12 March 2004
Supreme Court
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R L JAIN (D) BY LRS. Vs D D A

Bench: S. RAJENDRA BABU,DR. AR LAKSHMANAN,G.P. MATHUR.
Case number: C.A. No.-005515-005515 / 1997
Diary number: 9798 / 1997
Advocates: Vs SAHARYA & CO.


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5515 of 1997

PETITIONER: R.L. Jain (D) by LRs.

RESPONDENT: DDA & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2004

BENCH: S. Rajendra Babu , Dr. AR Lakshmanan & G.P. Mathur.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

G.P. MATHUR, J.

       In view of conflict of opinion in two decisions of this Court, namely,  Shri Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills v. State of Gujarat 1991(1) SCC 262 and  Union of India v. Budh Singh & Ors. 1995 (9) SCC 233, the appeal has been  placed for hearing before this larger Bench and the question in issue is  whether in a case where possession is taken before the issuance of  notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,  the claimant   (owner of land) is entitled to interest for such anterior period  in accordance  with Section 34 of  the said Act.

2.      The relevant facts may be noticed in brief.   The Chief Commissioner,  Delhi, on behalf of the Delhi Administration, issued a preliminary  notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter  referred to as "the Act") on 13.11.1959 for acquisition of a large area of  34070 acres of land including 1 bigha 11 biswa area in khasra no.223 of  village Kharera for the planned development of Delhi.   This was followed  by a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, which was published in the  Gazette on 11.10.1961.   The dispute in the present appeal relates to  aforesaid plot bearing khasra no.223.  Being an evacuee property,  the said  plot was notified for being sold in public auction by the Ministry of  Rehabilitation and it appears that in the auction notice it was mentioned that  the same shall be out of the purview of the notification issued on 13.11.1959  under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquisition of the land.  The original  appellant R.L. Jain purchased the said plot in the auction held on 8.4.1960  and a sale certificate was  issued in his favour on 31.8.1961.   In pursuance  of the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act, the  possession of plot no.223 was taken over by the Collector on 10.11.1961 and  was  handed over to the Delhi Development Authority (for short "the  DDA").   The plot was  included in Award No.1245 made by the Collector  on 30.12.1961 and compensation amount was determined.    R.L. Jain  received the compensation amount  under protest and sought reference to the  Court  since he was dissatisfied with the amount of the compensation offered  and paid to him.   The Collector thereafter made a reference to the Court  under Section 18 of the Act..   

3.      After considerable period of time,  R.L. Jain filed Suit No.154 of 1965  impleading Union of India as the sole defendant seeking a declaration that  the proceedings taken for acquisition of plot bearing no.223 of village  Kharera, which had been purchased by him in public auction, were illegal as  it was  stipulated in the auction notice that the said plot was not included in  the preliminary notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act which was  published on 13.11.1959.   After contest, the Sub-Judge First Class, Delhi   passed a decree on 12.4.1967 that the acquisition proceedings including  notification dated 11.10.1961 issued under Section 6 of the Act with regard  to the  plot in dispute are null and void.  The  Union of India preferred an

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appeal being RCA No.59 of 1968 but the same was dismissed by Senior  Subordinate Judge, Delhi (with enhanced appellate powers) on 13.1.1969  and the judgment and decree dated 12.4.1967 of the Subordinate Judge was  affirmed.   The matter rested there as it  was not carried in second appeal  before the High Court.

