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PETITIONER: QUDRAT ULLAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MUNICIPAL BOARD, BARELLY

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/11/1973

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PALEKAR, D.G. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  396            1974 SCR  (2) 530  1974 SCC  (1) 202  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC1758  (27)  RF         1975 SC2299  (607)  R          1976 SC1860  (9)  RF         1988 SC 184  (10)  R          1988 SC1845  (11)  RF         1990 SC 678  (6,7,8)  R          1992 SC1239  (22)

ACT: U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,  1947- Whether contract was alease  or  licence or  a  composite one-Interpretation-Repeal and replacement of an earlier  Act by  a  later  Act-Whether  right  under  the  temporary  Act outlives the Act itself.

HEADNOTE: The appellant’s father had been collecting "tahbazari’  dues under a contract from the Municipal Board.  Under the  terms of the contract the contractor had the right of use of sheds and  shops as enjoyed by the Municipal Board  as  proprietor and the contractor was empowered to let them to  sub-tenants on  rent.  In addition, the contract granted  certain  other strips  which  were  the flanks of the  central  road  strip running  between the stalls.  In 1951, the  Municipal  Board filed  a suit against the contractor praying that the  Board be  put  in  absolute proprietary  possession  over  certain sheds,  passages  and  some shops on  the  ground  that  the contract was a licence. The contractor pleaded the status and protection of a tenant under  the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent & Eviction  Act (U.  P. Act 3 of 1947). The  trial  court dismissed the suit, having regard  to  the then  existing rent control law.  The High Court  held  that the  contract  was a combination of a lease and  licence,  a lease with respect to sheds and shops and licence as regards patois  or  footpaths adjoining the roads; that  a  pavement could  not be said to be "accommodation" as defined  in  the Rent  Control & Eviction Act and that the contractor  was  a mere  licensee  with  respect to the  pavements.   Both  the parties appealed to this Court.  Additional ground was urged by  the Board that the 1947 Act having been revealed by  the

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Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting,  Rent and  Eviction)  Act,  1972, the Board  was  entitled  to  an ejectment decree even if the contract was a lease. HELD  : (1) There is no simple litmus test to distinguish  a lease as defined in s. 105, Transfer of Property Act from  a licence  as  defined  in  s.  52,  Easements  Act,  but  the character  of the transaction turns on the operative  intent of  the  parties.   If an  interest  in  immovable  property entitling  the transferor to enjoyment is created, it  is  a lease; if permission to use land without right to  exclusive possession is alone granted, a licence is the legal  result. [533H] In the instant case, though the purpose of the  transactions was not to grant regular leases of land but to make over  to the  contractor the right to collect Municipal  market  dues only,  it  is  not possible to ignore the  effect  of  clear recitals  transferring to the contractor more rights than  a mere  licence implies.  The shops and sheds referred  to  in the  contract are the subject matter of a lease not  licence only.   The contract presupposes the application of the  Act which is compatible only with the creation of a lease. Associated Hotels case, [1959] S.C.R. 265, followed. (2)The  High  Court  was not right  in  holding  that  the agreement  was  a  mere licence as  regards  the  patris  or footpaths  adjoining the roads.  The earlier  contract  says that  "those in yellow colour shall remain in possession  of the  first  party".   Further the bazar  dues  constitute  a benefit  arising  out  of  the land  and  may  be  immovable property which can be leased out. [536H; 537E] Ramjiwan  v.  Hanoman  Parshad, I. L.  R.  16  Lucknow  191, referred to. (3)By definition ’accommodation’ includes gardens, grounds and outhouses, if any, appurtenant to such building or  part of a building.  While the pavements were appurtenant to  the shops  or  sheds leased, the paths and  walks  are  separate entities and not in fact or law attached to them.  These are no appendages, no adjuncts, no space so bound to the use  of the buildings as to be treated as belonging 531 to   them.   Since  the  patris  and  pavements   were   not appurtenances,   they   fell   outside   the   contours   of "accommodation"  let  out and constitute the  subject  of  a distinct,  though connected demise incorporated in the  same documents.   Every  nexus is not an appurtenance.   The  law connotes  principal and subsidiary items integrated  by  use which  is  absent in the present case.  Since  the  contract covers  one  of the leases which is protected  by  the  Act, ejectment  in respect of the unprotected lease must  follow. The  decree for eviction granted by the High  Court,  except for certain portions of the pavement, was correct. [538 A-C] (4)The  general  principle regarding  the  consequence  of repeal of a statute is that the enactment which is  repealed is  to  be  treated, except as  to  transactions  past   and closed, as if it had never existed.  The operation  of  this principle  is  subject  to any savings  which  may  be  made expresly  or  by implication by  tyhe  repealing  enact-past transactiopn  it is this provisioon that will determine  the liability  under  the repealed enactment survives or  it  is extinguished.   Section  6  of  the  Uttar  Pradesh  General Clauses  Act  applies generallly in the absence of  a  fresh saving provision in the repealing statute. Where a repeal is followed  fresh legislation on the object the Court  has  to look to the provisions of the new Act to see whether   they indicate a differentintention. Sec. 43 (2) (h) makes it clear that even if the power forrecovery of possession be

