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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  336 of 2004

PETITIONER: Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and others

RESPONDENT: Bibi Husn Bano & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/2005

BENCH: P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

       A building, as defined in the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and  Eviction) Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), was taken on  rent from one Quasim, the predecessor of the respondents, by Ram Babu  Jaiswal, the predecessor of the appellants, some time in the year 1958.    Rent was enhanced and a fresh rent deed was executed on 7.4.1970.  That  tenancy continued.  Quasim, the landlord died.  His rights devolved on his  heirs.    It is the case of the appellants that they have taken assignment of  the rights of certain heirs, being co-owner landlords, on 29.12.1988.   The  respondents in this appeal, the heirs of Quasim, filed House Control Case  No.33 of 1993 under the Act, for fixation of fair rent.   By order dated  22.3.1994 the House Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs.4,950/- per month.    The plea based on assignment of the reversion by some of the legal  representatives of Quasim, the landlord, and the consequential  extinguishment of the lease was rejected.   An appeal preferred by the  appellants against the order fixing the fair rent as H.C. Appeal No.3/94-95  was also dismissed.   It is the case of the appellants that they have filed a  revision under the Act against the order fixing fair rent and the same is  pending.

2.      On 13.8.1997, the respondents herein filed a suit, T.S. (Eviction)  No.80/97, seeking eviction of the appellants on grounds of non payment of  rent and the bona fide need of the landlords for their own occupation.   On  13.9.1998, an application for the issue of a direction to the tenants to pay  the rent in arrears, was also filed by the landlords.  The trial court, directed  the defendants-tenants, to deposit rent at the rate of Rs.600/- per month, on  the basis that it was the last rent that was paid.   The suit was subsequently  transferred.   The trial court issued a subsequent direction to the tenants to  deposit the rent at the rate of Rs.4,950/- p.m., being the fair rent fixed under  the Act.   This was challenged in revision by the appellants, before the High  Court.   The High Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the revision  finding against the only contention on behalf of the appellants that since a  revision filed by them against the order fixing the fair rent was pending,  they could not be asked to deposit the rent at the rate at which the fair rent  was fixed.   It is this order that is challenged in this appeal.

3.      In this appeal, the only ground taken was that the tenants having  taken an assignment of the rights of certain co-owners, being the heirs of  Quasim, the original landlord, the lease or the tenancy over the building  must be taken to have been extinguished and since there was no subsisting  relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties, there could be no  direction to deposit the rent in terms of the Act.   On behalf of the appellants  a decision of this Court in Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari  (1998 (9) SCC 683) was relied on.    The Bench before which the matter

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came up, noticed that the decision relied on by the appellants was in conflict  with another decision of a co-equal Bench of this Court in T.  Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (2003 (5)  SCC 150) and referred the matter for being heard by a Bench of three  Judges.   The appeal is thus before this Bench.

4.      Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. M.K.S. Menon submitted that  the ratio of the decision in Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari  (supra) should be accepted and approved by this Court and the decision in  T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others  (supra)  deserves to be overruled.   Counsel submitted that once a tenant acquires  even the right of a co-owner landlord, or a fraction of the reversion, the  tenancy comes to an end and it could not be postulated that there could be a  continuance of the lease or the subsistence of the relationship of landlord  and tenant between the parties.   He also referred to the decision in Jagdish  Dutt and Another vs. Dharam Pal and Others  (1999 (3) SCC 644) in  support, pointing out that therein, this Court upheld an order of remand to  investigate the quantum of shares purchased by the tenant in occupation.    Counsel submitted that in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs. P. Nithyananda  Reddy and others  (supra) where a contrary view was taken, the effect of  Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been considered.    Learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the  matter has been elaborately discussed in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P.  Nithyananda Reddy and others  (supra) and the view taken therein was  consistent with Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act and the  settled position in that regard.   He also brought to our notice the decision in  the India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Others vs. Shagabandei  Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla (Smt.) and Others (2004 (3)  SCC 178)  in support of his position.

