REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1745-1753 OF 2004

Pralhad & Ors.  ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

State of Maharashtra and another ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. The relevant facts common in these appeals  

are that a preliminary notification dated  

5.03.1983 was issued under Section 4 of the  

Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (hereinafter  

referred  to  as,  ‘the  Principal  Act’)  in  

respect  of  the  land  at  Ghonga  Tank  in  

village Ghonga, Taluk Barshitakli, Akola,  

Nagpur. It was followed by a notification  

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under  Section  6  of  the  Principal  Act  on  

28.07.1983.  

2. The Land Acquisition Collector passed his  

award on 1.03.1984, awarding Rs.3600/- per  

acre  for  the  acquired  lands.  Landowners,  

being  aggrieved,  filed  a  Reference  

application  under  Section  18  of  Act  on  

5.04.1984, for enhancement of compensation.

3. Meanwhile, the Land Acquisition (Amendment)  

Act,  1984,  being  Act  68  of  1984  

(hereinafter ‘the Amendment Act’) received  

the assent of the President on 24.09.1984  

for  amending  the  Principal  Act.   The  

amendment  was  made  applicable  to  every  

pending proceeding for acquisition of any  

land under the Principal Act and which were  

pending on 30.04.1982.

4. On  25.04.1985,  the  Additional  District  

Judge, Akola, in the Reference Proceeding  

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enhanced  the  compensation  to  Rs.13,000/-  

per acre, with solatium at the rate of 30%  

as per the amendment and interest at the  

rate  of  9%  p.a.  from  the  date  of  

possession.  

5. The  State  of  Maharashtra  challenged  the  

award of the Reference Court in the High  

Court of Bombay (Nagpur Bench), Nagpur. The  

landowners  did  not  file  any  appeal  or  

cross-objections  against  the  judgment  of  

the Reference Court, but filed applications  

under  Order  41,  Rule  33  of  the  Civil  

Procedure Code (for short “CPC”) claiming  

additional compensation at the rate of 12%  

p.a.  on  the  market  value  for  the  period  

commencing from the date of publication of  

the  award  and  interest  at  9%  p.a.  on  

enhanced  compensation  from  the  date  of  

taking possession for a period of one year  

and  at  the  rate  of  15%  for  the  further  

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period,  in  view  of  the  amendment  to  the  

Principal Act.

6. The High Court, by judgment and order dated  

9.02.1999,  dismissed  the  appeals  of  the  

State  of  Maharashtra  as  well  as  the  

applications filed by the landowners under  

Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC. The High Court  

relied on various judgments of this Court  

and  held  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  to  

award additional benefits under Section 23  

(1A)  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  

while confirming the award of the Reference  

Court.

7. The  present  appeals  are  filed  by  the  

landowners before this Court, challenging  

the  dismissal  of  their  application  under  

Order 41, Rule 33 of the CPC by the High  

Court.

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8. The basic issue before the High Court was  

whether in absence of an appeal or cross-

objection  from  the  claimants,  is  it  

permissible to grant additional benefits to  

the appellants as provided in Section 23  

(1A) of the Amendment Act?

9. The  benefit  which  is  given  to  the  

landowners under the amendment provision,  

which came by virtue of Section 15 of Act  

68 of 1984, is now Section 23 (1A) of the  

Principal  Act.  Section  23  (1A)  of  the  

Principal Act runs as under:

“23(1A) In addition to the market value of  the  land,  as  above  provided,  the  Court  shall  in  every  case  award  an  amount  calculated  at  the  rate  of  twelve  per  centum per annum on such market value for  the period commencing on and from the date  of  the  publication  of  the  notification  under  section  4,  sub-section  (1),  in  respect of such land to the date of the  award  of  the  Collector  or  the  date  of  taking possession of the land, whichever  is earlier.  

Explanation.- In computing the period  referred  to  in  this  sub-section,  any  period  or  periods  during  which  the  

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proceedings  for  the  acquisition  of  the  land were held up on account of any stay  or injunction by the order of any Court  shall be excluded.]  

(2) In addition to the market-value of  the  land  as  above  provided,  the  Court  shall in every case award a sum of [thirty  per  centum]  on  such  market-value,  in  consideration of the compulsory nature of  the acquisition.

