http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 18  

PETITIONER: PRITAM PAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH,JABALPUR THROUGH REGISTRAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/02/1992

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR  904            1992 SCR  (2) 864  1993 SCC  Supl.  (1) 529 JT 1992 (2)    41  1992 SCALE  (1)416

ACT:     Constitution of India, 1950:     Articles  129  and  215-Contempt  Jurisdiction-Power  of Supreme  Court/High Court to punish for Contempt of  itself- Whether   could  be  curtailed  or  abridged   by   ordinary legislation  or  Rules-Procedure  for  contempt  proceedings being  summary, power to be used sparingly-Procedure  to  be fair and  contemner to be given an opportunity of  defending himself.     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:     Sections  2(b),  17 and  20-Criminal  Contempt-Advocate, practising  at  High  Court  making  libellous   allegations against   sitting  High  Court  Judges-Whether  amounts   to interference with administration of justice and affects  the image,  dignity and high esteem of office of judge  of  High Court-Sentence of two months’ simple imprisonment awarded by High Court-Whether justified.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant, an Advocate practising in the High  Court was  earlier working in the Defence Accounts Department,  on re-employment, after retiring from the Army. He had filed  a Writ  Petition  before  the  High  Court,  claiming  certain benefits  like pension, gratuity, pay and  allowances  etc., pertaining  to  the service rendered by him in  the  Defence Accounts  Department and the Army. The High Court  dismissed the Writ Petition. It also dismissed the appellant’s  review application.  This  Court also dismissed his  Special  Leave Petition against the High Court’s order.     Thereafter,  the  appellant, moved a  Contempt  Petition under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971  making some serious allegations against the two Judges of the  High Court,  who dismissed his Writ Petition and also the  Review Petition.  A  Division  Bench of the  High  Court  summarily dismissed the contempt petition.                                                        865     Meanwhile,  the Registry of the High Court examined  the allegations  made  in the affidavit filed by  the  appellant under Rule 5 of the Rules regarding contempts framed by  the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court, before which the  matter  was placed on the order of the  Chief  Justice,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 18  

took cognizance of the criminal contempt and directed  issue of notice to the appellant directing him to show cause as to why  he  should not be punished for contempt of  Court.  The appellant  filed  his  reply  raising  certain   preliminary objections,  contending  that  the notice was  bad  for  the reasons  that  (1)  the  Section  of  the  Act  under  which cognizance  had been taken was not  specifically  mentioned; (2)  the notice did not show sufficient cause as to why  the words and expressions used in the offending portions  marked had  been  construed  as  contemptuous  (3)  the   procedure followed by the High Court was contrary to the rules  framed by  it; and (4) no consent of the Advocate General had  been obtained, and prayed for discharge of the rule of contempt.     Meanwhile,  on the basis of the High Court’s Order,  the appellant  inspected  the  Court records  relating  to  this matter,  and  thereafter,  he was  also  informed  that  the proceedings were under the provisions of Article 215 of  the Constitution of India.     After examining the remarks made by the appellant in his contempt petition the High Court rejected the objections  of the  appellant/contemner  and held that  the  contemner  was guilty  of  criminal contempt of not only  scandalising  the Court  and  lowering its authority  but  also  substantially interfering  with the due course of justice. Taking note  of the defiant attitude of the contemner who even did not think it   necessary  to  apologise  but  tried  to  justify   the aspersions, the High Court sentenced the contemner to suffer simple imprisonment for two months.     In  the  appeal  before this Court,  the  contemner  who appeared  before  the Court in person,  contended  that  the order of the High Court should be set aside on the ground of procedural  irregularities  in that (1) that  the  offending remarks had not been communicated to him as per Rules 5  and 9  framed by the High Court; (2) that the cognizance of  the criminal  contempt  had not been taken  in  conformity  with Section  15  of  the  Act; (3)  that  the  procedure,  after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of the Act had not been followed; and (4) that Article 215 of the  Constitution of India did not prescribe any procedure to be followed. He                                                        866 also  contended that he had not been given a fair  and  full hearing  and  that the Judges had  browbeaten  and  unjustly convicted him ignoring the well settled principle that every person  had an inalienable right of making  fair  criticism, and  that the order in question was pre-conceived  and  pre- judged  one. In his written statement also he  made  certain remarks about the Judges of the High Court, in attempting to justify  his  action  which had led  to  the  initiation  of proceedings for contempt of Court before the High Court.     Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD: 1.1 The power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the  High Court, being Courts of Record under  Articles  129 and  215  of the Constitution respectively, is  an  inherent power  and  the  jurisdiction vested is a  special  one  not derived  from  any  other statute,  but  derived  only  from Articles   129  and  215  of  the  Constitution  of   India. Therefore,  the  constitutionally vested  right   cannot  be either  abridged  by any legislation including  Contempt  of Courts  Act  or  abrogated  or cut down.  Nor  can  they  be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision  of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure or any Rules.  The  special feature  of  the  procedure to be  followed  in  a  contempt proceeding being summary procedure, which is recognised  not only  in India but also abroad, the caution that has  to  be observed  in  exercising  this  inherent  power  by  summary

