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PETITIONER: R. L. ARORA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U. P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1962 AIR  764            1962 SCR  Supl. (2) 149  CITATOR INFO :  R          1963 SC 151  (25,32)  R          1964 SC1230  (1,2,9,10)  RF         1965 SC 646  (9,10)  F          1965 SC 995  (6,8,10,ETC.,)  RF         1968 SC 432  (2,14)  RF         1975 SC 629  (4,6)  RF         1980 SC1118  (4,14)  R          1980 SC1316  (4,5,9)

ACT:      Land  Acquisition-Acquisition   for  company- "Work likely  to  prove  useful  to  the  public", Meaning  of-Right  of  access  to  persons  having business with  company-Product  of  company  being useful to  the public-If  satisfy requirement-Land Acquisition Act, 1894[1 of 1894], ss. 6, 40, 41.

HEADNOTE:      The Government  acquired appellant’s land for a company for setting up a textile machinery parts factory.   The   entire   compensation   for   the acquisition was  to be  paid by  the company.  The Government was  satisfied that  the product of the company would  be useful  to the  public  and  the agreement between  the company  and the Government provided that  those who  had  business  with  the company shall  have access  to the land and works. The notifications  under ss.  4 and  6 of the Land acquisition Act,  1894, were  issued showing  that the  land   was  acquired  for  the  company.  The appellant contended that the notification under s. 6 was  invalid as  the acquisition was not for the construction of any work which was likely to prove useful to  the public  as contemplated  by  s.  40 (1)(b) read with cl. (5) of s. 41. ^      Held, (per Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo, Das Gupta and Ayyangar,  JJ., Sarkar,  J. contra),  that the notification under s. 6 of the Act was invalid and

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the proceedings  should  be  quashed.  Section  40 (1)(b), which  alone  could  apply  to  the  case, provided that in case of acquisition for a company the Government  could  give  its  consent  if  the acquisition was  needed for  the  construction  of some work  which was likely to prove useful to the public. For  such cases  cl. (5) of s. 41 provided that the  agreement between  the company  and  the Government shall  state the  terms  on  which  the public shall  be entitled  to use the works. These provisions had  to be  read together  and required that the  work should  be directly  useful to  the public and  that the  agreement should  contain  a term as  to how the public shall have the right to use the work directly themselves. The provision of access to  the  land  or  works  to  those  having business with  the company  or the  fact that  the product of  the company  would be  useful  to  the public  were   not   sufficient   to   bring   the acquisition for  a company  within the  meaning of the  relevant   words  in   ss.  40  and  41.  The satisfaction of  the Government  that the work was likely 150 to  prove  useful  to  the  public  upon  a  wrong construction of  s. 40  and s. 41 was not binding. The conclusiveness  attached by  s.  6(3)  to  the notification under s. 6(1) was only to this extent that the  land was  needed for  the purposes  of a company and this was not in dispute.      Babu Barkya  Thakur v.  The State  of Bombay, [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128 and Pandit Jhandu lal v. State of Punjab, [1961] 2 S. C. R. 459, referred to.      Per  Sarkar,   J.-The  acquisition   for  the company  to  set  up  a  textile  machinery  parts factory was  for some  work which  was  likely  to prove useful to the public and was valid. The work contemplated in  s. 40(1)(b)  was work  from which the  public  could  in  any  way  derive  benefit, whether by  direct use of the work or by enjoyment of the  fruits of  the activities carried on there or otherwise;  it  could  not  be  confined  to  a construction for  philanthropic purpose or to such work as  could be  itself used  by the public. The meaning could  not be  restricted by cl. (5) of s. 41 as  that would  defeat  the  intention  of  the statute. The provisions in the agreement about the terms on which the public would be entitled to use the work were inapplicable to cases where the work was such that the public could not use it.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal No. 446 of 1959.      Appeal from  the judgment  and  decree  dated July 30,  1958, of  the Allahabad  High  Court  in Special Appeal No. 202 of 1957.      C.  B.   Agarwala  and  Naunit  Lal  for  the Appellant.      G. S.  Pathak, S. T. Desai, and C. P. Lal for Respondents Nos. 1 to 3.      S. T.  Desai, Devendra Swarup and J. P. Goyal for Respondent No. 4.

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    1961.   December    15.   The   Judgment   of Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo,  Das Gupta  and  Ayyangar JJ., was  delivered  by  Wanchoo,  J.  Sarkar  J., delivered a separate Judgment.      WANCHOO,  J.-This   is   an   appeal   on   a certificate granted  by the  Allahabad High Court. The appellant  is the  owner of  certain lands  in village Nauraiya  Khera. Out  of those lands, 15.5 acres 151 were requisitioned  by the  Defence Department  of the Government  of India  and are  still in  their possession and  we are  not concerned  with  that. Besides that,  the appellant  has 9  acres of land which he  had purchased  many years  ago with  the idea of  erecting a factory thereon. The appellant got information  in May 1956 that steps were being taken to  acquire his  nine acres  of land  for an industrialist in Kanpur. He therefore wrote to the Collector of  Kanpur in  that connection.  On June 25, 1956, however, a notification was issued under s. 4  of the  Land Acquisition  Act No.  1 of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that certain land  which  was  specified  as  11.664  acres  in village Nauraiya  Khera was required for a company for the  construction of  textile machinery  parts factory  by   Lakshmi  Ratan   Engineering   Works Limited, Kanpur  (hereinafter called  the  Works). This  was   followed  on   July  5,   1956  by   a notification under  s. 6  of the Act, which was in terms similar  to the notification under s. 4. The notification also  provided for  the Collector  to take  possession  of  any  waste  or  arable  land forming part of the land mentioned in the Schedule to the  notification immediately  under the powers conferred by  s. 17(1)  of the  Act. It  is not in dispute that  this notification was issued without taking any  action under  Part VII  of the Act. On July 31,  1956, the  Collector took  possession of the land  and handed  it over  to the  Works along with the buildings standing on it.      In the  mean time  the appellant  had filed a writ petition  in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that  the notification of July 5, 1956, be quashed and  had also  applied for interim stay As however possession  had already been taken on July 31, 1956,  the application  for interim  stay  was infructuous. One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of July 31, 1956 appears to have been that  ss. 38  to 42  of the  Act had not been complied with. It seems that thereafter steps were 152 taken by  the State  Government to comply with the provisions  of  ss.  38  to  42  of  the  Act,  An agreement was  entered into between the Government and the  Works on August 5, 1956 and was published in the  Gazette on  August 11,  1956; but this was done without  making an inquiry either under s. 5A or s.  40 of  the Act. Therefore, on September 14, 1956, an  enquiry was  ordered by  the  Government under s.  40. The enquiry was accordingly made and the inquiry  submitted his  report on  October  3, 1956. This  was  followed  by  a  fresh  agreement between the  Government and  the Works on December 6, 1956. On December 7, 1956, a fresh notification