10. The  benefit  of  the  aforesaid  amended  

provision to the landowners was provided by  

Section 30 (1) of Act 68 of 1984. The said  

Section 30, which was known as transitional  

provision, read as under:

30.  Transitional  Provisions-  (1)  The  provisions of sub-section (1-A) of section  23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by  clause  (a)  of  section  15  of  this  Act,  shall apply, and shall be deemed to have  applied, also to, and in relation to,-

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition  of  any  land  under  the  Principal  Act  pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 [the  date  of  introduction  of  the  Land  Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the  House of the People],  in which no award  has been made by the Collector before that  date;

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(b) every proceeding for the acquisition  of  any  land  under  the  Principal  Act  commenced after that date, whether or not  an award has been made by the Collector  before  the  date  of  commencement  of  this  Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of  section 23 and section 28 of the Principal  Act, as amended by clause (b) of section  15  and  section  18  of  this  Act  respectively,  shall  apply,  and  shall  be  deemed to have applied, also to, and in  relation  to,  any  award  made  by  the  Collector or Court or to any order passed  by  the  High  Court  or  Supreme  Court  in  appeal  against  any  such  award  under  the  provisions of the Principal Act after the  30th day  of  April,  1982  [the  date  of  introduction  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Bill,  1982,  in  the  House  of  the People] and before the commencement of  this Act.”

11. The said transitional provision came up for  

consideration before this Court in several  

judgments and there was some divergence of  

judicial  opinion  which  was  ultimately  

settled by the Constitution Bench Judgment  

of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  K.S.  Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala and others,  (1994) 5 SCC 593.  

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12. In  the  case  of  Paripoornan (supra)  the  majority judgment was rendered by Justice  

S.C.  Agrawal.  In  rendering  the  majority  

judgment  their  Lordship  held  that  the  

decision of this Court in  Union of India  vs.  Zora Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 673, is not  correct and in paragraph 70 of the judgment  

the learned Judges held that the Parliament  

has  given  a  clear  indication  of  its  

intention in Section 30 (1), which was a  

transitional provision. The learned Judges  

held that since a clear intention has been  

given in Section 30(1), there is no scope  

for any speculation about the parliamentary  

intention  by  reading  Section  23(1A)  in  

isolation from Section 30(1) of the Act.  

(See para 70)

13. The learned Judges also noted the purpose  

of a transitional provision in the statute  

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and  referred  to  Francis  Bennion  on  

Statutory  Interpretation  and  also  to  

Thornton on Legislative Drafting. Relying  

on those treaties on interpretation, this  

Court held that Section 23 (1A) and Section  

30 are interconnected (See para 73, page  

639).  

14. In paragraph 74 at page 639 and 640 of the  

report this Court, on a conjoint reading of  

Section 23(1A) with Section 30(1), held as  

follows:

“…A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section  30  of  the  amending  Act  shows  that  it  divides the proceedings for acquisition of  land which had commenced prior to the date  of  the  commencement  of  the  amending  Act  into two categories, proceedings which had  commenced  prior  to  30-4-1982  and  proceedings  which  had  commenced  after  30-4-1982.  While  clause  (a)  of  Section  30(1)  deals  with  proceedings  which  had  commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b)  deals  with  proceedings  which  commenced  after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a),  Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable  to proceedings which had commenced prior  to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by  the Collector in those proceedings before  30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which  

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were  pending  before  the  Collector  on  30-4-1982  wherein  award  was  made  after  30-4-1982  but  before  the  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  amending  Act,  and  (ii)  such  proceedings  wherein  award  was  made by the Collector after the date of  the  commencement  of  the  amending  Act.  Similarly  Section  30(1)(b)  covers  (i) proceedings which had commenced after  30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to  the commencement of the amending Act…”

15. In subsequent judgment, in  Prem Chand and  others vs.  Union  of  India,  AIR  2010  SC  1308,  following  the  ratio  in  Paripoornan  (supra) this Court granted relief to the  

claimants in accordance with the provision  

of Section 23(1A) of the Act. In that case  

the land acquisition commenced on 22nd of  

March 1978 and the award was passed on 25th  

February 1983.

16. Keeping in mind the aforesaid declaration  

of  law,  this  Court  holds  that  in  the  

instant  case  the  acquisition  proceeding  

commenced with notification under Section 4  10

which is dated 5.3.1983 and the award was  

passed  on  1.3.1984.  Therefore,  the  

landowners who were affected by the instant  

acquisition proceeding were entitled to the  

benefit  of  the  amending  provision  under  

Section  23(1A)  in  view  of  the  ratio  in  

Paripoornan (supra).  

