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PETITIONER: PUNJAB LAND DEVELOPMENT ANDRECLAMATION CORPORATION LTD.,CHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT,CHANDIGARH ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/05/1990

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (CJ) RAY, B.C. (J) KANIA, M.H. AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1990 SCR  (3) 111        1990 SCC  (3) 682  JT 1990 (2)   489        1990 SCALE  (1)878

ACT: Industrial Disputes Act 1947:    Section 2(oo)--"Retrenchment"--Interpretation  of--Wheth- er termination by the employer of the services of a  workman by employer for any reason whatsoever or termination by  the employer of the services of a workman for any reason whatso- ever  otherwise  than as a punishment inflicted  by  way  of disciplinary action--Whether to be understood in its narrow, natural  and  contextual  meaning or in  its  wider  literal meaning.     Precedent--Ratio decidendi of the earlier  decision--How to ascertain--Major premise, minor premise and decision in a case-Whether  may be narrowed or widened by  the  subsequent decision.     Constitution of India, 1950--Article 141--Supreme  Court is  not bound by its earlier  decision--Stare  decisis--doc- trine of.     Decision per incuriam--meaning and effect of non  refer- ence  to  an  earlier  larger  bench  decision  of   Supreme Court--Subsequent  decision  of Supreme Court  will  be  per incuriam  only  if the ratio of the earlier decision  is  in conflict with it.     Interpretation      of      Statutes--Wider      literal construction--When  preferable  to  narrower,  natural   and contextual  construction--Definition clause using  the  word means  ’instead’ of ’includes’--Shows that no other  meaning can be assigned.

HEADNOTE:     This batch of eighteen appeals by special leave involves a  common question of law, regarding the scope and ambit  of the  word ’retrenchment’ as defined in Section 2(oo) of  the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. 112     One  of the appeals is by the workmen against the  order of  the High Court affirming the award of the  Labour  Court refusing to interfere with the order of termination of their services  by the employer for their trade  union-activities, while the rest are by the employers/ managements against the

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orders  of  High Courts/Industrial  Tribunal/  Labour  Court setting  aside the orders of termination of the services  of the illegal for non-compliance of the provisions of  Section 25F of the Act.     While  the employers’ contention is that the  word  "re- trenchment"  as  defined in Section 2(oo) of the  Act  means termination  of service of a workman only by way of  surplus labour  for any reason whatsoever, the workmen contend  that "retrenchment" means termination of the service of a workman for  any reason whatsoever, other than those  expressly  ex- cluded by the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act. Disposing of the appeals, this Court,     HELD: (1) Definition of ’retrenchment’ in Section  2(oo) means termination by the employer of the service of a  work- man  for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a  punish- ment  inflicted  by  way of disciplinary  action  and  those expressly  excluded  by the definition. This  is  the  wider literal  interpretation  as distinguished from  the  narrow, natural  and contextual interpretation of the word  to  mean termination  by the employer of the service of a workman  as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. [156C; 131B]     B.N.  Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, [1979] 2 SCR 409;  Jugal  Ki- shore  Saraf  v.  Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955]  1  SCR  1369; Sussex  Peerage Case, [1844] II CI & Fin 85:8 ER 1034  (HL); Thompson v. Goold & Co., 26 TLR 526; Ealsing L.B.C. v.  Race Relations Board, [1972] 1 All ER 105; Whiteley v.  Chappell, [1868]  LR 4; Prince Ernest of Hanover v. Attorney  General, [1956] Ch D 188 and Muir v. Keay, 44 MJMC 143, referred to.     (2) Difficulty was created by defining ’retrenchment’ to mean  something wider than what it naturally and  ordinarily meant. Such a definition created complexity as the draftsman himself in drafting the other sections using the  definition may  slip into the ordinary meaning instead of  the  defined meaning. However, a judge facing such a problem of interpre- tation cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. [149A-B; F] 113     (3)  The  definition has used the word ’means’.  When  a statute says that a word or phrase shall ’mean’--not  merely that it shall ’include’ certain things or acts, "the defini- tion is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be  assigned to the expression than is put down  in  defini- tion." [150F-G]     Queen v. Commissioners under the Boiler Explosions  Act, 1882,  [1891]  I  QBD 703 and Gough v. Gough,  [1891]  2  QB 665:65 LT II; relied on.     (4) There are apparent incongruities when the definition Clause  Section  2(oo) is considered in the context  of  the main provisions viz. Sections 25F, 25G and 25H but there  is room for harmonious construction. The definitions  contained in  Section 2 are subject to there being anything  repugnant in the subject or context. [152C-D]     Vishwamitra Press v. Workers, AIR 1953 SC 41; Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Presidency Juite Mills Co.  Employees Union,  [1952] I LLJ 796 (LAT) (Cal); Iron &  Steel  Mazdoor Union,  Kanpur v. J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.,  [1952]  LAC 467;  Halar  Salt and Chemical Works, Jamnagar  v.  Workmen, [1953]  2  LLJ 39; Prakriti Bhushan Gupta  v.  Chief  Mining Engineer, Railway Board, [1953] LAC 373; Sudarshan  Banerjee v. Mcleod and C. Ltd., [1953] LAC 702; Srinivasa Enterprises v.  Union of India, [1980] 4 SCC 507; Reserve Bank of  India v. Peerless Central Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.,  [1987] 2 SCR I, referred to.     (5)  The express exclusion of volitional element in  cl. (a)  and (b) of Section 2(oo) namely, voluntary  retirement,

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and  retirement  on superannuation age  implies  that  those would otherwise have been included. If such cases were to be included,  termination on abandonment of service, on  efflux of time and on failure to qualify, though only consequential or  resultant would be included as those have not  been  ex- cluded.  Then  there appears to be a gap between  the  first part  and the exclusion part. When such a gap is  disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act. The Court has to  inter- pret a statute and apply it to the facts. [150C-E] Duport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 All ER 529, referred to.     (6)  Construing  retrenchment in its  wider  sense,  the rights  of the employer under the standing orders and  under contracts  of employment may have been affected by  Sections 2(00) and 25F and other relevant sections. Secondly, it  may be  said that the rights as such are not affected  or  taken away but only additional social obligation has been 114 placed on the employer so as to give retrenchment benefit to affected.  workmen perhaps for tiding over immediate  finan- cial  distress.  Seen from this angle, there is  implicit  a social  policy. So goes the maxim-Stat Pro ratione  voluntes populi--the will of the people stands in place of a  reason. [153E-G]     (7)  In Sundara Money and subsequent cases  the  Supreme Court has adopted wider liberal meaning rejecting the narrow natural  and contextual meaning. The question of  subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court being per incuriam on grounds of failure to apply the earlier law laid down by the Consti- tution  Bench in Hariprasad Shukla case could arise only  if ratio  in  Sunclara Money and subsequent  decisions  was  in conflict with the ratio in Hariprasad and Anakapalli.  Hari- prasad  case  is not an authority for the  proposition  that Section  2(oo)  only covers cases of  discharge  of  surplus labour and staff. Sundara Money and subsequent decisions  in the line could not be held to be per incuriam in as much  as in  Hindustan  Steel and Santosh Gupta  cases  the  Division Benches  of  the Supreme Court had  referred  to  Hariprasad case, and rightly held that its ratio did not extend  beyond the case of termination on the ground of closure and as such it  would  not be correct to say  that  subsequent  decision overlooked a binding precedent. In a fast developing  branch of Industrial and Labour Law it may not be always of partic- ular importance to rigidly stick to a precedent and a prece- dent  may need to be departed from if the basis of  legisla- tion changes. [143B-C; 145E]     L. Robert D’Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern  Rail- way and Anr., [1979] 1 LLJ 211; Rajasthan State  Electricity Board  v.  Labour Court, [1966] 1 LLJ  381  (Raj.);  Goodlas Nerolac  Paints v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, [1967]  1  LLJ 545  (Punj.) and The Managing Director, National Garages  v. J. Gonsalves, [1962] 1 LLJ 56 (Bom.), overruled.     Delhi  Cloth  and  General Mills Ltd.  v.  Shambhu  Nath Mukherjee  and Ors., [1978] 1 SCR 591; Hindustan Steel  Ltd. v.  The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [1977] 1  SCR  586; Santosh  Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, [1980] 3  SCR  884; Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das, [1984] 1 SCC 509 and  Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex P. Khawaja, [1984] AC 74 (HL),  relied on.     Pipraich  Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills  Maz- door  Union, [1956] SCR 872; Sub Nomine Barsi Light  Railway Co.  v.  K.N. Joglekar, [1957] 1 LLJ  243  (SC);  Hariprasad Shivshankar  Shukla v. A.D. Divikar, [1957] SCR 121;  Anaka- palla Co-operative Agricultural 115 and  Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen. [1963] Supp. 1  SCR

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730 and Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The Outgoing Manage- ment  of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., [1964] 5 SCR 602,  dis- tinguished.     Employees  v.  India  Reconstitution  Corporation  Ltd., [1953] LAC 563; Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, [1960] 2  SCR  32; Benett Coleman and Company  Ltd.  v.  Employees, [1954] 1 LLJ 341 (LAT); Mahan Lal v. Bharat Electronic Ltd., [1981] 3 SCR 518 and Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govern- ment Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi, [1981] 1 SCR 789, referred to.     (8) Article 141 embodies, a rule of law, the doctrine of precedents on which our judicial system is based. [136H]     (9) Per Incuriam means through inadvertance. A  decision can  be  said generally to be given per  incuriam  when  the Supreme  Court  has acted in ignorance of its  own  previous decision  or when a High Court has acted in ignorance  of  a decision  of the Supreme Court. The problem of judgment  per incuriam when actually arises, should present no  difficulty as  the Supreme Court can lay down the law afresh if two  or more of its earlier judgments cannot stand together. Article 141, which embodies as a rule of law, the doctrine of prece- dents,  was enacted to make the law declared by the  Supreme Court itself. [136G; 138G; 137F]      Re  Dawson’s  Settlement Lloyds Bank  Ltd.  v.  Dawson, [1966] 3 All ER 68 and Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR 603, relied upon-      (10)  The  doctrine of ratio decidendi has also  to  be interpreted in the same line. To consider the ratio deciden- di  Court has to ascertain the principle on which  the  case was  decided. The ratio decidendi of a decision may be  nar- rowed or widened by the judges before whom it is cited as  a precedent. [139G-H]      State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Shikhar Misra, [1968] 2 SCR 154;  F.A. & AB Ltd. v. Lupton (Inspector of taxes),  [1972] A.C.  634;  Osborne  v. Rowlett. 13 Ch D 774  and  Quinn  v. Leathem. [1901] AC 495, relied on-      Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison (Watford) Ltd., [1963] AC 1; Finsbury  Securities Ltd. v. Inland  Revenue  Commissioners, [1966] 1 WLR 1402, referred to. 116

