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PETITIONER: PRAKASH AMICHAND SHAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/12/1985

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) MISRA, R.B. (J) KHALID, V. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  468            1985 SCR  Supl. (3)1025  1986 SCC  (1) 581        1985 SCALE  (2)1437  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC1466  (11)  F          1987 SC 493  (3)  D          1989 SC1796  (8)

ACT:      Bombay Town  Planning Act,  1954 Sections  32  &  53  - Whether  the   Town  Planning  Scheme  No.  VIII  (Umarwada) published under  the Act  is violative of Articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution of India.      Precedents, scope,  nature and authority of - Duty of a Constitution Bench  to consider the effect of the precedent, explained -  The binding  nature  of  Shantilal  Mangaldas’s case.      Statutes - Act not providing for an appeal from some of the decisions  under a particular section while providing an appeal against  some other  decisions under  the  very  same section Whether  could be  said  to  be  discriminatory  and unconstitutional.      Town Planning  Schemes under  the Bombay  Town Planning Act of  1954 not  providing  for  any  solatium  while  such solatium is  available under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  - Whether  for   that  reason   it  could   be  said   to   be discriminatory.

HEADNOTE:      Land admeasuring  in all  49 acres  22 gunthas  bearing Survey Nos.  75, 81, 83, 84 and 86 situated at Surat City in the State of Gujarat originally belonged to one Ladli Begum. She granted a lease in respect of the said land in favour of a company  called Nawab   of  Belha  Spinning,  Weaving  and Manufacturing Mills,  Ltd. under  a document  dated November 15, 1882  for a period of 99 years with effect from November 1, 1881  with a right for renewal for a further period of 99 years. the  company  which  had  taken  the  land  on  lease executed a sub-lease in respect of 38 acres 2 gunthas out of the entire  plot of  land on March 29, 1881 in favour of one Dr. Nassurwanji  N. Khambata  for the residuary period of 99 years without  the right  of renewal.  This sub-lease was to expire on October 31, 1980. Under a document dated April 30,

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1928 Surat  Parsi Panchayat  Board  acquired  the  lease  in respect of  the entire  38 acres  2 gunthas, from a lady who was the daughter of one Rustamji who had acquired the rights of  Dr.  Nassurwanji  N.  Khambata.  On  May  24,  1937  the appellant Prakash Amichand Shah 1026 purchased the  right, title ant interest of the head lessee, that is  Nawab of  Belha Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Mills Ltd.  in  an  auction  sale  held  in  the  course  of liquidation proceeding  of the  said company.  The appellant thus became  the head lessee of the entire plot of land with the rights  specified in  the document  dated  November  15, 1882. Surat  Parsi Panchsyat  Board which  had Acquired  the right of  the sub-lessee  in respect  of 38  acres 2 gunthas created sub-lease in respect of 34 acres 4 gunthas in Survey in Survey  Nos. 75,  81  and  32  in  favour  of  the  Surat Municipal Corporation  under a document dated March 30, 1963 relating the sub-lessee’s right in the remaining land.      The Surat  Borough Municipality  passed a resolution on August 2,  1963 to  prepare a Draft Development Plan for the entire area  within the  municipal limits  of Surat  city in accordance with  the Development  Regulations issued  by  it with the  object of  checking haphazard  growth of  he city. Pursuant to  the said  resolution, a notification was issued on April  3, 1965  under section  4 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  to acquire  a portion  of the entire plot of land admeasuring 34  acres 4 gunthas in Survey Nos. 75, 81 and 82 for the  purpose of  setting up  an industrial estate by the Surat  Borough  Municipality  ,  Surat  which  involved  the shifting of  Municipal Workshops and Central Stores. On June 22, 1965  the Surat  Borough Municipality made a declaration declaring its  intention to  prepare a Town Planning Scheme, being the  Town Planning  Scheme No.  VIII  of  Umarwada  in respect of  the locality called Umarwada under section 22 of the L.A.  Act.   Since the Surat Municipality could not make and publish  the draft  scheme even  within the time allowed under the  Bombay Town  Planning Act, under sub-section 2 of section 23  of the Act the Collector of Surat was authorised by the State Government to make and publish the draft scheme dated July  4, 1967 the land admeasuring 1,37,961 sq. meters out of  the aforesaid  land of  which the  appellant was the head  lessee   was  shown   as  reserved   for   the   Surat Municipality. The  appellant  filed  his  objection  to  the proposed reservation  pointing out  therein that  he himself needed the  land for  expansion  of  his  business  and  for construction of homes for his employees. He also stated that the Surat  Municipality had  acted mala fide in securing the reservation of such a large piece of land in its favour. The Government  of   Gujarat  after   overruling  the  objection ultimately granted  sanction to the draft scheme prepared by the collector  of Surat  b y  its notification dated May 10, 1968. When  one Mr.  M.C.  Makwana  appointed  as  the  Town Planning Officer  by the  Government on  February  28,  1969 entered upon  his functions under section 32 of the Act, the appellant again filed his objection to reservation of his 1027 land for  the alleged  purpose of the Municipal Corporation. In addition  the  appellant  also  claimed  compensation  in respect of  the said 38 acres 2 gunthas at the rate of Rs.50 per sq. yard alleging that the land in the vicinity had been sold at  that rate  and claimed towards his share two-thirds of the  total compensation.  Then on  June 30, 1970 the Town Planning Officer issued a notice expressing his intention to acquire the  land in  question admeasuring  1,37,961 per sq. meter. Aggrieved  by the  said decision, the appellant filed