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one under the earlier Rent Control Law the later Act   will apply and necessary amendments in the pleadings can be made. This  in dicates that it is the later Act that  must  govern pending  proceedings for recovery of possession or  recovery or  fixation of rent.  In the instant case the suit was  not even one under the Act but proceeds on the footing that  the contractor  was only a licensee and so none of  the  savings clauses in s. 43 (2) applies. [539 B; 540 A-D] HariPadaPal  Ghosh v. Tofajaddi Ijardar, 601.  L. R.  [1933] Cal.  1438 and Boddington v. Wisson, [1951] 1 All E.R.  166; 169, referred to. The  nature of the 1947 Act being temporary the right  comes to an end when the temporary Act expires at least by  efflux of time, if not by premature repeal.  The so called right is short  lived and its longevity, where it is derived under  a temporary statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself. [541F] Even  if  it  was  assumed that s. 3 of  the  1947  Act  has conferred  a right on the tenant, the survival of the  right or the continuation of the operation of the Act to the  pro- ceedings  is  all  that is ensured,  not  the  expansion  or extension  of that right.  The dispossession of  the  tenant was  permissible only if the grounds in s. 2 were  satisfied by  landlord.   This right was circumscribed in  content  to conditions  set  out and limited in duration to  the  period beyond which the Act did not exit.To hold otherwise would be to  give more quantum of right to the party enjoyed had  the repeal  not  been made.  Not to affect the previous  not  be converted  into sanctioning subsequent operation.   To  read postpartum  operation  into  a  temporary  Act  because   of premature  repeal  of  it was wrong.  On  this  footing  the right, if any, that thee contractor claimed terminated  with the expiration of that temporary statute. [541 G-H] Thus  (a) the disability of the Municipal Board  to  enforce its  cause  of  action  under the  ordinary  law  might  not necessarily  be transmuted into a substantive right  in  the contractor  (b)  the rights of a  statutory  tenant  created under  a  temporary  statute  go to  the  extent  of  merely preventing  the  eviction so long as the  temporary  statute lasts   (c)  the  provisions  of  s.43  did  not   preserve, subsequent to repeal, any right to rebuff the Board’s  claim for  eviction and (d) s. 6 of the U.P. General  Clauses  Act did not justify anything larger or for any time longer  than s. 2 of the 1947 Act confers or lasts. [543 B_C] Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi  and others,  A.I.R.  1956 S. C., 77 at  84,  Lachmeshwar  Prasad Shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others, A. I. R. 1941 Federal Court Vol. 28, p. 5 at 6, State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar, A. I. R. 1962 S.C., 945, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.  1727-1728 of 1968. Appeal from the judgement and order dated the 29th September 1964 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 320  of 1955. 532 A.K. Sen, Yogesh war Prasad, R. C. Jaiswal, S. K.  Bagga, S. Bagga, for the appellant (in C.A. 1727/68) and respondent (in C.A. 1728/68). Sarjoo  Prasad  and C. P. Lal, for the respondent  (in  C.A. 1727/68) and appellant (in C.A. No. 1728/68). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-

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KRISHNA IYER, J.-This litigation, started in 1951, has lived long, although the main point on which the fate of the  case rests is the contraction of a contract between the Municipal Board, Bareilly (the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 1727  of 1968)  and the The kedar under it of the  Municipal  market, one Habibullah (the father of the appellant in Civil  Appeal No.  1727  of  1968).  The present appellant  is  the  legal representative  of  the defendant and has himself  filed  an appeal  (C.A. No. 1728 of 1968) where the Board is the  sole respondent.   Instant  or  early  justice  seems  impossible without radical reorientation and systematic changes in  the judicial process, as these two appeals, which have  survived two decades, sadly illustrate. Now,  a brief narration of the facts.  Although the  canvass has  been spread out, the relevant dispute lies in a  narrow compass, and can be resolved by a close look at the terms of Ex.   ’1’  (substantially  repeated  in  Ex.   ’4’)  and  by applying settled rules which tell off a lease from a licence when  the deed is ambiguous.  It is unfortunate  that  legal drafting  by  the  respondent’s  lawmen  has  left  the  key documents  in a blurred. state, so much so, the trial  Judge and  the  learned judges in appeal have had  to  diverge  in their  conclusions, and before us long arguments  have  been hopefully  addressed to help us designate the contract  with certitude a lease or license. The defendant (the appellant’s father) had for several years been   collecting  ’tahbazari’  dues  from  the  market   in Patelganj under contracts from the Municipal Board, the last of which, according to the plaintiff, was executed on 19-11- 44  (Ex.   "1").   The  defendant’s  case  is  that  on  the expiration  of the term of Ex.  ’1’, a fresh contract  dated 31-12-47,  Ex.  ’4’ was entered into  between  the  parties, substantially  repeating the same terms and conditions.   On the basis that Ex.  ’4’ had not materialised into a  binding contract  for  want of Government  approval,  the  plaintiff ineffectually demanded of the defendant, by notice Ex.   ’6’ of  1951,  to  desist from realising  the  market  dues  and followed it up with a suit praying for many reliefs of which the crucial one runs thus               "(a)  The  plaintiff may be  put  in  absolute               proprietary possession after dispossessing the               defendants over the sheds and passage shown in               green  and shops bearing Nos. 17 to 20 and  24               to 28 and 31 and 32 situate in Bazar Patelganj               known  as Cambellgunj Sabzimandi  Bareilly  as               shown in the map attached to the plaint." The  plaintiff  claims Ex.  ’1’ to be a  licence  which,  if correct,  undoubtedly entitles him to the relief  while  the defendant pleads the status and                  533 protection of a tenant under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent  and  Eviction  Act (U.P.  Act  of  1947)  (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  The decision of this case  largely depends  on  Ex.  ’1’ being a lease or a  licence.   We  are satisfied  from the evidence on record that the  finding  of the  Courts below that Ex.  ’4’ is binding on the  plaintiff is  sound  but  since the effect of both  the  documents  is fairly  the  same we may as well proceed to  interpret  them straightaway.  In this Court, however, an additional  ground has  been urged by the respondent that the Act  having  been repealed by the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting,  rent  and eviction).Act, 1972 (Act of  1972)  (for short,  called the later Act), the Board is entitled  to  an ejectment decree even if Exs.  ’1’ and ’4’ are leases. The  trial court held that Ex.  ’1’ and ’4’ were demises  of

