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PETITIONER: PUNJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VIJAY SINGH LAMBA ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/04/1976

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 1441            1976 SCR   67  1976 SCC  (3) 344

ACT:      Quorum-Fixing a  quorum of  2 members in a committee of 3, does  not warrant  all the  three  must  be  present  for validity of  any action  of the committee -Punjab University Calendar,   1973,   Vol.   II-Regulations   31   and   32.1- Interpretation of.

HEADNOTE:      Regulations  31  and  32.1  of  the  Punjab  University Calendar, 1973, Volume II are as under:           "31.  The   Syndicate  shall  appoint  annually  a      standing committee  to deal  with cases  of the alleged      misconduct and  use of  unfair means in connection with      examinations;           32.1.  When   the  committee   is  unanimous,  its      decision shall  be final  except as provided in S.32.2.      If the  Committee is not unanimous, the matter shall be      referred to the Vice-Chancellor who shall either decide      the matter  himself or  refer it  to the  Syndicate for      decision".      By virtue  of the  powers vested  in the syndicate, the Punjab  University  appointed  a  standing  committee  under Regulation 31  consisting of  a retired high court judge, an Advocate who  was formerly  a minister  of State of Punjab & the Registrar  of the  University. It  also resolved, by its Resolution dated  17th August  1971, that  two members shall form the  quorum for  the meetings of the standing committee appointed under Regulation 31. For adopting unfair practices in the  examination, respondents  were disqualified  by  the Committee, in all the sittings of which, only two out of the three members  were present.  The respondents  contended  by their writ  petitions that  the decisions  of  the  Standing Committee were  without jurisdiction  in as  much as all the three members  of the  Standing Committee had not taken part the meetings  in which the decisions to disqualify them were taken. By a majority of 2 to 1, the High Court set aside the decisions taking the view that despite the circumstance that two members of the committee formed the quorum, the impugned decisions were  vitiated by the fact that only 2 and not all the  3   members  of   the  committee  participated  in  the proceedings.

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    Allowing the appeals by certificate, the Court, ^      HELD: (1) The Constitution of the Standing Committee is indisputably  within  the  powers  of  the  Syndicate  under Regulation 31.  The Syndicate which had the power to appoint the Standing  Committee had  the incidental power to fix the quorum for  the meetings of the Standing Committee. ’Quorum’ denotes the minimum number of members of any body of persons whose presence  is necessary in order to enable that body to transact its  business validly  so  that  its  acts  may  be lawful.  It   is  wholly   inappropriate  to   draw  on  the Constitution of  judicial tribunals  as a  parallel. In  the instant case,  the syndicate  by nominating  3 persons to be members of  the Standing  Committee, but by resolving that 2 of them would validly constitute the standing committee, did no more  than provide that though the Standing Committee may be composed  of 3  persons, any  2 of them could validly and effectively transact  the business  of and  on behalf of the Committee. [70 E-F, 71-A-C]      (ii) By  the quorum, a minimum number of members of the committee must  be present in order that its proceedings may be lawful, but that does not mean that more than the minimum are  denied   an   opportunity   to   participate   in   the deliberations and the decision of the committee. There is no 68 warrant  for  the  hypothesis  that  had  the  third  member attended the  meetings he  would  have  dissented  from  the decision of  the 2  other members  so as  to  necessitate  a reference to  the Vice Chancellor under Regulation 32.1. [71 F-G 72-AB]      (iii) When  Regulation 32.1  speaks  of  the  committee being unanimous,  it refers  to the unanimity of the members who for the time being are sitting on the committee and who, by forming the quorum can validly and lawfully discharge the functions of  the Committee.  The fixation of quorum neither makes Regulation  32.1 a  dead letter nor does it affect its application or  utility.  The  fixation  of  quorum  by  the Syndicate violates neither the letter nor the spirit of that Regulation. [72 C-D, E, F]      (iv) Regulation 32.1 is aimed at conferring finality on decisions of  the committee  if they  are unanimous  and  at leaving the  validity and  priority of a dissenting decision to the  judgment of  the Vice-Chancellor  who can  deal with the matter  himself or  refer it  to  the  decision  of  the Syndicate. Regulation 32.1 does not even remotely attempt to fix the  quorum. That  is not  its purpose,  and  it  sounds strange that  the Regulation, by a circuitous method, should fix the  quorum at  the full  complement of members. Quorums are seldom  so fixed  and were  it intended  that the entire committee  must  decide  every  case,  Regulation  31  could appropriately have said so. [72 G-H, 73 A]      It is  quite true  that judicial consistency is not the highest state  of legal  bliss. Law  must  grow,  it  cannot afford to  a static and therefore, judges ought to employ an intelligent technique  in the  use of  precedents.  But  the language  of   the  Regulations  called  for  no  review  of established precedents.  Nor indeed  is there  any  fear  of unfairness if  only 2  members decided the cases of students accused of adopting unfair practices in the examinations. In such cases,  it is  so much  better that the law is certain. [73 C-D, E]      Bharat Indu  v. The Punjab University & Anr. ILR [1967] 2 Punjab  & Haryana  198; Miss  Manjinder Kaur v. The Punjab University (Civil  Writ No. 3516/72 dt. 30-3-1973 decided by the Punjab High Court (approved).