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  3241-48 of 1981 Etc.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  20.7.1983  of  the Punjab    &    Haryana   High   Court   in    C.W.P.    Nos. 469,748,750,751,752 and 753 of 1981     B.N. Shinghvi, V.A. Bobde, M.K. Ramamurthy, N.B.  Shetty K.K.  Venugopal, Dr. Anand Prakash, S.S. JavaIi, H.S.  Gill, Brij Bhushan, M.G. Ramachandran, M.C. Dhingra, A.K.  Sanghi, U.A.  Rana, B.R. Agarwala, R.C. Pathak, Naresh Mathur,  S.K. Sajwan.  Baby Lal, Praveen Kumar, B.B. Singh, Vineet  Kumar, B.D. Ahmed. R.S. Hegde, Parijat Singh, Mrs. Jayshree Wad, S. Balakrishnan, Ms. Janani, Mrs. Urmila Kapoor, T.T. Kunhikan- nan,  H.K. Puri, S. Srinivasan, Mrs. M.  Karanjawala,  Vijay Kumar  Verma. Ashok Grover, V.N. Ganpule, M.A. Gagrat,  Mrs. P.S. Shroff, Anil Gupta, R.A. Gupta, A.K. Ghosh, S.  Mandal, Ranjit Kumar, M. Veerappa, Girish Chandra, Dr. Meera  Aggar- wal,  A.K.  Srivastava, K.R. Nambiar, A.G.  Ratnaparkhi,  R. Satish, P.H. Parekh, S.A. Shroff and K.V. Sree Kumar for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N.  SAIKIA.  J. This analogous  cluster  of  seventeen

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appeals  by  special  leave, and a  special  leave  petition involves  a common question of law though they arise out  of the following respective facts: c.A. Nos. 324 z-3248 of 1981     These eight appeals by the Land Development and Reclama- tion Corporation, Chandigarh are from the Judgment and Order of  the  Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing  its  writ petitions challenging the Award dated 2.8.1980 of the Labour Court, Chandigarh holding that the respondents were entitled to  reinstatement  with back wages except Yaspal  (C.A.  No. 3242  of 1981) who was to get wages up to  10.10.1979,  with benefits  of  continuity of service.  The  respondents  were workmen  under the management of the Corporation  and  their services were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court in its Award held that  their services were terminated illegally without  pay- ment  of  retrenchment  compensation  under  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act’, and that they were entitled to reinstatement. 117 C.A. No. 686 (NL) of 1982     This appeal is from the Judgment dated 9.11.1981 of  the High  Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench). The  first  respondent was  an employee of the appellant’s corporation since  1972. He  was  taken on probation in 1975 for one year  which  was extended  from time to time, lastly from 1.9.1977 to  31.10. 1977,  whereafter his services being not found  satisfactory were terminated with effect from 1.11.1977 under  Regulation 44(b)  of the State Transport Employees Service  Regulations of  the Corporation. The Labour Court took the view that  it amounted to retrenchment and the provisions of s. 25F of the Act having not been complied with the termination was  ille- gal. The appellant’s writ petition therefrom was dismissed. C.A. No. 1817 of 1982     The  respondent  workman was employed by  the  appellant Bank on 3.10.1962 as a clerk and he was put on probation for six months. As allegedly there was total lack of  confidence of  the  bank in the employee it terminated his  service  on 27.7.1974 on payment of three month’s salary. The industrial tribunal by its award dated 3.12.1981 directed reinstatement of  the workman with full back wages on the ground  of  non- compliance  with the provisions of s. 25F of the  Industrial Disputes Act. The employer Bank now appeals from that Award. C.A. No. 1898 of 1982     Respondent  Nos. 2-6 were employed on probation  by  the appellant  a partnership firm on 12.6.1975. Respondent  Nos. 2-5  assaulted a supervisor and being afraid of  police  re- mained  absent from 29.3.1976 and abandoned their  jobs  and their  services  were terminated. Respondent No.  6  stopped attending  duties from 9.8.1975 and he left the  service  of his  own accord. The Labour Court by its Award  dated  16.9. 1980  held that their termination amounted  to  retrenchment and was illegal for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 25F of the Act and they were entitled to reinstatement  with full back wages. The Management’s writ petition  challenging the Award having been unsuccessful, it has appealed. C.A. No. 3261 of 1982     Respondent Namdeo was a clerk under the appellant  Maha- rashtra  State  Road Transport Corporation.  Pursuant  to  a disciplinary 118 proceeding  his  service  was terminated  with  effect  from 23.4.1963  by giving him one month’s salary in lieu  of  no- tice.  Moved by the respondent, the  Assistant  Commissioner under s. 16 of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes  Settle-

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ment  Act, 1947 held the Inquiry Proceeding to be  an  empty paper  formality and the termination amounted  to  dismissal and  accordingly  he set aside the order  and  directed  the corporation to reinstate and pay him his back wages  amount- ing  to  Rs. 15,97 1.66 within one  month.  The  Corporation having  moved the State Industrial Court at Nagpur under  s. 16(5)  of the Settlement Act, that Court by its order  dated 29.9.1973 allowed the application and set aside the  Assist- ant  Labour Commissioner’s judgment and dismissed the  work- man’s application holding that the acts of misconduct fairly stood  proved and he deserved to be dismissed from  service. The  High Court on being moved by the workman set aside  the Labour  Court’s  order and restored that  of  the  Assistant Labour Commissioner. Hence this appeal. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3025  ..........  OF 1990     The  services  of the workman Sri Pratap  Singh,  driver respondent No. 3 were terminated with effect from 18.10.1974 under clause 9(a)(i) of the DRTA (Conditions of  Appointment and  Service) Regulations 1952. As the conciliation  efforts failed, the order was placed before the Labour Court, Delhi, who set aside the order on the ground of noncompliance  with the  provisions of s. 25F of the Act and ordered  reinstate- ment  with  full back wages and continuity of  service.  The High Court having dismissed the writ petition therefrom, the appellant  seeks special leave. We grant special  leave  and hear the appeal. C.A. No. 885 of 1980     The workmen appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were discharged on I 1.11.1972  for  their  trade union  activities.  The  Labour Court, Bombay by its Award dated 25.8.1977 refused to inter- fere.  Challenge  to  the Award in  the  High  Court  having failed, the workmen appealed to this Court. C.A. No. 1866 of 1982     The workman respondent No. 2 reported for artisan train- ing  on  25.9.1963 and was absorbed as  artisan  trainee  on 16.3.1964. He was made a skilled machine operator, under the appellant  company  and  was  discharged  with  effect  from 23.7.1970. The Labour Court by its 119 Award  dated 1.8.1980 held the termination to be illegal  on ground  of non-compliance of s. 25F of the Act,  though  the order  of discharge was issued under Standing  Order  18(1). The Company has appealed against the said order. C.A. No. 1868 of 1984     The respondent was an employee in the appellant’s facto- ry  as welder and his services were terminated  with  effect from  21.11.1972  under Standing Order No.  28.  The  Labour Court by its Award dated 30.12.1980 held the order of termi- nation  amounted to retrenchment and bad for  non-compliance with s. 25F and hence set it aside and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. Hence this appeal. C.A. No. 8456 of 1983     The respondent was dismissed by the  appellant--Corpora- tion  after  disciplinary inquiry by order  dated  28.5.1971 paying  one  month’s wages in advance.  The  workman  having raised  an industrial dispute, the Labour Court,  Aurangabad by  its Award dated 9.11.1979 held the order of  termination to  be  legal  and proper. The  respondent’s  writ  petition therefrom  was  allowed and the Award was  quashed  and  the workman  was declared entitled t0 reinstatement. Hence  this appeal. C.A. No. 10828 of 1983.     The  respondent was a store keeper of  Rungta  Colliery. His  name  was  struck off the rolls of  the  Colliery  with effect  from 8.7.1975. He having raised an  industrial  dis-

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pute,  the Industrial Tribunal, Jabalpur by its Award  dated 22.8.1977  held the striking off t0 be unjustified and  that the  termination  amounted to retrenchment and bad  for  non payment  of  retrenchment  compensation.  In  the  workman’s Letters  Patent Appeal the Division Bench of the High  Court also  held  that the termination amounted  to  retrenchment. Hence this Management’s appeal.     The respective cases were argued with some dexterity  by the  learned counsel Mr. B.N. Singhvi, Mr. N.B. Shetye,  Mr. S.S.  Javali, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. V.A. Bobde,  Mr.  M.K. Ramamurthy, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran & Mr. R.S. Hegde.      On  the above diverse facts two rival  contentions  are raised by the parties. The learned counsel for the employers contend that the word ’retrenchment’ as defined in s.  2(00) of the Act means termination of 120 service  of a workman only by way of surplus labour for  any reason  whatsoever.  The learned  counsel  representing  the workmen counted that ’retrenchment’ means termination of the service  of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other  than those  expressly excluded by the definition in s.  2(00)  of the Act.     The  precise  question  to  be  decided,  therefore,  is whether  on  a  proper construction  of  the  definition  of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) of the Act, it means  termination by  the  employer  of the service of a  workman  as  surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by the  employer  of the service of a workman  for  any  reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by  way of disciplinary action, and those expressly excluded by  the definition.  In other words, the question to be  decided  is whether the word "retrenchment" in the definition has to  be understood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning  or in its wider literal meaning.     Mr.  N.B.  Shetye, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, and  the  learned counsel  adopting their arguments refer to the  introduction of the provision of "retrenchment" in the Act.  Retrenchment was  not defined either in the repealed Trade Disputes  Act, 1929, or in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as originally enacted.  Owing to a crisis in the textile industry in  Bom- bay,  apprehending  large scale termination of  services  of workmen,  the Government of India issued an Ordinance  which later  became the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act,  1953 (Act 43 of 1953) which was deemed to have come into force on the  24th  day of October,  1953.  Besides  introducing  the definitions of "lay-off" [Clause 2 (kkk)] and "Retrenchment" [Clause  2(oo)]  this Amendment Act of  1953  also  inserted Chapter  VII  in  the Act which  dealt  with  "lay-off"  and "Retrenchment". That Chapter contained sections 25A to  25J. Section  25A  provided that sections 25C  to  25E  inclusive shall  not apply to certain categories of industrial  estab- lishments. Section 25C dealt with right of workmen  laid-off compensation. Section 25D provided for maintenance of muster rolls  of  workmen by employers and section 25E  stated  the cases  in  which the workmen were not  entitled  to  lay-off compensation. Section 25F dealt with conditions precedent to retrenchment  of workmen. Section 25G dealt  with  procedure for retrenchment and section 25H dealt with re-employment of retrenched workmen; and section 25J dealing with the  effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter said that the  provi- sions  of  this Chapter shall  have  effect  notwithstanding anything  inconsistent therewith contained in any other  law (including standing orders made under the Industrial Employ- ment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (XX of 1946); 121

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provided  that  nothing  contained in this  Act  shall  have effect to derogate from any fight which a workman has  under any  award for the time being in operation or  any  contract with the employer.     The  Statement of Objects and Reasons of  the  Amendment Act, 1953 was as under: "The  Industrial  Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 1953  seeks  to provide for payment of compensation to workmen in the  event of their lay-off or retrenchment. The provisions included in the  Bill are not new and were discussed at various  tripar- tite  meetings.  Those relating to lay-off are based  on  an agreement  entered into between the representatives  of  em- ployers  and  workers who attended the 13th session  of  the Standing  Labour Committee. In regard to  retrenchment,  the Bill  provides  that a workman who has  been  in  continuous employment  for  not less than one year  under  an  employer shall not be retrenched until he has been given one  month’s notice  in  writing  or one month’s wages in  lieu  of  such notice  and also a gratuity calculated at 15  days’  average pay for every completed year of service or any part  thereof in excess of six months. A similar provision was included in the  Labour  Relations Bill, 1950, which has  since  lapsed. Though compensation on the lines provided for in the Bill is given by all progressive employers, it is felt that a common standard should be set for all employers" Clause 2(00) as inserted read as under: "’Retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service  of  a workman for any reason  whatsoever  otherwise than  as a punishment inflicted by way of  disciplinary  ac- tion, but does not include-- (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of  super- annuation if the contract of employment between the employer and  the  workman concerned contains a stipulation  in  that behalf; or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health." 122 We  are  referred to contemporaneous interpretation  of  the word "retrenchment. In Employees of Messrs India Reconstruc- tion  Corporation  Ltd., Calcutta v. Messers.  India  Recon- struction Corporation Ltd., reported in 1953 LAC 563 it  was observed by the Calcutta High Court: "Ordinarily  retrenchment  means discharge from  service  of only the surplus part of the labour force but in the case of closure  the whole labour force is dispensed with.  In  sub- stance  the difference between closure and normal  retrench- ment  is one of degree only. As in the case of  retrenchment so  in the case of closure the workmen are  not  responsible for  closing their jobs. In both the cases, what  is  called compensation by way of retrenchment relief should be  admis- sible."     In  Messrs  Benett  Coleman and Company  Ltd.  v.  Their Employees,  reported in 1954 LAC 24 it was observed by  Cal- cutta High Court: "Thus whether the closure was justified or not, the  workmen who  have lost their jobs would in any event  get  compensa- tion.  If it was not bona fide or not justified, it  may  be that the measure of compensation would be larger than if  it was otherwise."     The  above  almost contemporaneous exposition  is  worth consideration, Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortio- sima  in lege, (2 Inst. 11). Contemporaneous  exposition  is the  best  and strongest in the law. A statute is  best  ex- plained by following the construction put upon it by  judges

