REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL  APPEAL NO.  9579 of 2003

R.S. Sujatha                    …Appellant Versus

State of Karnataka & Ors.        …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of the  

Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench (hereinafter called  

as the ‘Tribunal’) dated 19.12.2002 in Original Application No. 715  

of 2002.  

2.  (A) Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the  

State of Karnataka vide order dated 24.1.2001 initiated  disciplinary  

proceedings against  the appellant,  an Indian Administrative Service  

Officer of Karnataka cadre, on the allegation that she had committed  

certain  irregularities  in  the  allotment  of  wheat  under  a  special  

programme  called   the  State  Funded  Wheat  Based  Nutrition

Programme of the Government of India at public distribution system  

rates to a supplier  called M/s Nandi Agro Industries  Ltd. The said  

regular enquiry stood initiated on the basis of the preliminary enquiry  

report dated 31.3.1997.  

(B)   The appellant filed O.A. No.715 of 2002 before the Tribunal on  

5.8.2002 for quashing the Articles  of  charge dated 30.11.1999 and  

subsequent  proceedings  on  diverse  grounds.  In  the  said  Original  

Application (hereinafter referred to as `O.A.’), the appellant had made  

a  specific  averment  that  the  charge  memo  dated  30.11.1999  was  

received  by  her  only  on  19.6.2002,  as  the  copy  of  the  same  was  

furnished  to  her  by  the  3rd respondent  i.e.  the  Enquiry  Officer.  

Therefore,  it  had  been  contended  by  the  appellant  that  she  had  

approached the Tribunal within limitation.  However, taking abundant  

caution, she had also filed an application for condonation of delay.  

(C)   The reply to the said application was filed by the respondents  

therein on 18.10.2002, wherein it was contended that the order dated  

30.11.1999  had  been  issued  to  the  appellant  on  2.12.1999  by  

Registered Post with AD.  

(D) The Tribunal instead of proceeding with the  matter on merit or  

deciding  the  issue  of  limitation,  passed  an  order  dated  15.11.2002  

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stating  that  the  appellant  had  made  a  false  statement  in  the  O.A.  

regarding limitation which was intentional and deliberate.  Therefore,  

prima  facie, the  Tribunal  was  of  the  view  that  the  appellant  had  

committed  criminal  contempt  and  a  show  cause  notice  dated  

15.11.2002 was issued to the appellant calling upon her “to appear in  

person before the Tribunal on 29.11.2002 at 10.30 a.m. to answer the  

said show cause notice on which day the matter would be listed for  

hearing”.   

(E)  The appellant not only appeared in response to the said notice  

personally, but submitted a reply to the show cause notice contending  

that she had not made any false statement for the purpose of securing  

the order of condonation of  delay and in fact the charge memo dated  

30.11.1999 had been served upon her first time on 19.6.2002. She also  

made a request to summon certain government records to substantiate  

her case.  

(F) The Tribunal directed the respondent authorities to produce the  

documents,  i.e.  Inward  Register,  Postal  Acknowledge  Due  and  

original letter dated 23.12.1999 and other relevant documents, if any,  

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which would have  bearing on the  matter  by the  next  date  and the  

matter was directed to be listed on 12.12.2002.  

(G) On  12.12.2002  though  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent  

authorities  did not produce any of the required documents,  but he  

produced the photocopies of letter dated 23.12.1999 and the Inward  

Register.   The  Tribunal  adjourned  the  case  to  19.12.2002.  The  

Tribunal passed the impugned order dated 19.12.2002 holding that the  

appellant was guilty of perjury, as well as of criminal contempt of the  

Tribunal and imposed the punishment of imprisonment till rising of  

the court and a fine of Rs.2,000/-.  

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court by  

filing a writ petition which was ultimately dismissed vide order dated  

2.9.2003,  observing  that  the  High  Court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  

entertain the matter placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in  

T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. & Ors.,  (2001) 1 SCC 516,  

wherein it had been held that against the order under the Contempt of  

Court Act, 1971, passed by the Tribunal, the party aggrieved has to  

approach this Court. Hence, this appeal.  

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4. Shri Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel appearing for the appellant  

has submitted  that  the order impugned had been passed in flagrant  

violation  of  not  only  the  principles  of  natural  justice,  but  also  the  

statutory  rules  known  as  The  Contempt  of  Courts  (C.A.T.)  Rules,  

1992 (hereinafter called as 1992 Rules) and the appellant had not been  

given due opportunity to defend herself.  The Tribunal did not decide  

the original application filed by the appellant. The Tribunal picked up  

one of the pleadings taken by the appellant treating it to be false and  

initiated the criminal contempt proceedings which is not permissible  

in law. Therefore, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.  

