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PETITIONER: RAGHUNANDAN SARAN ASHOK SARAN & IRS, ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PEAREY LAL WORKSHOP (P) LTD. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/04/1986

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1682            1986 SCR  (2) 537  1986 SCC  (3)  38        JT 1986   415  1986 SCALE  (1)550

ACT:      Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958,  s.  14(2)  -  Tenant depositing arrears  of rent - When entitled to protection of non-eviction.

HEADNOTE:      The appellants-landlords flied three eviction petitions against not  the three  respondents tenants  in  respect  of different portions of a building situated in New Delhi under section (1)  of the  Delhi and  Ajmer Rent  Control Act 1952 (Act of  19523 on  the ground of non-payment of rent. During the pendency  of the proceedings, the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 (Act of 1958) came into force. The respondents-tenants, however, deposited  the arrears  and got the benefit of non- eviction under  Section 13(2)  of the  Act of  1952 and  the petitions were dismissed      The appellants-landlords  again flied  three  petitions for eviction  of the  respondents on  the  ground  that  the respondents-tenants had  committed a  second default  in the payment of  arrears of  rent. The  respondents deposited the arrears of rent in time as contemplated by section 15 of the Act of 1958 and sought the protection of non-eviction within the meaning  of sub-section  2 of  section 14  of the Act of 1958. The  appellants contended  before the  Additional Rent Controller that  the respondents had derived benefit of non- eviction under  section 13(2)  of the  Act of  1952 once and they were not entitled to get the same benefit under section 14(2) twice  over in  view of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act of 1958. It was argued on behalf of the respondents  that they had deposited the arrears of rent as provided  by 8.15  of the  Act of 1958 and therefore they were entitled to get the benefit of sub-section 2 of section 14 and  the benefit derived by the respondents under section 13(2) of  the Act  of 1952  will not stand in the way of the respondents getting  the benefit of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958. The 538 Additional Rent  Controller dismissed  the petitions holding that the  respondents were  entitled to  the benefit of sub- section 2 of section 14 of the Act on account of the deposit made by them in pursuance of the provisions of section 15 of

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the Act  of 1958  and that  the benefit  once derived by the respondents under  section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not attract the  proviso to  sub-section 2 and they are entitled to the  benefit of  non-eviction under  sub-section 14(2) of the Act  of 1958.  The Rent  Control Tribunal  and the  High Court confirmed  the order of the Additional Rent Controller in the first and second appeal respectively.      Dismissing the appeals by the appellants, ^      HELD: 1.  The respondents  cannot be  deprived  of  the benefit of section 14(2) of the 1958 Act merely because they had obtained  similar benefit under sub-section 2 of section 13 of the Act of 1952. [546 F-G]      2(i). If  the words  of statute  are clear, there is no question of  interpretation.  Grammatical  construction  has been accepted as the golden rule. [546 F]      2(ii).  Sub-section   2  of  s.  14  of  the  1958  Act contemplates to  give  the  benefit  to  a  tenant  of  non- eviction, if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by  section   15.  Obviously,   therefore,   sub-section   2 contemplates that  the benefit  of non-eviction  under  this sub-section can  be given  only to  a tenant  who has made a deposit as  required by  section 15  of  the  Act  of  1958. Therefore, the  deposit made  under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952  has been  completely excluded by sub-section 2. The proviso to  sub-section 2  also puts  a bar  on deriving the benefit under this sub-section i.e. sub-section 2 of section 14; thus  if the  expressions "deposit,  under-section 15 in sub-section 2  of section  14" and  "such  benefit"  in  the proviso thereto  is given a meaning, there is no escape from the conclusion  that no  second benefit  can be  given to  a tenant if  he had  already received  the benefit  under sub- section 2  by deposit made in accordance with the provisions of section 15 of the Act of 1958. [545 C-E]      3. Sub-section  2 of  s. 57  is  a  saving  clause  and provides that notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1952, 539 all suits  and other  proceedings under the said Act pending at the  commencement of  this Act, before any court or other authority shall  be continued  and disposed of in accordance with the  provisions of the said act, as if the said Act hat continued in force and this Act had not been passed. In view of  this  clear  saving  clause  the  deposit  made  by  the respondents must  be taken  to be  a deposit  under  section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and if the case is covered squarely by sub-section  2 of  section 57, it is not at all necessary to take  into consideration the other provisions of the Act. [545 H; 546 A-B]      4. There is marked difference between the provisions of 8. 13(2)  of the Act of 1952 and 88. 14(2) and 15 of the Act of 1958.  Section 15(2)  is  redically  different  from  the provisions of  section 13 of the old Act and the distinction between the  two sections  has been  clearly made out by the Delhi High  Court in  Dhan Raj  Jayna v.  S.P. Singh, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 297. [546 E-F]      Dhan Raj  Jayna v.  S,P, Singh,  A.I.R. 1973 Delhi 297, approved.      J.K. Steel Ltd, v. Union of India, [1969] 2 S.C.R. 481, 497, referred to. E

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1921 of 1976 etc.

