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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2164 of 2007

PETITIONER: Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board & Anr

RESPONDENT: Ram Sajivan & Anr

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/04/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2164 /2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 22185 of 2005) With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2165/2007 @ S.L.P.(C)No.22950 of 2005                                                               S.B. Sinha, J.

    Leave granted.

     These  two  appeals by special leave involving  common

question  of law and fact were taken up for hearing together

and are being disposed of by a common judgment.  Respondents

herein  were  employed on work charge  basis.   One  of  the

workman  was  transferred.   Respondents were  opposing  the

said  order of transfer.   They allegedly assaulted  one  of

their  senior officers as the said order of transfer despite

protests was not cancelled.   A First Information Report was

lodged.   Their services were terminated on 8.8.1994.   They

were found guilty in the criminal case and were convicted by

the  learned Trial Judge by an order dated 29.4.2000.   They

preferred  an appeal thereagainst.   However, an  industrial

dispute   was   raised  questioning  the   said   order   of

termination.   The said dispute was referred to  the  Labour

Court  for  adjudication  by the State  Government.   By  an

Award, re-instatement of the respondents was directed by the

said  Court  with  continuity of service  but  without  back

wages.    A  Writ  Petition preferred  thereagainst  by  the

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appellant was dismissed by the High Court by an Order  dated

22.11.2000,  whereupon the respondent joined  his  services.

In  the meanwhile, an appeal preferred by the respondent was

also  dismissed by an Order dated 17.4.2001 by the appellate

court.    A  show cause notice was issued as  to  why  their

services should not be terminated in view of the judgment of

conviction  having  been  upheld by the  learned  Additional

District   Judge.    Respondents  filed  their  show   cause

whereafter  an  order  terminating  their  services  on  the

charges  of  misconduct  was  passed  on  6.8.2001.   On   a

revisional  application filed by the respondents,  the  High

Court  by  a  Judgment dated 24.8.2001 directed them  to  be

released on probation.

     A  Writ Petition filed by the respondents was disposed

of  directing  the petitioner to decide the  representations

made  by  them  within two months.   Pursuant  to  the  said

Order,  a  representation was filed which was rejected.    A

writ  petition  was again filed questioning the  said  order

which by reason of the impugned judgment has been allowed by

the High Court.

     Mr. Vijay Kaushal, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of  the appellant raised short contention in support of this

appeal  viz. that  High Court committed a manifest error  in

passing the impugned judgment, insofar as it failed to  take

into  consideration that the respondents being guilty  of  a

serious misconduct, could not have been directed to  be  re-

instated  in  services only because they  were  let  off  on

probation.   Strong reliance in this behalf has been  placed

on  Union  of  India and Others v Bakshi Ram [(1990)  2  SCC

426].

     Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf

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of  the  respondent, on the other hand, submitted that  this

Court  should  not  exercise its discretionary  jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution of India having regard

to  the passage of time and particularly in view of the fact

that  no  disciplinary proceeding was initiated against  the

delinquent employees.

     The  learned counsel relying on the decision  of  this

Court  in The Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway

and Another v. T.R. Chellappan etc. [(1976) 3 SCC 190] urged

that  services of  an employee cannot be terminated  without

initiating   any  departmental  proceedings.   The   learned

counsel  argued that in any event  the appellant having  not

questioned the Award of the Labour Court, was bound to  give

effect thereto.

     This  Court  in  various decisions has considered  the

application of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act,

1958;  the purpose whereof not marring the offender\022s normal

life  by  removing him from the natural surrounding  of  his

house.

     See  Arvind  Mohan Sinha v. Amulya  Kumar  Biswas  and

Others  [(1974)  4  SCC 222] and Hansa v.  State  of  Punjab

[(1977) 3 SCC 575].

     We  are,  however,  not called  upon  to  determine  a

question  as  to whether the High Court was correct  in  its

judgment giving benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to

the  respondents.  The question, however, remain as to  what

would be the consequences therefor.

     It  may be true that, in absence of any statutory rule

operating  in the field, the services of an employee  cannot

be terminated only because he was found guilty of commission

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of  any  offence irrespective of the fact whether  the  same

involved any moral turpitude on his part, but it would be  a

different  thing  to  say  that  an  order  made  under  the

provisions  of  the  probation of offenders  Act,  would  by

itself  be sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that despite

commission  of a grave act of indiscipline, no  disciplinary

proceeding should be initiated.

