REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8235 OF 2009         (Arising out of SLP(c) No. 7410 of 2007)

R. Kolandaivelu & Ors.              …Appellants  

VERSUS

The Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Anr.            … Respondents

J U D G M E N T   

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1. Leave granted.   

2. The appellants are the owners of lands situated in  

Salem Taluk No. 151, Ayothiapatnam in the district  

of Salem, Tamil Nadu (hereinafter referred to as “the  

acquired lands”). A notification under Section 4(1) of  

the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short “the Act”)  

was  issued  on  24th of  December,  1986  for  

acquisition of  the said lands.  A declaration under  

Section 6 of the Act was issued on 23rd of December,  

1987.  Two  writ  petitions  being  W.P.Nos.835  and  

836 of 1988 were filed questioning the validity and  

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legality  of  the  aforesaid  notification  and  the  

declaration before the High Court of Madras.  In the  

pending writ  petitions,  on 11th of  February,  1988,  

the following interim order was passed :-  

“Interim stay for four weeks.  Notice returnable  

in four weeks.”  

The aforesaid two writ petitions finally came up for  

hearing before a learned Judge of the High Court who by  

an  order  dated  23rd of  August,  2001  rejected  the  writ  

petitions  and  feeling  aggrieved,  the  appeals  were  filed  

before the Division Bench which by the impugned order  

had  dismissed  the  appeals  of  the  appellants.  The  

appellants, feeling aggrieved, had filed two special leave  

petitions  which  on  grant  of  leave,  were  heard  in  the  

presence of the learned counsel for the parties.  

Having  heard  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

parties  and  after  careful  examination  of  the  relevant  

provisions  of  the  Act,  we  are  of  the  view  that  these  

appeals  have  no  merit.  The  submission  of  

Mr.Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing on  

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behalf of the appellants, was that having regard to the  

fact that the interim order of stay was operative only for a  

period of four weeks from 11th of February, 1988 to 11th  

of March, 1988, the High Court had fallen into a grave  

error  in  dismissing  the  writ  petitions  filed  by  the  

appellants  inasmuch  as  the  award  passed  on  23rd of  

August, 1993 was clearly beyond the period of two years  

from the date of issuance of declaration under Section 6  

of  the  Act  on 23rd of  December,  1987.   Mr.Viduthalai,  

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents  

contested  the  submissions  advanced  by  

Mr.Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the  appellants.  He submitted that  the  High Court  was  

fully  justified  in  dismissing  the  writ  petitions  having  

regard to the nature of the interim order of stay granted  

by  the  High  Court  in  the  pending  writ  petitions  and,  

therefore,  it  must be held that the question of holding  

that entire proceedings had lapsed and that the acquired  

lands must be restored to the appellants could not arise  

at all. Before we proceed  to consider the issue as posed  

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before us, it would be necessary to deal with some of the  

provisions of the Act. First of such provisions is Section 6  

of  the  Act  which  deals  with  intended  acquisition.  The  

explanation  to  Section  6  of  the  Act  says  that  “In   

computing  any  of  the  periods  referred  to  in  the  first  

proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding  

to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under  

Section  4(1),  is  stayed  by an order  of  a  Court  shall  be  

excluded.”

3.  Section 11 of the Act deals with enquiry and award  

by Collector. It says that –

“On the day so fixed, or any other day to which   the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector   shall  proceed to  enquire into  the objections (if   any)  which  any  person  interested  has  stated  pursuant  to a notice  given under  section  9 to   the measurements made under section 8, and  into the value of the land and at the date of the  publication of the notification under Section 4,   sub-section (1) and into the respective interests   of the persons claiming the compensation and  shall make an award under his hand…………… ………………”    

4. Next comes the most relevant provision of the Act  

for the purpose of this case i.e. Section 11A of the  

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Act  which  deals  with  the  period  within  which  an  

award shall  be  made.   It  says that  “The Collector  

shall  make  an  award  under  Section  11  within  a  

period of two years from the date of the publication   

of the declaration  and if  no award  is made within   

that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition  

of the land shall lapse, provided that in a case where   

the said declaration has been published before the   

commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)   

Act,  1984 (68  of  1984),  the  award  shall  be  made  

within  a  period  of  two  years  from  such  

commencement.   Explanation  –  In  computing  the  

period of  two  years  referred to in this  section,  the   

period during which any action or proceeding to be  

taken in pursuance of the said declaration is    stayed    

by an order of a Court shall be excluded.”