4.      As mentioned earlier in pursuance of the notifications issued under  Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act, the possession of the plot in dispute had been    taken over by the Collector on 10.11.1961 and was handed over to the  DDA  which  commenced construction on the acquired  land.  R.L. Jain then filed  Suit No.421 of 1967 against Union of India and DDA for permanent  injunction restraining them from making any construction over the disputed  plot and from disposing of the same in any manner.   During the pendency of  the suit an undertaking was given by the  DDA that no construction would  be raised on the plot in dispute.   However, the DDA proceeded with the  constructions and consequently the plaint was amended and relief of  mandatory injunction for removal of the construction was sought.   The Sub- Judge, Delhi decided the suit on  19.1.1980 and passed a decree for  demolition of the construction and the possession.   The appeal (RCA  No.465 of 1980) preferred against the said judgment and decree was  dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi on 18.3.1989 and the  decree for demolition and removal of the construction was affirmed.  The  DDA preferred a second appeal (RSA No.71 of 1989) in Delhi High Court  which was summarily dismissed on 14.8.1991 and then Special Leave  Petition  was filed in this Court.  In order to save the demolition of the  building constructed over the plot in dispute, the appropriate authority issued  fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquisition of the plot in  dispute on 9.9.1992 and the declaration made under Section 6(1) of the Act  was published on 8.9.1993.   After noticing that the  notifications under  Sections 4 and 6 had already been issued, the Special Leave Petition filed by  DDA was disposed of on 13.12.1993 with the following directions : "Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case and  to do complete justice between the parties we are of the view  that it would not be appropriate to permit the demolition of the  flats which have already been constructed on the land in  dispute.   We, therefore, direct that the compensation which  shall be determined under the land acquisition proceedings in  respect of the land in dispute shall be payable and paid to the  respondent \026 R.L. Jain or his nominee.   Needless to say that  all offers and counter offers for settling the dispute which were  made before this Court, shall stand withdrawn and ineffective.    We direct that the land acquisition proceedings be expedited  and be completed preferably within six months from today.    We allow the appeal in the above terms.  No costs."  

       The Collector thereafter  made an award on 11.6.1994 for the plot in  dispute determining its market value  as Rs.16,54,175/-  and  solatium at the  rate of 30% on the said amount as Rs.4,96,252/-.    The Collector  also  awarded interest from 10.11.1961 to 9.11.1962 at the rate of 9% amounting  to Rs.1,93,538/- and 10.11.1962 to  10.6.1994 (from the date of  dispossession till the date of the award) at the rate of 15% amounting to  Rs.1,01,86,839/-.    

5.      The award of the Collector was  challenged by the DDA by filing  Writ Petition No.292 of 1995 which has been partly allowed by the High  Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 19.3.1997.   The High  Court has held that the award of interest under Section 34 of the Act at the  rate of 9% p.a. w.e.f. 10.11.1961 to 9.12.1962 and then at the rate of 15%  p.a. from 10.11.1962 to 10.6.1994 is without jurisdiction and to that extent  the award has been set aside.  The remaining part of the award i.e. for  market value of land and solatium has been upheld.  

6.      Shri Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat 1991 (1) SCC  262 has been decided by a Bench of two Judges.  In this case the possession  of the land was taken over by the government on 19.11.1949 under an

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arrangement that suitable land of equal value will be given to the owner.   But, the government did not give any other alternative land and acquisition  proceedings were initiated whereunder the notification under Section 6(1) of  the Act was issued on 1.2.1955.  The claimant was not satisfied with the  award made by the Collector and accordingly asked for a reference under  Section 18 of the Act.  The District Judge determined the amount of  compensation for the acquired land but did not award any interest.  The  owner of the land did not prefer any appeal against the award of the District  Judge before the High Court, but the State preferred an appeal challenging  enhancement in compensation.   The claimant, then filed time barred cross  objection under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC along with an  application for  condonation of delay.  The application for condonation of delay was  dismissed  with the result, the cross objection stood rejected as time barred.   It was contended on behalf of the claimant (owner of the land) that he was  entitled to interest with effect from 19.11.1949.  The High Court took the  view that as the District Judge had not awarded interest for the period  claimed by the claimant and his cross objection having been rejected as time  barred, the claimant had no right to claim interest in the appeal preferred by  the State Government.  The claimant then preferred an appeal in this Court  which modified the decree of the High Court by awarding interest.  Paras 16  and 17 of the Report wherein the matter was dealt with read as under:      "16.  \005\005\005\005..The interest to be paid under Section 34 and  also under Section 28 is of different character than the  compensation amount under Section 23(1) of the Act.  Whereas  the interest, if payable under the Act, can be claimed at any  stage of the proceedings under the Act, the amount of  compensation under Section 23(1) which is an award-decree  under Section 26 is subject to the rules of Procedure and  Limitation.  The rules of procedure  are hand-maiden of justice.   The procedural hassle cannot come in the way of substantive  rights of citizens under the Act.

