http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6478-6479 of 2004

PETITIONER: R. Sulochana Devi

RESPONDENT: D.M. Sujatha & Ors.  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/2004

BENCH: K.G. Balakrishnan & Dr. AR. Lakshmanan

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2008-2009 of 2004)

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.

       Leave granted.         These two appeals are directed against the common judgment passed by the  High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal Nos. 2078-2079 of 2003 dated  23.12.2003.  Writ Appeal 2078 of 2003 was filed by Smt. D.M.Sujatha, first respondent  herein, against the order in Writ Petition No.4279 of 2003 dated 20.11.2003.  Writ  Appeal No. 2079 of 2003 was filed by the first respondent herein against the order in  Writ Petition No.6362 of 2003 dated 20.11.2003.  Both the appeals were heard together  by the Division Bench of the High Court which ultimately allowed both the writ appeals   filed by the first respondent herein and dismissed another Writ Petition No.4279 of 2003  as infructuous.         For proper appreciation of the controversy involved in the matter, it is necessary  to state the few facts in brief :         The appellant-Smt. R. Sulochana Devi joined the Andhra Christian College as  Demonstrator in the Department of Chemistry on 1.8.1968.  She was promoted as  Lecturer in an aided post on 1.8.1969 and her promotion was confirmed from the date  of appointment, i.e., with effect from 1.8.1969.  She was given the benefit of Career  Advancement Scheme of 16 years and 21 years.  She was also appointed as Vice  Principal and Associate Principal and also admitted to grant in aid.  The respondent- College appointed respondent No.1, Smt. D.M. Sujatha, as Lecturer in English w.e.f.  30.8.1969 and the Board of Education of the respondent-College approved the  promotion of the appellant as Lecturer as also the appointment of respondent No.1 as  Lecturer from the respective dates of their appointment.  On 1.5.1972, Smt. D.M.  Sujatha, respondent No.1, was reverted to the post of Junior Lecturer and worked in the  same post for about four years up to 31.8.1974.  She was again re-designated as a  Lecturer in English  only on 1.7.1976.  By proceedings dated 11.12.1975, the Director of  Higher Education directed the Director that respondent No.1 be treated as Lecturer  w.e.f. 30.8.1969 by extending general protection.  The Director of Higher Education by  the proceedings dated 11.12.1975 issued directions for the purpose of giving general  protection to Lecturers/Junior Lecturers working in various institutions to be treated as  Lecturers for the purpose of service and seniority from their respective dates of  appointment as Lecturer/Junior Lecturer, if they are appointed in the grant-in-aid post  prior to 1.5.1971.  In the seniority, the appellant was placed at S.No.20 and respondent  No.1 was placed at S.No.23.  The appellant was promoted as Vice-Principal of the  College by proceedings of the Manager of the Management.         One, Mr. P. Andrew was appointed as a Lecturer on 28.6.1969.  The  Management wanted to favour Mr. Andrew by appointing him as a Principal by  superseding the appellant herein and in order to achieve this object, the Management  of the College had approached the then Regional Joint Director (for short "the RJD")  with a query to decide the inter se seniority between Mr. P.Andrew and the appellant- Smt. Sulochana Devi.  According to the appellant, all this was behind the back of her.   The RJD, without following the principles of natural justice had given an opinion by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