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 18  

procedure  is that the power should be used sparingly,  that the  procedure  to be followed should be fair and  that  the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. [883B-D]     Sukhdev  Singh Sodhi v. The Chief Justice and Judges  of the PEPSU High Court, [1954] SCR 454; R.L. Kapur v. State of Madras, [1972] 1 SCC 651; Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, [1991] 4 SCC 406; S. Mulgaokar,  [1978] 3 SCC 339; Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State  of Uttar  Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169; and D.N. Taneja  v.  Bhajan Lal, [1988] 3 SCC 26 relied on.     Hira  Lal  Dixit  v. State of U.P.,  AIR  1954  SC  743; Advocate  General, Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries, [1980]  3 SCC 311; Ashram M. Jain v. A.T. Gupta, [1983] 4 SCC 125  and M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and                                                        867 Haryana, [1991] 3 SCC 600, referred to.     State of Bombay v. P. 1958 Bom. Law Reporter, (60)  Page 873, referred to.     Clements and the Republic Costa Rica v. Erlanger, [1877] 46 L.J. Ch. 375 page 383, Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9  S.Ct.  77 80 (1888); Matsusow v. United Sates,  229  F.2d 335,  339  (5th  Cir.)  1956;  Sukhdev  Singh  Sodhi,   C.K. Daphtary;  Re Abdool v. Mahtab, (1867) 8 WR Cr. 32 page  33; 1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40; Andre Paul v. Attorney General,  AIR 1936 PC 141, Attorney General v. Butterworth, (1963) 1  Q.B. 696; Reg. v. Odham’s Press Ltd. Ex parte A.G., (1957) 1 Q.B. 73;  Morris,  v. The Crown Office, (1970) 1  All.E.R.  1079, 1081,  Offutt v. U.S., (1954) 348 US 11 Jennison  v.  Baker, [1972] 1 All ER 997 1006, referred to.     Belchamber’s  Practice of the Civil Court, 1884  Ed.  P. 241;  Contempt  of  Court. By Oswald and  Halbury’s  Law  of England (4th Edition) by Lord Hailsham page 3, referred to.     1.2.  In the instant case, the offending  criticism  and the scandalising allegations made by the appellant/contemner are most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice  shaking the  confidence  of  the public  in  the  administration  of justice and calling for a more rapid and immediate  punitive action.  These  calculated  contemptuous  remarks  and   the sweeping  allegations are derogatory in character, not  only to the dignity of the Judges and casting aspersions on their conduct  in  the discharge of their judicial  functions  but also  wounds the dignity of the Court. It is highly  painful to note that the appellant/contemner who is none other  than an  Advocate  practising in the same highest  Court  of  the State after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person  has escalatingly  scandalised  the  Court  by  making  libellous allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious, intimidatory, malacious and beyond condonable limit. Even  a cursory reading of the remarks made against the Judge of the High   Court   unambiguously  show  that   the   potentially prejudicial   utterances  and  the  outrageous   allegations rumbustiously  and  invectively made by the  contemner  with malicious design of attempting to impair the  administration of  justice  have struck a blow on the  judiciary  and  also seriously  sullied the image, dignity and high esteem  which the  office of the Judge of the High Court carried  with  it and thus impeded the course of justice by fouling its source                                                        868 and stream. The incident in question is a flagrant onslaught on  the  independence of the judiciary, destructive  of  the orderly  administration  of justice and a challenge  to  the supremacy   of  the  Rule of Law. The  maxim  "Salus  populi suprema  lex",  that is, "the welfare of the people  is  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 18  

supreme law" adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be  achieved  only when justice  is  administered  lawfully, judicially,  without  fear  or  favour  and  without   being hampered  and thwarted, and this cannot be effective  unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. [888E-H,889A-C]     1.3.To  punish  an Advocate for Contempt  of  Court,  no doubt,  must  be  regarded as an  extreme  measure,  but  to preserve  the  proceedings  of the  Courts  from  the  being deflected  or  interfered with, and to keep the  streams  of justice  pure, serene and undefiled, it becomes the duty  of the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in  order to preserve its dignity. No one can claim immunity from  the operation  of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct  in relation to Court or Court proceedings interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. In view of the  heinous type of scandalising the Court, the finding  of the High Court that the appellant/contemner has made himself guilty of criminal contempt is confirmed. [889D-E]     1.4 As regards the sentence, it is clear from the  order of  the High Court that the appellant had adopted a  defiant attitude  and  tried to justify the aspersions made  by  him even without thinking it necessary to apologise. Before this Court   also,  the  appellant  has  neither  expressed   any contrition  nor  has  he  any  repentance  for  the  vicious allegations made against the Judges of the High Court.  But, on  the other hand, he has exhibited a dogged  determination to  pursue  the  matter, come what may.  A  reading  of  his memorandum  of grounds and the written and signed  arguments show  that he was ventured into another bout of  allegations against the High Court Judges and persisted in his  campaign of  vilification. His conduct in this Court  has  aggravated rather than mitigating his offence. [889F-H]     1.5.  Therefore, having regard to the sentencing  policy that  punishment should be commensurate with the gravity  of the  offence, the sentence of 2 months’ imprisonment  in  no way  calls  for interference and is  accordingly  confirmed. [890A]

JUDGMENT:     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 258 of 1981.                                                        869     From the Judgment and Order dated 12th Feb. 1981  of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 617 of 1980.     Appellant in person.     Uma Nath Singh for the Respondent.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     S.  RATNAVEL  PANDIAN,J. The appellant, Mr.  Pritam  Pal Dhingra is a practising Advocate in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh  at  Jabalpur, having joined the  Bar  on  4.2.1979. Earlier  to joining the Bar, he was serving in the Army  and retired on 23.12.65. Thereafter, he was re-employed  in  the Defence Accounts Department on 7.2.1966 as U.D.C. (Auditor). On  29.2.76,  the appellant served three months’  notice  of resignation  upon  the  departmental  authorities  for   the reasons mentioned in the  said notice and also requested  to pay him the contributory provident fund benefits for his  10 years  service though the date of his superannuation in  the said post was 30.9.1986. The Department not only refused  to accept  his  resignation but also did not relieve  him  even after   the  expiry  of  three  months.  According  to   the appellant,  there  was  neither  any  departmental   enquiry