17.     We do not, therefore, agree with the reasoning and the  findings reached by the High Court.  We are of the opinion that  it was not necessary for the appellant-claimant to have filed  separate appeal/cross objections before the High Court for the  purposes of claiming interest under Section 28 or Section 34 of  the Act.  He could claim the interest in the State appeal.  The  fact that he filed cross-objections which were dismissed as time  barred, is wholly irrelevant."

7.      The appeal preferred by the claimant was accordingly allowed and it  was held that he was entitled to interest on the compensation amount for the  period 19.11.1949 to 1.2.1955 in accordance with the provisions of the Act,  as they stood prior to amendment made by  Act No. 68 of 1984.

8.      In Union of India v. Budh Singh & Ors.  (1995) 6 SCC 233 which has  also been decided by a Bench of two Judges, the possession of land was  taken on 15.3.1963 and the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was  published on 16.11.1984.  The award decree passed by the reference Court  attained finally.   In execution proceedings the High Court passed an order  that in the event of default in payment of the amount within the stipulated  time, interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum from the date of taking  possession shall be paid.  In appeal before this Court the only question raised  was whether the owners of the land were entitled to interest at the rate of 18  per cent per annum from 15.3.1963, the date on which the possession was  taken, till 15.11.1984, preceding the date on which the notification under  Section 4(1) had been published.   After analysis of the provisions of the Act  it was held that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code covering the  entire field of operation of the liability of the State to make payment of  interest and entitlement thereof by the owner when the land is taken over.   The  court has no power to impose any condition to pay interest in excess of  the rate and the manner prescribed by the statute as well as for a period   anterior to the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.  It

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was also held that the parameter for initiation of proceedings is the  publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act which would  give legitimacy to the State to take possession of the land in accordance with  the provisions of the Act and further any possession taken otherwise would  not be considered to be  possession taken under the Act.  The Bench went on   to hold that the Act being  a self-contained code, the common law principles  of justice, equity and good conscience cannot be extended in awarding  interest, contrary to the provisions of the statute.           

9.      Shri Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel for the appellant has  submitted that in Suit No. 154 of 1965 filed by the original appellant R.L.  Jain, a decree had been passed that the notification issued under Section 6 of  the Act on 11.10.1961 was null and void and the proceedings for acquisition  of land with regard to plot No. 223 of village Kharera were illegal and the  said decree became final in view of the dismissal of the appeal preferred by  Union of India.  The earlier notifications issued under Section 4(1) and 6 of  the Act, therefore,  became non est in the eyes of law but the possession of  the plot in dispute had been taken over by Union of India on 10.11.1961.   The fresh notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 9.9.1992.   Section 34 clearly lays down that when the amount of compensation is not  paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector  shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon from the time of so  taking possession until it is paid or deposited.  The appellant was  consequently entitled to interest from the date of taking possession, viz. from  10.11.1961 and the Collector had rightly included the interest component in  the award made by him.  Learned counsel has submitted that language of  Section 34 and also of  Section 28 is plain and unambiguous and, therefore,  no other view is possible.  He has also submitted that in case it  is held that  the owner of the land is not entitled to interest for the period anterior to  notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, it will be highly unjust and  inequitable.  In support of his submission, he has  placed reliance on   Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. New Brunswick Electric Power  Commission AIR 1928 PC 287, wherein it was held that on a contract for  sale and purchase of land it is the practice to require the purchaser to pay  interest on his purchase money from the date when he took possession.  He  has also referred to The Revenue Divisional Officer Guntur v. Vasireddy  Rama Bhanu Bupal & Ors. AIR 1970 AP 262 (FB) wherein it was held that  possession taken even prior to acquisition proceedings and with the consent  of the owner would be possession of land  under the Act and interest is  payable from the date of taking possession.  Reliance has also been placed  upon Smt. Swarnamayi v. Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1964 Orissa 113,   where having regard to  Chapter XXVI  Rule 3 of Land Acquisition Manual,  it was held that where possession was obtained in accordance with the  consent of the owner thereof before acquisition proceedings started, interest  from the date of taking over possession can be granted.  Learned counsel has  lastly submitted that the view taken by this Court in Shri Vijay Cotton & Oil  Mills (supra) is the  legally correct and  equitable view and applying the  ratio of the said case, the award made by the Collector wherein the appellant  had been awarded  interest from the date of taking over possession, was  perfectly correct and the High Court has erred in setting aside the interest  component.

