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PETITIONER: R.C. PATUCK

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: FATIMA A. KINDASA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/05/1997

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: Present:              Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Majmudar              Hon’ble Mr. Justice Jagannadha Rao Soli J.  Sorabji and  J.G. Shah, Sr. Advs., M.D. Adkar, S.D. Singh, R.  Sathyanarayanan and  Manoj K.  Singh, Advs.  with them for the Petitioner Shivaji M. Jadhav, Adv. (NP) for the Respondent                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.      This special  leave petition  has  been  filed  by  the petitioner against  the Judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 9.7.1996  dismissing the  writ petition (criminal) No. 540/1996. The  High Court  refused to quash the order of the learned Chief  Metropolitan Magistrate.  4th Court,  Girgaum dated 26.4.1996.  The Learned  Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the  application of  the  petitioner  filed  under Section 145  of the Code as Criminal Procedure on the ground that even  as per the case of the petitioner, she was out of possession for a period more than two months before the date of the  preliminary order  of the magistrate dated 16.3.1993 passed under  Section 145(1).  The Court pointed cut that as per the  case  of  the  petitioner,  she  had  been  out  of possession from  November 1992 and, therefore, she could not take advantage  of the  proviso to sub-clause (4) of Section 145.  This   order  is  challenged  in  this  Special  leave petition.      The brief facts of the case are as follows:      The petitioner  is aged  75 years and is staying in one half of  a house  comprising 2500  sq. ft. in Malabar Hills. Bombay. She says that the first respondent approached her in November, 1991  for temporary  accommodation to stay for two or three  months Subsequently, the second respondent, who is said to  be the husband of the 1st respondent joined her and both of  them were  not willing  to vacate premises i.e. the 2500   Sq. ft. on  the ground floor of the house. Petitioner is in  possession of  the remaining  2500 sq.  ft. It is the specific case  of the  petitioner that in the second week of November, 1992  when the  petitioner was  out of Station for sometime, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 with the help of some

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other persons constructed a cement wall in the suit premises and divided  the ground  floor consisting of 5000 Sq ft into half and  half and  that this amounted of illegal occupation of 2500  Sq. ft.,  i.e. One  half of  the property,  by  the respondents Nos.  1 and 2. It is stated that on 21/22.2.1993 the  respondents   threatened  the   petitioner  with   dire consequences and,  therefore, petitioner gave a complaint to the Inspector  of  police,  Gamdevi,  Bombay  on  26.2.1993. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application under Section 145  of   the  Cr.P.C.   on  9.5.1993   before  the  learned Metropolitan  Magistrate,   14th  Court,   Girgaum   seeking restoration of  possession of  the of  2500 Sq.  ft. on  the ground floor.      The petitioner  also refers  to the  filing of  a civil suit  for   declaration  and  injunction,  namely,  RAD  No. 346/1992 by  the respondents  claiming tenancy rights on the basis of  alleged tenancy agreement and cheques on which the signatures of  the petitioner  were allegedly  forged. It is stated that  the Court granted an interim order initially in favour of  the  respondents  but  ultimately  the  same  was vacated and  the said  order was confirmed in appeal holding that there  was no  prima facie proof of tenancy. It is also stated that  in that  case the  documents relied upon by the second  respondent  were  held  to  be  prima  facie  forged documents. The  petitioner also  states that a complaint was made by  the petitioner against the respondents for cheating and a  case was  registered and  writ petition  bearing  No. 973/1993 dated  27.5.1992 was  filed by  the respondents for quashing the same.      It is  also stated  by the  petitioner that  respondent filed criminal  application No.  973/1993 on  27.7.1993  for quashing the  section 145  criminal proceedings  launched by the petitioner  but the said writ petition was dismissed. It appears that at the request launched proceedings against the respondents  under   the  Maharashtra  Vexatious  Litigation (Prevention) Act,  1971 and  the High Court of Bombay, after noticing that  the   respondents wore illegally and forcibly occupying several  premises  and  were  instituting  various proceedings,  came   to  the   conclusion  that   the   said proceedings started  by the  respondents were  vexatious and that  they   should  not  be  permitted  to  initiate  fresh proceedings,  except  with  the  sanction  cf  the  Advocate General.  It   is  also  stated  that  respondents  made  an application to  the Metropolitan  Magistrate for dropping of Section  145   proceedings  and  the  said  application  was rejected on  25.4.1995. Respondents  filed a revision before the Session  Court bearing  No. 189/1995,  and the  same was dismissed on 7.7.1995. It is said that the respondents filed writ petition  No. 1050/1995  challenging  the  order  dated 7.7.1995 and  25.4.1995 and  the same  was also dismissed by the High Court on 8.12.1995.      It was  at that  juncture that  the learned  Magistrate took  up   the  Section  145  proceedings  launched  by  the petitioner and dismissed the same on 26.4.1996 on the ground that the  petitioner even  as per  her own  case was  out of possession for more than two month before the passing of the preliminary order  dated 16.3.1993  under sub-clause  (1) of Section  145.   Against  the  order  of  the  learned  Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated 26.4.1996 the petitioner filed writ petition  bearing No. 540/1996 before the High Court of Bombay and  the same  was dismissed on 7.7.1996 holding that the petitioner  was not  in possession  for  more  than  two months before the date of passing of preliminary order under Section 145(1) on 16.3.1992. It is against this order of the High Court  dated 9.7.12996 that this special leave petition

