19 December 2008
Supreme Court
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PREMKUMAR Vs STATE OF KERALA

Bench: S.B. SINHA,CYRIAC JOSEPH, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-002088-002088 / 2008
Diary number: 12834 / 2008
Advocates: Vs P. V. DINESH


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2088 OF 2008 [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.3595 of 2008]

Premkumar & Ors. ..…Appellants

  Versus

State of Kerala ..…Respondent

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA,  J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Jeeja, the deceased was married on 12.09.1998 with the first appellant

herein, Dr. Premkumar at Attingal.  They had been residing at Chenkkottah,

in  the  district  of  Tenkasi  in  the  State  of  Tamil  Nadu.    She  committed

suicide at her matrimonial house which is in the State of Tamil Nadu on

14.02.2003.  Appellant no.2 herein, father-in-law of the deceased, informed

the Courtallam Police  about  the said unnatural  death  pursuant  whereto a

case being Crime No.64/2003 under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure  (Cr.P.C.)  was  registered.   The  body  of  the  deceased  was

subjected  to  inquest  by  the  Sub  Divisional  Executive  Magistrate  and

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Revenue Divisional Officer, Tenkasi and an enquiry was conducted by the

said officer and a report was submitted before the Deputy Superintendent of

Police, Tenkasi wherein, inter alia, it was stated :

“On the basis of the inquest conducted, and on the basis of  the  enquiries  made with  the husband,  father-in-law, mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, father,  mother,  brothers and  sisters  of  the  deceased,  and  on  the  basis  of  the evidence adduced by the reputed locals, and viewing the position  and  situation  of  the  room in  which  the  dead body was lying and other circumstances,  I come to the conclusion that the death of Jeeja by hanging is not one due to dowry based cruelty.

I request to make detailed investigation as to under what circumstances Smt. Jeeja died by hanging.”

The  Inspector  of  Police,  Courtallam submitted  a  report  before  the  Sub-

collector  and  Revenue  Divisional  Officer  stating  that  Jeeja  committed

suicide on account of her mental illness.  The investigation pursuant to the

report under Section 174, Cr.P.C. was stopped stating :

“It is truly evident that Jeeja, knowing that the fact of her mental illness had come to the knowledge of her husband and  parents-in-law,  and  that  despite  the  homeopathy, ayurveda and allopathic treatment the mental disease had not subsided, became mentally depressed and as a result of the mental agony she had undergone she came to the decision  of  committing  suicide  by  hanging,  and accordingly on  14.2.2003 at  9.00 AM after  telling  her husband that she would not speak to him, and after the departure of her husband and father-in-law to the clinic

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at  9.30  AM, she  went  to  wash  and  dry the  clothes  at 10.30 AM and after that she went into the first room at the upstairs and after locking from inside the box lock of the wooden plank shutter of the door and placing the key on  the  table,  and  locking  from  inside  of  the  glass windows on the south, lower and north side of the said room, she went into the bed room, and after locking the bed room door  from inside,  she  climbed  on  the  small stool  and the  cot  in  the  room and  after  tying  a  nylon churidar shawl at the ceiling fan clamp at the roof by a knot  and  tying  the  other  end  of  the  shawl  around  the neck by making a knot by herself and jumped down from the cot and as a result  of hanging the knot around her throat got tightened and caused suffocation that resulted in her death.

Therefore the investigation  of this  case is  stopped and further  action  dropped,  and  this  final  report  is submitted.”

Father of the deceased, however, lodged a complaint with the Kadakkavoor

Police in the State of Kerala on or about 04.03.2003 on the basis whereof a

First  Information  Report  (for  short,  ‘FIR’)  was  lodged  for  an  offence

punishable under Section 304B read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC).   

3. Appellant no.1 was arrested from his residence at Shenkottai (Tamil

Nadu) and produced before Judicial  Magistrate First  Class, Varkkala.  A

charge-sheet was filed by Kadakkavoor Police on or about 13.04.2004.   

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4. Appellants  filed  an  application  under  Section  482  of  the  Cr.P.C.

before the High Court  Kerala,  Ernakulam,  inter  alia,  contending that  the

Kadakkavoor Police Station in  the State of  Kerala  had no jurisdiction to

conduct an investigation in view of the provision contained in Section 177

of  the  Cr.P.C. and in  any event  one FIR having already been lodged by

appellant no.2 herein, the second FIR was not maintainable.   