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the Municipal market and dismissed the suit having regard to the  Rent  Control  Law then extant  which  did  not  exempt municipal  buildings from the operation thereof.   The  High Court expressed its view that               "On going through the entire document, we have               come  to  the  conclusion  that  Ex.  1  is  a               combination of a lease and a license.  It is a               lease  with  respect to the sheds  and  eleven               shops.   But the agreement was a mere  license               as regards the parties or footpaths  adjoining               the roads."               Holding  Ex.  ’1’ to be a composite deed,  the               learned  Judges declined ,the relief  relating               to  the  shops and sheds but put  a  different               construction  on  the  pavements  and   patois               included in the Ex.  ’1’ The court observed :-               "A   pavement   cannot  be  said  to   be   an               accommodation  as defined by section 2 of  the               Rent  Control  & Eviction Act.  We  have  held               that the defendant was merely a licensee  with               respect to the pavements.  So the requirements               of section 106 Transfer of Property Act do not               came  into  play as  regards  the  plaintiff’s               claim for ejectment from the patois.   Neither               the Rent Control and Eviction Act, nor section               106   Transfer  of  Property  Act  saves   the               defendant  as  regards plaintiff’s  claim  for               ejectment from the patris". Consequent modifications in the monetary part of the  decree were  also made, following upon a decree for  possession  to the limited extent of patris and pavements. Both sides have appealed but we have proceeded, for the sake of  convenience,  to  treat the  parties  as  appellant  and respondent  as  in  Civil Appeal, No.  1727  of  1968.   The primary bone of contention is the lease-licence  controversy but  even if we decide in favour of Ex.  ’1’ and ’4’,  being settings,  the  question  of the impact  of  the  later  Act remains to be decided. There  is  no simple litmus test to distinguish a  lease  as defined in s. 105 Transfer of Property Act from a licence as defined  in s. 52, Easements Act, but the character  of  the transaction  turns on the operative intent of  the  parties. To put it pithily, if an interest in immovable 534 property,   entitling  the  transferees  to  enjoyment,   is created,  it is a lease; if permission to use  land  without right to exclusive possession is alone granted, a licence is the  legal  result.   Marginal  variations  to  this   broad statement are possible and Ex.  ’1’ and ’4’ fall in the gray area  of  unclear recitals.  The law on the point  has  been stated by this Court in the Associated Hotels’ case(1).   In Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England, Volume  23,  the  distinctive flavor, the deceptive labels and the crucial  considerations in  a lease- versus licence situation have been  stated  and excepts  therefrom may serve as guidelines (see  pages  427, 428 and 429):               "  1022.  PRINCIPLES FOR  DETERMINING  WHETHER               AGREEMENT   CREATES  LEASE  OR  LICENCE.    In               determining   whether  an  agreement   creates               between   the  parties  the  relationship   of               landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser               and licensee the decisive consideration is the               intention  of the parties.  The parties to  an               agreement cannot, however, turn a lease into a