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who lived at the time it was made.     In  Pipraich  Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich  Sugar  Mills Mazdoor  Union, [1956] SCR 872, the appellant company  could not work its mills to full capacity owing to short supply of sugar-cane and got the permission of the Government to  sell its machinery but continued crushing cane under a lease from the purchaser. The workmen’s union in order to frustrate the transaction  resolved to go on strike and serving  a  strike notice did not cooperate with the management with the result that it lost heavily. On the expiry of the lease and closure of  the  industry,  the services of the  workmen  were  duly terminated by the company. The workmen claimed the share  of profits on the basis of the offer earlier made by the compa- ny and accepted by the workers. The company having  declined to pay and the dispute having been referred, 123 the  Industrial Tribunal held that the company was bound  to pay and accordingly awarded a sum of Rs.45,000  representing their share of the profits and the award was affirmed by the Labour  Appellate  Tribunal. Question before this  Court  in appeal  was  whether the termination of the workmen  on  the closure  of  the industry amounted to retrenchment.  It  was held that the award was not one for compensation for  termi- nation  of  the services of the workmen on  closure  of  the industry, as such discharge was different from the discharge on retrenchment, which implied the continuance of the indus- try  and discharge only of the surplusage, and  the  workmen were  not entitled either under the law as it stood  on  the day  of their discharge or even on merits to  any  compensa- tion.     The  contention of the workmen was that even before  the enactment of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953,  the tribunal had acted on the view that the retrenchment includ- ed discharge on closure of business and had awarded  compen- sation on that footing and that the award of the tribunal in Pipraich’s  case could be supported in that view and  should not be disturbed. This was based on the decision in  Employ- ees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Ltd. Calcutta v.  Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation  Ltd.,  (supra); and Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd. v. Their  Employ- ees, (supra). But their Lordship did not agree.  Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the four Judge Bench said: "Though  there  is discharge of workmen both when  there  is retrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to be awarded under the law, not for discharge as such but  for discharge on retrenchment, and if, as is conceded, retrench- ment  means in ordinary parlance, discharge of the  surplus, it cannot include discharge on closure of business."     As  a result it was held that the Award in Pipraich  was against  the agreement and could not be supported as one  of compensation to the workmen.     Thus this Court in Pipraich (supra) was dealing with the question whether the discharge of the workmen on closure  of the  undertaking would constitute retrenchment  and  whether the  workmen were entitled on that account  to  retrenchment compensation; and it was observed that retrenchment connoted in  its  ordinary acceptation that the business  itself  was being continued but that a portion of the staff or 124 the labour force was discharged as surplusage and the termi- nation  of  services of all the workmen as a result  of  the closure  of the business could not, therefore,  be  properly described  as retrenchment, which in the  ordinary  parlance meant  discharge from the service and did not  include  dis- charge on closure of business.

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   The  same view was expressed in  Hariprasad  Shivshankar Shukla  v. A.D. Divikar, [1957] SCR 121; also  reported  sub nomine  Barsi Light Railway Co. v. K.N. Joglekar,  [1957]  1 L.L.J.  243 (SC), wherein the Constitution Bench  heard  two appeals;  namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 103 and 105 of 1956.  In Civil  Appeal  No. 105 of 1956 the main  appellant  was  the Barsi Light Railway Company Ltd., and the principal respond- ent was the President of the Barsi Light Railwaymen’s Union. Under  an agreement dated August 1, 1895 between the  Secre- tary of State for India in Council and the Railway  Company, the  Secretary  of State could purchase and  take  over  the undertaking after giving Railway Company a notice. On Decem- ber  19, 1952 a notice was given to the Railway Company  for and on behalf of the President of India that the undertaking of the Railway Company would be purchased and taken over  as from  January  1, 1954. On November 11,  1953,  the  Railway Company served a notice on its workmen intimating that as  a result of the talking over, the services of all the  workmen of the Railway Company would be terminated with effect  from December  31, 1953. The notice further stated that the  Gov- ernment of India intended to employ such of the staff of the company as would be willing to serve on the railway on terms and conditions which were to be notified later. About 77 per cent of the staff of the Railway Company were reemployed  on the same scales of pay, about 23 per cent were reemployed on somewhat  lower scales of pay and only about 24 per cent  of the former employees of the Railway Company declined service under  the Government. Applications for compensation  having been filed on behalf of the erstwhile workmen of the Railway Company  under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936,  for payment  of  retrenchment compensation to the  said  workmen under  clause  (b) of s. 25F of the Act,  the  question  was whether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compen- sation  under clause (b) of s. 25F of the Act;  and  whether they had been retrenched by their former employer within the meaning  of  the expression ’retrenchment’ in  the  Act.  In Civil  Appeal  No. 103 of 1956, the main appellant  was  Sri Dinesh  Mills Ltd. Baroda and the principal  respondent  was District  Labour Officer and Inspector under the Payment  of Wages Act. The appellant company was running a woollen  mill at Baroda and had abut 450 workmen and 20 clerks who  worked in shifts day and night. On or about October 31, 125 1953, the appellant put up a notice declaring its  intention to  close down the entire mill. As a result of the  closure, the services of all 450 workmen and 20 clerks were terminat- ed  and the appellant company claimed that the  closure  was bona fide being due to heavy losses sustained by the  compa- ny. The principal respondent claimed retrenchment  compensa- tion for the workmen of the appellant under clause (b) of s. 25F of the Act. Section 25F at the relevant time stood as follows: "25F.  Conditions precedent to retrenchment of  workmen.--No workman employed in any industry who has been in  continuous service  for not less than one year under an employer  shall be retrenched by that employer until-- (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating  the reasons for retrenchment and the  period  of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu  of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;            Provided  that no such notice shall be  necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies  a date for the termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of  retrenchment, compensation  which  shall be equivalent  to  fifteen  days’

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average pay for every completed year of service or any  part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the  appro- priate Government."      In  both the appeals the question before the  Constitu- tion  Bench was whether the claim of the  erstwhile  workmen both  of the Railway Company and of Shri Dinesh Mills  Ltd., to the compensation under clause(b) of s. 25F of the Act was a  valid claim in law. Observing that the Act had a  ’plexus of  amendments’, and some of the recent amendments had  been quite extensive in nature and that s. 25F occurred in Ch. VA of  the Act which dealt with ’lay off and  retrenchment’  in the  Amending  Act, and analysing s. 25F as it  then  stood, S.K.  Das, J. speaking for the Constitution  Bench  observed that  in the first part of the section both the  words  ’re- trenched’  and ’retrenchment’ were used and  obviously  they had the same meaning except that one was verb 126 and  the  other was a noun and that to appreciate  the  true scope  and effect of s. 25F one must first  understand  what was meant by the expression ’retrenched’ or ’retrenchment’-     Analysing  the definition of ’retrenchment’ in s.  2(00) the Court found in it the following four essential  require- ments: (a) termination of the service of a workman;, (b)  by the employer; (c) for any reason whatsoever; and (d)  other- wise  than as a punishment inflicted by way of  disciplinary action. The Court then said: "It  must  be conceded that the definition is in  very  wide terms. The question, however, before us is does this defini- tion merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion  of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does  it go  so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as  to include  the  termination of services of all workmen  in  an industry when the industry itself ceases to exist on a  bona fide  closure or discontinuance of his business by  the  em- ployer?" The Court further said: "There  is  no  doubt that when the act  itself  provides  a dictionary  for the words used, we must look into that  dic- tionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the  legislature;  our task is to get the intention  as  ex- pressed  in  the  statute. Therefore, we  propose  first  to examine the language of the definition and see if the  ordi- nary, accepted notion of retrenchment fits in, squarely  and fairly, with the language used."     The  Court  reiterated  the  following  observations  in Pipraich (supra): "But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation  that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the  staff of the labour force is discharged  as  surplusage and  the  termination of services of all the  workmen  as  a result  of the closure of the business cannot  therefore  be properly described as retrenchment." 127 This  was the ordinary accepted notion of ’retrenchment’  in an  industry  before  addition of s. 2(oo) to  the  Act,  as retrenchment  in that case took place in 1951.  Replying  to the  argument  that by excluding the bona  fide  closure  of business as one of the reasons for termination of the  serv- ice  of workmen by the employer, one would be  cutting  down the amplitude of the expression ’for any reason  whatsoever’ and  reading  into the definition the words  which  did  not occur  there,  the  Court agreed that the  adoption  of  the

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ordinary  meaning  would  give to the  expression  ’for  any reason whatsoever’ a somewhat narrower scope; one might  say that  it would get a colour in the context in which  expres- sion occurred; but the Court did not agree that it  amounted to  importing new words in the definition and said that  the legislature  in  using that expression said in  effect:  "It does not matter why you are discharging the surplus; if  the other requirements of the definition are fulfilled, then  it is retrenchment". In the absence of any compelling words  to indicate that the intention was to include bona fide closure of the whole business, it would be divorcing the  expression altogether  from its context to give it such a wide  meaning as was contended. About the nature of the definition it  was said: "It  is  true that an artificial definition  may  include  a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary accepta- tion  of  the word which is the subject of  definition;  but there  must  then be compelling words to show  that  such  a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary  meaning is  intended.  Where, within the framework of  the  ordinary acceptation  of  the word, every single requirement  of  the definition  clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong  to  take the  definition as destroying the essential meaning  of  the word defined."      The  Court in Hariprasad dealt with two  other  conten- tions;  one  was that before the amending Act  of  1953  the retrenchment  had acquired a special meaning which  included the payment of compensation on a closure of business and the legislature  gave effect to that meaning in  the  definition clause  and  by inserting section 25F. The second  was  that section 25FF inserted in 1956 by Act 41 of 1956 was ’Parlia- mentary exposition’ of the meaning of the definition  clause and of section 25F. Rejecting the contentions the Court held that retrenchment meant the discharge of surplus workmen  in an  existing  or  continuing business; it  had  acquired  no special  meaning  so as to include discharge of  workmen  on bona  fide  closure of business, though a number  of  Labour Appellate Tribunals awarded compensation to 128 workmen  on closure of business as an equitable  relief  for variety of reasons. The Court accordingly held: "... that retrenchment as defined in s. 2(00) and as used in s.  25  has  no wider meaning than  the  ordinary,  accepted connotation  of the word; it means the discharge of  surplus labour  or staff by the employer for any reason  whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of discipli- nary action, and it has no application where the services of all workmen have been terminated by the employer on real and bona fide closure of business as in the’ case of Shri Dinesh Mills  Ld.  or where the services of all workmen  have  been terminated  by the employer on the business  or  undertaking being  taken over by another employer in circumstances  like those of the Railway Company."     It  is interesting to note that the Amending Act No.  41 of 1956 inserted original section 25FF on September 4, 1956. The objects and reasons were stated thus: "Doubt  has  been raised whether  retrenchment  compensation under  the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 becomes  payable  by reason  merely of the fact that there has been a  change  of employers,  even if the service of the workman is  continued without  interruption  and the terms and conditions  of  his service remain unaltered. This has created difficulty in the transfer, re-constitution and amalgamation of companies  and it  is  proposed  to make the intention  clear  by  amending section 25F of the Act."

