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PETITIONER: PRINCIPAL, KING GEORGE’S MEDICAL COLLEGE LUCKNOW

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. VISHAN KUMAR AGARWAL & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/10/1983

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR  221            1984 SCR  (1) 503  1984 SCC  (1) 416        1983 SCALE  (2)637

ACT:      Lucknow University  Ordinances, Chapter III Ordinance I Clause (c) second proviso, Para (ii)-Requisite qualification for admission  to the  Degree of  Doctor of Medicine-Whether the  material   date  for   determination  is  the  date  of examination or  the date  of application for admission-Scope of the  Ordinance I-Constitution  of India  Articles 14  and 226-For receiving  the benefit  of  the  relaxation  of  the rules, no  public  authority  can  make  any  discrimination between individual and individual.

HEADNOTE:      The Respondent  Dr. Vishan  Kumar  Agarwal  passed  the M.B.B.S. Examination of the Lucknow University in July 1971, completed his  one Year’s rotating compulsory internship and got his  name registered  as a medical graduate by the State Medical Council.  In August  1972  he  was  appointed  as  a Medical Officer  in the  Civil Hospital which is approved by the Medical  Council for  compulsory internship.  In October 1974 he  applied to  the Principal,  King  George’s  Medical College,  Lucknow  for  admission  to  the  M.D.  Course  in Physiology which  was due  to commence  in January 1975. The Principal of  the College,  inspite of the recommendation of the head  of the Department, rejected his application on the ground that  he did not fulfil the qualifications prescribed in para  (i) of  the second  proviso to  clause (c)  of  the Ordinance I Chapter II of the Lucknow University.      On April 4, 1975, the respondent filed a writ petition, and obtained an interim order under which he was admitted to the course and continued his studies. The respondent was due to appear  for his  examination in  December 1976 but he was refused an admission card. The suit filed by him against the refusal to grant admission card was admitted but the interim order obtained  was got  vacated by the college authorities. So he  appeared for  the December, 77 examination and by way of abundant  caution got  the writ petition amended so as to include a  prayer for  issuance of a mandamus to declare his result.  In   the  writ   petition  he   has  also   alleged discrimination shown  by relaxing the rules in favour of two other women  candidates. The  writ petition  was allowed and hence the  appeal by  the Principal  after obtaining special leave.

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    Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1:1.  The requirement of every one of the clauses in Ordinance  I has  to be fulfilled by the candidate on the date on which he applies for 504 admission to  the M.D.  or M.S. Course of studies. It is not sufficient  that  he  fulfills  the  requirements  of  these clauses on the date of the examination. [510 A-C]      1:2. Though  ordinance  I  begins  with  the  words-"No candidate shall be eligible to appear at the examination for the degree  of the  Doctor of Medicine or Master or Surgery, unless...........", it cannot he said that the material date for determining  whether the  conditions of  eligibility are fulfilled is  the date  of examination  and not  the date of application. [509 B-C]      1:3. Clauses  (a) to (e) of Ordinance I are parts of an Integrated Scheme  and, therefore, it will be wrong to apply different criteria  to the  interpretation of those clauses. The verbs  used in  clauses (a)  to (d) are: "has obtained", "has completed",  "has done",  and has put in" respectively. Giving to those words their natural meaning, the requirement of everyone  of these  clauses has  to be  fulfilled by  the candidate on  the date  on which he applied for admission to the M.D.  or M.S.  courses of  studies. It is not sufficient that he  fulfills the  requirements of  these clauses on the date of the examination. [509D, E-G]      1:4. There  is no  justification for  applying  to  the interpretation of  this clause a different test that the one which has to be applied to the interpretation of clauses (a) and  (b).  Neither  the  language  of  clause  (c)  nor  the requirement of  justice and fairplay warrants such a course. Therefore, the  condition prescribed by clause (c) must also be shown to have been fulfilled by the candidate on the date on which  he applies  for admission  to the  M.D. Course  of studies and not later. [509 G-H, 510 A]      2.  Whether   the  rules  contained  in  the  Ordinance governing admission  to the  post-graduate course of studies are mandatory  or directory is a matter which the University shall have  to consider  after taking  all relevant  factors into account like the nature of the requirement, its purpose and  the  consequences  of  its  relaxation  on  educational excellence. However,  if the  University considers  that any provision is  not mandatory,  its relaxation  in  particular cases has  to be  governed by  objective considerations.  No public  authority,  least  of  all  a  University  which  is entrusted with the future of the student community, can pick and choose  persons for  receiving the benefit of relaxation of the  rules. In  the first place, the rigour of a rule can be relaxed provided such relaxation is permissible under the rules or  if  the  rule  is  directory  and  not  mandatory. Secondly, even  if it  is permissible  to relax a rule, such relaxation must  be  governed  by  defined  guidelines.  The University and  the College  authorities must apply the same yard-stick to  all the  students who  apply for admission to the post-graduate course of studies. [512 B-D]      3:1. It  is not  open to the University, in the absence of any  counter affidavit  having been  filed to the amended writ petition, to contend that the relaxation in form of the two candidates  was inadvertent  or that it was made under a mis-conception. [511 G]      3:2. The  University did  grant the  concession to both the women  candidates, though  under clause (c), no power is conferred upon  it to relax the requirement of the period of