5. As noted herein earlier, Mr.V.Krishnamurthy, learned  

senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants  

urged  that  in  view  of  the  admitted  fact  that  the  

limited order of stay granted by the High Court in  

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the two writ petitions was not extended by it,  the  

award which was passed had lapsed after the expiry  

of period of two years from the date of publication of  

the declaration, therefore, it must be held that the  

entire  proceedings  for  the  acquisition  of  the  

acquired  lands  had  lapsed  and,  accordingly,  the  

acquired lands of the appellants must be restored to  

them.  In  this  connection,  Mr.Krishnamurthy  had  

drawn our attention to the admitted fact that the  

notification  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  was  

published in the official gazette on 23rd of December,  

1987  and  the  limited  interim  order  of  stay  was  

granted by the High Court on 11th of February, 1988  

and  on  3rd of  July,  1991,  an  order  of  stay  of  

dispossession  was  passed  in  favour  of  the  

appellants  and  thereafter  finally  the  award  was  

passed  on  23rd of  August,  1993.  From the  above  

facts, according to Mr.Krishnamurthy, it would be  

clear that admittedly the period of 2 years from the  

date of publication of the declaration under Section  

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6 of the Act i.e. 23rd of December, 1987 had lapsed  

before the date of award i.e. 23rd of August, 1993  

although a limited order of stay for four weeks was  

granted  which  was  not  extended  by  any  order  of  

extension.  In  support  of  this  contention,  

Mr.Krishnamurthy  placed  strong  reliance  on  a  

decision of this Court in the case of  Ashok Kumar  

and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Another 2007  

(3) SCC 470.   

6. As noted herein earlier, Mr.Viduthalai, the learned  

senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents  

submitted that on a perusal of the orders passed by  

the High Court on the question of grant of order of  

stay,  it  would  be  evident  that  the  parties  had  

proceeded all  along on the  basis  that  the  interim  

order  of  stay  granted  for  a  limited  period  had  

continued upto the stage when the interim order of  

stay  was  made  absolute  on  the  same  terms  and  

further in view of the findings of the High Court that  

both  the  parties  proceeded on  the  basis  that  the  

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interim order of stay was continuing all through, it  

must be held that the time during which the interim  

order  of  stay  was  continuing  i.e.  from  11th of  

February,  1988  to  3rd of  July,  1991  must  be  

excluded from the calculation of the period within  

the meaning of  explanation to Section 11A of the  

Act and if  this time is excluded, the award which  

was passed on 23rd of August, 1993 was well  within  

time  and,  therefore,  the  High  Court  was  fully  

justified in concluding that the question of holding  

that since the award was passed beyond the period  

of 2 years from the date of declaration, the entire  

acquisition  proceedings  must  be  held  to  have  

lapsed,  does  not  arise  at  all.  In  support  of  this  

submission,  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  

for the respondents has relied on two decisions of  

this  Court  namely  Bailamma  (Smt.)  Alias  

Doddabailamma  and  others  Vs.  Poornaprajna  

House Building Cooperative Society and others  

2006 (2) SCC 416 and  Yusufbhai Noormohamed  

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Nendoliya Vs. State of Gujarat and another 1991  

(4) SCC 531.   Accordingly,  Mr.Viduthalai,  learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  respondents  has submitted  

that there is no reason to interfere with the orders  

of  the  High  Court  holding  that  the  respondents  

were entitled to exclude the period in terms of the  

explanation to Section 11A of the Act.

7. We have carefully examined the rival submissions of  

the learned senior counsel for the parties. We have  

also  examined  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  

Court as well as the relevant provisions of the Act,  

namely, Sections 6 and 11A with its explanation, as  

noted herein earlier. From a perusal of the aforesaid  

provisions,  it  would be evident that the two years  

from the date of declaration must be computed after  

excluding the period when parties had approached  

the  court  and  obtained  interim  stay  of  such  

acquisition notices. As noted herein earlier, at the  

time of admission of the writ petitions, the following  

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interim order was passed on 11th of February 1988  

:-       

“Interim stay for four weeks.  Notice returnable  

in four weeks”

8. Subsequent to the passing of this interim order, it is  

true that the interim order was not extended by any  

further  order  of  the  Court.   However,  the  parties  

thought  that  the  interim  order  was  continuing.  

Keeping that in mind, the State/respondents filed  

an application for vacating the interim order dated  

11th of February, 1988 granted by the Court.   