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was issued  under  s.  6  of  the  Act  after  the formalities provided  under ss.  38 to 42 had been completed. Thereupon  the appellant  filed another writ petition on January 29, 1957, challenging the notification  of   December  7,  1956  on  various grounds.      It is  not necessary  to give  in detail  the grounds on  which the  notification of December 7, 1956 was attacked. It is enough to say that one of the grounds  was that the notification was invalid as it  was not  in compliance  with s. 40(1)(b) of the Act  read with  the fifth clause of the matter to be  provided in  the agreement under s. 41. The learned  Single   Judge  however   held  that  the agreement was in accordance with the provisions of ss. 40  and 41.  He also  held that  there was  no force in the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellant  and  dismissed  the  petition.  The appellant then went in appeal which was dismissed. He then applied for a certificate to enable him to appeal to  this Court, which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.      The only  question that  has  been  urged  on behalf of  the appellant  before us  is  that  the consent of  the Government  is being  sought to be given to an acquisition for a company which is not in accordance  with s.  4 (1)  (b) read  with  the fifth clause of the matter to be provided in the 153 agreement  under   s.   41   and   therefore   the notification of December 7, 1956 is invalid.      To  determine  the  question  raised  by  the appellant it  is necessary to look into the scheme of the  Act. The preamble to the Act shows that it is an  amending Act  enacted for  the  purpose  of "acquisition of  land needed  for public  purposes and for  Companies and  for determining the amount of compensation  to be  paid on  account  of  such acquisition." Section  3(e) defines the expression "company."  The  expression  "public  purpose"  is given an  inclusive definition  in s.  3(f).  Then comes s.  4 which  provides for  the  issue  of  a preliminary notification  to the  effect that land in any  locality is  needed or  is  likely  to  be needed for  any public  purpose. On  the issue  of such notification  steps are  taken to  survey the land and take all other action necessary to decide whether the  land is fit for the purpose for which it is needed and in that connection s. 5A provides for objections  by any  person interested  in  the land, and  the Collector  hears the  objector  and submits his  report to  Government for appropriate action. Then comes s. 6 which is in these terms:-           "(1) Subject  to the  provisions of Part      VII  of   this  Act   when  the   appropriate      Government is  satisfied,  after  considering      the report,  if any,  made under  s. 5A, sub-      section (2),  that  any  particular  land  is      needed  for   a  public  purpose,  or  for  a      company, a  declaration shall be made to that      effect under  the signature of a Secretary to      such  Government  or  of  some  officer  duly      authorised to certify its orders:      Provided that  no such  declaration shall  be made unless  the Compensation  to be  awarded  for

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such property is to be paid by the company, or 154 wholly or  partly out  of public  revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.      (2)  x    x    x    x    x      (3) The  said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that  the land  is needed  for  a  public purpose or  for a company, as the case may be; and after making  such  declaration,  the  appropriate Government  may   acquire  the   land  in   manner hereinafter appearing." Where however land is to be acquired for a company no notification  under s. 6 can be issued till the provisions of  Part VII  of the  Act are  complied with, for action under s. 6 for acquiring land for a company  is subject  to the  provisions of  Part VII. This  is made  further clear  by s.  39 which lays down  that "the  provisions of  sections 6 to 37(both inclusive)  shall not  be put  in force in order to acquire land for any Company, unless with the   previous    consent   of   the   appropriate Government. nor  unless  the  Company  shall  have executed  the  agreement  hereinafter  mentioned." Before  therefore   the  machinery   provided  for acquisition of  land  under  ss.  6  to  37  (both inclusive) of  the  Act  is  put  into  force  for acquiring  land   for  a  company  two  conditions precedent  must  be  fulfilled,  namely,  (i)  the previous consent of the appropriate Government has been obtained  and (ii)  an agreement in the terms of s.  41 has  been executed  by the company: (see Baba Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay) (1). In that case  the notification  under s. 4 of the Act was challenged as it did not say that the land was required for  a public purpose as provided therein but only  said that  the land  was required  for a company. This Court however pointed out that-           "though it  may appear  on the  words of      the Act  contained in Part II, which contains      the operative portions of the proceedings 155      leading up acquisition by the collector for a      Company may  or  may  not  be  for  a  public      purpose, the  provisions of  Part VII make it      clear that  the appropriate Government cannot      permit  the   bringing  into   operation  the      effective machinery  of the  Act unless it is      satisfied  as  aforesaid,  namely,  that  the      purpose  of  acquisition  is  to  enable  the      company to  erect dwelling houses for workmen      employed  by  it  or  for  the  provision  of      amenities directly connected with the company      or that  the land  is needed for construction      of  some   work  of   public  utility.  These      requirements indicate  that  the  acquisation      for a  Company also  is in  substance  for  a      public  purpose  inasmuch  as  it  cannot  be      seriously contend  that constructing dwelling      houses,  and   providing  amenities  for  the      benefit of  the workmen  employed by  it  and      construction of  some work  of public utility      do not serve a public purpose." Therefore, though  the words  "public purpose"  in ss. 4 and 6 have the same meaning, they have to be read in the restricted sense in accordance with s.

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40 when  the acquisition  is for a company under s 6. In  one case,  the notification under s. 6 will pay that  the acquisition is for a public purpose, in the  other case  the notification will say that it is  for a company. The proviso to s. 6(1) shows that  where   the  acquisition  is  for  a  public purpose, the compensation had to be paid wholly or partly  out   of  public  revenues  or  some  fund controlled or  managed by a local authority. Where however the  acquisition is  either for a company, the compensation  would  be  paid  wholly  by  the company.  Though  therefore  this  distinction  is there where the acquisition is either for a public purpose or  for a company, there is not a complete dichotomy  between   acquisitions  for   the   two purposes and it cannot be maintained that where 156 the acquisition is primarily for a company it must always be  preceded by  action under  Part VII and compensation must  always be  paid wholly  by  the company. A  third class of cases is possible where the acquisition may be primarily for a company but it may  also be  at the  same time  for  a  public purpose and  the whole of part of compensation may be paid  out  of  public  revenues  or  some  fund controlled or  managed by  a local  authority.  In such a  case though the acquisition may look as if it is  primarily for  a company it will be covered by  that  part  of  s.  6  which  lays  down  that acquisition may  be made  for a  public purpose if the whole  or part  of the  compensation is  to be paid out  of the  public  revenues  or  some  fund controlled or  managed by  a local authority. Such was the case in Pandit Jhandu, Lal v. the State of Punjab (1).  In that  case the acquisition was for the construction  of a  labour  colony  under  the Government  sponsored   housing  scheme   for  the industrial workers  of the  Thapar Industries  Co- operative Housing  Society Limited and part of the compensation was  to be  paid out  of  the  public funds. In  such a  case this  Court held  that "an acquisition for  a company  may also be made for a public purpose within the meaning of the Act, if a part or  the whole  of the  cost of acquisition is met by  public funds"  and therefore  it  was  not necessary to  go through  the procedure prescribed by Part  VII. It  is only where the acquisition is for a  company and  its cost is to be met entirely by the  company itself that the provisions of Part VII apply.  In the present case it is not the case of  the   respondents  that   any  part   of   the compensation is  to be  paid out  of what  may  be called public funds. It is not in dispute that the entire compensation is to be paid by the Works and therefore the provision of Part VII would apply to the present  case; and  it is  in this  background that 157 we have  to  consider  the  contention  raised  on behalf of the appellant.      We have  already pointed  out that  s. 39  as well as  the opening  words of  s. 6 make it clear that the  operative provisions  of the Act for the purpose of  acquiring land for a company will only apply when  two  conditions  precedent  have  been

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satisfied, namely, (i) the previous consent of the appropriate  government  has  been  given  to  the acquisition, and (ii) the company has entered into an agreement as provided in the Act. This takes us to s.  40, 41  and 42  of the Act. Section 40 lays down  when   the  consent   of   the   appropriate government can  be given. Section 41 lays down the terms which must be incorporated in the agreement. Section 42 then provides that every such agreement shall be  published in  the official  gazette  and shall thereupon  so far  as regards  the terms  on which the public shall be entitled to use the work have the  same effect  as if it had formed part of the Act.      Now s.  40(1) lays  down  that  such  consent shall  not   be  given   unless  the   appropriate government is  satisfied either  on the  report of the Collector  under s.  5A (2)  or by  an inquiry held as  hereinafter provided (a) that the purpose of the  acquisition is  to  obtain  land  for  the erection of  dwelling houses  for workmen employed by the  company or  for the provision of amenities directly connected  therewith, or  (b)  that  such acquisition is  needed for  the construction  of a work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public.      The Government  therefore cannot give consent to the acquisition of land for a company unless it is  satisfied  about  one  or  other  of  the  two conditions mentioned  in s.  40(1). We  are in the present case  not concerned  with cl.  (a)  of  s. 40(1) and  need not  refer to it further. The case of the  respondents is  that  the  Government  was satisfied as  to cl.  (b) of  s. 40(1) and that is why it gave the 158 consent required  under s.  39. The  main  dispute before us  is as  to the meaning to be given to cl (b) of s. 40(1).      We are  of opinion that it is not possible to interpret s.  40(1)(b) in isolation and by itself; it has to be interpreted in the context of what is provided in  s.  41  about  the  agreement  to  be entered  into   between  the  Government  and  the company which  agreement becomes a part of the Act under s.  42 so  far as regards the terms on which the public  shall be entitled to use the work. Now s. 41  provides that if the appropriate government is satisfied  that the  purpose  of  the  proposed acquisition is  to obtain land for the erection of dwelling  houses   for  workmen  employed  by  the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected   therewith   or   that   the   proposed acquisition is  needed for  the construction  of a work and  that such work is likely to prove useful to the  public, it  shall require  the company  to enter into  an agreement with it, providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate government for the following matters, namely-           (1)   the  payment  to  the  appropriate      Government of the cost of the acquisition;           (2)   the  transfer, on such payment, of      the land to the company;           (3)   the  terms on which the land shall      be held by the company;