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 18  

pending  nor  contemplated against him  during  those  three months i.e. between 29.2.76   and 31.5.76. However, a charge sheet  dated  21.12.76  for imposing a major  penalty  on  a complaint  by  Jt. C.D.A. Vehicle Factory was served on  him to which he submitted his written statement. Then he  served a  final quit notice w.e.f. 8.1.77. Though on the  basis  of the show cause notice, an enquiry was started, nothing  came out of it. Therefore, the  appellant moved the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur by filing Writ Petition M.P.  No. 786  of 1978 under Article 226 of the Constitution of  India sworn  on 27.11.78 requesting several prayers  inclusive  of issuance  of  directions  to  the  respondent  therein  (the departmental authorities) to accept his resignation so as to enable him to take any other profession of his liking and to declare the retention of his service against his will  after 31.5.1976  as illegal and malafide and to re-imburse pay and allowances for the period of his enforced absence after  the expiry  of  three months notice period etc. The  High  Court issued  show cause notice to the respondents 1 to 3  in  the Writ Petition. The respondent No. 3 thereafter accepted  the resignation dated 29.2.76 of the appellant w.e.f. 15.1.79 by                                                        870 which  time the appellant claims to have completed 31  years of combined military and civil service i.e. from 29.11.47 to 15.1.79.  Meanwhile,  the  departmental  enquiry   initiated against  him  was  dropped.  Then  the  appellant  submitted supplemental  applications  praying  that  his   resignation should  be  converted into one of voluntary  retirement  and that  his  military services should be  counted  with  civil service  and  that he should be given all  service  benefits like  pension,  gratuity  etc.  as  well  as   consequential benefits  on  account  of the delay  in  acceptance  of  his resignation. Two applications being I.A.No. 908/79 and  I.A. No. 4246/78 were filed by the appellant, they being one  for amendment  of  the petition and the other  for  taking  some additional  grounds.  Both applications were  allowed  by  a Division  Bench of the High Court comprising of Mr.  Justice J.S.  Verma (as he then was) and Mr. Justice U.N.  Bachawat, as  the  counsel for the  respondents had no  objection  and granted  one week time for incorporating the  amendments  in the  petition.  At  the  request  of  the  counsel  for  the respondent,  Shri  R.P. Sinha, the Court granted  two  weeks time  to file the additional return by order dated  16.3.79. The  case was listed for further hearing on 2.4.79 on  which date the writ petition was dismissed. The appellant then  on 16.4.79  moved  an  application to review  the  order  dated 2.4.79. The application was registered as M.C.C. No. 209  of 1979. This application was too dismissed on 23.4.79 with the following observation:          "The  grievance  of the petitioner in  this  review          petition  is  that  the  writ  petition  (M.P.  No.          786/78)  was  dismissed in motion  hearing  without          hearing the petitioner. The substance of the  order          dismissing  the Writ Petition in motion hearing  as          stated earlier indicates that this averment made by          the  petitioner is not correct. We also  distinctly          recollect  that the petitioner was heard  fully  on          the   question  of  admission  and  it   was   only          thereafter  that  the  petition  was  dismissed  by          dictating  that order in the Court in the  presence          of  the petitioner. We would, therefore,  reiterate          that  this grievance of the petitioner that he  was          not  heard at the time of motion hearing is  wholly          incorrect.          The  submissions made by the petitioner in  support

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 18  

        of  this review application are (1) that  there  is          error  apparent on the face of the  record  because          the  writ petition was dismissed in motion  hearing          without hearing the petitioner; (2) that, sum-                                                        871          marily dismissal of the writ petition was arbitrary          because  after  notice  had  been  issued  to   the          respondents  1 to 3 show cause why the petition  be          not  admitted,  it was incumbent on  the  Court  to          admit  the  writ petition and hear  both  sides  at          length  before passing any order; and (3) that,  on          account  of above position, the petitioner was  not          given  a  fair  deal  before  dismissing  the  writ          petition in motion hearing.          As  earlier stated, the petitioner was heard  fully          at  the  end  of motion hearing  and  so  also  the          counsel  for  respondents Nos. 1 to  3,  Shri  R.P.          Sinha. The main averment on the basis of which  all          the  aforesaid submissions are based, i.e. lack  of          full  opportunity to the petitioner is,  therefore,          wholly non-existent. We are constrained to  observe          that  in making these submissions,  the  petitioner          who  is now enrolled as an Advocate, has  not  been          fair   to  the  Court. The petitioner  who  is  now          enrolled  as  a lawyer was expected to  exhibit  at          least   the   minimum   decorum   and   sense    of          responsibility which is expected from a members  of          this  noble  profession. We are pained  to  observe          that  the  petitioner  took  a  very   unreasonable          attitude and exhibited a behaviour which could  not          be  appreciated even by the member of the  Bar  who          were present when this order was being dictated  in          the  Court room after the hearing. However,  taking          into account the fact that the petitioner is a  new          entrant  in  the Bar, we have chosen  not  to  take          serious notice of the conduct of the petitioner  in          the  hope that the petitioner having now  become  a          member  of  the  Bar will try to  follow  the  high          traditions of the Bar which he has chosen to join.          There is no merit in this Review application. It is          summarily dismissed."     On being aggrieved by the above order of dismissal dated 2.4.79, the appellant filed Special Leave Petition No.   570 of 1979 before this Court but was not successful as the  SLP was dismissed on 25.7.79.     The appellant on being disturbed by the dismissal of his Writ  Petition  moved a Contempt Petition on  16.4.80  under Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971  (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) making some                                                        872 serious  allegations against the two Hon’ble Judges  of  the High  Court  who dismissed his Writ Petition on  2.4.79  and thereafter the Review Petition on 23.4.79 and also impleaded Shri  R.P. Sinha as the third respondent in  that  petition. According  to  the  appellant,  the  contempt  petition  was registered  as  M.C.C. No. 136 of 1980 and placed  before  a Division   Bench  on  29.4.1980  which  after  hearing   the appellant summarily dismissed contempt petition.     While it was so, the Registry of the High Court examined the allegations made in the affidavit filed by the appellant in  M.C.C.  No.  136/80  under Rule  5  of  Rules  regarding contempts framed by the High Court (Notification No. 8958  - Nagpur  dated the 24th October, 1953) and placed the  matter before the learned Chief Justice of the said High Court  who on  that  motion/reference passed an order  on  2.5.1980  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 18  

place  the matter before a Division for further action.  The Division  Bench  before  which the matter  was  placed  took cognizance of criminal contempt and directed issue of notice on  13.5.80 to the appellant directing to show cause  as  to why he should not be punished for contempt of Court to which the  appellant filed his reply raising  certain  preliminary objections stating that the notice was bad for the  reasons, namely,  (1) The Section of the Act under  which  cognizance had  been taken was not specifically mentioned;  (2)  Though the  offending portions are marked the notice does not  show sufficient  cause as to why the words and  expressions  used therein  have  been  construed  as  contemptuous;  (3)   The procedure  followed  by the High Court was contrary  to  the rules  framed  by  it; and (4) No consent  of  the  Advocate General  has been obtained. The appellant, on the  basis  of the  above  objections  prayed  to  discharge  the  rule  of contempt.     On  11.7.80  when  the case came  up  for  hearing,  the learned Advocate General filed his reply to the  preliminary objection and served a copy of the same to the appellant. On the same day, the High Court passed an order reading thus:          "........The  Government  Advocate  further   gives          notice   to  the  respondent  that   the   contempt          proceedings are under Art. 215 of the Constitution.          Let the respondent take inspection of the  original          record in case he would like to know the  offending          portions marked both                                                        873          underlined  and  side marked and let him  file  his          reply on merits within 15 days."     Admittedly,  the appellant inspected the  Court  records relating to this matter. Even thereafter when the  appellant persistently  requested as under what Section of the Act  he has been charged, he was informed that the proceedings  were under  the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution  of India.     For  the proper understanding of the issue in  question, we  feel  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  reproduce  the offending  words and passages as appearing in  the  contempt petition. They are as follows:          "7.  That  on  2.4.79, when the case  came  up  for          hearing, the judicial process required that it  was          the  non-applicant, Shri R.P.Sinha who should  have          been heard in the first instance and he should have          been  asked by the Court whether he has  filed  the          addition return but on account of misfortune of the          petitioner  and misconduct of the Presiding  Judge,          Justice Shri J.S. Verma that he while coming out of          the chamber and occupying the seat in the temple of          justice called out the petitioner and told him that          after  the  acceptance  of  the  resignation,   the          petition  had  become infructuous as  such  he  was          dismissing it summarily. The petitioner was shocked          to  witness the most illegal  and  unconstitutional          legal    process    adopted    by    the    Hon’ble          Judge..............................................          ...... When the petitioner started arguing his case          that  his  Fundamental Rights were  infringed,  the          Hon’ble  Presiding  Judge  not  only  stopped   the          petitioner from arguing his case but threatened him          for dire consequences in case the petitioner argued          any more. This amounts to desacrilege the  sanctity          of his own Court by the Judges.          8. .......................          9.  .......  The Review Petition was heard  by  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 18  

