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PETITIONER: PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/04/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PATHAK, R.S. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1535            1980 SCR  (3) 855  1980 SCC  (3) 526  CITATOR INFO :  F          1988 SC1768  (2)  A          1991 SC2176  (41)

ACT:      Human  justice   vis-a-vis   Detention   Jurisprudence- Manacling  a  man  accused  at  an  offence,  constitutional validity of-Constitution  of India  Articles 14,  19 and 21- Issuance of  Writ of  Habeas Corpus  for human Justice under Article 32  of  the  Constitution-Universal  Declaration  of Human Rights, 1948 Articles 5 and 10 read with norms in part III and  the provisions  in  the  Prisoners  (Attendance  in Courts) Act, 1955-Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. III Chap. 25. Rule 26: 22, 23.

HEADNOTE:      Allowing the petition the Court ^      HELD: Per  Iyer J. (on behalf of Chinnappa Reddy J. and himself).      1. The  guarantee of  human dignity  forms part  of  an Constitutional  culture   and  the  positive  provisions  of Articles 14,  19 and 21 spring into action to disshackle any man since  to manacle man is more than to mortify him; it is to dehumanize  him  and,  therefore,  to  violate  his  very personhood, too  often using the mask of ’dangerousness’ and security. Even  a prisoner is a person not an animal, and an under-trial prisoner  is a fortiori so. Our nations founding document admits  of no  exception. Therefore,  all  measures authorised by the law must be taken by the Court to keep the stream of prison justice unsullied. [862 D-F, 863 E-F]      Sunil Batra  v. Delhi  Administration and ors. [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494; followed .      2. The  Supreme Court is the functional sentinel on the qui vive  where "habeas"  justice is  in jeopardy.  If  iron enters the  soul of  law and of the enforcing agents of law- rather, if  it is credibly alleged so-the Supreme Court must fling aside  forms of  procedure and  defend the complaining individual’s personal  liberty under  Articles 14  19 and 21 after due  investigation. Access  to human  justice  is  the essence of Article 32. [864 A-B]      3. Where  personal freedom is at stake or torture is in

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store to  read down  the law  is to write off the law and to rise to  the remedial demand of the manacled man is to break human bondage. if within the reach of judicial process. [864 F-G]      4. There cannot be a quasi-caste system among prisoners in the egalitarian context of Article 14. In plain language, to say  that the "better class under-trial be not handcuffed without  recording  the  reasons  in  the  daily  diary  for considering the  necessity of  the use  on such  a  prisoner while escort  to and  from court" means that ordinary Indian under-trials shall  be rentively  handcuffed during  transit between jail and court auld the better class prisoner 856 shall be  so confined  only if  reasonably apprehended to be violent or  rescued and is against the express provisions of Article 21. [863 D-E, 865 G-H]      Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 @ 647; applied.      Vishwanath v.  State Crl.  Misc. Main  No. 430  of 1978 decided on 6-4-79 (Delhi High Court), overruled.      5. Though  circumscribed by  the constraints  of lawful detention, the indwelling essence and inalienable attributes of man  qua man  are entitled to the great rights guaranteed by the Constitution. That is why in India, as in the similar jurisdiction in  America, the  broader  horizons  of  habeas corpus spread  out, beyond the orbit of release from illegal custody, into  every trauma  and torture on persons in legal custody, if  the cruelty  is contrary to law, degrades human dignity or  defiles his personhood to a degree that violates Articles 21,  14 and 19 enlivened by the Preamble. [868 A-B, 867 G-H]      6. The  collection of  handcuff law,  namely, Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955; Punjab Police Rules, 1934, (Vol. III)  Rules 26:  22(i)  (a)  to  (f);  26.21A,  27.12, Standing order  44, Instruction  on handcuffs  of  November, 1977, and  orders of  April 1979,  must meet  the demands of Articles 14,  19 and  21. Irons  forced on  under-trials  in transit must conform to the humane imperatives of the triple Articles.   Official    cruelty,   sans    constitutionality degenerates  into   criminality.  Rules,   standing  orders, Instructions and  Circulars must  bow before Part III of the Constitution. [872 B-D]      The Preamble  sets the  human tone  and temper  of  the Founding Document  and highlights  justice, Equality and the dignity of  the individual.  Article 14 interdicts arbitrary treatment, discriminatory  dealings and  capricious cruelty. Article 19  prescribes restrictions  on free movement unless in the  interests of  the general  public. Article 21 is the sanctuary of  human values,  prescribes fair  procedure  and forbids barbarities,  punitive or  procedural. such  is  the apercu. [872 C-E]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India,  [1978] 2  SCR 621 @ 647; Sunil  Batra v.  Delhi Administration,  [1978] 4 S.C.C. 494 @ 545; reiterated.      7. Handcuffing  is prima  facie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable,  is   over  harsh  And  at  the  first  blush, arbitrary. Absent fair procedure and objective monitoring to inflict  "irons"  is  to  resort  to  zoological  strategies repugnant to  Article 21.  Surely, the  competing claims  of securing  the  prisoner  from  fleeing  and  protecting  his personality from barbarity have to be harmonized. To prevent the  escape   of  an  under-trial  is  in  public  interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself be castigated. But to bind a  man hand  and foot,  fetter his  limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle  him along  in the  streets and stand him for

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hours in  the courts  is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society  and foul  the soul  of our Constitutional culture. [872 F-G]      8.  Insurance  against  escape  does  not  compulsorily required handcuffing.  There are  other measures  whereby an escort can  keep  safe  custody  of  a  detenu  without  the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron In contraptions. Indeed,  binding together  either the hands or feet or  both has  not merely a preventive impact but also a punitive hurtfulness.  Manacles  are  mayhem  on  the  human person and inflict humiliation on the bearer. 857 The three  components of  "irons" forced on the human person are:  to   handcuff  i.e.,   to  hoop   harshly  to   punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron straps are insult  and pain  writ  large,  animalising  victim  and keepers. Since  there are other ways of ensuring safety as a rule handcuffs  or other  fetters shall not be forced on the person of an under-trial prisoner ordinarily. As necessarily implicit in  Articles 14 and 19, when there is no compulsive need to  fetter a person’s limbs it is sadistic, capricious, despotic and  demoralizing to humble a man by manacling him. Such arbitrary  conduct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The animal  freedom of  movement, which  even a  detained is entitled to  under Article 19, cannot be cut down cruelly by application  of   handcuffs  or  other  hoops.  lt  will  be unreasonable so  to do  unless the State is able to make out that  no   other  practical  way  of  forbidding  escape  is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstances  so hostile to safe keeping. [872 G-H, 873 A-E]      9. Once  the Supreme  Court make  it  a  constitutional mandate and  law that  no prisoner  shall be  handcuffed  or fettered routinely  or merely  for the  convenience  of  the custodian or  escort, the  distinction  between  classes  of prisoners become  constitutionally obsolete.  Apart from the fact that  economic an  i social  importance cannot  be  the basis for classifying prisoners for purposes of handcuffs or otherwise, a  rich criminal  or under-trial  is  in  no  way different from  a poor  or pariah  convict or under trial in the matter  of security  risk. An affluent in custody may be as dangerous  or desperate  as an  indigent, if not more. He may be  more prone  to be  rescued than  an ordinary person. Therefore,  it  is  arbitrary  and  irrational  to  classify prisoners for  purposes of  handcuffs, into  ’B’  class  and ordinary class.  No one  shall be fettered in any form based on  superior  class  differential  as  the  law  heats  them equally. It  is brutalising  to handcuff  a person in public and so  is unreasonable  to do  so. Of  course,  the  police escort will  find it comfortable to fetter their charges and be at  ease, but  that is not a relevant consideration. [873 E-H]      10.   The    only    circumstance    which    validates incapacitation by irons-an extreme measure-is that otherwise there is  no other  reasonable way of preventing his escape, in the  given circumstances.  Securing the  prisoner being a necessity of  judicial trial,  the State  must take steps in this behalf.  But even here, the policeman’s easy assumption or scary  apprehension or  subjective satisfaction of likely escape if  fetters are  not fitted  on the  prisoner is  not enough. The  heavy deprivation  of personal  liberty must be justifiable as  reasonable restriction in the circumstances. Ignominy, inhumanity  and affliction, implicit in chains and shackles are permissible, as not unreasonable, only if every other less  cruel means  is fraught  with  risks  or  beyond