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         (4)   where  the acquisition  is for the      purpose of  erecting dwelling  houses or  the      provision of  amenities connected  therewith,      the time  within  which,  the  conditions  on      which and  the manner  in which  the dwelling      houses  or  amenities  shall  be  erected  or      provided; and           (5)   Where  the acquisition  is for the      construction of  any  other  work,  the  time      within which  and the conditions on which the      work 159      shall be  executed and  maintained,  and  the      terms on  which the  public shall be entitled      to use the work. It will  be clear  from the  above that  the fifth term is  directly related to s. 40(1)(b) and there can be  no doubt that in finding out what is meant by s.  40 (1)(b)  we must  take into  account  the fifth term  in s. 41 and it is only by reading the two together  that it will be possible to find out the intention  of the legislature when it provided for acquisition  of land for a company through the machinery of the Act.      We may here set out the contentions on either side as to the interpretation of these provisions. It is  contended for the appellant that though the words of  s. 40  (1)(b) are  wide in amplitude and provide for  acquisition of  land for construction of some  work which  is likely  to prove useful to the public,  these words  do not carry the meaning that  if   the  product   of  the   company  which constructs the  work is useful to the public, land can be  acquired for  it. It is urged that on this interpretation the  Government will be turned into a sort  of  agent  for  acquiring  lands  for  all companies which  produce something  which  may  be used by the public. It is therefore contended that when s.  40 (1)  (b) says  that acquisition may be made for  the construction  of some  work which is likely to  prove useful  to the  public, it is not the product  of the work which should be useful to the public but the work itself should be of direct use to  the public;  and it  is further urged that this interpretation of s. 40(1)(b) is confirmed if one looks  at the fifth term to be provided in the agreement according  to s.  41. That requires that the agreement  should provide  for  the  terms  on which the  public shall  be entitled  to  use  the work. It  is urged that this means that the public should be entitled to use the work as such and not merely the product of the work. 160      On the  other hand  it is  contended for  the respondents that  the words  in s. 40(1)(b) are of wide amplitude  and land can be acquired under the Act for  any company  when the  work set up by the companies likely to prove useful to the public. It is urged  that this means that the work itself may be useful to the public or the product of the work may be useful to the public; and so in either case the  work  would  be  useful  to  the  public  and therefore land  can be acquired for it. It is also urged that  the fifth  term in s. 41 should not be held to  cut down  the wide amplitude of the words

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used in s. 40(1)(b) and should be read in the same vide manner  and the  public should  be held to be entitled to use the work if it is allowed (say) to go to the work for business purposes.      The respondents rely on Ezra v. The Secretary of State (1) in support of their interpretation of the relevant  words in ss. 40 and 41. In that case the  Bank   of  Bengal,   a  Company   which   was incorporated under  Act XI of 1876, was anxious to extend its  premises for  the purpose of providing accommodation for the Public Debt office. The Bank was unable  to acquire the premises required by it by private  treaty and  therefore  approached  the Government to  acquire the  land for  it under the Land  Acquisition  Act.  Action  was  consequently taken under Part VII of the Act for acquisition of the premises  for the  company and  the  agreement provided that  the  public,  subject  to  the  Act constituting and the bye-laws regulating the Bank, shall be  entitled to  use the  said  building  or buildings  in  relation  to  the  said  Government business so  far as  the same might be utilised by the Bank for the purposes of such business. It was urged before  the High  Court that  this  was  not sufficient compliance  with the  fifth term of the agreement  provided   by  s.  41  The  High  Court repelled this contention on the ground, firstly 161 that  the  Government  was  vested  with  absolute discretion  in   this  matter  and  was  the  sole custodian of  the public interest in this country, and  secondly   that  the  rights  of  the  public generally  were   dependant  upon  the  Government business and  the Government  had  considered  the conditions  therein   inserted   as   sufficiently safeguarding its  interests. It  was further  held that  Court   had  no   power  to   enter  upon  a consideration  of   the  question   how  far  that provisions sufficiently  safeguarded the interests of the  Government or  of the  public, of which it was the  custodian (see  pp. 79-80).  The  problem that has  been posed  before us does not appear to have been  posed before  the High  Court  in  that form. Further the High Court seems to have thought that as the sections provided for the satisfaction of the Government there was no power in a court to enter upon a consideration of the question how far that provision  safeguarded the  interests of  the Government or  of the  public. This decision seems to suggest  that the  Government’s decision  as to the  terms   is  completely   final  and   as  the Government was  satisfied  by  the  terms  it  had imposed in that case the matter was no longer open before the  court. All that we need say about this case is, as already pointed out, that the question was not raised before the High Court in the manner in which it has been raised before us and that may account for  the view  taken by the High Court. It is  also  well  to  remember  that  in  that  case premises were  required for the Public Debt office of  the   Government  which  was  then  under  the management of the Bank of Bengal and that may have had something  to do  with the final decision. But in any  case, this  case does not lay down that it is  for  the  Government  to  determine  what  the

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relevant words  in ss.  40 and 41 mean, though the High Court  is right  when it  says that it is not for the court to enter upon a consideration of the question  how   far  the  provision  made  by  the Government  in   the  terms   of   the   agreement sufficiently 162 safeguards the interests of the public, that being a matter  entirely for  the  satisfaction  of  the Government. But  as the  matter was not considered by the  High Court  from the  point of  view  from which it  has been  argued before  us,  this  case cannot  be   treated  as   a   decision   on   the interpretation of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 merely  by implication.  In  any  case,  if  by implication  the   said  decision   supports   the respondents’ contention,  it  does  not  correctly represent the  true legal position in that behalf. In our  opinion the interpretation of the material terms in  s. 40(1)(b)  and the  fifth term  of the agreement provided  in s.  41 read together is and must always  be within  the  jurisdiction  of  the court.      Turning now to the opposing contentions as to the meaning  of the  relevant words  in ss. 40 and 41, we  have already  said that the two provisions of ss. 40 and 41 must be read together to find out the intention  of the legislature when it provided for acquisition  of land for a company through the agency of government. It seems to us that it could not be  the intention  of the legislature that the Government should  be made  a  general  agent  for companies to  acquire lands for them in order that the owners  of companies  may be  able to carry on their activities  for private  profit. It that was the intention  of the legislature, it was entirely unnecessary  to   provide  for   the  restrictions contained in  ss. 40  and 41  on the powers of the Government to  acquire lands  for companies. If we were to give the wide interpretation contended for on behalf of the respondents on the relevant words in ss.  40 and  41 it would amount to holding that the legislature  intended the  Government to  be a sort of  general agent  for companies  to  acquire lands for  them, so  that there  owners  may  make profits. It  can hardly  be denied  that a company which will  satisfy the definition of that word in s. 3  (e) will  be producing  something  or  other which will be useful to the 163 public and  which the public may need to purchase. So on  the wide  interpretation contended  for  on behalf of  the respondents,  we must  come to  the conclusion that  the intention  of the legislature was that  the Government  should be  an agent  for acquiring land for all companies for such purposes as they  might have  provided the product intended to be  produced is  in a  general manner useful to the public,  and if  that is  so  there  would  be clearly no  point  in  providing  the  restrictive provisions  in  ss.  40  and  41.  The  very  fact therefore that  the power  to use the machinery of the Act  for the acquisition of land for a company is conditioned  by the  restrictions in ss. 40 and 41 indicates  that the  legislature intended  that

