28 February 1997
Supreme Court
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RAE BARELLI KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK Vs BHOLA NATH SINGH

Bench: K. RAMASWAMY,SUJATA V. MAMOHAR
Case number: C.A. No.-001826-001826 / 1997
Diary number: 79250 / 1996
Advocates: Vs RACHNA GUPTA


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PETITIONER: RAI BARELI KSHETRIYA GRAMIN BANK

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHOLA NATH SINGH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       28/02/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, SUJATA V. MAMOHAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.  We have  heard learned  counsel on both sides.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  single Judge  of the  Allahabad High  Court, made on April 19,1996 in writ Petition no. 10200/90.      The admitted  position is  that the  respondent,  while working as  cashier-cum-clerk in  the  appellant  Bank,  was charged  with   the  allegation  that  he  had  fraudulently withdrawn a  sum of Rs. 28,500/- on different dates from the saving accounts  of different account holders by forging the bank records  and signatures  of  the  saving  bank  account holders. A  charge sheet  was served  upon him  to which the respondent gave his reply. An enquiry was conducted in which he did not participate. Proceedings were conducted ex-parte. Then, the enquiry officer, after detailed examination of the evidence adduced,  recorded findings that the respondent was guilty of  misconduct for  forgery of the signatures and for fraudulent  withdrawal   of  the  amounts.  Accordingly,  he submitted his  report. The  disciplinary authority  on April 17, 1989  had given the respondent a show cause notice as to why the  punishment of  dismissal should  not be  imposed on him. The  respondent submitted  his reply  there to on April 11,  1990.   On  consideration   thereof,  the  disciplinary authority imposed  the  punishment  of  the  dismissal  from service. In  appeal, the  Board had  considered  the  entire record and  confirmed the  order dismissing  the  respondent from service.  The respondent  , thereafter,  filed the writ petition in  the High court. The learned judge has gone into the merits of the matter and found that the charges have not been  proved.  Ultimately,  he  quashed  the  punishment  of dismissal from service. Thus, this appeal by special leave,      Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General, has contended that the procedure adopted by the leaned Judge is not  correct in  law. Even  the  writ  petition  was  not maintainable because  the alternative remedy of adjudication under the  Industrial Disputes  Act is Available. Therefore, the order  of the  learned single Judge is vitiated by error of law.  Shri Yogeshwar  Prasad, learned  senior counsel for respondent, contends that all the steps taken by the enquiry

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officer in  conducting enquiry  were not  in accordance with law. The  Branch Manager has admitted in a letter that he is responsible  for   the  withdrawal   of  the   amounts;  the respondent was made a scapegoat; the hand writing expert was not examined  in the  enquiry and,  therefore, there  is  no admissible evidence  to show  that the respondent had forged the signatures  of the  account holders  and  withdrawn  the amount. His  application to  summon the witness and to cross examine them  was denied violating the principles of natural justice. The  High court,  therefore, was  right in  holding that the charges have not been proved against the respondent beyond doubt.      Having regard  to the  respective contentions, the only question that  arises  for  consideration  is:  whether  the conclusion reached  by the  High court is correct in law? It is not  in dispute  that  the  procedural  steps  under  the disciplinary rules,  required by  the appellant,  have  been followed. After  the enquiry  was concluded  and report  was submitted, the  disciplinary authority  had given him a show cause notice  to the proposed punishment and the  respondent also submitted  his explanation.  After consideration of the report and  the  reply,  the  punishment  of  dismissal  was imposed by  the  disciplinary  authority  against  which  an appeal was  filed. At that stage, he made an application for summoning  the   witnesses  afresh.   That  application  was dismissed by  the appellate  authority. That  order also was allowed to  become final.  The appeal  was dismissed  by the Board.      Under these circumstances, the question arises: whether the High  Court would  be correct  in law  to appreciate the evidence and  the manner  in which  the evidence as examined and to  record a  finding in the behalf? The judicial review is not  akin to  adjudication of  the case  on merits  as an appellate authority.  The High  court,  in  the  proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within  the limits  of judicial  review to correct errors of  law or  procedural  errors  leading  to  manifest injustice or  voidation of principles of natural justice. In this case,  no such  errors were pointed out nor any finding in that  behalf was recorded by the High court. On the other hand, the  High Court  examined the  evidence as  if it is a Court of  first appeal  and reversed  the  finding  of  fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority.  Under   these  circumstances,  the  question  of examining the  evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate  court, is  wholly  illegal  and  cannot  be sustained.      Accordingly, we  set aside  the order of the High court and allow  the appeal.  consequently, the order of dismissal stands upheld. No costs.