        same  Bench in utter disregard of  judicial  cannon          since  no person against whom  serious  allegations          have been levelled (against) can be a Judge in  his          own case. The Review Petition was also                                                        874          rejected  summarily repeating the  false  averments          more   in  explicit  terms  that  they  heard   the          petitioner   as  well  as  the  counsel   for   the          respondents  thus super-imposing the seal of  truth          over the falsehood.                                GROUNDS          1.   The  petitioner  charges  the  Hon’ble   Court          especially  Justice J.S. Verma for adopting a  most          illegal  and unconstitutional judicial  process  in          utter  disregard  of  cannons  and  principles   of          adjudication,  for showing rude  behaviour  towards          the  petitioner.  The amounts  to  desacrilege  the          sanctity of his Court.          2.  That  when the attention of Justice  Verma  was          drawn  on 2.4.79, that he was violating  the  legal          process, he misbehaved with the petitioner  without          any valid reason which amounts to misconduct of the          Judges.          3. That again on 23.4.1979 when the Review Petition          was    being    argued,    he    threatened     the          applicant/petitioner  for dire consequences for  no          valid reasons.          4.  That the High Court is a Temple of Justice  and          the Judges who occupy the seat of justice are  just          like  Dharamraj.  Dharamraj’s are not  supposed  to          utter falsehood atleast while occupying this sacred          seat  of Justice. The Hon’ble Judges have not  only          uttered  falsehood  in their order dated  2.4.79  (          Annexure  ‘B’)  but  super -  imposed  their  false          averments  in  their order dated 23.4.79  in  which          they stated that they distinctly recollect that the          petitioner   as  well  as  the  counsel   for   the          respondents  were  heard. The  petitioner’s  charge          that   they  do  not  remember  as  to  what   they          heard................          5. ...............................................          6.  The charge against Justice U.N.  Bachawat  (the          associate Judge) is that he silently witnessed  the          proceedings  throughout. He never uttered a  single          word or intervened when his senior faltered out and          succumbed to the false averments                                                        875          of the Presiding Judge as if was not an independent          Judge but serving faithfully and obediently to  his          master.          7. ...............................................          8.   That  the  petitioner  avers  that  both   the          contemner Judges have acted and bad faith and  have          fouled  the seat of justice by clear malafides  act          of theirs and as such no protection can be extended          to  them  under cover a bonafide act done  in  good          faith as Judges.          9. That both the Judges have violated the  sanctity          attached to the seat of Justice and have  committed          a  Contempt  of their own Court.  Both  have  acted          malafidely in bad faith.                                PRAYER          It is, therefore, prayed that Contempt  Proceedings          under  Section  16 of the Contempt  of  Court  Act,          1971,  may be initiated against Justice J.S.  Verma

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 18  

        and  Justice  U.N. Bachawat of the  Madhya  Pradesh          High Court on the aforesaid grounds."     The  High Court after examining the  above  scandalising remarks  made  by  the appellant in  his  contempt  petition rejected  the objections of the appellant/contemner  holding that the cognizance of the criminal contempt was taken by it on suo moto, that the contemner was informed that the  Court was   invoking  its  jurisdiction  under  Article   215   of Constitution  of India to punish him for contempt, that  the Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971 does  not  confer  any  new jurisdiction by its authority, that in a suo moto action  by the  High  Court, consent of the Advocate  General  was  not necessary, that non quoting of the provisions Section in the notice is immaterial and that the contemner had full  notice of   the  charge  of  contempt  levelled  against  him   and concluded,  "We see no defect in the notice served upon  the contemner, nor do we find defect in the procedure followed."     Then after referring to certain decisions of this  Court in Perspective Publications v. State of Maharashtra,  [1969] 2 SCR 779; C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, [1971] 1 SCC 626 and Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of                                                        876 Orissa High Court, [1974] 1 SCC 374, the High Court made the following  observation  with reference to the facts  of  the case:          "16.  The offending portions in paras 7 and 9,  and          repeated  in grounds 1,2,3 and 4,8 and 9  attribute          to Mr. Justice J.S. Verma (a) improper motive,  (b)          unfairness  and  undue basis in  dealing  with  the          case, (c) being a Judge who administers justice  in          a  cursory  manner without giving  thought  to  the          points  involved,  (d)  of  being  intemperate   in          language, impatient and unjust, (e) who would arise          false proceedings and when falsity has been brought          his notice, would have the audacity to stick to the          falsehood.          17.  If the words have this import, the  inevitable          effect is undermining the confidence of the  public          in  the judiciary. The person who has  indulged  in          scurrilous  abuse  of  the Judge,  must  suffer  in          punishment."     On  the basis of the above observations, the High  Court recorded its finding thus:          "20. In our reading of the offending portions  duly          marked in paras 7,9 and grounds 1,2,3 and 4,8 and 9          of  the application dated 16.4.1980 in the  context          in   which  they  have  been  written,  there   are          imputations   of  malafides,  bias  and   prejudice          against  Mr.  Justice  J.S.  Verma.  The   contempt          involved in these passages is grossly scandalous.          21.  Coming  to  the allegations in  Ground  No.  6          relating to Mr. Justice Bachawat, it was said  that          "he  silently witnessed the proceedings.  He  never          uttered a single word or intervened when his senior          faltered  and succumbed to false averments  of  the          Presiding  Judge  as if he was not  an  independent          Judge  but  serving faithfully and  obediently  his          master."     Finally,  the  High Court held that the  contemner,  Mr. Pritam  Lal  is  guilty of criminal  contempt  of  not  only scandalising  the Court and lowering its authority but  also substantially  interfering with the due course  of  justice. Coming  to the question of sentence, the High  Court  taking note  of the defiant attitude of the contemner who even  did not think it necessary to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 18  