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availability. So  it is  that to be consistent with Arts. 14 an(l 19  handcuffs must  be the last refuge, not the routine regimen.  If  a  few  more  guards  will  suffice,  then  no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs.  If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron bondage. This is the legal norm. [874 A-C]      Functional compulsions  of  security  must  reach  that dismal degree that no alternative will work except manacles. Our Fundamental  Rights are  heavily  loaded  in  favour  or personal liberty  even in  prison, and  so, the  traditional approaches without  reverence for  the worth  of  the  human person are  obsolete, although they die hard. Discipline can be exaggerated by prison 858 keepers;  dangerousness  can  be  physically  worked  up  by escorts and  sadistic disposition, where higher awareness of constitutional rights  is absent,  may overpower  the  finer values of dignity and humanity. [874 D-E]      Therefore, there  must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a  strong inference  that the  prisoner is likely to jump jail  or break  out of  custody or  play the  vanishing trick.  The   belief  in   this  behalf  must  be  based  on antecedents which must be recorded and proneness to violence must be  authentic Vague  surmises or general averments that the under-trial  is a  crook or  desperado, rowdy or maniac, cannot suffice.  In short,  save in  rare cases  of concrete proof readily available of the dangerousness of the prisoner in transit-the onus of proof of which is on him who puts the person under  irons-the police  escort  will  be  committing personal assault  or mayhem  if he  handcuffs or fetters his charge. It  is disgusting to see the mechanical way in which callous policemen,  cavalier fashion,  handcuff prisoner  in their charge,  indifferently keeping them company assured by the thought  that the  detainee is  under ’iron’  restraint. [874 F-H]      11. Even orders of superiors are no valid justification as constitutional  rights cannot  be  kept  in  suspense  by superior orders,  unless  there  is  material,  sufficiently stringent, to  satisfy a  reasonable mind that dangerous and desperate is  the prisoner  who  is  being  transported  and further that by adding to the escort party or other strategy he cannot  be kept under control. It is hard to imagine such situations. It is unconscionable, indeed outrageous, to make the strange  classification between  better class  prisoners and ordinary  prisoners in  the matter  of handcuffing. This elitist concept  has no  basic except that on the assumption the ordinary Indian is a sub-citizen and freedoms under Part III of  the Constitution  are the  privilege  of  the  upper sector of society. [875 A-C]      Merely because a person is charged with a grave offence he cannot be handcuffed. He may be very quiet, well-behaved, docile or even timid. Merely because the offence is serious, the inference  of escape-proneness  or  desperate  character does not  follow. Many  other conditions  mentioned  in  the Police Manual  are totally  incongruous  and  must  fall  as unlawful.  Tangible  testimony,  documentary  or  other,  or desperate behaviour, geared to making good his escape, along will be  a valid  ground for  handcuffing and fettering, and even this  may be  avoided by increasing the strength of the escorts or  taking the prisoners in well-protested vans. And increase in  the number of escorts, arming them if necessary special training  for escorts police, transport of prisoners in protected  vehicles, are  easily available  alternatives. [875 C-E]      12. Even  in  cases  where,  in  extreme  circumstances

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handcuffs have  to be  put on  the prisoner,  the  escorting authority must  record  contemporaneously  the  reasons  for doing so.  otherwise under  Art. 21  the procedure  will  be unfair and  bad in  law. Nor  will  mere  recording  of  the reasons do,  as that  can be a mechanical process mindlessly made.  The   escorting  officer,  whenever  he  handcuffs  a prisoner  produced  in  court,  must  show  the  reasons  so recorded to  the  Presiding  Judge  and  get  his  approval. Otherwise, there  is no  control over possible arbitrariness in applying handcuffs and fetters. The minions of the police establishment must  make  good  their  security  recipes  by getting judicial  approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs shall 859 be  off,   no  escorting  authority  can  overrule  judicial direction. This  is implicit  in Art.  21 which insists upon fairness, reasonableness  and justice  in the very procedure which authorises  stringent deprivation of life and liberty. [875 G-H, 876 A]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India [1978] 2 SCR 621, and Sunil Batra  v.  Delhi  Administration  [1978]  4  SCC  494; applied.      13. Punjab  Police Manual,  in so  far as  it puts  the ordinary Indian  beneath the  better class breed (paragraphs 26.21A and 26.22 of Chapter XXVI) is untenable and arbitrary and Indian  humans shall not be dischotomised and the common run   discriminated   against   regarding   handcuffs.   The provisions in  para 26.22  that every  under  trial  who  is accused of  a non-bailable offence punishable with more than 3  years  prison  term  shall  be  routinely  handcuffed  is violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. So also para 26.22 (b) and (c). The  nature of the accusation is not the criterion. The clear and  present danger  of escape  breaking  out  of  the police control  is the  determinant. And for this there must be clear  material not qlib assumption record of reasons and judicial oversight  and summary hearing and direction by the Court where  the victim  is produced. Para 26, 22(1)(d), (e) and  (f)  also  hover  perilously  near  unconstitutionality unless  read  down  Handcuffs  are  not  summary  punishment vicariously imposed  at police  level, at once obnoxious and irreversible. Armed  escorts, worth  the salt, can overpower any  unarmed   under-trial  and   extraguards  can  make  up exceptional  needs.   In  very   special   situations,   the application of  irons cannot  be  ruled  out.  The  prisoner cannot  be  tortured  because  others  will  demonstrate  or attempt his  rescue. The plain law of under trial custody is thus contrary to unedifying escort practice. [876 C-G]      14. The  impossibility of  easy recapture  supplied the temptation to jump custody, not the nature of the offence or sentence.  Likewise,   the  habitual   or  violent   ’escape propensities’ proved by past conduct or present attempts are a surer  guide to the prospects of ruling away on the sly or by use  of force  than the  offence with which the person is charged or the sentence. Many a murderer, assuming him to be one, is  otherwise a  normal,  well  behaved,  even  docile, person and  it rarely  registers in  his mind to run away or force his escape. It is an indifferent escort or incompetent guard, not  the Section  with which  the accused is charged, that must  give the  clue to  the few escapes that occur. To abscond is a difficult adventure. "Human rights" seriousness loses it  valence where administrator’s convenience prevails over cultural  values. There is no genetic criminal tribe as such among humans. A disarmed arrestee has no hope of escape from the  law if  recapture is a certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief  if taken  into custody  as against  the desperate

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evasions of the chasing and the haunting fear that he may be caught  any   time  It  is  superstitious  to  practise  the barbarous bigotry  of  handcuffs  as  a  routine  regimen-an imperial heritage  well preserved. The problem is to get rid of mind-cuffs which make us callous to hand-cuffing prisoner who may be a patient even in the hospital bed and tie him up with ropes to the legs of the cot. [877 A-D, 878 A-C]      15. The  rule regarding  a prisoner  in transit between prison house  and court  house is freedom from handcuffs and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision will be restraints  with irons  to be  justified before or after. The judicial  officers, before whom the prisoner is Produced shall 860 interrogate the  prisoner, as  a rule,  whether he  has been subjected to handcuffs or other ’irons’ treatment and, if he has been,  the official  concerned shall he asked to explain the action forthwith. [879 G-H, 880 A-B] Per Pathak J. (Concurring)      1. It is an axiom of criminal law that a person alleged to have  committed an  offence is liable to arrest. Sections 46 and  49 of  the Code  of Criminal  Procedure  define  the parameters of  the power envisaged in the Code in the matter of arrest.  And s. 46, in particular foreshadows the central principle controlling  the power  to impose restraint on the person of  a prisoner  while in continued custody. Restraint may be  imposed where  it is reasonably apprehended that the prisoner will  attempt to  escape, and it should not be more than is  necessary to  prevent him  from escaping. Viewed in the light  of the law laid down by this Court in Sunil Batra v. Delhi  Administration and  ors., [1978] 4 SCC 494; that a person in  custody is  not wholly denuded of his fundamental rights, the  limitations flowing from that principle acquire a profound significance. [880 C-F]      The power  to restrain,  and the degree of restraint to be employed,  are not  for arbitrary  exercise. An arbitrary exercise of  that power  infringes the fundamental rights of the person in custody. And a malicious use of that power can bring s.  220 of  the Indian Penal Code into play. Too often is it  forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the power to  restrain a  person by handcuffing hum or otherwise there is  a simultaneous  restraint by the law on the police officer as to the exercise of that power. [880 F-G]      2. Whether  a person  should be  physically  restrained and, if  so, what  should be  the degree  of restraint, is a matter which  affects the  person in  custody so  long as he remains in  custody. Consistent  with the fundamental rights of such person the restraint can be imposed, if at all, to a degree no  greater than  is  necessary  for  preventing  his escape. To  prevent his escape is the object of imposing the restraint and  that object  at once defines that power. [880 H, 881 A]      3. Section  9(2)(e) of  the  Prisoners  (Attendance  in Court) Act, 1955 empowers the State Government to make rules providing for  the escort of persons confined in a prison to and from  Courts in  which their  attendance is required and for their  custody during the period of such attendance. The Punjab  Police   Rules,  1934   contain  Rule   26.22  which classifies those  cases in  which hand-cuffs may be applied. The classification  has been attempted somewhat broadly. But the classification  attempted by some of the clauses of Rule 26.22, particularly  (a) to  (c) which presume that in every instance covered  by any  of these  clauses the accused will attempt to escape cannot be sustained. [881 C-E]      The rule  should be  that the authority responsible for

