http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: R. L. KAPUR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/02/1972

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1972 AIR  858            1972 SCR  (3) 417  1972 SCC  (1) 651  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1990 SC 772  (16)  RF         1991 SC2176  (25)  R          1992 SC 904  (17,19)

ACT: Penal Code--S. 70 read with S. 25 of the General Clauses Act 1897--Whether   security  deposited  in  Court  in   certain contempt matters can be adjusted against a fine imposed upon him in those proceedings after the lapse of 6 years.

HEADNOTE: The  appeal is directed against the order of the High  Court of Madras directing a sum of Rs. 500/- deposited in the High Court as security for the appellants appearance before it in certain  contempt  of  Court  proceedings,  to  be  adjusted against the fine imposed upon him in those proceedings.  The contempt  of  Court proceedings (No. 3 of 1962)  were  taken against  the  appellant in the High Court in  respect  of  a letter  written and addressed by the appellant to  the  then Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained  certain remarks  in  regard  to the  dismissal  of  the  appellant’s revision  application by a single judge of the  High  Court. The  contempt with which the plaintiff was charged in  those proceedings was contempt of the High Court and not the  City Civil Court, in which the appellant had filed the suit ’from which,  the  said  revision  application  arose.   In  those proceedings,  the  High  Court by  its  judgment,  held  the appellant guilty of contempt of Court and sentenced him to 6 months  simple imprisonment and fine.  The appellant  served out the sentence of imprisonment but failed to pay the fine. The  said amount of Rs. 500, deposited in the said  contempt proceedings   remained  unattached  till  1971.   when   two applications  were  filed  in  the  High  Court-one  by  the appellant  for  refund  and  the  other  by  the  State  for adjustment  of  the said amount towards the  fine  remaining unpaid  and the High Court allowed the  State’s  application for payment of the said sum towards satisfaction of the said unpaid  fine.  Counsel for the appellant relied on S. 70  of the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed since the  passing of the order imposing fine upon the  appellant, the  State  application was time barred and the  High  Court could not pass the impugned order.  Further, counsel  relied

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

on S. 25 of the General Clauses Act 1897 which provides that Sections  63 to 70 of the Penal Code and the  provisions  of the  Criminal  Procedure Code in relation to the  issue  and execution  of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply  to all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation etc., and  since a  fine which was imposed upon the appellant, was  an  order passed  under the Contempt of Court Act 1952, Section 70  of the Penal Code was applicable.  Dismissing the appeal, HELD  : (i) See. 5 of the Penal Code provides,  inter  alia, that its provisions are not to affect the provisions of  any special or local law and under Art. 215 of the Constitution, every  High  Court  being a Court of Record,  have  all  the powers  of such a Court including the power to  punish  fore contempt  of  itself.  The jurisdiction a special  one.  not arising  or derived from the Contempt of Court’s  Act  1952, and  therefore, not within the purview of either  the  Penal Code  or  the  Code of Criminal Procedure.  The  law  as  to contempt of Court, as administered by the 418 Madras High Court, in the present case, is a special law and therefore,  S.  70 of the Penal Code does not apply  to  the facts  and circumstances of the case.. Further since such  a special law does not prescribe any period of limitation  for collecting  and  satisfying  a fine  imposed  thereunder  no question of limitation would arise. [420 A] (ii) The  power of the High Court to punish for contempt  of itself arises not under any Act, such as Contempt of Courts" Act, but the Constitution itself vests these rights on every High Court, and no Act of a Legislature could take away that jurisdiction  and  confer  it afresh by virtue  of  its  own authority  and since the sentence of fine  and  imprisonment passed  against the appellant was not imposed under any  act or  statute,Section  25 of the General Clauses  Act  has  no application in the present case. [420 E-F] Sukhdev  SinghSondhi v The Chief Justice and Judges  of  the Pepsu High Court [1954]S.C.R. 454 referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 185  of 1971. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated June  19, 1971 of the Madras High Court in Application  Nos. 1171 and 1172 of 1971. S.   N. Prasad, for the appellant. A.   V. Rangam, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat,  J.  This  appeal, by  special  leave,  is  directed against  the order of the High Court of Madras, directing  a sum of Rs. 500, deposited in the High Court as security  for the appellant’s appearance before it in certain contempt  of court  proceedings, to be adjusted against the fine  imposed upon him in those proceedings.  It appears that the contempt of  court  proceedings,  being No. 3  of  1962,  were  taken against  the  appellant in the High Court in  respect  of  a letter  written and addressed by the appellant to  the  then Chief Justice of the High Court and which contained  certain remarks  in  regard  to the  dismissal  of  the  appellant’s revision  application by a single Judge of the  High  Court. Thus,  the contempt with which the plaintiff was charged  in those  proceedings was contempt of the High Court,  and  not the  City  Civil Court, Madras, in which the  appellant  had filed  the  suit  from  out  of  which  the  said   revision application arose.  In those proceedings, the High Court, by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