5.      On the admitted facts and based on the arguments, the only question  that requires to be considered is the effect of the purchase of the rights of  certain co-owner landlords by the tenants of the building, on the lease  originally taken by them and on the basis of which they held the building.    A lease in terms of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act gets  determined on the happening of one of the events referred to in Section 111  of the Transfer of Property Act.   The clause relevant for our purpose is  admittedly clause (d).   Insofar as it is relevant, the Section reads: "Section 111:   Determination of lease \026 a lease of  immovable property determines \026 (a)     x       x       x       x        (b)     x       x       x       x (c)     x       x       x       x (d)     In case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in  the whole of the property become vested at the same  time in one person in the same right. (e)     x       x       x       x        (f)     x       x       x       x        (g)     x       x       x       x"

On a plain reading of the provision, it is clear that in a case where a tenant  takes an assignment of the rights of the landlord or the reversion, the lease  is determined, only in a case where by such assignment, the interests of the  lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property, become vested in the  tenant.  The emphasis in the Section is clearly on the coalescing of the  entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the property in the  hands of the lessee.   The above provision incorporates the doctrine of  merger at common law.  According to Blackstone (as quoted in Broom’s  Legal Maxims):  "when a less estate and a greater estate, limited subsequent to it,  coincide and meet in one and the same person without any  intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or in  the law phraseology, is said to be merged, that is sunk or  drowned in the greater; or to express the same thing in other

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words, the greater estate is accelerated so as to become at once  an estate in possession".   

In Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property, 16th Edition, it is  stated,  "The term ’merger’ means that, where a lesser and a greater  estate in the same land come together and vest, without any  intermediate estate, in the same person and in the same right,  the lesser is immediately annihilated by operation of law.  It is  said to be "merged", that is, sunk or drowned, in the greater  estate. "

       It is further stated :- "The essentials are that the estates shall unite in the same  person without any intervening estate, and that the person in  whom they unite shall hold them both in the same right.

To illustrate the first essential, if A, who is tenant for life, with  remainder to B for life, remainder to C in fee, purchases and  takes a conveyance of C’s fee, the intervening life interest of B,  since it is vested, excludes the possibility of merger." (see page  993).         In Megarry’s Manual of the Law of Real Property, 8th Edition, it is  explained as follows:- "Merger is the counterpart of surrender.  Under a surrender, the  landlord acquires the lease, whereas merger is the consequence  of the tenant retaining the lease and acquiring the reversion, or  of a third party acquiring both lease and reversion.  The  principle is the same in both surrender and merger: the lease is  absorbed by the reversion and destroyed.

For merger to be effective, the lease and the reversion must be  vested in the same person in the same right with no vested  estate intervening."          This is based on the principle that a man cannot be a lessee of  himself.  The House of Lords in Rye v. Rye  [1962] A.C. 496 said that a  person cannot grant himself a lease of the land of which he is the owner.                          According to the Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant,  "It may be laid down as a general rule that whenever the  particular estate and that immediately in reversion are both  legal or both equitable, and by any act or event subsequent to  the creation of the particular estate become for the first time  vested in one person in the same right, their separate existence  will cease and a merger will take place."   

       An extinguishment of a tenancy by merger is thus a counterpart of  surrender by the tenant to the landlord.  In Puran Chand Vs. Kirpal Singh,  (2001) 2 SCC 433, this Court stated that a landlord could not become his  own tenant and  "when a landlord transfers his rights in the leased property to  his tenant there would be a merger of the rights of the tenant in  his property to his higher rights as owner and the tenancy would  come to an end under Section 111(d) of the Transfer of  Property Act."

       Thus, the ingredients are that two immediate estates should come into  the hands of the same person at the same time and it must be rights in the  whole of the property.  A merger is prevented if there is an intermediate  estate outstanding with another at the relevant time.

6.      Obviously, the taking of an assignment of a fraction of the reversion,  or the rights of a co-owner landlord, does not and cannot bring about a

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determination of the lease in terms of Section 111(d) of the Transfer of  Property Act.   That a lease is not extinguished because the lessee purchases  a part of the reversion was laid down by the Privy Council in Faquir Baksh  vs. Murli Dhar  (58 Indian Appeals 75).  Their Lordships after setting out  the terms of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act quoted with  approval the statement of the law made by the trial Court in that case that  for a merger to take place, "The fusion of interests required by law is to be  in respect of the whole of the property."   This Court in Badri Narain Jha   and others vs. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and others (1951 SCR 153) held  that if a lessor purchases the whole of the lessee’s interest, the lease is  extinguished by merger, but there can be no merger or extinction where one  of several joint holders of the mokarrari interest purchases portion of the  lakhraj interest.  It was held that when there was no coalescence of the  interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the estate, there could be  no determination of the lease by merger.  We do not think that it is  necessary to multiply authorities in the face of the plain language of the  provision and the authoritative pronouncements of the Privy Council and of  this Court referred to above.   The position emerging from the relevant  provision of the Transfer of Property Act is that the lease or tenancy does  not get determined, by the tenant acquiring the rights of a co-owner landlord  and a merger takes place and the lease gets determined only if the entire  reversion or the entire rights of the landlord are purchased by the tenant.