saying that Mr. P. Andrew is senior to the appellant and that the amount to be paid to  the appellant as salary in excess should be recovered.  The opinion was also given on  the basis that in the audit report, the appellant’s promotion was not recorded and was  not approved by the Department of Higher Education as per the audit report and she  was only admitted as Junior Lecturer/Demonstrator in the Audit Report for the years  1973-1976 and that she was allowed only one increment treating her as Demonstrator.   According to the appellant, it was a pre-determined order passed by the RJD.         The Management of the College had resolved to promote Mr. P. Andrew as  Principal pursuant to the opinion rendered by the RJD for Collegiate Education when he  is senior to the appellant and Mr. P. Andrew was promoted as Principal by a Resolution  of the Management Committee dated 1.2.2001.  Aggrieved by the decision taken by the  Management for promoting Mr. P. Andrew as Principal by ignoring the seniority of the  appellant, the appellant filed a writ petition challenging the orders passed by the  respondent-College Management by way of Writ Petition 1031 of 2001.  The appellant  also gave a representation to the Commissioner of Collegiate Education that the RJD  had given a wrong opinion behind her back to the Management and the Management  was persuaded to appoint Mr. P. Andrew who is junior to the appellant as Principal.   The appellant urged the Commissioner of Collegiate Education to get the same rectified  by her representation dated 1.6.2001.  On 30.1.2001, the appellant assailed the  Resolution of the Management to promote Mr. P. Andrew as Principal by way of filing a  suit before the Junior Civil Judge, Guntur.  The appellant also made another  representation to the Commissioner of Collegiate   Education about the discrimination  meted to her and also the error committed in the audit report from 1973-1976.  In view  of some changed circumstances, the appellant withdrew the suit filed by her as not  pressed on 23.11.2001.  The appellant also withdrew Writ Petition No. 1031 of 2001  with an intention to approach the competent authority under the Andhra Pradesh  Education Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").  As no decision was  forthcoming from the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, the appellant made  another representation to the said authority and also the RJD of the Collegiate  Education.  On the same date, a similar representation was made to the Director of  Collegiate Education.  The appellant also filed the Service Registers and audit report  before the concerned authorities to show that ever since her appointment, she was  treated as a Lecturer for all purposes.           The RJD of Collegiate Education considered the case of the appellant and gave  a clarification that the appellant must be deemed as a Lecturer with effect from 1.8.1969  under the general protection in view of the proceedings bearing RC No. 4209/K II.3/5  dated 11.12.1975.  Copy of the order passed by the RJD of Collegiate Education dated  15.4.2002 is annexed as Annexure P-8.  The last paragraph of the order reads thus: "In view of the circumstances stated in the reference (4) read above  and in modification of the orders issued in the reference first read  above, Smt. R. Sulochana Devi, Lecturer in Chemistry, A.C. College,  Guntur is treated as Lecturer w.e.f. 01.08.1969, i.e., from the date of  promotion under general protection in view of the proceedings RC  No.4209/KII.3/5, dated 11.12.1975 of the Director of Higher Education,  Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad."   

Respondent No.1, Smt. D.M. Sujatha, made a representation to the RJD stating  that she had been ignored despite the fact that she was senior to the appellant and,  therefore, she ought to have been promoted as Principal.  Copy of the representation  given by respondent No.1 is annexed as Annexure P-9.  The RJD, by the proceedings  dated 3.2.2003, passed an order saying that the appellant cannot be made the  Principal because she had relinquished her right to become Principal since she did not  act upon the order passed by the RJD dated 15.4.2002 by virtue of which she was  Lecturer w.e.f. 1.8.1969 and, therefore, she has no right to claim seniority for the post  of Principal at this juncture after the retirement of Mr. P. Andrew.    Aggrieved by the  order passed by the RJD, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 4279 of 2003.  The High  Court granted interim suspension of the order dated 3.2.2003 issued by the RJD of  Collegiate Education in an interlocutory application.  The appellant, in the meantime,  made a representation to the Government by stating all the facts and bringing it to the  notice of the Government with regard to the mischief played by the Management and  the RJD collectively in order to do a favour to Mr. P. Andrew.  The Government issued  an order in favour of the appellant herein by G.O.RT. No. 308 dated 22.4.2003.  The  relevant portion of the G.O.RT.No.308 reads thus: "The matter has been examined in the light of the orders of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

A.P. High Court, 2nd read above, keeping in view the appeal petition  filed by Smt. R. Sulochana Devi, Lecturer 3rd above, and it is observed  that Smt. R. Sulochana Devi was treated as Lecturer in A.C. College  with effect from 1.8.1969.  though she has not challenged the  promotion of her junior, Sri P. Andrew as Principal, the fact remains  that she was not offered the post of Principal of A.C. College and,  therefore, the question of her relinquishment to the post of Principal  does not arise and that she is senior to Smt. D.M. Sujatha, Lecturer."  