                                                      877 apologise but tried to justify the aspersions, sentenced the contemner  to  suffer simple imprisonment  for  two  months. Hence the present appeal.     The  Contemner,  Mr. Pritam Lal appeared  before  us  in person  and advanced his arguments which are similar to  the submissions   made  before  the  High  Court,   inter   alia contending that the impugned order of the High Court  should be  set  aside with costs and suitable compensation  on  the ground  of  procedural irregularities in that (1)  that  the offending  remarks have not been communicated to him as  per Rules  5  and  9  framed by the High  Court;  (2)  that  the cognizance  of  the criminal cotmpt has not  been  taken  in conformity  with  Section  15  of  the  Act;  (3)  that  the procedure after cognizance as prescribed under Section 17 of the  Act has not been followed; and (4) that Article 215  of the  Constitution of India does not prescribe any  procedure to  be  followed. According to him he has not been  given  a fair  and  full hearing but on the other hand,  the  learned Judges have browbeaten and unjustly convicted him   ignoring the  well  settled principle that every person  has  got  an inalienable  right of making fair criticism. He has  further added  that  the impugned order was pre-conceived  and  pre- judged one. In addition to the oral arguments, he has  filed detailed  written  arguments, signed on  15.11.88  citing  a number  of  decisions  which in our view, do  not  have  any relevance  to  the  facts  of  the  case.  In  the   written submissions  also, he has again made certain outrageous  and contemptuous remarks about the Judges of the High Court,  in attempting  to  justify  his action which  has  led  to  the initiation  of the proceedings of contempt of  Court  before the High Court.     As  rightly  pointed  out  by  the  High  Court,   these contentions  in our opinion do not merit  any  consideration since every High Court which is a Court of Record is  vested with  ‘all  powers’  of such Court including  the  power  to punish for contempt of itself and has inherent  jurisdiction and inalienable right to uphold its dignity and authority.     Whilst  Article 129 deals with the power of the  Supreme Court as Court of Record, Article 215 which is analogous  to Article  129 speaks of the power of the High Court  in  that respect.     Prior  to the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it was  held that  the  High  Court has inherent power  to  deal  with  a contempt of itself summarily and                                                        878 to  adopt its own procedure, provided that it gives  a  fair and  reasonable  opportunity  to  the  contemner  to  defend himself.  But  the  procedure has  now  been  prescribed  by Section 15 of the Act in exercise of the powers conferred by Entry  14,  List  III  of  the  Seventh  Schedule   of   the Constitution.  Though  the  contempt  jurisdiction  of   the Supreme  Court  and  the  High Court  can  be  regulated  by legislation  by  appropriate Legislature under Entry  77  of List  I  and Entry 14 of List III in exercise of  which  the Parliament   has   enacted  the  Act  1971,   the   contempt jurisdiction  of  the Supreme Court and the  High  Court  is given a constitutional foundation by declaring to be ‘Courts of  Record’ under Articles 129 and 215 of  the  constitution and, therefore, the inherent power of the Supreme Court  and the High Court cannot be taken away by any legislation short of constitutional amendment. In fact, Section 22 of the  Act lays  down  that  the provisions of this  Act  shall  be  in addition  to and not in derogation of the provisions of  any other  law  relating to contempt of courts.  It  necessarily

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 18  

follows that the constitutional jurisdiction of the  Supreme Court  and the High Court under Articles 129 and 215  cannot be  curtailed  by  anything in the Act of  1971.  The  above position  of  law  has been well settled by  this  Court  in Sukhdev  Singh  Sodhi v. The Chief Justice  and  Judges  and Judges of the PEPSU High Court, [1954] SCR 454 holding thus:          "In  any case, so far as contempt of a  High  Court          itself  is  concerned, as distinct from  one  of  a          subordinate  Court,  the Constitution  vests  these          rights  in  every  High  Court,  so  no  Act  of  a          legislature  could take away that jurisdiction  and          confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority."     It has been further observed:          "The  High  Court can deal with  it  summarily  and          adopt  its own procedure. All that is necessary  is          that the procedure is fair and that, the  contemner          is made aware of the charge against him and given a          fair and reasonable opportunity to defend himself."     In  R.L.  Kapur v. State of Madras, [1972] 1 SCC  651  a question arose did the power of the High Court of Madras  to punish  contempt  of  itself arise  under  the  Contempt  of Courts  Act,  1952 so that under Section 25 of  the  General Clauses Act, 1897, Sections 63 to 70 of the Penal Code and                                                        879 the  relevant provisions of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure would apply. This question was answered by this Court in the following words:          "The  answer  to such a question  is  furnished  by          Article 215 of the Constitution and the  provisions          of  the  Contempt of Courts Act,  1952  themselves.          Article  215 declares that every High  Court  shall          be  a court of record and shall have all powers  of          such  a  court including the power  to  punish  for          contempt  of itself. Whether Article  215  declares          the power of the High Court already existing in  it          by  reason  of  its being a  court  of  record,  or          whether  the article confers the power as  inherent          in a court of record, the jurisdiction is a special          one,  not arising or derived from the  Contempt  of          Courts  Act,  1952, and therefore, not  within  the          purview  of  either the Penal Code or the  Code  of          Criminal Procedure."     After giving the above answer to the query raised,  this Court  has reiterated the view held in the case  of  Sukhdev Singh Sodhi (referred supra).     The  view expressed in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi and  followed in  R.L.  Kapur  been referred with  approval  in  a  recent decision  in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State  of Gujarat,  [1991]  4 SCC 406, holding that the view  of  this Court  in  Sukhdev  Singh  Sodhi is  "that  even  after  the codification  of  the  law of contempt in  India,  the  High Court’s  jurisdiction  as  a Court  of  Record  to  initiate proceedings   and  take  seisin  of  the   matter   remained unaffected by the contempts of Courts Act, 1926."     Beg,  C.J.  in  Re S. Mulgaokar, [1978] 3  SCC  339  has explained  the  special  power of the  Supreme  Court  under Article 129 stating. "This Court is armed, by Article 129 of the  Constitution, with very wide and special powers,  as  a Court of Record, to punish its contempts."     In  Delhi Judicial Service Association case (supra),  it has been pointed out as follows:          "Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court  shall          be a court of record and shall have all the  powers          of  such a court including the power to punish  for          contempt of itself. Article 215 contains