7.      In Abul Alim vs. Sheikh Jamal Uddin Ansari  (supra) relied on by  the learned counsel for the appellants, the question has not been considered  with reference to the relevant provision of the Transfer of Property Act  referred to above.   There is also no discussion on this question.   It appears  that in that case, an application filed by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a)  of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,  1972 for release of the building from the tenant, was held to be not  maintainable because the tenant had in the meanwhile acquired co- ownership in the demised shop.   It is simply stated  ’that the change of status of the tenant to that of being an equal  co-owner of the un-partitioned property, would, therefore, lead  to an irresistible conclusion that the release application was not  maintainable.   It is not disputed that there has been no partition  of the suit premises till date.   The High Court was under the  circumstances not justified in upsetting the findings of the trial  court and the appellate court in exercise of its powers under  writ jurisdiction.’    

With respect, we cannot consider this decision as laying down a  proposition of law that on a tenant acquiring the right of a co-owner  landlord, the tenancy of a building gets extinguished and the landlord  cannot seek eviction of the tenant under the Act or the fixation of fair rent  under the Act.   It must be pointed out that the observations as above are  made even without referring to Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property  Act which governs such a case and the earlier decisions of this Court.  The  observation runs counter to the statutory provision.  Hence, the decision  must be held to be not correctly decided on this question.  The decision in  Jagdish Dutt and Another vs. Dharam Pal and Others’s case (supra) is  also of no assistance to the appellants since that was a case to which,  according to this Court, Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act had  no application.   Their Lordships stated in paragraph 6 of the Judgment  therein,  "We need not examine the scope of Section 111(d) of the  Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as Respondent No.2 is held  to be trespasser and not a lessee."    

Their Lordships proceeded to say that they had to find out the effect  of the purchase of divided interest of some of the coparceners in the family  of the decree-holder in respect of the property that was the subject matter of  execution.  In view of the fact that, that was not a case dealing with merger  under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, we do not think it  necessary to consider the correctness or otherwise of the above decision,

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though there may be merit in the submission on behalf of the respondents  that the said decision cannot be said to lay down the correct law, even in  respect of the effect of acquisition of co-ownership rights by a person,  claiming to obstruct the execution of a decree for eviction especially since  that was also a claim of right by a judgment debtor who had been directed  to be evicted by the decree.    

8.      In T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and  others (supra) this Court considered the question in detail in the context of  Sections 105 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act and came to the  conclusion that there is no determination of the lease in terms of Section  111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act where a tenant acquires only partial  ownership interest.   After referring to the decision of the Privy Council, the  decision of this Court and other relevant materials, this Court held that the  lease cannot be said to have been determined by merger so long as the  interests of the lessee, the lesser estate and that of the owner, the larger  estate, do not come to coalesce in full.   This Court also noticed that merger  was largely a question of intention dependant on certain circumstances and  the courts will presume against it when it operates to the disadvantage of a  party.  With respect we find that the position has been correctly stated in T.  Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).    The subsequent decision in  India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and  Others vs. Shagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla  (Smt.) and Others  (supra) also proceeds on the same lines and supports  the above position.  We approve the principle of law stated in T.  Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P. Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).  