5. By reason  of  the  impugned  judgment,  the  said  application  having

been dismissed, the appellants are before us.   

6. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants would contend :  

(i)  As the entire cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of

the Police Station Courtallam in the State of Tamil Nadu,

the impugned order cannot be sustained;

(ii) By reason of insertion of Section 304B of the IPC, a legal

fiction  having  been  raised,  before  a  person  can  be

prosecuted under the said provision all ingredients thereof

must be strictly proved;

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(iii) All crime being local, the provisions of Section 177, Cr.P.C.

subject  to  the  exceptions  contained  in  Sections  178,  179

etc., must ordinarily be followed; and

(iv) In any view of the matter,  the second FIR in the State of

Kerala was not maintainable.   

7. Mr. P.V. Dinesh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State

of Kerala, however, would contend that the report made under Section 174,

Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be a First Information Report within the meaning

of  Section  154  thereof  as  the  same  was  meant  to  hold  an  inquest  and

submission of a report in respect thereof by an Executive Magistrate.  The

learned counsel  would  contend that  one of  the ingredients  of  an offence

under Section 304B of the IPC being demand of dowry and/or harassment

of  the  deceased  by  her  husband  or  relatives  of  the  husband  and  a  part

thereof having taken place in the State of Kerala, the Kerala Police had also

jurisdiction to investigate into the said offence.  

8. Jurisdiction to  make an enquiry and trial  is  laid  down in Chaptaer

XIII  of  Cr.P.C.   Section  177  thereof  provides  that  every  offence  shall

ordinarily  be  inquired  into  and  tried  by  a  Court  within  whose  local

jurisdiction it  was committed.  Section 178, however,  inter alia, provides

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that  when  it  is  uncertain  in  which  of  the  local  areas  an  offence  was

committed or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and

partly in another or where an offence is continuing one, and continues to be

committed in more local areas than one, it may be inquired into or tried by a

court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.   

9. The  word,  ‘ordinarily’  occurring  in  Section  177,  Cr.P.C.  must  be

given its  natural  meaning.   The provisions contained in  Section 178 and

other  provisions  would  be  attracted  when  Section  177  cannot  be  given

effect to.  These provisions in the Code governing the field emanate from

the  doctrine  that  all  crimes  are  local.   Investigation  into  a  crime,  the

witnesses who are required to be examined for the purpose of proving the

commission  thereof  and  other  relevant  factors  which  are  required  to  be

taken for consideration thereof lead to the aforementioned inference.  For

the purpose of finding out in regard to the place, where the enquiry or trial

should be conducted, would be that the offence has taken place wholly or

partly in  the jurisdiction of  one police  station  or  wholly or partly in  the

jurisdiction of another police station and, thus, would depend upon the fact

situation obtaining in each case.     

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10. The provisions of the Penal Code under which the accused is charged

will  also  play  an  important  role.   Appellants  have  been  charged  for

commission  of  an  offence  under  Section  304B  of  the  IPC.   The  said

provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 with effect from 19.11.1986.  By

reason thereof a new offence was created.  A new procedure for trial has

been laid down.  The ingredients  of the said offence must be proved for

bringing home a charge, namely, that the accused had killed the deceased

for not satisfying his demand of dowry and she was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or any relative of his for or in connection with

demand for dowry.  By reason of the said provision, a legal fiction has been

created.  What is, therefore, necessary is that such cruelty or harassment for

or in connection with any demand for dowry must have been made ‘soon

before her death’.  The said words do not lead to fixation of a time-frame.  It

will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  In support of

the case of the State, Mr. P.V. Dinesh has drawn our attention to paragraphs

7 and 8 of the First Information Report lodged by the father of the deceased

which is in the following terms :  

“7.  Three  months  after  the  delivery,  the  petitioners daughter  and  child  were  again  taken  to  Shengottai. Another  complaint  made  by  the  2nd counter  petitioner alleging that the petitioner and the family members have misappropriated some gold ornaments gifted to the child

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by  close  relatives.   Thereafter  there  were  not  much communications  and  the  petitioner  was  under  an impression that things were going on smoothly.   