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             licence merely by stating that the document is               to  be  deemed a licence or describing  it  as               such   the  relationship  of  the  parties  is               determined  by law on a consideration  of  all               relevant provisions of the agreement; nor will               the employment of words appropriate to a lease               prevent   the  agreement  from  conferring   a               licence  only  if from the whole  document  it               appears that it was intended merely to  confer               a  licence.   In  the absence  of  any  formal               document the intention of the parties must  be               inferred   from  the  circumstances  and   the               conduct of the parties.               1023.   NATURE OF GRANT OF  EXCLUSIVE  POSSES-               SION.   The fact that the agreement  grants  a               right of exclusive possession is not in itself               conclusive  evidence  of the  existence  of  a               tenancy,  but  it is a  consideration  of  the               first importance.               In  deciding whether a grantee is entitled  to               exclusive possession regard must be had to the               substance of the agreement.  To give exclusive               possession there need not be express words  to               that effect; it is sufficient if the nature of               the  acts to be done by the  grantee  requires               that he should have exclusive possession.               The  grant of an exclusive right to a  benefit               can,  however, be inferred only from  language               which is clear and explicit.  If an  exclusive               right  of  possession is  subject  to  certain               reservations  or  to  a  restriction  of   the               purposes  for which the premises may be  used,               the  reservations  or  restriction  will   not               necessarily  prevent the grant operating as  a               lease.               1024.    WHEN   GRANT   CONFERRING   EXCLUSIVE               POSSESSION OPERATES MERELY AS LICENCE. A grant               which   confers   the   right   to   exclusive               possession  may  operate as a licence  in  the               following  circumstances  which  negative  the               intention to create a lease,               (1)   [1959] S.C.R. 265.               535               1025.    INSTANCES  OF   AGREEMENTS   CREATING               LICENCES’.   A  licence  is  normally  created               where  a  person is granted the right  to  use               premises   without   becoming   entitled    to               exclusive    possession   thereof,   or    the               circumstances and conduct of the parties  show               that  all  that  was  intended  was  that  the               grantee should be granted a personal privilege               with   no  interest  in  the  land.   If   the               agreement  is  merely  for  the  use  of   the               property in a certain way and on certain terms               while  the property remains in the  possession               and  control of the owner, the agreement  will               operate   as  a  licence,  even   though   the               agreement  may employ words appropriate  to  a               lease".               Not  so  much the law as the  figment  of  the               terms  of a deed into the, legal  could  makes               the  forensic essay none too easy.   Decisions               are legion to prove the relevant  propositions               we have indicated above,. but we do not  think               it  necessary  to  cite  them  all  except  to

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             mention  that apart from Mrs. Clubwala’s  case               (2) referred to by the High Court,. a few more               cases were also referred to at the Bar.               With  these factual-legal background,  we  may               formulate  the  points we are called  upon  to               decide,  ignoring minor matters which  do  not               deflect  the  ultimate issue one  way  or  the               other.               (1)   Is Ex ’1’ (or Ex, ’4’) a lease or only a               licence or a composite one ?               (2)   If lease, does it embrace a demise of an               ’accommodation" as defined in the Act, or more               ?  if it covers more than an  ’accommodation’,               is the portion of the deed dealing with  ’non-               accommodation’ severable so ;is to warrant  a.               decree for possession confined to that portion               ? Similarly,. if Ex.  ’1’ is in part a licence               as the High Court has held, what is the relief               the Court can grant to the plaintiff ?               (3)   If  Ex.   ’1’ is a lease  wholly  of  an               accommodation,   can  the,   plaintiff   claim               possession  based on the repeal of the Act  by               the later Act during the pendency of the  pre-               sent appeal ? Before proceeding to discuss these matters, it is proper  to state  that  the  maps  attached  to  Ex.1  and  Ex.  4  are integrated  into the deeds we may also indicate  that  legal attention  and  cartographic precision appear to  have  gone into  the preparation of the two the kanamas.  While  it  is fair to infer that the purpose of these transactions was not to  grant regular leases of land but to make over the  right to  collect municipal market dues only, even so, it  is  not possible to ignore the effect of clear recitals transferring more rights than a mere licence implies, to the the kadar. Clause 1 itself is tell-tale,clause 2 clinches and clause  4 virtually  designates the transaction relating to the  shops and sheds as letting.. They speak for themselves thus : (1)  [1964]  Madras  Law  Journal  Reports,  Supreme   Court Section, p. 83. 536               "During the entire period of Theka, the  first               party shall have all the rights and powers, as               per  conditions laid down in the auction  sale               and  agreement in respect of use of sheds  and               shops  as  enjoyed  by  the  second  party  as               proprietor   on   possession   of   the   said               property’.               "The first party shall have possession of  the               sheds  aforesaid detailed in the said map  and               11 shops aforesaid".               "In  all  the  eleven shops  included  in  the               Theka, I, the Thekadar , would be empowered to               let  them to the subtenants on rents  mutually               settled between us". All  these  provisions relate to the shops and  sheds  only. Shri Sarjoo Prasad, appearing for the respondent Board, drew our attention to the controls and regulations vested in  the Board.  These marginal restrictions cannot cancel the effect of the clauses already read which cannot be reconciled  with a  straightforward grant of a mere ’right to realise  market fees.   The municipal mind., if we may say so,  went  beyond the  area of prudence if a licence was the intent.   We  are satisfied  that  the  shops  and sheds  in  Ex.   1  and  as reconstructed by the time of Ex. 4 are the subject matter of a lease, not licence only.  It is not without  significance’