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    From the Order dated 17.9.75 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 144 of 1975.      Madan Bhatia and Sushil Kumar for the appellants.      R.P. Bhatt and Parveen Kumar for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G      R.B. MISRA,  J.  The  fate  of  the  present  connected appeals by  special leave  hinges upon the interpretation of section  14(2)   of  the   Delhi  Rent   Control  Act,  1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1958").      Premises No.  9607 known as Pyare Lal Building, Janpath and Tolstoy  Marg, New  Delhi, is  owned by  the appellants. Three 540 different portions  of the  said building  were let  out  to three different  firms, M/s.  Pearey Lal  Workshop (P) Ltd., M/s. Ghaziabad  Engineering Co. (P) Ltd. and M/s. Pearey Lal & Sons,  on agreed rent of Rs. 400, Rs. 273 and Rs. 1094 per month respectively.      The tenants-respondents  had applied  for  fixation  of standard rent  before the Rent Controller who fixed standard rent of  the three  premises but  on appeal the order of the Rent Controller  fixing standard  rent was  set aside by the High Court  by its order dated May 22, 1972 holding that the tenants were liable to pay the agreed rent.       It  appears that  the tenants  fell in arrears of rent and did  not pay  the same  in spite of service of notice of demand. The  appellants, therefore,  were compelled  to file three different  petitions for  eviction of  the respondents under section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 (hereinafter  referred to as the "Act of 1952"). During the pendency  of the  proceedings the  Act of 1958 came into force. The tenants however deposited the arrears and got the benefit of  non-eviction under  section 13(2)  of the Act of 1952 which provides that no decree or order for the recovery of possession  of any premises shall be passed on the ground of default  in payment  of rent if, on the first date of the hearing of  the proceedings  for  eviction  or  within  such further time as may be allowed by the court, the tenant pays in cash the arrears of rent then due together with the costs of the suit.      The  respondents  again  committed  a  default  in  the payment of arrears of rent and failed to pay the same within two months of the service of notice of demand as required by Clause (a)  of sub-section  1 of  section 14  of the  Act of 1958. The  appellants therefore filed three petitions giving rise to  the present  appeals for  eviction on the ground of second default.  The  respondents,  however,  deposited  the arrears of rent within one month of the date of the order as contemplated by section 15 of the Act of 1958 and sought the protection of non-eviction within the meaning of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958. The appellants, however, sought the  advantage of  the proviso  to sub-section  2  of section 14  and alleged that the respondents had derived the benefit of 541 non-eviction under section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 once and they are  not entitled to get the same benefit under section 14(2) twice  over in  view of  the proviso to sub-section of section 14 of the Act of 1958.      These petitions  for  eviction  were  resisted  by  the respondents  on  the  ground,  inter  alia,  that  they  had deposited B the arrears of rent as provided by section 15 of the Act  of 1958.  They were  entitled to get the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 14 and the benefit derived by the respondents under  section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 will not

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stand in  the way  of the respondents getting the benefit of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act of 1958.      The Additional  Rent Controller dismissed the petitions of the appellants holding that the respondents were entitled to the  benefit of sub-section 2 of section 14 of the Act on account of  the deposit  made by  them in  pursuance of  the provisions of  section 15  of the Act of 1958. He was of the view that  the benefit once derived by the respondents under section 13(2)  of the  Act of  1952  will  not  attract  the proviso to  sub-section 2  and  they  are  entitled  to  the benefit of  non-eviction under  section 14(2)  of the Act of 1958.      The appellants  feeling aggrieved  took up  the  matter before the  Rent Control  Tribunal by  way of appeal but the Tribunal relying upon Dhan Raj Jayna v. S.P. Singh, A.I.R. 1973 Delhi  297 dismissed the appeal. The appellants took up the matter  to the  High Court  in second  appeal but  those appeals also  met the  same fate.  The appellants  have  now approached this Court by special leave.      The only  point  that  survives  for  consideration  is whether the  respondents are entitled to the benefit of sub- section 2  of section 14 of the Act of 1958 and the decision of this  question depends  upon the  interpretation of  sub- section 2 together with its proviso.      Section 13(1)  of the  1952 Act,  insofar as  material, reads :           "13.(1) Notwithstanding  anything to  the contrary           in any  other law  or any  contract, no  decree or           order 542           for the  recovery of  possession of  any  premises           shall be passed by any Court in favour of landlord           against  any  tenant  (including  a  tenant  whose           tenancy is terminated.)           Provided that  nothing in  this sub-section  shall           apply to  any suit  or other  proceeding for  such           recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied.           (a) that  the tenant has neither paid nor tendered           the whole  of the  arrears of  rent due within one           month of  the date on which a notice of demand for           the arrears  of rent has been served on him by the           landlord in  the manner provided in section 106 of           the Transfer  of Property  Act, 1882 (IV of 1882);           or           (2) No  decree or order for recovery of possession           shall be  passed on the ground specified in clause           (a) of  the proviso to sub-section (1), if, on the           first day  of the  hearing of  the suit  or within           such further  time as may be allowed by the Court,           the tenant  pays in Court the arrears of rent then           due together with the costs of the suit. The corresponding provision to s.13 of the 1952 Act is s. 14 of the 1958 Act. In so far as material it reads :           "14.(1) Notwithstanding  anything to  the contrary           contained in  any other  law or contract, no order           or decree  for the  recovery of  possession of any           premises shall  be made by any court or Controller           in favour of the landlord against a tenant.           Provided  that   the   Controller   may,   on   an           application made  to him in the prescribed manner,           make an  order for  the recovery  of possession of           the premises  on one  or  more  of  the  following           grounds only, namely:-           (a) that  the tenant has neither paid nor tendered           the whole  of the  arrears  of  the  rent  legally

