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PETITIONER: RACHAPUDI SUBBA RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL, ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/12/1980

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR  755            1981 SCR  (2) 320  1981 SCC  (2) 577

ACT:      Contempt of  Courts Act  1971-Sections 2(c),  3 and 13- Scope of-Contemner  attributed  mala  fides  to  a  judicial officer in  a judgment  which went against him-Notice issued by the  contemner during  pendency of execution proceedings- Whether amounts to contempt.      Words and Phrases : "due course of justice"-meaning of

HEADNOTE:      The  appellant   was  the   plaintiff  in  a  suit  for declaration of title in respect of a building. The defendant in that suit filed another suit claiming damages against the appellant. Both  the suits were heard by the Additional Sub- Judge who  by a  common judgment,  dismissed the appellant’s suit and decreed the defendant’s suit.      The appellant thereupon issued notice to the Additional Sub  Judge  alleging  that  he  (the  Additional  Sub-Judge) "created new  facts", had  "intentionally and with bad faith and maliciously disordered the existing oral and documentary evidence with  a view  to help  the plaintiff" in the second suit, had  "maintained different  standards even with regard to self-serving statements" and that these acts could not be said to  have been  done in  the discharge  of his  judicial duties within  the limits  of his jurisdiction in good faith and threatened  to seek  redress if  damages claimed  by him were not paid.      The Additional  Sub Judge  submitted this notice to the High Court  for suitable  action  being  taken  against  the appellant. At  the instance  of the  High Court the Advocate General  instituted   contempt   proceedings   against   the appellant. Negativing  the  appellant’s  defences  the  High Court convicted  him holding that the passages in the notice were per se scandalous and scurrilous, that the notice was a deliberate and  determined attempt  to scandalise  the Judge and the  Court by imputing lack of good faith and mala fides to a  judicial officer  in the  discharge  of  his  judicial duties and  that what the appellant had stated in the notice was clearly  ’criminal contempt’  as defined in section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act.      In appeal  to this  Court the  appellant contended  (i) that bad  faith and  malice stated by him in the notice were facts constituting  the cause  of action;  (ii) that  in any

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event  since  the  suit  had  been  disposed  of,  execution proceedings  did   not  constitute  a  pending  matter  and, therefore, what  he stated  fell  within  the  exception  of section 3,  particularly the  Explanation and  lastly, (iii) assuming that his action technically amounted to contempt of court no sentence could be imposed on him in view of section 13 of  the Act  under which a person cannot be convicted for contempt under the court is satisfied 321 that it  substantially interferes  or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD :  The tone,  temper and  contents of  the  notice imputing  malice,   partiality   and   dishonesty   to   the Subordinate  Judge   constitute  a   deliberate  attempt  to scandalise the  Judge, to  embarrass him  and to  lower  the authority of  his office  and the Court. The act and conduct of  the  appellant  in  issuing  the  impugned  notice  fell squarely within  sub-clauses (i)  and (ii) of the definition of ‘criminal  contempt’ in  section 2(c)  of the Contempt of Courts Act. [326G-H]      The contempt  committed by the appellant is serious and gross. He has recklessly imputed mala fides and lack of good faith to  the judicial  officer who  had  decided  the  case against  him.   The  imputations  were  per  se  scandalous, actuated by  bad faith.  He did not even pretend to give any reason either  in the notice or in the counter-affidavit for the alleged  malicious attitude  on the part of the judicial officer. Even  in this court he has not relented. He has not adopted, even  obliquely, an  attitude of  contrition  or  a pretence of remorse. [329 H]      1. Section  1 of the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered  to be done by a judicial officer in his judicial capacity, namely (1) acts which are within the limits of his jurisdiction and  (2)  acts  which  though  not  within  his jurisdiction were  done or  ordered to  be done believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction. The protection afforded by the  statute to  the first  category is  absolute and  no enquiry will  be entertained  that the  act in  question was erroneous or done without behaving in good faith. [325 B-E]      The expression  "jurisdiction" has  been  used  in  the section in  a wide sense meaning "generally the authority of the judicial officer to act in the matters". If the judicial officer had  the general  authority to enter upon an enquiry into the  cause, action  etc. in  the course  of  which  the impugned act  was done,  his act,  even if  erroneous, would still be  within his  "jurisdiction". The  mere fact that it was erroneous  would not  put it  beyond his "jurisdiction". Therefore, if  the judicial  officer is  found to  have been acting in  the discharge  of his  judicial duties,  then, in order to  exclude him  from the  protection of this statute, the complainant  has to  establish  that  (a)  the  judicial officer was  acting without  any jurisdiction whatsoever and (b) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction. [325 H]      In  the   instant  case   the  judicial   officer   had jurisdiction to try the suits. The acts characterised by the appellant as "wrong", "malicious", and "dishonest" were acts done in the discharge of his judicial duties i.e. within the exercise of  his jurisdiction  and,  therefore,  those  acts enjoy absolute  protection against  civil action. The notice in question can not be said to have been issued bona fide as a preliminary  lawful step  to the  filing of a suit against