After a lapse of more than one year, respondent No.1 had also filed Writ Petition  No.6362 of 2002 assailing the orders passed by the RJD dated 15.4.2002 bearing  proceedings LDS No. 758/B2/2002 wherein the appellant was treated as a Lecturer  w.e.f.  1.8.1969, i.e., from the date of her promotion as Lecturer from that of  Demonstrator under the general protection as per proceedings dated 11.12.1975 of the  Director of Higher Education modifying the order passed on 15.3.2000.  The first  respondent also filed another Writ Petition No.7723 of 2003 assailing the order passed  by the Government in G.O.Ms. No.308 dated 22.4.2003 wherein the appellant was  declared as senior to the first respondent. All the three writ petitions were heard together by the learned single Judge of  the High Court.  By a common judgment dated 20.11.2003, the learned single Judge  allowed the writ petition bearing No. 4279 of 2003 filed by the appellant herein and  dismissed the writ petitions filed by the first respondent herein.  In the concluding part o f  the judgment, the learned single Judge observed as follows: "I am constrained to observe that the management of the  College is behind this litigation since the opinion rendered by the 3rd  respondent on 15.2.2000 was at its instance and the same was  reversed on 15.4.2002  pursuant to the representation of the appellant  and that is the reason why the 5th respondent filed the Writ Petition  after more than an year against the said order dated 15.4.2002 of the  3rd respondent passed in favour of the petitioner.  Furthermore, the 5th  respondent has not challenged the promotion of the petitioner as Vice- Principal on 13.01.2002 and subsequently as Associate Principal on  10.1.2003."

Aggrieved by the above judgment, the first respondent herein filed writ appeals.   However, the first respondent has not challenged the order passed in Writ Petition  No.7723 of 2002 in which she had sought a mandamus to declare G.O.Ms. No.308  dated 22.4.2003 as illegal.   By a common judgment and order dated 23.12.2003, the Division Bench of the  High Court allowed the said writ appeals.    Being aggrieved by the said order, the  appellant has preferred the above appeals by way of special leave petitions. We heard Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant  and Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel, Ms. D. Bharathi Reddy and Mr. John  Mathew, learned counsel for the respondents. We have been taken though the entire pleadings, annexures filed along with the  special leave petition and the additional documents filed by the parties with the  permission of the Court. Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellant made the  following submissions: According to Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, the opinion rendered by the RJD dated 15.2.2000 is  not under any of the provisions of the Act and that the Division Bench is wrong in  construing that such an opinion is an order passed under the provisions of the Act.  It  was further submitted that the Division Bench is not right in interfering with the  discretionary power that is vested with the Management to choose a Head of the  Institution/Principal and, therefore, such interference is impermissible in law.  This  apart, the opinion dated 15.2.2000 rendered by the competent authority was given  behind the back of the appellant herein without there being any notice.   He further  contended that the Division Bench is not right in giving so much sanctity for the opinion  dated 15.2.2000 when it is vitiated for non-adherence of the principles of natural justice  and that such an order is a nullity in the eye of law and a void one being  non est in law.    It was further contended that the Division Bench is not correct in considering only the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