      In  Bakshi  Ram  (supra),  considering  the  fact  of

applicability of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act

and  referring to the decision of  this Court in  Chellappan

(supra), it was held;

       \02310.  In criminal trial the conviction  is         one  thing  and sentence is  another.  The         departmental punishment for misconduct  is         yet  a third one. The court while invoking         the  provisions of Section 3 or 4  of  the         Act does not deal with the conviction;  it         only  deals  with the sentence  which  the         offender   has  to  undergo.  Instead   of         sentencing   the   offender,   the   court         releases   him   on  probation   of   good         conduct.  The conviction however,  remains         untouched and the stigma of conviction  is         not   obliterated.  In  the   departmental         proceedings   the  delinquent   could   be         dismissed  or removed or reduced  in  rank         on  the ground of conduct which has led to         his  conviction on a criminal charge  [See         Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution  and         Tulsiram Patel case2].         11.   Section  12  of  the  Act  does  not         preclude   the  department   from   taking         action  for  misconduct  leading  to   the         offence  or  to his conviction thereon  as         per  law. The section was not intended  to         exonerate  the  person  from  departmental         punishment.  The question of reinstatement         into service from which he was removed  in         view   of   his   conviction   does    not         therefore, arise. That seems obvious  from         the  terminology of Section  12.  On  this         aspect,  the High Courts speaks  with  one         voice.      It was further observed;

       \02313.     Section 12 is thus clear  and  it         only  directs that the offender shall  not         suffer    disqualification,    if     any,         attaching  to a conviction of  an  offence         under  such  law. Such law in the  context         is     other     law     providing     for         disqualification     on     account     of

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       conviction.  For  instance,   if   a   law         provides for disqualification of a  person         for  being appointed in any office or  for         seeking election to any authority or  body         in    view   of   his   conviction,   that         disqualification by virtue of  Section  12         stands  removed.  That in  effect  is  the         scope  and  effect of Section  12  of  the         Act.  But  that is not the same  thing  to         state   that  the  person  who  has   been         dismissed  from  service in  view  of  his         conviction  is  entitled to  reinstatement         upon  getting the benefit of probation  of         good conduct. Apparently, such a view  has         no  support by the terms of Section 12 and         the   order  of  the  High  Court  cannot,         therefore, be sustained.\024

     In  Chellappan  (supra) whereupon  Mr.  Nidhesh  Gupta

placed strong reliance, proceeded on the basis that the term

\023consider\024   and  \023determine\024  would  carry  with   it   the

principles  of  natural  justice vis-‘-vis.  application  of

Section 12.

       \02313.  It was, however, suggested that  Rule         14(i)   of  the  Rules  of  1968   is   the         provision      which      contains      the         disqualification  by  dispensing  with  the         departmental  inquiries contemplated  under         Rules  9  to  13  of the said  Rules.  This         cannot be the position, because as we  have         already  said  Rule 14(i) only incorporates         the  principle  of proviso (a)  to  Article         311(2).  If Section 12 of the Probation  of         Offenders  Act  completely  wiped  out  the         disqualification   contained   in   Article         311(2)  proviso  (a)  then  it  would  have         become  ultra vires as it would  have  come         into  direct  conflict with the  provisions         of  the  proviso (a) to Article 311(2).  In         our  opinion, however, Section  12  of  the         Act  refers  to only such disqualifications         as   are   expressly  mentioned  in   other         statutes  regarding holding of  offices  or         standing  for  elections and  so  on.  This         matter  was considered by a number of  High         Courts   and   there  is  a  consensus   of         judicial   opinion  on  this   point   that         Section  12 of the Act is not an  automatic         disqualification    attached     to     the         conviction itself.         ***                                     ***         ***         21. We now come to the third point that  is         involved  in this case, namely, the  extent         and  ambit of the last part of Rule  14  of         the  Rules  of 1968. The concerned  portion         runs thus:         ...    the   disciplinary   authority   may         consider the circumstances of the case  and         make such orders thereon as it deems fit.

