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PETITIONER: R.V. BHUPAL PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/08/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  140            1995 SCC  (5) 698  JT 1995 (6)   258        1995 SCALE  (5)41

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                            ORDER      Leave granted.      Smt. Saleha  Begum, the  3rd respondent has demised her property, namely,  Shaensha Mahal situated on Congress Road, Governorpet, Vijayawada,  A.P. to the appellant for a period of 20  years by  lease deed  dated January  1, 1964  and  in furtherance thereof,  the appellant  has  been  running  the exhibition of  Cinematograph films  in the said theatre. The lease, by  efflux of  twenty  years,  contracted  thereunder expired on  December 31,  1983. When  the  appellant  sought renewal of  the  licence  granted  under  the  A.P.  Cinemas (Regulation) Rules,  1970  (for  short,  ‘the  Rules’),  the landlady objected  to the  renewal. The  licensing authority and the  appellate authority  had granted  licence but  in a write petition  filed by  the landlady  the  learned  single judge held that the appellant is not in lawful possession of the theatre  and that,  therefore, the  grant of renewal was not justified in law. This was affirmed in W.A. Nos.1118 and 1183 of  1992 dated September 3, 1993. Thus these appeals by special leave.      Sri  U.R.   Lalit,  learned   senior  counsel  for  the appellant, contended  that in  1983,  the  Rules  have  been amended and  the pre-existing  Rule has been bifurcated into initial grant  of licence  in  Rule  11(B)  and  renewal  is separately dealt with under Rule 12(B). Rule 11(B), sub-rule (2) envisages  proof  of  lawful  possession  of  the  site, building and the equipment, while Rule 12(B) expressly omits to satisfy the requirement. The rule making authority having had knowledge  of the  decisions rendered  by various courts including this  Court on  the insistence  of proof of lawful possession  by   the  licensee  and  unlawful  or  litigious possession disentitles  the licensee  to have  renewal, rule making authority had done away with the requirement of being in lawful  possession at  the stage  of granting renewal. On interpretation of  the  rules,  the  legislative  intendment

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should be  given effect  to. The  Full Bench  of the  Andhra Pradesh High  Court in Smt. Y. Anasuya v. Government of A.P. [1993 (1)  ALT 661  (F.B.)]  wrongly  interpreted  the  rule bringing the  requirement of  being in  lawful possession at the stage  of granting  renewal. He  also further  contended that the  appellant having  lawfully entered into possession and having  remained in  possession  during  the  subsisting period of  lease and  after expiry  thereof, his  possession also is  juridical possession  until he is duly ejected by a decree of  the Court.  His possession cannot be termed to be unlawful nor  can he  be treated  as a  rank trespasser. The appellant is in long settled possession. The appellant is in long settled  possession. The  object of  the  Rules  is  to facilitate  the   exhibition  of   Cinematograph  films   to entertain the  public.  When  the  licensee  is  in  settled possession protected  by general  law, he continues to be in lawful  possession   till  he   is   duly   ejected.   While interpreting the  Rule, the  Court would  endeavour to  give effect to the juridical possession so long as he is not duly ejected in due course of law. The Full Bench, therefore, was not right  in its  conclusion. In support thereof, he placed reliance on  the decision  of this  Court in  Lalu  Yeshwant Singh v.  Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. [(1968) 2 SCR 203] and in Krishna Kishore Firm v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors. [(1990) Supp. 2 SCR 8 at 11]. He also cited in his support East India Hotels Ltd. v. Syndicate Bank [(1992) Supp 2 SCC 29].      Sri  K.   Ram  Kumar,  learned  counsel  appearing  for respondent No.3,  contended that under the conditions of the lease, on  its expiry, the appellant had to deliver not only the  vacant   possession  but  also  the  equipment  without claiming any compensation. There is nothing to indicate that the landlady  had acquiesced  in the appellant’s continuance in possession  of the theatre after the expiry of the lease. In fact,  the landlady  filed O.S.  No.538/85 on the file of the Court  of the  Principal Subordinate Judge at Vijayawada for eviction  of the  appellant from  the  demised  premises which would  indicate that  the possession  of the appellant was never  treated to  be lawful.  It is also contended that the Full  Bench, while  interpreting  the  Rule,  has  taken notice is  to  be  renewed  it  should  be  subject  to  the willingness of  the lessor.  When the lessor objected to the grant of  the  licence  on  the  ground  that  she  had  not acquiesced in  the possession  of  the  licensee  under  the Rules, the  possession of the licensee of the theatre cannot be considered  to be  lawful possession. Therefore, the High Court was right in its conclusion that the possession of the appellant is  not lawful  for grant  of the  renewal of  the licence.      