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JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1121- 1125 of 1975.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated the 31st March 1975 of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 5948, 6115, 6736, 6779 and 6780 of 1974.      Hardev Singh and R. S. Sodhi for the Appellant.      S. K.  Bagga and (Mrs.) S. Bagga for Sole Respondent in CA 1121 R-1 in CAs. 1122-1125/75.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD, J.-These  appeals arise  out of a decision rendered by a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in various writ  petitions   filed  by   the  students  of  the  Punjab University,  who   were  disqualified  for  adopting  unfair practices in  the examinations. Most of them had copied from a common  source. By a majority of 2 to 1, the High Court by its Judgment dated March 31, 1975 set aside the decisions of a Committee  appointed to  inquire into  the charges against the erring  students. The  judgment of  the  majority  rests solely on the 69 view that  despite the  circumstance that two members of the Committee formed  the quorum  the  impunged  decisions  were vitiated by  the fact  that only 2 and not all the 3 members of the  Committee participated in the proceedings. Aggrieved by the  majority judgment  of the  High  Court,  the  Punjab University,  Chandigarh,   has  filed  these  appeals  by  a certificate granted by the High Court on the ground that the appeals involve  a substantial  question of  law of  general importance which requires to be determined by this Court.      The respondents  to these  appeals were detected in the use of  unfair means  by the  supervisory staff at different examinations held  by  the  Punjab  University.  The  Deputy Registrar  of   the  University   issued  notices   to   the respondents calling  upon them  to submit their replies to a questionnaire. Respondents  denied having  used unfair means in the  examinations but their explanation having been found to be  unsatisfactory, the charges were referred for inquiry and decision  to the  Standing Committee which was appointed to deal  with cases of misconduct and use of unfair means at the University examinations.      The Standing  Committee consisted of Shri G. L. Chopra, a retired  Judge of  the High  Court, Shri  Ajmer Singh,  an advocate  who   was  formerly   a  Minister  of  the  Punjab Government, and  Shri Jagjit  Singh, the  Registrar  of  the University. The  Standing Committee  was  appointed  by  the Syndicate of  the University  under  Regulation  31  of  the Punjab University  Calender, 1973,  Volume II.  In a meeting dated August 17, 1971 the Syndicate passed a Resolution that two members  shall form  the quorum  for the meetings of the Standing  Committee   appointed  under   Regulation  31.  In everyone of  the meetings, only two out of the three members of the Standing Committee were present.      Respondents  appeared  before  the  Standing  Committee which, on  a consideration  of their  statements came to the unanimous conclusion that the respondents had adopted unfair means in  the examinations.  By the  impugned decisions they were disqualified  for varying terms. It is not alleged that the Standing  Committee had  committed breach  of any of the procedural provisions or of the rules of natural justice. We may also  mention in  passing that  none of  the respondents took any  objection during  the  inquiry  that  it  was  not

