REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.            OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (CRL.) No. 5565 of 2004)

Priya Vrat Singh & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Shyam Ji Sahai … Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned

Single  Judge  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  dismissing  the

application filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

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Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Cr.P.C’).  Appellants have filed the

petition  for  quashing  criminal  proceeding  against  them  in

Complaint  Case  No.  896  of  1994  subsequently  numbered  as

Criminal Case No. 931 of 1995 relating to alleged commission of

offences punishable under Sections 494, 120B and 109 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and Sections 3 & 4 of

the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  (in  short  the  ‘Dowry  Act’)

pending  in  the  Court  of  Special  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,

Varanasi.  The prayer was rejected by the High Court being of

the view that the trial court can be directed to conclude the trial

expeditiously and at the time of framing charges, the appellants

can raise such points as has been raised in the present dispute.

Liberty was also granted to appear within one month from the

date of order before the trial court and to obtain bail.   

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

Daughter of the respondent namely Madhulika Singh was

married  to  appellant  No.1  Priya  Vrat  Singh.  According  to  the

appellants, Madhulika started behaving rudely with her husband

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and his family members as Priya Vrat was unemployed. Tension

between two reached to such an extent that Madhulika tried to

commit  suicide  on  7.3.1992.  She  thereafter  started  giving

repeated threats to commit suicide and appellant was seriously

harassed.  From  16.7.1992  onwards  appellant  No.1  and

Madhulika started living separately in the same house. However,

shortly  thereafter  Madhulika  left  her  matrimonial  house  and

started living in the parental house.  In the meantime, appellant

No.1 filed a suit  in Original  Suit No.  188 of  1992 in the Civil

Court at Barabanki for dissolution of marriage between him and

Madhulika on the ground of cruelty and harassment meted out

to him by Madhulika.  The said suit was decreed on 1.1.1993 ex

parte in favour of appellant No.1.  Time for filing appeal against

the ex-parte decree  dated 1.1.1993 under Section 28(4)  of  the

Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (in short the ‘Marriage Act’) expired on

31.1.1993.   On  21.2.1993  after  dissolution  of  marriage,

appellant No.1 re-married one Neha alias Sunita at Jalgaon in

Maharashtra  on  2.3.1993.   On  6.12.1994  respondent  filed  a

private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi

wherein all the appellants were arrayed as accused persons.  It

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was alleged that in 21.2.1993 appellant No.1 had re married in

Sankat  Mochan  Mandir,  Varanasi.  Allegations  of  dowry

harassment were also made.  It was submitted that the marriage

attracted punishment  under  Sections 494,  120B and 109 IPC

and  Sections  3  &  4  of  the  Dowry  Act.   On  1.6.1995  learned

Special  CJM,  Varanasi  issued  summons.  Long  thereafter,  on

9.7.1996 Madhulika filed a Restoration Petition before the Civil

Judge for recalling the order of ex parte. On 9.8.1996, appellants

moved an application before the learned Special CJM, Varanasi,

and protested to the summoning order.  However, the same was

rejected by order dated 9.8.1996.  On 24.9.1996 petition under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed which was numbered as Criminal

Misc.  Case  No.  4501  of  1996.   On  2.3.1997  the  restoration

petition was allowed.  On 25.10.2001 the High Court dismissed

the Criminal Misc. Case.

4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the marriage of appellant No. 1 with appellant No.

3  is  protected  under  Section  15  of  the  Marriage  Act  and

therefore, the proceedings under Section 494 IPC are clearly not

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maintainable.   Further  it  is  pointed  out  that  the  allegation of

alleged  demand  for  dowry  was  made  for  the  first  time  in

December, 1994.  In the complaint filed, the allegation is that the

dowry torture was made some times in 1992. It  has not been

explained  as  to  why  for  more  than  two  years  no  action  was

taken.  Further it appears that in the Complaint Petition apart

from the husband, the mother of the husband, the subsequently

married  wife,  husband’s  mother’s  sister,  husband’s  brother  in

law and Sunita’s  father were impleaded  as party.  No role  has

been specifically  ascribed to anybody except  the husband and

that  too  of  a    dowry  demand  in  February,  1993  when  the

complaint was filed on 6.12.1994 i.e. nearly after 22 months. It

is  to  be  noted  that  in  spite  of  service  of  notice,  none  has

appeared on behalf of respondent No.1.   

5. The  parameters  for  exercise  of  power  under  Section  482

have been laid down by this Court in several cases.

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6. The Section does  not  confer  any new power on the High

Court.  It  only  saves  the  inherent  power  which  the  Court

possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three

circumstances  under  which  the  inherent  jurisdiction  may  be

exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise

secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to

lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of

inherent  jurisdiction.  No  legislative  enactment  dealing  with

procedure  can  provide  for  all  cases  that  may  possibly  arise.

Courts,  therefore,  have  inherent  powers  apart  from  express

provisions  of  law which are  necessary  for  proper  discharge  of

functions  and duties  imposed  upon them by  law.  That  is  the

doctrine  which  finds  expression  in  the  section  which  merely

recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All

courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any

express  provision,  as  inherent  in  their  constitution,  all  such

powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in

course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex

aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae

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esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives

him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers

under  the  section,  the  court  does  not  function  as  a  court  of

appeal  or  revision.  Inherent  jurisdiction  under  the  section

though wide  has to be  exercised  sparingly,  carefully  and with

caution and only  when such exercise  is  justified  by  the  tests

specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex

debito  justitiae  to  do  real  and  substantial  justice  for  the

administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court

exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to

abuse that authority so as to produce injustice,  the court has

power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the

court  to allow any action which would  result  in injustice  and

prevent  promotion  of  justice.  In  exercise  of  the  powers  court

would  be  justified  to  quash  any  proceeding  if  it  finds  that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of

court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the

ends of justice.  

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7. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court

under  Section  482  of  the  Code  are  very  wide  and  the  very

plenitude  of  the  power  requires  great  caution  in  its  exercise.

Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this

power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should

not  be  exercised  to  stifle  a  legitimate  prosecution.  The  High

Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain

from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts

are incomplete  and hazy,  more  so when the evidence  has not

been  collected  and produced  before  the  Court  and the  issues

involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot

be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of

course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases

in  which  the  High  Court  will  exercise  its  extraordinary

jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata

Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), Raghubir Saran (Dr.)

v.  State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1) and  Minu Kumari v.  State of

Bihar (2006 (4) SCC 359).  

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8. The present case appears to be one where the category 7 of

the illustrations given in  State of Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal (1952

(supp.) 1 SCC 335) is clearly applicable.  

9. That being so the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we

direct. The proceedings in Case No.896 of 1994 pending before

the Special CJM, Varanasi stand quashed.

10. Appeal is allowed.

……………………………J. (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi:  August 5, 2008

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