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land  should  be  acquired  through  the  coercive machinery of  the  Act  only  for  the  restricted purpose mentioned  in ss  40 and  41, which  would also be  a public purpose for the purpose of s. 4. We find  it impossible to accept the argument that the intention  of the  legislature could have been that individuals  should be compelled to part with their lands for private profit of others who might be owners  of companies  through  the  Government, simply because  the company  might  produce  goods which would  be useful to the public. If therefore the legislature  intended by  the provisions of s. 40 and 41 that there should be restrictions on the power to acquire land for companies it can only be given effect to by putting the narrower meaning on the words  used in ss. 40 and 41, as contended for by the  appellant. Further,  reading s. 40 (1) (b) and the fifth term of the agreement as provided in s. 41  together (as  they must  in our  opinion be read together  in  order  to  find  out  the  real intention of  the legislature)  there  can  be  no doubt that  the only  meaning to be given to these provisions read  together is,  as contended for on behalf of  the appellant.  In this  connection  we ought to  add that as we shall presently point out the material words of the fifth term in the 164 agreement  provided   in  s.   41  are  reasonably incapable of  the construction  suggested  by  the respondents.      Let us  therefore turn  to the words of s. 40 (1)(b), which  says that acquisition should be for some work  which is  likely to prove useful to the public. Now  if  the  legislature  intended  these words to  mean that  even where the product of the work is useful to the public, land can be acquired for the  company for that purpose, the legislature could have  easily used the words "the product of" before the  words "such  work". The very fact that there is  no reference  to the product of the work in s.  40(1)(b) shows  that when  the  legislature said that  the work  should  be  likely  to  prove useful to the public it meant that the work should be directly  useful  to  the  public  through  the public being  able to  use  it  instead  of  being indirectly useful to the public through the public being able  to use  its product.  We have no doubt therefore that when s. 40(1)(b) says that the work should be  useful to  the public  it means that it should be  directly useful  to  the  public  which should be  able to make use of it. This meaning in our opinion  is made  perfectly clear  by what  is provided in  the fifth  term in  s. 41. Before the machinery of  the Act can be put into operation to acquire land  for a company, the Government has to take an  agreement  from  the  company,  and  that agreement  must   provide,  where  acquisition  is needed for  the construction of some work and that work is  likely to prove useful to the public, the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work.  These works  can  only  mean  that  the public should  have a right to use the work itself and not  the product  of its and it is the duty of the Government when it takes an agreement under s. 41 to  see that  the public  is so entitled to use

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the work.  To say  that the  public is entitled to use the work because the public can go to the work in the  way of  business is  in  our  opinion  not giving any right to the public to use the work 165 directly as  such.  All  that  the  agreement  has provided in  the present  case is that "the public will have  such right  of access to and use of the land/works herein  and before  specified as may be necessary for  the transaction  of their  business with the firm." This in our opinion is not what is meant by  the words "the terms on which the public shall be  entitled to  use the  work" in the fifth term of  the agreement  as provided in s. 41. Such use for  business is  implicit in  every business, even if  the Government  does not acquire land for it, for  no company can carry on for a, moment its business with  any profit  if it  does  not  allow those with  whom it  has business  to come  to its premises. Therefore,  when the fifth term provides for the  use of the work by the public as of right it cannot  possibly envisage the use only by those who have business with a factory (for example) and their going  there to  transact business; such use would in  any case  have to  be permitted  by  the owner of  the company, as otherwise it will not be worth  his  while  to  run  the  company  at  all. Therefore, when  the fifth term provides that "the public shall be entitled to use the work" it means that the  public shall be entitled to use the work directly and  as of  right for its own benefit and does not  mean that  those who  have business with the  company   can  go  upon  the  work  for  that business. Reading  therefore s.  40 (1)(b) and the fifth term  of the  agreement provided  in s.  41, there  is   in  our  opinion  no  doubt  that  the intention of  the legislature was that land should be acquired  only when  the work to be constructed is directly  useful to  the public  and the public shall be  entitled to use the work as such for its own benefit  in accordance  with the  terms of the agreement which  under s.  42 are made to have the same effect  as if  they form  part of the Act. We are   of   opinion   that   this   is   the   only interpretation of the relevant 166 words of  ss. 40 and 41, and the legislature could not have intended otherwise.      Let us  now turn  to some  of  the  arguments advanced on  behalf of the respondents against the clear  intention   of  the  legislature  which  is deducible from  the interpretation  of  the  words used in  ss. 40  and 41.  It is urged in the first place that  ss. 40  and 41  both provide  for  the satisfaction of  the  Government  and  it  is  the Government which has to be satisfied that the work is likely  to  prove  useful  to  the  public  and further that  it is the Government which has to be satisfied that the terms contain a provision as to how the  public shall be entitled to use the work. It is further urged that as the Government in this case was  satisfied that  the Works  was useful to the public  and was also satisfied as to the terms in the  agreement on  which the  public  shall  be entitled to  use  the  Works,  the  court  has  no

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further say  in the matter. We are of opinion that this argument  is entirely  fallacious. It is true that it is for the Government to be satisfied that the work  to be  constructed will be useful to the public; it  is  also  true  that  it  is  for  the Government to be satisfied that there is a term in the agreement  providing that  the public shall be entitled to  use the  work; but this does not mean that it  is the  Government which has the right to interpret the  words used in s. 40(1)(b) or in the fifth term  of the  agreement in  s. 41. It is the court which  has to  interpret  what  those  words mean. After the court has interpreted these words, it is  the Government  which has  to carry out the object of  ss. 40  and 41 to its satisfaction. The Government cannot say that ss. 40 and 41 mean this and further  say that  they are satisfied that the meaning they  have given  to the relevant words in these sections  has been  carried out in the terms of the  agreement provided  by them. It is for the court to  say what the words in ss. 40 and 41 mean though it is for the Government 167 to decide whether the work is useful to the public and whether  the terms  contain provisions for the manner in  which the  public shall  be entitled to use the  work. It is only in this latter part that the Government’s  satisfaction comes in and if the Government is  satisfied that satisfaction may not be open  to challenge; but the satisfaction of the Government must  be based  on the meaning given to the relevant  words in ss. 40 and 41 by the court. The Government  cannot both  give meaning  to  the words and  also say that they are satisfied on the meaning given by them. The meaning has to be given by the  court and  it is  only thereafter that the Government’s  satisfaction  may  not  be  open  to challenge if  they have  carried out  the  meaning given to  the relevant  words by  the  court.  The argument therefore  that it  is  the  Government’s satisfaction which  is required  both by s. 40 and s. 41  is of no help to the respondents, for it is for the  court to  say what  these words  mean and then see  whether  the  Government  are  satisfied according to  the meaning  given to these words by the court.  We have  already indicated  what these words mean  and if  it plainly  appears  that  the Government are  satisfied as  a result  of  giving some other  meaning to the words, the satisfaction of the  Government is of no use, for then they are not satisfied about what they should be satisfied. In the  present case  the Government seems to have taken a  wrong view that so long as the product of the Works  is useful  to the public and so long as the public is entitled to go upon the Works in the way of  business, that  is all that is required by the relevant  words in ss. 40 and 41. We have held that this is not the meaning of the relevant words in ss.  40 and  41 and  therefore the Government’s satisfaction on this meaning cannot be binding and would be worthless.      Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  also relied on certain American decisions and pointed 168 out that the trend in the United States of America

