REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8501 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19921 of 2006)

Prithipal Singh                                                                ….. Appellant

VERSUS

Satpal Singh (dead) through its LRs.                        ….Respondents

J  U  D  G  M  E  N T  

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This is an appeal arising out of a Judgment and order dated 30th  

of October, 2006 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in  

C.M.  No.  65 of  2002,  whereby the High Court  had dismissed the  

petition filed by the landlord/appellant  and upheld the order passed  

by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.  The order of the Additional  

Rent Controller holding that he is conferred with power to set aside  

an ex-parte order for eviction in the exercise of its jurisdiction under  

Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 of the  

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Code of Civil Procedure (in short, “the Code”) was thereby affirmed  

by the High Court in appeal.    

3. The brief facts leading to the filing of this appeal may be stated as  

follows in a nutshell :-

The landlord/appellant filed an eviction petition under Section  

14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short “the Rent Act”)  

before  the  Rent  Controller,  Delhi  for  eviction  of  the  

Tenant/Respondent  from  No.  1-C/46,  Ramesh  Nagar,  Namdhari  

Colony, New Delhi (in short “the tenanted premises”).  After filing of  

the  eviction  proceeding,  summons  was  issued  in  compliance  with  

Section 25(3) (a) of the Rent Act to the tenant/respondent to appear  

before  the  Rent  Controller  on a  specified  date  for  the  purpose of  

defending the eviction proceeding.  The tenant/respondent filed an  

affidavit  by  way  of  an  application  praying  for  leave  to  defend  the  

eviction proceeding after delay of 8 days from the date of service of  

notice  upon  him.   By  an  order  dated  28th of  February,  2001,  the  

Affidavit  (the  application  for  leave  to  defend)  was  rejected  by the  

Additional  Rent  Controller  as  it  was filed  8  days  beyond the date  

mentioned in  the  summons.   Since there  was a  delay of  8  days,  

Additional Rent Controller held that under the Rent Act, he was not  

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conferred with any power to condone the delay in filing such affidavit.  

Since the prayer for leave to defend the proceeding was rejected as a  

follow up action, an eviction order was passed by the Additional Rent  

Controller,  Delhi  in  favour  of  the  landlord/appellant  on  28th of  

February, 2001 in compliance with sub-section (4) of Section 25 B of  

the Rent Act.    

4. Feeling aggrieved, the tenant/respondent filed an application for  

setting  aside  the  aforesaid  order  dated  28th  of  February,  2001  

passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi under Order 9 Rule  

13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Code and also  

prayed for leave to defend the eviction proceeding after condoning  

the delay in filing the same.  By an order dated 7th of  December,  

2001, the application for setting aside the ex-parte order of eviction  

passed  on  28th of  February,  2001  was  allowed  and  the  eviction  

proceeding  was  restored  to  its  original  file  by  the  Additional  Rent  

Controller,  Delhi.   The Additional  Rent Controller,  by the aforesaid  

order, also allowed the prayer of the tenant/respondent by granting  

leave to contest the eviction proceeding in compliance with Section  

25(B)(4) of the Rent Act.   

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5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Addl. Rent Controller,  

Delhi, the Landlord/Appellant filed an application under Article 227 of  

the Constitution,  which came to be registered as CM No.65/2002,  

before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.  The High Court, by the  

impugned  judgment,  had  dismissed  the  petition  filed  by  the  

landlord/appellant holding that there was no patent error or erroneous  

exercise of  jurisdiction by the Trial  Court  in  setting aside order  of  

eviction thereby restoring the affidavit filed by the tenant/respondent  

for leave to contest the eviction proceeding.  However, the High Court  

observed  in  the  impugned  Judgment  that  the  Additional  Rent  

Controller may not have power to condone the delay in seeking leave  

to defend, but once the eviction decree was passed, the Addl. Rent  

Controller can set aside an order of eviction and restore the prayer for  

leave to defend the eviction proceeding by resorting to Order 9 Rule  

13 read with Order 37 Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Code.   