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the subordinate Judge. [326 D]      2. Section  3(2) is  not applicable to this category of contempt which falls under sub-clause (i) of section 2(c) or which is  otherwise of a kind different from those mentioned in section 3(1). 322      In the  instant case  though the contempt committed was not in  connection with any pending proceeding, it primarily and squarely  fell under sub-clause (i) though the aforesaid residuary phrase  in sub-clause (iii) may also be attracted. An unfounded  imputation of  mala fides,  bias, prejudice or ridiculing the  performance of a Judge or casting aspersions on his  integrity is  always considered to mean scandalising the Court  and  lowering  the  authority  of  his  Court  by bringing him  and his  office into disrespect and disrepute. Vilification of the Judge, even in administrative matters or decided judicial  matters, may amount to "criminal contempt" under sub-clause  (i) of  section 2(c) as it lowers or tends to  lower   the  authority   or  dignity  of  the  Court  by undermining public  confidence in  the capacity of the Judge to mete out evenhanded and impartial justice. [328 H]      3. The  amplitude of  the words "due course of justice’ in section  13 is  wider than  the words  "due course of any judicial proceedings" or "administration of justice" used in sub-clause (ii)  or (iii)  of section  2(c). The contempt of court committed  by the appellant falls under sub-clause (i) and also  within the  amplitude of  sub-clause (iii). If the act complained  against scandalizes  the judicial officer in regard to  the discharge  of his judicial functions, thereby substantially interferes  or tends  to interfere  with  "due course of  justice" which is a facet of the broad concept of the "administration  of  justice"  it  is  punishable  under section 13. [329 F-G]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 172 of 1975.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  23-4-1975  of  the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Contempt Case No. 14/1975.      Appellant in person.      P. Ram Reddy, and G. N. Rao for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.  This appeal  by Rachapudi  Subba  Rao  is directed against  a judgment,  dated April  23, 1975  of the High Court  of Andhra  Pradesh, whereby  the  appellant  was convicted for  committing  gross  contempt  of  court  under Section 12  read with  Sections 10 and 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act,  1971, (hereinafter  referred to as the Act) and sentenced to undergo one month’s imprisonment. It arises out of these facts :      The appellant  filed Original  Suit No.  101 of 1973 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, against five persons for  declaration of  his title and for injunction in respect of  a building.  The  1st  defendant  in  that  suit instituted Original  Suit No.  275 of 1972 in the same Court against the  appellant for  possession of  the same building and for  recovery of damages for use and occupation. The 1st Additional Subordinate  Judge,  Vijayawada,  heard  the  two suits together  and by  a common judgment, dated October 31, 1974, dismissed the appellant’s suit and decreed the suit of the then 1st defendant against 323 him  with   costs.  The  decree-holder  filed  petition  for