its  judgment and order, dated February 25, 1964,  held  the appellant  guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him  to six  months’  single imprisonment and fine.   The  appellant served  out the sentence of imprisonment, but failed to  pay the fine. 419 It  appears that the said amount of Rs. 500,  deposited,  as aforesaid,  in  the  said  contempt  proceedings,   remained unattached till 1971.  In 1971, two applications were  filed in  the High Court, one by the appellant for refund  of  the said  amount  and  the  other on behalf  of  the  State  for adjustment  of  the said amount towards the  fine  remaining unpaid.   By an order, dated June 29, 1971, the  High  Court dismissed the appellant’s application for refund and allowed the State’s application for payment of the said sum  towards satisfaction of the said unpaid fine. As against the said order, counsel for the appellant  relied on sec. 70 of the Penal Code and urged that six years having elapsed  since the passing of the order imposing  fine  upon the  appellant, the State’s application was time barred  and the High Court could not pass the impugned order, the effect of  which was to collect the said fine from out of the  said deposit.   If sec. 70 were to apply to the said contempt  of court  proceedings,  there  is no  doubt  that  the  State’s application  would be time barred as that section  in  terms provides that such fine can be levied within six years after the  passing of the order of conviction and  sentence.   But sec.  5  of the Penal Code provides, inter  alia,  that  its provisions  are not to affect the provisions of any  special or  local law.  Under sec. 41 of the Penal Code,  a  special law  is one applicable to a particular subject.   Therefore, if  the law as to contempt of court, as administered by  the High  Court  of Madras, a chartered High Court, were  to  be regarded  as  special  law,  sec.  70  of  the  Penal  Code, obviously, cannot apply,, and since such a special law  does not  prescribe any period of limitation for  collecting  and satisfying  a  fine  imposed  thereunder,  no  question   of limitation would arise. Counsel,  however, relied on sec. 25 of the General  Clauses Act,  1897 which provides that secs. 63 to 70 of  the  Penal Code and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the issue and execution of warrants for the levy of  fines shall apply to all fines imposed under  "any  Act, Regulation,  rule or bye-law" unless such  Act,  Regulation, rule  or  bye-law  contains  an  express  provision  to  the contrary.  The argument was that the order of sentence which imposed upon the appellant the fine was and must be regarded as  an order passed under the Contempt of Courts Act,  XXXII of  1952,  and consequently, sec. 70 of the Penal  Code  was applicable. The question is, does the power of the High Court of  Madras to  punish  contempt of itself arise under the  Contempt  of Courts  Act,  1952,  so that under see. 25  of  the  General Clauses Act, 1897, secs. 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and  the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure  would apply?   The answer to such a question is furnished by  Art. 215  of the Constitution and the provisions of the  Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 420 themselves.   Art. 215 declares that every High Court  shall be  a  court of record and shall have all powers of  such  a court including the power to punish for contempt of  itself. Whether  Art.  215  declares the power  of  the  High  Court already  existing  in it by reason of its being a  court  of record, or whether the Article confers the power as inherent

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special one, not arising  or derived from the Contempt of Courts  Act,  1952, and  therefore, not within the purview of either  the  Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Such a position  is also  clear  from the provisions of the Contempt  of  Courts Act,  1952.   Sec. 3 of that Act provides  that  every  High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction,  powers and  authority  in accordance with the  same  procedure  and practice in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to  it as  it has and exercises in respect of contempts of  itself. The only limitation to the power is, as provided by sub-sec. (2),  that  it  shall  not take  cognizance  of  a  contempt committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Penal Code.   As explained  in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. The Chief  Justice  and Judges  of  the Pepsu High Court,(1) sec. 3 of  the  Act  is similar to sec. 2 of the 1926 Act, and "far from  conferring a  new  jurisdiction,  assumes,  as did  the  Old  Act,  the existence  of a right to punish for contempt in  every  High Court  and  further  assumes  the  existence  of  a  special practice  and procedure, for it says that every  High  Court shall  exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and  authority "in accordance with the same procedure and practice." In any case,  so  far  as  contempt of the  High  Court  itself  is concerned, as distinguished from that of a court subordinate to  it,  the Constitution vests these rights in  every  High Court,  and so no Act of a legislature could take away  that jurisdiction  and  confer  it afresh by virtue  of  its  own authority.   No doubt, sec. 5 of the Act states that a  High Court  shall  have jurisdiction to inquire into  and  try  a contempt  of itself or of a court subordinate to it  whether the  alleged  contempt is committed within  or  outside  the local  limits of its jurisdiction and whether the  contemnor is  within or outside such limits.  The effect of sec. 5  is only  to widen the scope of the existing jurisdiction  of  a special  kind and not conferring a new jurisdiction.  It  is true  that under sec. 4 of the Act the maximum sentence  and fine   which   can  be  imposed   is   respectively   simple imprisonment  for  six months and a fine of  Rs.  2,000,  or both.   But  that  again is a  restriction  on  an  existing jurisdiction and not conferment of a new jurisdiction.  That being the position, sec. 25 in the General Clauses Act, 1897 cannot apply.  The result is that sec. 70 of the Penal  Code is  no  impediment by way of limitation in the  way  of  the recovery of the fine. (1) [1954] S.C.R. 454, at 463. 421 It  is  true  that the deposit was  made  for  a  particular purpose, that is, to secure the presence of the  appellant at the time of the hearing of the said contempt proceedings. But the High Court, as a court of record, being clothed with a   special  jurisdiction,  has  also  all  incidental   and necessary   powers   to   effectuate   that    jurisdiction. Consequently, it had the power to order satisfaction of fine imposed by it from out of an available fund deposited by  or on behalf of or for the benefit of the appellant. In  our  view,  the  contentions raised  on  behalf  of  the appellant  cannot, for the reasons aforesaid, be  sustained. The  appeal fails and is dismissed.  There will be no  order as to costs. S.C.                                                  Appeal dismissed. 422

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5