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PETITIONER: PUSHPA DEVI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, NEW DELHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/08/1977

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 2230            1978 SCR  (1) 329  1977 SCC  (4) 184

ACT: Doctrine  of  blending under the Hindu Law-Whether  a  Hindu female who is a member of an undivided family can impress an absolute  self-acquired property with a character  of  joint family property-Doctrine of blending, explained.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant, a member of the joint Hindu family,  in  her individual capacity and with the aid of her personal  assets entered  into  a partnership with her father-in-law  in  the name and style of "Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co." Her  minor son, Ravi Narain Khanna was admitted to the benefits of that partnership.  The partnership firm owned two cinema  houses- Nishat  Talkies,  Kanpur and Novelty Talkies,  Lucknow.   On August 31, 1961, a sum of Rs. 67,284.57 stood to the  credit of  the appellant in the books of Nishat Talkies  being  her individual  share  of  the income  from  that  Talkies.   On September  1, 1961, the appellant made a  sworn  declaration stating  that  she was the sole and absolute  owner  of  the amounts  standing  to  her credit in  the  books  of  Nishat Talkies  and  of her share in that  business  and  declaring unequivocally  her intention to treat both the  capital  and her  share  in the business of Nishat Talkies as  the  joint family  property of the Hindu undivided family of which  she Was  a  member.   By  clause (6)  of  the  declaration,  the appellant  stated  that  she  had  abandoned  for  ever  her separate interest and ownership over the capital  investment of Rs. 67,284.57, her one-third share in the net profits and 1/3rd  share  in the net losses in the  business  of  Nishat Talkies in favour of the joint Hindu family to be solely and exclusively  enjoyed by it.  As such, in her tax return  for the   assessment  year  1963764  for  which   the   previous accounting year ended on August 31, 1962, she omitted a  sum of  Rs.  20,865/- being 1/3rd share of the income  from  the business  of Nishat Talkies for the year in question on  the ground that the said sum was credited to the account of  the joint  Hindu  family  in the books of the firm  as  per  the declaration dated September 1, 1961 and the Hindu  undivided family  has also paid advance tax on the said  amount.   The Income  Tax  Officer in his assessment order held  that  the individual  share  of the income is exigible  to  tax  since throwing the capital amount into the family stock was of  no

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avail as the sine qua non of the matter was that "the  Karta should  become  partner in consequence of investment’  "  On appeal,  the Appellate Assistant Commissioner  affirmed  the order of the I.T.O. and held (i) the appellant, not being  a copartner,  it was not open to her to impress  her  personal property with a character of joint family property; and (ii) as  the  joint  family  did not  possess  any  joint  family property  there  was  no joint family  stock  in  which  the appellant  could  throw  her  separate  property.   But,  in further   appeal,  the  Appellate  Tribunal   accepted   the appellant’s   contention   and  held  that  there   was   no justification  for discriminating against a Hindu female  on the  ground of sex and that there was no reason why a  Hindu female who was a member of an undivided family could not  by an unequivocal expression of intention impress her  separate property  with  the character of joint family  property,  so long  as she was not trying to enlarge her rights under  the Hindu  law  or  to  improve her status  under  that  law  by abandoning   her  exclusive  right  in   the   self-acquired property.   On a reference, the Delhi High  Court  disagreed with the Tribunal and answered the question in favour of the Revenue  on the ground that the right of blending  could  be exercised  only  by a coparcener and  since  the  appellant, though a member of the joint family was not a coparcener she could  not  throw her separate property  into  joint  family stock.  ’The High Court, however, rejected the contention of the Revenue that since the joint family did not possess  any property  no  member  thereof  could  blend  hi-,   separate property   with  joint  family  property.   In   appeal   by certificate  granted by the High Court under s. 261  of  the Income  Tax  Act. 1961, by a judgment  dated  September  24, 1976,   this   Court  directed  the  Tribunal  to   send   a supplementary statement in the case on the question "Whether there  was a gift of the appellant’s capital investment  and her share in the business of Nishat 330 Talkies  in favour of the Hindu undivided family?"  Pursuant to the directions of this Court, the Tribunal further  found by  its order dated 31st January 1977 that there was a  gift by  the  appellant in favour of joint family  and  that  the latter had accepted that gift. Allowing the appeal partly, the Court, HELD  : (1) The true rule of blending is that the  right  to blend is limited to coparceners only.  It is the  coparcener who alone can blend his separate property with joint  family property and the said right is not available to a female who though  a  member  of  joint family  is  not  a  coparcener. Whether  that  separate property is  the  female’s  absolute property or whether she has a limited state in that property would make no difference to that position. 1335A, E-F] Mallesappa Bandappa Desai and Ors. v. Desai Mallappa & Ors., 1961 (3) SCR 779. applied. Lakkireddi  Chinna  Venkata Reddi v.  Lakkireddy  Lakshmamma (1964)  2 S.CR. 172; Rajjani Kanta Pal & Ors. v. Jaga  Mohan Pal  50  I.A.  173 and Commissioner of Gift  tax,  Delhi  v. Munshi Lal 85 I.T.R. 129, held not applicable. Goll  Eswariah  v.  Commissioner of  Gift-tax  76  ITR  675, referred to. Shiva  Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari Debi 59 I.A.  331, distinguished. (2)  The theory of blending under the Hindu Law involves the process  of  a  wider sharing of  one’s  own  properties  by permitting  the members of one’s joint family the  privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But,  while  introducing.  new sharers  in  one’s  exclusive