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these days was to give a wide meaning to the power of eminent domain contained in the fifth amendment to the  Constitution of  the  United  States.  The fifth amendment  lays  down  as  follows  in  this respect:-      "nor shall  private  property  be  taken  for public use, without just compensation." It  seems  that  there  has  been  controversy  in America as  to the  meaning of  the words  "public use" used in the above amendment and there are two views prevalent.  The older  view was,  and it  is still held in some States, that "public use" means "use by  the public-that is, public employment-and consequently that  to make  a use  public, a  duty must devolve  on the person or corporation holding property appropriated  by right  of eminent domain to furnish  the public  with the use intended, and that there  must be  a right  on the  part of  the public, or  some portion  of it, or some public or quasi-public agency  on behalf  of the  public, to use the property after it is condemned". The later view is that "public use" means "public advantage, convenience, or  benefit, and  that anything which tends  to  enlarge  the  resources,  increase  the industrial energies,  and promote  the  productive power  of   any   considerable   number   of   the inhabitants of  a section  of the  State, or which leads to  the growth  of towns and the creation of new resources  for the  employment of  capital and labour contributes  to the general welfare and the prosperity of  the whole  community and giving the Constitution    a    broad    and    comprehensive interpretation, constitutes  a  public  use"  (see American Jurisprudence.  Vol. 18.  pp. 661-62). In one State, where the older view is still held, the court  pointed   out  that  "if  public  use  were construed  to   mean  that  the  public  would  be benefited in  the sense  that  the  enterprise  or improvement for  the use of which the property was taken might contribute to the comfort 169 or  convenience   of  the  public,  or  a  portion thereof,  or   be  esteemed  necessary  for  their enjoyment, there  would be  absolutely no limit to the right  to take private property, that it would not be  difficult to  show that  a factory, hotel, etc., the  erection  of  which  was  contemplated, would result  in benefit  to the public, and that, under this  power, the  property  of  the  citizen would never  be safe  from an invasion." (see ibid p. 664)  It is  the later  view prevalent  in some States in  America for  which the  respondents are contending, and  the result  of that  would be the same as  pointed out above. But we do not think it necessary to  examine  the  American  cases  cited before us because the words in our statute are not pari materia  with the  words used  in  the  fifth amendment to  the American Constitution. The fifth amendment contemplates that private property shall not be  acquired except for public use. The public use there  is thus  connected with  the purpose of acquisition and may perhaps in certain conceivable circumstances depending  upon the  conditions in a particular   State,    be   open    to   a   wider interpretation. But  the two views prevalent about

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it in  America itself  show that in one view it is the actual  use of  the work  that  is  emphasised while in  the other  view it is the public benefit arising from  the work  that is emphasised. Now so far as  the words  in the Act are concerned, it is to our  mind perfectly  obvious  that  it  is  the actual use of the work which the Act envisages and not the  public benefit  that  might  directly  or indirectly  arise   from  the   use  of  the  land acquired. This  is clear  from the words used both in s. 40(1)(b) and the fifth term of the agreement provided in  s. 41. Section 40(1)(b) requires that the acquisition  is for  the construction  of some work, and  that work  is likely to prove useful to the public.  It does  not say that the acquisition of land would be useful to the public. Further the fifth term in the agreement provided in s 41 makes this clear beyond all doubt for it 170 provides that  the  agreement  shall  contain  the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work.  These words  therefore in  the Act  are clearly referable  to the  narrower view prevalent in America, which emphasises the use by the public of the  actual work  constructed. We are therefore of opinion  that the  respondents  can  derive  no advantage from  the American  cases cited on their behalf to  show the  wider interpretation  of  the words used  in the fifth amendment to the American Constitution.      Another argument on behalf of the respondents is  based   on  s.   50  of   the  Damodar  Valley Corporation Act  (No. XIV  of 1948) which provides that "any  land required  by the  Corporation  for carrying out its functions under this Act shall be deemed to  be needed for a public purpose and such land shall  be acquired  for the Corporation as if the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (1 of  1894), were applicable to it and the Corporation  were a company within the meaning of cl.  (e) of s. 3 of the said Act." That section is not  before us  for interpretation  and  it  is therefore not  necessary for  us to  say  anything about the  scope and  meaning of that section. All that we  need point  out is  that section  was not enacted to  explain what  the legislature meant by the use  of the  relevant words  in ss. 40 and 41. Whatever therefore  may be  the interpretation  of that section  and whatever  may be  the reason why the legislature  enacted that  section in that Act that will  not control the meaning of the relevant words in  ss. 40  and 41,  and it is therefore not necessary for  us to interpret that section in the present  proceedings.  As  against  this,  learned Counsel for  the appellant  pointed out that there are  many  other  later  Acts  creating  statutory corporations like  the Damodar Valley Corporation, in which there is no provision corresponding to s. 50. That  again is a matter into which we need not go, and  it is  unnecessary to  consider  why  the legislature provided  s. 50  in the Damodar Valley Corporation 171 Act and  did not  provide some  similar section in other Acts  creating statutory  corporations which

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were enacted  after the Damodar Valley Corporation Act  was   put  on   the   statute   book.   These considerations in our opinion have no relevance to the interpretation of the relevant words of ss. 40 and 41  of the Act and we do not therefore propose to say  anything about s, 50 of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act. We may add that the works are not like the  Damodar Valley  Corporation and  what we say in  the present  case may  not necessarily  be taken to apply to a statutory corporation like the Damodar Valley  Corporation, which is wholly owned by the State,      Then  it   was  urged   on  behalf   of   the respondents that  s. 6(3)  makes the purpose noted in the notification under s. 6(1) not justiciable. We have  not been  able  to  understand  how  that provision helps  the respondents. All that s. 6(3) says is  that the  declaration shall be conclusive evidence that  the land  is needed  for  a  public purpose  or  for  a  company.  In  this  case  the declaration was  that the  land was  needed for  a company  and   that  according   to  s.   6(3)  is conclusive evidence  that the  land is  so needed. Now it  is not  the case of the appellant that the land was  not needed  for the Works in the present case, nor  does the  appellant say that though the land  was  needed  for  some  other  purpose,  the notification falsely  declares that  it was needed for  the   Works.   In   the   circumstances   the conclusiveness envisaged  by s.  6 (3)  is  of  no assistance to  the solving  of  the  problem  with which we are concerned in the present case.      It is  then urged  for the  respondents  that though the  appellant had alleged mala fides, that part of the case was given up by him and therefore it is not open to him to urge the contentions that have been  urged before  us. There  is no force in this argument  either, for there is no question of any mala fides or 172 fraud on  the Act  in the  present case.  What the appellant contends  is that  the relevant words in ss. 40  and 41  have a certain meaning and that on that meaning the action of the State Government in giving  consent  for  the  use  of  the  machinery provided in  the Act  for the  acquisition of land for the  Works is  not within the contemplation of the Act.  This contention  has nothing  to do with mala fides  or with  fraud on  the statute. It has always been  the case  of the  appellant that  the consent given by the Government was not within the meaning of the relevant words in ss. 40 and 41 and therefore the  entire proceedings  for acquisition of the  appellant’s land  must be quashed, for the conditions  precedent   for  the   issue  of   the notification under  s. 6  had  not  been  complied with. On  that case the appellant must succeed, if we accept  the meaning  for which he contends, and that has nothing to do with mala fides or fraud on the statute on the part of the Government.      Lastly we may notice an argument on behalf of the appellant  that if  we  look  to  the  history behind the  legislation which  culminated into the Act, we  shall find that acquisition for a company was always for construction of some work which the

