24 August 2004
Supreme Court
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PRITHAWI NATH RAM Vs STATE OF JHARKHAND AND OTHERS

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,D.M. DHARMADHIKARI
Case number: C.A. No.-005024-005024 / 2000
Diary number: 6607 / 2000
Advocates: IRSHAD AHMAD Vs


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5024 of 2000

PETITIONER: Prithawi Nath Ram                                                

RESPONDENT: State of Jharkhand and Ors.                                      

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/08/2004

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & D.M. DHARMADHIKARI

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T WITH

IA NOS. 10-11 OF 2004  

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       Appellant filed an application under Sections 11 and 15 of the  Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the ’Act’) read with   Article 215 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the ’Constitution’).  The foundation of such application was alleged non-compliance of the  directions given by a learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in CWJC  1120 of 1998 by order dated 30.3.1999.  

       A learned Single Judge of the said High Court, while dealing with the  application for initiation of contempt proceedings, has passed the impugned  judgment holding that it would not be proper to take any action for  contempt.  Though learned Single Judge noticed that the scope of  consideration while dealing with an application for initiation of contempt  proceedings was confined to the question whether there was compliance  with the order or not, yet proceeded to examine the correctness of the order  and called upon the parties to satisfy him that the direction of the kind  contained in the order dated 30.3.1999 could be issued. After an  indepth  analysis, he came to hold that the directions could not have been given and  therefore there was no scope for taking any action for contempt.             Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single  Judge has not kept the correct parameters of law in view while dealing with  the application for contempt. In essence he has sat in judgment over the  decision rendered by another learned Single Judge. It was not open in the  contempt proceedings to examine whether the order,  non-implementation of  which was being urged, is valid or not. That is beyond the scope of  consideration.         In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that there can be   no straight jacket formula which can be applied in such matters. If the order  was not capable of being implemented, certainly it was open to the learned  Single Judge dealing with the application for initiation of contempt  proceedings to consider whether the order was legal or not.  While dealing with  an application for contempt, the Court is  really  concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received  its finality had been complied with or not.  It would not be permissible for a  Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been  assailed and to take the view different than what was taken in the earlier  decision.  A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari and Anr. V. Union of  India and Ors. (2001 (10) SCC 496). The Court exercising contempt  jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious  conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying  with the directions in the judgment or order.  If there was no ambiguity or

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indefiniteness in the order, it is for the concerned party to approach the  higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a  question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court.  The Court  exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself power to decide the  original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the  judgment or order.  Though strong reliance was placed by learned counsel  for the State of Bihar on a three-Judge Bench decision in Niaz Mohammad  and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors.  (1994 (6) SCC 352), we find that the  same has no application to the facts of the present case.  In that case the  question arose about the impossibility to obey the order. If that was the stand  of the State,  the least it could have done was to assail correctness of the  judgment before the higher Court.  State took diametrically opposite stands  before this Court. One was  that there was no specific direction to do  anything in particular and, second was  what was required to be done has  been done.  If what was to be done has been done, it cannot certainly be said  that there was impossibility to carry out the orders.  In any event, the High  Court has not recorded a finding that the direction given earlier was  impossible to be carried out or that the direction given has been complied  with.   On the question of impossibility to carry out the direction, the views  expressed in T.R. Dhananjaya v. J. Vasudevan (1995 (5) SCC 619) need to  be noted. It was held that when the claim inter se had been adjudicated and  had attained finality, it is not open to the respondent to go behind the orders  and truncate the effect thereof by hovering over the rules to get round the  result, to legitimize legal alibi to circumvent the order passed by a Court.    

In Mohd. Iqbal Khanday v. Abdul Majid Rather (AIR 1994 SC 2252),  it was held that if a party is aggrieved by the order, he should take prompt  steps to invoke appellate proceedings and cannot ignore the order and plead  about the difficulties of implementation at the time contempt proceedings  are initiated.       If any party concerned is aggrieved by the order which in its opinion  is wrong or against rules or its implementation is neither practicable nor  feasible, it should always either approach to the Court that passed the order  or invoke jurisdiction of the Appellate Court.  Rightness or wrongness of the  order cannot be urged in contempt proceedings.  Right or wrong the order  has to be obeyed. Flouting an order of the Court would render the party  liable for contempt.  While dealing with an application for contempt the  Court cannot traverse beyond the order, non-compliance of which is alleged.  In other words, it cannot say what should not have been done or what should  have been done. It cannot traverse beyond the order. It cannot test  correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete  any direction. That would be exercising review jurisdiction while dealing  with an application for initiation of contempt proceedings.  The same would  be impermissible and indefensible.  In that view of the matter,  the order of  the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted  for fresh consideration.  It shall deal with the application in its proper perspective in accordance with  law afresh.  We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion  regarding acceptability or otherwise of the application for initiation of  contempt proceedings.

In a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief  in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take  that as a ground for dis-obedience of any interim order passed by the Court.

It is to be noted that after re-organisation of States, the dispute  presently pertains to the State of Jharkhand, which has been substituted in  place of original respondent, the State of Bihar.  

Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.