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an appeal  before the  Board of  appeal. The Board of Appeal held that  disputes regarding  compensation of  lands  taken away for  the purpose  of the  scheme being  not within  the scope of  section 33  (1) (xiii)  of the Act the decision of the  Town  Planning  Officer  on  those  questions  was  not appealable under  section 34  of the  Act. Aggrieved  by the decision of  the Board  the appellant  filed a writ petition before the  High Court  of Gujarat  which was dismissed. The Constitution questions raised in the writ petition could not be decided  by the High Court as emergency was then in force in the  country and the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and  31  of  the  Constitution  of  India  on  which  the appellant’s contentions  were based  remained  suspended  at that time. The High Court, however, referred to the decision of  this  Court  in  State  of  Gujarat  v.  Shri  Shantilal Mangaldas, [1969]  3 S.C.R. 341 in which the validity of the Bombay Town  Planning Act had been upheld . Aggrieved by the judgment of  the High  Court the appellant filed this appeal by special  leave. The  appeal was  heard by a Bench of this Court consisting  of A.C.  Gupta and  A.P. Sen JJ, which, by its  judgment  dated  July  24,  1981  reported  as  Prakash Amichand Shah  v. State of Gujarat. [1982] 1 S.C.R. 81, came to the  conclusion that  the High  Court was  right  in  its finding that  he  decision  of  the  Town  Planning  Officer determining the  amount of  compensation in  the appellant’s case was  not appealable.  However, the  Court felt that the case should  be placed  before the  Constitution  Bench  for hearing the question relating to the constitutional validity of  the   Act.  Hence   the  appellant’s   case  before  the Constitution Bench.      Dismissing the appeal, the Court ^      HELD: 1.1  There is  no constitutional infirmity in the provision of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 and there is no ground  to declare  the Act  which  has  been  upheld  in Shantilal Mangaldas’s about 17 years ago as unconstitutional now  and   to  unsettle  all  settled  transactions  drawing inspiration from  certain vague  observations made  in  game subsequent decisions. [1056 D-E; 1060 B-C] 1028      1.2 The  Bombay Town  Planning Act  is not  bad for not extending the procedure of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the proceedings under the Town Planning Scheme. It cannot be struck down on the ground, that if the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had  been applied,  the appellant  would have  had  the benefit of the machinery provided under section 18 and 54 of the Acquisition  Act ant since it is not available under the procedure prescribed  by the  Act in the case of lands taken under section 53 thereof the Act is discriminatory. [1057 D- E]      2.1 The  object of  the Bombay Town Planning Act is not just acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land there for some public purpose. It consists of several activities which have as  their ultimate object the orderly development of an urban area.  It envisages  the preparation  of a development plan, allocation  of land  for various  private  and  public uses,  preparation  of  a  Town  Planning  Scheme  and  main provisions for  future development  of the area in question. On the  final Town  Planning Scheme  coming into force under section 53  of the  Act there is an automatic vesting of all lands required  by the  local authority.  It is  not a  case where the  provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be  set in  motion either  by the  Collector  or  by  the Government. The  divesting of title takes place statutorily. Section 71  of the  Act provides for payment of compensation