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the prisoners  custody should  consider  the  case  of  each prisoner individually  and decide  whether the prisoner is a person who  having  regard  to  his  circumstances,  general conduct, behaviour  and character  will attempt to escape or disturb the  peace by  becoming violent.  That is  the basic criterion, and  all provisions relating to the imposition of restraint must  be guided by it. In the ultimate analysis it is that  guiding principle  which  must  determine  in  each individual case whether a restraint should be imposed and to what degree. [881 E-G] 861      4. Rule  26.22 read  with Rule  26.21 A  of the  Punjab Police Rules  1934 draw a distinction between "better class" under-trial prisoners  and "ordinary" under-trial prisoners, as a  basis for determining who should be handcuffed and who should not  be. The social status of a person, his education and habit  of life associated with a superior mode of living is intended  to protect  his dignity  of  person.  But  that dignity is a dignity which belongs to all, rich and poor, of high social  status and  low, literate and illiterate. It is the basic  assumption that  all individuals  are entitled to enjoy that  dignity that determines the rule that ordinarily no restraint  should be  imposed except in those cases where there is  a reasonable  fear of  the prisoner  attempting to escape or attempting violence. It is abhorrent to envisage a prisoner being  handcuffed merely because it is assumed that he does  not belong  to "a  better class",  that he does not possess the  basic dignity  pertaining to  every individual. Then there  is need  to guard  against a misuse of the power from other  motives. It  is grossly  objectionable that  the power given  by the  law to  impose a  restraint, either  by applying handcuffs  or  otherwise,  should  be  seen  as  an opportunity for  exposing the accused to public ridicule and humiliation.  Nor   is  the   power  intended   to  be  used vindictively or by way of punishment. Even Standing order 44 and the  instructions on  handcuffs of November 1977 operate some what  in excess  of the  object to  be observed  by the imposition  of  handcuffs,  having  regard  to  the  central principle that  only he  should be  handcuffed  who  can  be reasonably apprehended  to attempt  from  escape  or  become violent. [881 G-H. 882 A-D]      5. Whether  handcuffs  or  other  restraint  should  be imposed on a prisoner is primarily a matter for the decision of the  authority responsible  for  his  custody.  It  is  a judgment to  be exercised  with reference to each individual case. It  is for  that authority to exercise its discretion. The primary  decision should  not be  that of  any other The matter is  one where  the circumstances  may change from one moment to  another, and inevitably in some cases it may fall to the  decision of the escorting authority midway to decide on imposing  a restraint on the prisoner. The prior decision of an  external authority  can not  be reasonably imposed on the exercise of that power. But there is room for imposing a supervisory regime  over the  exercise of  that  power.  One sector of  superviory jurisdiction  could appropriately  lie with the court trying the accused, and it would be desirable for the  custodial authority  to inform  that court  of  the circumstances in  which, and the justification for, imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. It should be for the court concerned  to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the purpose of enforcing such control 882 E-G]      6. In  the  present  case,  the  question  whether  the petitioner should  be handcuffed  should be left to be dealt with by  the Magistrate  concerned before whom he is brought for trial  in the  cases instituted against him. [882 H, 883

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A]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1979.           (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)      Dr. Y.S. Chitale, (Amicus Curiae) and Mukul Mudgal, for the petitioner. 862      R.N. Sachthey,  H.S. Marwah  and M.N.  Shroff  for  the Respondent.           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by          KRISHNA  IYER J.-"When they arrested my neighbour I      did not  protest. When  they arrested the men and women      in the  opposite house I did not protest. And when they      finally came for me, there was nobody left to protest." This grim scenario burns into our judicial consciousness the moral emerging from the case being that if to-day freedom of one forlorn  person falls  to the police somewhere, tomorrow the freedom  of many may fall elsewhere with none to whimper unless the  court process  in vigilates  in time and polices the police  before it  is too late. This futuristic thought, triggered off by a telegram from one Shukla, prisoner lodged in  the  Tihar  Jail,  has  prompted  the  present  ’habeas’ proceedings. The brief message he sent runs thus:           In spite  of Court  order and  directions of  your      Lordship in  Sunil Batra  v. Delhi handcuffs are forced      on me and others. Admit writ of Habeas Corpus.      Those who  are injured  to handcuffs and bar fetters on others may ignore this grievance, but the guarantee of human dignity, which  forms h  part of our constitutional culture, and the  positive provisions  of Arts.  14, 19 and 21 spring into action when we realise that to manacle man is more than to mortify  him; it  is to dehumanize him and, therefore, to violate his  very personhood,  too often  using the  mask of ’dangerousness’ and  security. This  sensitized perspective, shared by  court and  counsel  alike,  has  prompted  us  to examine the  issue from  a fundamental  viewpoint and not to dismiss it  as a daily sight to be pitied and buried Indeed, we have  been informed  that  the  High  Court  had  earlier dismissed this  petitioner’s demand to be freed from fetters on his person but we are far from satisfied going by what is stated in  Annexure A  to the counter-affidavit of the Asst. Superintendent of  Police, that  the matter has received the constitutional  concern  it  deserves.  Annexure  A  to  the counter-affidavit  is   a  communication   from  the   Delhi Administration for  general guidance  and  makes  disturbing reading as  it has the flavour of legal advice and executive directive and makes mention of a petition for like relief in the High Court:           The petition was listed before Hon’ble Mr. Justice      Yogeshwar Dayal  of Delhi  High  Court.  After  hearing      arguments, 863      the Hon’ble  Court was  pleased to dismiss the petition      filed by  the petitioner  Shri P.S.  Shukla asking  for      directions for  not putting the handcuffs when escorted      from jail to the court and back to the Jail. In view of      the circumstances  of the case, it was observed that no      directions were  needed. However,  it came to my notice      that the  requirements of Punjab Police Rules contained      in Volume III Chapter 25 Rule 26, 22, 23 and High Court      Rules and  orders Volume III Chapter 27 Rule 19 are not      being complied with. I would also draw the attention of

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    all concerned  to the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice      R.N. Aggarwal  in Vishwa  Nath Versus State, Crl. Misc.      Main No. 430 of 1978 decided on 6-4-1979 wherein it has      been observed  that a  better class  under-trial be not      handcuffed with  out recording the reasons in the daily      diary for  considering the necessity of the use of such      a prisoner  is being  escorted to and from the court by      the police,  use of handcuffs be not reported to unless      there is  a reasonable  expectation that  such prisoner      will use  violence or  that an  attempt will be made to      rescue  him.  The  practice  of  use  of  handcuffs  be      followed in accordance with the rules mentioned above. In plain  language, it  means that  ordinary  Indian  under- trials shall  be routinely handcuffed during transit between jail and  court and  the better  class prisoner  shall be so confined only  if reasonably  apprehended to  be violent  or rescued.      The facts  are largely  beyond dispute  and need  brief narration so that the law may be discussed and declared. The basic assumption  we humanistically  make  is  that  even  a prisoner is  a person,  not an  animal, that  an under-trial prisoner a  fortiori  so.  Our  nation’s  founding  document admits of no exception on this subject as Sunil Batra’s case has clearly  stated. Based  on  this  thesis,  all  measures authorised by the law must be taken by the court to keep the stream of prison Justice unsullied.      A condensed  statement of the facts may help concritise the legal issue argued before us. A prisoner sent a telegram to a  judge of  this Court (one of us) complaining of forced handcuffs on  him and other prisoners, implicitly protesting against the  humiliation and  torture of being held in irons in public,  back and  forth, when,  as under-trials  kept in custody in  the Tihar  Jail, they  were being taken to Delhi courts for  trial of  their cases.  The practice  persisted, bewails the petitioner, despite the court’s direction not to use irons on him and this led to 864 the telegraphic  ’litany’ to  the Supreme Court which is the functional sentinel  on the  qui-vive where ’habeas’ justice is in  jeopardy. If  iron enters  the soul of law and of the enforcing agents  of law-rather,  if it  is credibly alleged so-this court must fling aside forms of procedure and defend the complaining  individual’s personal  liberty under  Arts. 14, 19  and 21  after due  investigation.  Access  to  human justice is  the essence  of Art.  32, and sensitized by this dynamic perspective  we have  examined the facts and the law and the  rival versions  of the  petitioner  and  the  Delhi Administration.   The    blurred    area    of    ’detention jurisprudence’ where  considerations of prevention of escape and personhood  of prisoner  come  into  conflict,  warrants fuller exploration  than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on  both sides  (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by  Shri Mudgal,  and Shri Sachthey for the State) have rendered  brief   oral  assistance   and  presented  written submissions  on   a  wider  basis.  After  all,  even  while discussing   the    relevant   statutory    provisions   and constitutional requirements,  court and  counsel must  never forget the  core principle  found in Art. 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:      "No one  shall be  subjected to  torture or  to  cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." And read  Art. 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:      Art. 10: All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with  humanity and  with respect  for  the  inherent