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   Hariprasad’s  case (supra) was decided on  November  27, 1956. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (4 of 1957) was promulgated immediately thereafter with  effect from December 1, 1956 and that Ordinance was replaced by the Industrial  Disputes (Amendment) Act 1957 (XVIII  of  1957). The following was the Statement of Objects and Reasons: "In  a  judgment delivered on the 27th November,  1956,  the Supreme  Court  held that no retrenchment  compensation  was payable  under section 25F of the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947,  to workmen whose services were terminated by  an  em- ployer on a real and bona fide closure of business, or  when termination occurred as a result of transfer of owner- 129 ship  from one employer to another (see AIR 1957 SC  12  1). This  has  led and is likely to lead to a  large  number  of workmen  being  rendered  unemployed without  any  compensa- tion.  In  order to meet this situation  which  was  causing hardship  to  workmen, it was considered necessary  to  take immediate  action  and the Industrial  Disputes  (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (4 of 1957), was promulgated with retrospec- tive effect from 1st December, 1956." "This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of Parliament  enact- ing  the  provisions contained in sections 25FF  and  25FFF. These  sections provide that ’compensation would be  payable to  workmen whose services are terminated on account of  the transfer or closure of undertakings.’ In the case of  trans- fer of undertakings, however, if the workman is  re-employed on  terms  and conditions which are not less  favourable  to him,  he will not be entitled to any compensation. This  was the  position  which existed prior to the  decision  of  the Supreme Court. In the case of closure of business on account of the circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the maximum compensation payable to workmen has been limited  to his  average  pay for three months. If  the  undertaking  is engaged  in  any  construction work and it  is  closed  down within  two years on account of the completion of its  work, no compensation would be payable to workmen employed  there- in."      Hariprasad (supra) having accepted the ordinary contex- tual meaning of retrenchment, namely, termination of surplus labour  as the major premise it was surely open to the  Par- liament to have amended the definition of retrenchment in s. 2(00) of the Act. Instead of doing that the Parliament added s. 25FF and 25FFF which said: "25FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of under- takings--Where the ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by operation of law, from the employer, in relation to that undertaking to a  new employer,  every workman who has been in continuous  service for  not less than one year in that undertaking  immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compen- sation in accordance with the provisions of section 25F,  as if the workman had been retrenched: 130          Provided  that nothing in this section shall  apply to  a workman in any case where there has been a  change  of employers by reason of the transfer, if-- (a)  the service of the workman has not been interrupted  by such transfer; (b)  the terms and conditions of service applicable  to  the workman after such transfer are not in any way less  favour- able to the workman than those applicable to him immediately before the transfer; and (c) the new employer is under the terms of such transfer  or otherwise,  legally  liable to pay to the  workman,  in  the

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event  of his retrenchment, compensation on the  basis  that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer." "25FFF.  Compensation to workmen in case of closing down  of undertakings--(1)  Where an undertaking is closed  down  for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in contin- uous service for not less than one year in that  undertaking immediately before such closure shall, subject to the provi- sions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and  compen- sation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched;          Provided that where the undertaking is closed  down on  account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the  control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the  workmen under clause (b) of section 25-F shall not exceed his  aver- age pay for three months." Thus, by this Amendment Act the Parliament clearly  provided that though such termination may not have been  retrenchment technically  so-called, as decided by this Court,  neverthe- less the employees in question whose services were terminat- ed  by the transfer or closure of the undertaking  would  be entitled  to  compensation, as if the said  termination  was retrenchment.  As  it has been observed, the words  "as  if" brought  out  the  legal  distinction  between  retrenchment defined by s. 2(00) as it was interpreted by this Court  and termination  of  services consequent upon  transfer  of  the undertaking.  In other words, the provision was that  though termination of services on transfer or closure of 131 the  undertaking may not be retrenchment, the  workmen  con- cerned were entitled to compensation as if the said termina- tion was retrenchment.     Thus  we  find that till then the  accepted  meaning  of retrenchment  was ordinary, contextual and narrower  meaning of termination of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever.     In  Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural and  Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 730, a  company running a sugar mill was suffering losses every year due  to insufficient  supply  of sugarcane and wanted to  shift  the mill.  The  cane-growers formed a co-operative  society  and purchased  the mill. As agreed between the company  and  the society, the company terminated the services of the  employ- ees and paid retrenchment compensation to them under section 25FF  of  the  Act. This society employed some  of  the  old employees  and refused to absorb some of them who raised  an industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal having  directed the  purchaser-society by its award to re-employ  them,  the society contended that it was not a successor in-interest of the  company  and hence the claim of re-employment  was  not sustainable  and the services of the employees  having  been terminated upon payment of compensation by the company under s. 25FF no claim could be made against the transferee socie- ty.  This Court held that the society was the  successor-in- interest of the company as it carried on the same or similar business  as was carried by the vendor company at  the  same place  and without substantial break in continuity.  It  was further  held that the employees were not entitled  to  both compensation  for termination of service and  immediate  re- employment  at the hands of the transferee and  section  25H was not applicable to the case as the termination of service upon  transfer or closure was not retrenchment  properly  so called and that termination of service dealt with in s. 25FF could not be equated with retrenchment covered by s. 25F. It was  observed  that  the words ’as if’ in  s.  25FF  clearly distinguished  retrenchment under s. 2(00)  and  termination

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under s. 25FF. Gajendragadkar, J., as he then was,  speaking for the five Judges Bench said that in Hariprasad this Court was called upon to consider the true scope and effect of the concept  of retrenchment as defined in s. 2(00) and it  held that the said definition had to be read in the light of  the accepted  connotation  of the words, and as such,  it  could have  no wider meaning than the ordinary connotation of  the word  and according to this connotation  retrenchment  meant the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any  reason  whatsoever,  otherwise’ then  as  a  punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and did 132 not  include termination of services of all workmen  on  the bona  fide closure of industry or on change of ownership  or management thereof. It was observed: "   .....  the effect of this decision was that  though  the definition  of  the  word ’retrenchment’  may  perhaps  have included  the termination of services caused by the  closure of  the concern or by its transfer, these two  latter  cases could  not be held to fall under the definition  because  of the  ordinary  accepted connotation of the said  word.  This decision  necessarily meant that the word ’retrenchment’  in s. 25FF had to bear a corresponding interpretation."     In Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The outgoing  Manage- ment of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., reported in [1964] 5 SCR 602, it was similarly observed at page 613 of the report: "In  dealing with the question of retrenchment in the  light of  the relevant provisions to which we have just  referred, it  is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the  manage- ment can retrench its employees only for proper reasons.  It is undoubtedly true that it is for the ’management to decide the strength of its labour force, for the number of  workmen required  to carry out efficiently the work involved in  the industrial  undertaking of any employer must always be  left to  be determined by the management in its  discretion,  and so,  occasions  may arise when the number of  employees  may exceed the reasonable and legitimate needs of the  undertak- ing. In such a case, if any workman become surplus, it would be  open  to the management to retrench  them.  Workmen  may become  surplus on the ground of rationalisation or  on  the ground  of economy reasonably and bona fide adopted  by  the management, or of other industrial or trade reasons. In  all these cases, the management would be justified in  effecting retrenchment in its labour force. Thus, though the right  of the  management to effect retrenchment can not  normally  be questioned, when a dispute arises before an Industrial Court in  regard to the validity of any retrenchment, it would  be necessary  for industrial adjudication to  consider  whether the impugned retrenchment was justified for proper  reasons. It  would not be open to the management either  capriciously or  without  any reason at all to say that  it  proposes  to reduce its labour 133 force  for  no  rhyme or reason. This position  can  not  be seriously disputed"     In  Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v.  Shambhu  Nath Mukherjee  and Ors., reported in [1978] 1 SCR 591 where  the post  of motion setter was abolished and the respondent  was given  a job of a trainee on probation for the post  of  As- sistant  Line Fixer and the management found him  unsuitable for  the job even after extending his probation period  upto nine  months and offered him the post of fitter on the  same pay and the respondent instead of accepting the offer wanted to be given another chance to show his efficiency in his job and the management struck off his name from the rolls  with-

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out  complying with the provisions of s. 25F(a) and  (b)  of the  Act  and  the Labour Court having given  award  in  the respondent’s  favour and the appellant’s writ  petition  was rejected  by the High Court, Goswami, J. speaking for  three Judges  Bench  said: "Striking off the name of  the  workman from  the  rolls  by the management is  termination  of  his service. Such termination of service is retrenchment  within the meaning of s. 2(00) of the Act. There is nothing to show that the provisions of section 25F (a) and (b) were complied with  by the management in this case. The provisions  of  s. 25F(a),  the  proviso apart, and (b) are mandatory  and  any order  of retrenchment in violation of these two  peremptory conditions precedent is invalid." The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The earlier decisions were not referred to.     Next comes the decision in State Bank of India v.   Shri N. Sundara Money, reported [1976] 3 SCR 160, (Y.V.  Chandra- chud, V.R. Krishna lyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ.). In an applica- tion  under Article 226, the respondent on automatic  extin- guishment  of  his  service consequent  to  the  pre-emptive provision  as  to  the temporariness of the  period  of  his employment  in his appointment letter claiming to have  been deemed  to have had continuous service for one  year  within the  meaning of s. 25(B)(2) of the Act, the Single Bench  of the High Court having allowed his writ petition and the writ appeal  of the appellant having also failed, this  Court  in appeal found as fact that the appointment was purely  tempo- rary  one  for a period of 9 days but  might  be  terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the  peti- tioner’s  discretion; and the employment  unless  terminated earlier,  would  automatically cease at the  expiry  of  the period i.e. 18.11.1972. This 9 days’ employment added on  to what  had gone before ripened to a continuous service for  a year  "on  the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days  of  broken bits  of service" and considering the meaning of  ’retrench- ment’ it was held that the expression for any reason whatso- ever 134 was  very  wide and almost admitting of  no  exception.  The contention  of the employer was that when the order  of  ap- pointment  carried an automatic cessatioin of  service,  the period  of employment worked itself out by efflux  of  time, not  by  act  of employer and such cases  were  outside  the concept  of  retrenchment. This Court observed that  to  re- trench  is  to cut down and one could not  retrench  without trenching or cutting, but "dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction where the benignant moo&of a law and, more emphatically, the definition clause furnish a different denotation." Accepting the literal meaning, Krishna Iyer, J. observed: "A break down of s. 2(00) unmistakably expands the semantics of retrenchment. ’Termination  .....  for any reason whatso- ever’ are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termina- tion  spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has  the employee’s  service been terminated? Verbal  apparel  apart, the substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or  the running  out  of the stipulated term. To  protect  the  weak against  the strong this policy of comprehensive  definition has  been effectuated. Termination embraces not  merely  the act of termination by the employer, but the fact of termina- tion  howsoever produced. May be, the present may be a  hard case, but we can visualise abuses by employers, by  suitable verbal  devices, circumventing the amount of s. 25F  and  s. 2(00).  Without speculating on possibilities, we  may  agree that  ’retrenchment’ is no longer terra incognita  but  area