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public could use. Reference in this connection was made to  Act  XXII  of  1863  which  provided  for acquisition for private individuals and companies. That Act applied to works of public utility, which were defined under s. II to mean any bridge, road, railroad,  tramroad,   canal  for   irrigation  or navigation, work for the improvement of a river or harbour,  dock,  quay,  jetty,  drainage  work  or electric telegraph  and also  all works subsidiary to any  such work.  At the  same  time  there  was another Act  in force,  namely, Act  VI  of  1857, which provided  for acquisition of land for public purposes. Then  came the  Act (X  of 1870),  which repealed both  Acts No. VI of 1857 and No. XXII of 1863 and made 173 a consolidated  provision for  acquisition of land for public  purposes and for companies and brought in Chap.  VII for  the first  time. This  Act  was replaced in  1894 by the present Act. However, Act X of  1870 was  a consolidating  and amending Act. The  Act   of  1894   is  also  an  amending  Act. Therefore, it  is  not  possible  to  derive  much assistance from  the previous  law existing before the Act  of 1870  was  passed,  for  it  not  only consolidated the previous law but also amended it. We have  therefore to  interpret the  Act  on  the words as  they now  stand and  cannot derive  much assistance from  the provisions  of  Act  XXII  of 1863. That  is why  we have  interpreted above the relevant words  of  ss.  40  and  41  without  any reference to  the past history of the law relating to acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies.      Coming now  to the facts of the present case, we have  to see  whether the  acquisition is for a work which is useful to the public under s. 40 (1) (b) and  which the  public in  entitled to  use in accordance with  the fifth  term to  be entered in the agreement under s. 41. We have already set out the term  in the  agreement which shows that those who have business with the company shall have such right of  access to  and  use  of  the  land/works herein and  before specified  as may  be necessary for the  transaction of  their business  with  the firm."  This  in  our  opinion  is  not  what  the relevant provisions of ss. 40 and 41 require. What these provisions  require is  that the work should be directly  useful to  public and  the  agreement shall contain a term how the public shall have the right to  use the  work  directly  themselves.  It seems to  us that  under the relevant words in ss. 40(1)(b) and  41 it  is works  like a  hospital, a public reading room or a library or an educational institution open to that public or such other work as  the   public  may   directly  use   that   are contemplated and it is only for such works which 174 are useful  to the  public in  this way and can be directly used  by it that land can be acquired for a  company   under  the  Act.  This  is  also  the implication of  the following observations of this Court in Babu Barkya Thakur’s case (1) at pp. 137- 38 with reference to ss. 40 and 41:           "In an  industrial concern  employing  a

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    large number of workmen away from their homes      it is a social necessity that there should be      proper housing  accommodation  available  for      such workmen.  Where a  large section  of the      community is  concerned,  its  welfare  is  a      matter of  public concern.  Similarly,  if  a      Company  is   generous  enough   to  erect  a      hospital or a public reading room and library      or an  educational institution  open  to  the      public, it cannot be doubted that the work is      one of  public utility  and comes  within the      provisions of the Act." The fact  that the product of the company would be useful to  the public  is not  sufficient to bring the acquisition  for a  company within the meaning of the  relevant words  in ss.  40 and  41. In the present case all that the Government was satisfied about appears  to  be  that  the  product  of  the company will  be useful  to  the  public  and  the provision in  the agreement  is  merely  that  the public shall  be able  to go  upon the  works  for purpose of  business. This  in our  opinion is not the meaning of the relevant words under ss. 40 and 41 and  therefore the Government’s satisfaction in that behalf is not enough to entitle it to use the machinery  of   the  Act   for  the   purpose   of acquisition in  this case.  We therefore allow the appeal with  costs and  setting aside the order of the High  Court quash  the notification under s. 6 of  the   Act  and   the   proceedings   resulting therefrom.      SARKAR, J.-The  appellant was  the  owner  of certain lands.  The Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh acquired the lands under the Land Acquisition 175 Act, 1894.  The appellant,  thereupon,  moved  the High Court  at Allahabad  under Art.  226  of  the Constitution for  an appropriate with to quash the order of  acquisition made  by the Government. The petition was  dismissed by  the High Court and the appellant  has   filed  this  appeal  against  the judgment of  the High  Court. The  land, it may be stated, was  acquired  by  the  Government  for  a company called the Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd., which  required it  for setting up a textile machinery parts factory.      Sections 6  to 37  of the  Act lay  down  the procedure for  all acquisitions under it. Part VII of the  Act,  which  consists  of  ss.  38  to  44 provides for  acquisition of  lands for  companies for certain  specified  purposes.  It  is  not  in controversy that  the acquisition  in the  present case was  made under this part. It is necessary to set  out  ss.  39,  40  and  41  of  Part  VII  to appreciate the contention of the appellant:           S. 39.  The provisions  of sections 6 to      37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force      in order  to acquire  land for  any  Company,      unless  with  the  previous  consent  of  the      appropriate  Government,   nor   unless   the      Company shall  have  executed  the  agreement      hereinafter mentioned.           S. 40.  (1) Such  consent shall  not  be      given unless  the appropriate  Government  be      satisfied,  either   on  the  report  of  the

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    Collector under  section 5A  sub-section (2),      or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided      ,-                (a)  that   the  purpose   of   the           acquisition is  to obtain  land for  the           erection of  dwelling houses for workman           employed  by  the  Company  or  for  the           provision    of    amenities    directly           connected therewith, or 176                (b) that such acquisition is needed           for the  construction of  some work, and           that such work is likely to prove useful           to the public.           (2) Such  enquiry shall  be held by such      officer and  at such  time and  place as  the      appropriate Government shall appoint.           (3) Such  officer may summon and enforce      the attendance  of witnesses  and compel  the      production of documents by the same means and      as far  as possible  in the same manner as is      provided by  the Code  of Civil  Procedure in      the case of a Civil Court.           S. 41.  If the appropriate Government is      satisfied after  considering the  report,  if      any, of  the Collector under section 5A, sub-      section (2),  or on the report of the officer      making the  inquiry under section 40 that the      purpose of  the proposed  acquisition  is  to      obtain land  for  the  erection  of  dwelling      houses for workman employed by the Company or      for  the   provision  of  amenities  directly      connected therewith,  or  that  the  proposed      acquisition is needed for the construction of      a work, and that such work is likely to prove      useful to  the public,  it shall  require the      company to  enter into  an agreement with the      appropriate  Government,   providing  to  the      satisfaction of  the  appropriate  Government      for the following matters, namely:-           (1)  the  payment   to  the  appropriate                Government  of   the  cost  of  the                acquisition;           (2)  the transfer,  on such  payment  of                the land to the company;           (3)  the terms  on which  the land shall                be held by the Company; 177           (4)  where the  acquisition is  for  the                purpose of erecting dwelling houses                or  the   provision  of   amenities                connected   therewith,   the   time                within  which,  the  conditions  on                which and  the manner  in which the                dwelling houses  or amenities shall                be erected or provided; and           (5)  where the  acquisition is  for  the                construction of  any other work the                time   within    which   and    the                conditions on  which the work shall                be executed and maintained, and the                terms on  which the public shall be                entitled to use the work.      There  is  no  dispute  that  the  Government declared  that   it   was   satisfied   that   the

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acquisition needed for the construction of a work, namely, a textile machinery parts factory and that this work was likely to prove useful to the public but the  appellant contends that such a factory is not a  work contemplated  by s.  40(1)(b) and  the Government had  no right,  therefore, to  give its consent   to    the   acquisition.   The   precise significance of  this contention  will have  to be stated more fully later.      The first  point  taken  by  the  respondents against this  contention of  the appellant is that the  satisfaction   of  the  Government  under  s. 40(1)(b) is  subjective and  that a declaration in the official gazette that the acquisition is for a public purpose  is under  s. 6(3)  conclusive  and cannot therefore be questioned in a court. I think that the appellant is right when he says that this conclusiveness is  of no avail unless the work can be said  to be  within s. 40(1)(b). The Government cannot by  simply making  a declaration that it is satisfied that  the acquisition  is needed for the construction of  some work  likely to prove useful to the public stop further enquiries even 178 though  the   satisfaction  contemplated   is  the Government’s subjective  satisfaction. If the work is  not   within   the   Act,   the   Government’s satisfaction  avails  nothing.  And  that  is  the contention of  the  appellant.  No  doubt  if  the Government says  it is  satisfied,  it  cannot  be contended  that  it  is  not  satisfied.  But  the Government has  to be  satisfied about a specified thing and  a question  can be raised as to whether the thing  about which the Government is satisfied is  the  thing  contemplated  by  the  section.  I therefore, proceed  to consider  whether the  work about which  the Government  was satisfied  in the present case, is within s. 40(1)(b).      The real  question raised by the appellant is as to  the meaning  of the  words  "such  work  is likely to prove useful to the public" in cl.(b) of s. 40(1). What is a work likely to prove useful to the public ? The appellant says it is a work which the public  can use  for the  purpose for which it was constructed.  Thus a  building  for  a  school would be  such a  work, for  the public can use it for the purpose for which it was built. So would a building for  a hospital  or a  library be.  It is said that this is the natural and ordinary meaning of the words. Then it is said, even if it were not so, they  have to be so read in view of ss. 39 and 41. The  matter is  put in this way: In view of s. 39 land  cannot be  acquired under Part VII unless two conditions  are fulfilled.  The first  is  the consent  of  the  Government  to  the  acquisition which, in  view of  s. 41, cannot be given-leaving out  the   cases  of   acquisition  for  workmen’s dwelling houses  with which  we are  not concerned now-unless  the  acquisition  is  needed  for  the construction of  a work  which is  likely to prove useful to  the public. The second is the execution of an  agreement by  the Company providing for the matters stated in s. 41, one of which is the terms on which  the public  shall be entitled to use the work to be constructed on the land to be acquired,