audit reports to hold that the appellant is a Lecturer only w.e.f. 1.4.1976 when there is  ample evidence produced by the appellant to show that she is a Lecturer w.e.f.  1.8.1969.  It was also contended that the first respondent herein had not chosen to  challenge the order passed in Writ Petition No. 7723 of 2003 and that the Division  Bench is not right in not taking this aspect of the matter into consideration to  understand the conduct of the first respondent.  He would further submit that the  proposition propounded by the Division Bench that a quasi-judicial   authority cannot  review its own order unless the power to review is expressly conferred on it by the  Statute can not be applied to the facts of the present case.  It was further contended  that the Division Bench has failed to take into consideration that the opinion of the RJD  dated 15.2.2000 is non est in law since no notice had been given to the parties before  passing such an order and, therefore, the subsequent order that was passed by the  RJD dated 15.4.2002, after considering all the relevant documents, was the first order  and cannot be termed as review at all.  It was further contended that the Division Bench  could not appreciate the fact that the Government of Andhra Pradesh had categorically  stated in its counter that the appellant is a Lecturer with effect from the date of her  promotion, i.e., from 1.8.1969 and, therefore, she is senior to the first respondent  herein.  This apart, the first respondent has not raised any grievance or dispute at any  stage at all except in the year 2003 regarding her seniority above the appellant herein.   Even when the order was passed by the RJD dated 15.4.2002, the first respondent did  not raise even a little finger within time.  It was then submitted that the appellant, at no   point of time, has expressly or even impliedly relinquished her right to the post of  Principal as per the seniority and she made several representations and also filed a suit  and the writ petition complaining about the discrimination meted to her.  However, the  same were withdrawn since the appellant thought it would be appropriate to go through  proper channel, that is, to approach the competent authority under the Act.  It was also  a matter of record that the appellant made several representations as can be seen from  the record itself.  Representations dated 1.6.2001, 22.10.2001, 10.12.2002, 10.1.2003,  5.2.2003, 10.2.2003 etc. were all in respect of the injustice that has been caused to her.   Mr. T.L.V. Iyer further submitted that the Division Bench should have seen the  Resolutions of the Management, minutes of the Management, proceedings of the  competent authorities, the service registers, the seniority registers, the pay scale details   etc. Each go to show that the appellant was never contemplated to be deemed to be a  Demonstrator and not a Lecturer and that the minutes of the Management, in  unambiguous terms, show that the appellant was appointed as Demonstrator on  1.8.1969 continued as Demonstrator up to 31.7.1969 and, thereafter from 1.8.1969,  she was promoted to the post of Lecturer that too in aided post.  In fact, there is any  amount of evidence produced by the appellant to show that she is Lecturer from  1.8.1969 whereas the Division Bench is wrong in considering only audit reports to hold  that she is a Lecturer only w.e.f. 1.4.1976 which is a very hyper technical view taken by  the Division Bench.   Concluding his submissions, learned senior counsel submitted    that the Division Bench has failed to see that the RJD gave the opinion dated  15.12.2000 without any authority under the provisions of the Act and in such an event,  the opinion dated 15.12.2000 is not a valid order in the eye of law apart from being  vitiated for non-adherence to the principles of natural justice.  Therefore, such an  opinion dated 15.12.2000 cannot be construed to be a valid order under the provisions  of the Act and, therefore, such an opinion cannot even be challenged by way of an  appeal before the Government for all practical purposes.        

Mr. P.P.Rao, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent,  submitted that: 1.      the appellant’s promotion as Lecturer in chemistry w.e.f. 01.08.1969  was not approved by the departmental authorities and it was not in  consonance with the rules and her pay as Lecturer was disallowed for  the years 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76 and hence the  appellant cannot reckon her seniority from 01.08.1969.    2.      The appellant though questioned the proceedings dated 15.02.2000 in  writ petition No. 1031 of 2001 and withdrew the same and also filed  the suit claiming seniority and withdrew the same on 13.03.2000  without seeking liberty to agitate the same.  The appellant having not  filed any appeal against the proceedings dated 15.02.2000, the same  had become final and the respondent authority has no power under  the provisions of the A.P. Education Act to review the said proceeding;