10.     Shri Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing  for the respondents has submitted that under the Scheme of the Act no event  prior to publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act can be taken  note of as any proceedings under the Act can commence only after  publication of the said notification.  The market value of the land has to be  determined as  on the date of issuance of preliminary notification under  Section 4(1) and therefore, the Collector or the Court cannot travel prior to  the said date. Both Sections 28 and 34 contemplate payment of interest  where possession is taken over under the Act after the notification under  Section 4(1) has been issued and compensation amount has not been paid  and not for any anterior period.  The view taken in Union of India v. Budh  Singh (supra) it is submitted, represents the correct legal position which has  been reiterated in a recent decision in Smt. Lila Ghosh v. State of West

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Bengal JT 2003(9) SC 23.

11.      In order to decide the question whether the provisions of Section 34  of the Act regarding  payment of interest would be applicable to a case  where possession has been taken over prior to issuance of notification under  Section 4(1)  of the Act  it is necessary to have a look at the Scheme of the  Land Acquisition Act.   Acquisition means taking not by voluntary  agreement but by authority of an Act of Parliament and by virtue of the  compulsory powers thereby conferred. In  case of acquisition the property is   taken by the State permanently and the title to the property vests in the State.   The Land Acquisition Act makes complete provision for acquiring title over  the land, taking possession thereof and for payment of compensation to the  land owner.  Part II of the Act deals with acquisition and the heading of  Section 4 is "Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers  thereupon".  Sub-section (1) of Section 4 provides that whenever it appears  to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely  to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, a notification to that  effect shall be published in the  Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers  circulating in that locality and the Collector shall cause public notice of the  substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said  locality.  Sub-section (2) provides that thereupon it shall be lawful for any  officer either generally or specially authorised by such Government in this  behalf  and for his servants and workmen, to enter upon and survey and take  levels of any land in such locality, to dig or bore in the sub-soil and to do all  other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such  purpose etc. etc.  This provision shows that the officers and servants and  workmen of the government get the lawful authority to enter upon and  survey the land and  to do other  works only after the preliminary   notification under Section 4(1) has been published.  Section 5-A enables a  person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4 (1) to  file objection against the acquisition of the land and also for  hearing of the  objection by the Collector.  If the State Government is satisfied, after  considering the report,  that any  particular land is needed for public  purposes or for a company, it can make a declaration to that effect under  Section 6 of the Act and the said declaration has to be published in the  Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers and  public notice of the  substance of such declaration has to be given in the locality.  Thereafter the  Collector is required to issue notice to persons interested under Section 9 (1)  of the Act stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land  and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to  him.  Section 11 provides for making of an award by the Collector of the  compensation which should be allowed for the land.  Section 16 provides  that when the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take  possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the  Government, free from all encumbrances.  This provision shows that  possession of the land can be taken only after the Collector has made an  award under Section 11.  Section 17 is in the nature of an exception  to  Section 16 and it provides that in cases of  urgency, whenever the  appropriate Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has  been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the  publication of  the notice mentioned in Section 9 (1), take possession of any land needed for  a public purpose  and such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the  Government, free from all encumbrances.  The urgency provision contained  in Section 17(1)  can be invoked and possession can be taken over only after  publication of notification under Section 9(1) which itself can be done after  publication of notification under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act. Even here in  view of sub-section (3-A) the Collector has to tender 80 per cent of the  estimated amount of compensation to the persons interested entitled thereto  before taking over possession.   The scheme of the Act does not contemplate  taking over of possession prior to the issuance of notification under Section  4(1) of the Act and if possession is taken prior to the said notification it will   de hors the Act.  It is for this reason that both Sections 11(1) and 23(1)  enjoin the determination of the market value of the land on the date of  publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for the purpose of  determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired

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under the Act.  These provisions show in unmistakable terms that  publication of notification under Section 4(1) is the sine-qua-non for any  proceedings under the Act   Section 34 of the Act, on the basis whereof the  appellant laid claim for interest, reads as under: "34.    Payment of Interest \026 When the amount of such  compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking  possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount  awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per  annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have  been so paid or deposited.

       Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is  not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date  on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per  centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of  the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or  part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the  date of such expiry."

12.     The expression "the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with  interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so  taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited" should not be  read in isolation divorced from its context.  The words "such possession"  and "so taking possession" are important and have to be given meaning  in  the light of other provisions of the Act.  "Such compensation" would mean  the compensation determined in accordance with other provisions of the Act,  namely, Sections 11 and 15 of the Act which by virtue of Section 23(1)  mean market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4(1)  and other amounts like statutory sum under sub-section (1-A) and solatium  under Sub-section (2) of Section 23.    The heading of Part II of the Act is   Acquisition  and there is a sub-heading "Taking Possession" which  contains Sections 16 and 17  of the Act. The words "so taking possession"  would therefore mean taking possession in accordance with Sections 16 or   17 of the Act.  These are the only two Sections in the Act which specifically  deal with the subject of  taking possession of the acquired land.  Clearly the  stage for taking possession under the aforesaid provisions  would be reached  only after publication of the notification under Sections 4(1) and 9(1) of the  Act. If possession is  taken prior to the issuance of the notification under  Section 4(1) it would not be in accordance with Sections 16 or 17 and  will  be without any authority of law and consequently cannot be recognised for  the purposes of the Act.  For the parity of reasons the words "from the date  on which he took possession of the land" occurring in Section 28 of the Act  would also mean lawful taking of possession in accordance with Sections 16  or 17 of the Act.  The words "so taking possession" can under no  circumstances mean such dispossession of the owner of the land which has  been done prior to publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act  which is de hors the provisions of the Act.

13.     In Union of India v. Budh Singh (supra) after analysis of the  provisions of the Act the Bench arrived at the following conclusions: "The parameter for initiation of the proceedings is the  publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in  the State Gazette or in an appropriate case in District Gazette  as per the local amendments.  But the condition precedent is  publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the  appropriate gazette.  That would give legitimacy to the State to  take possession of the land in accordance with the provisions  of the Act.  Any possession otherwise would not be considered  to be possession taken under the Act."

14.     In Shri Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills (supra),  the precise question raised  here namely whether in a case where the possession is taken prior to the  issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, interest can be

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awarded in accordance with Sections 28 or 34 of the Act was not examined  and the only issue examined was whether in an appeal which has been  preferred by the State Government challenging the quantum of  compensation awarded by the District Judge it is open to the High Court to  award interest to the claimant even though he had not preferred any appeal  or cross objection for the said purpose. It is well settled that a decision as an  authority for what it actually decides.  What is of the essence in a decision is  its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows   from the various observations made therein. (See Krishena Kumar v. Union  of India, AIR 1990 SC 1782, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam  Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38 and  M/s. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. & Anr. v.  State of Orissa AIR 1991 SC 672).        Shri Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills (supra)  is therefore not an authority for the proposition that where possession is  taken before issuance of notification under Section 4(1), interest on the  compensation amount could be awarded in accordance with Section 34 of  the Act with effect from the date of taking of possession.  

