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PETITIONER: R.M TEWARI, ADVOCATE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       20/02/1996

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 2047            1996 SCC  (2) 610  JT 1996 (2)   657        1996 SCALE  (2)389

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             AND CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 250 OF 1996 ------------------------------- (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No 701 of 1995) Govt. of N.C.T., Delhi V. Judge, Designated Court II (TADA)                             AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 251 OF 1996 ------------------------------ (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1268 of 1995) Mohd. Mehfooz V. Chief Secretary & Anr.                       J U D G M E N T J. S. VERMA. J. :      Leave granted in special leave petitions.      In Kartar Singh etc. vs. State of Punjab etc., (1994) 3 SCC  569,   the  Constitution   Bench  while  upholding  the constitutional validity  of the  provisions in the Terrorist and Disruptive  Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (for short "the TADA  Act") except  Section  22  therein,  noticed  the general  perception  that  there  was  some  misuse  of  the stringent  provisions   by  the  authorities  concerned.  To prevent any possible misuse of the stringent provisions, the Constitution Bench  suggested a strict review of these cases in its observations made as under :      "In order to ensure higher level of      scrutiny and  applicability of TADA      Act,  there  must  be  a  screening      Committee  or  a  Review  Committee      constituted    by    the    Central      Government consisting  of the  Home

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    Secretary, Law  Secretary and other      secretaries   concerned    of   the      various Departments  to review  all      the TADA  cases instituted  by  the      Central Government  as well  as  to      have  a   quarterly  administrative      review,   reviewing   the   States’      action in  the application  of  the      TADA provisions  in the  respective      States,    and    the    incidental      questions   arising   in   relation      thereto. Similarly, There must be a      Screening or  Review  Committee  at      the State  level constituted by the      respective States consisting of the      Chief  Secretary,  Home  Secretarys      Law Secretary,Director  General  of      Police (Law  and Order)  and  other      officials   as    the    respective      Government may  think  it  fit,  to      review the  action of the enforcing      authorities  under   the  Act   and      screen the  cases registered  under      the  provisions   of  the  Act  and      decide the further course of action      in every matter and so on."                          ( at page 683 )      It  appears   that  in   compliance  with   the   above observations of  this  Court  in  Kartar  Singh  (supra),  a Screening Committee or a Review Committee was constituted by the Government  in several  States including  Delhi. A  High Power  Committee   under  the   Chairmanship  of  the  Chief Secretary of  Delhi reviewed the prosecutions made under the TADA Act  and the  Government of Delhi conveyed its approval to the  Director of  Prosecution, Delhi  for deletion of the charges under  the TADA  Act in the specified criminal cases pending before  the Designated  Court. The  learned  Special Additional  Public  Prosecutor  filed  applications  in  the Designated Court  for withdrawal  of charges  under the TADA Act in  all those  cases pending in the Desionated Court. It appears that  the only  reason assigned  for  withdrawal  of charges under  the TADA Act by the learned Public Prosecutor was the recommendation of the High Power Committee which was constituted to  review the  cases  in  accordance  with  the observations of  this Court in Kartar Singh. The Deasignated Court dismissed  those applications  taking  ths  view  that administrative decisions  cannot interfere  with the working of the judicial system. Apparently, the view taken is that a mere administrative  decision taken  on  the  basis  of  the recommendation of  the Review Committee is not sufficient to permit withdrawal  of a  criminal prosecution  pending in  a court of law.      The appeals  by special  leave challenge  the orders of the Designated  Court and  the writ petition by an advocate, in public  interest, is  for a  direction to  the Designated Court to  permit withdrawal  of all prosecutions recommended by the Review Committee.      The scope of Section 321 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr  P.C.) dealing  with withdrawal from prosecution is settled by  decisions of  this Court. In State of Orissa vs. Chandrika Mohapatra  and Others, (1976) 4 SCC 250, the scope was indicated as under :           "Now  the   law  as   to  when      consent    to     withdrawal     of      prosecution  should   be   accorded

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    under Section  494 of  the Code  of      Criminal Procedure  is well settled      as a  result of  several  decisions      of this  Court. The  first case  in      which this  question  came  up  for      consideration was State of Bihar v.      Ram Naresh Pandey, 1957 SCR 279 ...      It was pointed out by this Court in      that case  that in granting consent      to withdrawal  from prosecution the      court     undoubtedly     exercises      judicial discretion,  but  it  does      not follow  that the  discretion is      to     be   exercised   only   with      reference to  material gathered  by      the  judicial method. . ...."                          ( at pase 252 )           "It will,  therefore, be  seen      that it  is not  sufficient for the      Public  Prosecutor  merely  to  say      that it is not expedient to proceed      with the  prosecution.  He  has  to      make out  some ground  which  would      show that the prosecution is sousht      to be  withdrawn because inter alia      the prosecution  may not be able to      produce  sufficient   evidence   to      sustain  the  charge  or  that  the      prosecution does  not appear  to be      well-founded  or   that  there  are      other circumstances  which  clearly      show    that    the    object    of      administration of justice would not      be advanced  or furthered  by going      on  with   the   prosecution.   The      ultimate guiding consideration must      always   be    the   interest    of      administration of  justice and that      is  the  touchstone  on  which  the      question must be determined whether      the prosecution  should be  allowed      to be withdrawn."                          ( at Page 253 ) In Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar & Others, [1983] 2 SCR 61, it was reiterated as under :      "From the  aforesaid enunciation of      the legal  position  governing  the      proper  exercise   of   the   power      contained in  s. 321, three or four      things become  amply clear.  In the      first  place   though  it   is   an      executive function  of  the  Public      Prosecutor  for   which   statutory      discretion is  vested in  him,  the      discretion is  neither absolute nor      unreviewable but  it is  subject to      the Court’s  supervisory  function.      In fact being an executive function      it would  be subject  to a judicial      review on  certain limited  grounds      like any  other  executive  action,      the   authority   with   whom   the      discretion    is    vested    "must      genuinely  address  itself  to  the      matter  before  it,  must  not  act