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one year which is permissible under the third 505 proviso to  clause (d).  When the  requirement of clause (c) was not invariably insisted upon by the University or by the College  and   they  did  not  regard  that  requirement  as mandatory, it is unfair that the respondent should be picked up for  differential treatment, though situated similarly in the  matter  of  the  application  of  clause  (c).  If  the requirement of  clause (c)  could be  relaxed in the case of the other two candidates in regard to their admission to the M.D. course  of studies,  it would not be permissible to the University to  regard that  requirement as  mandatory in the case of  the respondent when he applied for admission to the very same  course of  studies. Clause  (c)  does  not  apply differently to men and women. [511 B-E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1351 of 1980.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  27th March,  1980 of  the  Allahabad  High  Court (Lucknow Bench) in Writ Petition No. 907 of 1975.      S.N. Kacker,  N.S.  Pandey  and  Altaf  Ahmad  for  the Appellant.      K.B. Asthana,  Shakeel Ahmed,  M. Qamaruddin  and  Mrs. Qamaruddin for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD, C.  J. This  appeal,  with  its  long  and labyrinthian history,  sums up  how the  process of  law can frustrate rather  than further  the cause  of  justice.  The appeal portrays the resolute story of a medical graduate who has been  trying over the past eight years to obtain a post- graduate qualification. Law has both helped and hindered him in that quest. His name is Vishan Kumar Agarwal.      This appeal  is filed  by the  principal, King George’s Medical  College,  Lucknow,  against  the  judgment  of  the Allahabad High  Court dated March 27, 1980. Respondent No. 1 is Dr.  Vishan Kumar  Agarwal, while  respondent No.  2  who supports him  is the Head of the Department of Physiology of the Medical  College. In  a writ  petition filed by Dr. V.K. Agarwal under  Article 226  of the  Constitution,  the  High Court issued  a mandamus asking the appellant to declare the result  of   the  examination   for  the   degree  of   M.D. (Physiology) for  which the  petitioner had appeared in July 1977. We will refer to Dr. V.K. Agarwal as ’the respondent’. 506      The question which arises in this appeal is whether the respondent possessed  the requisite  qualification for being admitted to  the course  of study  the degree  of Doctor  of Medicine  of  the  Lucknow  University.  Having  passed  the M.B.B.S. Examination of the Lucknow University in July 1971, the respondent  completed  one  year’s  rotating  compulsory internship,  whereupon   he  was  registered  as  a  medical graduate by  the State  Medical Council.  In August 1972, he was appointed  as a Medical Officer in the Civil Hospital at Lucknow  which  is  approved  by  the  Medical  Council  for compulsory internship.      In  October   1974,  the   respondent  applied  to  the Principal,  King  George’s  Medical  College,  Lucknow,  for admission to the M.D. course in Physiology, which was due to commence on  January 1,  1975. The  Head of  the  Physiology Department recommended the respondent’s candidature, but the principal  rejected  the  respondent’s  application  on  the