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about which work the Government has 179 been satisfied  that it  is likely to prove useful to the public. Since both these conditions have to be fulfilled,  the work must be such as the public can use  directly; if it were not such a work then the  condition  as  to  the  agreement  cannot  be fulfilled. Therefore, the work in s. 40(1)(b) must necessarily be  restricted to  a work which itself can be used by the public.      The appellant  contends that  the work in the present case  being a factory, it is not one which the public  can use  and, therefore,  it is  not a work for  setting up of which the Government could under  s.   40(1)(b)  give   its  consent  to  the acquisition. It  appears that  in the present case the Company  had executed  an agreement purporting to be  in  terms  of  s.  41  and  that  agreement provided that  the public  would have  a "right of access to and use of the land-works......as may be necessary for  the transaction  of their  business with the  firm",  that  is,  the  Company.  It  is contended by  the appellant  that this  is  not  a compliance with  the second  condition. It is said that this  is not  really providing for the use of the work  for that  means use by the public of the work, for  the purpose  for which  it  was  built. Hence, it  is  argued,  that  the  acquisition  is illegal.      I am unable to accept the appellant’s reading of s. 40(1)(b) as correct. The words "such work is likely to  prove useful  to the  public"  read  by themselves seem  to me plainly to imply a work the construction which  results in  some benefit which the public  would enjoy.  They do  not contemplate only a  work which itself can be put by the public to  its   use.  For   example,  a  work  producing electricity for  supply to  the public  is a  work which is  useful to  the public.  So also  a  work producing any  commodity like  say,  medicines  or cloth would be a work which would be useful to the public. Again,  I  feel  no  doubt  that  a  radio broadcasting station  would be  a work which would be useful to the public. Take another case, 180 namely a post-graduate college turning out a small number of  highly qualified medical doctors. There can be  no doubt that the building for the college can be  said to be a work useful to the public. It would be  so not  because the  public would have a chance of  getting  training  there  and  a  small number of  the members  of the  public would after the training  be able  to make  a good livelihood, but because  an institution of this kind is useful to the  public as  it turns  out men who give very useful  service   to  the   public.  In   all  the illustrations given  the works  would be useful to the public  though the public might have no access to the  work or  any right to use them directly. I think it  would be  unduly restricting the meaning of the  word ’useful’ to say that a work is useful to the public only when it can directly be used by the public.  The words  are  not  work  which  the public can  use", in which case it might with some justification have been said that the work must be

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such as  the public  could  use.  In  the  Shorter Oxford Dictionary,  among the meanings of ’useful’ appear, "having  the qualities to bring about good or advantage", "helpful in effecting a purpose". I find no  reason not to apply these meanings to the word  ’useful’   in  the   section   that   I   am considering.      If  the   meaning  for  which  the  appellant contends were  to be  given to the words, then the work contemplated  can  only  be  a  work  like  a hospital, school  or philanthropic institutions of similar kind  which itself  the public  can put to its use.  It seems  to me that it would be strange if the  section only  contemplated that,  Part VII clearly   deals   with   companies   as   business institutions. A company in the Act means a company incorporated  under   one  or   other  of  certain Companies Acts  and includes  a society registered under the  Societies Registration  Act, 1860 and a registered society  within the  meaning of the Co- operative Societies  Act, 1912:  see s.  3(e). Now the first and the last are essentially business 181 institutions. Under  s. 38A  again, a  company for the  purpose   of  part  VII  is  to  include  "an industrial concern,  ordinarily employing not less than one hundred workmen owned by an individual or by an  association of  individuals and not being a Company", This  again is  essentially  a  business organisation. It  is  true  that  land  cannot  be acquired  for  this  last,  mentioned  variety  of "Company" under  Part VII  except for  erection of dwelling houses  for its  workmen or for amenities connected therewith.  I am however referring to s. 38A  to   show  that  Part  VII  is  dealing  with "companies" as  business organisations  and not as donors for  philanthropic purposes, That being so, it would  be curious if Part VII was intended only for   acquiring    lands   for    these   business organisations so  that they  might out  of charity set    up     philanthropic    institutions.    If encouragement of philanthrophy was the idea behind Part  VII,   why  were  its  provisions  not  made available   to    philanthropic   minded   private individuals or associations of individuals ?      Another reason  which to  my  mind  indicates that s.  40(1)(b) is not confined to philanthropic institutions is  that the word ’work’ would hardly then have  been used;  it is  to my  mind  a  very inappropriate use of the word ’work’ to describe a philanthropic institution.  ’Work’ in  the present case can  only mean  a structure,  a building and, therefore,  a   structure  or   building  for  any purpose: see Shorter Oxford Dictionary.      Section  40,   furthermore,  contemplates  an enquiry for determining whether the work is likely to prove  useful to  the public in course of which it may  even be necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses  and production of documents. This is not an enquiry to hear the objections of the owner of the  land to  be acquired,  to the acquisition: Ezra v. Secretary of State(1) I can hardly imagine that 182 provisions for  such elaborate  enquiry would have

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been made  if all  that the  Government had  to be satisfied was  whether a philanthropic institution would be  useful to  the  public.  It  would  also appear inexplicable  that Part  VII was  needed at all for the purpose of acquisition of land for the establishment  of  philanthropic  institutions  by companies for that could well have been done under s. 6 as that would clearly be an acquisition for a company for  a public  purpose. I  do not  suppose there can be any doubt that the establishment of a philanthropic  institution   would  be   a  public purpose. I  am unable to agree with the contention that land can be acquired for a company only under Part VII. Section 43 says that this Part would not apply to acquisition of land for a company for the purposes of  which under  an  agreement  with  the company, the  Government is bound to provide land. Acquisition in  such cases  for  the  company  has therefore to be under ss. 6 to 37. It would follow that under s. 6 land can be acquired for a company in a  case not  coming under Part VII. In the view that land  can be acquired for a company under the Act otherwise  than under Part VII, I am supported by A. Natesa Asari v. The State of Madras (1).      Lastly, I  think it  right to  point out that though the provisions in Part VII have been on the statute book  since at least 1870, in not a single case it  appears to  have been  held in  all these years that  the work  contemplated is  work  of  a philanthropic nature  which the  public can put to its use  directly. I am not saying that this is an argument which  is conclusive but it strikes me as somewhat extraordinary  if the  meaning was as the appellant contends,  it  should  not  have  struck anyone so long. In Ezra v. Secretary of State (2), an acquisition  of land  for the  Bank  of  Bengal under Part VII for the 183 purpose of  constructing a  building in  which the Public Debt  Office of the Government which was in charge of  the Bank, was to be housed, was upheld. This  was   not  a   case  of  acquisition  for  a philanthropic purpose.  In Radha Raman v. State of U. P.  (1), an  acquisition under Part VII for the purpose of  a  co-operative  housing  society  was upheld. In  Ranibala Bhar  v. State of West Bengal (2) an  acquisition for  extension of  the textile mills of a company was upheld.      Reading s. 40(1)(b) by itself, I am for these reasons unable  to accept  the view  that the work there contemplated  is only  a building  or  other construction put up for a philanthropic purpose or is such as itself can be used by the public. In my opinion, the  work contemplated is a work from the construction of  which the  public can  in any way derive benefit,  whether by  the direct use of the work or  by the  enjoyment of  the fruits  of  the activities  carried   on  there,   or,   may   be, otherwise.      The question then is, however wide may be the meaning of  the  words  "work....likely  to  prove useful to the public" when read by themselves, has that meaning  to be controlled in view of the fact that under  s. 41 an agreement has to be made with the company  concerning the work providing for the