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competent to  only two  members of the Standing Committee to inquire into  the charges.  Before the  High Court also, the sole ground on which the decisions of the Standing Committee were  challenged   was  that   the  decisions  were  without jurisdiction inasmuch  as  all  the  three  members  of  the Standing Committee  had not  taken part  in the  meetings in which the decision to disqualify the respondents was taken.      The Punjab University, Chandigarh, was set up under the East Punjab  Ordinance 1947, which was later replaced by the Punjab University  Act, 1947.  By section  8 of  the Act the supreme authority  of the  University vests  in  the  Senate consisting  of  the  Chancellor,  the  Vice-Chancellor,  ex- officio Fellows  and Ordinary Fellows. Section 1 1(2) of the Act provides  inter alia  that the Senate shall exercise its powers  in   accordance  with   the  statutes,   rules   and regulations for the 70 time being in force. Section 20 of the Act provides that the Executive Government  of the  University shall  vest in  the Syndicate consisting of the Vice-Chancellor as Chairman, the Directors  of   Public  Instruction   Punjab,  Haryana   and Chandigarh, the Director of Education, Himachal Pradesh, and not less  than 12  or more  than 15  ex-officio or  ordinary Fellows elected  by various  Faculties. Section 31(1) of the Act provides  for the framing of Regulations and states that the Senate,  with the  sanction of  the Government, may from time to  time make  regulations consistent  with the Act for providing  for  all  matters  relating  to  the  University. Section  31   (2)   enumerates   matters   regarding   which regulations can  be made  and they  include the  conduct  of students, the  procedure to  be followed  at meetings of the Senate, Syndicate and Faculties and the quorum of members to be required  for the  transaction of  business. Acting under the power  conferred by section 31, the Senate of the Punjab University  framed  regulations  in  consultation  with  the Government, which include regulations relating to the use of unfair  means   in  examinations.   These  regulations   are contained in  Chapter II  of the Punjab University Calendar, 1973, Volume II.      The decision of these appeals turns on the construction and meaning  of regulations  31 and 32.1 of Chapter II which read thus:-           "31.  The   Syndicate  shall  appoint  annually  a      Standing Committee  to deal  with cases  of the alleged      misconduct and  use of  unfair means in connection with      examination;           32.1.  When   the  Committee   is  unanimous,  its      decision shall  be final except as provided in 32.2. If      the Committee  is not  unanimous the  matter  shall  be      referred to the Vice-Chancellor who shall either decide      the matter  himself or  refer it  to the  Syndicate for      decision".      The  constitution   of  the   Standing   Committee   is indisputably  within  the  powers  of  the  Syndicate  under Regulation 31.  No exception  can therefore  be taken to the appointment of  the Standing  Committee by the Syndicate and indeed no  objection was  at any stage taken in that behalf. Equally clear  seems to  us the  position that the Syndicate which had  the power  to appoint  the Standing Committee had the incidental  power to  fix the quorum for the meetings of the Standing  Committee. ’Quorum’ denotes the minimum number of  members  of  any  body  of  persons  whose  presence  is necessary in  order to  enable that  body  to  transact  its business validly  so that  its acts  may be  lawful.  It  is generally left  to committees  themselves to  fix the quorum