8.  During December 2002 the counter petitioners along with  the  daughter  of  the  petitioner  came  to  their residence at Trivandrum and stayed there for some days. During this period, the counter petitioners again made a demand for sale of the property stands in the name of the daughter  of  the  petitioner  and  to  hand  over  the  sale proceeds  to  them.  This  demand was negatived  by the petitioners  daughter  and  she  was  manhandled  by  the counter petitioners and she was harassed repeatedly and even she was deprived of food for a day or two in this connection.  She could not with stand the harassment for longer period during last  week of January 2003, the 1st counter petitioner along with Jeeja and child came to the petitioners  residence.   She  came there  agreeing  the  1st counter  petitioner  to  discuss  this  issue  with  the petitioner, but ignoring the said agreement, she did not speak much about  the sale  of  property is  sold  and the amount is paid to the counter petitioners.  The petitioner advised her to relax and stay here for some days.  The wife  of  the  petitioner  was  ailing  as  she  underwent  an operation and that may be reason why the demand of the counter  petitioners  was  not  exactly  disclosed  to  the petitioner.   While  she  was  staying  at  the  petitioners house  she  was  taken  by  the  first  counter  petitioner  a week  prior  to  14-2-03,  disregarding  the  petitioners request to retain her at the petitioners house.”

11. This Court in the case of  Vidhya Devi & Anr. v.  State of Haryana

reported in (2004) 9 SCC 476 observed as under :  

“6. ….. The expression “soon before” is a relative term which requires to be construed in the context of specific

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circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule of any universal application can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.”

12.  In  this  case  nothing  happened  even  a  week  prior  to  her  death.

Admittedly, no torture or harassment had taken place in regard to demand of

sale of land in her favour.  However, that may be a subject-matter of proof.

We are making these observations only for the purpose of disposal of this

application.

13.  So far as the jurisdiction of Kadakkavoor Police Station vis-à-vis the

provisions of Section 177, Cr.P.C. is concerned, we may notice that in the

case of  Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. v.  Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.

(2004) 8 SCC 100 this Court in a case arising under Sections 498A and 406

as well as Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 held as under :

“9.  “All crime is local,  the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed  by  Blackstone.   A  significant  word  used  in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”.  Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read  subject  to  the  special  provisions  contained  in  the code.   As  observed  by  the  Court  in  Purushottamdas Dalmia  v.  State of W.B. AIR 1961 SC 1589 : (1962) 2 SCR 101, L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras AIR 1961 SC 1601 : (1962) 2 SCR 116, Banwarilal Jhunjhunwala v.  Union of  India AIR 1963 SC 1620 :  1963 Supp.(2)

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SCR 338 and  Mohan Baitha  v. State of Bihar (2001) 4 SCC  350  exception  implied  by  the  word  “ordinarily” need not be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of  offences  by the  same court.   No such  exception  is applicable to the case at hand.”

The question, therefore, which is required to be posed was as to whether any

part  of  the  cause  of  action  arose  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court

concerned.   

14. This Court applied the meaning of the expression ‘cause of action’ to

hold :

“17.  The  expression  “cause  of  action”  is  generally understood  to  mean  a  situation  or  state  of  facts  that entitles  a  party  to  maintain  an  action  in  a  court  or  a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. In Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim;  the  phrase  comprises  every  fact,  which,  if traversed,  the  plaintiff  must  prove  in  order  to  obtain judgment.  In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed  to  the  phrase  “cause  of  action”  in  common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.”

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15. An identical question recently came up for consideration in the case

of Asit Bhattacharjee v. M/s. Hanuman Prasad Ojha & Ors. 2007(7) SCALE

241  wherein  this  Court  in  the  peculiar  facts  obtaining  therein  although

opined that a part of cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction

of  the  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Kolkata  as  a  larger  part  arose  in  U.P.

directed as under :

“37.  We,  therefore,  are  of  the  opinion  that  interest  of justice would be subserved if this appeal is disposed of with the following directions :

(i)  Further  investigation  shall  be  carried  out  by C.B.C.I.D. of the State of Uttar Pradesh.

(ii) Accused/respondents shall surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad and their applications for grant of bail, if any, may be considered by the said court on its own merits.

(iii) The accused/respondent shall render all cooperation with the Investigating Officer.  They shall appear before the  Investigating  Officer  as  and  when  directed,  if released on bail.

