http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: R. CHANDEVARAPPA ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/09/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. HANSARIA B.L. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (6) 309        JT 1995 (7)    93  1995 SCALE  (5)620

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH       CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8507, 8508 & 8510/95 OF 1995.  (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 57/91, 11397/89 and 17011/90)                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      We have  heard the  counsel on both sides. The facts in the appeal  No. 8507/95  arising out of SLP (C) No. 11571/89 are sufficient  to dispose  of all these appeals by a common judgment, since common question of law arises for decision.      The appellant’s  predecessor-in-title, Dasana  Rangaiah Bin Dasaiah  was granted  on November  16, 1951 an extent of two acres  of land  in Government vacant land bearing Survey No.  6   of  Beekanahalli   village,  Chikmangalur  Taluk  & District.  The  appellant  claimed  to  have  purchased  the property from  the sons and widow of the assignee on October 16, 1968.  On a  representation made  by one  of the sons on February 27,  1987 to  the Assistant Commissioner contending that the alienation was in violation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Prohibition of Certain Lands Act, 1975. The sale was  set aside  as violative  of the  Revenue Code Rule 43(5). The  appellant carried  the  matter  in  appeal.  The appellate authority  by its  order dated  November 17,  1987 confirmed the  same under Rule 43(5) of the Revenue Code. In the writ  petition and  writ appeal,  it was confirmed. Thus the appeal  against the  order of  the Division  Bench dated June 23,  1989 made  in W.A.  No.950/89 by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore.      Shri Ravi  P. Wadhwani,  the learned  counsel appearing for the  appellant, has  strenuously contended,  after  good preparation that  under the  grant initially  made to Dasana Rangaiah Bin  Dasaiah, the  prohibition for  alienation  was only for  ten years and, therefore, by necessary implication the grantee  thereafter, was  free to alienate the land. The alienation was made 17 years after the grant. Therefore, the Tribunals and  the High  Court were not justified in setting

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

aside the  alienation. It is also contended that the Act has no retrospective  operation and the alienation made prior to the Act  has come  into force  cannot be set aside under the Act. Further  submission is  that in any event the appellant having remained in uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years he had perfected his title by adverse possession. This contention was  specifically  raised  before  the  Assistant Commissioner and  the appellate  authority.  Therefore,  the matter needs  to be  examined in  the light  of the law laid down by this Court in K.T. Huchegowda v. Deputy Commissioner & Ors. [(1994) 3 SCC 536].      Shri Veerappa,  the learned  counsel appearing  for the State, contended  that the  cultivation chit  given  to  the original assignee  was only for personal cultivation subject to the  condition that  he will  be eligible to encumber the land only  to improve the assigned land. But the prohibition for alienation  of assigned  land always remained. The title always  remained   with  the   Government.  Therefore,   the limitation would  not run  against the  Government when  the land was sold. Since it is in contravention of Rule 43(5) of the Revenue  Code, the  appellant does  not get any title to the land.  The question of adverse possession does not arise as against  the State  since it  was not  pleaded  that  the appellant  had   asserted  his   title  against   the  State adversely. Therefore,  the ratio  in the  above case  has no application and  that the  matter need  not be  remitted for consideration.      Having  given   our  anxious   considerations  to   the respective contentions,  the first  question that arises for determination is what would be the nature of the right given to the  assignee Dasana  Rangaiah Bin Dasaiah. Article 39(b) of the  Constitution of India envisages that the State shall in particular  direct its  policy towards  securing that the ownership and  control of  the  material  resources  of  the community are  so distributed as best to subserve the common good. Admittedly,  Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are the weaker sections of the society who have been deprived of their   economic    status   by    obnoxious   practice   of untouchability and  the tribes living in the forest area far away from  the  civilised  social  life.  To  augment  their economic status  and to  bring them  on par  into  the  main stream of  the society,  the State  with a  view  to  render economic justice  envisaged in  the Preamble and Articles 38 and  46   of  the   Constitution  distributed  the  material resources, namely,  the land  for self-cultivation. It is an economic empowerment  of the  poor. It  is common  knowledge that many  a member  of the  deprived classes  live upon the agriculture either  by cultivation on lease hold basis or as agricultural labour.  Under these  circumstances, the  State having implemented  the policy of economic empowerment to do economic justice  assigned lands  to them  to see  that they remain in  possession and enjoy the property from generation to generation.      In Murlidhar Dayandeo Kesekar v. Vishwanath Pandu Barde & Anr.  [JT (1995)  3 SC  563],  the  question  was  whether permission for  alienation under  Bombay Revenue Code of the lands belonging  to the  Scheduled Tribes  could be  granted and,  if   so,  what  circumstances  should  be  taken  into consideration by  the competent authority to grant or refuse to grant  permission. The  authorities had  refused to grant permission for  alienation by  the scheduled  tribes to  the non-tribal. It was challenged in the writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. When the matter came up to this court, it  was held  that the  right to  development  is  an inalienable human  right by  virtue  of  which  every  human