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       In  this connection it was contended by the         learned  counsel  for the  appellants  that         this provision does not contemplate a full-         dress or a fresh inquiry after hearing  the         accused  but only requires the disciplinary         authority  to  impose  a  suitable  penalty         once  it  is  proved  that  the  delinquent         employee  has been convicted on a  criminal         charge.  The Rajasthan High Court in  Civil         Writ  Petition  No. 352 of 1971  concerning         Civil  Appeal No. 891 of 1975 has  given  a         very  wide connotation to the word consider         as  appearing in Rule 14 and has held  that         the   word  consider  is  wide  enough   to         require the disciplinary authority to  hold         a  detailed determination of the matter. We         feel  that we are not in a position  to  go         to   the   extreme  limit  to   which   the         Rajasthan  High  Court has gone.  The  word         consider     has     been      used      in         contradistinction to the word  \023determine\024.         The   rule-making  authority   deliberately         used   the   word   \023consider\024   and    not         \023determine\024  because the  word  \023determine\024         has   a   much   wider  scope.   The   word         \023consider\024   merely  connotes  that   there         should  be active application of  the  mind         by   the   disciplinary   authority   after         considering  the  entire  circumstances  of         the  case in order to decide the nature and         extent of the penalty to be imposed on  the         delinquent employee on his conviction on  a         criminal   charge.  This  matter   can   be         objectively   determined   only   if    the         delinquent employee is heard and  is  given         a   chance   to   satisfy   the   authority         regarding  the  final orders  that  may  be         passed  by  the  said authority.  In  other         words,   the   term  \023consider\024  postulates         consideration of all the aspects, the  pros         and  cons  of the matter after hearing  the         aggrieved person. Such an inquiry would  be         a   summary  inquiry  to  be  held  by  the         disciplinary  authority after  hearing  the         delinquent  employee.  It  is  not  at  all         necessary  for  the disciplinary  authority         to   order  a  fresh  departmental  inquiry         which  is dispensed with under Rule  14  of         the  Rules  of 1968 which incorporates  the         principle   contained  in  Article   311(2)         proviso  (a). This provision confers  power         on  the  disciplinary authority  to  decide         whether  in the facts and circumstances  of         a  particular case what penalty, if at all,         should   be   imposed  on  the   delinquent         employee.   It   is   obvious    that    in         considering  this  matter the  disciplinary         authority  will have to take  into  account         the   entire   conduct  of  the  delinquent         employee,  the  gravity of  the  misconduct         committed  by  him, the  impact  which  his         misconduct  is  likely  to  have   on   the         administration   and   other    extenuating         circumstances or redeeming features if  any         present  in  the  case and  so  on  and  so

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       forth. It may be that the conviction of  an         accused may be for a trivial offence as  in         the  case of the respondent T.R. Chellappan         in  Civil Appeal No. 1664 of 1974  where  a         stern  warning  or a fine would  have  been         sufficient   to  meet  the  exigencies   of         service.     It   is  possible   that   the         delinquent employee may be found guilty  of         some   technical  offence,  for   instance,         violation  of  the transport rules  or  the         rules  under the Motor Vehicles Act and  so         on,   where   no  major  penalty   may   be         attracted. It is difficult to lay down  any         hard  and  fast  rules as  to  the  factors         which   the  disciplinary  authority  would         have  to  consider, but  I  have  mentioned         some  of  these factors by way of instances         which  are  merely  illustrative  and   not         exhaustive.  In other words,  the  position         is  that  the conviction of the  delinquent         employee   would  be  taken  as  sufficient         proof  of misconduct and then the authority         will  have to embark upon a summary inquiry         as  to the nature and extent of the penalty         to  be  imposed on the delinquent  employee         and  in  the course of the inquiry  if  the         authority  is  of  the  opinion  that   the         offence  is  too trivial or of a  technical         nature  it may refuse to impose any penalty         in  spite of the conviction. This is a very         salutary    provision   which   has    been         enshrined  in these Rules and  one  of  the         purposes for conferring this power is  that         in  cases  where the disciplinary authority         is  satisfied that the delinquent  employee         is   a   youthful  offender  who   is   not         convicted of any serious offence and  shows         poignant  penitence or real  repentance  he         may  be  dealt with as lightly as possible.         This  appears  to us to be  the  scope  and         ambit  of this provision. We must, however,         hasten  to  add  that  we  should  not   be         understood  as  laying down that  the  last         part  of  Rule  14  of the  Rules  of  1968         contains  a licence to employees  convicted         of    serious   offences   to   insist   on         reinstatement.   The  statutory   provision         referred to above merely imports a rule  of         natural  justice in enjoining  that  before         taking  final  action  in  the  matter  the         delinquent  employee should  be  heard  and         the  circumstances  of  the  case  may   be         objectively considered. This is in  keeping         with  the  sense of justice  and  fairplay.         The    disciplinary   authority   has   the         undoubted    power   after   hearing    the         delinquent  employee  and  considering  the         circumstances  of the case to  inflict  any         major  penalty  on the delinquent  employee         without  any  further departmental  inquiry         if  the  authority is of the  opinion  that         the  employee has been guilty of a  serious         offence  involving  moral  turpitude   and,         therefore,   it   is   not   desirable   or         conducive     in    the    interests     of