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property  one  does not by the process  of  blending  efface oneself  by  renouncing  one’s own  interest  in  favour  of others.   To blend is to share along with others and not  to surrender  one’s  interest  in  favour  of  others  to   the exclusion of oneself.  If a Hindu female who is a member  of an   undivided  family  impresses  her  absolute   exclusive property  with the character of joint family  property,  she creates new the     exclusion of herself because not being a to   demand a share in the joint family  She has  no   right for  survivorship and is of the joint family property.   Her right  to  property is contingent, inter alia, on a  husband and his sons.  Under s. 3 (2) and claimants to her  property to  coparcener  she has no right property by  asking  for  a partition. entitled only to be maintained out demand a share in the joint family partition taking place between her (3)  of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, her right  to demand  a  partition  in the joint family  property  of  the Mitakshara joint family accrued on the death of her husband. Thus, the expression ’blending’ is inapposite in the case of a  Hindu  female who puts her separate property, be  it  her absolute  property  or limited estate, in the  joint  family stock.               (3)   In the instant case :               (i)   the  income of Rs. 21,544/- from  Nishat               Talkies  was not assessable in the hands of  a               Hindu   undivided   family   on   the    basis               that  the  appellant had blended it  with  the               joint family property;               (ii)  the  appellant  must be deemed  to  have               made  a  gift of the items  mentioned  in  her               declaration  dt.   September 1,  1961  to  the               undivided  family of which she was  a  member.               The income of the property gifted to the Hindu               undivided family will be liable to be  brought               to tax in accordance with law.               (iii) The  High Court is not quite correct  in               the  unqualified statement it has made in  its               order granting certificate to the appellant to               appeal to this Court that this question is res               integra. [333F, 337A-D, F-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1738  of 1971. From the Judgment and Order dated the) 18th January 1971  of the Delhi High Court in Income Tax Reference No. 19 of 1970. 331 M.   B. Lal for the Appellant. B.   B. Ahuja and Girish Chandra for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD,  J. Two questions arise for  consideration  ’in this appeal one of them being subsidiary to the other.   The main  question is whether a Hindu female who is a member  of an  undivided  family can blend her separate  property  with joint family property. The  appellant,  Pushpa Devi is a member of  a  joint  Hindu family consisting of herself, her husband, her  father-in- law,  her mother-in-law, her minor son and three  daughters. On  June 19, 1958 the appellant, in her individual  capacity and  with  the  aid of her personal assets  entered  into  a partners* with her father-in-law, Gur Narain Khanna, in  the name  and style of Gur Narain Jagat Narain & Co.  Her  minor son,  Ravi  Narain Khanna, was admitted to the  benefits  of