The respective  contentions give  rise to  the question whether  the   possession  of   the  appellant   is   lawful possession. Rule 11(B), sub-rule (2) envisages thus :      "(2)  On  receipt  of  the  reports  and      certificates referred  to in  clause (b)      for sub-rule  (1) or,  if the  same have      not   been    received   in    time   on      consideration   of    the   certificates      referred to  in clause  (c) of Rule 11-A      on merits, if the licensing authority is      satisfied  that   the  applicant  is  in      lawful possession  of the site, building      and equipment  he shall, within ten days      from the  date of  receipt of  the above      reports and certificates or the due date      for the  receipt of  above  reports  and      certificates grant  a license  in Form-B

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    with  or   without   adding   additional      conditions thereto,  consistent with the      provisions of  these rules,  as  he  may      deem fit  in the  interest of the health      and safety of the public;           Provided  that   if  the  licensing      authority   is    satisfied   that   the      provisions of  these rules have not been      fulfilled and  or that, in the case of a      temporary cinema building the provisions      in Appendix-IV  are not fulfilled he may      refuse to  grant the licence applied for      the communicate  to  the  applicant  the      reasons for such refusal.           Provided also  that the  period  of      validity of  a licence  shall so  far it      may be  co-related with  the  period  of      validity   of    electrical   and   fire      certificate granted  in accordance  with      the provisions in Appendix-IV." Rule 12 (B) (1) read thus:      "Renwal of  Licences to cinema buildings      :- (1) within fifteen days of receipt of      such    application,    the    licensing      authority shall;      (a)  If   the  application   is  not  in      accordance with the rules, dispose it of      in accordance  with clause  (a) of  sub-      rule (1) of Rule 9(B).      (b) If  the application is in order, the      electrical and fire certificate is valid      and if  the certificate  of longevity of      the building  initially  issued  by  the      concerned Executive  Engineer  (R&B)  is      valid  for  the  period  for  which  the      renewal of  licence is  applied for, the      licence may  be renewed  for the  period      applied for:           Provided further  that, in  case of      an application  for renewal of a licence      (in  respect   of  a   permanent  cinema      building) which  is made three months in      advance of the expiry of the licence, if      the authorities concerned do not furnish      their reports  and certificates in time,      the  respective  certificates  shall  be      deemed to have been renewed;           Provided  that   if  the  licensing      authority   is    satisfied   that   the      provisions of  these rules have not been      fulfilled he  may refuse  to  grant  the      renewal applied  for and  communicate to      the  applicant   the  reasons  for  such      refusal;           Provided further that the period of      validity   of    electrical   and   fire      certificate granted  in accordance  with      the provision in Appendix-VI."      It is  true, as rightly pointed out by Shri U.R. Lalit, that under  Rules 11  of the  unamended Rules,  the right to initial  grant   and  the   renewal  of   the  licence   was compendiously considered  as an  integral scheme  in  single Rule, which  was thereafter,  i.e. in  1983, amended  giving separate headings  and consideration  for the  grant of  the licence and  grant of  renewal of  the licence.  One of  the

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conditions for  the grant  of licence  is that the applicant shall satisfy  the licensing authority that the applicant is in lawful  possession of  the site,  building and equipment. When the  licensee sought  renewal of  the licence,  diverse conditions prescribed  in Rule  12(B)  are  required  to  be complied with.  Application for  renewal of  a licence for a permanent cinema  building should  be made  three months  in advance  of  the  expiry  of  licence.  If  the  authorities concerned do  not furnish  their reports and certificates in time, the  respective certificates  shall be  deemed to have been renewed  provided that  if the  licensing authority  is satisfied that  the provisions  of these rules have not been fulfilled he may refuse to grant the renewal applied for and communicate to  the applicant  the reasons for such-refusal. The second  proviso  provides  clearly  that  not  only  the conditions enumerated  in clauses  (a) and  (b) of  sub-rule (1), but  also all  the provisions  of the  Rules should  be satisfied for the grant of the renewal.      