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terms on  which the  public can  use it  ? Is that meaning to  be restricted and the words understood as contemplating  only a  work which is capable of meaning to  be restricted  and  the  words  public directly ?  I do not think so. That would not be a reasonable way  of interpreting  the statute. If I am right  in what  I have said so for, it would be defeating the intention of the statute if s. 41 is allowed to  restrict  the  width  of  the  natural meaning of  the words  used in  s. 40(1)(b). In my view, Part  VII was  enacted mainly  for acquiring lands for business organisations and therefore for purposes of their 184 business also,  provided that  business was useful to the public. Obviously, in a very large majority of cases  of such  acquisition  it  would  not  be possible to  permit the  use by  the public of the works put  up on  the land. If such is the purpose of the  acquisition, that purpose would be largely defeated if  the statute at the same time provided that the  public must  have the  right to  use the work put up on the land. A construction leading to such  a   result  would   in  my  view  be  wholly unjustified. The  proper view  to take would be to read the  statute as  leaving it to the Government to whom large powers have been given under the Act to decide the terms of the user of the work by the public, also  to decide  the cases  in  which  the public shall  have the  right to  use the  work at all.      I think  that the interpretation suggested by me has  the support  of authority.  It has  to  be observed that  when it is said that the meaning of s. 10(1)(b)  must be  restricted to  bring  it  in consonance with s. 41, it is conceded that the two sections cannot  stand side  by side,  each having its  full  operation.  Now,  in  such  a  case,  I conceive it is the duty of the Court to remove the conflict by such interpretation as would carry out the intention  of the legislature. I may read here the  following   passage  from   Maxwell  on   the Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) p. 78,           "The beneficial  spirit of  construction      is also well illustrated by cases where there      is so  far a  conflict  between  the  general      enactment  and   some   of   its   subsidiary      provisions that  the former  would be limited      in the  scope of  its operation if the latter      were not restricted." In such  a case  the rule is to allow scope to the general enactment.  Maxwell cites  Cortis v.  Kent Water Works(1)  in support  of  this  proposition. There 185 an Act  authorised the  imposition of a local rate on all persons occupying land in a parish and gave a dissatisfied  rate-payer an  appeal but required the appellant  to enter  into a  recognisance  for prosecuting  the   appeal.  Under   this  Act,   a corporation was subjected to a rate and a suit was brought to  recover that  rate.  It  was  said  on behalf of  the corporation  that the  Act did  not authorise  the   imposition  of   the  rate  on  a corporation because it contemplated the imposition

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of a  rate on a person who could appeal against it and that  a corporation  was  not  such  a  person because it  could not maintain the appeal provided in the  statute as  that appeal  was one  which  a person who  could enter  into a recognisance could prosecute, and  a corporation could not enter into a recognisance. Bayley, J. observed,           "But assuming  that  they  cannot  enter      into a  recognisance, yet if they are persons      capable of  being aggrieved  by and appealing      against a rate, I should say that part of the      clause which  gives by  the appeal applies to      all persons  capable of  appealing, and  that      the other part of the clause which requires a      recognisance to  be entered into applies only      to those  who are  capable of entering into a      recognisance, but  is inapplicable  to  those      who are not." I think  on the  same principle  I should  in  the present case  hold  that  the  provisions  in  the agreement about  the terms  on  which  the  public would  be  entitled  to  use  the  work  would  be inapplicable to a case where the work is such that the public  cannot use  it. Thus  for example,  if land  is   acquired  for   setting  up   a  highly specialised drug  factory, it  may be  a  work  to which  public   admission  as   of  right   cannot conveniently be  granted and  to such  a work  the last part of s. 41(5) would not be applicable. 186      I also find some support for the view that it is not  obligatory that  the public  shall use the work from  the fact  that the  user of the work by the  public   shall  be  such  as  the  Government determines. The  Government may  be satisfied with very little user. The Government’s satisfaction as to the quantum of this user is plainly conclusive. Therefore, it  would seem that the provision as to the term of the user of the work by the public was not intended  to confer  a substantial  benefit on the  public  a  benefit  which  would  warrant  an interpretation  defeating  which  otherwise  would appear to be the main purpose of the statute.      Another reason leading me to the view that it is not  obligatory  under  the  statute  that  the public must  have a right to use the work is this. Obviously, the  public cannot in any case have the right to  use the  whole work.  Even if a hospital was put up, the public cannot insist on using, say the dispensing  room or  the place where medicines are stocked  or the  residential quarters  of  the staff.  That   being  so,  it  would  be  for  the Government to  decide what  user of the work would be available  to the  public.  If  the  Government decides that  the public  shall have  the use of a very small  part of  the work, I do not think that any complaint can be legitimately made. This would show that the term as to user by the public was in no case  intended to confer a great benefit on the public. If  this is  true,  there  would  be  less reason for  thinking that  was an obligatory term. If it  was not  obligatory, it  cannot  of  course control the meaning of s. 40(1)(b).      What I  have said so far does not lead to the result that  Part VII  was enacted for the private

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benefit of  companies as  business  organisations. Nor is  its effect  to convert the Government into land agents  for them.  In order  that land may be acquired under  Part VII,  the Government  must be satisfied that  it is  required to  put up  a work which 187 would be  useful to the public. So the controlling idea is  benefit to  the public.  It is because of this that the Government acquires the land for the Company. No  doubt the Company would itself derive some private  benefit  from  the  work.  But  that cannot justify  the view  that the  acquisition is for the  benefit of  the Company  only or that the Act converts  the Government into a land agent for the Company.  No one  can force  the Government to acquire the  land and when the Government does so, it does  for public benefit and not solely for the Company’s benefit.  Take  a  case  where  land  is acquired to  house the  workmen of a company. Here the public cannot use the land. The acquisition is no doubt for the benefit of the workmen but at the same time  the financial  advantage goes solely to the Company.  Is it  to be  said that  the Act  is converting the Government into land agents for the Company ?  Obviously not. If so, neither can it be said in  the case of acquisition for a company for putting up  a work  that the  Government would  be acting as a land agent for the company.      It is  no argument  that the Government might use its  powers under  Part  VII  to  advance  the interest of its friends and supporters. Assume the Government does  that. The  Government may equally use all  other  powers  given  to  it  by  various statutes for a similar purpose. But that would not justify interpreting  a statute plainly giving the Government a  power, as  not doing  so. A  country cannot go  on unless power can be entrusted to its Government. The  remedy against the misuse of such power is  not always to the Court but to those who put the Government where it is,      In the  present case,  it will be remembered, the land  was acquired  for the  setting up  of  a textile machinery  parts factory.  The  Government was satisfied that it was a work which would prove 188 useful  to   the  public.  It  seems  to  me  that Government were entitled so to be satisfied within the meaning  of s.  40(1)(b). It is no part of the duty of  this Court  to sit  in judgment  over the merits of  Government’s satisfaction.  I think  it right however  to point  out that  I find no fault with the Government for having been satisfied that the work  would be  useful to the public. Textiles are an  essential commodity  for our  daily  life. Their  manufacture  therefore  is  useful  to  the public. Textile manufacture requires textile mills and the  mills no doubt require parts. Therefore a factory for  the purpose  of  manufacturing  these parts can,  in my  view, be said to serve a public purpose.  I   find  it   impossible  to  take  any objection to the present acquisition on the ground that the  work proposed to be set up is not likely to prove  useful  to  the  public.  Nor  is  it  a legitimate objection  to the  acquisition that the

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public  cannot  directly  use  the  work  and  the reasons for this view have been earlier stated.      I would  therefore dismiss  this appeal  with costs.      By COURT:  In accordance  with the opinion of the majority, the appeal is allowed with costs.                                    Appeal allowed. 189