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dignity of the human person. Of course,  while these larger considerations may colour our mental process,  our task  cannot over flow the actual facts of the  case or  the norms in Part III and the Provisions in the Prisoners  (Attendance in  Courts) Act, 1955 (for short, the Act). All that we mean is that where personal freedom is at stake  or torture  is in store to read down the law is to write off  the law and to rise to the remedial demand of the manacled man  is to break human bondage, if within the reach of the  judicial process. In this jurisdiction, the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter are a mariner’s compass:      "The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.      And, in Maneka Gandhi’s case it has been stated: 865           ’the ambit  of personal  liberty protected by Art.      21  is   wide  and   comprehensive.  It  embraces  both      substantive  rights   to  personal   liberty  and   the      procedure provided for their deprivation." Has the handcuffs device-if so, how far-procedural sanction? That is the key question.      The prisoner  complains that  he was  also chained  but that fact is controverted and may be left out for the while. Within this  frame of  facts we  have to consider whether it was right  that Shukla  was shackled.  The respondent relies upon  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  rules  framed thereunder and  under the  Police Act  as  making  shackling lawful.  This  plea  of  legality  has  to  be  scanned  for constitutionality in  the light  of the  submissions of  Dr. Chitale who  heavily relies upon Art. 21 of the Constitution and the  collective consciousness  relating to  human rights burgeoning in our half-century.      The  petitioner   is  an   under-trial  prisoner  whose presence is needed in several cases, making periodical trips between jail house and magistrate’s courts inevitable. Being in custody  he may try to flee and so escort duty to prevent escape is  necessary. But  escorts, while taking responsible care not  to allow  their charges  to escape,  must  respect their personhood.  The dilemma of human rights jurisprudence comes here.  Can the  custodian fetter  the  person  of  the prisoner, while  in transit,  with irons, maybe handcuffs or chains or  bar fetters?  When does  such traumatic treatment break into  the inviolable  zone of  guaranteed rights? When does disciplinary  measure end  and draconic torture begin ? What are  the constitutional  parameters, viable  guidelines and practical  strategies which will permit the peaceful co- existence of  custodial conditions  and basic  dignity?  The decisional focus  turns on this know-how and it affects tens of thousands  of  persons  languishing  for  long  years  in prisons with  pending trials  Many. Shukla’s in shackles are invisible parties before us that makes the issue a matter of moment. We  appreciate the  services of  Dr. Chitale and his junior Shri  Mudgal who  have appeared  as amicus curiae and belighted the  blurred area  of law  and recognise  the help rendered by Shri Sachthey who has appeared for the State and given the full facts.      The petitioner  claims that  he  is  a  ’better  class’ prisoner, a  fact which  is admitted,  although one fails to understand how  there can  be  a  quasi-caste  system  among prisoners in  the egalitarian  context of  Art. 14.  It is a sour fact  of lire  that discriminatory treatment based upon wealth and  circumstances dies hard under the Indian Sun. We hope  the   Ministry  of   Home  Affairs   and  the   Prison Administration will  take due  note of  the  survival  after legal death of this invidious distinction and put all

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866 prisoners on  the same  footing unless  there is  a rational classification  based   upon  health,   age,   academic   or occupational  needs   or  like  legitimate  ground  and  not irrelevant factors like wealth, political importance, social status and  other criteria  which are  a  hang-over  of  the hierarchical social  structure hostile to the constitutional ethos. Be  that as  it may,  under the  existing rules,  the petitioner is  a better  class prisoner  and claims  certain advantage for  that reason  in the  matter of  freedom  from handcuffs. It is alleged by the State that there are several cases where the petitioner is needed in the courts of Delhi. The respondents  would have  it that  he is  "an inter-State cheat and a very clever trickster and tries to brow-beat and misbehave with  the  object  to  escape  from  custody."  of course, the  petitioner contends  that  his  social  status, family background  and academic  qualifications warrant  his being treated  as a  better class prisoner and adds that the court  had   directed  that   for  that  reason  he  be  not handcuffed. He  also states  that under  the relevant  rules better class  prisoners are  exempt from handcuffs and cites in support the view of the High Court of Delhi that a better class under-trial should not be handcuffed without recording of reasons  in the daily diary for considering the necessity for the  use of  handcuffs. The  High Court  appears to have observed (Annexure  A to  the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State)  that unless  there be  reasonable expectation of violence or attempt to be rescued the prisoner should not be handcuffed.      The fact,  nevertheless, remains  that even  apart from the High Court’s order the trial judge (Shri A. K. Garg) had directed the  officers concerned  that while  escorting  the accused from  jail to  court and back handcuffing should not be done unless it was so warranted.           "....I direct  that the  officers concerned  while      escorting the  accused from  jail to  court  and  back,      shall resort  to handcuffing  only if warranted by rule      applicable  to   better  class   prisoners  and  if  so      warranted by the exigency of the situation on obtaining      the requisite permission as required under the relevant      rules." Heedless of  judicial command  the man  was fettered  during transit, under  superior police  orders, and  so this habeas corpus petition  and this  Court appointed Dr. Y. S. Chitale as amicus  curiae, gave  suitable directions  to the  prison officials to  make the  work of  counsel fruitful and issued notice to  the State  before further  action. "To wipe every tear from  every eye"  has judicial  dimension.  Here  is  a prisoner who  bitterly complains  that he  has been publicly handcuffed while  being escorted  to court  and invokes  the court’s power to protect the integrity of his person and the dignity of  his humanhood against custodial cruelty contrary to constitutional prescriptions. 867      The Superintendent  of the  Jail pleaded he had nothing to do  with  the  transport  to  and  from  court  and  Shri Sachthey, counsel  for the  Delhi Administration,  explained that escorting  prisoners between custodial campus and court was the  responsibility of  a special wing of the police. He urged that  when a  prisoner was a security-risk, irons were not allergic  to the  law and the rules permitted their use. The petitioner  was a  clever crook and by enticements would escape from gullible constables. Since iron was too stern to be fooled, his hands were clad with handcuffs. The safety of the prisoner  being the  onus of the escort police the order