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execution of  his decree  against the  appellant. The latter filed an application for stay of the execution.      When the  execution and the appellant’s application for stay were pending, the appellant on December 25, 1974 issued notice to  the Additional Subordinate Judge, who had decided the suits  against him.  In that  notice which  is a lengthy document, he  inter alia  made these allegations against the Judge :           "3. In  the said  judgment (O.S.  Nos. 101/73  and      275/ 72)  your honour created new facts by making third      version  without   evidence  as  detailed  below  among      others."           "4. Your  honour has intentionally, with bad faith      and  maliciously,  disordered  the  existing  oral  and      documentary evidence  with a view to help the plaintiff      in O.S. 275/72 causing damage and injury to me."           "5. Your honour has maintained different standards      in the  same judgment  with regard  to Exs.  B.9, B.10,      B.13 and  A.15 to  A.19 and  A.20 to  A.22 and B.11 and      B.12 in para No. 25."           "6. Your honour has maintained different standards      even with regard to self-serving statements."           "16. Your  honour  has  side-tracked  the  binding      direct decisions  of the  High Courts  and the  Supreme      Court disordering the contents of the said decisions."           "18. So  under these  circumstances it  cannot  be      said that  these acts  done by  your good-self  in  the      discharge of  your honour’s  judicial duty  within  the      limits of your honour’s jurisdiction in good faith; for      the above  said acts  themselves prove that your honour      has done  these acts  with mala fide exercise of powers      without jurisdiction."      In the concluding paragraphs of the notice, he stated :           "Your honour  has done  these acts  in  excess  of      jurisdiction knowing  the law regarding your own powers      and duties.  So, your  honour is  liable in tort to pay      damages for  the heavy monetary loss incurred by me and      for the injury.           Hence, I  request your  honour to pay a sum of Rs.      30,000 by  way of  damages for  the heavy monetary loss      incurred by  me and  for the injury within a reasonable      time, or else I will be compelled to seek legal redress      for the same. 324           I hereby reserve my rights to take available legal      actions   against   your   honour   under   the   other      enactments."      After  receiving   this  notice,   the  1st  Additional Subordinate Judge  sent it  to the  High Court for necessary action. The  High Court  requested the  Advocate-General  to institute contempt  proceeding.  The  Advocate-General  then filed a  Contempt Petition  No. 14  of 1975, supported by an affidavit and  prayed that  the appellant  be committed  for Contempt of  Court  of  the  Additional  Subordinate  Judge, Vijayawada and  be  punished  under  Section  12  read  with Sections 10 and 15 of the Act.      In his  counter-affidavit filed  before the High Court, the appellant  not only tried to justify the issuance of the notice to  the Subordinate Judge, but also asserted that the notice was  intended to  uphold the purity of administration of justice  and to safeguard the interests of the litigating public. The  High Court  found that  the passages  extracted above were  per se  scandalous and scurrilous and the notice was undoubtedly  a deliberate  and determined attempt on the part of the appellant "to scandalise the Judge and the Court