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that  partnership.   Each of the three partners had  a  one- third  share  in the profits of the partnership,  while  the appellant  and her father-in-law had an equal share  in  the losses. The firm owned two cinema houses: Nishat Talkies, Kanpur and Novelty Talkies, Lucknow.  Separate accounts were maintained in  respect  of the two businesses and separate  profit  and loss accounts used to be drawn up.  On August 31, 1961 a sum of Rs. 67,284.57 stood to the credit of the appellant in the books of Nisliat Talkies.  That amount consisted of a sum of Rs.  16,666.67 in the capital account and Rs.  50,617.90  in the current account. On September 1, 1961 the appellant made a sworn  declaration stating  that  she was the sole and absolute  owner  of  the amounts  standing  to  her credit in  the  books  of  Nishat Talkies  and  of her share in that  business  and  declaring unequivocally  her intention to treat both her  capital  and her  share  in the business of Nishat Talkies as  the  joint family property of tile Hindu undivided family of which  she was  a  member.   By  clause (6)  of  the  declaration,  the appellant  stated  that  she  had  abandoned  for  ever  her separate interest and ownership over the capital  investment of Rs. 67,284.57, her one-third share in the net profits and one-half  share in the net losses in the business of  Nishat Talkies,  in favour of the joint Hindu family to  be  wholly and exclusively enjoyed and possessed by it. We  are  concerned in this appeal with the  assessment  year 196364,  for  which the previous accounting  year  ended  on August 31, 1962.    A  sum  of Rs. 20,865,  being  one-third share of the income from the  business  of  Nishat   Talkies for, the year in question, was credited to  the  account  of the joint Hindu family in the- books of the firm.      That income  would  have originally fallen to the  share  of  the appellant  in  the business of Nishat Talkies,  but  it  was credited  to  the  account  of the  joint  Hindu  family  in consequence  of  the declaration made by  the  appellant  on September 1, 1961.  The Hindu undivided family paid  advance tax on the amount and filed its return in respect 332 of that income.     The  appellant, on the other, hand,  did not include that income in her     return for the year.  She appended  a note at the end of the return saying: "Share  of income from Nishat Talkies,   Kanpur Rs. 20,865/-.Please see note on back page of computation    of        assessable income."In the note on the back page of the return,  the appellant referredto the declaration of September 1,  1961 and stated that her one-third share in the income of  Nishat Talkies was assessable in, the hands of the Hindu  undivided family  since the income had ceased to be hers by reason  of the declaration. The Income-tax Officer rejected the appellant’s  contention, on  the  ,ground that throwing the capital amount  into  the family  stock was of on avail as the "sine qua non"  of  the matter  was  that  "the Karta should  become  a  partner  in consequence   of  investment".   The  Appellate,   Assistant Commissioner affirmed the order of the I.T.O. on the, ground that  since  the  appellant, though a member  of  the  joint family,  was not) a coparcener, it was not open, to  her  to impress  her, personal property with the character of  joint family property.  The second ground on which the appellant’s claim  was rejected by the A.A.C. was that the joint  family did  not possess any joint family property  and,  therefore, there was no joint family stock in which the appellant could throw her separate property. In  a  further  appeal, the  Income-tax  Appellate  Tribunal

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accepted the appellant’s contention, holding that there  was no justification for )discriminating against Hindu female on the  ground of sex and that there was no reason why a  Hindu female  who  was a member of an are undivided  family  could not, by an unequivocal expression of intention, impress  her separate  property  with  the  character  of  joint   family property. The Tribunal observed that the appellant was, not trying to enlargeher  rights under the Hindu law  or to improve her status under thatlaw  by  abandoning  her, exclusive right in her self-acquired property. Surrender of interest by a female was not, according to the  Tribunal, foreign  to  the  genius of Hindu  law  and,  therefore,  no restriction  could be placed on a female’s fight to  abandon her exclusive interest in favour of the join family of which she was a member. At  the instance of the revenue, the Tribunal  referred  for the opinion of the Delhi High Court the following question :               Wheher  on the facts and in the  circumstances               of  the cases, the tribunal rightly held  that               the   income   of  Rs.  21,544/was   not   the               individual income of the appellant but was the               income of the Hindu undivided family of  which               she was a member., Disagreeing with, the Tribunal, the High Court answered  the question  in  favour of the revenue on the ground  that  the right  of blending could be exercised only by  a  coparcener and since the appellant, though a member of the joint family was  not  a coparcener, she, could’ not throw  her  separate property  into  the  joint family stock.   The  High  Court, however,  rejected the contention of the revenue that  since the 333 joint family did not possess any property, no member thereof could   blend  his  separate  property  with  joint   family property. The  High Court has granted to the appellant  a  certificate under  section 261 of the, Income-tax Act, 1961 to file,  an appeal to. this Court on the ground that the case involves a substantial  question  of law as to the right  of  a  female member of a joint Hindu family to impress her  self-acquired property with the character of joint Hindu family  property. The question, according to the High Court, is res integra. Thisappeal  had  come up for hearing before  a  three-Judge Bench earlierwhen  it was felt that the question  referred by  the  Tribunal  for the opinion of  the  High  Court  was comprehensive enough to cover the point.               Whether  there was a gift of  the  appellant’s               capital  investment  and  her  share  in  the,               business  of Nishat Talkies in favour  of  the               Hindu undivided family. By a judgment dated September 24, 1976 Khanna J., on  behalf of the Rench, directed the Tribunal to send a  supplementary statement of the case on that question.  In  pursuance of the direction, the Tribunal has  forwarded to  this Court a supplementary statement of the  case  along with  its finding on ,the question which it was directed  to consider.  By its order dated January 31, 1977 the  Tribunal has taken the view that there was a gift by the appellant in favour of the joint family and that the latter had  accepted that gift. We  are  thus  required to consider two  questions  in  this appeal one relating to the right of a Hindu female, who is a member of an undivided family, to impress her absolute self- acquired  property  with  the  character  of  joint   family property and the other as to whether, if ,there has been  no