6. Against the aforesaid order of the High Court, a Special Leave  

Petition was filed, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence of  

the learned counsel  for  the parties.   Before us,  the pivotal  issues  

which were raised by the learned counsel  for  the parties,  may be  

stated as follows :-

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(i) Whether  the  Additional  Rent  Controller,  exercising  powers  and  

jurisdiction under the Rent Act, which is a special Act, was justified in   

setting aside the order of eviction which amounted to restoration of   

and allowing the application for leave to defend the eviction petition  

although such application was rejected earlier on the ground of delay.  

(ii) Whether the Additional Rent Controller is competent to recall orders   

of eviction on an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Order   

37 Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Code and condone the delay in  

applying for leave to defend when he was not conferred with such   

power to condone the delay in filing the application for leave to defend  

the eviction proceedings under the Rent Act specially when such an   

affidavit (application for leave to defend) was earlier rejected by the  

Additional Rent Controller, Delhi on the ground of delay.

7. We have heard Mr. Gulati, learned counsel appearing for the  

Landlord/Appellant  and  Mr.  Tyagi,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf  of  the  tenant/Respondent.  We have carefully  examined the  

impugned order of the High Court as well as the order of the Addl.  

Rent Controller, Delhi.  Before we take up the aforesaid issues for our  

decision, it  would be useful for us to refer to some of the relevant  

provisions of the Rent Act read with Third Schedule of the Rent Act  

and relevant Rules of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 (in short,  

“the Rules”).   

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8. Chapter  III  of  the  Rent  Act  deals  with  control  of  eviction  of  

tenants.  Section 14 of the Rent Act protects a tenant from eviction.  

Section 14 (1)(e) of the Rent Act says that when the premises let for  

residential  purposes  are  required  bona  fide  by  the  landlord  for  

occupation as a residence for himself or for any member in his family  

dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for  

whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such  

person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation,  

the  Rent  Controller  may,  on  the  application  made  to  him  in  the  

prescribed manner, make an order for recovery of possession. By an  

amendment dated 1st of February, 1975, Section 14 was amended so  

far as the classes of landlords are concerned.  Section 14A confers  

right  on  a  landlord  who,  being  a  person  in  occupation  of  any  

residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any  

local authority, which is required to be vacated on the notice issued  

by  such  authority.   Section  14B  was  inserted  for  the  purpose  of  

conferring right on the landlords who are members of Armed forces to  

recover immediate possession of the premises on the ground of bona  

fide  requirement.   This  amendment  of  Section  14  of  the  Act  was  

brought by the Legislature on 1st of February, 1988.  Section 14C was  

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introduced by  another  amendment  conferring  power on a  landlord  

who is a Central Government or a Delhi Administration employee to  

recover immediate possession from a tenant.  Section 14D deals with  

the right of a widow of a landlord to recover immediate possession of  

a tenanted premises for the bona fide requirement of a widow.  All  

these amendments were brought into force by the Legislature on 1st  

of January, 1988.   

9. Now comes  Chapter  IIIA  of  the  Rent  Act  which  consists  of  

Sections 25A to 25C and inserted by Act of 1976, i.e., w.e.f.  1st of  

February, 1975.  By introduction of Chapter IIIA, a special provision  

was  introduced  by  the  Legislature  for  summary  trial  of  certain  

applications filed under the Rent Act.  Section 25A of the Act clearly  

says  that  this  provision  of  Chapter  IIIA  to  have  overriding  effect  

notwithstanding any inconsistency thereof contained elsewhere in this  

Act or any other law for the time being in force.  Section 25B is the  

provision by which special procedure for disposal of applications for  

eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement filed at the instance  

of the landlord under Section 14 or 14A or 14B or 14C or 14D of the  

Act  has  been  laid  down.   Since  we are  concerned  primarily  with  

Section  25B  of  the  Rent  Act,  by  which  the  procedure  has  been  

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adopted  specifically  for  eviction  of  a  tenant  by  a  landlord  on  the  

ground  of  bona  fide  requirement,  we need  to  reproduce  the  said  

Section which runs as under:-

“25B – Special procedure for the disposal of applications for   eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement -  