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that Ex. 4 presupposes, when making reference to the  expiry of the term, the application of the Act, which is compatible only with the creation of a lease. These  two deeds, however, cover other areas, and ’there  is the  rub’.  The thekanama relates to patris (sidewalks)  and footpaths.   Out of the totality of space mapped out in  the attached  plans  the municipal board excluded  2  categories from the transaction viz. the red and blue coloured portions i.e.  the roads, the meat market and the shop buildings  let out to others.  Ex.  1 expressly granted to the  appellant’s father  i.e. the first party in Ex. 1, the  yellow  portions which  were made up of two categories viz. shops and  sheds, and  strips  marked  4, 7, 8 :and 9 which  were  really  the flanks  of the red coloured central strips  running  between the  stalls.  It is clear that the width of  these  internal roads  was originally 9 feet but only a middle ribbon of  31 was  now  left  open for free passage, the belts  of  31  on either  side  marked yellow being converted into  Walks  and vending  sites.  One question on which there was  divergence of findings between the courts below was as to whether these yellow belts were leased out or only licensed for collection of Tahbazari.  The High Court argued :-               "Admittedly,  the public has right of  passage               over roads indicated in the map in red colour.               Footpaths  in  question  are  situate  between               shops  and  the public road.  It  is  unlikely               that  the agreement was intended to  interfere               with the right of the public to pass over  the               footpaths adjoining the road". and  concluded  that ’the agreement was a  mere  licence  as regards the patris or footpaths adjoining the roads’.  We do not  agree.  Maybe it was reasonable, having regard  to  the nature  of these yellow strips and their use, not  to  grant leases   thereof  Maybe  there  are   stricter   regulations regarding the rates of fees to be levied from vendors and 537 pedlars  using those spaces; maybe the municipal  board  had the  right  to  construct gates  or  chabutras  (i.e.  minor structures  which are a facility for the display of  wares); maybe it was not wise to part with possession over pavements and  paths.  But no legal bar to giving a lease,  imprudent- though  it  be, was pointed out to us.  We would  have  been reluctant, having regard to the social consequences, to read more  than  a licence into Ex.  1 and 4 but  for  compelling grounds  already referred to. The map or the deed  does  not make  any distinction as between yellow sheds and  shops  on the  one  hand and yellow partris on the other.   ’Those  in yellow  colour  shall remain in possession of  first  party’ says,.  Ex. 1. The very need for a recital that the thekadar will  have  no objection to the  municipality,  constructing chabutras  and iron gates implies the  former’s  possession, not  mere  use.   The  reference in the  map  to  the  green pavements  and roads 2 and 3 as ’land leased out but  public has  got  right of easement over it’ has  a  clear  ’demise’ impact over the extra space beyond the shops and sheds.   It may  be mentioned that there was a fire in the market  place which  gutted many structures.. On extensive  reconstruction some  yellow  strips  and the ’green’ roads  2  and  3  were obliterated and yet these reconstructed buildings were  made over to the contractor.  There are other features pressed by one side or, the other, but the over-all effect is that  the green and yellow portions outside the shops and buildings in Ex.   1  were also leased out.  The green areas  though  not expressly  specified in Ex.  1 or Ex. 4 are clearly  covered by the lease, for the reference at the foot of the map.  and

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the  circumstance that on reconstruction after the fire  the roads  Nos.  2 and 3 marked green were built upon  and  made over  to  the  thekedar are sufficient  to  hold  that  way. Internal,  connecting  walks within a market or  a  park  or entertainment complex cannot be equated with public  streets and highways but have a quasi-private touch although  vested in  a  public  body.  The bazar dues  constitute  a  benefit arising out of the land and may be immovable property  which can be leased out (vide s. 3 (26) General Clauses Act,  1897 and (Ram Jiwan.  v. Hanoman Pershad The  further  point  is whether the terms of Ex.   1  and  4 warrant  the-lease  of  the whole as too  integrated  to  be severable  or sufficiently individualised that we can  spell out  a  lease of the pavements and pathways  as  a  separate item.   If  these were possible the  next  consideration  is about  the  concept of ’accommodation, in the  Act  and  the liability  to eviction of the non-accommodation  segment  of the composite deed.  The  built-up  area  and the open spaces   are  dealt  with differently in regard to both the lessor’s control over  the lessee  and  the  latter’s,rights  vis-a-vis  the  temporary occupants.  Moreover, the two parts, are not so enmeshed  or inter-dependent  as to be treated as unun quid.   While  the ’green’  pavements  are appurtenant to the  shops  or  sheds leased, the paths and walks are separate entities and not in fact  or law attached to them.  These are no appendages,  no adjuncts,  no space so bound to the use of the buildings  as to be treated as belonging to them.  Such being the sense of appurtenance,  we have to examine whether. these open  areas are  part of the ’accommodation, let out to  the  defendant. By definition ’accommodation’ includes gardens, grounds (1)  I.L.R. 16 Lucknow 191. 538 and out-houses if any, appurtenant to such building or  part of  a  building.   Since we have held that  the  patris  and pavements marked yellow and not rebuilt upon by the time  of Ex. 4, are not appurtenances, they fall outside the contours of the ’accommodation’ let out and constitute the subject of a  distinct,  though connected, demise incorporated  in  the same  document  Ex. 1 (and Ex. 4).  Every nexus  is  not  an appurtenance.  The latter connotes principal and  subsidiary items  integrated  by  use,  absent  in  the  present  case. Holding,  as  we do, that the thekaname covers a  couple  of leases  as  it  were and further that only one  of  them  is protected   by  the  Act,  ejectment  in  respect   of   the unprotected  lease  must follow.  Even  on  the  defendant’s case, it expired in 1952 and obviously the suit for recovery having been instituted (earlier), there was no holding over. The  result is that though on a different basis  the  decree for eviction granted by the High Court, except for the green coloured pavements, is correct. Now comes the additional ground taken before us based on the passage of the later Act.  It is admitted that, by  frequent amendments,  the duration of the Act was extended from  time to time till at last it was to expire on September 30, 1972. Some  time  before  this date the  later  Act,  a  permanent statute, was put on the Statute Book which by s. 43 repealed the  Act of 1947 and by s. 2 excluded from the scope of  the protection  of  the  Act accommodation  belonging  to  local bodies.  It is useful to extract ss. 2 and 43 at this  stage :               "2’  Exemptions  from  operation  of  Act.-(1)               Nothing in this Act shall apply to-               (a)   any  building belonging to or vested  in               the  State  Government or  the  Government  of