5. There is  none to oppose the appeal.  We have considered the  

submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant.  

6. The facts mentioned hereinabove make it clear that the Tribunal  

has not adjudicated upon the case filed by the appellant at all.  The  

appellant had approached the Tribunal for quashing of the disciplinary  

proceedings initiated against her  and the opposite party had raised the  

issue of limitation pointing out that she had been served the Articles  

of Charges at an earlier stage and the averment made by the appellant  

in this regard was false.  The Tribunal ought to have framed an issue  

on limitation, asked the parties to lead evidence and decide it on merit.  

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It  was  totally  unwarranted  and  uncalled  for  to  initiate  criminal  

contempt proceedings  merely on the basis of the pleadings taken by  

the  opposite  parties  therein.  Criminal  contempt  has  been  defined  

under Section 2(c)  of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which reads  

as under:

 “(c) “Criminal Contempt” means the publication   (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs,   by  visible  representations,  or  otherwise)  of  any   matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever   which; -

(i) scandalize or tends to scandalize or lowers   or tends to lower the authority of any court;   or

 (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere  

with,  the  due  course  of  any  judicial   proceedings; or

(iii)interferes  or  tends  to  interfere  with,  or   obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration   of justice in any other manner.”

          It has been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that  

none of the above referred to provisions was attracted in the facts of  

this case.  

7. The learned Tribunal proceeded on the basis that this Court in  

Chandra Shashi v. Anil  Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421, held  

that  nobody  should  be  permitted  to  indulge  in  immoral  acts  like  

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perjury,  prevarication  and  motivated  falsehoods  in  the  judicial  

proceedings  and  if  someone  does  so,  it  must  be  dealt  with  

appropriately.  In case the recourse to a false plea is taken with an  

oblique motive, it would definitely hinder, hamper or impede the flow  

of justice and prevent the courts from performing their legal duties.  

8. Before the Tribunal,  the case had been at a preliminary stage,  

thus, the Tribunal ought not to have initiated the criminal contempt  

proceedings  at  such  a  pre-mature  stage  making  reference  to  the  

provisions of Sections 191, 193 and 197 of the Indian Penal Code,  

1860  (hereinafter  called  as  the  IPC).  Section  191  IPC  deals  with  

giving false evidence; Section 193 provides for punishment for giving  

false evidence; and Section 197 deals with issuing or signing a false  

certificate.  

9. In  Chajoo  Ram v.  Radhey  Shyam & Anr., AIR 1971  SC  

1367,  this  Court  while  dealing  with  a  similar  issue  held  as  

under:

“…………No doubt giving of false evidence and filing   false affidavits is an evil which must be effectively curbed   with a strong hand but to start prosecution for perjury   too  readily  and  too  frequently  without  due  care  and  

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caution  and  on  inconclusive  and  doubtful  material   defeats its very purpose. Prosecution should be ordered   when it is considered expedient in the interests of justice   to punish the delinquent and not merely because there is   some inaccuracy in the statement which may be innocent   or  immaterial.  There  must  be  prima  facie  case  of   deliberate  falsehood on a matter  of  substance and the  Court  should  be  satisfied  that  there  is  reasonable  foundation for the charge…..”

10. In Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr.,  AIR  

1982  SC  1238,   this  Court  while  dealing  with  a  case  of  a  false  

statement for the purposes of Sections 193 and 199 IPC held as under:

“ ……..  When  it  is  alleged  that  a  false  statement  has  been  made  in  a  declaration  which  is  receivable  as  evidence in  any  Court  of  Justice  or  before  any  public  servant  or   other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be   set out and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth  found in some document has to be referred to pointing  out  that  the  two situations  cannot co-exist,  both being  attributable to the same person and, therefore, one to his   knowledge must  be false.  Rival  contentions set  out  in  affidavits accepted or rejected by courts with reference  to  onus  probandi  do  not  furnish  foundation  for  a   charge  under  Section  199  IPC.  ………Acceptance  or  rejection of evidence by itself is not a sufficient yardstick   to dub the one rejected as false.  Falsity can be alleged   when truth stands out glaringly and to the knowledge of   the person who is making the false statement.   Day in   and  day  out  in  courts  averments  made  by  one  set  of   witnesses  are  accepted  and the  counter-averments  are  rejected.  If  in all  such cases complaints  under Section   199  IPC  are  to  be  filed  not  only  there  will  open  up   

