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PETITIONER: R.C.SHARMA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/05/1976

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH RAY, A.N. (CJ) SINGH, JASWANT

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2037            1976 SCR  580  1976 SCC  (3) 574

ACT:      Service matter-Departmental  proceedings-When could  be declared null and void.      Procedure-Time  limit   in  delivering  judgment  after hearing arguments-If prescribed by C.P.C.

HEADNOTE:      After holding a departmental enquiry on certain charges of contravention  of Government Servants’ Conduct Rules, the appellant was  reduced in  rank. His  suit for a declaration that the  impugned  action  was  void  and  inoperative  was dismissed. The High Court dismissed his appeal.      On appeal,  it  was  contended  that  the  departmental enquiry was  vitiated on account of material irregularities, and that,  as a  result of excessive delay, between the date of hearing  and delivery  of judgment  by the High Court, it did not  deal with  a number  of submissions made by him and thereby caused prejudice.      Dismissing the appeal to this Court, ^      HELD: (1)(a)  The question  whether the  appellant  was given a  reasonable opportunity  to lead  evidence  and  was sufficiently heard  or hot is largely a question of fact. It is only  when an opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial  contravenes mandatory provision of law or a rule of  natural   justice  that   it  could  vitiate  the  whole departmental trial. Prejudice to the Government servant from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved.[583C]      (b) The  plea that  the appellant had been subjected to trial on  allegations which  had been  the subject-matter of previous enquiries  overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of  any previous enquiry. If an enquiry was held at a particular stage,  possibly  to  determine  whether  regular proceedings should  be drawn up or started, it did not debar a departmental trial. [583D]      State of  Assam &  Anr. v. J. N. Roy Biswas AIR 1975 SC 2277 and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, AIR 1937 PC 27, held inapplicable.      (c) It  was not  shown whether  any evidence  which the appellant tried  to produce  was really wrongly excluded and at what  stage and for what reasons. All these are questions

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of fact  which should  be raised  in the departmental trial. After that  if there  was any  patent error  a writ petition lay. [584A]      (d) A suit challenging a departmental proceeding cannot be  treated   as  an  appeal  from  the  findings  in  those proceedings or  against  a  punishment  inflicted  upon  the Government servant  even if these were erroneous. A question which could  affect the  result in a civil suit has to be of such a  nature that  it goes to the root of the jurisdiction that the  conduct of  the departmental  trial illegally  and vitiates  the   result.  It  is  only  if  the  departmental proceeding is  null and  void that  a plaintiff could obtain the reliefs he had asked for. [584E-F]      Smt. Ujjam  Bai v. State of U.P. & Anr. [1963] 1 S.C.R. 778 @ 835, 836, referred to.      (e) Unless  a point  could be  raised on  behalf of  an appellant which  is capable  of vitiating  the  departmental proceedings  there   could  be   no  declaration   that  the departmental proceedings were null and void. [585H] 581      (2) The  Civil Procedure  Code does  not provide a time limit for  the period  between the  hearing of arguments and the delivery  of a  judgment. Nevertheless,  an unreasonable delay between  the hearing  of  arguments  and  delivery  of judgment, unless  explained by  exceptional or extraordinary circumstances,  is  highly  undesirable  even  when  written arguments were  submitted. It  is  not  unlikely  that  some points which  the litigant  considered important  might have escaped  notice.   But,  what  is  more  important  is  that litigants must  have complete  confidence in  the results of litigation. This  confidence tends  to be  shaken  if  there excessive delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1155 of 1971.      (Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1969 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 178/61).      S. C.  Manchanda,  Sadhu  Singh,  R.  N.  Kapoor,  Mrs. Nirmala  Gupta,  Uzzal  Singh  and  J.  M.  Khanna  for  the appellant.      Gobind Das,  P. P.  Rao, Girish Chandra and S. P. Nayar for the respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BEG, J.  This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court given  by it  on 17th  November,  1969,  dismissing  a plaintiff’s first appeal arising out of an original suit for a declaration  that the  order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax,  Lucknow,  on  2nd  April,  1956,  reducing  the appellant in  rank from the post of an Income-tax Officer to that of  an Income-tax  Inspector, was void and inoperative. It appears that the appellant was in service upto 30th April 1958, when  he was  prematurely retired.  The appellant also claimed Rs.  20,904/-as arrears  of salary,  but he  reduced this claim to Rs. 16,561.29.      The appellant was originally appointed on 22nd November 1922, as  Lower Division Clerk, and, thereafter, promoted as Income-tax Inspector in 1942. He was promoted to the post of Income-tax Officer  in 1945. His case was that he had worked to  the   entire  satisfaction  of  his  immediate  superior