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

3.      It was further argued that the appellant was designated as a Lecturer  w.e.f. 01.04.1976 consequent on the merger of the posts in terms of  instructions contained in G.O.Ms. No.1072 dated 26.11.1976 and  G.O.Ms. No. 748 dated 30.08.1982.  It was further contended that the  appellant is not entitled to the general protection contained in the  proceedings of the Director of Higher Education dated 11.12.1975.   having regard to the fact that the appellant is not a teacher and is not  an Assistant Lecturer entitled to the benefit of the proceedings of the  Director of Higher Education dated 11.12.1975. 4.      He would further submit that by the proceedings dated 15.04.2002,  the appellant is given seniority over the first respondent herein and in  that view of the matter the first-respondent herein is entitled to notice  assuming without admitting that the RJD had the power to review his  order. 5.      It is also submitted that the appellant was granted career  advancement scheme erroneously counting her service from  01.08.1969 which was disallowed by the audit. 6.      The RJD by his proceedings dated 15.02.2000 has assigned the date  on 01.04.1976 to the appellant as a date from which she is eligible to  be treated as Lecturer taking into account service registers, audit  report and other materials which establish that the appellant did not  draw the scale of pay payable to the post of a Lecturer even though  she was allegedly promoted as such. 7.      No notice was issued to the first respondent herein before passing of  the impugned proceedings dated 15.04.2002 as the said proceedings  adversely affects the rights, interests and legitimate expectations of  the first respondent.  The said proceedings were passed in post-haste  by RJD with an intention of conferring undue favour on the appellant  and unduly affecting the right of the first respondent herein and others  and that the mode and manner in which the proceedings were passed  lack of arbitrariness and unfairness; 8.      The order dated 15.02.2000 was appealable under Section 89 of the  A.P. Education Act, 1982 and that the appellant did not prefer any  appeal against the said order and, therefore, the order dated  15.02.2000 became final and conclusive so far as the seniority of the  appointment in the post of Lecturer is concerned.  The RJD being a  quasi judicial authority could not review its orders since power of  review is conferred only on the Government and a quasi judicial  authority cannot review its order unless the power of review is  expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives  jurisdiction.  Therefore, the order dated 15.04.2002 of the RJD which  amounted to a review of the order dated 15.02.2000 is, therefore,  without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained.  This apart the said order  was an adjudication by the RJD and not a mere opinion as to the  seniority of the appellant and the same holds good so long as it is not  varied or altered in accordance with law; 9.      The Management of the college having entertained a doubt regarding  seniority of the appellant itself sought determination of the RJD in this  regard and it is, therefore, not open to the college to contend that the  decision of the RJD is not binding.  Commenting on the entry in the  service book, Mr. P.P. Rao contended that the appellant is seeking  seniority over the respondent No.1 on the basis of an alleged entry in  her service book by the Management that she was promoted as  Lecturer on 01.08.1969 and that the said entry on the face of it is  fabricated as would be evident from various factors.  Furthermore, as  per established practice when the entry is made in the service book it  has to be preceded by proceedings of the approving authority i.e.  Director of Higher Education.  However, the aforesaid entry in the  service book of the appellant does not contain any proceedings  number of the approving authority.  Therefore, it is evident that the  Management has manipulated the improper entry in the service book  of the appellant in collusion with the appellant.  Concluding his  argument Mr. Rao submitted that the impugned judgment of the  Division Bench is well-considered and well-reasoned judgment and  that the present appeal is devoid of any merit and liable to be rejected.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

           Learned counsel appearing for the College invited our attention to the counter  affidavit filed by the College in this matter.  It is useful to reproduce para 5 of the  counter affidavit filed by the Management which reads thus: "It is respectfully submitted that even if seniority is taken into consideration,  the Petitioner herein is senior to the 1st Respondent.  The College has  appointed the petitioner herein on 1.8.1968 as Demonstrator (aided) in the  Department of Chemistry.  On 1.8.1969 i.e. one year later the Petitioner was  promoted as Lecturer in an aided post w.e.f. 1.8.1969.  The 1st Respondent  herein was appointed as Lecturer in English from 30.08.1969.  There is a  clear gap of one month between the appointment of the Petitioner and the  1st Respondent herein.  It is respectfully submitted that the 1st Respondent  was reverted to the post of Jr. Lecturer from 1.5.70 up to 31.8.1974.   Therefore, by no stretch of imagination the 1st Respondent can be junior to  the petitioner herein.  It is pertinent to mention herein that the petitioner had  never suffered any reversion.  Moreover, the Petitioner herein was given the  benefit of career advancement scheme of 16 years and 21 years.  It is  respectfully submitted that because it was always felt that the Petitioner  herein should be the successor to Shri P. Andrew, at the time when Shri P.  Andrew was given the Principalship the Petitioner was appointed as the  Vice Principal and this decision was taken by the management of the  institution consciously as the management thought that in terms of seniority  as also the capability and efficiency, the Petitioner herein is a better  candidate.  Since 13.01.2000, the petitioner herein was discharging duties  as Vice-Principal of the college and proceedings to this effect have also  been issued by the manager of the Andhra Evangelical Luthern Chruch,  Guntur."     