“(1)  Every  application  by  a  landlord  for  the  recovery  of   possession  of  any  premises  on  the  ground  specified  in  clause (e) of the proviso 10 sub-section (I) of section 14, or   under section 14A1[or under section 14B or under section   I4C or under section 14D], shall be dealt with in accordance  with the procedure specified in this section.

(2) The Controller shall issue summons, in relation to every   application  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1),  in  the  form  specified in the Third Schedule.

(3)(a) The Controller shall, in addition to, and simultaneously  with, the issue of summons for service on the tenant, also   direct  the  summons  to  be  served  by  registered  post,   acknowledgment due, addressed to the tenant or his agent   empowered to  accept  the  service  at  the  place  where  the  tenant or his agent actually and voluntarily resides or carries  on business or  personally  works for  gain  and may,  if  the   circumstances  of  the  case  so  require,  also  direct  the  publication of the summons in a newspaper circulating in the  locality in which the tenant is last known to have resided or   carried on business or personally worked for gain.

(b) When an acknowledgement purporting to be signed by  the tenant or his agent is received by the Controller or the   registered article containing the summons is received back  with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a   postal  employee to the effect  that  the tenant or  his agent   had  refused  to  take  delivery  of  the  registered  article,  the  Controller may declare that there has been a valid service of   summons.

(4)  The  tenant  on  whom  the  summons  is  duly  served  (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the   form specified in the Third Schedule shall  not  contest  the  prayer  for  eviction  from  the  premises  unless  he  files  an  

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affidavit  slating the grounds on which he seeks to contest   the  application  for  eviction  and  obtains  leave  from  the  Controller  as  hereinafter  provided;  and  in  default  of  his  appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining  such  leave,  the  statement  made  by  the  landlord  in  the  application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by  the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for   eviction on the ground aforesaid.

(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest   the application if  the affidavit  filed by the tenant discloses  such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an   order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the   ground specified in- clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section   (1) of section 14, or under section 14A.

(6)  Where  leave  is  granted  to  the  tenant  to  contest  the  application,  the  Controller  shall  commence the  hearing  of  the application as early as practicable.

(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of   section 37, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in a   proceeding to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice  and procedure  of  a  Court  of  Small  Causes,  including  the   recording of evidence.

(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for   the recovery of  possession of  any premises made by the  Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this  section:

Provided  that  the  High  Court  may,  for  the  purpose  of   satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under   this section is according to law, call  for the records of the  case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.

(9) Where no application has been made to the High Court   on  revision,  the  Controller  may,  exercise  the  powers  of   review in accordance with the provisions of Order XLVII of   the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of   1908).

(10)  Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Chapter,  the   procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction on  the  ground  specified  in  clause  (e)  of  the  proviso  to  sub- section (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be the  

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same as the procedure for the disposal of applications by  Controllers.

10. From a close examination of Section 25B sub-section (1) of the  

Rent Act, it would be evident and clear that in an application filed by a  

landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the ground  

specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14  

or under Section 14A or under Section 14B or under Section 14C or  

under  Section  14D,  shall  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with  the  

procedure specified in this Section. (Emphasis supplied)     

11. Sub-section (2) of Section 25B of the Rent Act says that the  

Controller  shall  issue  summons  in  relation  to  every  application  

referred  to  in  sub-section  1  in  the  form  specified  in  the  Third  

Schedule.   Sub-section  (3)  (a)  of  Section  25B  provides  that  

Controller,  in  addition  to  and  simultaneously  with,  the  issue  of  

summons for service on the tenant, also directs the summons to be  

served by registered post,  acknowledgment due,  addressed to the  

tenant or  his agent empowered to accept the service at the place  

where  the  tenant  or  his  agent  actually  and  voluntarily  resides  or  

carries  on  business  or  personally  works  for  gain  and  may,  if  the  

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circumstances of the case so require, also direct the publication of  

the summons in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the  

tenant  is  last  known  to  have  resided  or  carried  on  business  or  

personally worked for gain.