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covered  by an expansive definition. It means ’to end,  con- clude,  cease.’ In the present case the  employment  ceased, concluded,  ended on the expiration of 9 days  automatically may  be, but cessation all the same. That to write into  the order  of  appointment the date of  termination  confers  no mokshas from s. 25F (b) is inferable from the proviso to  s. 25F(1).  True,  the section speaks of  retrenchment  by  the employer  and it is urged that some act of volition  by  the employer  to  bring about the termination  is  essential  to attract  s.  25F and a omatic extinguishment of  service  by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient." It was further observed: "Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially 135 to suit the social philosophy of the statute. So screened we hold that the transitive and intransitive senses are covered in  the  current context. Moreover, an  employer  terminates employment  not  merely by passing an order as  the  service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one  giving employment and the other ending or limiting it.. A separate, subsequent  determination is not the sole magnetic  pull  of the  provision.  A  pre-emptive provision  to  terminate  is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexterity  of  diction cannot defeat  the  articulated  con- science of the provision."     The  precedents  including Hariprasad do not  appear  to have  been brought to the notice of their Lordship  in  this case.  It  may be noted that since Delhi Cloth  and  General Mills (supra) a change in interpretation of retrenchment  in s. 2(00) of the Act is clearly discernible.     Mr. Venugopal would submit that the Judgment in  Sundara Money’s case and for that matter the subsequent decisions in the  line  are per incuriam for two reasons: (i)  that  they failed t0 apply the law laid down by the Constitution  Bench of  this Hon’ble Court in Hariprasad Shukla’s  case  (supra) and (ii) for the reason that they have ignored the impact of two  of  the provisions introduced by the Amendment  Act  of 1953 along with the definition of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) and  s.  25F  namely, ss. 25G and 25H.  We  agree  with  the learned  counsel that the question of the  subsequent  deci- sions  being per incuriam could arise only if the  ratio  of Sundara  Money’s  case and the subsequent Judgments  in  the line was in conflict with the ratio in the Hariprasad  Shuk- la’s case (supra) and Anakapalla’s case (supra). The  issue, it is urged, was, whether it was necessary for the Court  to interpret  s.  2(00) as being restricted to  termination  of services  of  workmen  rendered surplus for  arriving  at  a decision in the case and if it was unnecessary to so  inter- pret  s. 2(00) for the purpose of arriving at a decision  in that case, the interpretation of s. 2(00) would  necessarily by  rendered obiter. According to counsel, the long  discus- sion  on  interpretation of s. 2(00) could  not  be  brushed aside  as either obiter or mere casual observations  of  the Constitution Bench.      It  is urged that for the.purpose of  ratio  decidendi, the  question is not whether a subsequent Bench of  the  Su- preme Court thinks that it was necessary or unnecessary  for the  Constitution Bench, of the earlier Bench to have  dealt with  the issue, but whether the Constitution  Bench  itself thought it necessary to interpret Section 2(00) for 136 arriving at its final decision. If the smaller Bench of  the Supreme Court could ignore the earlier decision of a  larger Bench  of the Supreme Court by holding that in its  opinion, it was not necessary for the earlier Bench to have gone into

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the issue, equally it would be open to a High Court to adopt the  same approach and ignore binding Judgments of  the  Su- preme Court; giving rise to judicial indiscipline. According to counsel the Constitution Bench, in its unanimous verdict, undoubtedly found it necessary to go into the interpretation of  s. 2(00) and did so with elaborate reasoning  supporting its findings, because if the contention of the Management in that  case was accepted, namely, that  "retrenchment"  would cover  only  termination of surplus labour  for  any  reason whatsoever,  the  logical result of this finding,  would  be twofold: (i) that the termination of the entirety of workmen by reason of closure, would not be a termination of  workmen rendered surplus and, therefore, a case of closure would  be outside  s.  2(00), and (ii) secondly, such  termination  of workmen  rendered surplus, could arise only if the  industry continued to be a running industry.     The  question whether the positive content of  s.  2(00) restricting the definition of workmen rendered surplus,  for any reason, whatsoever, is part of the ratio or not, submits Mr. Venugopal, is wholly an academic question in view of the fact  that  as  many as 9 High Courts  have  restricted  the applicability of s. 25F, 25G and 25H to only cases of termi- nation of services of surplus labour for any reason  whatso- ever and not to other types of termination, whatever may  be the  reason for such termination. Even if a Judgment was  to be based on two alternative reasons or conclusions, each one of these alternative reasons or basis, would form the  ratio of  the Judgment. It is also urged that the  argument  would equally  apply to the ratio of Anakapalla’s  case  rendering the Judgments in Sundra Money’s case and the later decisions per  incuriam, for not having noticed or followed a  binding precedent  of the Supreme Court itself, as the  Judgment  of the Constitution Bench binds smaller Divisions of the Court.     We now deal with the question of per incuriam by  reason of allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions. The  Latin expression per incuriam means  through  inadvert- ence.  A  decision  can be said generally t0  be  given  per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a  previ- ous  decision of its own or when a High Court has  acted  in ignorance of a decision of this Court. It can not be doubted that  Art. 141 embodies, as a rule of law, the  doctrine  of precedents on which our judicial system is based. In  Bengal Immunity  Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar, [1955] 2 SCR  603, it was held that the words of Art. 137 14 1, "binding on all courts within the territory of India", though  wide  enough to include the Supreme  Court,  do  not include the Supreme Court itself, and it is not bound by its own judgments but is free to reconsider them in  appropriate cases.  This is necessary for proper development of law  and justice.  May be for the same reasons before judgments  were given in the House of Lords in Re-Dawson’s Settlement Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Dawson and Ors., [1966] 1 WLR 1234, on July 26, 1966  Lord  Gardiner, L.C. made the following  statement  on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: "Their  Lordships regard the use of precedent as  an  indis- pensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its  application to individual cases. It provides  at  least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely  in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development  of  legal rules. Their  Lordships  nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead  to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict  the proper  development of the law. They propose, therefore,  to modify  their  present practice and, while  treating  former

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decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart  from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.           In  this  connection they will bear  in  mind  the danger  of  disturbing retrospectively the  basis  on  which contracts,  settlements of property and fiscal  arrangements have  been entered into and also the especial need for  cer- tainty as to the criminal law."     Though the above announcement was not made in the course of judicial proceeding it shows that it is open to House  of Lords to depart from the doctrine of precedent when  consid- ered justified. Section 2 12 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 141 of the Constitution of India were  enacted to make the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts in the country excluding, as is now being  interpret- ed, the Supreme Court itself. The doctrine of ratio deciden- di has also to be interpreted in the same line. In England a decision is said to be given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court  of  co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered  the  case before  it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a  decision of  the  House of Lords. In the former case it  must  decide which  decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound  by the  decision of the House of Lords. It has been  said  that the decision of the House of 138 Lords  mentioned above, refers to a decision  subsequent  to that  of the Court of Appeal. However, "a prior decision  of the  House  of Lords inconsistent with the decision  of  the Court  of  Appeal, but which was not cited to the  Court  of Appeal  will make the later decision of the Court of  Appeal of  no value as given per incuriam." But if the prior  deci- sion  had been cited to the Court of Appeal and  that  court had  misinterpreted  a  previous decision of  the  House  of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and  leave the House to rectify the mistake.  In  Halsbury’s Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. 10 para 745 it has been said: "While  former decisions of the House are  normally  binding upon it, the House will depart from one of its own  previous decisions when it appears right in the interests of  justice and  of  the proper development of the law to do  so.  Cases where  the House may reconsider its own  previous  decisions are those involving broad issues of justice or public policy and  questions of legal principle. Only in rare  cases  will the  House reconsider questions of construction of  statutes or  other  documents.  The House is not bound  to  follow  a previous case merely because it is indistinguishable on  the facts. ’ ’     The  position and experience in this Court could not  be much different, keeping in view the need for proper develop- ment of law and justice.     As regards the judgments of the Supreme Court  allegedly rendered in ignorance of a relevant constitutional provision or  other  statutory provisions on the subjects  covered  by them,  it is true that the Supreme Court may not be said  to "declare  the law" on those subjects if the relevant  provi- sions were not really present to its mind. But in this  case ss. 25G and 25H were not directly attracted and even if they could  be  said to have been attracted in  laying  down  the major premise, they were to be interpreted consistently with the subject or context. The problem of judgment per incuriam when  actually arises, should present no difficulty as  this Court  can  lay down the law afresh, if two or more  of  its earlier judgments cannot stand together. The question howev- er  is whether in this case there is in fact a Judgment  per incuriarn.  This raises the question of ratio  decidendi  in

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Hariprasad  and Anakapalla’s cases on the one hand  and  the subsequent decisions taking the contrary view on the other. 139     An  analysis of judicial precedent, ratio decidendi  and the  ambit of earlier and later decisions is to be found  in the  House of Lords’ decision in F.A. & A.B. Ltd. v.  Lupton (Inspector  of Taxes), [19722] AC 634, Lord Simon  concerned with  the decisions in Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison  (Watford) Ltd., [1963] A.C. 1, and Finsbury Securities Ltd. v.  Inland Revenue Commissioners, [1966] 1 WLR 1402, with their  inter- relationship  and  with the question whether  Lupton’s  case fell  within  the precedent established by the  one  or  the other case, said: "What  constitutes binding precedent is the ratio  decidendi of a case and this is almost always to be ascertained by  an analysis of the material facts of the case that is, general- ly,  those  facts which the tribunal whose  decision  is  in question itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be  mate- rial." It has also been analysed: "A  judicial decision will often be reached by a process  of reasoning which can be reduced into a sort of complex syllo- gism,  with the major premise consisting of  a  pre-existing rule  of law (either statutory or judge-made) and  with  the minor  premise consisting of the material facts of the  case under  immediate consideration. The conclusion is the  deci- sion of the case, which may or may not establish new law--in the vast majority of cases it will be merely the application of  existing law to the facts judicially ascertained.  Where the  decision does consititute new law, this may or may  not be expressly stated as a proposition of law: frequently  the new  law will appear only from subsequent comparison of,  on the  one  hand,  the material facts inherent  in  the  major premise with, on the other, the material facts which consti- tute  the minor premise. As a result of this  comparison  it will  often be apparent that a rule has been extended by  an analogy expressed or implied."      To  consider  the ratio decidendi of a  case  we  have, therefore, to ascertain the principle on which the case  was decided. Sir George Jessel in Osborne v. Rowlett, [1880]  13 Ch.  D.  774,  remarked that ’the only thing  in  a  judge’s decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge  is the principle upon which the case was decided’.      The  ratio decidendi of a decision may be  narrowed  or widened  by the judges before whom it is cited as  a  prece- dent. In the process the 140 ratio decidendi which the judges who decided the case  would themselves  have chosen may be even different from  the  one which  has been approved by subsequent judges. This  is  be- cause  Judges,  while deciding a case will  give  their  own reasons but may not distinguish their remarks in a rigid way between what they thought to be the ratio decidendi and what were  their  obiter dicta, that is, things said  in  passing having no binding force, though of some persuasive power. It is said that "a judicial decision is the abstraction of  the principle  from  the facts and arguments of  the  case."  "A subsequent  judge  may extend it to a broader  principle  of wider application or narrow it down for a narrower  applica- tion." The submissions of Mr. Venugopal that for the purpose of ratio decidendi, the question is not whether a subsequent Bench of this Court thinks that it was necessary or unneces- sary  for  the Constitution Bench, or the earlier  Bench  to have  dealt  with the issue, but  whether  the  Constitution Bench itself thought it necessary to interpret s. 2 (00) for