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floodgates of litigation but  it  would unquestionably be  an abuse of the process of the court…..”                                                           (Emphasis added)

11. In Pritish v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 236,  

this  Court  dealt  with  the  provision  of  Section  340 of  the  Code of  

Criminal  Procedure,  1973  extensively,  in  a  case  where  admittedly  

forged document had been filed in a reference under Section 18 of the  

Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  for  getting  a  higher  amount  of  

compensation. The court observed as under :-

“Reading of the sub-section makes it clear that the hub  of this provision is formation of an opinion by the court   (before  which  proceedings  were  to  be  held)  that  it  is   expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry should   be  made  into  an  offence  which  appears  to  have  been   committed…………But once the court decides to do so,   then the court should make a finding to the effect that on   the fact situation it is expedient in the interest of justice   that  the  offence  should  further  be  probed  into……It   should again be remembered that the preliminary inquiry   contemplated  in  the  sub-section  is  not  for  finding  whether any particular person is guilty or not. Far from  that, the purpose of preliminary inquiry, even if the court   opts  to  conduct  it,  is  only  to  decide  whether  it  is   expedient  in  the  interest  of  justice  to  inquire  into  the   offence which appears to have been committed.”  

12. Thus,  from the above,  it  is  evident  that  the inquiry/contempt  

proceedings  should  be  initiated  by  the  court  in  exceptional  

circumstances where the court is of the opinion that perjury has been  

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committed by a party deliberately to have some beneficial order from  

the court. There must be grounds of a nature higher than mere surmise  

or suspicion for initiating such proceedings.  There must  be distinct  

evidence of the commission of an offence by such  a person as mere  

suspicion cannot bring home the charge of perjury. More so, the court  

has also to determine as on facts, whether it is expedient in the interest  

of  justice  to  inquire  into  the  offence  which  appears  to  have  been  

committed.   

13. In  the  instant  case,  all  the  documents  summoned  by  the  

Tribunal  had not  been produced before the Tribunal.  More so,  any  

document sent by Registered Post is presumed to have been received  

by  the  addressee  in  view  of  the  provisions  of  Section  27  of  the  

General Clauses Act, 1897 and Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the  

Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872,   but  every  presumption  is  rebuttable.  

(Vide:  Harihar  Banerji  v.  Ramshashi  Roy, AIR  1918  PC  102;  

Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr. v. Atmaram Sugomal Postani,  

AIR  1989  SC  1433;  Shimla  Development  Authority  &  Ors.  v.  

Santosh Sharma (Smt.) & Anr., (1997) 2 SCC 637; and  Dr. Sunil  

Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra,  JT  

2010 (12) SC 287).  

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14. In such a fact-situation, the appellant ought to have been given  

time to rebut this presumption and lead evidence to prove that she did  

not receive the said document as alleged by the opposite parties, and it  

was necessary to do so for the  reasons we record  later.   

15. The Tribunal proceeded in great haste as the show cause notice  

was   issued  by  the  Tribunal  on  15.11.2002  for  initiating  the  said  

proceedings, fixed the date for 12.12.2002 and disposed of the matter  

on  19.12.2002.   The  Tribunal  failed  to  appreciate  that  criminal  

contempt proceedings are quasi criminal in nature and any action on  

the part of a party by mistake, inadvertence or by misunderstanding  

does not amount to contempt. In contempt proceedings, the court is  

the accuser as well as judge of the accusation. Therefore, it behoves  

the  Tribunal  to  act  with  great  circumspection  as  far  as  possible,  

making all  allowances for  errors  of  judgment.  Any action taken in  

unclear  case  is  to  make  the  law  of  contempt  do  duty  for  other  

measures  and  therefore  is  totally  unwarranted  and  should  not  be  

encouraged.  The proceedings being quasi criminal in nature, burden  

and standard of  proof  required is  the  same as required in  criminal  

cases.   The charges  have to be  framed as per the statutory rules  

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framed for the purpose and proved beyond reasonable doubt keeping  

in mind that the alleged contemnor is entitled to the benefit of doubt.  