15.     Similar view has been taken in a recent decision by a Bench of two  Judges in Smt. Lila Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal J.T. 2003 (9) SC 23 and  the reasons given there in para 16 of the Report are being reproduced below: "Even though the authority in Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills  Ltd. appears to support the claimants, it is to be seen that apart  from mentioning sections 28 and 34, no reasons have been  given to justify the award of interest from a date prior to  commencement of acquisition proceedings.  A plain reading of  section 34 shows that interest is payable only if the  compensation which is payable, is not paid or deposited before  taking possession.  The question of payment or deposit of  compensation will not arise if there is no acquisition  proceeding.  In case where possession is taken prior to  acquisition proceedings a party may have a right to claim  compensation or interest.  But such a claim would not be either  under section 34 or section 28.  In our view interest under these  sections can only start running from the date the compensation  is payable.  Normally this would  be from the date of the award.   Of course, there may be cases under section 17 where by  invoking urgency clause possession has been taken before the  acquisition proceedings are initiated.  In such cases,  compensation, under the Land  Acquisition Act, would be  payable by virtue of the provisions of section 17.  As in cases  under section 17 compensation is payable, interest my run from  the date possession was taken\005\005\005\005\005\005"

16.     In this connection it will be apposite to refer to Sub-section (1A) of  Section 23 of the Act which enjoins payment of an amount calculated at the  rate of twelve per centum per annum  on such market value for  the period  commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification  under Section 4(1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the  Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.  There are  two decisions of this Court, wherein same controversy arose  namely, whether the claimant would be entitled to additional sum at the rate  of  twelve per centum  on the market value where possession has been taken  over prior to publication of notification under Section 4(1). In  Special  Tehsildar (LA) PWD Schemes Vijaywada v. M.A. Jabbar  AIR 1995 SC 762  which has been  decided by a Bench of two Judges (K. Ramaswamy and  Mrs. Sujata V. Manohar, JJ) it was   held that claimant would not be entitled  to this additional sum for the period anterior to publication of notification  under Section 4(1).  However in Assistant Commissioner, Gadag, Sub- Division, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavanewwa & Ors. AIR 1995 SC 2492   also decided by  a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and B.L. Hansaria, JJ)  it was held that even though notification under Section 4(1) was issued after  taking possession of the acquired land  the owners would be entitled to  additional amount at twelve per cent per annum  from the date of taking  possession though notification under Section 4(1) was published later. For  the reasons already indicated,  we are of the opinion that the view taken in

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Special Tehsildar is legally correct and the view to the contrary taken in  Assistant Commissioner, Gadag (supra),  is not in accordance with law and  is hereby overruled.

17.     Shri Dave learned counsel for the appellant has also placed strong  reliance on Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh and another AIR 1961 SC 908  wherein the question of  payment of interest in the matter of award of  compensation was considered by this Court.  In this case the initial  notification was issued under Section 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894  but the proceedings for acquisition were completed under East Punjab Act  No. 48 of 1948.  The High Court negatived the claim for  interest on the  ground that the 1948 Act made no provision for award of interest.  After   quoting with approval the following observations of Privy Council  in  Inglewood Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. vs. New Brunswick Electric Power  Commission AIR 1928 PC 287: "upon the expropriation of land under statutory power, whether  for the purpose of private gain or of good to the public at large,  the owner is entitled to interest upon the principal sum awarded  from the date when possession was taken, unless the statute  clearly shows a contrary intention."

the bench held as under : "\005\005\005.When a claim for payment of interest is made by a  person whose immovable property has been acquired  compulsorily he is not making claim for damages properly or  technically so called; he is basing his claim on the general rule  that if he is deprived of his land he should be put in possession  of compensation immediately; if not, in lieu of possession taken  by compulsory acquisition interest should be paid to him on the  said amount of compensation.  