For the  grant of  the licence, one of the requirements is that the applicant should have lawful possession of site, building and  equipment. It  is true that the right to grant licence and right to grant renewal are separately dealt with by Rule  11(B) and  Rule 12(B)  respectively. But  when Rule 11(B) and  Rule 12(B)  respectively. But when Rule 12(B)(1), second proviso itself indicates that the licensing authority should satisfy  itself that  the licensee that satisfied all the provisions  of the  rules, the  licensee should  satisfy that he is in lawful possession when he seeks renewal.      Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act [for short, ‘the TP  Act’] defines  "lease" of  immovable property as "a transfer of  a right  to enjoy  such property,  made  for  a certain time,  express or  implied,  or  in  perpetuity,  in consideration of  a price  paid or  promised, or  of money a share of  crops, service  or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically  or  on  specified  occasions  to  the transfer by  the transferee,who accepts the transfer on such terms".  Therefore  the  lessor  of  immovable  property  by contract in  writing or  otherwise can transfer his property to the  lessee to  enjoy such property. It may be made for a certain time,  express or  implied,  or  in  perpetuity,  in consideration of  a price  or promised, or of money etc. and the lessee accepts the transfer on such terms. Under Section 111 of the TP Act, a lease of immovable property determines, inter alia,  by efflux  of the  time  limited.  Section  116 envisages the effect of holding over and provides that "if a lessee or  under-lessee of  property remains  in  possession thereof after  the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and  the lessor  or his legal representative accepts rent from  the lessee  or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in absence of an agreement  to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month  to month, according to the purpose for which the property is  leased, as  specified in  Section 106". Section 106 of  the TP Act deals with the duration of certain leases in the absence of written contract or local usage with which we are  not concerned  in this  case since the appellant and the landlady  are governed  by the  written lease. Since the landlady had  not accepted  or asserted  to the  appellant’s continuance  in  possession,  he  cannot  be  treated  under Section 116 to be a tenant holding over.      Tenant at  sufferance is  one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of  the term or expiry of the lease by efflux of time. The  tenant  at  sufferance  is,  therefore,  one  who wrongfully continues in possession after the extinction of a

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lawful title.  There is  little difference between him and a trespasser. In  Mulla’s Transfer  of Property Act [7th End.] at page  633, the position of tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus:  A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction to avoid continuance  in possession operating as a trespass. It has been  described as  the least  and lowest interest which can subsist  in reality. It, therefore, cannot be created by contract and arises only by implication of law when a person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in possession after that title has been determined, without the consent of the person entitled. A Tenancy at sufferance does not create  the relationship of landlord and tenant. At page 769, it  is stated  regarding the  right of a tenant holding over thus:  The act  of holding over after the expiration of the term  does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind. If  the   lessee   remaining   in   possession   after   the determination of the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant  on sufferance.  The expression  "holding over"  is used in  the sense  of retaining  possession. A  distinction should be  drawn between  a tenant  continuing in possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord  and a  tenant doing  so  with  the  landlord’s consent. The  former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of  the English law and the latter class of tenants is called  a tenant  holding over  or a  tenant at will. The lessee holding  over with  the consent of the lessor is in a better position  than a  mere tenant at will. The tenancy on sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the  landlord, but  the relationship  of the landlord and tenant is  not established  until  the  rent  was  paid  and accepted. The  assent of  the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy  after the  determination of  the tenancy  would create a  new tenancy.  The possession  of a  tenant who has ceased to  be a  tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have  a  right  to  continue  in  possession  after  the termination of the tenancy, his possession is juridical.      