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officers and  higher authorities  and had earned a number of certificates  highly   appreciative  of  his  work.  He  was confirmed early  in 1952  as an  Income-tax Officer. He was, however, placed under suspension on 30th September, 1953, by the Commissioner  of Income-Tax, U.P., Lucknow, on the basis of a preliminary enquiry on allegations involving corruption and violation of service rules. 582 Charges were  framed on  30th December,  1953, by Shri A. K. Bose, Deputy  Director of  Investigations, who was appointed by the  Commissioner of Income-tax as the Inquiring Officer. The preliminary  enquiry had  been conducted  by Shri  G. S. Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Meerut.      That first  charge was  that the  appellant had entered into partnership with others, under the name of Gautam Cycle Mart, Meerut,  in 1939,  in contravention  of the Government Servants’ Conduct  Rules. The  second charge was that he had made various  investments in  the name of various members of his family  far in  excess of  and disproportionate  to  the known sources of his income. His high standard of living and expenditure were  also mentioned  there. The  third and  the last charge gave particulars of thirteen assessment cases in which the  appellant  was  alleged  to  be  either  "grossly negligent, careless,  inefficient,  and/or  corrupt  in  the performance of his duties as Income-tax Officer".      The  appellant’s  defences  included  alleged  confused nature of  charges characterized  by him  as  "vague,  over- lapping, intermingled"  and wrongly joined together. He also pleaded that  there had  been an enquiry in 1949, by Shri A. R. Sachdeva,  Asstt. Inspecting  Commissioner, into  some of the matters  mentioned in  the charges,  and about others in 1952  by   Shri  R.   N.  Srivastava,   another   Inspecting Commissioner, and  that the appellant had been exonerated of the allegations  and imputations  made against  him on  each occasion. One  of his defences was that a fresh enquiry into the same  charges was not permissible under the Departmental rules and  was also  barred by  rules of natural justice. He also complained  of  failure  to  give  him  opportunity  to produce nine witnesses in his defence with some documents.      It  is   evident  that  the  questions  raised  by  the appellant depended  on findings  of fact. All relevant facts had been examined by the officer who held the enquiry and by the punishing  authority. No  malafides against  either  the Inquiring  Officer,   Shri  A.   K.  Bose,  Deputy  Director Investigation,  or   against  the  punishing  authority  was alleged. There  are, however,  suggestions that  Shri G.  S. Srivastava and  Shri R.  N. Srivastava, Inspecting Assistant Commissioners, were  pursuing the appellant for some unknown reason which  we do not find stated anywhere. We fail to see how these  two officers,  who neither  conducted the  actual departmental trial  nor could  have any  influence over  the punishing authority,  could cause any miscarriage of justice or do  anything to  vitiate the  departmental  trial  merely because  they  held  preliminary  inquiries  before  framing charges. The  defence  of  the  appellant  seemed  something similar to  the much  too common a defence of the accused in criminal trials  attributing all  their misfortunes  to  the hostility of the police. 583      The  question   whether  the   appellant  was  given  a reasonable opportunity  to lead  evidence and to be heard or not is  largely a  question of  fact. It  is  only  when  an opportunity denied  is of  such a  nature  that  the  denial contravenes a  mandatory provision  of  law  or  a  rule  of

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natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial. Prejudice to the government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved.      The plea that the appellant has been subjected to trial on allegations which had been the subject matter of previous enquiries overlooks that no charge was framed as a result of any previous  enquiry. Therefore, the two authorities cited: The State  of Assam  & Anr.  v. J.  N. Roy Biswas, and R. T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State, do not help the appellant. If an  inquiry is  held, at  a particular stage, possibly to determine whether  regular proceedings should be drawn up or started, it  does not  debar a  departmental trial. That was the nature  of the previous enquiries. It appears that it is only  after  the  appellant’s  activities  had  become  more notorious that  further enquiry  was undertaken  and regular charges framed.  It is  possible that the appellant may have been emboldened by the failure of officers to report earlier that charges  should be  framed and tried. In any case, this could not  stand in  the way of the first regular enquiry in the course  of which  charges were actually framed and fully enquired into  by Officers  whose  integrity  and  sense  of justice is not challenged.      As for  the denial  of the  opportunity to produce nine witnesses in  defence, all  that is  suggested is that these witnesses could  only state  what opinions  they had  formed about the  work, efficiency, and integrity of the appellant. They could  not say  anything about the particular instances which formed  the subject  matter of the charges against the appellant. It  is not  uncommon for  astute Govt.  servants, facing such  enquiries, to  give long lists of witnesses and documents so  as to  either prolong an enquiry or to prepare grounds for  future  litigation.  Unless  the  exclusion  of evidence is  of a  kind which amounts to a denial of natural justice or  would have  affected the final decision it could not be material. In the case before us, it has not even been shown how  the witnesses  whose production  was said to have been disallowed  could help the appellant’s case on specific charges. Indeed,  we do  not know whether any evidence which the appellant  tried to  produce was really wrongly excluded and at  what stage  and for  what  reasons.  All  these  are questions of  fact which should be, initially, raised in the departmental trial.  After that,  if there  was  any  patent error a writ petition lay. Finally, the 584 trial Court and the High Court had considered at some length all relevant questions raised.      Learned Counsel  for the  appellant has  handed over  a very carefully  and laboriously  prepared statement of facts of the case to show us that the evidence did not support the charges  levelled   against  the   appellant.  It  was  also submitted  that,   apart  from   the  charges   relating  to partnership in  the Gautam  Cycle Mart,  no other charge was found substantiated.  Furthermore, it  was  submitted  that, after the  inquiring officer had found that the Gautam Cycle Mart was  started in  1942 and  not in  1939, the  appellant should have  been given  a further opportunity to meet a new case. No  rule was  cited in  support of  such  a  technical objection to  the nature of the charge which would cover the starting of  the Gautam Cycle Mart at any time subsequent to 1939 also.  In any case, it was for the appellant to satisfy the Departmental authorities, which had looked into the case upto its  final stages,  that he had suffered some injustice which  to   be  set  right.  He  had  been  given  a  second opportunity by  the punishing  authority before it inflicted the punishment  of demotion. Nothing further was required by