Law  does  not  permit  imposing  any  punishment  in  contempt  

proceedings  on  mere  probabilities.  The  court  cannot  punish  the  

alleged contemnor without any foundation merely on conjectures and  

surmises. (See  Sahdeo alias Sahdeo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh  

& Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 705).  

16. Needless to say,  the contempt proceedings being quasi criminal  

in nature require strict adherence to the procedure prescribed under  

the rules applicable in such proceedings.  In L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State  

of U.P.,  AIR 1998 SC 3337, this court while dealing with the issue of  

observance of the statutory rules held as under:   

“……… we are of the opinion that the Court while  passing the impugned order had not followed the  procedure prescribed by law.  It  is true that the  High  Court  can  invoke  powers  and  jurisdiction  vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of   India  but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised  in accordance with the procedure prescribed by   law  .”                                                   (Emphasis supplied)  

17. In  Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C. Ltd.,  

AIR 2009 SC 735, and Sahdeo (supra), this Court reiterated a similar  

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view observing that in contempt proceedings the court must conclude  

the  trial  and  complete  the  proceedings  “in  accordance  with  the  

procedure prescribed by law”.   

18. The instant case has  to be dealt with  under the 1992 Rules.  

The aforesaid rules provide the following procedure:

“Rule 7. Initiation of proceedings: -  (i) ……………………….. (ii) Every  petition  for  ‘Criminal  Contempt’   

made in accordance with these rules and  every information other than a petition, for  initiating  action  for  criminal  contempt   under the Act on being scrutinized by the   Registrar  shall  first  be  placed  on  the  administrative side before the Chairman in   the  case  of  the  principal  Bench  and  the   concerned  Vice  Chairman in  the  case  of   other  Benches  or  such  other  Member  as   may be designated by him for this purpose  and if he considers it expedient and proper   to  take  action  under  the  Act,  the  said   petition  or  information  shall  be  registered   and  numbered  in  the  Registry  and  placed   before the Bench for preliminary hearing.

 (iii) When  suo  motu  action  is  taken,  the   

statement  of  facts  constituting  the  alleged  contempt  and  copy  of  the  draft  charges  shall  be  prepared  and  signed  by  the   Registrar  before  placing  them  for  preliminary hearing.  

Rule 13. Hearing of the case and trial:- (a)…………………….. (b)………………………

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(c)  The respondent shall be furnished with a copy   of the charge framed, which shall be read over   and explained to the respondent. The Tribunal   shall then record his plea, if any.

(d)……………………. (e) …………………….

Rule 15. Procedure for trial:-

(i) Except as otherwise provided in the Act and  these  rules,  the  procedure  prescribed  for   summary trials under Chapter XXI of the  Code shall as far as practicable be followed  in the trial of case for contempt.  

(ii) …………………….. (iii) ……………………… (iv) …………………….. (v) …………………….

                                                           (Emphasis added)

19. In  the  instant  case,  admittedly,  the  procedure  prescribed  

hereinabove under the 1992 Rules has not been followed. A criminal  

contempt case has neither been registered nor numbered separately.  

No charge (s) had ever been framed by the Tribunal as mandatorily  

required under the rules. Thus question of furnishing the copy of the  

same  to  the  appellant  did  not  arise.  Therefore,  the  contempt  

proceedings had not been concluded in conformity with the aforesaid  

rules at all.  This Court in Sahdeo (supra) while dealing with a similar  

situation held as under:  

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“Every  statutory  provision  requires  strict   adherence, for the reason that the Statute creates   rights  in  favour  of  persons  concerned.   The  impugned judgment suffered from non-observance  of  the  principles  of  natural  justice  and  not   ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952.   Thus,  the  trial  itself  suffered  from  material   procedural  defect  and  stood  vitiated.  The  impugned  judgment  and  order,  so  far  as  the  conviction  of  the  appellants  in  Contempt   proceedings  are  concerned,  is  liable  to  be  set   aside.”

                                                             (Emphasis added)

20. The ratio of the judgment in Sahdeo (supra) applies to this case  

in entirety.   The instant  case is  squarely covered  by the aforesaid  

judgment.  In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order  

dated 19.12.2002 in O.A. No. 715 of 2002 passed by the Tribunal is  

liable to be set aside.  The appeal is allowed. The judgment and order  

of the Tribunal is set aside.  No costs.  

                                   ……………… ………………J.

(P. SATHASIVAM)

                      ..……………………… ……J.

                           (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi; November  29, 2010

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