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ground that  he did  not fulfil the qualification prescribed in paragraph  (i) of  the second  proviso to  clause (c)  of Ordinance  1  of  Chapter  III  of  the  Lucknow  University Ordinances. The aforesaid Chapter III is entitled "Doctor of Medicine and Master of Surgery".      On April  4, 1975  the respondent filed a writ petition in the  Allahabad High  Court,  out  of  which  this  appeal arises. The  High Court  passed an interim order on the same date asking  the University  to admit  the petitioner to the M.D. course  in Physiology  subject to the availability of a seat.  The   University  complied  with  that  direction  by admitting  the  respondent  to  the  M.D.  course.  But,  on February 3,  1976, the  Principal of  the College  filed  an application for  vacating the  interim order  dated April 4, 1975 by  which the respondent was directed to be admitted to the M.D.  course. The application filed by the Principal was rejected on  November 12,  1976, with  the result  that  the respondent  continued   his  studies   for  M.D.  degree  in Physiology, uninterrupted.  He submitted  his thesis,  which was approved by the University authorities.      The  respondent   was  due   to  appear  for  the  M.D. examination which  was scheduled to be held in December 1976 but, he was refused an admission card without which he could not appear  for the  examination. Undaunted, he filed a suit in which  the trial court passed and interim order directing the University  authorities not  to obstruct  the petitioner from appearing  for the examination. The respondent appeared for the written examination but, as if not to be 507 outdone, the  University filed an appeal against the interim order, which  came to  be allowed.  As a  consequence of the appellate order,  the appearance  of the  respondent at  the written examination of 1976 become abortive since, it was as if he  appeared for  the examination  without  an  admission card. Inevitably,  he was  driven to  wait  until  the  next examination which  was due  to be  held  in  July  1977.  He appeared for  that examination  but, apprehending  that  the University will  not declare his result, he amended his writ petition  so   as  to  ask  for  a  mandamus  directing  the University to  declare his result. The High Court issued the mandamus which is the subject matter of this appeal.      The contention  of the  respondent  that  he  was  duly qualified to  be admitted  to the  M.D. (Physiology) courses has to  be examined  on the  basis of  paragraph (i)  of the second proviso to clause (c) of Ordinance 1. That Ordinance, to the extent material, reads thus:      "1.  No candidate  shall be  eligible to  appear at the           examination for  the degree  of Doctor of Medicine           or Master of Surgery unless:      (a)  he has  obtained the  degree of  M.B.B.S.  of  the           University               of                Lucknow           ..................................      (b)  he has,  after passing  the M.B.B.S.  examination,           completed   one    year’s   compulsory    rotating           housemanship ................      (c)  he has,  after full  registration, done one year’s           housemanship or equivalent job:           Provided  that   for  basic  science,  one  year’s      demonstratorship or  equivalent job in the subject will      be considered equivalent to one year’s housemanship.           Provided  also   that  works   in  the   following      capacities will  be considered  as  equivalent  to  one      year’s housemanship;           (i)  Three years’  work as  a Medical Officer in a                hospital approved  by the Medical Council for

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              compulsory internship. 508           (ii)          .........             ............           (iii)         .........            .............      (d)  He has  subsequent to  1(c) put in two years’ work           in the  subject in  department  concerned  in  the           college."      (e)      ........       .........         ..........      There is  no dispute  that the respondent satisfied the requirements of  clauses (a)  and (b) of Ordinance 1. He had obtained the degree of M.B.B.S. or the University of Lucknow as  required   by  clause   (a)  and,   after  passing  that examination, he had completed one year’s compulsory rotating housemanship as  required by  clause (b). The narrow dispute between the parties is whether, after full registration, the respondent had  done one  year’s housemanship  or equivalent job on  the material date. Under paragraph (i) of the second proviso to clause (c) of the Ordinance, three years’ work as a Medical  Officer in  a hospital  approved by  the  Medical Council for  compulsory internship,  can  be  considered  as equivalent to one year’s housemanship. The respondent passed his M.B.B.S.  examination in  July 1971 and after completing one year’s  compulsory rotating  housemanship,  he  obtained full registration  with the State Medical Council. In August 1972, he  started working  as a Medical Officer in the Civil Hospital, Lucknow,  which is approved by the Medical Council for compulsory  internship.  He  had  not  done  one  year’s housemanship after  full  registration  but,  by  virtue  of paragraph (i)  of the  second proviso  to clause  (c) of the Ordinance, three  years’ work  as a  Medical Officer  in the Civil Hospital  at Lucknow would be equivalent to one year’s housemanship.      When the  respondent appeared  for the M.D. examination in July  1977, he  had evidently completed three years’ work as a  Medical Officer in the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, which, as stated  earlier, is  approved by  the Medical Council for compulsory internship.  According to  the Principal  of  the Lucknow Medical  College, the  impediment in  the way of the respondent was  that on  the date  on which  he applied  for admission to  the M.D.  course, that  is to  say, in October 1974, he  had not  completed three  years’ work as a Medical Officer in  the Civil  Hospital, having  started working  in that capacity  in August 1972 only. Thus, the question which arises  for   consideration  is  whether  the  qualification prescribed by  paragraph (i) of the second proviso to clause (c) of Ordinance 1 is required to be fulfilled 509 by the  candidate on  the  date  on  which  he  applies  for admission to  the M.D.  course of  studies  or  whether,  as contended  by   the  respondent,   it  is   enough  if  that qualification is fulfilled on the date of the examination.      Ordinance 1  begins with the words: "No candidate shall be eligible  to appear  at the examination for the degree of Doctor of  Medicine or Master of Surgery, unless..........." (emphasis supplied).  The respondent  derives sustenance  to his contention  from the  words which we have underlined. It is  argued   on  his  behalf  that  Ordinance  1  prescribes conditions of  eligibility for  appearing at the examination and not  for making an application for admission to the M.D. course  of   studies.  Therefore,   the  material  date  for determining  whether   the  conditions  of  eligibility  are fulfilled is  the date  of examination  and not  the date of application. This contention is difficult to accept. Clauses (a) to  (e) of Ordinance 1 are parts of an integrated scheme and therefore  it will  be wrong to apply different criteria