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for their  meetings and  perhaps, if  the Syndicate  had not fixed the  quorum  it  might  have  been  competent  to  the Standing Committee itself to devise its day-to-day procedure including the  fixation of quorum But that is going one step ahead, for  here the  quorum was  fixed not  by the Standing Committee but  by the  Syndicate itself  which appointed the Standing Committee  and which  indubitably had  the right to appoint the  Committee-under Regulation 31. We are unable to see any  valid reason  for which  the fixation of quorum for the 71 meetings of  a Committee  appointed by  the Syndicate can be said to  be beyond the powers of the Syndicate. It is wholly inappropriate in this connection to draw on the constitution of judicial  tribunals as a parallel because, if by law such a  tribunal   must  consist   of  3   members  there  is  no jurisdiction in the tribunal to fix a smaller quorum for its sittings. A  court is  not a  committee and  if by  law  any matter is  required to  be heard,  say by  a bench  of three Judges, there  is no  power in those three Judges to resolve that only two of them will form a quorum. In fact, quorum is fixed for meetings of committees and not for the sittings of courts. In  the instant  case the Syndicate had the right to fix the  number of persons who would constitute the Standing Committee and by fixing the quorum at 2, it did no more than provide that  though the  Standing Committee may be composed of 3  persons, any  2 of  them could validly and effectively transact the  business of  and on  behalf of  the committee. Putting the  matter  a  little  differently,  the  Syndicate nominated 3  persons to be members of the Standing Committee but resolved that any 2 of them would validly constitute the Standing Committee  for the  time being  to dispose  of  any business which comes before it.      Great reliance  was placed  by the  respondents both in the High  Court and  before us  on Regulation  32.1 which we have set  out above,  in support  of the contention that the decision of  the Standing Committee was without jurisdiction since all  the members of the Committee had not participated in  the  various  decisions.  By  Regulation  32.1,  if  the Standing  Committee   is  unanimous  in  its  decision,  the decision is  final except as provided in Regulation 32.2; if the committee  is  not  unanimous,  the  matter  has  to  be referred to  the Vice-Chancellor  who can  either decide the matter  himself  or  refer  it  to  the  Syndicate  for  its decision. It  is urged on behalf of the respondents that the possible dissent  of the  3rd member, were he present, would have necessitated  a reference  to the  Vice-Chancellor  who might not  agree with the majority opinion, which shows that no sanctity  can attach  to a decision rendered by less than the whole  body of 3 members of the Standing Committee. This argument is  purely hypothetical  and besides,  it overlooks that the  fixation of quorum for the meetings of a committee does not  preclude all  the members  of the  committee  from attending the  meetings. By  the quorum, a minimum number of the committee  must be present in order that its proceedings may be  lawful but  that does  not mean  that more  than the minimum are  denied an  opportunity to  participate  in  the deliberations and the decisions of the committee. Whenever a committee is  scheduled to  meet, due notice of the meetings has to go to all the members of the committee and it is left to each  individual  member  whether  or  not  to  attend  a particular meeting. Every member has thus the choice and the opportunity to attend every meeting of the committee. If any member considers  the matter  which is  to be  discussed  or determined in  a particular  meeting as  of such  importance