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of the  trial court was not blindly binding. The Rules state so and  this explanation  must absolve the police. Many more details have  been mentioned  in the  return of  the  police officer concerned  and will  be referred  to where necessary but the  basic defence, put in blunt terms, is that all soft talk of  human dignity is banished when security claims come into  stern  play.  Surely,  no  cut-and-dried  reply  to  a composite security-versus-humanity question can be given. We have been  persuaded by  counsel to consider this grim issue because it  occurs frequently  and the law must be clarified for the  benefit of  the escort  officials and  their  human charges. Dr.  Chitale’s  contention  comes  to  this:  Human rights are not constitutional clap trap in silent meditation but part  of the  nation’s founding  charter  in  sensitized animation. No  prisoner is beneath the law and while the Act does provide for rules regarding journey in custody when the court demands  his presence,  they must be read in the light of the larger back drop of human rights.      Here is  a prisoner-the petitioner-who protests against his  being  handcuffed  routinely,  publicly,  vulgarly  and unjustifiably in  the trips  to and  fro between  the prison house and  the court  house in callous contumely and invokes the writ  jurisdiction  of  this  Court  under  Art.  32  to protect, within  the limited  circumstances  of  his  lawful custody. We must investigate the deeper issues of detainee’s rights  against   custodial  cruelty   and   infliction   of indignity. within the human rights parameters of Part III of the   Constitution,    informed   by    the    compassionate international charters  and covenants.  The raw  history  of human bondage  and the  roots  of  the  habeas  corpus  writ enlighten the  wise  exercise  of  constitutional  power  in enlarging the person of men in unlawful detention. No longer is this  liberating writ tramelled by the traditional limits of English  vintage; for,  our founding fathers exceeded the inspiration of  the prerogative  writs by phrasing the power in larger  diction. That is why, in India, as in the similar jurisdiction in  America, the  broader  horizons  of  Habeas corpus spread  out, beyond the orbit of release from illegal custody, into  every trauma  and torture on persons in legal custody, if the cruelty is contrary to law, degrades 868 human dignity  or defiles  his personhood  to a  degree that violates Arts. 21, 14 and l 9 enlivened by the Preamble.      The  legality   of  the  petitioner’s  custody  is  not directly  in   issue  but,   though  circumscribed   by  the constraints of  lawful detention, the indwelling essence and inalienable attributes  of man  qua man  are entitled to the great rights guranteed by the Constitution.      In Sunil  Batra’s case (supra) it has been laid down by a Constitution  Bench of  this Court  that imprisonment does not, ipso  facto Mean  that fundamental  rights  desert  the detainee      There is  no dispute that the petitioner was, as a fact handcuffed on several occasions. It is admitted, again, that the petitioner  was so  handcuffed on 6-10-1979 under orders of the Inspector of Police whose reasons set out in Annexure E, to  say the  least,  are  vague  and  unverifiable,  even vagarious      Counsel for  the respondent  in his written submissions states that  the petitioner  is involved  in over a score of cases. But that, by itself, is no ground for handcuffing the prisoner. He  further contends  that the  police authorities are in charge of escorting prisoners and have the discretion to handcuff  them, a  claim which  must be substantiated not merely with  reference to the Act and the Rules but also the

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Articles of the Constitution. We may first state the law and then test that law on the touch-stone of constitutionality.      Section  9(2)(e)   of  the   Act  empowers   the  State Government to  make Rules  regarding the  escort of  persons confined in  a prison  to and  from courts  in  which  their attendance is  required and  for their  custody  during  the period of  such attendance.  The Punjab  Police Rules,  1934 (Vol. III),  contain some  relevant provisions  although the statutory source is not cited. We may extract them here:           26.22(1) Every  male  person  falling  within  the      following category,  who has  to be  escorted in police      custody, and                          whether under police arrest, remand      Conditions in which or trial, shall, provided that he      handcuffs are to be appears to be in health and not      used.               incapable of offering effective                          resistance by reason of age, be                          carefully handcuffed on arrest and                          before      removal from  any building  from which  he may he taken      after arrest:-      (a)  persons  accused   of  a   non  bailable   offence           punishable with any sentence exceeding in severity           a term of three years’ imprisonment. 869      (b)  Persons accused  of an  offence  punishable  under           section 148 or 226, Indian Penal Code.      (c)   Persons accused  of, and previously convicted of,           such an offence as to bring the case under section           75, Indian Penal Code.      (d)  Desperate characters.      (e)  Persons who are violent, disorderly or obstructive           or  acting  in  a  manner  calculated  to  provoke           popular demonstration.      (f)   Persons who are likely to attempt to escape or to           commit suicide  or to  be the object of an attempt           at rescue.  This  rule  shall  apply  whether  the           prisoners are escorted by road or in a vehicle.           (2) Better  class under-trial  prisoners must only      be hand  cuffed when  this is regarded as necessary for      safe  custody,   When  a   better  class   prisoner  is      handcuffed for  reasons other  than those  contained in      (a),  (b)   and  (c)   of  sub-rule   (1)  the  officer      responsible shall  enter in  the Station Diary or other      appropriate record  his reasons for considering the use      of hand-cuffs necessary. This paragraph  sanctions handcuffing  as a routine exercise on arrest, if any of the conditions (a) to (f) is satisfied. ’Better   Class’    under-trial   prisoners   receive   more respectable treatment  in the  sense that  they shall not be handcuffed unless it is necessary for safe custody Moreover, when  handcuffing  better  class  under-trials  the  officer concerned shall  record the  reasons for considering the use of handcuffs necessary.      Better class  prisoners are  defined  in  rule  26.21-A which also may be set out here:           26.21-A. Under-trial  prisoners are  divided  into      two classes  based on  previous standard of living. The      classifying authority  is the  trying court  subject to      the approval of the      District Magistrate, but                               during the period before a      Classification of  under- prisoner  is brought before a      trial prisoners.         competent court, discretion                               shall be  exercised   by   the      officer in  charge of  the Police  Station concerned to

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    classify him  as either  ’better class’  or ’ordinary’.      Only those prisoners should be classified provisionally      as ’better  class’ who  by social  status, education or      habit of life have been accustomed 870      to a  superior mode  of  living.  The  fact,  that  the      prisoner is  to be  tried for  the  commission  of  any      particular class  of offence  is not  to be considered.      The possession  of a  certain degree  of literacy is in      itself not sufficient for ’better class’ classification      and no  under-trial prisoner  shall  be  so  classified      whose mode  of living  does not  appear to  the  Police      officer concerned  to have  definitely superior to that      of the ordinary run of the population, whether urban or      rural.  Under-trial  prisoners  classified  as  ’better      class’ shall  be given  the diet  on the  same scale as      prescribed for A and  B class convict prisoners in Rule      26.27(1). The dichotomy  between ordinary  and better  class prisoners has relevance  to the  facilities they  enjoy and  also bear upon the  manacles that  may be  clamped  on  their  person. Social status, education. mode of living superior to that of the ordinary  run of  the  population  are  the  demarcating tests.      Paragraph 27.12  directs that  prisoners  brought  into court  in  handcuffs  shall  continue  in  handcuffs  unless removal thereof  is  "specially  ordered  by  the  Presiding officer", that is to say, handcuffs even within the court is the rule and removal an exception.      We  may  advert  to  revised  police  instructions  and standing orders  bearing on handcuffs on prisoners since the escort officials  treat these  as of  scriptural  authority. Standing order 44 reads:      (1) The  rules relating  to  handcuffing  of  political prisoners and  others are  laid down  in Police Rules 18.30, 18.35, 26.22,  26.23 and  26.24. A  careful Perusal of these provisions shows  that handcuffs  are to be used if a person is involved  in serious non-bailable offences, is a previous convict,  a  desperate  character,  violent,  disorderly  or obstructive or  a person  who is likely to commit suicide or who may attempt to escape.      (2) In  accordance with  the instructions issued by the Government of  India, Ministry  of Home-  Affairs, New Delhi vide their  letters No.  2/15/57-P-IV dated  26-7-57 and No. 8/70/74-GPA-I dated  5-11-74, copies  of which  were sent to all concerned  vide this  Hdqrs.  endst.  No.  19143-293/C&T dated 3-9-76,  handcuffs are  normally, to  be used  by  the Police  only   where  the   accused/prisoner   is   violent, disorderly, obstructive  or is  likely to attempt ’to escape or commit  suicide or  is charged  with certain serious non- bailable’ offences.      (3)          x x          x x           x x 871      (4) It  has  been  observed  that  in  actual  practice prisoners/persons arrested by the police are handcuffed as a matter of routine. This is to be strictly stopped forthwith.      (5) Handcuffs  should not  be used in routine. They are to be  used only  where the person is desperate, rowdy or is involved in non-bailable offence. There should ordinarily be no occasion  to handcuff  Persons occupying  a  good  social position in  public life,  or  professionals  like  jurists, advocates doctors,  writers, educationists  and  well  known journalists. This is at best an illustrative list; obviously it cannot  be exhaustive.  It is  the  spirit  behind  these instructions that should be understood. It shall be the duty