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has been filed.      Notice was  issued to  the respondents  in the  special leave petition  and notice  was served  and at  one time Mr. S.M. Jadhav  appeared for  the  first  respondent.  Separate notice was  taken to the second respondent and was served on 9.9.1996. The matter was finally heard on 23.4.1997. Even on that day  Mr. S.M.  Jadhav, counsel for the first respondent did not  appear nor  was there  any representation  for  the second respondent.      Learned senior  counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, contended  that the  orders passed  by  the  Chief Metropolitan Magistrate  dated  26.4.1996  and  the  further orders passed  by the  High Court on 9.7.1996 were liable to be set  aside as  the possession  of the  respondents was  a continuing wrong.  He also  contended that  this was  a hard case in  which an  old lady  aged about  75 years  was being victimised by  the respondents  who were  in  the  habit  of illegally occupying  various premises  in Bombay and that in exercise of  the powers  of this  Court under Article 842 of the Constitution  of India. This Court could grant relief in spite of  the fact  that the  dispossession was  more than 2 months next  before  the  preliminary  order  under  Section 145(1).      So far  as the  first submission  of learned counsel is concerned, it  may be  stated that  as found  by the learned Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate in  his order dated 26.4.1996 there was  an earlier  complaint lodged  by  the  petitioner before the  concerned police  authorities at  Bombay wherein she admitted  that  the  first  respondent  was  in  illegal occupation even  from 17.3.1992. In any event the subsequent complaint  filed   by  the   petitioner  before  the  police authorities on  26.2.1993 showed  that the  respondents  had constructed a  temporary wall.  Even earlier  the petitioner had made  a complaint to the Bombay Municipal corporation on 12.11.1992  in   regard  to  the  same,  and  therefore  the dispossession, at  any rate, was there by 12.11.1992. it is, therefore, clear  that prima  facie the alleged unauthorised occupation or  construction of  the wall  was there  atleast from November, 1992. It is, therefor, clear that prima facie the alleged  unauthorised occupation  or construction of the wall was  there atleast from November, 1992. if not earlier. If that  be so,  the said occupation is clearly for a period in  excess   of  2  months  next  before  the  date  of  the preliminary order dated 16.31993 passed under Section 145(1) of the  Cr. P.C. In this connection it is necessary to refer to the  provisions of sub-clauses (1) to (4) of Section 145, Cr. P.C.      "145.   Procedure   where   dispute      concerning land  or water is likely      to  cause  breach  of  peace.-  (1)      Whenever an Executive Magistrate is      satisfied from a report of a police      officer or  upon other  information      that a  dispute likely  to cause  a      breach   of    the   peace   exists      concerning any land or water or the      boundaries  thereof,   within   his      local jurisdiction,  he shall  make      an order  in writing,  stating  the      grounds of  his being so satisfied.      and requiring the parties concerned      in such dispute to attend his Court      in  person  or  by  pleader,  on  a      specified date and time, and to put      in  written   statements  of  their

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    respective claims  as respects  the      fact of  actual possession  of  the      subject of dispute.      (2)  For   the  purposes   of  this      Section  the  expression  ‘land  or      water’ includes buildings, markets,      fisheries, crops  or other  produce      of land.  and the  rents or profits      of any such property.      (3) A  copy of  the order  shall be      served in  manner provided  by this      Code for  the service  of a summons      upon such  person or persons as the      Magistrate may direct. and at least      one  copy  shall  be  published  by      being affixed  to some  conspicuous      place at  or near  the  subject  of      dispute.      (4)  The   Magistrate  shall  then,      without reference  to the merits or      the claims of any of the parties to      a right  to possess  the subject of      dispute. peruse  the statements  so      put in,  hear the  parties. receive      all  such   evidence  as   may   be      produced by them, take such further      evidence,  if  any,  as  he  thinks      necessary, and, if possible, decide      whether  any   and  which   of  the      parties was,  at the  date  of  the      order made by him under Sub-section      (1), in  possession of  the subject      of dispute."      It will  be seen  from the  facts stated above that the order  under  Section  145(1)  was  passed  by  the  learned Magistrate  on   16.3.1993.  The  question  is  whether  the magistrate could  have passed  any order  in favour  of  the petitioner under  Sub-section (4)  of Section  145. Going by the main  sub-clause (4) of Section 145 it is clear that the Magistrate could  initially decide  who was in possession as on the  date when  the order under Section 145(1) was passed on 16.3.1993.  In cases  where the  proviso to the said sub- clause  (4)   applied,  that  is,  if  it  appeared  to  the Magistrate that  any party  had been forcibly end wrongfully dispossessed, within  two months  next before  the  date  on which the  report of  a police  officer or other information was received  by the  Magistrate, or  after  that  date  and before the  date of  his order  under sub-section  (1),  the Magistrate might  treat the  party so dispossessed as if the said party  had been  in possession on the date of his order under sub  section (1).  In other  words, if  the conditions mentioned in  the proviso to sub-section (4) were satisfied, the Magistrate  could deem a person to be in , possession as on  the   date  of   the  order   under  Section      145(1) notwithstanding  the   fact  that   he  was  not  infact  in possession on that date. but lost possession earlier, Within two months next before the order. In this case unfortunately there is  no material  to show  that any  report of a police office or  other information  was received by the Magistrate within the period  contemplated by the proviso. On the other hand, petitioner’s admissions show that she lost possession much before the period mentioned in the said proviso.      We are,  therefore, of  the view  that both the learned Chief Metropolitan  Magistrate and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that no order for restoration of