12. A reading of  sub-section (3)(a)  of  Section 25B would  clearly  

indicate that in a proceeding under Section 14(1)(e), how the tenant  

can be served intimating institution of  the eviction proceeding and  

date fixed for hearing of the same.  Sub-section (3)(b) of Section 25B  

says  when  the  acknowledgement  purporting  to  be  signed  by  the  

tenant  or  his agent  is received by the Controller  or  the registered  

article containing the summons is received back with an endorsement  

purporting to have been made by a postal employee to the effect that  

the tenant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the registered  

article, the Controller may declare that there has been a valid service  

of summons.   

13. Next comes the very important provision in Section 25B of the  

Rent Act, i.e., sub-section (4) of the same.  It clearly provides that a  

tenant on whom the summons is duly served in the form specified in  

the Third Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the  

premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he  

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seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from  

the  Controller,  as  hereinafter  provided,  and  in  default  of  his  

appearance  in  pursuance  of  the  summons  or  his  obtaining  such  

leave,  the  statement  made  by  the  landlord  in  the  application  for  

eviction  shall  be  deemed  to  be  admitted  by  the  tenant  and  the  

applicant  shall  be  entitled  to  an  order  for  eviction  on  the  ground  

aforesaid.

14.From a careful  perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 25B of the  

Rent Act, it would be clearly evident that the tenant shall not be  

permitted  to  contest  the  prayer  for  eviction  unless  he  files  an  

affidavit  before  the  Controller  stating  the  ground  on  which  he  

seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from  

the Controller.  This Section also clearly indicates that in default of  

his appearance in compliance with the summons or his obtaining  

such leave,  the statement  made by the landlord in the eviction  

proceeding shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the  

landlord shall  be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground  

mentioned in the eviction petition.   

15.At this stage, we may also note that in sub-section (4) of Section  

25B of the Rent Act read with Third Schedule, it has been made  

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clear by the Legislature that if the summons of the proceeding is  

received by the tenant,  he has to appear and ask for  leave to  

contest the eviction proceeding within 15 days from the date of  

service  of  notice  upon  the  tenant  and  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  

automatically, an order of eviction in favour of the landlord on the  

ground of bona fide requirement shall be made.

16.Sub-section (5)  of  Section 25B of  the Act  clearly  says that  the  

Controller  shall  give  to  the tenant  leave to  contest  the eviction  

proceeding if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts  

as would itself disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for  

recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in  

clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) or under Section 14A.   

17.Sub-section (6) of Section 25B of the Rent Act says that where  

leave  is  granted  to  the  tenant  to  contest  the  application,  the  

Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early  

as  practicable.  Sub-section  (7)  of  Section  25B  says  that  

notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section  

37, the Controller shall, while holding an enquiry in a proceeding  

to which this Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of  

a  Court  of  Small  Causes  including  the  recording  of  evidence.  

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Sub-section (8) of Section 25B bars an appeal or a second appeal  

against an order for recovery of possession of any premises made  

by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this  

section.  Proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25B also makes it  

clear that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself  

that  an  order  made  by  the  Controller  under  this  section  is,  

according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such  

order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.  Sub-section (9) of Section  

25B deals with the power of the Controller to review its order if no  

application was made before the High Court in revision.

18.Finally,  sub-section  (10)  of  Section  25B  clearly  says  that  the  

procedure for  the disposal  of  an application for  eviction on the  

ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of  

Section 14 or Section 14A shall be the same as the procedure for  

disposal of application by Controllers.   

