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Where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature has to be  gathered from the language used vide Grasim Industries Limited vs.  Collector of Customs 2002 (4) SCC 297 and Union of India vs. Hamsoli  Devi 2002 (7) SCC 273. In Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi and others 2002(7)  SCC (vide para 9), this Court observed :

"It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that  when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then  the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it  would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical  construction on the grounds that such construction is more  consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act."

  The function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to  legislate vide District Mining Officer vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company  2002 (7) SCC 358.  If we accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned  counsel for the respondent we will really be legislating because in the guise  of interpretation we will be really amending Section 31.  

In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit  vs. State of Maharashtra AIR  2001 SC 1980, this Court observed :

"It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the  words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary  or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical  meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or  unless there is something in the context or in the object of the  statute to suggest to the contrary.  The golden rule is that the  words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary  meaning.  It is yet another rule of construction that when the  words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the  Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of  the consequences.  It is said that the words themselves best  declare the intention of the law-giver.  The Courts are adhered  to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to  each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a  sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute  as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper  application in circumstances conceivable within the  contemplation of the statute".  

The same view has been taken by this Court in S. Mehta vs. State of  Maharashtra 2001 (8) SCC 257 (vide para 34) and Patangrao Kaddam vs.  Prithviraj Sajirao Yadav Deshmugh AIR 2001 SC 1121.

The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no  interpretation.  In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without  distorting or twisting its language.   

We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only  followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also followed by the lay man in his  ordinary life.  To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a pencil", then  he means that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the object is a  pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant.  In other words,  the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and  we say what we mean.  If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation,  social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other.  If  we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book.  If we say it  is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be  able to communicate with each other.  Life will become impossible.  Hence,  the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what

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we say and we say what we mean.    

In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the literal rule  applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting Section 31,  since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be  ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity.

In view of the above, we are clearly of the opinion that the recovery in  question is time-barred and it is hereby quashed. The impugned order of the  High Court is set aside.  The appeals are accordingly allowed.  No costs.