(iv)  Investigation  shall  be  carried  out  inter  alia  on the premise that the jurisdiction to make investigation shall be subject  to  the ultimate  decision of  the Court  of  the Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate,  Calcutta  as  if investigations are being carried out by the C.B.C.I.D. of the  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  in  continuation  of  the investigation  made  by  the  Officer-in-charge  of  the Shakespeare  Sarani  Police  Station.   The  Chief

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Metropolitan Magistrate,  Allahabad shall  be entitled to pass appropriate orders from time to time in this behalf.  

(v) The Report on completion of the investigation shall be  forwarded  to  the  Chief  Metropolitan  Magistrate, Calcutta  who  shall  determine  the  question  of  his  own jurisdiction at an appropriate stage.

(vi)  This  order,  it  is  made  clear,  is  being  passed  in exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   All  concerned authorities are directed to carry out these directions.”

16. Yet  recently  in  the  case  of  Naresh  Kavarchand  Khatri v.  State  of

Gujarat & Anr. (2008) 8 SCC 300 this Court directed as under :

“11.  Mr.  Sorabjee,  learned  Senior  Counsel  and  Mr. Huzffa Ahmadi, appearing for Respondent 2 in each of the appeals, however, brought to our notice that charge- sheet has already been submitted.  It was contended that proper investigation  has been carried out  in  the matter and  even  the  respondent-accused  had  been  taken  into custody and, thus, this Court, in a situation of this nature, should not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.   

12. Investigation has been carried out by the officer in charge of Police Station Waghodia only pursuant to the order of the High Court.  If the order of the High Court is to  be set  aside, the investigation must be held to  have been carried  out  without  any jurisdiction.   We are not herein concerned with the quality of the investigation but the effect of the order passed by the High Court.  We do not  know  as  to  whether  (sic  the  issue  of)  proper

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investigation as contended, has in fact been considered by the court or not.

13.  The first  information report  was lodged on 23-12- 2006.  The High Court appears to have been approached within a few days, namely, 26-12-2006.   The impugned order  has  been  passed  on  28-12-2006.   The  first information report prima facie shows that a part of cause of jurisdiction arose within the territorial jurisdiction of Vadodara Police  Station.   We fail  to  understand as  to how at such an early stage, the investigation should have been directed to be transferred, having regard to the fact that Waghodia Police Station where the “institution” in question is situated is within the jurisdiction of Vadodara (District) and is, therefore, not a case where the accused would have been even otherwise gravely prejudiced in joining investigation.   

14. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a case where  we  should  refuse  to  exercise  jurisdiction  under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.  We, therefore, set  aside  the  impugned  orders.   Consequently,  the charge-sheets filed by Waghodia Police Station stand set aside.  The police officer concerned of Vadodara Police Station  would  initiate  appropriate  investigation  in  the matter in accordance with law.  Any document collected as also the statements of any witnesses recorded by the officer in charge of Waghodia Police Station, however, may be sent to the incharge of Vadodara Police Station.”

17.  In a case of this nature and following the aforementioned decisions

and particularly  in  view of  the  fact  that  the  police  at  Courtallam,  Tamil

Nadu had already been informed, although stricto sensu, the same cannot be

construed to be an FIR within the meaning of provisions of Section 154,

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Cr.P.C.,  and,  thus,  F.I.R.  lodged  at  Kadakkavoor  Police  Station  was

maintainable,  we are  of  the opinion  that  the  interest  of  justice  would be

subserved if the investigation and consequent trial is transferred to Police

Officer  in  charge  of  Courtallam  Police  Station,  Tamil  Nadu.   All  the

materials  collected  by  Kadakkavoor  Police  Station,  Kerala  shall  be

transferred to the officer incharge of Courtallam Police Station, Tamil Nadu.

The officer incharge of Kadakkavoor Police Station,  Kerala,  must ensure

that  in the event  a charge-sheet is  filed and cognizance of offence under

Section  304B,  IPC  is  taken,  witnesses  who  are  available  within  his

jurisdiction shall be produced.   

We have passed this unusual order keeping in view the specific defence

raised by the appellants  that  the deceased had been suffering from some

mental illness.  However, with a view that a fair investigation is carried out

we would direct that the Superintendent of Police of the concerned district

at Tamil Nadu shall himself make an investigation and/or cause the same to

be made by a highly responsible officer.  

18.  The appeal stands allowed to the aforementioned extent accordingly.

……………………….J.

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[S.B. Sinha]

……………………….J. [Cyriac Joseph]

New Delhi. December 19, 2008.

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