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to the  owner of an original plot who is not provided with a plot in  the final  scheme, or  if the  contribution  to  be levied from him under section 66 of the Act is less than the total amount  to be  deducted therefrom  under  any  of  the provisions of  the Act.  Section 73  of the Act provides for payment due  to be made to any person by the local authority by adjustment  of account  as provided in the Act Section 32 of the  Act lays  down the  various duties and powers of the Town Planning Officer which he has to discharge and exercise for the  benefit of  the whole  community. All his functions are parts of the social and economic planning undertaken and executed for  the benefit of the community at large and they cannot be  done in  isolation. When such functions happen to be integral  parts of  a single  plan which  in  this  ca  e happens to  be an  urban development  plan, they  have to be viewed in their totality and not as individual acts directed against a  single person  or a  few  persons.  It  is  quite possible that  when statutory  provisions are  made for that purpose, there would be some difference between their impact on rights  of individuals  at one  stage and their impact at another stage. [1046 C-H; 1047 A]      2.2 In  this very  Act, there are three types of taking over of lands-first under section 11, secondly under section 53 and 1029 thirdly under  section 84 of the Act, each being a part of a single scheme  but each  one having  a specific  object  and public  purpose   to  be  achieved.  While  as  regards  the determination of  compensation lt  may be  possible to apply the provisions  of the  Land acquisition Act, 1894 with some modification as  provided in  the Schedule to the Act in the case of  lands acquired  either under  section 11  or  under section 84 of the Act, ii the case of lands which are needed for the  local authority  under the  owners Planning  Scheme which authorises allotment of reconstituted plots to persons from whom original plots are taken, it is difficult to apply the provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894.  The provisions of  section 32 and the other financial provisions of the  Act provide for the determination of the cost of the scheme,  the   development  charges   to   be   levied   and contribution to  be made  by the  local authority etc. It is only after  all that exercise is done the money will be paid to or  demanded  from  the  owners  of  the  original  plots depending on  the circumstances  governing each  case. If in the above  context, the Act has made special provision under section 67  to 71  of the  Act for  determining compensation payable to  the owners  of original plots who do not get the reconstituted plot  6 lt can not be said that there has been any violation  of Article 14 of the Constitution. Even there the market  value of the land taken 18 ¯ t lost sight of and hence no  violation of  Article 31(2)  of  the  Constitution either. [1047 A-E]      State of  Gujarat v.  Shri Shantilal  Mangaldas & Ors., [1969] 3.  S.C.R. 341.,  The Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. G.J.  Desai &  Ors. C.A.No.  1034 of 1967 decided ib 28th August 1969.,  Maneklal Chhotalal  & Ors.  v. M.G. Makwana & Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R. 65 explained an applied.      3.1 A  decision ordinarily  is a  decision on  the case before  the   Court,  while  the  principle  underlying  the decision would  be bindings  as a  precedent in a case which comes up  for decision  subsequently. Hence,  while applying the decision  to a  later case,  the Court  which 18 dealing with lt  should carefully  try to certain the true principle laid down  by the  previous decision. A decision often takes its colour  from the questions involved in the case in which

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it is  rendered. The  scope and  authority  of  a  precedent should never be expanded unnecessarily beyond the needs of a given situation. [1052 C-E]      3.2  Expressions  like  "virtually  overruled"  or  "in substance overruled" are expression of inexactitude. In such circumstances, it is the duty of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court  which has  to  consider  the  effect  of  the precedent in question to read 1030 it over  again ant to form its own opinion instead of wholly relying upon  the gloss placed on it in some other decision. An inappropriate  purpose for which a precedent is used at a later date  does not  take away  its binding  character as a precedent. In  such cases  there is good reason to disregard the later  decision. Such  occasions in judicial history are not rare.  The history  of the  law relating to the right of labourers to strike in a factory of one such instance. [1055 E-F; H; 1056A]      3.3 Therefore, as long as the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 which  was upheld  by the  Supreme Court  in  Shantilal Mangal das’s  has not  been struck town by this Court in any subsequent decision  it would be wholly unjust to declare it inferentially  as   having  been   declared  as  void  in  a subsequent decision  which depends  mostly on the reasons in Shantilal Mangaldas’s case for its survival. The decision in Shantilal Mangaldas’s  case has  not been  overruled by  the Bank Nationalisation case which has only explained Shantilal MangalDas’s case and does not overrule it particularly after the Nation  has first expressed itself in favour of the 25th Constitution Amendment and then decided to delete Article 31 altogether from the Constitution. [1056 B-E]      R.C. Cooper  v. Union  of India  [1970] 3  S.C.R.  530; Kesvananda Bharati  v. State  of Kerala [1973] Suppl. S.C.R. l; State  of Karanataka  & Anr.  v. Rangnatha  Reddy &  Anr. [1978] S.C.R. 641 explained.      Temperton v.  Russell (1893)  1 Q.B. 715 (CA); Allen v. Flood  (1898)  A.C.1;  Quinn  v.  Leathem  (1901)  A.C.  495 referred to.      4. There  is no  rule  that  every  decision  of  every officer under  a statute should be made appealable and if it is not 80 made appealable the statute should be struck down. It  may  be  salutary  if  an  appeal  is  provided  against decisions on  questions which are of great importance either to private  parties or to the members of the general public, but ordinarily  on Such  matters the Legislature is the best judge. Unless  the Court finds that the absence of an appeal is  likely  to  make  the  whole  procedure  oppressive  and arbitrary,   the    Court   does    not   condemn    it   as unconstitutional. Considering  the status of the officer who is appointed  as a  Town Planning Officer, Section 32 of the Bombay  Town   Planning  Act   cannot  be   said  to  confer uncanalised  and   arbitrary  power  on  the  Town  Planning Officer, merely because of the denial of the right of appeal in some cases. [1056 F-H; 1057 A-B]      M/s Babubbsi  & Co.  Ors. v.  State of Gujarat [1985] 2 S.C.C. 732 followed. 1031      5.1 It  is wrong  to contend  that the  denial  of  the solatium of  15 per cent (or 30 per cent, as the law now is) of  the  market  value  of  the  land  in  addition  to  the compensation payable  for lands taken by the local authority for purposes  of the  scheme makes  the Bombay Town Planning Act discriminatory. [1057 E-F; 1059 G]      5.2 It  cannot also  be said  as a  rule that the State which has  got to  supply and maintain large public services