9. On 3rd of  July,  1991,  on the  said  application  for  

vacating the interim order filed at the instance of  

the State/respondents, the High Court passed the  

following order :-

“These petitions  coming on for hearing  upon  perusing  the  petitions  and  the  respective   affidavits  filed  in  support  of  W.P.  Nos.  835  and 836/88 on the file of the High Court and  the  order  of  this  Court  dated  11.02.88  and  made in W. M.P. Nos. 1248 and 1249 of 1988  and  the  counter  affidavits  filed  herein  and  upon hearing the arguments of Mr. N. Chinnu,  Advocate  for  the  petitioners  in  W.M.P.  Nos.   

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1248  and  1249/88  and  for  the  respective   respondents  in  W.  M.  P.  Nos.  11986  and  11987/90  and  Mrs.  M.  Gomathi,  Govt.   Advocate (Writs) on behalf of the respondents  in W.M.P. Nos. 1248 and 1249/90 and for the  petitioners in W.M.P. Nos. 11986 and 11987 of  1990, it is ordered;  that the dispossession of   the  petitionsers  (in  W.M.P.  Nos.  1248  and  1249/90) of their lands alone in (1) Survey No.  99/3A,  an  extent  of  1.34  acres  of   Ayothipatnam  Village,  Salem  Taluk,  Salem  District (in W.M.P. Nos. 1248/88) and (2) 1-37  acres  in  Survey  Nos.  98/3  and  98/4,  Ayothiapatnam  Village,  Salem  District  in  W.M.P. No. 1249/88 respectively pursuant to   the  Section  4(1)  Notification  in  G.O.  Ms.  No.  3320,  Social  Welfare,  dated  24.12.1986,  on  the  file  of  the  first  respondent  in  both  the   petitions,  and  published  at  page  21  of  the  Part-II  Section – 2 Supplement to Tamil Nadu  Govt. Gazette Issue No. 1C, dated 07.01.1987,  and  Section-6  Declaration  in  G.O.  Ns.  No.  2532, Social  Welfare, dated 08.12.1987, and  published  at  pages  23  and  24  of  part-II   Section  2  Supplement  to  Tamil  Nadu  Govt.   Gazette issue No. 49-C, dated 23.12.1987, in  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  lands  of  the  petitioners  in  each  of  the  petitions  be  and  hereby are stayed pending further orders on  this petition.” (Emphasis supplied)

10. As  noted  herein  earlier,  at  the  instance  of  the  

appellants, the notification issued under Section 4  

of  the  Act  and  the  declaration  under  Section  6  

initially  were  stayed  for  four  weeks  on  11th of  

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February, 1988, but the Interlocutory Applications  

remained pending for final disposal and finally on  

the  applications  to  vacate  the  stay  order  at  the  

instance of the State/respondents, the applications  

to vacate the stay were disposed of, as noted herein  

earlier  by  an  order  which  clearly  shows  that  the  

order of stay granted initially for four weeks would  

continue pending further orders. From a perusal of  

the aforesaid interim order of the High Court passed  

on 3rd of  July,  1991,  it  is,  therefore,  evident  that  

there  was  an  order  of  prohibition  from  

dispossessing  the  appellants  from  the  acquired  

lands pending further orders.

11. In view of our discussions made herein above and  

considering  the  nature  of  interim  order  of  stay  

passed  by  the  High  Court  finally  on  3rd of  July,  

1991, it  is abundantly clear that both the parties  

proceeded  on  the  basis  that  the  interim  order  of  

stay had been continuing and the respondents were  

prohibited  from dispossessing the  appellants  from  

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the acquired lands pending further orders.  If  that  

was  not  the  case,  the  question  of  filing  an  

application for vacating the order of stay granted in  

favour of the appellants could not arise at all and  

there was no occasion for the appellants to contest  

the application for  vacating the stay order on the  

basis that the interim order of stay was continuing  

and should be allowed to continue.  That apart,  it  

may  be  stated  that  although  initially  the  interim  

order was passed for four weeks, the same interim  

order  which  was  granted  initially  was  made  final  

until further orders on 3rd of July, 1991. From the  

above  narration  of  facts,  it  must  be  held  that  no  

steps  could  be  taken  in  view  of  the  pending  

applications for grant of interim order and in view of  

the  interim order  granted  pending  further  orders.  

Therefore,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  acquisition  

proceedings had lapsed due to expiry of two years  

from the date of publication of the declaration under  

Section 6 of the Act relating to the acquired lands.  