The learned counsel for the Government of Andhra Pradesh drew our attention  to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State in the writ petition. "The 6th respondent was appointed as demonstrator in Chemistry on   1-8-1968 in the 5th respondent college.  Later, she was appointed as  lecturer in the department of Chemistry with effect from 1-8-1969 by  the principal, A.C.College Guntur vide orders dt. 1-8-1969.  The Board  of education of college of the education approved the appointment of  the 6th respondent at its meeting on 17-4-1970 vide their minutes No.  155/22.  The director of collegiate education Andhra Pradesh,  Hyderabad has also submitted the 6th respondent into grant-in-aid in  the audit report of the 2nd respondent for the years 1969-70 (i.e. the  year of her appointment) 1970-71 and 1971-72.  The 6th respondent  has sufficient work load i.e. 18 hours per week, on par with the other  senior lecturers for the academic years 1969-70; 1970-71; 1971-72;  1973-74; 1974-75 and 1975-76.  By counting the service w.e.f. 1-8- 1969; the 6th respondent was awarded selection grade scale under  career advancement scheme with effect from 1-1-1986 by virtue of  completing more than 16 years of service which is the pre-requisite  condition in the A.P. revised scale (UGC) 1986.  It is also submitted  that the then special officer of A.C. College, Guntur who was also the  then regional joint Director of Collegiate education, Guntur has  recorded the grant-in-aid certificate in the service book of the 6th  respondent to the effect that the incumbent has been working as  Lecturer in the grant-in-aid post with effect from 1-8-1969.  On the  same analogy adopted in respect of the petitioner; the 6th respondent  was entitled to the general protection as per the orders of the 2nd  respondent vide Rc No. 4209/K.II.3/5, dt. 11-12-1975.  Since, the 6th  respondent was appointed and worked in the grant-in-aid post of  Lecturer prior to 1-5-1971; the post of Lecturer of 6th respondent was  protected as per general protection and she was treated as Lecturer  w.e.f. 1-8-1969 vide 3rd respondent orders No.L.Dis.No. 758/B2/2002,  dt. 15-4-2002.

         The 6th respondent was never reverted to a lower post and she  was a Lecturer since 1-8-1969.  On par with the petitioner, the 6th  respondent was also brought under general protection by the 3rd  respondent vide L.Dis.No.758/B2/2002, and treated as lecture w.e.f. 1- 8-1969 as such, the 6th respondent became senior to the petitioner."    