       The normal rule, therefore, is that if on account of acquisition of land  a person is deprived of possession of his property he should be paid  compensation immediately and if the same is not paid to him forthwith he  would be entitled to interest thereon from the date  of dispossession till the  date of payment thereof.  But here the land has been acquired only after the  preliminary notification was issued on 9.9.1992 as earlier acquisition  proceedings were declared to be null and void in the suit instituted by the  land owner himself and consequently he was not entitled to compensation or  interest thereon for the anterior period

18.      In a case where the land owner is dispossessed prior to the issuance of  preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act the government  merely takes possession of the land but the title thereof continues to vest  with the land owner.  It is fully open for the land owner to recover the  possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceedings.  He is  therefore only entitled to get rent or damages for use and occupation for the  period the government retains possession of the property.  Where possession  is taken prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification, in our opinion,  it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine the rent or  damages for use of the property to which the land owner is entitled while  determining the compensation amount payable to the land owner for the  acquisition of the property.  The provision of Section 48 of the Act lend  support to such a course of action.    For delayed payment of such amount  appropriate interest at prevailing bank rate maybe awarded.

19.     The case may be examined from the equitable consideration as well.  In the earlier acquisition proceedings the notification under Section 4(1) had  been published on 13.11.1959 and the Collector had made an award for  Rs.6301/- for the plot in dispute  on 30.12.1961. The award was made within  1-1/2 months of  dispossession which allegedly took place on 10.11.1961.   This amount was paid to R.L. Jain and was  retained by him.  Learned  counsel for the respondent has placed before the Court a copy of the sale  certificate issued in favour of R.L. Jain on 31.8.1961 which shows that the

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plot was purchased by him for Rs. 3200/- only and thus he had received  almost double amount of  compensation. Therefore, even on equitable  ground he is not entitled to any amount from the date of dispossession till  the date of second notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which was  issued in 1992.    

20.     In this connection, it may be noted that the only plea taken in  Suit  no.154 of 1965  filed by R.L. Jain was that it was given out at the time of  auction sale of the plot that  the  same was outside the purview of the  preliminary notification issued on 13.11.1959 under Section 4(1) of the Act.  Even assuming that it was so but that by itself  could not render the  acquisition proceedings invalid.   At best, he would have been entitled to  refund of the sale consideration paid by him.   However, the Sub-Judge  passed a decree that the acquisition proceedings with regard to the plot in  dispute are illegal and the notification issued under Section 6(1) of the Act  on 11.10.1961 is null and void. The decree having become final it is binding  upon the respondent, DDA.   The original appellant R.L. Jain on the one  hand received compensation amount in terms of the award of the Collector  and sought a reference to the Court on the ground of alleged inadequacy of  compensation and at the same time filed the suit challenging the acquisition  proceedings wherein he obtained a decree that the acquisition proceedings  are null and void.  It was on account of this judgment and decree that he  succeeded in the second suit (Suit No.421 of 1967), wherein a decree for  demolition of construction made by DDA and restoration of possession in  his favour was passed.  It is in such circumstances that in order to save the  construction the land acquisition proceedings were initiated again by issuing  a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act on 9.9.1992.  Under the award  given by the Collector on 11.6.1994 he has been awarded Rs.16,54,175 as  the market value of the land and  Rs.4,96,252 as solatium.   The appellant  has thus been more than  adequately compensated and in our opinion even  on equitable grounds he is not entitled to any further amount.

       For the reasons discussed above, there is no merit in this appeal and  the same is hereby dismissed  with  costs.