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law. And, it was probably because the appellant was absolved of charges  involving corruption  in the  discharge  of  his duties that  he was  given the lesser punishment of demotion and neither dismissed nor removed from service.      A  suit   challenging  the   validity  of  departmental proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal from the findings in the  departmental proceedings or the punishment inflicted upon the  Govt. servant  even  if  these  are  erroneous.  A question which  could effect  the result in a civil suit has to be  of such   nature  that it  goes to  the root  of  the jurisdiction and  the conduct  of the  department trial  and vitiates  the   result.  It  is  only  if  the  departmental proceeding in  null and void that a plaintiff in such a suit could obtain  the relief  he had asked. We are unable to see what point had been raised by the appellant which could have had that effect upon the departmental proceedings.      In Smt.  Ujjam Bai vs. State of & Anr., this Court said (at P. 835):           "A  tribunal   may  lack  jurisdiction  if  it  is      improperly constituted,  or  if  it  fails  to  observe      certain essential  preliminaries to the inquiry. But it      does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing its decision      upon an incorrect determination of any question that it      is empowered  or required  (i.e.) has  jurisdiction  to      determine". After citing  a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 11, page 59, this Court held (at p. 836): 585           The characteristic  attribute of a judicial act or      decision is  that it  binds, whether  it  be  right  or      wrong. An  error of law or fact committed by a judicial      or quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached      otherwise  than   on  appeal   unless   the   erroneous      determination  relates   to  a   mauer  on   which  the      jurisdiction of  that body  depends. These  princi ples      govern  not  onnly  the  findings  of  inferior  courts      stricto strictio  also the  findings of  administrative      bodies  which  are  deemed  be  acting  in  a  judicial      capacity. Such  bodies are deemed to have been invested      with  power   to  err   within  the   limits  of  their      jurisdiction; and  provided that they keep within those      limits, their  decisions  must  be  accepted  as  valid      unless set aside on appeal".      Learned Counsel  for the  appellant said all that could possibly be  said on  behalf of  his client.  He pointed out that the  High Court  had given  its judgment  eight  months after it  had heerad argumenst. He urged that the result was that  the   High  Court  did  not  deal  with  a  number  of submissions  made   because  they   had,  apparently,   been forgotten. The  Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for  the period  between the  hearing of arguments and the delivery  of a  judgment. Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of arguments and delivery of  a   judgment,  unless   explained  by   exceptional   or extraordinary circumstances, is highly undesirable even when written arguments  are submitted.  It is  not unlikely  that some points  which the  litigant considers importan may have escaped notice. But, what is more important is the litigants must have  complete confidence in the results of litigation. This confidence  tends to  be shaken  if there  is excessive delay  between   hearing  of   arguments  and   delivery  of judgments. Justice, as we have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done.      On 4th  March, 1971,  however, the  High Court refusing the certificate  of fitness  of the  case for appeal to this

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Court observed  that questions  had  been  attempted  to  be raised before  it in  asking for certification which had not been argued  at the  time when the first appeal was heard by the High  Court. We  find that one of the learned Judges who dismissed the  application for  a certificate  of fitness of the case  had also  heard the arguments in the first appeal. There is  no affidavit  before us that any particular points argued before the Division Bench had not been referred to or dealt with  by the  Bench. Moreover,  the Division Bench had probably not  dealt with  all arguments on questions of fact because it  did not  consider it  necessary to  do so. After all, it  was not  hearing an  appeal against the findings of the  departmental   authorities.  It   pointed   this   out. Furthermore, after  hearing the  arguments  of  the  learned Counsel for  the appellant,  we are  ourselves unable to see any point  which could  be raised on behalf of the appellant capable of  vitiating the  departmental proceedings.  Unless such a  point could be raised, there could be no declaration that the departmental proceedings were null and void.      There is  also an  application before us for revocation of grant  of special  leave to  appeal by  this Court on the ground that some material 586 facts were  suppressed or  misrepresented for the purpose of obtaining special leave. Although the special leave petition does not state that all the points sought to be raised by it were not  argued before  the Division  Bench,  this  is  not enough to  merit cancellation of the special leave to appeal which was  granted by  this Court.  At the  time of grant of special leave,  the order  refusing grant  of certificate of fitness of  the case for appeal to this Court must have been before this  Court. We  are unable  now to  see the point on which special leave was granted. But, that too would not, by itself, merit  a revocation  of special  leave at this stage after hearing arguments.      We,  therefore,   dismiss  both   the  appeal  and  the application for  revocation of  special leave.  Parties will bear their own costs. P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 587