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             India or any local authority; or                 *        *         *         *         *               "43. Repeal   and  savings.-(1)  The   United               Provinces  (Temporary)  Control  of  Rent  and               Eviction  Act,  1947 (U.  P. Act  No.  III  of               1947) is hereby repealed.               (2 ) Notwithstanding such repeal-                *         *         *         *         * We havein this case a temporary Act which would have died a natural death by the end of September, 1972 but before its life  had  run out was extinguished by statutory  repeal  on 22nd July, 1972 on which date the later Act came into force. Surely, there has been a repeal of the Act which was  relied upon   successfully   by  the  defendant   and   his   legal representative  the  appellant, throughout  the  litigation. But  now that defence or protection is no longer  available. However, counsel for the appellant contends that a right has accrued  to him under the Act which cannot be taken away  by its   repeal  since  the  later  Act  is  not  in  terms   a retrospective one.  Actually, it is correct to say that,  s. 43  has not been made retrospective.  Even so,  the  counsel for  the respondent submits that, on the repeal of the  Act, the  disability which his clients suffered  has  disappeared and  he  is  entitled  to  enforce  his  cause  of   action. According  to him, the, Act did not confer any right on  the tenant but imposed a disability on the landlord in enforcing his  right  to  evict  and that a  mere  defence  cannot  be described 539 as a right in the defendant.  According to him, the  ’right’ referred  to under s. 6 of the General Clauses Act or s.  43 of  the  repealing  Act is a substantive  right  and  not  a defensive plea.  We have to examine these rival positions in some detail. Certain propositions are clear regarding the consequence  of repeal  of  a  statute.  The general principle  is  that  an enactment  which is repealed is to be treated, except as  to transactions  Past and closed, as if it had  never  existed. However,  the operation of this principle is subject to  any savings  which may be made, expressly or by implication’  by the  repealing enactment (vide Halsbury’s Laws  of  England, Vol. 36 paragraph 714).  The U. P. General Clauses Act  (Act 1  of 1904) provides for the consequences of a repeal  under s. 6, the relevant parts of which may be reproduced here :               "6.   EFFECT  OF  REPEAL.-Where   any   (Uttar               Pradesh)  Act repeals any  enactment  hitherto               made or thereafter to be made, then, unless  a               different intention appears, the repeal  shall               not-               (b)  affect  the  previous  operation  of  any               enactment so repealed or anything duly done or               suffered thereunder; or                (c)  affect any right, privilege,  obligation               or  liability  acquired, accrued  or  incurred               under any enactment so repealed; or               (e)   affect any remedy, or any  investigation               or  legal  proceeding  commenced  before   the               repealing  Act shall have come into  operation               in  respect  of any   such  right,  privilege,               obligation, liability; penalty,     forfeiture               or punishment as aforesaid:               and  any such remedy may been forced  and  any               such in investigation or legal proceeding  may               be  continued  and  concluded,  and  any  such               penalty,  forfeiture or punishment imposed  as