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for having  held against him, by imputing lack of good faith and mala fides to a judicial officer in the discharge of his judicial duties;"  that it  was also  an attempt to frighten the judicial officer by threatening to file suit for damages for Rs.  30,000/- and  to undermine  his self-confidence  in dealing with  causes that might come up before him for trial in future.  The High Court concluded that what the appellant has stated  in  the  notice  in  question,  is  clearly  and squarely "criminal  contempt" as  defined by Section 2(c) of the Act.  It negatived  the defence  raised by the appellant and convicted him as aforesaid.      Before us, the appellant has argued his case in person. He has  also submitted written arguments which he has orally elaborated and  supplemented. As before the High Court, here also the  appellant intransigently  maintains that  there is nothing scandalous  in the  contents of  the notice.  In the written arguments  he reiterates  the  imputation  that  the Subordinate Judge  had deliberately  delivered "a  dishonest Judgment" against  him and  the Judge was "guilty of serious misbehaviour in  the performance  of his  duties;" that  the allegations of  "bad faith" "malice" etc. in the notice were facts constituting the cause of action, which were essential to be  stated under  Section 80,  C.P.C. for  the  suit  for damages which  the appellant  proposed to  file against  the Subordinate Judge;  that the giving of the notice containing such  statements   of  material   facts  being  a  mandatory requirement of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure the issuance of such notice to the Subordinate 325 Judge could  not be  characterised  ‘scandalous’  so  as  to constitute Contempt of Court.      The contention  is clearly  unsustainable. Section 1 of the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 provides :           "No  Judge,  Magistrate,  Justice  of  the  Peace,      Collector or  other person  acting judicially  shall be      liable to  be sued  in any Civil Court for any act done      or ordered  to be  done by  him in the discharge of his      judicial duty,  whether or not within the limits of his      jurisdiction :           Provided that  he at  the  time,  in  good  faith,      believed himself  to have  jurisdiction to  do or order      the act  complained of;  and no officer of any Court or      other person,  bound to  execute the lawful warrants or      orders of  any such  Judge, Magistrate,  Justice of the      Peace, Collector  or  other  person  acting  judicially      shall be  liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the      execution of  any warrant  or order,  which he would be      bound to  execute, if  within the  jurisdiction of  the      person issuing the same."      As pointed  out by  this Court in Anwar Hussain v. Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee  & Ors  the Section affords protection to two broad categories  of acts  done or  ordered to  be done by a judicial officer  in his  judicial capacity.  In  the  first category fall  those acts which are within the limits of his jurisdiction. The  second category  encompasses  those  acts which may  not be  within the  jurisdiction of  the judicial officer, but  are, nevertheless,  done or ordered to be done by him,  believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done. In the case of acts of the first category  committed in  the discharge  of his judicial duties, the  protection afforded by the statute is absolute, and no  enquiry will  be entertained  as to  whether the act done or  ordered to bed done was erroneous, or even illegal, or was done or ordered without believing in good faith.      In the  case  of  acts  of  the  second  category,  the

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protection of  the statute  will be available if at the time of doing,  ordering the  act, the  judicial  officer  acting judicially,  in   good  faith   believed  himself   to  have jurisdiction  to  do  or  order  the  same.  The  expression "jurisdiction" in  this Section  has not  been used  in  the limited sense of the term, as connoting the "power" to do or order to do the particular act complained of, but is used in a wide sense as meaning "generally 326 the  authority  of  the  Judicial  Officer  to  act  in  the matters". Therefore, if the judicial officer had the general authority to  enter upon the enquiry into the cause, action, petition or  other proceeding  in the  course of  which  the impugned act  was done  or ordered  by him  in his  judicial capacity, the  act, even  if erroneous, will still be within his ‘jurisdiction’,  and the mere fact that it was erroneous will not  put it  beyond his  "jurisdiction". Error  in  the exercise of  jurisdiction is not to be confused with lack of jurisdiction in  entertaining the  cause or  proceeding.  It follows that  if the  judicial officer is found to have been acting in  the discharge  of his  judicial duties,  then, in order to  exclude him  from the  protection of this statute, the complainant  has to  establish  that  (1)  the  judicial officer  complained   against   was   acting   without   any jurisdiction whatsoever,  and (2) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction.      In  the   instant  case,   the  Subordinate  Judge  had unquestionably, the jurisdiction to try and decide the suits concerned. It  is further  not disputed  that  the  findings which the  appellant characterises  as "wrong",  "malicious" and "dishonest",  are acts  done by the Subordinate Judge in the  discharge  of  his  judicial  duties  i.e.  within  the exercise of  his jurisdiction.  This being the position, the acts of  the Subordinate  Judge, done by him in his judicial capacity,  on   the  basis   of  which   the  appellant  was threatening to  bring an  action  for  damages  against  the Judge, enjoy  absolute protection  against civil action. Nor would the  fact that  the  appellant  had  the  temerity  to ridicule and  characterise the  findings and decision of the Subordinate Judge  as "malicious"  "dishonest" and motivated ‘to help  the plaintiff  in O.S.  No.  275/  1972’,  without stating any  particulars or  facts on which these scurrilous allegations were  founded, give  him the  locus to  bring  a civil action  for damages  against the Subordinate Judge. In the  circumstances,   it  is  not  possible  to  accept  the appellant’s contention that the notice in question, was bona fide issued  by him  as a  preliminary lawful  step  to  the filing of a suit against the Subordinate Judge.      We agree  with the High Court that the tone, temper and contents  of   the  notice,  particularly  of  the  passages extracted earlier,  which  impute,  malice,  partiality  and dishonesty  to   the  Subordinate   Judge  in  the  judicial adjudication of  the aforesaid  suits against the appellant, constitute a  deliberate attempt  to scandalise the judge to terribly embarrass  him and  to lower  the authority  of his office and  the Court.  The act and conduct of the appellant in issuing  this notice therefore, fell squarely within sub- clauses  (i)   and  (ii)  of  the  definition  of  "criminal contempt" given  in Section  2(c)  of  the  Act,  reproduced below:      "2(c)  ‘criminal   contempt’  means   the   publication      (whether by  words, spoken  or written, or by signs, or      by visible repre- 327      sentations’ or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of