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to the  interpretation of  those clauses.  Clause (a) of the Ordinance requires  that the  candidate "has  obtained"  the degree of M.B.B.S. It is inarguable that a candidate who has not yet obtained the M.B.B.S. degree can apply for admission to the  M.D. course  of studies in anticipation of or on the supposition that  he will  pass that  examination before the M.D. examination  is held.  He must hold the M.B.B.S. degree on the  date on which he applies for admission to the course of studies  leading to  the  M.D.  examination.  Clause  (b) requires that  the candidate "has ........... completed" one year’s compulsory  rotating housemanship  after passing  the M.B.B.S. examination.  As in  the case  of clause  (a), this qualification must also be possessed by the candidate on the date on which he applies for admission to the M.D. course of studies. It  is not  enough that the candidate has completed one year’s compulsory rotating housemanship after making the application and  before the  date of  the  examination.  The language of  clause (c)  is, in material respects, identical with the  language of clauses (a) and (b). Leaving aside for a moment  the equivalence prescribed by paragraph (i) of the second  proviso   to  clause   (c)  of  the  Ordinance,  the substantive  provision  of  clause  (c)  requires  that  the candidate "has,  after full  registration, done  one  year’s housemanship or  equivalent job".  There is no justification for  applying   to  the  interpretation  of  this  clause  a different test  than the  one which has to be applied to the interpretation of  clauses (a) and (b). Neither the language of clause  (c) nor  the requirement  of justice and fairplay warrants such  a course. Therefore, the condition prescribed by clause  (c) must  also be shown to have been fulfilled by the candidate on the date on which he 510 applies for  admission to the M.D. course of studies and not later. Clause  (d) of  the  Ordinance  points  in  the  same direction. It  requires that  subsequent  to  obtaining  the qualification prescribed  by clause 1(c), the candidate "has ........ put  in two  years’ work  in  the  subject  in  the department concerned  in the  college". The  verbs  used  in clauses (a)  to (d)  are: "has  obtained", "has  completed", "has done"  and "has  put in"  respectively. Giving to those words their  natural meaning,  we are  of the  view that the requirement of everyone of these clauses has to be fulfilled by the  candidate on  the  date  on  which  he  applies  for admission to  the M.D.  or M.S. course of studies. It is not sufficient that he fulfils the requirements of these clauses on the date of the examination.      As a  result of the interpretation which we have placed upon clause  (c) of  Ordinance 1, the writ petition filed by the respondent  in Allahabad  High Court  is  liable  to  be dismissed. But,  in view  of the circumstances which we will immediately mention,  it would  be unjust to deny the relief sought by  the respondent.  We have  already mentioned  that after appearing  for July  1977 examination,  the respondent amended his  writ petition  and asked for a writ of mandamus directing  the   University  to   declare  his  result.  The respondent made  a specific  averment in  the  amended  writ petition that  two candidates,  Dr. (Miss) Rashmi Saxena and Dr. Mrs. Ratna Prabha Gupta, were admitted by the University to the  same course  of post-graduate  studies, even  though they did not possess the requisite qualification on the date on which  they applied  for admission.  Learned counsel  who appeared for  the Principal  of the  Medical College  in the High Court, produced the necessary papers before it relating to the  admission of  the two candidates. The High Court has observed in  its judgment  that the  papers relating  to Dr.