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         recoverable from him within two months of the date 543           On which  a notice  of demand  for the  arrears of           rent A  has been  served on him by the landlord in           the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer           of Property Act, 1882;           ..................................................           (2) No order for the recovery of possession of any           premises shall  be made on the ground specified in           clause (a)  of the  proviso to sub-section (1), if           the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by           section 15;           Provided that  no tenant  shall be entitled to the           benefit  under   this  sub-section,   if,   having           obtained such  benefit  once  in  respect  of  any           premises he  again makes  a default in the payment           of rent  of those  premises for  three consecutive           months."      The learned  single Judge  of the  Delhi High  Court in Dhan Raj  Jayna v.  S.P.  Singh  (Supra)  dealing  with  the interpretation of  sub-section 2  of section  14 observed as follows :           "Once the  tenant pays the arrears of rent and the           future rent in accordance with section 15(1) he is           entitled to  the benefit  of section 14(2) to have           the petition for eviction dismissed. me proviso to           section 14(2)  however, denies  to the tenant such           benefit for  a second  time. He  can thus get such           benefit only  once, it  is to  be noted  that  the           previous suit was dismissed by Shri Tandon and the           dismissal was  confirmed by  the High  Court under           section 13(2)  of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control           Act, 1952.  The provisions  of section  13(2) were           not in  pari materia  to the provisions of section           14(2) of  the Delhi  Rent Control  Act,  1958.  me           payment under  section 13(2) of the old Act was to           be made  on the  first  hearing  of  the  suit  or           without such further time as may be allowed by the           Court. On  the other  hand, under Section 14(2) of           the new  Act, in  addition to  the arrears of rent           the Controller  can  also  order  the  payment  of           pendente lite rent. Under section 13(2) of the old           Act there was no provision 544           for the payment of pendente lite rent. The benefit           of section 14(2) under the new Act is available on           payment of  the arrears  as well  as the  pendente           lite rent.  In view  of these  differences between           the two  provisions it  cannot be  said  that  the           dismissal of  the previous suit by Shri Tandon was           under Section  14(2) of the new Act. me benefit of           Section  14(2)  is  being  given  to  the  tenant,           therefore, for  the  first  time  in  the  present           proceedings. m  e proviso  to section 14(2) is not           therefore, a  bar to  the grant of this benefit to           him."       Shri  Bhatia appearing  for the  appellants  contended that the  aforesaid observation made in the reported case is only by way of obiter dicta inasmuch as no arguments were in fact advanced as to the true interpretation and the scope of section 14(2) of the Act of 1958 and it appears to have been assumed in  this case  by the  parties  concerned  that  the benefit of  non-eviction on  account of  non-payment of rent derived by  a tenant  under the old Act cannot be taken into consideration under section 14(2) of the Act of 1958.