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    under the  dictates of another body      must  not   do  what  it  has  been      forbidden to  do, must  act in good      faith,  must  have  regard  to  all      relevant  considerations  and  must      not   be   swayed   by   irrelevant      considerations, must  not  seek  to      promote  purposes   alien  to   the      letter or  to  the  spirit  of  the      legislation that  gives it power to      act and not must act arbitrarily or      capriciously  ...   These   several      principles  can   conveniently   be      grouped in  two main  categories  :      failure to  exercise a  discretion,      and    excess     or    abuse    of      discretionary   poser.    The   two      classes are  not, however, mutually      exclusive."   (vide    de   Smith’s      Judicial Review  of  Administrative      Action 4th Edition pp. 285-86)."                       ( at pages 81-82 )      "Fourthly,  the  decision  in  R.K.      Jain’s case  (supra) clearly  shows      that when  paucity of  evidence  or      lack  of   prospect  of  successful      prosecution  is   the  ground   for      withdrawal the court has not merely      the power but a duty to examine the      material on  record  without  which      the validity  and propriety of such      ground cannot be determined.  ’                             (at page 83)      It is,  therefore, clear  that the Designated Court was right in taking the view that withdrawal from prosecution is not  to  be  permitted  mechanically  by  the  court  on  an application for  that purpose made by the Public Prosecutor. It is  equally clear that the Public Prosecutor also has not to act  mechanlcally  in  the  discharge  of  his  statutory function under  Section 321 Cr.P.C. on such a recommendation being made  by the Review Committee; and that it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to satisfy himself that it is a fit case for  withdrawal from  prosecution before  he seeks  the consent of the court for that purpose.      It appears that in these matters, the Public Prosecutor did not  fully appreciate  the  requirements  offection  321 Cr.P.C.  and  made  the  applications  for  withdrawal  from prosecution only  on the basis of the recommendations of the Review Committee. It was necessary for the Public Prosecutor to satisfy  himself in  each case  that the  case is fit for withdrawal from  prosecution in  accordance with the settled principles indicated in the decisions of this Court and then to satisfy the Designated Court of the existence of a ground which permits withdrawal from prosecution under Section 321 C P Cr .      It would  now be open to the Public Prosecutor to apply for withdrawal  from prosecution under Section 321 Cr.P C in accordance with law on any ground available according to the settled principles;  and on  such an application being made, the Designated  Court would  decide the  same in  accordance with law.      The observations  in Kartar Sinsh have to be understood in the  context in which they were made It was observed that a review  of the  cases should  be  made  by  a  High  Power Committee  to  ensure  that  there  was  no  misuse  of  the

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stringent provisions  of the  TADA Act and any case in which resort to  the TADA  Act was  found to  be unwarranted,  the necessary remedial  measures should  be  taken.  The  Review Committee is  expected to  perform  its  functions  in  this manner. If the recommendation of the Review Committee, based on the material present, is,that resort to provisions of the TADA  Act  is  unwarranted  for  any  reason  which  Permits withdrawal from  prosecution for  those offences, a suitable application made  under Section  321 Cr.P.C.  on that ground has to  be considered  and decided  by the  Designated Court giving due  weight to  the  opinion  formed  by  the  Public Prosecutor on  the basis  of the  recommendation of the High Power Committee.      It has  also to  be borne  in  mind  that  the  initial invocation of  the stringent  provisions of  the TADA Act is itself subject to sanction of the Government and, therefore, the revised opinion of the Government formed on the basis of the  recommendation   of  the  High  Power  Committee  after scruting of  each case  should not be lightly disregarded by the court  except for  weighty reasons  such as malafides or manifest arbitrariness. The worth of the material to support the charge  under the TADA Act and the evidence which can be produced, is  likely to  be known  to the prosecuting agency and, therefore,  mere existence  of Prima  facig material to support the  framing of  the charge  should not by itself be treated as  sufficient to  refuse the consent for withdrawal from prosecution.  It is  in this manner an application made to withdraw  the charges  of offences  under  the  TADA  Act pursuant to  review of a case by the Review Committee has to be considered and decided by the Designated Courts.      The applications  made under  Section 321  Cr.P.C.  not having been  decided on  the basis  indicated  above,  fresh applications  made   in  all  such  cases  pursuant  to  the recommendations of  the  Review  Committee  or  the  revised opinion of  the Government have to be considered and decided by the Designated Courts in the manner indicated above.      By an  order dated 4.5.1995 made by this Court in these matters, it  was directed  that the  Designated Court  would consider the  bail applications  of all  accused persons  in respect of  whom a  prayer had  been made  for withdrawal of charges framed  under the  provisions of  the  TADA  Act  on merits  in   accordance  with   law,  after  excluding  from consideration the  accusation relating  to charges under the provisions of  the TADA  Act. The  bail granted  to all such accused persons  pursuant to  that order would continue till conclusion of the trial in each case.      The writ petition and the appeals are disposed of accordingly.