NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2126 OF 2004

Smt. Rafeeqan (Dead) by Lr.  ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

Smt. Hussan Bano ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  

judgment  and  order  dated  27th May  2003  

passed  by  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  Civil  

Revision No.754 of 2002. By the impugned  

judgment and order, the High Court affirmed  

the order of the Additional Rent Controller  

dated 27th May, 2002 by which the Additional  

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Rent Controller dismissed the application  

of the appellant for leave to defend in the  

eviction  proceeding  filed  against  her  by  

the respondent under Section 14-D of the  

Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter, ‘the  

said Act’).

2. The material facts of the case are that the  

respondent, a widow, filed a petition under  

Section  14-D  of  the  said  Act  to  recover  

immediate  possession  of  the  premises  of  

which  the  appellant  is  a  tenant  in  one  

room,  kitchen,  bathroom,  latrine  and  

courtyard on the first floor of property  

No.4899-A  Gali  Maulvi  Abdul  Rahim,  Bara  

Hindu Rao, Dehli at a rent of Rs.100/- per  

month and other charges.  

3. Admittedly,  the  respondent  purchased  the  

property in question by a registered sale  

deed dated 31.10.1961 and the appellant was  

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inducted as a tenant in the said property  

by  the  previous  owner.  In  the  eviction  

petition it was stated by the respondent-

landlord that she and her family require  

the  tenanted  premises  for  her  own  

residential  purposes.  When  such  eviction  

petition  came  before  the  Court  of  the  

Additional Rent Controller, Delhi the Court  

recorded that nobody appeared on behalf of  

the  appellant  in  spite  of  notice  in  the  

newspaper  and  no  leave  application  was  

filed.  However,  the  Additional  Rent  

Controller,  Delhi  by  judgment  and  order  

dated  18.3.1999  dismissed  the  eviction  

petition  filed  by  the  respondent  herein,  

inter alia, on the ground that the tenanted  

premises was let out by the previous owner  

from whom the respondent herein purchased  

the tenanted premises.  It was not let out  

either by the respondent herein or by her  

husband or by any of her blood relations  

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and  the  Additional  Rent  Controller  held  

that Section 14-B of the said Act does not  

apply.   

4.  Challenging  the  said  order  a  revision  

petition  was  filed  by  the  respondent  

herein.  In  such  revision  petition,  the  

Delhi High Court vide order dated 11.9.2000  

was pleased to set aside the order dated  

18.3.1999  passed  by  the  Additional  Rent  

Controller, Delhi and the Delhi High Court  

was pleased to direct the Additional Rent  

Controller to decide the eviction petition  

on  merits.   The  Delhi  High  Court  was  

pleased to hold as follows:-

“Admit.

The  petitioner  is  aggrieved  by  an  order dated 18th March, 1999 passed by the  learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.  

The petitioner was non-suited on the  ground that the suit premises were not let  out by her husband or by her but were in  

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fact  let  out  by  the  predecessor-in- interest of the petitioner.

The admitted position is that the suit  premises were purchased by the petitioner  some  time  in  1961.   She,  unfortunately,  became a widow in 1980.   

It has been held by various judgments  of this Court such as Mr. B.M. Chanana Vs.  Union of India and others, 1990 (18) DRJ  55;  Mrs.  Sarla  Luthra  Vs.  M/s.  Gedore  Tools (India) Pvt. Ltd., 1993 (25) DRJ 52  and Bhupinder Singh Vs. Janak Rani, 1948  (47)  DRJ  789  that  the  provisions  of  Section  14-D  of  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  cannot  be  given  restricted  meaning.  It  is  immaterial  that  the  suit  premises were let out by the predecessor- in-interest or the widow.  The expression  “letting out by her or by her husband” has  to  be  given  a  wider  meaning  including  therein the predecessor-in-interest of the  widow.

Under these circumstances, I am of the  view that the impugned order passed by the  learned Additional Rent Controller cannot  be sustained.

The learned Additional Rent Controller  should now decide the eviction petition on  merits.

The  parties  will  appear  before  the  learned Additional Rent Controller on 25th  September, 2000.”   

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5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant  

in this case mainly argued on two points.  

His first submission is that the decision  

of  the  Delhi  High  Court  quoted  above  is  

erroneous  in  view  of  subsequent  

Constitution Bench decision of this Court  

in Nathi Devi vs. Radha Devi Gupta – (2005)  2 SCC 271.  