9.      Learned counsel for the appellants referred to the decision in  Nalakath Sainuddin vs.  Koorikadan Sulaiman (2002) 6 SCC 1) and  submitted that the ratio of that decision supports his arguments.   That was a  case where a lessor granted a building consisting of two rooms on lease to a  tenant.  The tenant, in his turn sub-let one of the rooms to another and  continued to be in possession as a tenant of one of the rooms.   The sub- tenant of one of the rooms, purchased the entire reversion or the rights of  the landlord from the original owner, the head lessor.   On the strength of  the assignment of the reversion, the sub-tenant of one of the rooms sued his  lessor \026 the original tenant, for eviction under the Kerala Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act.   What the sub-tenant of a part of the building had in  his hands was only sub-tenancy regarding that portion and the reversion of  the entire original lease in his hands.   The original lease granted was still  outstanding and it had to be terminated and the assignee \026 sub-tenant had  approached the Rent Control Court for extinguishment of the tenancy  granted by the landlord in favour of the original tenant and for possession of  the portion or the room in the hands of the original lessee.   It could not be  said to be a case where the entire rights of the lessor and the lessee in the  whole of the property had come into the hands of the sub-lessee.  Therefore,  there could be no merger in the eye of law.   In an identical situation this  Court in Indra Perfumery  v.  Moti Lal & Ors.  (1969) II S.C.W.R. 967)  held that Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act would have no  application.   This Court stated: "Section 111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, on  which the appellant relied, does not assist his case.  That clause  provides that a lease of immoveable property determines in case  the interests of the lessee and the lesser in the whole of the  property becomes vested at the same time in one person in the  same right.  The clause has no application, unless the interest of  the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property is vested  in the same person.  The appellant is the owner of the house, he  is also a tenant of a part of the house of which the respondents  are tenants from Mohd. Shafi."

10.     When an owner of property grants a lease to another, he retains with  himself the reversion and transfers the right as a lessee to the transferee.   When that transferee, the first lessee, leases out the building or a part

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thereof further, that lessee retains with him the reversion of that sub-lease  and transfers to the sub-lessee only the rights of a lessee under him.   Even  in spite of the transfer of the reversion of the first lease by the ultimate  landlord to the sub-lessee, the original lessee, on the strength of the tenancy  created by him, is entitled to seek eviction of his tenant, namely, the sub- tenant on the strength of his letting.   The fact that the sub-tenant had  acquired the ultimate reversion, might not stand in the way since so long as  the tenancy in favour of the original lessee is not terminated in the mode  known to law, that lessee would continue to enjoy the rights of the transfer  in his favour by way of lease.   The merger takes place in terms of Section  111(d) of the Transfer of Property Act, only in a case where the interests of  the lessee and that of the lessor in the whole of the property, become vested  at the same time in one person, in the same right.  In Nalakath Sainuddin  vs. Koorikadan Sulaiman (supra) such a sub-tenant had rightly  approached the Rent Control Court for eviction of his lessor, the lessee from  the landlord, by invoking the relevant provisions of the Rent Control Act on  the strength of the transfer of ownership in his favour by the head lessor.   The rights under the original lease still continued with the original lessee  and the right in the property to possess, outstanding with the lessee had not  come into the hands of the sub-lessee merely on the strength of the  assignment of the ultimate reversion.  It could not, therefore, be said that  there was a coalescing of the interest of the lessee and the lessor in the  assignee landlord, (the sub-tenant) in respect of the original lease in the  whole of the property as contemplated by Section 111(d) of the Transfer of  Property Act.   The decision in Nalakath Sainuddin vs. Koorikadan  Sulaiman (supra) is of no avail to the appellants.  

11.     It is clear from the facts of the case in  Nalakath Sainuddin vs.   Koorikadan Sulaiman (supra) that when the sub-tenant of a part took an  assignment of the reversion of the head-lease, an intermediate estate in the  form of the original lease was still outstanding not only as regards the room  or portion in the possession of the lessee himself but also as regards the  portion or room in his possession as a sub-lessee.

12.     As the passages from text books extracted in paragraph 6 show, the  intervention of an intermediate estate prevents a merger in the hands of the  sub-lessee-assignor of the ultimate reversion.   The original lease still  outstanding, is an intermediate estate.   ’Intermediate’, according to concise  Oxford Dictionary means "coming between two things in time, place,  character etc."   The estate in the leasehold would hence be an intermediate  estate coming between the ultimate reversion and the sub-lease.

In Someshwari Prasad Narain Deo vs. Maheshwari Prasad  Narain Deo, ILR X Patna 630, the owner had acquired the rights of the  sub-tenant of a portion of the leased property.  The plea of merger raised  therein was rejected in the following words: "The position in Artoka was that the Raj was the superior and  had granted the village in lekheraj to certain Baids who had  created a mukarrari lease of a portion thereof.  This mukarrari  was acquired by the Raj.  Consequently there could be no  coalescence, because there is an intermediate estate of the Baids  still in existence to prevent it; and moreover the mukarrari  interest was only over a portion of the property."