19. The scope of Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act has been elaborately  

discussed  in  the  case  of  Ravi  Dutt  Sharma  v.  Ratan  Lal  

Bhargava, (AIR 1984 SC 967), in which this Court duly discussed  

the object of the Rent Act and also the insertion of Chapter IIIA of  

the same in the following manner :-

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“The  dominant  object  of  the  act  is  to  provide  a  speedy,   expeditious  and  effective  remedy  for  a  class  of  landlords  contemplated by Sections 14(1)(e) and 14A and for avoiding  unusual dilatory process provided otherwise by the Rent Act.   It is common experience that suits for eviction under the Act   take a long time commencing with the Rent Controller and  ending  up  with  the  Supreme  Court.  In  many  cases   experience has indicated that by the time the eviction decree  became final several years elapsed and either the landlord  died  or  the  necessity  which  provided  the  cause  of  action  disappeared  and  if  there  was  further  delay  in  securing  eviction  and  the  family  of  the  landlord  had  by  then  expanded, in the absence of accommodation the members  of the family were virtually thrown on the road. It was this   mischief,  which  the  Legislature  intended  to  avoid  by  incorporating  the  new  procedure  in  Chapter  III-A.  The  Legislature in its  wisdom thought that  in  cases where the  landlords  required  their  own  premises  for  bona  fide  and  personal  necessity  they  should  be  treated  as  a  separate  class along with the landlords covered by Section 14(A) and  should be allowed to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction  within  the  quickest  possible  time.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  said  that  the classification of  such landlords would  be an  unreasonable one because such a classification has got a   clear nexus with the objects of the Amending Act and the   purposes,  which  it  seeks  to  subserve.  Tenants  cannot   complain of any discrimination because the Rent Act merely   gave certain protection to them in public interest and if the   protection  or  part  of  it  afforded  by  the  Rent  Act  was  withdrawn and the common law right of the tenant under the  Transfer  of  property  Act  was  still  preserved,  no  genuine   grievance could be made.”

20.Before we take up the question posed before us in detail, we may  

also refer to one provision of the Rules, namely, Rule 23 of the  

said Rules which runs as under :-

“Code  of  Civil  Procedure  to  be  generally  followed  –  In  deciding any question, relating to procedure not specifically   provided by the Act and these rules the Controller and the  Rent Control Tribunal shall, as far as possible, be guided by   the  provisions  contained  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,   1908.”

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21. A challenge was thrown to Section 25B of the Rent Act in Kewal  

Singh  Vs. Smt.  Lajwanti  [1980 (1)  SCC 290],  questioning the  

classification  held  to  be  not  in  consonance  with  the  objective  

sought to be achieved and the aforesaid provision must be held to  

be  unconstitutional  wherein  this  Court  held  that  the  special  

provision namely, Section 25B of the Rent Act providing summary  

procedure  for  eviction  while  the  landlord  pleading  bona  fide  

personal  requirement,  separate  classification  of  such  landlords  

were held to be justified as such classification must be held to be  

in  consonance  with  the  objective  sought  to  be  achieved  and  

provision  not  unconstitutional.   Accordingly,  in  the  aforesaid  

decision,  this Court  held that  Section 25B does not  suffer  from  

excessive delegation.  Keeping in view the aforesaid observations  

of this Court in this case and considering the special provisions  

made in Section 25B of the Act, we conclude that Section 25B of  

the Act is a complete code by which the entire procedure to be  

adopted  for  eviction  of  a  tenant  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide  

requirement filed by the landlord in respect of a premises, shall be  

followed.  As noted herein earlier, Section 25B(1) clearly says that  

any application filed by a landlord for recovery of possession of  

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any premises,  inter alia, on the ground of Section 14(1)(e) of the  

Rent Act,  shall  be dealt  with  in accordance with  the procedure  

specified in Section 25B of the Rent Act.  Therefore, sub-section  

(1) of Section 25B makes it clear that if any application for eviction  

of a tenant is filed by the landlord, the special procedure indicated  

in  Section  25B  has  to  be  followed  and  Section  25B(1)  clearly  

stipulates that the application for eviction shall be strictly dealt with  

in accordance with the procedure specified in this Section.   