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

                We have given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the  learned counsel appearing on either side with reference to the annexures and other  relevant records and also the judgments of the learned single Judge and of the Division  Bench. It is not in dispute that the appellant was offered the post of Lecturer w.e.f  01.08.1969 and she accepted the same.  The minutes of the Management of the  respondent-College dated 06.03.1976 shows that the appellant entered into service as  a Lecturer w.e.f. 01.08.1969 which was voted to confirm as of 01.01.1976.  In the very  same minutes, it was shown that the first-respondent herein entered into service as  junior Lecturer w.e.f. 30.08.1969.  Further, the seniority list of the college, the name of  the appellant was shown at sl. No. 20 and it was stated that she had been working as a  Lecturer in Chemistry having been joined on 01.08.1969 and prior to that, she worked  as Demonstrator from 01.08.1968 to 31.07.1969.  Whereas, the first respondent was  shown at sl. No. 23 and stated that she had been working as a Lecturer in English  w.e.f. 30.08.1969.  This apart, the extract of the service book of the appellant shows  that she was promoted as Lecturer w.e.f. 01.08.1969 and prior to that she worked as a  Demonstrator.  Further, the service book shows that the post in which the appellant was  working was admitted to grant-in-aid w.e.f. 01.08.1969.  It was also stated in the service  book that the appellant was extended with the benefit CAS after completion of 16 years  of service vide proceedings of the RJD dated 31.01.1996 and accordingly her pay was  regulated in the post of Lecturer.  It is also seen that 20 years of CAS benefit was also  extended by the RJD through his Proceedings dated 14.09.1999 and the increments,  salary etc. were regulated as such.  Further, the President and the Manager of the  College had issued proceedings dated 12.01.2000 appointing the appellant as Vice- Principal of the College w.e.f. 12.01.2000.  At no point of time, there was any break in  the service of the appellant as a Lecturer right from 01.08.1969 though there was a  break in the service of the first respondent herein.  As already noticed, the appellant  had also challenged the proceedings of the respondents and filed writ petition  questioning the appointment of Mr. Andrew and withdrew the same in view of the  subsequent changed circumstances. We have perused the proceedings dated 15.02.2000 by the RJD.  It was an  opinion rendered at the instance of the Correspondent of the College.  Thus, it was  purely an opinion rather than an administrative order and when the appellant made a  representation, the same was reconsidered and a proper opinion was rendered on  15.04.2002.  Thus, in our opinion, it does not amount to review.  Further they are not  quasi judicial orders passed in exercise of any statutory power and it does not oust the  jurisdiction of the RJD to reconsider it and pass revised order.  Therefore, the  submission of Mr. P.P.Rao that this Court has to consider whether the RJD has power  to review its own order and whether such a power is conferred on such authority has no  merits and cannot be accepted.  In this connection, we are in full agreement with the  arguments advanced by Mr. T.L.V. Iyer on behalf of the appellant. Much arguments were advanced by Mr. P.P.Rao that because of the audit  objection the appellant was not paid the salary of the Lecturer.  This contention has no  merit.  Admittedly, the appellant was appointed as Demonstrator w.e.f. 01.08.1969 and  she had drawn her salary as a Lecturer from 01.08.1969 in an aided vacancy.  It was  submitted that though there was some audit objection, but no recoveries were made  against the appellant and she continued as Lecturer althrough. The argument of Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for the first respondent  that while issuing the modified order dated 15.04.2002 the RJD has not issued any  notice to the first respondent, cannot be accepted, since the first respondent was  nowhere in the picture at that time.  In fact, the dispute as to seniority at that time was  inter se the appellant and one Andrew and the first respondent did not raise any  dispute.  The first respondent did not bother as to the claim of the appellant that she is  senior to Mr. Andrew.  If she was really concerned, she could have joined the issue and  worked out her remedies.  The fact remains that the first respondent did not raise any  objection immediately after the order was passed on 15.04.2002 declaring the seniority  of the appellant in the post of Lecturer and that it should be reckoned from 01.08.1969.   She filed writ petition only after about an year of issuance of the said order dated  15.04.2002.  Further, issuing of any notice to the first respondent in the proceedings in  G.O.Rt. No. 308 dated 22.04.2003 also does not arise.  Since the said G.O. has not  altered anybody’s seniority.  The said G.O. was issued, in fact, in pursuance of a  representation of the appellant dated 13.03.2003.  The first respondent, in our opinion,  was not entitled for any relief, since her right as such either under the Proceedings  dated 15.02.2000 or the Order dated 15.04.2002 of the RJD was affected.  Under these

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

circumstances, there was no necessity for the Government to issue any notice to the  first respondent while issuing the said G.O.  It is true that there was some audit  objection but the fact remains no recoveries were made against the appellant treating  her only as demonstrator and that would in our opinion categorically indicate that the  appellant was althrough was a Lecturer in the aided vacancy right from 01.08.1969 as  such she was senior to Mr. Andrew and was deprived of her right being promoted to the  post of Principal on 31.01.2001 and again when the first respondent was made in  charge Principal of the College w.e.f. 01.05.2003 on retirement of Mr. Andrew.  Thus, it  is seen that the appellant has suffered humiliation in view of the wrong decision taken  by the RJD earlier on 15.03.2000 which was later modified by an order dated  15.04.2002. As rightly pointed out by Mr. T.L.V. Iyer that the opinion of the RJD dated  15.02.2000 is an opinion which is non est in law since no notice has been given to  parties before passing such an order and, therefore, the subsequent order that was  passed by the RJD dated 15.04.2002 after considering all the relevant documents.  Mr.  Iyer is also right in contending that the order dated 15.02.2000 is a nullity and,  therefore, it can be ignored by the appellant and the question of filing a review by the  appellant does not arise.  When the order passed by an authority is not in accordance  with law and no notice was communicated to the party it is a nullity and need not be  challenged in a Court of law.   We see merit in the submission of Mr. Iyer that an order made in violation of  natural justice is void.  Mr. T.L.V. Iyer in support of his above contention relied on the  judgment of this Court in Krishan Lal vs. State of J & K (1994) 4 SCC 422 to the effect  that an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice renders an order  invalid.  Likewise, an order made without hearing the party affected is also bad in law.   In the instant case, the order made in violation of natural justice is void.   At the time of hearing, a dispute was raised by Mr. P.P. Rao that the appellant  Sulochana Devi was not appointed as an Associate-Principal.  Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, in  support of his contention, that the appellant was appointed as Associate-Principal has  placed before us the extract from the minutes of the meeting of the executive council of  Andhra Evangelical Lutheran Church dated 10.01.2003 which reads thus: "COMMITTEE ON ASSIGNMENTS:  A.C. College matters:

            Reported that the Board of College education send the panel of  Two names Mrs. R. Sulochana Devi and Mrs. D.M. Sujatha for the  appointment of Associate Principal for A.C.College, Guntur as Dr.  P.Andrew, Principal, A.C.College is going to be retired on 30-4-2003 on  superannuation.

           Recommended that Mrs. R. Sulochana Devi be appointed as  Associate Principal with immediate effect according to the verification of  their service registers.  Further Mrs. R. Sulochana Devi and Mrs. D.M.  Sujatha are hereby requested to submit all the relevant papers along with  service registers to claim their seniority and also to seek clarification from  the Commissioner for Higher Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad in  connection with the appointment to the post of Principal, A.C. College.

          VOTED to approve the above recommendation of the Committee on  Assignments."

In our view, the Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the  discretionary power that is vested with the Management to chose the principal of its  choice.  It is settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that Courts shall be loathe in   interfering with the choice of the Management in the selection of the Principal candidate  with reference to the educational institutions under the Management of the minority  institutions.  As rightly contended by Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, the learned Judges of the Division  Bench is not correct in giving so much sanctity for the opinion dated 15.02.2000 of RJD  where it is a violation for non-adherence to the principles of natural justice.  As already  noticed, there is abundant material and evidence produced by the appellant to show  that she is a Lecturer w.e.f. 01.08.1969 and the Division Bench is wrong in considering  only audit reports to hold that she is a Lecturer only w.e.f. 01.04.1976.  The Division  Bench could have avoided in taking such a hypertechnical view.   The appellant had been deprived of her legal entitlement as the Principal of the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

College by the Management at the first instance in order to favour Mr. P. Andrew and  accommodate him.  Now, even after Mr. P. Andrew’s retirement, the appellant was  Principal for only a short time basing on the single Judge’s judgment.  However, by  virtue of the order passed by the Division Bench, the Management of the College had  appointed the first respondent as Principal.  In our opinion, the order passed by the  Division Bench is not correct and is, therefore, liable to be set aside and accordingly we  do so and restore the order passed by the learned single Judge. We were told that the appellant herein has left only about one and a half years  of service before her superannuation whereas the first respondent will have some  months thereafter after the appellant’s superannuation.  We, therefore, hold that the  first respondent is not entitled to hold the post of Principal in view of our present  judgment.  The appellant admittedly being senior to the first respondent is entitled to  hold the post of Principal of the College in question till her date of retirement.  We,  therefore, direct the respondents herein, namely, the Government of Andhra Pradesh,  the Commissioner of Collegiate Education, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, the Regional  Joint Director of Collegiate Education, Guntur and the Management of the College,  namely, Andhra Christian College represented by its Correspondent to immediately  place her as the Principal of the Andhra Christian College with immediate effect and at  any rate not later than two weeks from today.  Since she is deprived of her lawful claim  to be the Principal of the College at the behest of the first respondent herein D.M.  Sujatha, we direct her to pay the cost of Rs.5,000/- to the appellant herein within two  weeks from today failing which the Andhra Christian College Management shall pay the  said amount to the appellant and adjust the same from the future salary payable to the  first respondent - D.M. Sujatha. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is thus disposed of.