       Fry, J, stated in Chambers V. Kingham, Law Reports (1878) 10  Chancery 743, "I take the general rule to be, that where one of the interests  is held en autre droit, no merger takes place."  According to Black’s Law  Dictionary en autre droit means ’in the right of another’. The leasehold  interest outstanding with the original lessee would be an interest held by  that lessee in his own right standing in the way of merger.

       In Madan Pal v. Bashanti Kumar Shit, AIR 1989 CALCUTTA  223, a sub-lessee of a portion had acquired a part of the interest of the  superior lessor.  The plea of extinguishment by a merger was raised.  The  Court held,

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"The interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the  property should become vested at the same time in one person  and in the same right, i.e., there must be the union of the entire  interest of the lessor and the lessee.  Thus a lease is not  extinguished because the lessee purchases a part of the  reversion.  Again, the union of estate cannot occur if there is  any intervening estate.  In the instant case the petitioner has  acquired only 1/3rd interest of the lessor.  Moreover, the  petitioner has not acquired the interest of the opposite party,  who is his lessee.  He has acquired only a partial interest of the  superior landlord or the lessor of the first degree.  It can not,  therefore, be said that there has been the union of the entire  interest of the lessor and the lessee.  There is no merger even  though by virtue of the purchase, the petitioner has become one  of the co-sharer landlords of the opposite party but the sub- tenancy created by the opposite party in favour of the petitioner  can not be said to have determined."  

       In a case involving surrender by a sub-lessee in favour of the landlord  or the ultimate owner, the Kerala High Court in P. Veeriah v. Mohammed  Kunju Koya and others,  1991 (2) KLJ 96, held that there would be no  extinguishment of the original lease granted by the owner by merger and  that the lease between the lessor and the lessee will continue.  Thus, so long  as an intermediate estate was outstanding, it appears to be not possible to  say that there would be a merger in the hands of sub-lessee of a portion  when he takes an assignment of the interests of the original landlord.  

13.     Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act referred to by learned  counsel does not enable him to contend that rights of the lessee and the  lessor in the whole of the property has vested in the lessee.  The right to  joint possession acquired by the assignment from a co-owner, under that  section still leaves outstanding the rights of the other co-owners in the  property and does not bring about a situation enabling the lessee to plead  that the entire rights in the whole of the property have come to coalesce in  him so as to bring about a merger.  There is no merger unless the interests  are co-extensive.  In other words, there must be a union of the entire interest  of the lessor and the lessee.  This does not happen when a lessee takes an  assignment of only the rights of a co-owner-lessor. The position emerging  from Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, therefore, does not make  any dent in the ratio enunciated in T. Lakshmipathi and ors. Vs.P.  Nithyananda Reddy and others (supra).

14.     Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act also does not help the  appellant.  Section 109 only provides that even without an attornment by the  lessee, an assignee of the rights of the lessor would be entitled to proceed  against the lessee on the basis that he is his lessee, except as regards arrears  of rent already accrued (unless it is specifically conveyed).  This statutory  attornment, so to say, does not enable the assignee of the reversion to plead  that the lease has become extinguished.   It would only enable the assignee  from the lessor to assert his rights as a lessor notwithstanding that there is  no privity of contract between him and the lessee.  In a case where he is an  assignee of a portion, he could enforce his right to claim eviction or that  portion, on the strength of Section 109 of the Act even though the original  lessor could not split up the lease himself.    Construing the effect of the  words of the Section, in connection with the question whether the tenancy  gets split up on the assignment of a part of the reversion, this Court in  Mohan Singh (Dead by L.Rs.) v. Devi Charan and others (AIR 1988 SC  1365), observed: "It is trite proposition that a landlord cannot split the  unity and integrity of the tenancy and recover possession  of a part of the demised premises from the tenant.  But  S.109, T.P. Act, provides a statutory exception to this  rule and enables an assignee of a part of the reversion to  exercise all the rights of the landlord in respect of the

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portion respecting which the reversion is so assigned  subject, of course, to the other covenants running with  the land.  This is the true effect of the words ’shall  possess all the rights\005\005 of the lessor as to the property  or part transferred\005\005’ occurring in S.109, T.P. Act.   There is no need for a consensual attornment.  The  attornment is brought about by operation of law.  The  limitation on the right of the landlord against splitting up  of the integrity of the tenancy, inhering in the inhibitions  of his own contract, does not visit the assignee of the part  of the reversion.  There is no need for the consent of the  tenant for the severance of the reversion and the  assignment of the part so severed.  This proposition is too  well settled to require any further elucidation or  reiteration."