The question  then  is  what  is  the  meaning  of  the expression ‘lawful  possession’. This was considered by this Court in  a leading  decision on  the right to grant licence under the  Cinematographic Act  and Madras  Cinemas Rules in M.C. Chockalingam  &  Ors.  v.  V.  Manickavasagam  &  Ors., [(1974) 2  SCR 143  at 152].  Rule 13  of the  Madras  Rules required the  licensee in  lawful possession,  when  he  had applied for  renewal after  the expiry  of the  lease of the licensee. The Court observed thus:      "Turning to  rule 13,  even in the first      part if the applicant for the licence is      the owner  of the  property  he  has  to      produce before  the licensing  authority      the necessary  records not only relating      to his  ownership but also regarding his      possession. It  is  implicit,  that  the      owner having a title to the property, if      he can  satisfy the  licensing authority      with regard to his possession also, will      indeed  be   in   ‘lawful   possession’,      although the  word ‘lawful’  is not used      in the first part. It is in that context      that the  word ‘possession’  is even not      necessary to be qualified by ‘lawful’ in      the first  part of rule 13. If, however,      the applicant for the licence is not the      owner,  there  is  no  question  of  his      showing title  to the  property and  the

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    only  requirement   of  the  law  is  to      produce  to   the  satisfaction  of  the      authority  documentary   evidence   with      regard to  his lawful  possession of the      property. The  word ‘lawful’. therefore,      naturally assumes  significance  in  the      second  part   while  it  was  not  even      necessary in  the first  part. The  fact      that  after  expiry  of  the  lease  the      tenant  will  be  able  to  continue  in      possession of  the property by resisting      a suit  for eviction, does not establish      a  case   in  law  slaw  to  answer  the      requirement of  lawful possession of the      property within  the meaning of rule 13.      Lawful possession  cannot be established      without  the  concomitant  existence  of      lawful relationship between the landlord      and the tenant. This relationship cannot      be established  against the  consent  of      the landlord unless, however, in view of      a  special   law,  his  consent  becomes      irrelevant.  Lawful  possession  is  not      litigious possession  and must have some      foundation in  a legal  right to possess      the property  which  cannot  be  equated      with  a   temporary  right   to  enforce      recovery  of  the  property  in  case  a      person   is   wrongfully   or   forcibly      dispossessed from it. This Court in Lalu      Yeshwant Singh’s case (supra) had not to      consider whether  judicial possession in      that case was also lawful possession. We      are clearly  of opinion  that  juridical      possession is  possession  protected  by      law against  wrongful dispossession  but      cannot per  se always  be  equated  with      lawful possession."      This decision  has been  followed  in  many  subsequent decisions of  this Court.  In  Krishna  Kishor  Firm’s  case (supra), this  Court has  considered the  controversy  in  a slightly different scenario. The facts therein were that the appellant-firm while running the Cinema Theatre on a licence granted pursuant to a lease by the landlords, one of the co- owners had  agreed to  sell his  share of  the property  and another co-owner  also entered  separately into a lease. The question therein  was  whether  the  possession  was  lawful possession under  the Rules.  Giving various  illustrations, this Court  held that  the  lawful  possession  means  legal possession which  is also  rightful or  at least  excusable. Thus that  which is not stricto legalo may yet be lawful. It should  not   be  forbidden  by  law.  In  fact  "legal"  is associated with  provisions in  the Act,  rules etc. whereas "lawful" visualizes  all that is not illegal, against law or even permissible.  "Lawful" is  wider  in  connotation  than "legal".  Although   provisions  in   Specific  Relief   Act empowering a  person or  tenant to  recover possession if he has been  evicted forcibly by the landlord, may be juridical and not  lawful or  a tenant  holding over  is not in lawful possession unless landlord agrees or acquiesces in expressly or impliedly  but that  does not  alter the  legal  position about possession  of a  person not  legal  yet  not  without interest. In considering the Chockalingam’s case, this Court made a  distinction between  nature of the possession of the lessee after the expiry of period of lease and the nature of