22.Apart from that, as we have noted herein earlier, Section 25B itself  

is a special code and therefore, Rent Controller, while dealing with  

an application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide  

requirement, has to follow strictly in compliance with Section 25B  

of the Act.  Therefore, after insertion of Section 25B of the Act, any  

application for granting eviction for a special kind of landlord, shall  

be dealt with strictly in compliance with Section 25B and question  

of relying on Rule 23 of the Code, which also does not give full  

right to apply the provisions of the Code, could be applied.   

23.That apart, Rule 23 does not specifically confer any power on the  

Controller to follow the provisions of the Code in special classes of  

landlords.  It is a general rule, by which the Controller in deciding  

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any question relating to procedure not specifically provided by the  

Act and these rules shall,  as far as possible, be guided by the  

provisions contained in the Code.   

24.In view of our discussions made hereinabove that Section 25B has  

been  inserted  by  the  Legislature  for  eviction  of  a  tenant  of  a  

certain  classes  of  landlords,  in  which  the  entire  procedure  has  

been given, it is difficult for us to hold that Rule 23 of the Rules  

can  be  applied  in  the  present  case  in  view  of  the  specific  

provisions provided in Section 25B of the Rent Act.  Accordingly,  

we are of the view that Rule 23 has no manner of application.   

25.That being the position, if Rule 23 cannot be applied in the present  

case because of applicability of Section 25B, which is a special  

code and specific procedure for eviction of a tenant by a landlord  

on the ground of bona fide requirement, we cannot agree with the  

courts below that in view of Rule 23 of the Rules, the provisions of  

the Code can be applied in the present case and, therefore, we  

are of the view that the High Court had acted illegally and with  

material  irregularity  in  the  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  in  setting  

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aside the order of eviction and in allowing the affidavit filed by the  

tenant for the purpose of defending the proceedings for eviction.   

26. That apart, from a perusal of the order of the High Court and also  

of the Rent Controller, it would be evident that the High Court had  

relied on a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Mohd.  

Quresh vs. Smt. Roopa Fotedar & Ors. [1990 (1) ILR 16] and  

held in favour of the tenant/respondent.  In Mohd. Quresh (supra),  

another decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of  Gurditta  

Mal Vs. Bal Sarup [AIR 1980 Delhi 216] was relied on to come to  

a  conclusion  that  in  view  of  Rule  23  of  the  Rules,  the  Rent  

Controller was conferred with the power to entertain an application  

under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Section 151 of the Code.   

27.   We may now note that the High Court, relying on Mohd. Quresh  

(supra) which had relied on the decision of Gurditta Mal (supra) held  

that the application under Order 37 Rule 4 read with Section 151 was  

entertainable by the Rent Controller.   In our view, the High Court,  

while deciding the present case had failed to notice that the decision  

in Gurditta Mal (supra) was considered in the subsequent decision of  

this Court in the case of  Prakash H Jain v. Ms. Marie Fernandes  

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(AIR  2003  SC  4591).   In  para  8  at  page  4593  of  the  aforesaid  

decision, this Court observed as follows:-

“In  Gurditta Mal v. Bal Swarup (AIR 1980 Delhi  216) a   learned Single Judge of the said High Court chose to infer   conferment  of  power  under  Rule  23  of  the  Delhi  Rent   Control Rules, 1959, though such power was not conferred   under the statute, by relying upon Section 151 CPC which  in our view could not have been, having regard to the very  nature  and content  of  power  under  Section  151 and its   inapplicability to Authorities other than ordinary courts”