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such  blending,  the  transaction in the  instant  case  can amount to a gift in favour of the undivided family.  We will proceed  to  a gift in favour of the undivided  family.   We will proceed to examine the first questions The  High  Court  is not quite correct  in  the  unqualified statement it has made in its order granting a certificate to the appellant to appeal to this Court that this question  is res intera.  The question, in our opinion, is fairly, if not fully,  covered  by a considered judgment of this  Court  in Mallesappa  Bandappa  Desai  & Ors. v.  Desai  Mallesappa  & Ors.(1). The appellants therein brought a suit against their uncle and another for partition of joint family  properties, their  case  being  that they and  respondent  1  were  each entitled  to  a half share hi those properties.   The  trial court passed a decree in favour of the appellants, except in regard to certain items.  That decree was challenged by res- pondent  1 in the Madrus High Court, one of his  contentions being that in any case, the appellants were not entitled to a share in the properties at Jonnagri, items 4 to 61.   This contention was accepted by ’the High Court which modified to that extent the decree of the trial court. (1)  [1961] 3 S.C.R. 779. 334 In  an appeal filed in this Court by certificate granted  by the High Court, one of the main contentions raised on behalf of the appellants, was that the Jonnagiri properties were as much properties of the joint family as the other items  and, therefore, the High Court had fallen into error in  refusing to  grant to the appellants a share in those  properties.The Jonnagiri properties belonged originally to one Karnam Chan- nappa, on whose death the properties’ devolved on his  widow Bassamma.   Bassamma died in 1920, leaving behind her  three daughters,  one  of whom was Channamma.   Channamma  married Ramappa,  Aid the couple gave birth to four sons,  including the appellants’ father Bandappa and respondent 1,  Mallappa. It was common ground between the parties that the  Jonnagiri properties were obtained by Channamma by succession from her father and were held by her as a. limited owner.   Channamma was a member of the joint family consisting of herself,  her husband,  their sons and others.  The appellants’  case  was that  after the Jonnagiri properties had devolved  on  Chan- namma  by succession, she allowed the said properties to  be thrown  into  the  common  stock  of  the  other  properties belonging to the joint family and that, by virtue of such  a blending,  the Jon properties of Channamma had acquired  the character of joint family property. Gajendragadkar  J.,  who  spoke  for  the  Court  began   an examination  of  the appellants’ contention  by  posing  the fundamental question whether the doctrine of blending can be invoked  in  such  a case.  After  stating  that  the  Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rani Prayag Kumari  Debi(1) was in error in observing that the doctrine of blending  was based on the text of Yagnavaikya (Ch.1, Sect. 4, pl.30)  and the  commentary  made on it by  Vijnyaneshwara  (Mitakshara, ch.1,  sect. 4, pl.31), the learned Judge observed  that  it was unnecessary to investigate whether any other text can be treated as the foundation of the doctrine of blending  since the doctrine, as evolved by Judicial decisions, had received a wide recognition and had become a part of Hindu law.   The Court  then  proceeded to examine the question  whether  the principle of blending applied in regard to property held  by a Hindu female as a limited owner and answered that question in the negative. It  is  undoubtedly true, as contended  by  the  appellant’s learned counsel, that the question which the Court posed for