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 18  

                                                      880          similar provisions in respect of a High Court. Both          the Supreme Court as well as High Courts are courts          of  record  having powers to  punish  for  contempt          including  the  power  to punish  for  contempt  of          itself."     Yet another question whether the provisions of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure are applicable to  such  Proceedings, has been negatively answered by this Court in Sukhdev  Singh Sodhi case (supra) stating thus:          "We  hold  therefore  that  the  Code  of  Criminal          Procedure  does  not apply in matters  of  contempt          triable by the High Court. The High Court can  deal          with it summarily and adopt its own procedure.  All          that is necessary is that the procedure is fair and          that  the  contemner is made aware  of  the  charge          against  him  and  given  a  fair  and   reasonable          opportunity to defend himself."     See  also Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The  State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169.     From the above judicial pronouncements of this Court, it is manifestly clear that the power of the Supreme Court  and the High Court being the Courts of Record as embodied  under Articles  129 and 215 respectively cannot be restricted  and trammelled   by  any  ordinary  legislation  including   the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and their  inherent power is elastic, unfettered and not subjected to any limit. It  would  be  appropriate, in  this  connection,  to  refer certain  English authorities dealing with the power  of  the superior Courts as Courts of Record.     The  1884 edition of Belchamber’s Practice of the  Civil Court says at page 241 that -          "Every  superior  court of record, whether  in  the          United  Kingdom, or in the colonial possessions  or          dependencies  of  the Crown has inherent  power  to          punish contempts, without its precincts, as well as          in facie curiae............."     In  9  Halsbury’s Law of England (4th Edition)  by  Lord Hailsham  at page 3 under the caption  "Criminal  Contempt", the following passage is found:                                                        881          "The superior courts have an inherent  jurisdiction          to punish criminal contempt....."     It is further stated at page 3 itself that the power  to commit  by summary process is arbitrary and  unlimited,  but that power should be exercised with the greatest caution.     In  Re  Clements  and  the Republic  of  Costa  Rica  v. Erlanger,  [1877] 46 L.J.Ch. 375 at page 383,  Lord  Jessel, M.R. said:          "......this jurisdiction of committing for contempt          being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be          most   jealously   and   carefully   watched,   and          exercised....,"     Reference also may be bad to a decision of the  Division Bench  of  the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay  v.  P., 1958  Bom. Law Reporter, (60) Page 873 wherein it  has  been held  that  the jurisdiction which each Judge  of  the  High Court  possesses and uses as constituting a Court of  Record is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself  for punishment for contempt of Court, whether it is ex facie the Court  or  otherwise  and  that for  the  exercise  of  that jurisdiction  it  is not necessary to refer  either  to  the Letters  Patent or the Rules framed by the Court  thereunder and  that it is a jurisdiction which is being  exercised  in the  same  manner as was exercised in the  Court  of  King’s

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 18  

Bench Division in England.     In special feature of the procedure to be followed in  a contempt  proceeding  is  the  summary  procedure  which  is recognised not only in India but also abroad.     It  is  an  outstanding characteristic  of  the  law  of contempt both in England and Scotland that it makes use of a particular  and  summary procedure which is unknown  to  any other  branch of those countries. In England,  this  summary procedure  began  to  be adopted by the  common  law  Courts inspite  of  trial by jury and that the trial  by  jury  for contempt  has steadily declined and has now fallen  entirely into disuse. In other words, consequent upon the use of  the summary  procedure  in England, a person alleged  to  be  in contempt  does  not  enjoy  the  benefit  of  some  of   the safeguards  of  the  ordinary criminal  law  such  as  those provided  by the Judges’ Rules in England and Wales and  the right to trial by jury.                                                        882 Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of United States  reads  that ‘‘A criminal contempt  may  be  punished summarily  if the Judge certifies that he saw or  heard  the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was  committed in the actual presence of the Court."     In  Ex  parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307, 9 S.Ct.  77,  80 (1888)  and in Matsusow v. United States, 229 F.2d 335,  339 (5th Cir. 1956), it has been ruled that "If the contempt  be committed  in  the face of the court, the  offender  may  be instantly  apprehended and imprisoned at the  discretion  of the judges, without any further proof or examination."     In  the  Contempt  of Court  by  Oswald,  the  following passage  relating  to  the summary power  of  punishment  is found:          "The  summary power of punishment for contempt  has          been  conferred  on the courts to keep a  blaze  of          glory around them, to deter people from  attempting          to  render  them contemptible in the  eyes  of  the          public.  These  powers are necessary  to  keep  the          course   of  justice  free,  as  it  is  of   great          importance to society."     In the year 1899, Lord Moriss in delivering the judgment of  the Judicial Committee in Mc Leod v. St. Aubin  1899  AC 549 (C) said:          "The  power  summarily to commit  for  contempt  is          considered   for  the  proper   administration   of          justice."     This has long been the practice in India also.     The power under Articles 129 and 215 is a summary  power as  held in the cases of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi, C.K.  Daphtary (referred to above) and in Hira Lal Dixit v. State of  U.P., AIR 1954 SC 743.     Peacock,  C.J.laid  down the rule quite broadly  in  the following  words in Re Abdool v. Mahtab, 1867 (8 WR) Cr.  32 at page 33:          "there  can be no doubt that every court of  record          has the power of summarily punishing for contempt."     The above view is re-stated in a number of decisions  of this Court.     In the case of Sukhdev Singh Sodhi it has been observed:                                                        883          ".......the  power  of a High  Court  to  institute          proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary          is  special jurisdiction which is inherent  in  all          courts  of  record and section 1 (2)  of  the  Code          expressly  excludes special jurisdiction  from  its          scope."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 18  