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at great  cost should always pay in addition to a reasonable compensation some amount by way of solatium. The interest of the public  is equally  important. In  any event  it is  not shown that  the compensation  payable in the present case is illusory and unreal. [1059 H; 1060 A-B]      Nagpur Improvement Trust and Anr. v. Vithal Rao & Ors., [1973] 3  S.C.R. 39;  State of Kerala & Ors. v. T.N. Peter & Anr.,[1980] 3  S.C.R. 290;  P.C.  Goswami  v.  Collector  of Darrang,A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1214 distinguished.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1224 of 1977.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  3.9.1976  of  the Gujarat High  Court in Special Civil Application No. 1501 of 1974.      R.F. Nariman,  P.K. Manohar  and P.H.  Parekh  for  the Appellants.      T.S. Krishnamoorthy  Iyer, T.U.  Mehta , Prashant Desai and S.C. Patel for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  This  appeal  by  special  leave  is preferred against  the judgment  dated September  3, 1976 in Special Civil  Application No.  1501 of  1976 on the file of the High  Court of  Gujarat filed  under Article  226 of the Constitution of  India in which the appellant had challenged the constitutional  validity of the Town Planning Scheme No. VIII (Umarwada)  in respect  of certain  lands  situated  at Surat City  in the  State of  Gujarat, published  under  the provisions  of   the  Bombay   Town   Planning   Act,   1954 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’) in so far as the said scheme pertained  to the land of which the appellant was the lessee, alleging inter alia that it was violative of Article 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India.      The land  in question  originally belonged to one Ladli Begum. She  granted a  lease in  respect of the said land in favour of a 1032 company  called   Nawab  of   Belha  Spinning,  Weaving  and Manufacturing Mills Ltd. under a document dated November 15, 1882 for  a period  of 99 years with effect from November 1, 1881 with  a right  of renewal  for a  further period  of 99 years. The  land was  described as  the land  bearing Survey Nos. 75,  81, 83,  84 and  86 measuring  in all  49 acres 22 gunthas. The  company which  had taken  the  land  on  lease executed a sub-lease in respect of 38 acres 2 gunthas out of the entire  plot of  land on March 29, 1884 in favour of one Dr. Nassurwanju  N. Rhambata  for the residuary period of 99 years without  the right  of renewal.  This sub-lease was to expire on October 31, 1980. Under a document dated April 30, 1928 Surat  Parsi Panchayat  Board  required  the  lease  in respect of the entire 38 acres 2 gunthas, referred to above, from a  lady who  was the  daughter of  one Rustamji who had acquired the  rights of  Dr. Nassurwanji N. Khambata. On May 24, 1937  the  appellant  purchased  the  right,  title  and interest of  the head lessee, i.e., Nawab of Belha Spinning, Weaving and Manufacturing Mills Ltd. in an auction sale held in  the  course  of  liquidation  proceedings  of  the  said company. The  appellant thus  became the  head lessee of the entire plot  of  land  with  the  rights  specified  in  the documents dated  November 15, 1882, referred to above. Surat Parsi Panchayat  Board which  had acquired  the right of the sub-lessee in  respect of  38  acres  2  gunthas  created  a