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       administration to retain such a  person  in         service.\024

     We  may  further  notice that  interpretation  of  the

proviso  (b)  appended to Article 311(2) of the Constitution

of India, vis-‘-vis, the aforementioned terms \023consider\024 and

\023determine\024, came up for consideration before this Court  in

Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel etc. [(1985)  3

SCC 398], wherein Chellappan (supra) was expressly overruled

stating;

       \023115. The decision in Challappan case  is,         therefore,  not  correct with  respect  to         the  interpretation placed by it upon Rule         14  of  the  Railway  Servants  Rules  and         particularly   upon  the   word   consider         occurring  in the last part of  that  rule         and  in interpreting Rule 14 by itself and         not   in   conjunction  with  the   second         proviso  to Article 311(2). Before parting         with  Challappan case, we may, also  point         out  that that case never held the  field.         The  judgment  in that case was  delivered         on   September  15,  1975,  and   it   was         reported  in  (1976) 1 SCR  at  pages  783         ff*.  Hardly  was that case reported  then         in  the next group of appeals in which the         same  question  was  raised,  namely,  the         three civil appeals mentioned earlier,  an         order  of reference to a larger Bench  was         made    on   November   18,   1976.    The         correctness   of  Challappan   case   was,         therefore,   doubted   from    the    very         beginning.\024

     The  services of the respondent were terminated  which

have  been  set aside by the Labour Court pursuant  whereto,

they have been re-instated in service.

     It is, however, one thing to say that prior to passing

of  the  order  of  termination, a  disciplinary  proceeding

should  have been initiated, but it is another thing to  say

as  has been stated by the High Court that only because  the

respondents were let off on probation, the same  should  not

affect his service career at all.

     Before  embarking on the said issue, we may  notice  a

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decision  of this Court relied upon by this Court  in  Aitha

Chander Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1981 (Supp) SCC 17],

wherein it was observed;

         \023As  the  appellant has been released  on           probation,   this  may  not  affect   his           service career in view of Section  12  of           the Probation of Offenders Act....  \024

    The said decision does not lay down any law.  No reason

has  been assigned in support thereof.   This Court  therein

evidently  exercised its jurisdiction under Article  142  of

the Constitution of India.

     In  fact  in Harichand v Director of School  Education

[(1998)  2 SCC 383],  Aitha Chander Rao (supra) was held  to

be not a binding precedent on the point holding ;

          \0236.  The order in the case of the  said            Rao  was delivered on an appeal against            conviction.    The    conviction    was            sustained  but, having  regard  to  the            peculiar  circumstances  of  the  case,            the  said Rao was released on probation            and  it  was  added that this  may  not            affect  his service career in  view  of            Section   12   of  the   Probation   of            Offenders  Act. We do not find  in  the            order  in  Rao case1 any discussion  of            the  provision of Section 12 or of  the            meaning  of the words disqualification,            if  any attaching to a conviction of an            offence  under  such law  therein.  The            order  cannot, therefore,  be  regarded            as a binding precedent upon the point.            7.  In  our  view, Section  12  of  the            Probation of Offenders Act would  apply            only  in  respect of a disqualification            that  goes with a conviction under  the            law  which provides for the offence and            its   punishment.  That  is  the  plain            meaning  of the words disqualification,            if  any,  attaching to a conviction  of            an  offence  under  such  law  therein.            Where  the  law  that provides  for  an            offence   and   its   punishment   also            stipulates   a   disqualification,    a            person  convicted of  the  offence  but            released  on  probation  does  not,  by            reason   of  Section  12,  suffer   the            disqualification.  It  cannot  be  held            that,  by  reason  of  Section  12,   a            conviction  for an offence  should  not            be  taken into account for the purposes            of  dismissal  of the person  convicted            from government service.\024

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     When  the order of termination passed by the appellant

on  the  ground  of misconduct was set aside by  the  Labour

Court,  the only course open to it was to initiate a regular

departmental  proceedings.  Once  they  had  terminated  the

services  of the respondent, during pendency of the criminal

case  which as noticed hereinbefore was set aside  resulting

in  their re-instatement in services, which although did not

preclude  the  appellant from taking further action  against

the  respondents, the same was required to be done  only  in

terms  of  the extant rules i.e. by initiation of a  regular

departmental proceedings.