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(Miss) Saxena  show that  she had  passed the four-and-half- year Course  M.B.B.S. examination in December 1972, that she completed   the   pre-registration   one   year   compulsory housemanship on  January 11,  1974, that  she did  the post- registration housemanship from January 18, 1974 to August 8, 1974 and that on May 9, 1974 she joined as a Demonstrator in Physiology.  She   applied  for   admission  to   the   M.D. (Physiology) course  on October  18, 1974.  That application was accepted  on December  30, 1974.  As held  by  the  High Court, it  is clear  from these  dates that  on the  date on which Dr.  (Miss) Saxena  applied for  admission to the M.D. course, she  had complected a period of 9 months only in her House-job as  a Demonstrator,  whereas  she  ought  to  have completed one year as prescribed by clause (c). In fact, the requisite period  of one  year was  not  completed  even  on December 30, 1974 when her application for admission was 511 accepted by  the University. She had sought admission to the course which  was to commence on January 1, 1975 but she had started her  post-registration housemanship  on January  18, 1974. Thus,  she had  not completed  the requisite period of one year’s housemanship even on the date on which the course commenced.      The papers  relating to  the admission  of  Dr.  (Mrs.) Ratna  Prabha  Gupta  to  the  course  of  studies  in  M.D. (Physiology) disclose  the same state of affairs. Though she was not qualified under the first proviso to clause (c); she was admitted  to the  course by the University. It has to be borne in  mind that  the University  granted this concession though, under  clause (c),  no power is conferred upon it to relax the  requirement of  the period  of one  year which is permissible under the third proviso to clause (d).      We agree  with the  High Court that the papers relating to the  admission of  Dr. (Miss) Saxena and Dr. (Mrs.) Gupta show that  the requirement of clause (c), was not invariably insisted upon  by the University or by the College. They did not regard  that requirement  as mandatory.  We consider  it unfair that  the  respondent  should  be  picked  up  for  a differential treatment,  though situated  similarly  in  the matter of  the application of clause (c). If the requirement of clause  (c) could be relaxed in the case of the other two candidates in  regard to  their admission to the M.D. course of studies, it would not be permissible to the University to regard that  requirement as  mandatory in  the case  of  the respondent when  he applied  for admission  to the very same course of  studies. Clause (c) does not apply differently to men and women.      There  is   no  substance  in  the  contention  of  the University or  of the  Principal of the Medical College that the University authorities committed an error in the case of the two  women-candidates. Neither  the University  nor  the Principal of the Medical College filed any counter-affidavit to the  amended writ  petition, with  the  result  that  the averments made by the respondent in regard to the relaxation made  in   favour   of   those   two   candidates   remained uncontroverted. It  is therefore  not open to the University authorities to  contend that the relaxation in favour of the two candidates  was inadvertent  or that it was made under a misconception.      In all  future cases  the interpretation  put by  us on Ordinance 1  must hold  good. In  so far  as the case of the respondent is  concerned, his  writ petition succeeds on the ground that the University and the 512 College authorities  must apply  the same  yard-stick to all

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the students  who apply  for admission  to the post-graduate course of studies.      Whether the  rules contained in the Ordinance governing admission  to   the  post-graduate  course  of  studies  are mandatory or  directory is  a matter  which  the  University shall have  to consider  after taking  all relevant  factors into account like the nature of the requirement, its purpose and  the  consequences  of  its  relaxation  on  educational excellence. We  have not gone into that question because, no contention in  that behalf  was made  either before us or in the High  Court. One thing, however, must be made clear that if the  University  considers  that  any  provision  is  not mandatory, its  relaxation in  particular cases  has  to  be governed by  objective considerations.  No public authority, least of all a University which is entrusted with the future of the  student community,  can pick  and choose persons for receiving the  benefit of  relaxation of  the rules.  In the first place,  the rigour  of a  rule can be relaxed provided such relaxation  is permissible  under the  rules or  if the rule is directory and not mandatory. Secondly, even if it is permissible to  relax a  rule, such  relaxation,  as  stated above, must be goverded by defined guidelines.      For these  reasons, we confirm the judgment of the High Court and  dismiss  the  appeal  with  costs  in  favour  of respondent Dr. Vishan Kumar Agarwal. S.R.                                     Appeal dismissed. 513