   The  position  of  law  that  emerges  from  the   above decisions is that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and  the High Court, being Courts of Record  under  Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an  inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special one  not derived  from  any  other  statute  but  derived  only  from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India (See  D.N. Taneja  v.  Bhajan Lal, [1988] 3 SCC 26) and  therefore  the constitutionally  vested right cannot be either abridged  by any  legislation or abrogated or cut down. Nor can  they  be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision  of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure or any Rules.  The  caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary   procedure  is  that  the  power  should  be   used sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be  fair and  that the contemner should be made aware of  the  charge against  him  and given a reasonable opportunity  to  defend himself.     If  we  examine  the facts of the present  case  in  the backdrop  of the proposition of law, the contentions  raised by  the appellant challenging the procedure followed by  the High  Court  do  not  merit  any  consideration  since   the appellant  has  been served with a notice  of  contempt  and thereafter  permitted to go through the records and  finally has  been afforded a fair opportunity of putting  forth  his explanation for the charge levelled against him. Incidently, we  may  say that the submission of the contemner  that  the impugned  order  is  vitiated on the  ground  of  procedural irregularities  and that Article 215 of the Constitution  of India  is to be read in conjunction with the  provisions  of Sections   15  and  17  of  the  Act  of  1971,  cannot   be countenanced  and it has to be summarily rejected  as  being devoid of any merit.     The  remaining important question for consideration  are whether  the  statements  which we  have  extracted  in  the preceding  part  of  this judgment, made  by  the  contemner amount to a scurrilous attack on the integrity,  honesty and judicial  impartiality  of the learned Judges  of  the  High Court and whether the contemner by his conduct as well as by making such                                                        884 written  scandalising statements and invective remarks  have interfered   and   seriously   disturbed   the   system   of administration of justice by bringing it down to  disrespect and disrepute.     There  is  an  abundance  of  empirical  decisions  upon particular  instances  of  conduct which has  been  held  to constitute contempt of Court. We shall now refer to a few.     Lord Russel of Killowen, L.C.J. has laid down the law of Contempt in 1900 (2) Q.B. 36 at 40 as follows:          "Any  act done or writing published  calculated  to          bring  a  Court  or  a  Judge  of  the  Court  into          contempt, or to lower his authority, is a  Contempt          of Court."     The above proposition has been approved and followed  by Lord  Atkin in Andre Paul v. Attorney General, AIR  1936  PC 141.     Lord Justice Donovan in Attorney General v. Butterworth, 1963 (1) Q.B 696, after making reference to Reg. v.  Odham’s Press Ltd., ex parte A.G. 1957 (1) Q.B. 73 said, "Whether or not   there   was  an  intention  to  interfere   with   the administration  of  justice is relevant to penalty,  not  to guilt."  This makes it clear that an intention to  interfere with  the proper administration of justice is  an  essential ingredient  of  the offence of contempt of court and  it  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 18  

enough  if the action complained of is inherently likely  so to interfere.     In Morris v. The Crown Office, (1970) 1 All.E.R. 1079 at page 1081, Lord Denning M.R. said:          "The  course  of justice must not be  deflected  or          interfered  with. Those who strike at it strike  at          the very foundations of our society."     In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke:          "The sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to          give  our courts the power effectively  to  protect          the  rights  of  the public by  ensuring  that  the          administration  of justice shall not be  obstructed          or prevented."                                                        885     Frank  Further,  J in Offutt v. U.S., [1954] 348  US  11 expressed his view as follows:          "It is a mode of vindicating the magesty of law, in          its  active manifestation against  obstruction  and          outrage."     In Jennison v. Baker, [1972] 2 All ER 997 at page  1006, it is stated:          "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while          those  who defy it go free, and those who seek  its          protection lose hope."     Chinnappa  Reddy, J. Speaking for the Bench in  Advocate General,  Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries, [1980] 3  SCC  311 citing those two decisions in the ases of Offut and Jennison (supra) stated thus:          "......it may be necessary to punish as a contempt,          a  course  of  conduct which  abuses  and  makes  a          mockery  of  the judicial process  and  which  thus          extends   its  pernicious  influence   beyond   the          parties  to the action and affects the interest  of          the  public in the administration of  Justice.  The          public  have  an interest, an abiding  and  a  real          interest,  and a vital stake in the  effective  and          orderly administration of justice, because,  unless          justice  is so administered, there is the peril  of          all  rights and liberties perishing. The Court  has          the  duty of protecting the interest of the  public          in the due administration of justice and, so it  is          entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt  of          Court,  not in order to protect the dignity of  the          Court  against insult or injury as  the  expression          "Contempt  of  Court" may seem to suggest,  but  to          protect  and to vindicate the right of  the  public          that  the  administration of justice shall  not  be          prevented,  prejudiced,  obstructed  or  interfered          with."     Krishna  Iyer,  J.  in his separate Judgment  in  re  S. Mulgaokar  (supra)  while  giving the  broad  guidelines  in taking  punitive action in the matter of Contempt  of  Court has stated:          ".......if  the Court considers the attack  on  the          judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory          or  malicious beyond condonable limits, the  strong          arm of the law must, in the name of public interest          and public justice, strike a blow on him who                                                        886          challenges  the  supremacy of the rule  of  law  by          fouling its source and stream."     In the case of Brahma Prakash (supra), this Court  after referring  to various decisions of the foreign countries  as well as of the Privy Council stated thus:          "It will be an injury to the public if it tends  to

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 18  

        create  an apprehension in the minds of the  people          regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the          Judge or to deter actual and prospective  litigants          from  placing  complete reliance upon  the  Court’s          administration  of justice, or if it is  likely  to          cause  embarrassment  in  the  mind  of  the  Judge          himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It          is  well  established that it is not  necessary  to          prove  affirmatively that there has been an  actual          interference with the administration of justice  by          reason  of such defamatory statement; it is  enough          if it is likely, or trends in any way, to interfere          with the proper administration of law."     In  Ashram  M.Jain v. A.T. Gupta, [1983] 4 SCC  125  the facts were thus:     The  petitioner  who  filed  a  special  leave  petition accompanying by an affidavit affirming the statement made in the  said SLP indulged in wild and vicious diatribe  against the  then  Chief Justice of the High Court  of  Maharashtra. When  the  SLP was heard, this Court directed notice  to  be issued  to  the  petitioner  as to  why  he  should  not  be committed  for  contempt under the Contempt of  Courts  Act, 1971.  After hearing the parties and then not accepting  the unconditional   apology  of  the  petitioner,   this   Court convicted  the petitioner for contempt and sentenced him  to suffer  simple imprisonment for a period of two  months.  In that case, Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the Bench said:          "The   strains  and  mortification  of   litigation          cannot  be  allowed to lead litigants  to  tarnish,          terrorise and destroy the system of  administration          of  justice  by vilification of judges. It  is  not          that judges need be protected; judges may well take          care of themselves. It is the right and interest of          the  public  in the due administration  of  justice          that has to be protected."                                                        887     Reference may be made to a recent decision of this Court in M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana, [1991] 3 SCC 600. In that case, the appellant, a practising  advocate having  failed to persuade the learned Subordinate Judge  to grant  an ad-interim injunction pending filing of a  counter by  the  opposite  party, made  certain  derogatory  remarks against the learned Judge who instead of succumbing to  such unprofessional  conduct  made  a record  of  the  derogatory remarks and forwarded the same to the High Court through the District Judge to initiate proceedings for Contempt of Court against  the  appellant.  The High Court  holding  that  the remarks  made  on the learned Sub Judge are  disparaging  in character  and  derogatory to the dignity of  the  judiciary found  the  appellant  guilty of Section 2 (c)  (i)  of  the Contempt of Courts Act. The appellant therein though  denied to  have made the remarks, however, offered  an  unqualified apology.  But the High Court without accepting  the  apology punished  the  appellant therein with a fine of  Rs.  1,000. Ahmadi,  J.  of  this Court in  his  separate  judgment  has observed:          "The  tendency  of  maligning  the  reputation   of          judicial officers by disgruntled elements who  fail          to secure the desired order is ever on the increase          and  it is high time it is nipped in the bud.  And,          when  a  number of the profession resorts  to  such          cheap gimmiks with a view to browbeating the  judge          into  submission, it is all the more painful.  When          there  is a deliberate attempt to scandalise  which          would shake the confidence of the litigating public