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of  supervisory   officers  at   various  levels,   the  SHO primarily, to  see  that  these  instructions  are  strictly complied  with.   In  case   of  non-observance   of   these instructions severe  action  should  be  taken  against  the defaulter.      There is a procedural safeguard in sub-clause (6):      (6) The  duty officers  of the police station must also ensure that an accused when brought at the police station or despatched. the  facts where  he was handcuffed or otherwise should be  clearly mentioned  along  with  the  reasons  for handcuffing in  the relevant  daily diary report. The SHO of the  police   station  and  ACP  of  the  Sub-Division  will occasionally check  up the  relevant daily diary to see that these instructions  are being  complied with  by the  police station staff      Political  prisoners,  if  handcuffed,  should  not  be walked  through   the  streets   (sub-para  7)  and  so,  by implication others can be.      These orders  are of  April 1979  and cancel  those  of 1972. The  instructions on handcuffs of November 1977 may be reproduced in fairness:      In practice  it has  been observed  that handcuffs  are being  used  for  under-trials  who  are  charged  with  the offences punishable  with imprisonment  of less than 3 years which is  contrary to  the instructions of P.P.R. unless and until the officer handcuffing the under-trial has reasons to believe that  the handcuff  was used because the under-trial was violent,  disorderly or  obstructive or  acting  in  the manner calculated  to provoke  popular demonstrations  or he has apprehensions  that the  person so handcuffed was likely to attempt  to escape  or to  commit suicide  or  any  other reason of  that type  for which he should record a report in D.D. before use of hand. cuff when and wherever available. 872      The  above   instructions  should   be  complied   with meticulously and  all formalities for use of handcuff should be done before the use of handcuffs.      This collection  of handcuff  law must meet the demands of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. In the Sobraj case the imposition of bar fetters on B, a prisoner was subjected to constitutional scrutiny by  this Court.  Likewise, irons  forced on  under- trials in  transit must conform to the humane imperatives of the    triple     articles.    Official     cruelty,    sans constitutionality,  degenerates   into  criminality.  Rules, Standing orders,  Instructions and Circulars must bow before Part III of the Constitution. So the first task is to assess the limits set by these I articles.      The Preamble  sets the  humane tone  and temper  of the Founding Document  and highlights  Justice, Equality and the dignity of  the individual.  Art.  14  interdicts  arbitrary treatment discriminatory  dealings and  capricious  cruelty. Art. 19  prescribes restrictions  on free movement unless in the interests  of the  general  public.  Art  21  after  the landmark case  in Maneka  Gandhi  followed  by  Sunil  Batra (supra) is  the sanctuary  of human  values prescribes  fair procedure and  forbids barbarities,  punitive or processual. Such is the apercu, if we may generalise.      Handcuffing is  prima  facie  inhuman  and,  therefore, unreasonable,  is   over-harsh  and   at  the  first  flush, arbitrary. Absent  fair procedure  and objective monitoring, to inflict  ’irons’ is  to resort  to zoological  strategies repugnant to  Art. 21.  Thus, we must critically examine the justification  offered   by  the  State  for  this  mode  of restraint. Surely,  the competing  claims  of  securing  the prisoner from  fleeing and  protecting his  personality from

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barbarity have to be harmonised. To prevent the escape of an under-trial is  in public  interest,  reasonable,  just  and cannot, by itself, be castigated But to bind a man hand-and- foot, fetter  his limbs  with hoops  of steel,  shuffle  him along in  the streets  and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the  soul of  our constitutional culture. Where then do we draw  the humane  line and  how far  do the  rules err in print and praxis ?      Insurance against  escape does not compulsorily require hand cuffing. There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe  custody of  a detenu  without the  indignity  and cruelty implicit  in handcuffs  or other  iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the 873 hands or  the feet  or both  has  not  merely  a  preventive impact, but also a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the  human person  and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopaedia  Britannica, Vol.  II (1973 Edn.) at p. 53 states "handcuffs  and fetters  are instruments for securing the hands  or feet  of prisoners under arrest, or as a means of punishment."  The three  components of  ’irons’ forced on the human  person must be distinctly understood. Firstly, to handcuff is  to hoop  harshly. Further,  to handcuff  is  to punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron straps are  insult and  pain writ  large, animalising victim and keeper. Since there are other ways of ensuring security, it can  be laid  down as  a rule  that  handcuffs  or  other fetters shall  not be forced on the person of an under-trial prisoner ordinarily. The latest police instructions produced before us  hearteningly reflect  this view.  We lay  down as necessarily implicit  in Arts.  14 and 19 that when there is no compulsive  need  to  fetter  a  person’s  limbs,  it  is sadistic, capricious  despotic and  demoralizing to humble a man by  manacling him.  Such arbitrary  conduct surely slaps Art. 14  on the face. The criminal freedom of movement which even a  detainee is  entitled to  under Art.  19 (see  Sunil Batra, supra)  cannot be  cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or  other hoops.  It will be unreasonable so to do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and  desperate and  the circumstance so hostile to safe-keeping.      Once we  make  it  a  constitutional  mandate  that  no prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the  convenience  of  the  custodian  or  escort-and  we declare that  to be  the law-the distinction between classes of prisoners  becomes constitutionally  obsolete. Apart from the fact  that economic  and social importance cannot be the basis for classifying prisoners for purposes of handcuffs or otherwise, how  can we assume that a rich criminal or under- trial is  any different  from a  poor or  pariah convict  or under-trial in  the matter of security risk ? An affluent in custody may  be as dangerous or desperate as an indigent, if not more.  He may  be more  prone  to  be  rescued  than  an ordinary person. We hold that it is arbitrary and irrational to classify,  prisoners for  purposes of handcuffs, into ’B’ class and  ordinary class.  No one  shall be fettered in any form based  on superior class differentia, as the law treats them equally.  It is  brutalising to  handcuff a  person  in public and  so is  unreasonable to  do so.  Of  course,  the police escort  will find  it  comfortable  to  fetter  their charges  and   be  at  ease  but  that  is  not  a  relevant consideration. 874

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    The only circumstance which validates incapacitation by irons-an extreme measure-is that otherwise there is no other reasonable way  of  preventing  his  escape,  in  the  given circumstances. Securing  the prisoner  being a  necessity of judicial trial,  the State  must take  steps in this behalf. But even  here, the  policeman’s easy  assumption  or  scary apprehension or  subjective satisfaction of likely escape if fetters are  not fitted  on the  prisoner is not enough. The heavy deprivation of personal liberty must be justifiable as reasonable  restriction   in  the  circumstances.  Ignominy, inhumanity and  affliction, implicit  in chains and shackles are permissible,  as not  unreasonable, only  if every other less  cruel   means  is   fraught  with   risks  or   beyond availability. So  it is  that to be consistent with Arts. 14 and 19  handcuffs must  be the  last refuge, not the routine regimen.  If  a  few  more  guards  will  suffice,  then  no handcuffs. If a close watch by armed policemen will do, then no handcuffs.  If alternative measures may be provided, then no iron bondage. This is the legal norm.      Functional compulsions  of  security  must  reach  that dismal degree that no alternative will work except manacles. We must  realise that  our Fundamental  Rights  are  heavily loaded in  favour of-  personal liberty  even in prison, and so, the  traditional approaches  without reverence  for  the worth of  the human  person are  obsolete, although they die hard. Discipline  can  be  exaggerated  by  prison  keepers; dangerousness can  be physically  worked up  by escorts  and sadistic   disposition,    where   higher    awareness    of constitutional rights is absent, may overpower the values of dignity and  humanity. We  regret to  observe that cruel and unusual treatment  has an unhappy appeal to jail keepers and escorting  officers,  which  must  be  countered  by  strict directions to  keep to  the parameters  of the constitution. The conclusion  flowing from  these considerations  is  that there must first be well-grounded basis for drawing a strong inference that  the prisoner is likely to jump jail or break out of  custody or  play the  vanishing trick. The belief in this behalf  must be  based on  antecedents  which  must  be recorded and  proneness to violence must be authentic. Vague surmises or  general averments  that the  under-trial  is  a crook or  desperado, rowdy  or maniac,  cannot  suffice.  In short,  save   in  rare  cases  of  concrete  proof  readily available of  the dangerousness  of the prisoner in transit- the onus  of proof  of which  is on  him who puts the person under irons-the  police escort  will be  committing personal assault or  mayhem if he handcuffs or fetters his charge. It is disgusting  to see  the mechanical  way in  which callous policemen, cavalier  fashion,  handcuff  prisoner  in  their charge, indifferently  keeping them  company assured  by the thought that the detainee is under ’iron’ restraint. 875      Even orders  of superiors are no valid justification as constitutional rights cannot be kept in suspense by superior orders, unless there is material, sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a  reasonable mind  that dangerous  and desperate is the prisoner  who is  being transported  and further that by adding to  the escort  party or  other strategy he cannot be kept under  control. It  is hard to imagine such situations. We  must   repeat  that   it  is   unconscionable,   indeed, outrageous,  to  make  the  strange  classification  between better class  prisoners and ordinary prisoners in the matter of handcuffing.  This elitist  concept has  no basis  except that on  the assumption the ordinary Indian is a sub-citizen and freedoms  under Part  III of  the constitution  are  the privilege of the upper sector of society.