This indicates the effect of Section 109 of the Act.  It only does away with  the need for an attornment and brings about a splitting up of the tenancy in  certain cases.  It does not put an end to the tenancy itself as regards the split  portion and only leaves the assignor-lessor to work out the rights against the  tenant.           In Vishnu Deo v. Bal Kishan (AIR 2002 SC 569), this Court  considered the availability of a plea based on an attornment by a sub-lessee  to the original lessor.  In that case, the lessee had sued the sub-lessee for  eviction with arrears of rent under the Rent Control Act.  The ultimate  lessor, the owner, a trust, had sued the lessee for possession.  The sub-lessee  resisted the suit by his lessor by pleading that he had attorned to the original  lessor-owner and since the owner had sued the lessee for possession, the  lessee could not seek to evict the sub-lessee and the lessee’s suit was not  maintainable.  This Court repelled the said contention.  This Court held that  the defence of eviction by title paramount, was not available to the sub- lessee.  On the subsistence of the relationship of lessor and lessee between  the parties in spite of the attornment by the sub-lessee to the ultimate lessor- owner, this Court held : "The tenant’s tenancy with the trust will not come to an end  unless and until a decree for eviction on one of the grounds  available under the Rajasthan Act has been passed against him  and termination of his tenancy upheld by a judicial verdict.  Till  then he would remain a tenant of the Trust.  Mere institution of  a suit for eviction by the Trust, the owner of the property;  against the tenant does not bring the tenancy of the tenant to an  end.  The tenant cannot be said to have been evicted by  paramount title holder.  It cannot be said that the tenant does  not have any defence nor can he lawfully resist the suit filed by  the owner Trust.  The plain and simple legal position which  flows is that the sub-tenant must discharge his statutory  obligation to put his landlord, that is, the tenant in possession of  the premises in view of the latter’s entitlement to hold the  tenancy premises until his own right comes to an end and the  tenant must discharge his statutory obligation to put his own  landlord, that is, the Trust, in possession of the tenancy  premises on his entitlement to hold the tenancy premises  coming to an end." (Head Notes. Emphasis supplied)

This Court also re-emphasized the obligation of the sub-tenant to surrender  to his lessor in terms of Section 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act.

15.     Here in this case, the lessee has acquired only the rights of certain co- owner landlords and may have the right to work out his rights against the  others. The right to work out his rights would not enable him to plead that  the two rights in the whole of the property has come to vest in him.  What is  involved in the present case is the question whether on the acquisition of the

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rights of some of the co-owner landlords by the tenant, there is an  extinguishment of the tenancy by merger as postulated by Section 111 (d)  of the Transfer of Property Act.  T. Lakshmipathi answers that question  and with respect, answers that question correctly.

16.     A plain and grammatical interpretation of Section 111(d) of the  Transfer of Property Act leaves no room for doubt that unless the interests  of the lessee and that of the lessor in the whole of the property leased,  become vested at the same time in one person in the same right, a  determination of the lease cannot take place.    On taking an assignment  from some of the co-owner landlords, the interests of the lessee and the  lessor in the whole of the property do not become vested at the same time in  one person in the same right.   Therefore, a lessee who has taken assignment  of the rights of a co-owner lessor, cannot successfully raise the plea of  determination of tenancy on the ground of merger of his lessee’s estate in  that of the estate of the landlord.   It is, thus, clear that there is no substance  in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that in the case on  hand, it should have been held that the tenancy stood determined and the  application of the landlord for a direction to the tenant to deposit the rent in  arrears should have been dismissed.   The position of the appellants as  tenants continue and they are bound to comply with the requirements of the  Rent Control Act under which the order for deposit has been passed against  them.  The High Court has rightly dismissed the revision.

17.     Thus, there is no merit in this appeal.   Confirming the order of the  High Court the appeal is dismissed.