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arriving at the final decision has to be held to be  untena- ble in this wide and rigid form.     Analysing the compled syllogism of Hariprasad’s case  we find  that  its major premise was  that  retrenchment  meant termination  of surplus labour of an existing  industry  and the minor premise was, that the termination in that case was of  all  the  workmen on closure of business  on  change  of ownership. The decision was that there was no  retrenchment. In  this  context it is important to  note  what  subsequent benches  of this Court thought to be the ratio decidendi  of Hariprasad, and for that matter of Anakapalla.     In  Santosh Gupta v. State Bank Of Patiala, reported  in [1980] 3 SCR 884, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. sitting with Krish- na Iyer, J. deduced the ratio decidendi of Hariprasad thus: "In  Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divikar, the  Su- preme  Court took the view that the word  ’retrenchment’  as defined in s. 2(00) did not include termination of  services of  all workmen on a bona fide closure of an industry or  on change of ownership or management of the industry. In  order to  provide for the situations which the Supreme Court  held were  not covered by the definition of the  expression  ’re- trenchment’,  the  Parliament  added s. 25FF  and  s.  25FFF providing for the payment of compensation to the workmen  in case  of transfer of undertakings and in case of closure  of undertakings respectively." 141     In  Hariprasad  (supra) the  learned  Judges  themselves formulated the question before them as follows: "The  question, however, before us is--does this  definition merely  give  effect  to the ordinary,  accepted  notion  of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does  it go  so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as  to include  the  termination of services of all workmen  in  an industry when the industry itself ceases t0 exist on a  bona fide  closure or discontinuance of his business by  the  em- ployer."     The  question was answered by the learned Judges in  the following words: "In the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the intention  was  even to include a bona fide closure  of  the whole business, it would, we think, be divorcing the expres- sion  altogether  from the context to give it  such  a  wide meaning  as  is  contended for by learned  counsel  for  the respondents  .....  it would be against the entire scheme of the Act to give the definition clause relating to  retrench- ment  such a meaning as would include within the  definition termination  of service of all workmen by the employer  when the business itself ceases to exist." Rejecting the submission of Dr. Anand Prakash that "termina- tion of service for any reason whatsoever" meant no more and no  less than discharge of a labour force which was  a  sur- plusage,  it was observed in Santosh Gupta (supra) that  the misunderstanding  of  the  observations  and  the  resulting confusion stem from not appreciating the lead question which was  posed and answered by the learned Judges and’ that  the reference to ’discharge on account of surplusage’ was illus- trative and not exhaustive on account of transfer or closure of business.      Mr. V.A. Bobde submits, and we think rightly, that  the sole reason for the decision in Hariprasad was that the  Act postulated the existence and continuance of an industry  and where  the industry i.e. the undertaking, itself was  closed down or transferred, the very substratum disappeared and the Act could not regulate industrial employment in the  absence

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of  an industry. The true position in that case was that  s. 2(00)  and  25F could not be invoked since  the  undertaking itself 142 ceased  to exist. The ratio of Hariprasad, according to  the learned  counsel, is discernible from the discussion at  pp. 13 1-132 of the report about the ordinary accepted notion of retrenchment  ’in an industry’ and Pipraich’s case  was  re- ferred to for the proposition that continuance of the  busi- ness was essential; the emphasis was not on the discharge of surplus  labour but on the fact that "retrenchment  connotes in  its  ordinary acceptation that the  business  itself  is being  continued  ..... the termination of services  of  all the  workmen  as  a result of the closure  of  the  business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment."  At page  134 in the last four lines also it was said: "But  the fundamental question at issue is, does the definition clause cover cases of closure of business when the closure is  real and  bona fide?" The reasons for arriving at the  conclusion are  given as "it would be against the entire scheme of  the Act  to give the definition clause relating to  retrenchment such a meaning as would include within the definition termi- nation  of service of all workmen by the employer  when  the business  itself  ceases to exist and  that  the  industrial dispute  to which the provisions of the Act applies is  only one  which  arises out of an existing industry".  Thus,  the Court  was neither called upon to decide nor did  it  decide whether in a continuing business, retrenchment was  confined only  to  discharge of surplus staff and  the  reference  to discharge  of surplusage was for the purpose of  contrasting the  situation  in that case, i.e. workmen  were  being  re- trenched because of cessation of business and those observa- tions did not constitute reasons for the decision. What  was decided  was  that if there was no continuing  industry  the provision  could  not apply. In fact  the  question  whether retrenchment  did or did not include other terminations  was never  required to be decided in Hariprasad and  could  not, therefore  have  been, or be taken to have been  decided  by this Court.     Lord Halsbury’s dicta in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495 at page 506 is: "   .....  every judgment must be read as applicable to  the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since  the generality  of the expressions which may be found there  are not  intended to be expositions of the whole law,  but  gov- erned  and qualified by the particular facts of the case  in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that  a case is only on authority for what it actually decides." This Court held in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Misra, [1968] 2 SCR 154, that a decision is only an authority for what  it actually decides. 143 What  is of the essence in a decision is its ratio  and  not other  observation found therein nor what logically  follows from the various observations made in it. We agree with  Mr. Bobde  when  he  submits that Hariprasad’s case  is  not  an authority  for  the proposition that s.  2(00)  only  covers cases  of discharge of surplus labour and staff.  The  Judg- ments in Sundara Money (supra) and the subsequent  decisions in the line could not be held to be per incuriam inasmuch as in Hindustan Steel and Santhosh Gupta’s cases, the  Division Benches of this Court had referred to Hariprasad’s case  and rightly held that its ratio did not extend beyond a case  of termination  on the ground of closure and as such  it  would not be correct to say that the subsequent decisions  ignored

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a binding precedent.     In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, [1977] 1 SCR 586 the question was whether termination of  service  by efflux of time was  termination  of  service within  the definition of retrenchment in section  2(oo)  of the Act. Both the earlier decisions of the Court in Haripra- sad (supra) and Sundara Money (supra) were considered and it was  held  that there was nothing in  Hariprasad  which  was inconsistent  with the decision in Sundara Money’s case.  It was  observed that the decision in Hariprasad was only  that the words "for any reason whatsoever" used in the definition of retrenchment would not include a bona fide closure of the whole business because it would affect the entire scheme  of the  Act.  The decisions in L. Robert D’Souza  v.  Executive Engineer,  Southern Railway and Anr., [1979] 1  L.L.J.  211; The  Managing  Director, National  Garages  v.J.  Gonsalves, [1962] 1 L.L.J. 56; Goodlas Nerolac Paints v. Chief  Commis- sioner,  Delhi,  [1967]  1 L.L.J. 545  and  Rajasthan  State Electricity  Board v. Labour Court, [1966] 1 L.L.J. 381,  in which  contrary  view was taken, were overruled  in  Santosh Gupta  holding  that  the discharge of the  workman  on  the ground  that  she  did not pass the test  which  would  have enabled  her to be confirmed was ’retrenchment’  within  the meaning  of section 2(oo) and therefore, the requirement  of section  25F  had to be complied with. The workman  was  em- ployed in the State Bank of Patiala from July 13, 1973  till August, 1974 when her services were terminated. According to the workman she. had worked for 240 days in the year preced- ing August 21, 1974 and the termination of her services  was retrenchment  as  it did not fall within any  of  the  three accepted cases. The management’s contention was that  termi- nation was not due to discharge of surplus labour but due to failure  of  the workman to pass the test which  could  have enabled  her to be confirmed in the service and as  such  it was not retrenchment. This contention was repelled. 144     Both  Mr. Shetye and Mr. Venugopal submit that  judicial discipline required the smaller benches to follow the  deci- sions in the larger benches. This reminds us of the words of Lord  Mailsham of Marylebone, the Lord Chancellor,  "in  the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this  country, it is necessary for each lower tier  .....  to accept loyal- ly  the decisions of the higher tiers". However, in view  of the ratio decidendi of Hariprasad, as we have seen, there is no room for such a criticism.     In Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corpora- tion, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah, reported in [1984] 1 SCC 244, a  Division Bench of A.N. Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.  fol- lowing  the decisions in State Bank of India v.  N.  Sundara Money,  (supra); Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding  Officer, Labour  Court, Orissa, (supra); Santosh Gupta v. State  Bank of Patiala, (supra); Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, [ 1960]  2  SCR  32; Mohan Lal v. Management  of  M/s.  Bharat Electronics Ltd., [1981] 3 SCR 518 and Surendra Kumar  Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour  Court, New  Delhi, [1981] 1 SCR 789, held that in the above  series of cases that have come later, the Constitution Bench  deci- sion  in Hariprasad (supra) has been examined and the  ratio indicated therein has been confined to its own facts and the view  indicated by the Court in that case did not meet  with the approval of Parliament and, therefore, the law had  been subsequently amended. Speaking for the Court, R.N. Misra, J. significantly said: "We  are now inclined to hold that the stage has  come  when the view indicated in Money case (supra) has been  ’absorbed

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into  the consensus’ and there is no scope for  putting  the clock back or for an anti-clockwise operation."     More  than  a month thereafter in Gammon India  Ltd.  v. Niranjan Dass, [1984] 1 SCC 509, a three Judges Bench  (D.A. Desai,  R.B. Misra and Ranganath Misra, JJ.) construing  the one month’s notice of termination in that case due to reduc- tion of volume of business of the company said: "On a true construction of the notice, it would appeal  that the respondent had become surplus on account of reduction in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the traditional  sense  of the term as interpreted  in  Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor 145 Union,  though that view does not hold the field in view  of the recent decisions of this Court in State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money; Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa; Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of  Patia- la;  Delhi  Cloth  and General Mills Ltd.  v.  Shambhu  Nath Mukherjee; Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat  Electron- ics Ltd. and L. Robert D’Souza v. Executive Engineer, South- ern Railway. The recitals and averments in the notice  leave no  room  for doubt that the service of the  respondent  was terminated  for the reason that on account of recession  and reduction  in the volume of work of the company,  respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service  for  the  reasons mentioned in the  notice  is  not covered  by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s.  2(00) which  defines  retrenchment and it is by now  well  settled that  where the termination of service does not fall  within any  of  the excluded categories, the termination  would  be ipso  facto  retrenchment. It was not even attempted  to  be urged  that the case of the respondent would fall in any  of the excluded categories. It is therefore indisputably a case of retrenchment." (Emphasis supplied)      In  a fast developing branch of Industrial  and  Labour law it may not always be of particular importance to rigidly adhere to a precedent, and a precedent may need be  departed from if the basis of legislation changes. It was in realisa- tion of the idea of a living law that in Reg v. Home  Secre- tary, Ex. P. Khawaja, reported in [1984] AC 74 (H.L.) it was said at p. 84: The  House will depart from a previous decision where it  is right  to do so and where adherence to a  previous  decision may  lead to injustice in a particular case.  Constitutional and administrative law are not fields where it is of partic- ular  importance to adhere to precedent. A recent  precedent may be more readily departed from than one which is of  long standing.  A precedent may be departed from where the  issue is one of statutory construction-"      We  now  take up the question of interpretation  of  s. 2(00) of the Act dealing with the rival contentions, namely, ordinary or contextual as against literal meaning. 146     When  we  analyse  the mental process  in  drafting  the definition of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) of the Act we  find that  firstly it is to mean the termination by the  employer of  the  service  of a workman for  any  reason  whatsoever. Having  said  so  the Parliament proceeded to  limit  it  by excluding certain types of termination, namely,  termination as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The other  types  of  termination excluded  were  (a)  voluntary retrenchment; or (b) retrenchment of the workman on reaching the  age  of superannuation if the  contract  of  employment between  the employer and the workman concerned  contains  a