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    any other act whatsoever which :-           (i)  scandalises or  tends to scandalise or lowers                or tends  to  lower  the  authority  of,  any                court; or           (ii) prejudices,  or   interferes  or   tends   to                interfere  with,   the  due   course  of  any                judicial proceeding.           (iii)interferes or  tends to  interfere  with,  or                obstructs   or   tends   to   obstruct,   the                administration  of   justice  in   any  other                manner;"      It  is   noteworthy,  that  in  the  categorisation  of contempt  in  the  three  sub-clauses  (i)  to  (iii),  only category (ii)  refers to "judicial proceeding". Scandalizing of Court in its administrative capacity will also be covered by sub-clauses  (i) and (iii). The phrase "administration of justice" in  sub-clause (iii)  is far  wider in  scope  than "course of  any judicial proceeding". The last words "in any other manner"  of sub-clause  (iii) further extend its ambit and give  it a residuary character. Although sub-clauses (i) to  (iii)  describe  three  distinct  species  of  ‘criminal contempt’,  they   are  not   always   mutually   exclusive. Interference or  tendency to  interfere  with  any  judicial proceeding or  administration of justice is a common element of sub-clauses  (ii) and (iii). This element is not required to be  established for  a  criminal  contempt  of  the  kind falling under sub-clause (i).      The next contention of the appellant is that his act in question  falls   within  the   exemption  of   Section   3, particularly the  Explanation to  that  Section,  since  the suits in  respect of which the notice was issued had already been decided  and the  execution of  the decree  against the appellant, though  pending, did  not  constitute  a  pending matter for the purpose of availing the protection of Section 3. The material part of Section 3 is as follows:           "3(1). A person shall not be guilty of contempt of      court on  the ground  that he has published (whether by      words spoken  or written  or by  signs  or  by  visible      representations  or   otherwise)   any   matter   which      interferes or  tends to interfere with, or obstructs or      tends to  obstruct, the course of justice in connection      with any  civil or  criminal proceeding  pending at the      time  of  publication,  if  at  that  time  he  had  no      reasonable grounds  for believing  that the  proceeding      was pending.           (2)  Notwithstanding   anything  to  the  contrary      contained in  this Act  or any  other law  for the time      being in force, 328      the publication  of any  such matter as is mentioned in      sub-section  (1)   in  connection  with  any  civil  or      criminal proceeding which is not pending at the time of      publication shall  not be deemed to constitute contempt      of court."           (3) ...........................      Explanation:  For   the  purposes  of  this  Section  a      Judicial proceeding-           (b) which has been heard and finally decided shall      not be  deemed to  be pending  merely by  reason of the      fact that  proceedings for the execution of the decree,      order or sentence passed therein are pending."      Section 3  is in  the nature  of an  exception to those categories of  "criminal contempt"  which  fall  under  sub- clause (ii) and to certain categories of "criminal contempt" which come  under sub-clause  (iii) of Section 2(c), but not