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that he  must make  his voice heard and cast his vote, it is open to  him and indeed he is entitled to attend the meeting and make  his presence felt. Though a faint attempt was made in these  appeals for  the first  time to  suggest that  the notice of the meetings 72 of the  Standing Committee  was not  served  on  all  the  3 members of the committee we are satisfied that such a notice was in  fact given and someone or the other of the 3 members chose to  remain absent  at the  meetings  of  the  Standing Committee.  There   is,  therefore,   no  warrant   for  the hypothesis that  had the  third member attended the meetings he would  have dissented  from the  decision of  the 2 other members so  as to  necessitate  a  reference  to  the  Vice- Chancellor under Regulation 32.1.      Apart from  this consideration,  we are unable to agree that anything  contained in  Regulation 32.1  can affect the power of the Syndicate to fix the quorum for the meetings of the Standing Committee. If the quorum consists of 2 members, any 2  out of the 3 members can perform the functions of the Standing Committee,  though the committee may be composed of 3 members.  When Regulation  32.1 speaks  of  the  committee being unanimous,  it refers  to the unanimity of the members who for the time being are sitting as the committee and who, by forming the quorum can validly and lawfully discharge the functions of  the committee  and transact  all  business  on behalf of  the committee. If only 2 members out of the 3 who compose the  Standing Committee  have  participated  in  the business of  any particular  meeting, the  question  to  ask under Regulation  32.1 is whether there is unanimity amongst those two  members. If  they are unanimous their decision is final. If  they differ, the matter has to be referred to the Vice-Chancellor. Thus,  the fixation of quorum neither makes Regulation 32.1  a  dead  letter  nor  does  it  affect  its application or  utility. With  respect,  we  are  unable  to appreciate the reasoning of the majority that "The manner in which Regulation  32.1 has  been framed leaves no doubt that the consideration  of the  question of  students’ misconduct and the  use of unfair means in examination by them has been placed at  a high  pedestal" and that therefore "there is no escape from  the conclusion  that the  consideration of  the case of  a student  against whom  there are  allegations  of misconduct or  of use unfair means in an examination, has to be by  all the  members of the Standing Committee and not by some of  them and  that any decision of the Syndicate to the contrary would  he violative  of the  letter and  spirit  of Regulation 32.1."  The fixation  of quorum  by the Syndicate violates  neither   the  letter   nor  the  spirit  of  that Regulation.      The majority  Judges were therefore in error in holding that Regulation  32.1 "clearly  negatives the  fixation of a quorum and  makes it  incumbent that  the decision  must  be taken by  the full Committee" for the reason that "In a way, this regulation  fixes the  quorum at  the number of members originally appointed". The learned Judges read far more into Regulation 32.1  than there  is in  it and we see no warrant for construing  that regulation  as fixing the quorum at the number of  members originally  appointed to  the  committee. Regulation 32.1  is aimed  at conferring finally on decision of the  committee if  they are  unanimous and at leaving the validity and  propriety of  a  dissenting  decision  to  the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor who can deal with the matter himself or  refer it  to  the  decision  of  the  Syndicate. Regulation 3 2.1 does not even remotely attempt to fix the 73

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quorum. That  is not its purpose, and it sounds strange that the Regulation,  by a  circuitous  method,  should  fix  the quorum at the full complement of members. Quorums are seldom so fixed and were it intended that the entire committee must decide every  case, Regulation  31 could  appropriately have said so.      We share  the deep  concern voiced  in  the  dissenting opinion of  Sandhawalia J.  that there  was no justification for ignoring the stream of precedents which had consistently recognised the  validity of  decisions taken by 2 members of the  Standing  Committee.  In  Bharat  Indu  v.  The  Punjab University and  another(1),  Regulation  19  which  was  the precursor of  and was  identical with  Regulation 32.1  came before the  Punjab  High  Court.  By  a  closely  considered judgment, Dua  J.  who  spoke  for  the  Bench  specifically rejected the  argument accepted by the two learned Judges in the instant  case. In  Miss Manjinder  Kaur  v.  The  Punjab University (Civil  Writ No.  3516 of  1972, decided on March 30, 1973), the same contention was repeated on behalf of the students and  once again  it was considered and rejected. It is quite  true that  judicial consistency is not the highest state of  legal bliss. Law must grow, it cannot afford to be static and  theretore Judges  ought to employ an intelligent technique in  the use of precedents. Precedents, as observed by Lord  Macmillan,  should  be  "stepping  stones  and  not halting places".(2)  But, Justice  Cardozo’s caution  should not go unheeded that the weekly change in the composition of the court  ought not  to be  accompanied by  changes in  its rulings. The  language of  the  Regulations  called  for  no review of  established precedents.  Nor indeed  is there any fear of  unfairness if  only 2  members decided the cases of students  accused   of  adopting  unfair  practices  in  the examinations. In  such cases  it is  so much better that the law is certain.      In the  result we  allow the  appeals,  set  aside  the decision of  the majority  and uphold  that of  the minority Judge. The  writ petitions  filed by  the  respondents  will consequently stand  dismissed but  there will be no order as to costs. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 74