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possession could be passed in favour of the petitioner under Section 145  of the  Cr. P.C.  A contention  was then raised that as  the dispossession of the petitioner was continuing, and it  amounted to  a continuing  wrong and,  therefor, the proviso to sub-clause (4) must be deemed to be satisfied. We are afraid  that such  a contention  based on continuance of dispossession. cannot be accepted.      The next  question is  whether the  petitioner is to be granted relief in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 142  of the  Constitution of  India. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied upon the judgment of this Court in  Union Carbide Corporation vs. Union of India (1991 (4)  SCC  584)  for  submitting  that  the  prohibitions  or limitations contained  in ordinary  laws cannot, ipso facto, act as  prohibitions or  limitations on  the  constitutional powers of  this  Court  under  Article  142.  The  following passage in the said judgment was referred to :      "The power  under Article 142 is at      an entirely  different level and of      a different  quality.  Prohibitions      or   limitations    or   provisions      contained in  ordinary laws cannot,      ipso facto,  act as prohibitions or      limitations on  the  constitutional      powers  under   Article  142.  Such      Prohibitions or  limitations in the      statutes might  embody and  reflect      the scheme  of  a  particular  law.      taking into  account the nature and      status  of  the  authority  or  the      court  on   which   conferment   of      powers- limited in some appropriate      way   -    is   contemplated.   The      limitations  may   not  necessarily      reflect,  or   be  based   on   any      fundamental    considerations    of      public   policy.    Sri   Sorabjee,      learned Attorney General, referring      to Garg  case, said that limitation      on the  powers  under  Article  142      arising  from  "inconsistency  with      express  statutory   provisions  of      substantive law"  must really  mean      and be  understood as  some express      prohibition   contained    in   any      substantive   statutory   law.   He      suggested that  if  the  expression      ’prohibition’ is  read in  place of      ‘provision’  that   would   perhaps      convey the   appropriate  idea. But      we  think   that  such  prohibition      should also be shown to be based on      some  underlying   fundamental  and      general issues of public policy art      not   merely    incidental   to   a      particular  statutory   scheme   or      pattern. It  will again  be  wholly      incorrect to  say that powers under      Article 142  are subject   to  such      express   statutory   prohibitions.      That would  convey  the  idea  that      statutory   provisions  override  a      constitutional provisions. Perhaps,      the proper  way of  expressing  the      idea is that in exercising the idea

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    is that  in exercising powers under      Article 142  and in  assessing  the      needs of  "complete justice"  of  a      cause or  matter,  the  apex  Court      will  take   note  of  the  express      prohibitions  in   any  substantive      statutory provision  based on  some      fundamental  principles  of  public      policy and regulate the exercise of      its    power     and     discretion      accordingly. The  proposition  does      not relate  but only  to what is or      is not   ‘complete  justice’  of  a      cause or matter and in the ultimate      analysis of  the propriety  of  the      exercise of  the power. No question      of  lack   of  jurisdiction  or  of      nullity can arise."      Relying upon  the  aforesaid  passage,  learned  senior counsel contended  at the  limitation of  two months  in the proviso to  Sub-clause (4)  of Section 145 would not come in the way for this Court while exercising powers under Article 142 far  granting possession  to the  petitioner even though the dispossession  of the  petitioner was  for a  period  in excess of two months next before the date of the preliminary order passed  under Section  145 (1).  It will  be seen that even according  to the  petitioner. she  permitted the first respondent in December. 1991 temporarily occupy 2500 sq. ft. in the  ground floor of the promises. Subsequently the first respondent did  not vacate  and on  the other  hand, the 1st respondent allowed  the  second  respondent  to  occupy  the property claiming  that he  was her  husband and  thereafter they constructed  a wall  dividing the said portion from the other portion  occupied by the petitioner. On these facts we do not  find any  social circumstances  which are  different from ordinary  cases where  a person permits a licensee or a tenant to  occupy the  premises and  upon termination of the licensee or  the lease,  the licensee  or the tenant, as the case may  be, does  not vacate  the premises  or makes  some constriction on  the property. No doubt the petitioner is an old lady of 75 years and there is some material to show that the respondents  1 and  2 have  been  indulging  in  similar litigations in  Bombay. But  that  in  our  opinion  is  not sufficient to  pursuade us  to exercise powers under Article 142  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  The  petitioner  has adequate remedies  under the law for recovery of possession. For the  aforesaid reasons  this special  leave petition  is dismissed.