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further sub-lease  in respect  of 34  acres 4 gunthas out of the 38  acres 2  gunthas in  favour of  the Surat  Municipal Corporation under  a document dated March 30, 1963 retaining the sub-lessee’s right in the remaining land.      The Surat  Borough Municipality  passed a resolution on August 2,  1963 to  prepare a Draft Development Plan for the entire area  within the  municipal limits  of Surat  City in accordance with  the Development  Regulations issued  by  it with the  object of  checking haphazard  growth of the city. Pursuant to  the said  resolution, a notification was issued on April  3, 1955  under section  4 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  to acquire  a portion  of the entire plot of land admeasuring 34  acres 4 gunthas in Survey Nos. 75, 81 and 82 for the  purpose of  setting up  an industrial estate by the Surat  Borough   Municipality,  Surat   which  involved  the shifting of  Municipal Workshops and Central Stores. On June 26, 1965  the Surat  Borough Municipality made a declaration declaring its  intention to  prepare a Town Planning Scheme, being the  Town Planning  Scheme No.  VIII  of  Umarwada  in respect of  the locality called Umarwada under section 22 of the Act. The Municipality however could not make and publish the draft  scheme within  12 months  from the declaration of its intention as 1033 required by  section 23(1) of the Act. The State Government, however, by  its  Notification  dated  August  31,  1966  in exercise of  its power  under the  proviso to  section 23(1) extended the  period for  making and  publishing  the  draft scheme by  six months.  The Municipality  could not make and publish the draft scheme even within that extended period of six months.  Then under sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Act the  Collector of  Surat was  authorised  by  the  State Government to  make and publish the draft scheme within nine months from December 26, 1966. Accordingly, the Collector of Surat by  Notification dated  July 4, 1967 published a draft scheme. In  the draft  scheme as  made and  published by the Collector, the  land admeasuring  1,37,961 sq. metres out of the aforesaid  land of  which the  appellant  was  the  head lessee was shown as reserved for the Surat Municipality. The appellant filed  his objection  to the  proposed reservation pointing out  therein that  he himself  needed the  land for expansion of  his business and for construction of homes for his employees.  He also  stated that  the Surat Municipality had acted  mala fide  in securing  the reservation of such a large piece of land in its favour. The Government of Gujarat after overruling  the objection  ultimately granted sanction to the  draft scheme  prepared by  the Collector of Surat by its Notification  dated May  10, 1968.  On June  7, 1968 one Shri N.R.  Bhambhani was  appointed  as  the  Town  Planning Officer to  finalise the  scheme. He  was succeeded  by Shri M.G.Makwana who  was appointed  as the Town Planning Officer by the  Government on  February  28,  1969.  When  the  Town Planning Officer entered upon his functions under section 32 of the  Act, the  appellant again filed his objection to the reservation of  his land  for the  alleged  purpose  of  the Municipal  Corporation.   In  addition  the  appellant  also claimed compensation  in respect  of the  said  38  acres  2 gunthas at  the rate of Rs.50 per sq. yard alleging that the land in  the vicinity had been sold at that rate and claimed towards his share two-thirds of the total compensation. Then on June  30, 1970  the Town Planning Officer issued a notice expressing his  intention to  acquire the  land in  question admeasuring 1,37,961  sq. metres.  On November  4,  1971  he determined the  compensation payable  in respect of the said land at  the rate  of Rs.2.40 paise per sq. metre. Aggrieved