Again in para 10 at page 4594, this Court observed as  

under :-

“We  have  carefully  considered  the  submissions  of  the   learned counsel appearing on either side. Questions of the   nature raised before us have to be considered not only on  the  nature  and  character  of  the  Authority,  whether  it  is   court or not but also on the nature of powers conferred on   such  Authority  or  Court,  the  scheme  underlying  the   provisions of the Act concerned and the nature of powers,   the  extant  thereof  or  the  limitations,  if  any,  contained  therein  with  particular  reference  to  the  intention  of  the   Legislature as well, found expressed therein. There is no   such  thing  as  any  inherent  power  of  court  to  condone  delay  in  filing  a  proceedings  before  Court/Authority   concerned, unless the law warrants and permits it, since it   has a tendency to alter the rights accrued to one or the   other partly under the statute concerned.”                    

28.  Therefore, in view of our discussions made hereinearlier and in  

view of our findings that there was no reason for us not to rely on the  

decision of Prakash H. Jain (supra), only because that decision was  

rendered  under  the  Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act,  whereas  the  

present case has been filed under the Delhi Rent Control Act, but on  

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comparing the aforesaid two Acts and in view of the observations and  

principles laid  down by this  Court  in  Prakash H.  Jain (supra),  as  

noted hereinearlier, we are of the view that the provisions under the  

Maharashtra  Rent  Control  Act  and  the  provisions  under  the  Delhi  

Rent Control Act are pari materia and therefore, the decision in the  

case of Prakash H. Jain (supra) practically overrules the decision of  

the Delhi High Court reported in Mohd. Quresh (supra) and Gurditta  

Mal (supra).

29.   For the reasons aforesaid, we are therefore of the view that the  

High  Court  has  acted  illegally  and with  material  irregularity  in  the  

exercise of its jurisdiction in affirming the order of the Additional Rent  

Controller  whereby the Additional  Rent  Controller  had allowed the  

application for  setting aside the order  of  eviction and restored the  

application for leave to contest  the eviction proceeding when such  

power,  in  our  view,  was  not  conferred  on  the  Rent  Controller  to  

entertain such an application filed by the tenant/respondent.  

30.  There is another aspect of this matter.  It is difficult to understand  

how an application for leave to contest having been rejected, may be  

on the ground of delay, could be allowed when it is not disputed by  

the tenant respondent that  no application for condonation of delay  

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could be entertained by the Rent Controller as the provisions of the  

Limitation Act, 1963 could not be attracted.   

31.     That apart, we have also carefully examined the special reason  

given by the tenant/respondent in the original application for leave to  

contest  and  the  present  application  after  order  of  eviction  was  

passed.   On a reading of  these two applications,  we find that  the  

same defence was taken by the tenant after the order of eviction was  

passed  and  therefore,  we  do  not  think  that  such  reason  can  be  

considered to be a special  reason within the meaning of Order 37  

Rule 4 of the Code for allowing the tenant to defend the proceedings  

if Order 37 Rule 4 of the Code applies to a special Act.     

32.     For all the reasons aforesaid, the order of eviction passed by  

the  Additional  Rent  Controller  on  28th of  February,  2001  stands  

restored, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the order of  

the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, are set aside and the application  

filed by the landlord under Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Act stands  

allowed.   

33.     Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case,  

we  grant  time  to  the  tenant/respondent  to  vacate  the  tenanted  

premises within a period of six months from this date provided the  

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tenant/respondent files an usual undertaking in this Court within one  

month.       

34.    In the event, if no undertaking is filed within a month mentioned  

hereinabove, it will be open for the landlord/appellant to proceed and  

take delivery of possession in accordance with law.   

35.    The appeal is thus allowed.  There will be no order as to costs.  

…………………...J.  [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi;               …………………….J. December 18, 2009.          [R. M. Lodha]  

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