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its  consideration  at  page 785 of  the  report  speaks  of properties  held by a Hindu female as a limited owner.   But the   question  was  framed  in  that  manner  because   the properties which had developed on Channamma on her  father’s death  were  held by her as a limited owner and not  as  her absolute  properties.   The ultimate decision of  the  Court that   the  Jonnagiri  properties  which  had  devolved   on Channamma  could  not be treated as the  properties  of  the joint   family  is  not  based  upon  or  governed  by   the consideration  that  she  had  a  limited  estate  in  those properties.  The decision of the Court, as Gajendragadkar J. has stated at more than one place in the Judgment is :               "The  rule  of  blending  postulates  that   a               coparcener   who   is   interested   in    the               coparcenary property and who owns sep-               (1)59 I.A. 331.               335               arate  property of his own may  by  deliberate               and  intentional  conduct treat  his  separate               property  as forming part of  the  coparcenary               property.  If it appears that- property  which               is  separately acquired has been  deliberately               and  voluntarily thrown by the owner into  the               joint  stock  with  the  clear  intention   of               abandoning his claim on the said property  and               with  the  object of assimilating  it  to  the               joint  family property then the said  property               becomes a part of the joint family estate;  in               other  words,  the  separate  property  of   a               coparcener  loses  its separate  character  by               reason of the owner’s conduct and gets  thrown               into  the common stock of which it  becomes  a               part.   This  doctrine  therefore   inevitably               postulates  that  the owner  of  the  separate               property  is a coparcener who has an  interest               in  the coparcenary property and  desires  to-               blend   his   separate   property   with   the               coparcenary property." (pp.785786). After stating the position thus, the Court again adverts  to the  fact that Channamma held the Jonnagiri properties as  a limited owner, but having done so, it restates the  position that a Hindu female, not being a coparcener has no  interest in  the coparcenary property and cannot blend  her  property with the joint family property.  The frequent reference  in the  judgment  in  Mallesappa  (supra)  to  the  fact   that Channamma held a limited estate and the further reference by the  Court  to the Hindu law principle that a  Hindu  female owning  a  limited  estate cannot circumvent  the  rules  of surrender  and allow the members of her husband’s family  to treat  her  limited  estate  as part  of  the  joint  family property belonging to the family is apt to confuse the  true issue, but we have no doubt that the judgment rests squarely and principally on the consideration that Channamma was  not a  coparcener.   While. concluding the  discussion  on  this topic,  the,  Court  observed  at page  787  that  on  first principles, the result which was canvassed by the appellants was  inconsistent both with "the basic notion  of  blending" and with "the basic character of a limited owner’s title  to the  property held by her".  The "basic notion of  blending’ which  the  Court has highlighted at several places  in  its judgment  is that it is the coparcener who alone  can  blend his  separate property with joint family property  and  that the  said right is not available to a female who,  though  a member  of  the joint family, is not a coparcener.   We  are clear  that  Mallesappa  (supra) is  an  authority  for  the

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proposition  that  a Hindu female, not being  a  coparcener, cannot  blend  her  separate  property  with  joint   family property.   Whether that separate property is  the  female’s absolute  property  or whether she has a limited  estate  in that property would make no difference to that position.  We may  mention  that Mallesappa (supra) is quoted  in  Mulla’s Hindu  Law  (14th  Ed.  p. 277)  as  an  authority  for  the proposition that the doctrine of blending cannot be  applied to  the  case of a Hindu female who has  acquired  immovable property from her father, for she is not a coparcener. The  Judgment  of this Court in  Lakkireddi  Chinna  Venkata Reddi v.  Lakkireddy Lakshmama,(1) that of the Privy Council in Rajani (1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 172. 33 6 Kanta Pal & Ors. v. Joga Mohan Pal(1) and of the Delhi  High Court in Commissioner of Gift-tax, Delhi v. Munshi Lal (2  ) do  not deal with the question whether a Hindu  female,  not being  a  coparcener, can blend her separate  property  with joint  family property.  The statement of law in  Lakkireddi (supra)  that  property,  separate or  self-acquired,  of  a member  of  joint  Hindu family may be  impressed  with  the character  of  joint family property if  it  is  voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein is to be understood in  the  context  that property devised  under  a  will  was alleged in the case to have been impressed with the  charac- ter  of  joint family property, by the male members  of  the family. In Rajani Kanta Pal (supra) also, the blending   was alleged to have been done by a male member of a joint family and the real controversy was whether the Mitakshara rule  of blending applied in the case of brothers living together and forming  a joint family governed by the Dayabhaga school  of law.   The Privy Council held that the rule of blending  ex- tended  to Dayabhaga families also.  In the case decided  by the Delhi High Court in Munshi Lal, (supra) it is true  that one  of  the  assessees  was a  female  member  of  a  Hindu undivided  family  and  the  contention  was  that  she  had impressed her separate property with the character of  joint family property.  It is, however clear from the judgment  of the High Court that the question whether a female member  of a  joint  Hindu  family can blend her  property  with  joint family  property was not urged or considered in  that  case. The  capacity  or competency to blend was assumed  both  as, regards the male and the female assessee who were members of joint  Hindu  family.  It was on that  assumption  that  the question  was  referred to the High Court  for  its  opinion under  section 26(1) of the Gift-tax Act, 1958  whether  the act  of throwing the self-acquired property into the  common hotchpotch  amounted  to a gift as defined in  the  Gift-tax Act.  Following the decision of this Court in Goli  Eswariah v. Commissioner of Gift-tax, ( 3) the Delhi High Court  held that  the  transaction  did  not  amount  to  a  gift   and, therefore, the gift-tax was not attracted.  Thus, in none of these three cases cited by the appellant, was the competency of  incorporation  of separate property  with  joint  family property in issue. The  decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh  v. Rani  Prayag Kumari Debi (supra) is also not to  the  point. It  was  held therein that unless the power is  excluded  by statute  or  custom, the holder of  a  customary  impartable estate,  by a declaration of his intention, can  incorporate with  the estate his self-acquired immovable  property,  and thereupon  the  property accrues to the estate  and  is  im- pressed  with  all its incidents, including  the  custom  of