    Submission of Mr. Gupta, that owing to passage of time,

this   Court  would  refrain  itself  from  permitting   the

appellant to initiate a full fledged departmental proceeding

at  this stage, does not appeal to us.   There are cases and

cases. Factors taking into consideration for issuing such  a

direction  would  be different depending  upon  the  factual

matrix  involved in each case.    Indiscipline at  the  work

place   has   been   considered  by  this  Court   seriously

particularly when the misconduct alleged is physical assault

of  a  higher authority.   The nature of assault, the   role

played  by  the  concerned workman and the  question  as  to

whether  with the passage of time any proceeding  should  be

initiated or not, in our opinion plays an important role and

as  such  does not merit laying down a general law  in  this

behalf.

     In  Muriadih  Colliery of Bharat Coking Coal  Ltd.  v.

Bihar  Colliery Kamgar Union Through Workmen [(2005)  3  SCC

331], a Division Bench noticing an earlier judgment of  this

Court  in  Krishnakali  Tea Estate v. Akhil  Bharatiya  Chah

Mazdoor Sangh and Another [(2004) 8 SCC 200] opined;

         \02317.  ..... The courts below by condoning

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         an   act   of   physical  violence   have           undermined   the   discipline   in    the           organization, hence, in the above factual           backdrop, it can never be said  that  the           Industrial Tribunal could have  exercised           its  authority under Section 11-A of  the           Act  to interfere with the punishment  of           dismissal.    Substituting the  order  of           dismissal in such a case, withholding  of           one  increment  in  our  opinions  wholly           disproportionate  to   the   gravity   of           misconduct and is unsupportable.                      18.   Herein it is worthwhile  to  recall           the  finding of the learned Single  Judge           who has rightly held that the assault  on           the  senior  officials by the workmen  in           discharging   of  their   duties   is   a           misconduct   and  in  such  a   situation           officials  who are managing  the  affairs           will be demoralised.\024

     In  Hombe Gowda Educational Trust and Another v. State

of  Karnataka  and  Others [(2006)  1  SCC  430],  the  said

decisions were followed stating;

         \02330.  This Court has come a long way from           its   earlier  viewpoints.    The  recent           trend in the decisions of this Court seek           to  strike a balance between the  earlier           approach   to  the  industrial   relation           wherein  only the interest of the workmen           was  sought  to  be  protected  with  the           avowed  object of fast industrial  growth           of  the country.  In several decisions of           this  Court  it  has  been  noticed   how           discipline  at  the  workplace/industrial           undertakings received a setback.  In view           of  the change in economic policy of  the           country,  it  may not now  be  proper  to           allow   the   employees  to   break   the           discipline  with impunity.   Our  country           is   governed  by  rule  of  law.     All           actions,  therefore,  must  be  taken  in           accordance  with law.   Law  declared  by           this Court in terms of Article 141 of the           Constitution, as noticed in the decisions           noticed supra, categorically demonstrates           that  the  Tribunal  would  not  normally           interfere  with the quantum of punishment           imposed   by  the  employers  unless   an           appropriate  case is made  out  therefor.           The Tribunal being inferior to this Court           was bound to follow the decisions of this           Court  which are applicable to the  facts           of  the  present case in question.    The           Tribunal  can  neither ignore  the  ratio           laid  down  by this Court nor  refuse  to           follow the same.\024            

     See  also Harjit Singh & Anr. v The State of Punjab  &

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Anr. [2007 (3) SCALE 553].

     A  question as to whether a long delay by itself would

be  a  sufficient ground for not directing initiation  of  a

departmental  proceeding  came up for  consideration  before

this  Court  in P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India  &  Ors.

[2006  (5) SCALE 54], wherein the doctrine of prejudice  was

considered  stating  that  if there  exists  a  satisfactory

explanation  for delay, same may not be a bar  in  directing

initiation  of  a fresh proceedings.  We, however,  are  not

oblivious that in a different situation, this Court in  M.V.

Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88] took the  factor

in  regard to delay in initiating a departmental proceedings

as  one of the relevant factors amongst others  to determine

the  question as to whether a misconduct has been proved  or

not.

      The  instant case is not one where we can ignore  the

gravity  of  the offence.  It is also not a case  where  the

respondents  have  pleaded prejudice or  brought  sufficient

materials on records so as to enable this Court to arrive at

a   finding  that  no  evidence  would  be  available.    If

departmental  proceeding is directed to  be  initiated  then

Respondent would not be in a position to adduce any evidence

in support of defence, because of passage of time.

     We, therefore are of the opinion that the interest  of

justice  would be met if liberty is granted to the appellant

herein to initiate a disciplinary

proceedings against the respondent whereafter the appellants

may  pass  appropriate order in accordance  with  law.   The

impugned judgment is set aside.

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    These appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent.

However, there shall be no order as to costs.