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stipulation on that behalf; or (c) termination of service of a  workman  on the ground of continued ill health.  Had  the Parliament  envisaged  only the question of  termination  of surplus labour alone in mind, there would arise no  question of excluding (a), (b) and (c) above. The same mental process was  evident  when s. 2(00) was  amended  inserting  another exclusion  clause (bb) by the Amending Act 49 of 1984,  with effect from 18.8.1984, "termination of the service of  work- man  as a result of the non-renewal of the contract  of  em- ployment  between the employer and the workman concerned  on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a  stipu- lation in that behalf contained therein." This is literal interpretation as distinguished from contex- tual interpretation. "The only rule of construction of Acts of Parliament",  says Tindal,  C.J. in Sussex Peerage case, [1844] 11 C1 & Fin  85 (143),  "is that they should be construed according  to  the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the  words of  the statute are in themselves precise  and  unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the  lawgiv- er." In  Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, reported in [1979] 2 SCR 409  (418) it  was  similarly  said: "The Court has  to  determine  the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of  a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no  more can be necessary then to expound those words in their  ordi- nary  and  natural sense. The words themselves alone  do  in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver."  As was stated in Thompson v. Gould, reported in [1910] A.C. 409 (420) "it is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words  which  are  not there, and in the  absence  of  clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do 147 so."  "The  cardinal rule of construction of statute  is  to read  statutes  literally, that is, by giving to  the  words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning."  [Jugalki- shore v. Ram Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] 1 SCR 1369] To  interpret an Act of Parliament is to give effect to  its intention.  Lord  Simon in Ealing L.B.C. v.  Race  Relations Board, [1972] AC 342 (360) said:       "The  Court sometimes asks itself what  the  draftsman must have intended. This is reasonable enough: the draftsman knows  what  is the intention of the  legislative  initiator (nowadays almost always an organ of the executive); he  know what  canons of construction the courts will apply;  and  he will  express himself in such a way as accordingly  to  give effect to the legislative intention. Parliament, of  course, in  enacting  legislation  assumes  responsibility  for  the language  of the draftsman. But the reality is that  only  a minority  of  legislators  will attend the  debates  on  the legislation. Failing special interest in the  subject-matter of the legislation, what will demand their attention will be something  on the face of proposed legislation which  alerts them  to a questionable matter. Accordingly, such canons  of construction  as that words in a non-technical statute  will primarily   be  interpreted  according  to  their   ordinary meaning  .....  "     According  to  Lord Simon looking into  the  legislative history  or’ the preparatory works may sometimes  be  useful but  may  often lead to abuse and waste, as  "an  individual legislator may indicate his assent on an assumption that the legislation  means so-and-so and the courts may have no  way of  knowing  how far his assumption is shared  by  his  col-

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leagues, even those present." "In the absence of such  mate- rial  it is said, the courts have five principal avenues  of approach to the ascertainment of the legislative  intention: (1)  examination of the social background,  as  specifically proved if not within common knowledge, in order to  identify the  social  or juristic defect which is likely  subject  of remedy; (2) a conspectus of the entire relevant body of  the law for the same purpose; (3) particular regard to the  long title of the statute to be interpreted (and where available, the  preamble), in which the general legislative  objectives will  be  stated;  (4) scrutiny of the actual  words  to  be interpreted,  in  the  light of the  established  canons  of interpretation; and (5) examination of the other  provisions of  the  statute in question (or of other statutes  in  pari materia) for the illumination which they 148 throw  on  the  particular words which are  the  subject  of interpretation.     The  Heydon’s Rule requires that the court will look  at the Act to see what was its purpose and what mischief in the earlier  law it was designed to prevent. Four things are  to be considered: (i) What was the law before the making of the Act?  (ii)  What was the mischief and defect for  which  the earlier  law did not provide? (iii) What remedy the  Parlia- ment had resolved to cure? (iv) What is the true reason  for the remedy? The Court shall make such construction as  shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.     Where  the statute has been passed to remedy a  weakness in the law, it is to be interpreted in such a way as well to bring about that remedy.     The literal rules of construction require the wording of the  Act to be construed according to its literal and  gram- matical meaning whatever the result may be. Unless otherwise provided, the same word must normally be construed  through- out the Act in the same sense, and in the case of old  stat- utes regard must be had to its contemporary meaning if there has  been no change with the passage of time.  However,  the Law  Commission 21 of England has struck a note  of  caution that "to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of  the words of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in  draftsmanship".  In Whiteley v.  Chappelf,  [1968-69]  4 L.R.Q.B.  Div. 147, a statute concerned with electoral  mal- practices made it an offence to personate ’any person  enti- tle  to vote’ at an election. The defendant was  accused  of personating a deceased voter and the court, using the liter- al rule, found that there was no offence as the  personation was  not of person entitled to vote. A dead person  was  not entitled to vote. A deceased person did not exist and had no right  to vote and as a result the decision arrived  at  was contrary  to the intention of Parliament. As it was  pointed out in Prince of Hanover v. Attorney General [1956] Ch. Div. 188,  the Golden Rule in the form of modified literal  Rule, according  to  which  the words of statute will  as  far  as possible be construed according to their ordinary and  plain and natural meaning, unless this leads to an absurd  result. Where the conclusion reached by applying the literal rule is contrary to the intention of Parliament, the Golden rule  is helpful.  A  tested rule is that of Noscitur a  sociis.  The meaning  of a word can be gathered from its  context.  Under this rule words of doubtful meaning may be better understood from the nature of the words and phrases with which they are associated [Muir v. Keay, [1875] L.R 10 Q.B. 594]. But  this will not apply when the word itself has been defined. 149     In  the  case before us the difficulty  was  created  by

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defining ’retrenchment’ to mean something wider than what it naturally  and ordinarily meant. While naturally  and  ordi- narily  it  meant discharge of surplus labour,  the  defined meaning  was  termination of service of a  workman  for  any reason  whatsoever except those excluded in  the  definition itself. Such a definition creates complexity as the  drafts- man himself in drafting the other sections using the defined word  may  slip  into the ordinary meaning  instead  of  the defined meaning.     Way  back  in the Queen v. The Commissioners  under  the Boiler  Explosions Act, 1882, [1891] 1 Q.B. Division 703,  a boiler  for generating steam was situate above ground  at  a colliery, and a pipe conducted the steam down the shaft  and along  the working to a pumping engine in the mine. A  valve in  this pipe, in the mine and near the pumping engine  blew off.  The question was whether the pipe in which the  explo- sion  occurred  was  a ’boiler’  within  the  interpretation clause  of the Boiler Explosions Act, 1882. Lord M.R.  Esher said;  "If the Act had dealt with the explosion of a  boiler and in some other’ section with an explosion in pipes or  in any other specified thing, the matter would be easy; but the draftsman has gone upon that which to my mind is a dangerous method  of drawing Acts of Parliament. He has put in a  sec- tion which says that a boiler shall mean something which  is in  reality not a boiler. This third section of the  Act  of 1882 that is the Boiler Explosions Act 1882 is a ’peculiarly bad specimen’ of the method of drafting, which enacts that a word shall mean something which in fact it does not mean."     However, a judge facing such a problem of interpretation can not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman.  Lord Denning in his Discipline of Law says at p. 12: "Whenever  a statute comes up for consideration it  must  be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold  sets  of facts which may arise, and,  even  if  it were,  it is not possible to provide for them in terms  free from  all ambiguity. The English language is not an  instru- ment of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the  poorer if it were. This is where the draftsman of  Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A  judge, believing  himself to be lettered by the supposed rule  that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments  that the  draftsmen have not provided for this or that,  or  have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would cer- 150 tainly  save the judges trouble if Acts of  Parliament  were drafted  with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In  the absence  of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot  simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to  work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parlia- ment, and he must do this not only from the language of  the statute, but also from a consideration of the social  condi- tions  which gave rise to it, and of the mischief  which  it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the  writ- ten word so as to give ’force and life’ to the intention  of the legislature."     Analysing the definition of retrenchment in s. 2(00)  we find  that termination by the employer of the service  of  a workman would not otherwise have covered the cases  excluded in (a) and (b), namely, voluntary retirement and  retirement on reaching the stipulated age of retirement. There would be no volitional element of the employer. Their express  exclu- sion implies that those would otherwise have been  included. Again  if  those cases were to be included,  termination  on abandonment of service, or on efflux of time, and on failure to qualify, although only consequential or resultant,  would

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be  included  as those have not been excluded.  Thus,  there appears to be a gap between the first part and the exclusion part. Mr. Venugopal, on this basis, points out that cases of voluntary retirement, superannuation and tenure  appointment are  not cases of termination ’by the employer’  and  would, therefore,  in any event, be outside the scope of  the  main provisions and are not really provisos.     The definition has used the word ’means’. When a statute says that a word or phrase shall "mean"--not merely that  it shall "include"--certain things or acts, "the definition  is a  hard-and-fast  definition, and no other  meaning  can  be assigned  to the expression than is put down in  definition" (per Esher, M.R., Gough v. Gough, [1891] 2 QB 665). A  defi- nition is an explicit statement of the full connotation of a term.     Mr. Venugopal submits that the definition clause  cannot be  interpreted in isolation and the scope of the  exception to the main provision would also have to be looked into  and when so interpreted, it is obvious that a restrictive  mean- ing has to be given to s. 2(00).     It is also pointed out that s. 25G deals with the  prin- ciple  of ’last come, first go’, a principle  which  existed prior to the Amendment Act 151 of 1953 only in relation to termination of workmen  rendered surplus for any reasons whatsoever and that was followed  in Vishwamitra  Press, Kanpur v. Workers of Vishwamitra  Press, [1952] L.A.C. 20 at p.33/41; Presidency Jute Mills Co.  Ltd. v.  Presidency Jute Mills Co.Employees Union, [1952]  L.A.C. 62;  Iron  and Steel Mazdoor Union,Kanpur v. J.K.  Iron  and Steel  Co. Ltd., [1952] L.A.C. 467; Halar Sali and  Chemical Works,  Jamnagar  v.  Workmen,  [1953]  L.A.C.  134;Prakriti Bhushan Gupta v. Chief Mining Engineer Railway  Board,[1953] L.A.C.  373;  Sudarshan  Banerjee v. Mcleod  and  Co.  Ltd., [1953]  L.A.C. 702 (7 11). Besides, it is submitted, by  its very  nature  the wide definition of retrenchment  would  be wholly inapplicable to termination simpliciter. The question of picking out a junior in the same category for being  sent out in place of a person whose services are being terminated simpliciter  or otherwise on the ground that the  management does  not want to continue his contract of employment  would not  arise. Similarly it is pointed out that starting   from Sundara Money where termination simpliciter of a workman for not  having passed a test, or for not having  satisfactorily completed  his  probation would not attract s. 25G,  as  the very  question of picking out a junior in the same  category for being sent out instead of the person who failed to  pass a  test or failed to satisfactorily complete  his  probation could  never arise. If, however, s. 25G were to be  followed in  such cases, the section would itself be rendered  uncon- stitutional  and  violative  of fundamental  rights  of  the workmen under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the  Constitu- tion. It would be no defence to this argument to say that the  management  could record reasons as to why  it  is  not sending out the juniormost in such cases. Since in no single case  of termination simpliciter would s. 25G be  applicable and  in every such case of termination simpliciter,  without exception, reasons would have to be recorded- Similarly,  it is  submitted, s. 25H which deals with re-employment of  re- trenched  workmen, can also have no application  whatsoever, to  a case of termination simipliciter because of  the  fact that the employee whose services have been terminated, would have  been holding a post which ’eo instanti’  would  become vacant  as a result of the termination of his  services  and under s. 25H he would have a right to be reinstated  against