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the possession  of the lessee acquiesced in by the landlord. In that  context, it  was pointed out that the lessee before expiry of  period of lease acquired lessor’s entire interest resulting in  drowning or  sinking of  inferior  right  into superior right.  That is a right one of merger into another. It has  been separately  recognised by Section 111(d) of the TP Act.  Similarly, a tenant after expiry of period of lease may be  holding over  and the  lessor may  acquiesce in  his continuance, expressly  or impliedly.  That is  from conduct into lawful.  The other may be where lessor may not agree to renew the  lease nor  he may  acquiesce in  his continuance. Such a  lessee cannot  claim  any  right  or  interest.  His possession is  neither legal  nor lawful. Such was the ratio of Chockalingam’s case.      In the  backdrop of the factual position, law laid down by  this  Court  in  Krishna  Kishore  Firm’s  case  [supra] requires to  be understood.  It is  seen  that  one  of  the lessors had  entered into  an agreement  of  sale  with  the lessee to  the extent of his share in the joint property and some of the co-owners had also entered into a fresh lease to the extent  of their  share in  that property.  The property being joint and indivisible, in that backdrop this Court had held that  the possession of the appellant therein cannot be considered  to   be   unlawful.   The   ratio   is   clearly distinguishable. Decision  of this  Court in  Lalu  Yeshwant Singh’s case  [supra] also  renders little assistance to the appellant. Therein,  the tenant  had  committed  default  in payment of  rent. The  landlord instead of filing a suit for ejectment of the tenant had taken law into his hands and had the  tenant   forcibly  ejected  from  possession.  When  he approached the  Court, this Court settled the legal position that  the   landlord  is  not  permitted  to  take  forcible possession except in due process of law and they must obtain such possession as they are entitled through court of law as the law  recognised. The  possession of  a  tenant  who  had ceased to  be a  tenant, after  expiry or termination of the lease, is  protected  by  law  until  he  is  duly  ejected. Although he  may not  have a  legal  right  to  continue  in possession after the termination of the tenancy or after the expiry of  the tenancy,  his possession  was  at  sufferance recognised to  be juridical and that possession is protected by Common law.      Suppose a  person trespasses  into Government  land and remains in  unlawful possession,  whether he is liable to be ejected under  the Public Premises Act. Since Government has not recognised  the right  of the  trespasser to  remain  in possession of the Government land, the Government is free to take action  as is  available under  law either under Public Premises Act  or appropriate  law. But the Government cannot forcibly  eject  the  trespasser.  In  fact,  this  sort  of controversy had  arisen  in  East  India  Hotels  Ltd.  case [supra]. Therein, the licensor, after the fire had broken in the premises,  requested to  give possession  for  effecting repairers and  the licensor  was alleged to have promised to give back  possession to  the licensee. Since the possession was not  redelivered, the licensee approached the High Court under Section  6  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963  for possession. The  High Court  granted decree  for  possession until he  was duly  ejected. One  of us  [K. Ramaswamy,  J.] considered the  entire case law including the cases cited by Sri Lalit  in the  context of  the power  of the Court under section 6  of the  Specific Relief  Act to  grant decree for possession for a licensee. It was held in para 44 that:      "Law respects  possession even  if there      is no  title to  support it.  No one  is

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    permitted to take law in one’s own hands      and to  dispossess the  person in actual      settled possession without due course of      law. No  person can be allowed to become      a judge  in his  own case. The object of      s.6 is  to discourage  people to  act in      self-help, however, good their title may      be. The  licensee in possession for well      over 15  years is  in settled possession      and is  entitled to remain in possession      and is  entitled to remain in possession      and make  use of  the premises  for  the      purpose for  which it  was demised until      he is  ejected in due course of law. The      acquiescence of  the  landlord  in  this      context would be to the initial unlawful      entry into  possession and  continuation      thereafter but not to the continuance in      possession of  the  licensee  after  the      expiry or  termination of  the  licence.      That was what this Court appears to have      meant in  the previous  decisions.  Take      for instance  that when  a  licence  was      granted for  a couple of years and after      its expiry  by efflux  of  time,  or  on      termination, if  the possession  of  the      licensee, though  unlawful and unjust is      not protected,  the aggressor  or mighty      would trample upon the right of the weak      and meek  and denial of relief under s.6      would put  a premium upon the aggression      or treachery  or tricks.  