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    We must  clarify a  few other  facets, in  the light of Police Standing  orders. Merely  because a person is charged with a grave offence he cannot be handcuffed, He may be very quiet, well-behaved,  docile or  even timid.  Merely because the offence is serious, the inference of escape proneness or desperate character  does not  follow. Many other conditions mentioned in  the Police Manual are totally incongruous with what we  have  stated  above  and  must  fall  as  unlawful. Tangible  testimony,  documentary  or  other,  or  desperate behaviour, geared to making good his escaped alone will be a valid ground  for handcuffing  and fettering,  and even this may be  avoided by increasing the strength of the escorts or taking  the   prisoners  in   well  protected  vans.  It  is heartening to  note that  in some  States in this country no handcuffing is  done at all, save in rare cases, when taking under-trials to  courts and the scary impression that unless the person  is confined  in irons  he will  run  away  is  a convenient myth.      Some increase  in the number of escorts, arming them if necessary, special  training for escort police, transport of prisoners  in   protected  vehicles,  are  easily  available alternatives and, in fact, are adopted in some States in the country where handcuffing is virtually abolished, e.g. Tamil Nadu.      Even  in   cases  where,   in  extreme   circumstances, handcuffs have  to be  put on  the prisoner,  the  escorting authority must  record  contemporaneously  the  reasons  for doing so.  Otherwise, under  Art. 21  the procedure  will be unfair and  bad in  law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. The escorting officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and  get his  approval. Otherwise, there is no control over 876 possible arbitrariness  in applying  handcuffs and  fetters. The minions of the police establishment must make good their security recipes by getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs  that handcuffs  shall  be  off  no  escorting authority can  overrule judicial direction. This is implicit in Art.  21 which  insists upon fairness, reasonableness and justice in  the very  procedure which  authorises  stringent deprivation  of  life  and  liberty.  The  ratio  in  Maneka Gandhi’s case  and Sunil  Batra’s ease  (supra), read in its proper light, leads us to this conclusion.      We, therefore,  hold that  the petition must be allowed and handcuffs  on the  prisoner dropped. We declare that the Punjab Police  Manual, in  so far  as it  puts the  ordinary Indian beneath the better class breed (paragraphs 26.21A and 26 .22  of Chapter  XXVI) is  untenable  and  arbitrary  and direct that  Indian humans shall not be dichotomised and the common run  discriminated against  regarding handcuffs.  The provisions in  para 26.22  that  every  under-trial  who  is accused of  a non-bailable offence punishable with more than 3  years  prison  term  shall  be  routinely  handcuffed  is violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 21. So also para 26.22 (b) and (c). The  nature of the accusation is not the criterion. The clear and  present danger  of escape  breaking  out  of  the police control  is the  determinant. And for this there must be clear  material, not  glib assumption,  record of reasons and judicial  oversight and summary hearing and direction by the court  where the  victim is  produced. We  go further to hold that  para 26.22  (1)  (b),  (e)  and  (f)  also  hover perilously near  unconstitutionality unless  read down as we herein direct.  ’Desperate character’ is who ? Handcuffs are

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not summary  punishment vicariously imposed at police level, at once obnoxious and irreversible. Armed escorts, worth the salt, can  overpower any unarmed under-trial and extraguards can make  up exceptional  needs. In very special situations, we do  not rule  out  the  application  of  irons  The  same reasoning appears  to (e)  and (f). Why torture the prisoner because others  will demonstrate or attempt his rescue ? The plain law  of under-trial  custody is  thus contrary  to the unedifying escort practice. We remove the handcuffs from the law and  humanize the  police praxis  to harmonise  with the satvic values  of Part  III. The law must be firm, not foul, stern, not sadistic, strong, not callous.      Traditionally,  it   used  to   be  thought   that  the seriousness of  the possible sentence is the decisive factor for refusal  of bail.  The assumption  was that  this gave a temptation for  the prisoner  to escape.  This  is  held  by modern penologists  to be  a psychic  fallacy and  the  bail jurisprudence  evolved   in   the   English   and   American Jurisdictions and 877 in India now takes a liberal view. The impossibility of easy recapture supplied  the temptation  to jump custody, not the nature of the offence or sentence. Likewise, the habitual or violent ’escape  propensities’ proved  by  past  conduct  or present attempts  are a  surer guide  to  the  prospects  of running away  on the sly or by use of force than the offence with which  the person  is charged  or the  sentence. Many a murderer, assuming  him to  be one,  is otherwise  a normal, well-behaved, even docile, person and it rarely registers in his mind  to run  away  or  force  his  escape.  It  is  all indifferent escort  or incompetent  guard, not  the  Section with which  the accused  is charged, that must give the clue to the  few escapes  that occur.  To abscond  is a difficult adventure. No  study of  escapes and  their reasons has been made by  criminologists and  the  facile  resort  to  animal keeping methods  as an  easy substitute appeals to Authority in such circumstances. ’Human rights’, seriousness loses its valence  where  administrator’s  convenience  prevails  over cultural values.  The fact  remains for its empirical worth, that in some States, e.g. Tamil Nadu and Kerala, handcuffing is rarely  done even  in serious  cases, save in those cases where evidence  of dangerousness,  underground operations to escape and  the like  is available. It is interesting that a streak of  humanism had  found  its  place  in  the  law  of handcuffing even in the old Bombay Criminal Manual which now prevails in the Gujarat State and perhaps in the Maharashtra State. But in the light 878 of the  constitutional imperatives  we  have  discussed,  we enlarge the  law  of  personal  liberty  further  to  be  in consonance with fundamental rights of persons in custody.      There is  no  genetic  criminal  tribe  as  such  among humans. A  disarmed arrestee  has no hope of escape from the law if  recapture is a certainty. He heaves a sigh of relief if taken  into custody  as against the desperate evasions of the chasing  and the  haunting fear  that he  may be  caught anytime. It  is  superstitious  to  practise  the  barbarous bigotry  of  handcuffs  as  a  routine  regimen-an  imperial heritage, well preserved. The problem is to get rid of mind- cuffs which  make us  callous to hand-cuffing a prisoner who may be  a patient  even in  the hospital  bed and tie him up with ropes to the legs of the cot.      Zoological culture  cannot be compatible with reverence for life, even of a terrible criminal.      We have discussed at length what may be dismissed as of

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little concern.  The reason  is simple.  Any man  may, by  a freak of  fate, become an under-trial and every man, barring those who  through wealth  and political clout, are regarded as V.I.Ps,  are ordinary  classes  and  under  the  existing Police Manual  may be man-handled by handcuffs. The peril to human dignity  and fair  procedure is, therefore, widespread and  we  must  speak  up.  Of  course,  the  1977  and  1979 ’instructions’ we  have referred to earlier show a change of heart. This  Court must  declare the  law so  that abuse  by escort constables  may be  Repelled. We repeat with respect, the observations in Wiliam King Jackson v. D.E. Bishop.           (1)  We   are  not  convinced  that  any  rule  or      regulation  as   to  the  use  of  the  strap,  however      seriously  or   sincerely  conceived  and  drawn,  will      successfully  prevent   abuse.   The   present   record      discloses misinterpretation even of the newly adopted           (2) Rules  in this  area  are  seen  often  to  go      unobserved.           (3) Regulations are easily circumvented           (4) Corporal punishment is easily subject to abuse      in the hands of the sadistic and the unscrupulous.           (5) Where power to punish is granted to persons in      lower levels  of administrative  authority, there is an      inherent  and   natural  difficulty  in  enforcing  the      limitations of that power. 879      Labels   like    ’desperate’   and    ’dangerous’   are treacherous. Kent  S.  Miller,  writing  on  ’dangerousness’ says:           Considerable attention  has been given to the role      of  psychological   tests   in   predicting   dangerous      behaviour, and  there is  a wide range of opinion as to      their value.           Thus far  no, structured  or projective test scale      has been  derived which,  when used  alone will predict      violence in  the  individual  case  in  a  satisfactory      manner. Indeed,  none has  been  developed  which  will      adequately  postdict   let   alone   predict,   violent      behaviour......           ....  But   we  are   on  dangerous   ground  when      deprivation of liberty occurs under such conditions.           ....The practice has been to markedly overpredict.      In addition, the courts and mental health professionals      involved   have    systematically   ignored   statutory      requirements  relating   to  dangerousness  and  mental      illness....           .... In  balancing  the  interests  of  the  state      against  the   loss  of   liberty  and  rights  of  the      individual, a  prediction of  dangerous behaviour  must      have a  high level  of probability,  (a condition which      currently does  not exist) and the harm to be prevented      should be considerable.      A law  which handcuffs  almost every  undertrial  (who, presumably, is innocent) is itself dangerous.      Before we  conclude, we  must confess that we have been influenced  by  the  thought  that  some  in  authority  are sometimes moved  by the  punitive  passion  for  retribution through  the   process  of  parading  under-trial  prisoners cruelly clad  in hateful  irons. We  must also frankly state that our  culture, constitutional and other, revolts against such an attitude because, truth to tell.      ’each tear  that flows, when it could have been spared,      is an  accusation, and  he commits  a  crime  who  with      brutal inadvertancy crushes a poor earthworm.’      We clearly  declare-and it  shall be  obeyed  from  the