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12. In Yusufbhai Noormohamed’s case (supra) at para  

8, this Court observed as under :-

“The  said  Explanation  is  in  the  widest  possible  terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for  limiting the action or proceeding referred to in the   Explanation  to  actions  or  proceedings  preceding  the making of the award under Section 11 of the  said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned  Single Judge himself where the case is covered by  Section17, the possession can be taken before an  award  is  made and we  see no reason why the  aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be  given  a  different  meaning  depending  upon  whether  the  case  is  covered  by  Section17  or   otherwise. On the other hand, it appears to us that   Section11-A  is  intended  to  limit  the  benefit  conferred on a land holder whose land is acquired  after the declaration under Section 6 is made to in  cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is  that the award must be made within a period  of two years of the declaration, failing which  the acquisition proceedings would lapse and  the land would revert to the land-holder. In  order to get the benefit of the said provision  what is required, is that the land-holder who  seeks the benefit must not have obtained any  order from a court restraining any action or  proceeding in  pursuance of  the  declaration  under Section 6 of the said Act so that the  Explanation  covers  only  the  cases  of  those  land-holders  who  do  not  obtain  any  order  from a court which would delay or prevent  the  making  of  the  award  or  taking  possession of the land acquired.                                                   (emphasis supplied)  

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13. From  the  above  observations  of  this  Court,  it  is  

clear that the explanation to Section 11A of the Act  

is intended to confer a benefit on the land holder,  

whose land is acquired after the declaration under  

Section 6 is made.  By the provision of Section 11A,  

the  State  authorities  are  required  to  pass  a  final  

award within two years from the date of publication  

of  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  failing  

which, the acquisition proceedings would lapse, and  

it would clearly show the intention of the legislature  

that the benefit of this provision would be in favour  

of the land owner if the award could not be passed  

within two years from the date of declaration when  

no order was obtained by the land owner from the  

Court  staying the  acquisition and the  land would  

revert back to the land owner because of expiry of  

the period of two years from the date of declaration  

or notification within the meaning of Section 11A of  

the Act. As noted herein earlier, initially the interim  

order of stay was granted staying the notifications  

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for four weeks, but from the record and the conduct  

of  both the  parties  and after  considering  the  fact  

that  the  State/respondents  had  to  file  an  

application for vacating the stay order thinking that  

stay  order  was  continuing  and  the  appellants  

having contested the said application for stay till the  

disposal of the same, there cannot be any doubt in  

our  mind that  both the  parties  proceeded on the  

basis that the interim order of stay passed initially  

for  four  weeks  continued  till  the  final  order  of  

interim  stay  passed  by  the  High  Court  on  the  

application for vacating the interim order of stay.  

14. Such being the stand taken by us, we are, therefore,  

of  the  view  that  the  award  was  passed  in  

accordance with Section 11A of the Act, that is to  

say,  the award was passed within two years from  

the date of publication of declaration under Section  

6 of the Act.   

15. There is another aspect of the matter.  The purpose  

for  which the  Land Acquisition Act  was amended  

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and  Section  11A  was  enacted,  was  to  prevent  

inordinate  delay  being  caused  by  the  Land  

Acquisition  Officer  in  making  an  award  which  

deprived the land owners of their enjoyment of their  

land or dealt with the land whose possession was  

already  taken.   The  delay  in  making  the  award  

subjected the owner of the land to untold hardship.  

The objects and reasons for introducing Section 11A  

into the Act were that "the pendency of acquisition  

proceedings for long periods often causes hardship  

to the affected parties and renders unrealistic  the  

scale  of  compensation  offered  to  them"  and "it  is  

proposed to provide for a period of two years from  

the  date  of  publication  of  the  declaration  under  

Section  6 of  the  Act  within  which  the  Collector  

should  make  his  award  under  the  Act".  By  the  

introduction of this explanation and Section 11A of  

the Act, the Legislature intended to emphasize that  

the Collector shall  make his award under the Act  

within  two  years  from  the  date  of  publication  of  

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declaration under Section 6 of the Act, failing which  

the acquisition proceeding itself shall lapse.  In this  

connection, reliance can be made to a decision of  

this  Court  in  Bailamma  (supra)  as  noted  herein  

earlier. In this decision, this Court had considered  

the effect of the amendment of the Act introducing  

Section 11A with explanation and observed in this  

connection as follows :

“This Court emphasized the fact that Section 11- A was enacted with a view to prevent inordinate   delay being made by Land Acquisition Officer in  making the award which deprived owners of the  enjoyment  of  the  property  or  to  deal  with  the  land whose possession has already been taken  Delay in making the award subjected the owner   of the land to untold hardship. The objects and  reasons for introducing Section 11-A into the Act  were  that  "the  pendency  of  acquisition   proceedings  for  long  periods  often  causes  hardship  to  the  affected  parties  and  renders  unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to   them" and "it is proposed to provide for a period  of two years from the date of publication of the   declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  within   which  the  Collector  should  make  his  award  under the Act". The emphasis, therefore, was on  the  Collector  making  his  award  within  the  period prescribed. However, the legislature was   also  aware  of  the  reality  of  the  situation  and  