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the very post from which his services have been  terminated, rendering  the  provision itself an absurdity. It  is  urged that  s. 25F is only procedural in character along with  ss. 25G  and  25H and do not prohibit the substantive  right  of termination but on the other hand requires that in effecting termination of employment,notice would be given and  payment of  money would be made and theater procedure under ss.  25G and 25H would follow. 152     Mr.  Bobde  refutes the above argument saying  that  ss. 25F,  25G and 25H relate to retrenchment but their  contents are  different. Whereas S. 25F provides for  the  conditions precedent  for effecting a valid retrenchment, S.  25G  only provides  the procedure for doing so. Section  25H  operates after a valid retrenchment and provides for re-employment in the circumstances stated therein. According to counsel,  the argument  is misconceived firstly for the reasons that s.  2 itself says that retrenchment will be understood as  defined in  s. 2(00) unless there is anything repugnant in the  sub- ject  or  context; secondly s. 25F clearly  applies  to  re- trenchment  as plainly defined by s. 2(00); thirdly  s.  25G does  not  incorporate in absolute terms--the  principle  of ’last  come,  first go’ and provides  that  ordinarily  last employee is to be retrenched, and fourthly ss. 25H upon  its true  construction should be held to be applicable when  the retrenchment  has  occurred  on the ground  of  the  workman becoming  surplus to the establishment and he has  been  re- trenched under ss. 25F and 25G on the principle ’last  come, first  go’. Only then should he be given an  opportunity  to offer himself for re-employment- In substance it is  submit- ted  that there is no conflict between the definition of  s. 2(00)  and the provisions of ss. 25F, 25G and 25H.  We  find that  though there are apparent incongruities in the  provi- sions,  there  is room for harmonious construction  in  this regard.     For  the purpose of harmonious construction, it  can  be seen that the definitions contained in section 2 are subject to their being anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this, it is clear that the extended meaning given to the term ’retrenchment’ under clause (00) of section 2 is also subject to the context and the subject matter.  Section 25-F  prescribed  the conditions precedent to  a  valid  re- trenchment  of workers as discussed earlier.  Very  briefly, the  conditions  prescribed are the giving  of  one  month’s notice  indicating the reasons for retrenchment and  payment of  wages for the period of the notice. Section  25-FF  pro- vides  for  compensation to workmen in case of  transfer  of undertakings.  Very briefly, it provides that every  workman who  has  been in continuous service for not less  than  one year  in  an undertaking immediately  before  such  transfer shall  be entitled to notice and compensation in  accordance with  the provisions of section 25F "as if the  workman  had been  retrenched". (Emphasis supplied). Section 25-FFA  pro- vides that sixty days’ notice must be given of intention  to close  down any undertaking and section 25-FFF provides  for compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertak- ings.  Very  briefly stated section 25-FFF  which  has  been already  discussed lays down that "where an  undertaking  is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in continuous service for 153 not  less  than  one year in  that  undertaking  immediately before  such  closure shall, subject to  the  provisions  of sub-section  (2), be entitled to notice and compensation  in accordance  with the provisions of section 25-F, as  if  the

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workman had been retrenched". (Emphasised supplied). Section 25-H  provides for re-employment of retrenched  workmen.  In brief,  it provides that where any workmen  are  retrenched, and  the employer proposes to take toto his  employment  any person,  he  shall, give an opportunity  to  the  retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment as provided in the  section  subject to the conditions as set  out  in  the section. In our view, the principle of harmonious  construc- tion implies that in a case where there is a genuine  trans- fer  of an undertaking or genuine closure of an  undertaking as  contemplated  in  the aforesaid sections,  it  would  be inconsistent  to read into the provisions a right  given  to workman  "deemed.  to be retrenched" a right  to  claim  re- employment  as provided in section 25-H. In such  cases,  as specifically  provided in the relevant sections the  workmen concerned would only be entitled to notice and  compensation in accordance with section 25-F. It is significant that in a case  of transfer of an undertaking or closure of an  under- taking  in  accordance with the  aforesaid  provisions,  the benefit  specifically  given to the workmen is  "as  if  the workmen had been retrenched" and this benefit is  restricted to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F.      The  last submission is that if retrenchment is  under- stood in its wider sense what would happen to the rights  of the  employer under the Standing Orders and under  the  con- tracts of employment in respect of the workmen whose service has been terminated. There may be two answers to this  ques- tion. Firstly, those rights may have been affected by intro- duction  of ss. 2(00), 25F and the other relevant  sections. Secondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affect- ed  or taken away, but only an additional social  obligation has been imposed on the employer so as to give the retrench- ment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for  immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty. Looked at from this angle,  there  is  implicit a social policy.  As  the  maxim goes--Stat  pro  ratione voluntas populi; the  will  of  the people stands in place of a reason.      Regarding the seeming gaps in the definition one  would aptly remember what Lord Simonds said against the view  that the court having discovered the intention of Parliament must proceed to fill in the gaps and what the legislature had not written the court must write. "It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legisla- 154 tive function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it  is the less justifiable when it is guess work with  what material  the  legislature would, if it had  discovered  the gap,  have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed,  the  remedy lies in an amending Act."     The Court has to interpret a statute and apply it to the facts. Hans Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law (P. 355)  makes a  distinction between interpretation by the science of  law or  jurisprudence  on the one hand and interpretation  by  a law-applying  organ  (especially the court)  on  the  other. According to him "jurisprudential interpretation i.,  purely cognitive  ascertainment of the meaning of legal  norms.  In contradistinction  to  the interpretation by  legal  organs, jurisprudential  interpretation does not create  law".  "The purely  cognitive interpretation by jurisprudence is  there- fore unable to fill alleged gaps in the law. The filling  of a  so-called gap in the law is a law-creating function  that can  only  be  performed by a law-applying  organ;  and  the function  of creating law is not performed by  jurisprudence interpreting  law. Jurisprudential interpretation can do  no

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more  than  exhibit all possible meanings of a  legal  norm. Jurisprudence as cognition of law cannot decide between  the possibilities  exhibited by it, but must leave the  decision to  the  legal organ who, according to the legal  order,  is authorised to apply the law." According to the author if law is  to  be applied by a legal organ, he must  determine  the meaning  of  the norms to be applied;  he  must  ’interpret’ those norms (P. 348). Interpretation therefore is an  intel- lectual activity which accompanies the process of law appli- cation in its advance from a higher level to a lower  level. According  to him, the law to be applied is a frame.  "There are  cases of intended or unintended indefiniteness  at  the lower level and several possibilities are open to the appli- cation  of  law." The traditional theory believes  that  the statute, applied to a concrete case, can always supply  only one correct decision and that the positive--legal  ’correct- ness’ of this decision is based on the statute itself.  This theory  describes the interpretive procedure as if  it  con- sisted merely in an intellectual act of clarifying or under- standing;  as if the law-applying organ had to use only  his reason but not his will, and as if by a purely  intellectual activity, among the various existing possibilities only  one correct  choice  could be made in accordance  with  positive law.  According  to the author: "The legal  act  applying  a legal  norm may be performed in such a way that it  conforms (a)  with the one or the other of the different meanings  of the  legal  norm,  (b) with the will of  the  norm  creating authority  that is to be determined somehow’, (c)  with  the expression which the norm-creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e) the concrete case to 155 which the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under the  assumption that the two contradictory norms annul  each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame."     The  definitions  is  s. 2 of the Act are  to  be  taken ’unless  there is anything repugnant in the subject or  con- text’. The contextual interpretation has not been ruled out. In R.B.I. v. Peerless General Finance, reported in [1987]  2 SCR 1, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. said: "Interpretation  must  depend on the text and  the  context. They  are the bases of interpretation. One may well  say  if the  text is the texture, context is what gives the  colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpreta- tion  is best which makes the textual  interpretation  match the  contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we  know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read,  first as a whole and then section by section,  clause by  clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a  statute is  looked  at, in the context of its  enactment,  with  the glasses  of the statutemaker, provided by such context,  its scheme,  the sections, clauses, phrases and words  may  take colour and appear different than when the statute is  looked at  without the glasses provided by the context. With  these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each  section,  each clause, each phrase and  each  word  is meant  and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of  the entire  Act. No part of a statute and no word of  a  statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so  that  every word has a place and everything  is  in  its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in  the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what  preceded the  enactment  and the reasons for it that the  Court  con-

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strued the expression ’Prize Chit’ in Srinivasa and we  find no reason to depart from the Court’s construction."     As we have mentioned, industrial and labour  legislation involves social and labour policy. Often they are passed  in conformity with the resolutions of the International  Labour Organisation. In Duport Steels v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142. the  House  of Lords observed that there  was  a  difference between  applying  the law and making it,  and  that  judges ought  to  avoid becoming involved in  controversial  social issues, since this might affect their reputation in imparti- ality. Lord Diplock said: 156 "A statute passed to remedy what is perceived by  Parliament to  be a defect in the existing law may in actual  operation turn out t0 have injurious consequences that Parliament  did not  anticipate  at the time the statute was passed;  if  it had,  it would have made some provision in the Act in  order to  prevent them  .....  But if this be the case it  is  for Parliament.  not  for the judiciary, to decide  whether  any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts     Applying  the  above reasonings; principles  and  prece- dents,  t0  the definition in s. 2(00) of the Act,  we  hold that "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the  service of a workman for any reason  whatsoever  except those expressly excluded in the section.     The result is that C.A. Nos. 3241-48 of 1981, 686(NL) of 1982,  18  17 of 1982, 1898 of 1982, 3261 of 1982,  1866  of 1982,  1868  of 1982, 8456 of 1983, 10828 of  1983  and  the appeal  arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3149 of 1983 are  dis- missed with costs quantified at Rs.3,000 in each appeal.  It is  stated that in C.A. No. 686 of 1982 the  respondent  has already   been  reinstated  pursuant  to  the  order   dated 24.10.1983  passed by this Court, having regard to the  fact that  he has served since 1983, he shall be  considered  for confirmation  with  effect from his due  date  according  to Rules, if he is not already confirmed by the Corporation.     In  view of the facts and circumstances of the case,  we dispose of C.A. No. 885 of 1980 with the direction that  the two workmen involved in this appeal be paid compensation  of Rs. 1,25,000 (Rupees one lakh twenty five thousand) each  in full  and final settlement of all claims including  that  of reinstatement.  The  payment shall be spread over  a  period from 11.11.1972 till date for the purpose of Income-tax.     C.A.  No.  4116 (NL) of 1984 was on the board,  but  the paper  book is not available. Hence it is delinked from  the series.     C.A.  Nos. 512-513 of 1984 and C.A No. 783 of 1984  were wrongly  placed  on  the board. Their  subject  matters  are different  and  hence are delinked from this cluster  to  be heard separately by an appropriate bench. R.N.J.                                     Appeals  disposed of. 157