REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 423 OF 2002

Radhey Shyam Aggarwal ..Appellant

Versus

State N.C.T. Delhi   ..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

1. The only point urged in this appeal is that the High Court ought to

have held that  the provisions of Section 16-A of the Prevention of Food

Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short the ‘Act’) providing for summary trial are

mandatory. While  In the instant  case the trial  Court  adopted the  warrant

case procedure.  

2. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that

no prejudice has been shown by the appellant and in any event there is no

absolute bar on the Court to adopting warrant procedure in a given case.  

3. Section 16-A of the Act reads as follows:

“16-A.  Power  of  Court  to  try  cases  summarily.  - Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of Sec.16 shall be tried in a summary way by  a  Judicial  Magistrate  of  the  first  class  specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sec. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial:

Provided that  In the case of  any conviction  in  a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year :

Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of a summary trial under this section, It appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such  that  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  a  term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for  any  other  reason,  undesirable  to  try  the  case summarily the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record  an  order  to  that  effect  and thereafter  recall  any witness  who may have  been examined  and proceed  to hear or  rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.”   

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4. From  the  order  of  the  trial  Court  it  is  clear  that  the  case  was

proceeded  in  the  manner  provided  for  trial  of  warrant  cases  and  the

prosecution was directed to lead pre charge evidence and such evidence was

led.  At no stage there was any challenge to the procedure adopted.  In fact

second proviso to Section 16-A permits such a course to be adopted.   

5. It is the case of the appellant that the Magistrate had not heard the

parties and/or recorded an order to the effect that the case was such that

sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be

passed.   

6. As noted above, this was not the case of the appellant at any stage and

for the first time in the Special Leave Petition such a stand was taken.  

7. Additionally, as rightly contended by learned counsel for the State no

prejudice has been shown. In that view of the matter we are not inclined to

accept the stand that there was any violation of the requirements of Section

16-A of the Act.  However, we find that the occurrence took place nearly

two decades  back  and  the  infractions  related  to  a  small  quantity  of  ‘lal

mirch’. The sentence imposed is 15 months.  It is accepted that the appellant

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has already suffered custody for more than a year.  That  being so,  in the

peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case  we reduce  the  sentence  to  the  period

already undergone.  Bail bonds executed for giving effect to the order for

bail  dated  11.2.2002  shall  stand  discharged.   With  the  aforesaid

modification of sentence the appeal is disposed of.  

………………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………………….J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi, February 06, 2009

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