17. Now,  the  only  question  which  remains  is  

whether the landowners, without filing an  

appeal before the High Court from the order  

of the Reference Court, are entitled to the  

aforesaid  benefit  on  the  basis  of  their  

application under Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC.

18. The provision of Order 41, Rule 33 of CPC  

is clearly an enabling provision, whereby  

the Appellate Court is empowered to pass  

any decree or make any order which ought to  

have been passed or made, and to pass or  

make such further or other decree or order  

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as  the  case  may  require.  Therefore,  the  

power  is  very  wide  and  in  this  enabling  

provision, the crucial words are that the  

Appellate Court is empowered to pass any  

Order which ought to have been made as the  

case may  require.  The  expression  ‘Order  

ought to have been made’ would obviously  

mean  an  Order  which  justice  of  the  case  

requires  to  be  made.  This  is  made  clear  

from the expression used in the said Rule  

by saying ‘the court may pass such further  

or other Order as the  case may require.’  

This  expression  ‘case’  would  mean  the  

justice of the case. Of course, this power  

cannot  be  exercised  ignoring  a  legal  

interdict or a prohibition clamped by law.

19. In fact, the ambit of this provision has  

come  up  for  consideration  in  several  

decisions of this Court. Commenting on this  

power, Mulla (CPC, 15th Edition, pg. 2647)  

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observed  that  this  Rule  is  modelled  on  

Order 59, Rule 10(4) of the Supreme Court  

of Judicature of England, and Mulla further  

opined that the purpose of this rule is to  

do complete justice between the parties.

20. In  Vanarsi vs. Ramphal, AIR 2004 SC 1989,  this  Court  construing  the  provisions  of  

Order  41  Rule  33  of  CPC  held  that  this  

provision  confers  powers  of  the  widest  

amplitude on the appellate court so as to  

do  complete  justice  between  the  parties.  

This Court further held that such power is  

unfettered by considerations as to what is  

the  subject  matter  of  appeal  or  who  has  

filed the appeal or whether the appeal is  

being  dismissed,  allowed  or  disposed  of  

while  modifying  the  judgments  appealed  

against. The learned Judges held that one  

of the objects in conferring such power is  

to  avoid  inconsistency,  inequity  and  

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inequality  in  granting  reliefs  and  the  

overriding consideration is achieving the  

ends of justice. The learned Judges also  

held  that  the  power  can  be  exercised  

subject to three limitations: firstly, this  

power cannot be exercised to the prejudice  

of a person who is not a party before the  

Court;  secondly,  this  power  cannot  be  

exercised in favour of a claim which has  

been  given  up  or  lost;  and  thirdly,  the  

power cannot be exercised when such part of  

the  decree  which  has  been  permitted  to  

become final by a party is reversed to the  

advantage of that party. (See para 15 at  

pg. 1997). It has also been held by this  

Court  in  Samundra  Devi  and  others vs.  Narendra Kaur and others, (2008) 9 SCC 100  (para 21) that this power under Order 41,  

Rule 33 of CPC cannot be exercised ignoring  

a legal interdict.  

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21. In  the  instant  case,  the  right  of  the  

landowner  to  receive  the  benefit  under  

section  23(1A)  of  the  Principal  Act  is  

legally permissible in view of the majority  

decision in Paripoornan (supra). Therefore,  the  law  declared  by  this  Court  in  

Paripoornan (supra) is binding on the High  Court under Article 141 of the Constitution  

and High Court is bound to follow the same,  

especially  when  an  application  has  been  

made by the landowner under Order 41 Rule  

33 of CPC.

22. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  interpretation  

given to Order 41 Rule 33 of CPC by this  

Court, we are of the opinion that the High  

Court denied the relief to the appellants  

to which they are entitled in view of the  

Constitution Bench decision in  Paripoornan  (supra), by taking a rather restricted and  

narrow view of the scope of Order 41 Rule  

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33 of CPC and also on a misconstruction of  

the ratio in Paripoornan (supra).  

23. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court holds  

that  the  appellants  are  entitled  to  the  

benefit of the amended provision of Section  

23 (1A) of the Principal Act in view of the  

clear  law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  

Paripoornan (supra).  The  appeals  are  allowed to the extent indicated above. No  

order as to costs.  

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) September 15, 2010

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