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    This contention, in our opinion, has no force. The High Court of Delhi had construed the provisions of section 14(2) as  there   was  a   dispute  between  the  parties  on  the interpretation of section 14(2). The construction put by the High Court on the interpretation of sub-section 2 of section 14 along  with the proviso thereto is fully warranted by the language of this section.      Shri  Bhatia  laid  much  emphasis  on  the  expression "having obtained  such benefit  once". According to him, the expression is  wide enough to include even a benefit derived under the  Act of  1952. It  was further  contended  by  the counsel that  if the  Legislature intended to put any fetter on the  wide expression  used in  the proviso  it would have clearly said  so that  the benefit  derived under the Act of 1952 disentitled  a tenant  from ting the benefit of section 14(2) the  Act of  1958. As a second limb of his contention, Shri Bhatia,  further submitted that under the Act of 1952 a tenant could  commit default  times without  number and each time  he  could  get  the  benefit  of  non-eviction  if  he deposited the rent on the first day of the hearing. A tenant could tire out the landlord by 545 adopting such an attitude. me Legislature, therefore, wanted A to  remove the vice of the Act of 1952 and that is why the proviso to sub-section 2 of section 14 contemplates that the benefit of  non-eviction once  derived by  the tenant  under sub-section 2 of section 14 will not be given the benefit of non-eviction for the second time.      There is  no denying  the  fact  that  the  Legislature wanted to  remove the  vice of  the Act  of 1952 but to what extent the  tenant will  be deprived  of the benefit of sub- section 2 of section 14 will depend upon the expression used by the  Legislature in the section. The argument advanced by Shri Bhatia  loses sight  of certain  words of sub-section 2 and of  the proviso  thereto. Sub-section  2 contemplates to give the  benefit to  a tenant of non-eviction if the tenant makes  payment   or  deposit  as  required  by  section  15. Obviously, therefore,  sub-section 2  contemplates that  the benefit of  non-eviction under this sub-section can be given only to  a tenant  who has  made a  deposit as  required  by section 15  of the  Act of 1958. therefore, the deposit made under section  13(2) of  the Act of 1952 has been completely excluded by  sub-section 2. me proviso to sub-section 2 also puts a  bar on  deriving the  benefit under this sub-section i.e. sub-section  2 of  section 14,  thus if the expressions "deposit under-section  15 in  sub-section 2  of section 14" and "such  benefit"  in  the  proviso  thereto  is  given  a meaning, there  is no  escape from  the conclusion  that  no second benefit  can be  given to  a tenant if he had already received the  benefit under sub-section 2 by deposit made in accordance with  the provisions  of section 15 of the Act of 1958.      It was further contended on the strength of the proviso to sub-section 2 of section 57 of the Act of 1958, that even if the  deposit was  made under  section 13(2) of the Act of 1952 during  the pendency  of the  Act of 1958, the Court or the authority  shall have  to take  into  consideration  the provisions of the Act of 1958 and in that view of the matter it can  safely be  assumed that  the  deposit  made  by  the respondents during  the pendency  of the  Act of  1958 is  a deposit within  the meaning  of section  15 of  Act of 1958. Thus argument  again ignores  sub-section 2  of section  57. Sub-section  2   is  a   saving  clause  and  provides  that notwithstanding the repeal of the Act of 1952, all suits and other proceedings under the said Act

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546 pending at the commencement of this Act, before any Court or other authority  shall  be  continued  and  disposed  of  in accordance with  the provisions  of the  said Act, as if the said Act  had continued  in force  and this act had not been passed. In  view of  this clear  saving clause,  the deposit made by  the respondents must be taken to be a deposit under section 13(2)  of the Act of 1952 and if the case is covered squarely by  sub-section 2  of section  57 it  is not at all necessary to take into consideration the other provisions of the Act.       Shri Bhatia further contended that the benefit, either under the  Act of 1952 or the Act of 1958, afforded a tenant the benefit  of non-eviction  and this benefit was identical in both these sections 13(2) of the Act of 1952 and 14(2) of the Act  of 1958.  Section 13(2)  of the old Act and section 14(2) of the new Act, according to learned counsel, form one scheme, one code and re-enforce each other and in support of this contention  he relies  on J.K.  Steel Ind.  v. Union of India, [1969]  2 S.C.R.  481, 497.  He contends  that  these sections are in pari materia and the modification introduced by section  14(2) and  section 15 of the Act of 1958 is only regarding the  mode of  deposit. We  find  it  difficult  to accept this  contention either.  There is  marked difference between the  three provisions.  Section 15(2)  is  radically different from  the provisions  of section 13 of the old Act and the  distinction  between  the  two  sections  has  been clearly made  out by  the Delhi  High Court in the aforesaid reported decision.  If once we accept the interpretation put forward by  the Tribunal  on section  14(2)  read  with  the proviso thereto it is not at all necessary to enter into the alterative contentions  raised by  Shri Bhatia. If the words of  statute   are   clear,   there   is   no   question   of interpretation. Grammatical  construction has  been accepted as the  golden rule and so construed, the respondents cannot be deprived  of the  benefit of section 14(2) merely because they had  obtained similar  benefit under  sub-section 2  of section 13  of the  Act of  1952. We see no reason to differ from the view taken by the Tribunal as confirmed by the High Court.      In  the   result  the   appeals  must  fail.  They  are accordingly dismissed  but in the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. M.L.A.                                    Appeals dismissed. 547