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to that  category of  contempt which  falls under sub-clause (i) of  Section 2(c). This is clear from a comparison of the language of  section 3(1)  with that  of Section  2(c).  The words "interferes  or tends  to interfere with the course of justice  in  connection  with  any  proceeding  pending"  in section 3(1)  substantially reiterate  the language  of sub- clause  (ii)   of  Section   2(c).  Similarly,   the   words "interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstruct or tends to obstruct" in Section 3(1) are a reproduction of the first limb of  sub-clause (iii)  of Section  2(c). The phrase "the administration of  justice in  any  other  manner"  used  in Section 2(c)  (iii) has  been substituted in Section 3(1) by the narrower  phrase "the  course of  justice in  connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at the time of publication". But  there are no words in Section 3 which may be referable  to that  species of  "criminal contempt" which would fall  within sub-clause (i) of the definition given in Section 2(c). Subsection (2) of Section 3 expressly confines its operation  to those  categories of  contempt  which  are referred to  in sub-section  (1). Section 3(2) therefore, is not applicable  to that  category of  contempt  which  falls under sub-clause  (i) of Section 2(c), or which is otherwise of a kind different from those mentioned in Section 3(1).      In the instant case, the contempt committed, though not in connection  with any  pending proceeding,  primarily  and squarely falls  under sub-clause  (i) though  the  aforesaid residuary phrase  in sub-clause (iii) may also be attracted. Unfounded imputation  of  mala  fides,  bias,  prejudice  or ridiculing the  performance of a Judge or casting aspersions on his  integrity as  has been  done by the appellant in the notice 329 in question-are  always considered  to mean scandalising the Court, and  lowering the  authority of his court by bringing him  and   his  office   into  disrespect   and   disrepute. Vilification of the Judge, even in administrative matters or decided judicial  matters, may amount to "criminal contempt" under sub-clause  (i) of  Section 2(c) as it lowers or tends to  lower   the  authority   or  dignity  of  the  Court  by undermining public  confidence in  the capacity of the judge to mete out even-handed and impartial justice.      For the  aforesaid reasons, we negative this contention of the appellant.      The last  argument urged  by the appellant is that even if his  act technically  amounted to  contempt of  court, no sentence could  be imposed  on him  in view of Section 13 of the Act which reads as follows :           "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for      the time  being in  force,  no  court  shall  impose  a      sentence under  this Act for a contempt of court unless      it is  satisfied that  the contempt is of such a nature      that   it    substantially   interferes,    or    tends      substantially to  interfere  with  the  due  course  of      justice."      The appellant  contends, that  the High  Court has  not given any  finding in  regard to  this contention  which was raised by him there, also.      The contention must be repelled.      The High  Court has  dealt with this contention. It has rightly pointed  out that  the amplitude  of the  words "due course of  justice" used  in Section  13 is  wider than  the words  "due   course  of   any   judicial   proceeding"   or "administration of  justice" used  in  sub-clauses  (ii)  or (iii) of  Section 2(c).  We have  held that  the contempt of court committed by the appellant falls both under sub-clause

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(i) and  also within  the amplitude  of sub-clause (iii). If the act  complained  scandalizes  the  judicial  officer  in regard to  the  discharge  of  his  judicial  functions,  it thereby substantially  interferes or tends to interfere with the "due  course of  justice" which  is a facet of the broad concept of  the "administration of justice", and as such, is punishable under Section 13.      We agree with the High Court that the contempt of court committed by  the appellant  is serious  and gross as he has recklessly imputed  mala fides and lack of good faith to the judicial officer  who had decided the cases against him. The imputations levelled  were per se scandalous and actuated by bad faith.  The appellant  did not  even pretend to give any reason for the alleged malicious attitude on the 330 part of the judicial officer, either in the notice or in the counter-affidavit. Even  in this  Court he has not relented. He  has   not  adopted,   even  obliquely,  an  attitude  of contrition or a pretence of remorse.      For the  foregoing reasons,  we dismiss this appeal and maintain the conviction and sentence of the appellant. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 331