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             if the repealing Act had not been passed."               If  a  contrary  intention  appears  from  the               repealing  statute,  that  prevails.   It  was               pointed  out to us that s. 2 of the later  Act               specifically states that :               "Nothing in this Act shall apply to-               (a)  any  building  belonging  to  or   vested               in............ any local authority." Even  so, we have to read this provision in conformity  with s. 43 which repealed the Act viz.  U. P. Act No. 3 of  1947. Section  43(2)  is  the savings clause.   If  the  repealing enactment,  as  in  this case,  makes  a  special  provision regarding pending or past transactions it is this  provision that will determine whether the liability arising under  the repealed  enactment survives or is extinguished. (See I.  L. R. 1955 Cuttack, 529, I. L. R. 1963 (1) Kerala, 402 and A.I. R. 1960 Cal.,388).  Section  6  of the General  Clauses  Act applies generally in the 540 absence  of  a  special saving provision  in  the  repealing statute, for when there is one then a different intention is indicated.   In  any case where a repeal is  followed  by  a fresh  legislation on the subject, the Court has to look  to the provisions of the new Act to see whether they indicate a different intention. Section 43 (2) (h) states that notwithstanding the repeal of the  earlier  Act any Court before which any suit  or  other proceeding  relating to the............. eviction  from  any building  is pending immediately before the commencement  of this  Act may, on an application being made to it within  60 days  from  such commencement, grant leave to any  party  to amend  its pleadings in consequence of the pro-. visions  of this Act." It is, therefore, clear that even if the  statute for  recovery  of possession be one under the  earlier  Rent Control   Law  the  later  Act  will  apply  and   necessary amendments  in the pleadings can be made.   This  definitely indicates that it is the later Act that must govern  pending proceedings  for  recovery  of  possession  or  recovery  or fixation  of  rent.   However, the suit with  which  we  are concerned is not even one under the Act, but proceeds on the footing that the defendant is only a licensee.  So much  so, none  of  the  savings clauses in s. 43  (2)  applies.   The result is that the application of the old Act is repelled by the  general rule that on repeal a statute is deemed not  to have been on the Statute Book at all. Let us assume that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act  applies. Even so, what is preserved is (a) the previous operation  of the repealed enactment, (b) rights, privileges,  obligations and  liabilities  acquired, accrued or  incurred  under  the enactment repealed and (c) investigations, legal proceedings and  remedies  in  respect of  any  such  right,  privilege, obligation  or liability.  According to Shri  Sarjoo  Prasad for the respondent, the defendant had no right or  privilege under  the  repealed Act, since s. 3 is  only  a  procedural restriction  and does not create a substantive  right.   All that s. 3 therein laid down was that :-               "No suit shall, without the permission of  the               District  Magistrate,  be filed in  any  civil               Court against a tenant for his, eviction  from               any accommodation except on one or more of the               following grounds........................" it  is  more  a procedural disability that is  cast,  not  a substantive  cause  of action that is created.   Citing  the authority in Haripada Pal Ghosh v. Tofajaddi Ijardar (1), he argued that by operation of the repeal,. the restriction  on

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his  right is removed and so he can now support his  present action even if previously the Act had barred it.  It is true that a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case cited,  dealing  with  a situation where  an  Act  had  been repealed by another, observed:--               "The  disability,  which was  imposed  by  the               previous  law having been removed,  there  was               nothing   that  stood  in  the  way   of   the               plaintiffs  recovering  rent at  the  contract               rate, when               (1)   60 I.L.R. [1933] Cal. 1438.               541               the  cause of action for the same arose.   The               effect  of substitution of the new section  48               for the old section 48 by section 31 of Act IV               of   1928,  was  that  the  old  section   was               repealed.   The effect of repeal of a  statute               in  the absence of saving clauses is  that  it               has  to  be considered as if the  statute,  so               repealed, had never existed." There is force in this submission.  A  ruling which lends more support to the position we  take may  be  referred to here.  Boddington v. Wisson  (1)  dealt with  a case where the landlord of a holding served  on  the tenant  a notice to quit without the consent in  writing  of the  Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, as  required  by Regulation  62  (4A) of the Defence  (General)  Regulations, 1939.   Before  the period of notice  expired,  the  Defence Regulations  Order,  1948 revoked  the  earlier  regulation. Dealing  with s. 38 of the Interpretation Act,  1889,  which corresponds to S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, Evershed, M. R. disposed of the contention of the tenant that the  repeal would  not affect anything duly done under  another  statute thus :               "......  nor  do  I think  that  the  tenant’s               protection  under  the  regulation  could   be               fairly  described in the words of  sub-s.  (2)               (c)  as  a  "right" or  "privilege",  or  the.               limitation  of the landlord’s right be  fairly               described  as an "obligation" or  "liability",               nor  do  I  think that it is a  penalty  or  a               punishment  in  respect of an  offence  within               para (d)." The  Court eventually concluded that the notice to quit  was valid  since  the  regulation  requiring  consent  had  been revoked and the landlord was entitled to possession. Moreover, the nature of the Act being temporary, the  right, if  we  can attribute that quality to a  disability  of  the other  party to enforce his right unless additional  grounds were  made  out,  comes to an end  when  the  temporary  Act expires  at  least by efflux of time, if  not  by  premature repeal.    The  so-called  right  is  short-lived  and   its longevity,  where it is derived under a  temporary  statute, cannot exceed the duration of the statute itself. Let  us assume for argument’s sake that s. 3 of the Act  has conferred a right on the tenant in which case it survives by virtue  of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act.  What follows  ? The  survival  of  the  right or  the  continuation  of  the operation  of  the  Act to the proceedings is  all  that  is ensured, not the expansion or extension of that right.   For the normal life of the Act i.e. till September 30, 1972, the dispossession  of  the  tenant is permissible  only  if  the grounds  in s. 2 are satisfied by the landlord.  This  right is  circumscribed  in  content to  conditions  set  out  and limited in duration to the period beyond which the Act  does