6. The  Constitution  Bench  in  Nathi  Devi  (supra) was formed in view of divergence of  

opinion between two Benches of this Court  

on the interpretation of Section 14-D of  

the said Act.  

7. For proper appreciation of the points at  

issue, the provision of Section 14-D of the  

said Act is set out below:-

14D. Right to recover immediate possession  of premises to accrue to a widow. – (1)  Where  the  landlord  is  a  widow  and  the  premises  let  out  by  her,  or  by  her  

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husband, are required by her for her own  residence, she may apply to the Controller  for recovering the immediate possession of  such premises.  

(2) Where the landlord referred to in  sub-section (1) has let out more than one  premises, it shall he open to her to make  an application under that sub-section in  respect of any one of the  premises chosen  by her.”  

8. In  Nathi Devi (supra) this Court noticed  the  difference  of  opinion  between  the  

decision  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

Surjit  Singh  Kalra vs.  Union  of  India,  (1991) 2 SCC 87, and the decision of this  

Court in Kanta Goel vs. B.P. Pathak, (1977)  2 SCC 814.

9. The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  

Nathi Devi (supra), upholding the reasoning  given by this Court in  Surjit Singh Kalra  (supra)  held as follows:  

“…The expression “let out by her, or by  her  husband”  is  not  an  expression  which  

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permits  of  any  ambiguity.  We  must,  therefore, give it its normal meaning. So  understood  the  conclusion  is  inescapable  that  the  legislative  intent  was  only  to  confer a special right on a limited class  of  widows  viz.  the  widow  who  let  the  premises  or  whose  husband  had  let  the  premises  before  his  death,  and  which  premises  the  widow  requires  for  her  own  use.” (Para 28, page 284 of the report)

10. The  Constitution  Bench  made  the  position  

further  clear  in  paragraph  32,  in  the  

following words:-

“…Section  14-D  benefits  only  a  class  of  widows viz. a widow who or whose husband  had let out the premises. If the intention  was  to  benefit  all  widows,  the  section  would  have  provided  that  a  widow  is  entitled to obtain immediate possession of  the  premises  owned  by  her  and  the  expressions  “let  out  by  her  or  by  her  husband”  and  “such  premises”  in  Section  14-D would be redundant….”  

11. Again in the same paragraph it was held as  

follows:

“….in our view, Section 14-D insists that  the premises must be one let out by her or  by  her  husband.  A  widow  or  her  late  husband who acquired a tenanted premises  by  sale  or  transfer  cannot  invoke  the  provisions of Section 14-D to evict a pre- existing tenant.”

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12. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation  

of law by the Constitution Bench of this  

Court on Section 14-D of the said Act, the  

judgment of the Delhi High Court, extracted  

above, is clearly erroneous.

13. It may be true that the decision of the  

Delhi High Court, extracted above, giving a  

different  interpretation  of  Section  14-D  

was not challenged by the appellant herein.  

But  the  High  Court  judgment  on  

interpretation of Section 14-D is clearly  

erroneous  in  view  of  the  subsequent  

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court  

in  Nathi  Devi (supra).  The  Constitution  Bench decision in  Nathi Devi (supra), in  view of the mandate of Article 141 of the  

Constitution is binding on all subordinate  

Courts and Delhi High Court and the rights  

of  the  parties  in  a  pending  proceeding  

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under Section 14-D of the said Act must be  

governed by the law laid down in Nathi Devi  (supra).

14. The learned counsel for the appellant has,  

however, argued another point, namely, that  

there is no relationship of landlord and  

tenant  between  the  appellant  and  the  

respondent.   

15. In view of the decision of this Court in  

Nathi Devi (supra), this Court need not go  into the aforesaid question.   

16. Following the Constitution Bench judgment  

of this Court in  Nathi Devi (supra) this  Court  allows  the  appeal  and  holds  that  

provision of Section 14-D is not applicable  

for eviction of the appellant in this case,  

since  she  is  admittedly  a  pre-existing  

tenant  on  the  premises  prior  to  the  

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purchase of the property by the husband of  

the respondent landlord.   

17. This Court, however, makes it clear that  

the respondent-landlord, if so advised, is  

at liberty to initiate eviction proceedings  

against  the  appellant  in  accordance  with  

law.   The  appeal  is,  thus,  allowed.  The  

impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  is  set  

aside. No order as to costs.   

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) September 6, 2010

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