No doubt  long      delay in disposal of cases due to docket      explosion became  a ruse to unscrupulous      litigant to  abuse the due course of law      to protract  litigation  and  remain  in      unjust   or   wrongful   possession   of      property.  Landlord  could  be  suitably      compensated  by  award  of  damages.  It      cannot, by  any stretch  of imagination,      be  said   that  a   person  in  settled      possession,  though   unlawful,  is  not      entitled to  the protection under s.6 of      the Act.  Maintenance of  law and  order      and enthusing confidence in the efficacy      of rule  of law  are condition precedent      for orderly  society. Therefore,  giving      primacy, legitimacy  or legality  to the      conduct or  acts of the landlord to take      possession of the property in derogation      of  the  due  course  of  law  would  be      deleterious to  rule of law and a pat on      high-handedness or self-help."      It was  held that  so long as the licensee has not been evicted in  execution of  the decree  lawfully obtained, his possession under  s.6 of the Act as a licensee is protected. Section 6  can be  availed of to recover possession until he is lawfully dispossessed in due course of law.      In view  of the settled position of law, the possession of the appellant is as tenant at sufferance and is liable to ejectment in  due course  of law.  But his possession is not legal nor  lawful. In  other words,  his possession  of  the theatre is  unlawful or  litigious possession. The appellant may remain  in possession  until he is ejected in due course in execution  of  the  decree  in  the  suit  filed  by  the

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respondent.  His  possession  cannot  be  considered  to  be settled possession.  He is  akin  to  a  trespasser,  though initially he had lawful entry.      In this  behalf,  it  is  necessary  to  see  even  the contract under which he was put in possession.      Para 22 & 23 of the contract reads thus:      22. "That  the  lessee  shall  quit  the      scheduled properties  on expiry  of  the      lease period  and deliver  possession of      the entire  demised  properties  to  the      Lessor including  furniture installed by      the  Lessors   and  other  improvements,      alterations,               constructions      reconstructions and  additions  effected      by the  Lessees if any in good condition      subject only  to the  changes caused  by      reasonable    wear    and    tear    and      irresistible force;  that in  default of      so quitting  the premises,  the  Lessees      shall pay  enhanced rent  and damages at      the rate  of Rs.100/-per  day, till they      are evicted  by the provisions of law by      the Lessor.      23. On  expiry of  the lease period, the      Lessees  should   sign   all   necessary      applications and  papers and  co-operate      to obtain  transfer of  all the licences      back  in  the  name  of  Lessor  or  her      nominees  promptly  and  also  send  all      necessary  statements  to  the  officers      concerned for  the purpose or otherwise,      the Lessor  gets every  right to get all      the licences  transferred  in  her  name      automatically  immediately   after   the      expiry of the Lease period."      A reading  of these two covenants clearly manifests the intention of  the parties that after the expiry of the lease he is enjoined to deliver possession of the demised premises to the landlady.      After the  expiry of  the lease,he  is treated to be in unlawful possession, since he is required to pay damages for use and  occupation at  the rate of Rs.100/- per day till he is evicted  in due  course of  law. Thereby it is clear that his possession  was not  treated to  be juridical possession was  not   treated  to  be  juridical  possession  but  only unlawful.  He  is  required  to  pay  damages  for  use  and occupation. Clause 23 indicates that on expiry of the lease, the lessees  should  sign  all  necessary  applications  and papers and  cooperate with  the lessor to obtain transfer of all the licences. That would clearly indicate the intention, namely, that  the appellant  shall remain in possession only for the period of twenty years and thereafter his possession becomes unlawful.      The High  Court, therefore, was right in its conclusion that the  possession  of  the  appellant  is  unlawful.  The learned Single Judge of the High Court [K. Ramaswamy, J., as he then  was] in  M. Kameswara  Somayajulu vs. State of A.P. [1989 (1)  APL] 82 (SN)] was not correct in his holding that at the  time of renewal, the licensee need not establish his lawful possession  due to  omission in  Rule 12(B) (1) which was followed  by another  Division Bench. The Full Bench has reconsidered the controversy. For different reasons given by us, we  think that  the conclusion reached by the Full Bench is correct.      The appeals  are dismissed.  No costs.  The respondents

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are  entitled  to  withdraw  the  amount  deposited  by  the appellant pursuant  to the  interim  order  passed  by  this Court.