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Inspector General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons to the  escort constable  and the  jailwarder-that the  rule regarding a  prisoner in  transit between  prison house  and court house  is freedom  from hand-cuffs  and the exception, under conditions of judicial supervision we 880 have indicated earlier, will be restraints with irons, to be justified before  or after.  We mandate the judicial officer before when  the prisoner  is produced  to  interrogate  the prisoner, as  a rule,  whether  he  has  been  subjected  to handcuffs or  other "irons"  treatment and,  if he has been, the official  concerned shall be asked to explain the action forthwith in the light of this Judgment. PATHAK, J:  I have  read the  judgment of my learned brother Krishna Iyer with considerable interest but I should like to set forth my own views shortly.      It is  an axiom  of the  criminal  law  that  a  person alleged to have committed an offence is liable to arrest. In making an  arrest, declares  s. 46  of the  Code of Criminal Procedure, "the  police officer  or other  person making the same shall  actually touch or confine the body of the person to be  arrested, unless there be a submission to the custody by word  or action."  If there is forcible resistance to the endeavour to  arrest or  an attempt to evade the arrest, the law allows  the police  officer or  other person  to use all means necessary  to effect the arrest. Simultaneously, s. 49 provides that  the person arrested must "not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape." The two sections define the parameters of the power envisaged by the Code  in the matter of arrest. And s. 46, in particular, foreshadows the  central principle  controlling the power to impose restraint  on the  person  of  a  prisoner  while  in continued custody.  Restraint may  be imposed  where  it  is reasonably apprehended  that the  prisoner will  attempt  to escape, and  it should  not be  more than  is  necessary  to prevent him  from escaping.  Viewed in  the light of the law laid  down   by  this   Court  in   Sunil  Batra   v.  Delhi Administration and  others that  a person  in custody is not wholly denuded  of his  fundamental rights,  the limitations following   from   that   principle   acquire   a   profound significance. The  power to  restrain,  and  the  degree  of restraint to be employed, are not for arbitrary exercise. An arbitrary exercise  of that  power infringes the fundamental rights of the person in custody. And a malicious use of that power can  bring s.  220 of the Indian Penal Code into play. Too often is it forgotten that if a police officer is vested with the  power to  restrain a person by hand-cuffing him or otherwise there  is a  simultaneous restraint  by the law on the police officer as to the exercise of that power.      Whether a  person should  be physically restrained and, if so,  what should  be the degree of restraint, is a matter which affects the person in custody so long as he remains in custody. Consistent with 881 the fundamental  rights of  such person the restraint can be imposed, if at all, to a degree no greater than is necessary for preventing  his escape.  To prevent  his escape  is  the object of imposing the restraint, and that object defines at once  the   bounds  of  that  power.  The  principle  is  of significant relevance  in the  present case.  The petitioner complaints that he is unnecessarily handcuffed when escorted from the jail house to the court building, where he is being tried  for  criminal  offences,  and  back  from  the  court building to  the jail  house. He  contends that  there is no reason why  he  should  be  handcuffed.  On  behalf  of  the

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respondent it  is pointed  out by the Superintendent Central Jail, Tihar,  where the  petitioner is  detained,  that  the police authorities  take charge  of prisoners  from the main gate of  the jail  for the  purpose of escorting them to the court building  and back, and that the jail authorities have no control  during such custody over the manner in which the prisoners  are   treated.  S.9(2)   (e)  of   the  Prisoners (Attendance  in   Courts)  Act,   1955  empowers  the  State Government to make rules providing for the escort of persons confined in  a prison  to and  from courts  in  which  their attendance is  required and  for their  custody  during  the period of  such attendance.  The Punjab  Police Rules,  1934 contain Rule  26.22 which  classifies those  cases in  which handcuffs  may  be  applied.  The  classification  has  been attempted some what broadly, but it seems to me that some of the clauses  of Rule 26.22, particularly clauses (a) to (c), appear to  presume that  in every instance covered by any of those clauses  the accused  will attempt  to escape.  It  is difficult to  sustain the  classification attempted by those clauses. The  rule, I  think, should  be that  the authority responsible for  the prisoners  custody should  consider the case of  each prisoner  individually and  decide whether the prisoner is a person who having regard to his circumstances, general conduct,  behaviour and  character will  attempt  to escape or disturb the peace by becoming violent. That is the basic  criterion,   and  all   provisions  relating  to  the imposition of  restraint  must  be  guided  by  it.  In  the ultimate analysis  it is  that guiding  principle which must determine in each individual case whether a restraint should be imposed and to what degree.      Rule 26.22  read with rule 26.21-A of the Punjab Police Rules,  1934  draw  a  distinction  between  "better  class" undertrial prisoners and "ordinary" undertrial prisoner 35 a basis for  determining who  should  be  handcuffed  and  who should not be. As I have observed, the appropriate principle for a  classification should  be  defined  by  the  need  to prevent the  prisoner  escaping  from  custody  or  becoming violent. The  social status  of a  person, his education and habit of  life associated  with superior mode of living seem to me to be intended to protect his 882 dignity of  person. But  that dignity  is  a  dignity  which belongs to  all, rich  and poor,  of high  social status and low, literate  and illiterate.  It is  the basic  assumption that all individuals are entitled to enjoy that dignity that determines the  rule that  ordinarily no restraint should be imposed except  in those  cases where  there is a reasonable fear of  the prisoner  attempting to  escape  or  attempting violence. It  is abhorrent  to  envisage  a  prisoner  being handcuffed merely  because it  is assumed  that he  does not belong to  "a better  class", that  he does  not possess the basic dignity  pertaining to every individual. Then there is need to  guard against  a misuse  of the  power  from  other motives. It is grossly objectionable that the power given by the law  to impose a restraint, either by applying handcuffs or otherwise,  should be seen as an opportunity for exposing the accused  to public  ridicule and humiliation. Nor is the power  intended  to  be  used  vindictively  or  by  way  of punishment.  Standing  order  44  and  the  Instructions  on Handcuffs  of  November,  1977,  reproduced  by  my  learned brother, evidence  the growing  concern at a higher level of the administration  over the  indiscriminate manner in which handcuffs are  being used. To my mind, even those provisions operate somewhat  in excess of the object to be subserved by the imposition  of handcuffs,  having regard  to the central

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principle that  only he  should be  handcuffed  who  can  be reasonably  apprehended  to  attempt  an  escape  or  become violent.      Now whether  handcuffs or  other  restraint  should  be imposed on a prisoner is primarily a matter for the decision of the  authority responsible  for  his  custody.  It  is  a judgment to  be exercised  with reference to each individual case. It  is for  that authority to exercise its discretion, and I  am not  willing to  accept that  the primary decision should be  that of  any other.  The matter  is one where the circumstances may  change from  one moment  to another,  and inevitably in  some cases it may fall to the decision of the escorting authority midway to decide on imposing a restraint on the  prisoner. I  do not think that any prior decision of an external  authority can  be  reasonably  imposed  on  the exercise of  that power.  But I  do agree that there is room for imposing  a supervisory regime over the exercise of that power.  One   sector  of   supervisory  jurisdiction   could appropriately lie  with the court trying the accused, and it would be  desirable for  the custodial  authority to  inform that  court   of  the   circumstances  in   which,  and  the justification for,  imposing a  restraint on the body of the accused. It  should be  for the  court concerned to work out the modalities of the procedure requisite for the purpose of enforcing such control.      In  the   present  case  it  seems  sufficient,  in  my judgment, that the question whether the petitioner should be handcuffed should be left 883 to be  dealt with  in the  light of  the  observations  made herein  by   the  Magistrate   concerned,  before  whom  the petitioner is  brought for  trial in  the  cases  instituted against him. The petition is disposed of accordingly. S. R.                                      Petition allowed. 884