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descent by primogeniture.  The appellant argues that if  the holder  of  an  impartable estate  can  blend  his  separate property  with the estate of an impartible estate, there  is no  reason why a Hindu female should not have the  right  to blend her separate property with joint family property.  The analogy  is misconceived because the true rule of  blending, as  we have explained above, is that the right to  blend  is limited to coparceners. (1)  50 I.A. 173. (2)  85 I.T.R. 129. (3)  76 I.T.R. 675. 337 Having considered the decisions cited at the bar, it may  be useful  to  have a fresh look at the doctrine  of  blending. The  theory  of blending under the Hindu  law  involves  the process  of  a  wider sharing of  one’s  own  properties  by permitting  the members of one’s joint family the  privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But  while introducing new sharers in one’s  exclusive  pro- perty,  one  does  not by the  process  of  blending  efface oneself  by  renouncing  one’s own  interest  in  favour  of others.   To blend is to share along with others and not  to surrender  one’s  interest  in  favour  of  others  to   the exclusion of oneself.  If a Hindu female, who is a member of an undivided family, impresses her absolute, exclusive  pro- perty  with  the  character of joint  family  property,  she creates  new claimants to her property to the  exclusion  of herself because not being a coparcener, she has no right  to demand a share in the joint family property by asking for  a partition.  She has no right of survivorship and is entitled only to be maintained out of the joint family property.  Her right  to  demand a share in the joint  family  property  is contingent,  inter alia, on partition taking  place  between her husband and his sons (see Mulla’s Hindu Law, 14th Ed. p. 403,  para 315).  Under section 3 (2) and (3) of  the  Hindu Women’s  Rights to Property Act, 1937 her right to demand  a partition  in  the joint family property of  the  Mitakshara joint  family. accrued on the death of her  husband.   Thus, the  expression  ’blending’ is inapposite in the case  of  a Hindu  female  who  puts her separate property,  be  it  her absolute  property  or limited estate, in the  joint  family stock. It  is  well  settled that a Hindu  coparcenary  is  a  much narrower  body  than the joint family and it  includes  only those persons who acquire by birth an interest in _the joint or  coparcenary property.  These are the  three  generations next  to  the holder in unbroken male descent  (see  Mulla’s Hindu  Law,  14th  Ed. p. 262, para 213).   A  Hindu  female therefore is not a coparcener.  Even the right to reunite is limited  under the Hindu law to males (Mulla, p.  430,  para 342).    It   does  not  therefore  militate   against   the fundamental  notions governing a Hindu joint family that  a female member of the joint family cannot blend her  separate property, even if she is an absolute owner thereof, with the joint family property. In  our  opinion, therefore, the income of Rs.  21,544  from Nishat Talkies was not assessable in the hands of the  Hindu undivided family on the basis that the appellant had blended it with the joint family property. As  regards  the  second question on which  this  Court  had called  for a supplementary statement, there is  no  serious controversy that by the declaration dated September 1,  1961 the  appellant  must be deemed to have made a  gift  of  the items mentioned therein to the undivided family of which she was  a member.  The Tribunal’s finding to that effect  must,

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therefore, be confirmed.  The income of the property  gifted to  the Hindu undivided family will be liable to be  brought to tax consistently with this finding and in accordance with law. In  the  result,  the appeal fails in regard  to  the  first question  but will succeed in regard to the  second.   There will be no order as to costs. S.R.                         Appeal allowed in part. 338