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 18  

        in the system, the damage caused is not only to the          reputation  of the concerned judge but also to  the          fair   name  of  the  judiciary.  Veiled   threats,          abrasive  behaviour, use of disrespectful  language          and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like  the          present  one are often designedly employed  with  a          view to taming a judge into submission to secure  a          desired  order.  Such  cases  raise  larger  issues          touching the independence of not only the concerned          judge but the entire institution. The foundation of          our  system which is based on the independence  and          impartiality of those who man it will be shaken  if          disparaging and derogatory remarks are made against          the  presiding judicial officers with impunity.  It          is  high  time  that  we  realise  that  the   much          cherished judicial independence has to be protected          not only from the executive or                                                        888          the  legislature  but also from those  who  are  an          integral part of the system."     After  having  made the above observation,  the  learned judge   concerned  with  the  conclusion  of   Agarwal,   J. dismissing  the appeal and while doing so, he expressed  his painful thought as follows:          "When  a  member  of  the bar  is  required  to  be          punished  for  use of contemptuous language  it  is          highly  painful  - it pleases none  -  but  painful          duties  have to be performed to uphold  the  honour          and dignity of the individual judge and his  office          and  the  prestige of the institution.  Courts  are          generally slow in using their contempt jurisdiction          against  erring  members of the profession  in  the          hope  that the concerned Bar Council  will  chasten          its  member for failure to maintain proper  ethical          norms.  If  timely  action  is  taken  by  the  Bar          Councils, the decline in the ethical values can  be          easily arrested."     We are in full agreement with the above view.     Reverting  to  the  facts of  the  case,  the  offending criticism  and  the  scandalising allegations  made  by  the appellant/contemner are most fatal and dangerous obstruction of  justice  shaking  the confidence of the  public  in  the administration  of justice and calling for a more rapid  and immediate  punitive  action. These  calculated  contemptuous remarks   and  the  sweeping  allegations  which   we   have extracted above are derogatory in character not only to  the dignity  of the learned Judges casting aspersions  on  their conduct  in  the discharge of their judicial  functions  but also  wounds the dignity of the Court. It is highly  painful to note that the appellant/contemner who is none other  than an  Advocate  practising in the same highest  Court  of  the state after having failed to wrench a decision in his favour in his own cause which he prosecuted as party in person  has escalatingly  scandalised  the  Court  by  making  libellous allegations which are scurrilous, highly offensive, vicious, intimidatory, malacious and beyond condonable limit. Even  a cursory  reading  of the remarks made  against  the  learned Judge  of  the  High  Court  unambiguously  show  that   the potentially   prejudicial  utterances  and  the   outrageous allegations  rumbustiously  and  invectively  made  by   the contemner with malacious design of attempting to impair                                                        889 the  administration  of justice have struck a  blow  on  the judiciary and also seriously sullied the image, dignity  and high esteem which the office of the Judge of the High  Court

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 18  

carries  with it  and thus impeded the course of justice  by fouling  its source and steam. In our opinion, the  incident in  question is a flagrant onslaught on the independence  of the judiciary, destructive of the orderly administration  of justice and a challenge to the supremacy of the Rule of Law.     The  maxim  "Salus  populi suprema lex",  that  is  "the welfare  of  the  people  is  the  supreme  law"  adequately enunciates  the idea of law. This can be achieved only  when justice  is administered lawfully, judicially, without  fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and  this cannot  be effective unless respect for it is  fostered  and maintained.     To  punish an Advocate for Contempt of court, no  doubt, must be regarded as an extreme measure, but to preserve  the proceedings of the Courts from being deflected or interfered with,  and to keep the streams of justice pure,  serene  and undefiled, it becomes the duty of the Court, though painful, to punish the contemner in order to preserve its dignity. No one  can  claim immunity from the operation of  the  law  of contempt,  if  his act or conduct in relation  to  Court  or Court  proceedings  interferes  with  or  is  calculated  to obstruct the due course of justice.     In  view of the above heinous type of  scandalising  the Court,  we  unhesitatingly confirm the finding of  the  High Court  that the appellant/contemner has made himself  guilty of criminal contempt.     Coming  to  the question of sentence,  it  appears  from order  of  the High Court that the appellant had  adopted  a defiant attitude and tried to justify the aspersions made by him even without thinking it necessary to apologise.  Before this  Court  also, the appellant has neither  expressed  any contrition  nor  has  he  any  repentance  for  the  vicious allegations  made  against the learned Judges  of  the  High Court.  But  on the other hand, he has  exhibited  a  dogged determination to pursue the matter, come what may. A reading of  his  memorandum of grounds  and the written  and  signed arguments  show  that he was ventured into another  bout  of allegations  against the High Court Judges and persisted  in his  campaign  of  vilification.  His  present  conduct  has aggravated rather than mitigating his offence.                                                        890     Therefore,  having regard to the sentencing policy  that punishment  should be commensurate with the gravity  of  the offence, we hold that the sentence of 2 months, imprisonment in  no  way  calls  for  interference  and  accordingly  the sentence is confirmed.     For  the reasons aforementioned, the Criminal Appeal  is dismissed. N.P.V.                                     Appeal dismissed.                                                        891