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

person is entitled to participate in contribution to, and to enjoy economic,  social, cultural and political development, in which  all human  rights and  fundamental freedoms can be fully realised.  All human  rights derive  from dignity  and worth in  man. Democracy  blossoms the person’s full freedom to  achieve   excellence.  The   socio-economic  content  in directive principles  is all  pervasive to make the right to life meaningful  to the Indian citizens. For national unity, equality of  status and  dignity of persons envisaged in the Constitution, social and economic reforms in a democracy are necessary. Welfare  is a  form of  liberty  inasmuch  as  it liberates men  from social  conditions  which  narrow  their choices and  brighten their  self development. Article 46 of the Constitution  mandates the State to promote with special care the  educational and  economic interests  of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and  Scheduled Tribes,  and shall  protect them  from social injustice  and all  forms of  exploitation. Political democracy must  be made a social democracy as a way of life. It recognises  and affords  to realise liberty, equality and fraternity as  the principles of life. Economic empowerment, thereby, is  the foundation  to  make  equality  of  status, dignity of  person and  equal opportunity  a truism.  Social revolution through  rule of  law lies in effectuation of the fundamental rights  and directive principles a supplementary and complementary  to each  other. Political democracy would stabilize socio-economic democracy to make it a way of life.      It was,  therefore, held  that the State is enjoined to provide adequate  means of  livelihood to  the poor,  weaker sections of  the society,  the  dalits  and  tribes  and  to distribute material  resources of  the community to them for common welfare  etc. Therefore,  civil,  political,  social, economic and cultural rights are necessary to the individual to protect  and preserve  human dignity, social and economic rights are  sine quanon  concomitant to assimilate the poor, the depressed  and deprived,  i.e., the dalits and tribes in the national  main stream for ultimate equitable society and democratic way  of life  to create  unity, fraternity  among people  in   an  integrated  Bharat.  Property  is  a  legal institution  the  essence  of  which  is  the  creation  and protection of  certain private rights in wealth of any kind. Liberty, independence,  self-respect, have  their  roots  in property. To  denigrate the  institution of  property is  to shut one’s eyes to the stark reality evidenced by the innate instinct and  the steady  object  of  pursuit  of  the  vast majority of  people. The  economic rights  provide man  with freedom from  fear and  freedom from want, and that they are as important if not more, in the scale of values. The effect of social  and economic legislation was held thus: "In fact, the cumulative  effect of social and economic legislation is to specify  the basic structure. Moreover, the social system shapes the  wants and  aspirations that its citizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an economic system is  not only  an institutional  device for satisfying existing  wants   and  needs  but  a  way  of  creating  and fashioning wants  in the  future. The  economic empowerment, therefore, to  the poor,  dalits and  tribes as  an integral constitutional scheme  of socio-economic  democracy is a way of life  of political  democracy. Economic  empowerment  is, therefore, a  basic human  right and  a fundamental right as part of right to live, equality and of status and dignity to the  poor,   weaker  sections,   dalits  and   tribes."  The Prohibition   from   alienation   is   to   effectuate   the constitutional policy of economic empowerment under Articles

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

14, 21,  38, 39  and  46  read  with  the  Preamble  of  the Constitution. Accordingly it was held that refusal to permit alienation is  to effectuate  the constitutional policy. The alienation was  declared to  be void under section 23 of the Contract Act being violative of the constitutional scheme of economic empowerment  to accord  equality of status, dignity of persons and economic empowerment.      It is  seen that  the cultivation  chit under which the assignee  had  come  into  possession  prescribes  that  the assignee should  be in  personal cultivation of the land and that it  should not  be alienated. It is also stated that he is empowered  to encumber the land to secure loan to improve the assigned  lands either  from the  Government or from the Cooperative Society  for bona  fide purpose of improving the land or  for buying  cattle or  agricultural implements  for better cultivation  of the land. That would clearly indicate the object of assignment, namely, the assignee should remain in  possession   and  cultivate  the  land  personally  from generation to generation to augment economic status so as to secure economic  justice envisaged under the Preamble of the Constitution and the Directive Principles.      The question,  therefore, is  whether the alienation by the assignee  in favour  of the  appellant is  valid in law. Such  alienation  obviously  is  opposed  to  public  policy rendering the  sale void  under Section  23 of  the Contract Act. It  is seen that Rule 43(5) of the Revenue Code clearly prohibits alienation  of assigned  lands. The Division Bench of the  High Court  in  W.A.  No.807  of  1987  titled  Smt. Ammanamma v.  Venkataiah & Ors. had considered the effect of Rule 43(5)  and  held  that  once  relevant  rules  prohibit alienation of  the property  granted to  depressed class for all times  to come,  it cannot  be got  over by a grant made contrary to  the  statutory  rules.  Therefore,  prohibitory clause is  absolute in  its terms and that alone will govern the rights of the parties. We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court.      The  question   then  is   whether  the  appellant  has perfected his title by adverse possession. It is seen that a contention was raised before the Assistant Commissioner that the appellant  having remained  in possession  from 1968, he perfected his  title by  adverse possession. But the crucial facts  to   constitute  adverse  possession  have  not  been pleaded. Admittedly  the appellant came into possession by a derivative title  from the original grantee. It is seen that the original  grantee has  no right  to alienate  the  land. Therefore, having come into possession under colour of title from original  grantee, if  the appellant  intends to  plead adverse possession  as against  the State,  he must disclaim his title  and plead  his hostile  claim to the knowledge of the State  and that  the State  had  not  taken  any  action thereon  within   the  prescribed   period.   Thereby,   the appellant’s possession  would become  adverse. No such stand was taken  nor evidence has been adduced in this behalf. The counsel in  fairness, despite  his research,  is  unable  to bring to  our notice  any such plea having been taken by the appellant.      This Court  has held  that any alienation made contrary to the  Act and  the public  policy is  not valid.  In  that behalf, this Court had adverted in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment  as to  when adverse  possession of  purchasers arises against  the depressed  classes. In  this case we are not concerned  with the  situation as  it had arisen in that case. Under  those circumstances,  the  need  to  remit  the matter for reconsideration by the High Court does not arise.      The appeals  are  accordingly  dismissed.  But  in  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

circumstances, without costs.