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was not oblivious of the fact that in many cases  acquisition  proceedings  were  stalled  by  stay  orders obtained from courts of law by interested  parties. It,  therefore, became imperative that in  computing  the  period of  two  years,  the  period  during which an order of stay operated, which   prevented the authorities from taking any action  or  proceeding in  pursuance  of  the  declaration,   must be excluded. If such a provision was not  made, an acquisition proceeding could be easily  defeated  by  obtaining  an  order  of  stay  and  prolonging the litigation thereafter.  Explanation  to  Section  11-A  was  meant  to  deal  with   situations of this kind. The explanation is in the  widest  possible  terms  which  do  not  limit  its   operation  to  cases  where  an  order  of  stay  is   obtained  by  a  land-owner  alone.  One  can  conceive  of  cases  where  apart  from  land-  owners others may be interested in stalling the   land acquisition proceeding. It is no doubt true  that in most of the reported decisions the party   that obtained the stay order happened to be the   owner  of  the  land  acquired.  But  that  will  not   lead us to  the  conclusion that  the  explanation  applied  only  to  cases  where  stay  had  been  obtained by the owners of the land. There may  be others who may be interested in obtaining an   order of stay being aggrieved by the acquisition  proceeding.  It  may  be  that  on  account  of   development of  that  area some persons in the   vicinity may be adversely affected, or it may be  for any other reason that persons in the locality   are adversely affected by the project for which   acquisition  is  being  made.  One  can  imagine  many instances  in  which  a person other  than   the  owner  may  be  interested  in  defeating  the  

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acquisition proceeding. Once an order of stay is  obtained and the Government and the Collector   are  prevented  from  taking  any  further  action  pursuant  to  the  declaration,  they  cannot  be  faulted for the delay, and therefore, the period  during which the order of stay operates must be  excluded. In a sense, operation of the order of   stay  provides  a  justification  for  the  delay  in  taking  further  steps  in  the  acquisition   proceeding for which the authorities are not to   blame.”

16. Following  the  principles  laid  down  and  the  

observations  made  by  this  Court  in  the  aforesaid  

decision, with which we are in respectful agreement,  

we  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  

State/respondent was entitled to exclude the period  

mentioned herein earlier and that it must also be  

held that if  such period is excluded the period of  

two years from the date of declaration under Section  

6 of the Act before the award is passed would not  

expire and accordingly, the question of holding that  

the entire acquisition proceeding shall lapse, cannot  

arise at all.     

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17. Before  we  part  with  this  judgment,  we  may  deal  

with the decision of this Court as relied on by the  

learned senior counsel for the appellants in Ashok  

Kumar’s  case  (supra).   In  our  view,  this  decision  

stands on a different footing.  In that decision, it is  

true that the interim order of injunction was passed  

but  not  extended  whereas  in  the  present  case  

admittedly the interim order which was granted by  

the  court  for  a  limited  period  was  extended  till  

further orders by an order dated 3rd of July, 1991  

which was passed on the  application for  vacating  

the  order  of  stay  filed  by  the  State/respondents.  

Such  being  the  position  and  in  view  of  our  

discussions  made  herein  above,  therefore,  the  

appellants  having  taken  advantage  of  an  order  

passed by the High Court during the pendency of  

the writ petition which was sought to be vacated by  

the  State/respondents  by filing  an application for  

vacating the stay order, it must be concluded that  

the  award  was  passed within  two  years  from the  

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date of publication of the declaration under Section  

6 of the Act and the respondents were entitled to  

exclude the period from 11th of February, 1988 to 3rd  

of  July,  1991  and,  therefore,  if  this  period  is  

excluded as enshrined in the explanation to Section  

11A  of  the  Act,  the  award  was  within  time  and,  

therefore,  the  question  of  holding  that  the  

acquisition proceeding must lapse because of expiry  

of  the  said  period,  cannot  arise  at  all.  No  other  

submissions were advanced by the learned counsel  

for the parties.   

18. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any reason  

to interfere with the impugned order passed by the  

High Court and accordingly the appeal is dismissed.  

There will be no order as to costs.  

…………………………J. [Tarun Chatterjee]

…………………………J. [ Surinder Singh Nijjar ]

New Delhi. December 11, 2009.

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