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not exist.  To hold otherwise would be to give more  quantum of  right  to the party than he would have enjoyed  had  the repeal not been made.  Not to affect the previous  operation cannot  be converted into sanctioning subsequent  operation. To read postmortem operation (1)  [1951] 1 All E.R. 166; 169. 602 Sup CI/74 542 into  a temporary.  Act because of a premature repeal of  it is  wrong.  To adopt the words Jagannadhadas, J.  in  Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi and  others (1) has observed :-               "What  in  effect,  learned  counsel  for  the               appellant  contends for is not  the  "previous               operation of the repealed law" but the "future               operation of the Previous law."               On  this footing the right, if any,  that  the               defendant    claims   terminates   with    the               expiration of that temporary statute.               The  only  further question is whether  it  is               permissible for this Court to take note of the               extinguishment  of  the statutory  tenancy  at               this  stage and grant relief to the  appellant               accordingly.  The leading case of  Lachmeshwar               Prasad  Shukul  and  others  v.  Keshwar   Lal               Chaudhuri and others (2) lays down the law  on               the point.  Gwyer, C. J., quoted with approval               the following observations of Hughes, C.J.               "We have frequently held that in the  exercise               of  our appellate jurisdiction we  have  power               not  only  to correct error  in  the  judgment               under  review but to make such disposition  of               the   case  as  justice  requires.    And   in               determining  what  justice does  require,  the               Court is bound to consider any change,  either               in fact or in law, which has supervened  since               the judgment was entered." Justice  Varadachariar, J. in the same case stated  that  in this  country the Courts have recognised an appeal to be  in the  nature of a rehearing and that "in moulding the  relief to  be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of  appeal  is entitled  to take into account even facts and  events  which have come into existence after the decree appealed against." This  appellate obligation is almost jurisdictional.   In  a sense,  the multi-decked mechanism of the legal process,  at every tier, is the handmaid, not the mistress of justice. We  may mention as an additional reason for  our  conclusion that  the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses  Act  in relation to the effect of repeal do not ordinarily apply  to a temporary Act.  Stating this proposition,  Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was, indicated the consequence of repeal of a temporary  Act.  In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar  (3), the learned Judge continued               "As  observed by Patanjali Sastri, J.,  as  he               then  was, in S. Krishnan v. State of  Madras,               1951 SCR 621 (AIR 1951 SC 301),  the   general               rule in regard to a temporary statute is that               in  the  absence of special provision  to  the               contrary,  proceedings which are  being  taken               against  a  person under it  will  ipso  facto               terminate  as  soon as  the  statute  expires.               That  is  why the Legislature  can  and  often               does,  avoid such an anomalous consequence  by               enacting  in  the temporary statute  a  saving               provision, the effect of which is in some res-

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             pects  similar to that of s. 6 of the  General               Clauses Act. (1)A.I.R.1956 C.Vol 43,77at84. (2)  A.I.R. 1941 Federal Court Vol. 28, p. 5 at 6. (3)  A.I.R. 1962 S.C. Vol. 49, 945. 543 The  U. P. Act , 1947, however, expressly attracts s.  6  of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1 of 1904 (vide s. 1 (4))  and that  is  why  we  have discussed  the  position  even  with reference to the Genera ’ Clauses Act. From what we have stated above, it follows that the argument of  any vested right in the defendant being taken away  does not  hold  good;  nor  is  there  any  foundation  for   the contention   that   the   later   Act   is   being   applied retrospectively.  All that we hold is (a) that a  disability of  the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action  under  the ordinary  law  may  not necessarily  be  transmuted  into  a substantive  right  in the defendant, (b) that rights  of  a statutory  tenant created under a temporary statute,  as  in this  case,  go  to  the extent  of  merely  preventing  the eviction  so long as the temporary statute lasts,  (c)  that the  provisions  of  s. 43 do not  preserve,  subsequent  to repeal,  any  right  to rebuff the  plaintiff’s  claim  for, eviction  and (d) that S. 6 of the General Clauses Act  does not justify anything longer or for any time longer than s. 2 of the Act confers or lasts.  It-is appropriate for a  Court to  do  justice  between parties to the  litigation  and  in moulding   the  relief  in  the  light  of  the   subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes.  A  court of  justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and  not leave  the door ajar for parties to litigate again.  In  the present  case,  it  is not seriously disputed  that  if  the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today,  the Rent  Control Law does not stand in the way.  Therefore,  it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and  ending litigation which has seen two decades  pass,  to conclude  it  here by taking cognizance  and  adjusting  the relief  in  the  light of the later Act and  repeal  of  the earlier Act.  Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P Public  Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised  Occupants)  Act, 1972.  This statute ’which provides for summary eviction  of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of  a  tenant.  The far-fetched submission  has  hardly  any substance and we reject it. In  the result, C.A. 1727 of 1968 is dismissed and C.A.  No. 1728  of  1968 is allowed.  It falls to be observed  that  a public body statutorily charged with running a public market should  have  been party to an ambiguous deed  resulting  in waste   of  public  money  in  long-lived   litigation   Had sufficient care been bestowed at the formative stages of the transaction,  these  could have been averted.   We  are  not satisfied that the defendant is solely to blame for the suit and  appeals  and therefore, direct that parties  will  bear their costs throughout. P.B. R.      C. A. 1727168dismissed.              C.     A. 1728168 allowed. 544