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by the  said decision,  the appellant filed an appeal before the Board  of Appeal. The Board of Appeal held that disputes regarding compensation  of lands  taken away for the purpose of  the  scheme  being  not  within  the  scope  of  section 33(1)(xiii) of  the Act  the decision  of the  Town Planning Officer on  those questions was not appealable under section 34 of  the Act. The Board of Appeal inter alia observed that it was  not for  the Board  to say  anything  regarding  the propriety of the action taken by the Town Planning 1034 Officer in  reserving the  entire plot  of land  admeasuring 1,37,961 sq.  metres, in which the appellant was interested, for the purpose of the Surat Municipality. It also held that on the  question of  apportionment of  the  compensation  no appeal lay  to it.  Aggrieved by  the decision of the Board, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Gujarat out of which this appeal arises.      The High  Court dismissed  the writ petition concurring with the  Board of  Appeal that  the appeal was incompetent. The constitutional  questions raised  in the  writ  petition could not be decided by the High Court as emergency was then in force  in  the  country  and  the  rights  guaranteed  by Articles 14,19  and 31 of the Constitution of India on which the appellant’s  contentions were   based remained suspended at that  time.  The  High  Court  however  referred  to  the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shri Shantilal Mangaldas,[1969] 3  S.C.R. 341, in which the validity of the Act had  been upheld.  Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.      This appeal  was heard  first by  a bench of this Court consisting of  A.C. Gupta and A.P. Sen, JJ. On that occasion the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in case the Court  upheld that the appeal preferred by the appellant before the  Board of  Appeal was  maintainable he  would not press the grounds questioning the constitutional validity at that stage  and the  matter should then go back to the Board of  Appeal   for  its   decision  on  the  adequacy  of  the compensation. He  further submitted  that if the Court found that the  Board of  Appeal was  right in  holding  that  the appeal was  not maintainable,  he should  be given  leave to urge the  grounds challenging  the validity  of the Act. The learned Judges  who heard  the appeal came to the conclusion that the  High Court  was right in finding that the decision of the  Town Planning  Officer  determining  the  amount  of compensation in  the appellant’s  case was not appealable by its judgment  dated July  24,  1981  which  is  reported  as Prakash Amitchand  Shah v.  State of Gujarat,[1982] 1 S.C.R. 81. In  view of the above conclusion the court felt that the case should  be placed before Constitution Bench for hearing the questions relating to the constitutional validity of the Act. That  is how  the case  is now before this Constitution Bench to consider the said questions.      Before taking  up  for  consideration  the  contentions urged on  behalf  of  the  appellant,  it  is  necessary  to understand the 1035 objects and  the scheme of the Act. The principal objects of any Town  Planning legislation  generally are to provide for planning, the development and control of the use of land and to confer on public authorities such as City Municipalities, Municipal Boroughs,  Town  Municipalities,  Town  Panchayats etc. powers in respect of the acquisition and development of land for  planning and  other purposes.  Such laws generally provide for the preparation of schemes that might be made in respect of  the land  with the general object of controlling

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its  development,   securing  proper   sanitary  conditions, amenities  and  conveniences  such  as  public  parks,  play grounds, hospital  areas etc., preserving existing buildings or other  objects of  architectural, historic  and  artistic interest and  places  of  natural  interest  or  beauty  and generally of  protecting existing  amenities. The Act is one such piece of legislation. It was enacted in the place of an earlier statute  which was  in  force  in  the  province  of Bombay, namely,  the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915. The Act came into  force on  April 1, 1957 before the reorganisation of the  State of  Bombay and  it continued to be in force in the State  of Gujarat  even after  the Bombay Reorganisation Act  1960  came  into  force.  Under  the  Act  every  local authority as defined under section 2(4) thereof was required by section  3 of  the Act  to carry out a survey of the area within its  jurisdiction and  not later than four years from the date  on which  the Act  came into  force to prepare and publish in  the prescribed  manner a development plan and to submit it  to the  State  Government  for  sanction.  Before carrying out  a survey  of the  area  referred  to  in  sub- sections (1) and (2) of section 3 of the Act for the purpose of preparing  the development  plan for  such area,  a local authority is required to make a declaration of its intention to prepare  the development  plan and  to  despatch  a  copy thereof to  the State  Government  for  publication  in  the Official Gazette  and to publish it in the prescribed manner for inviting  suggestions from the public within a period of two months.  Section 4  to 7  of the  Act  provide  for  the declaration of  intention of  making development  plan,  the manner of  preparing a  development plan, power of entry for carrying out  survey for  preparing development plan and the contents of  a development  plan. Section 7 of the Act which deals with  the contents  of development  plan  states  that generally the development plan should indicate the manner in which the  development and  improvement of  the entire  area within the  jurisdiction of  the local  authority are  to be carried out  and regulated.  The local authority is required to indicate  in the  development  plan  its  proposals  with regard to the following :           (a) proposals  for designating the use of the land           for the  purposes  such  as  (1)  residential  (2)           industrial, (3) commercial, and (4) agricultural; 1036           (b) proposals  for designation  of land for public           purposes such  as parks,  play grounds, recreation           grounds, open spaces, schools, markets or medical,           public health or physical culture institutions;           (c) proposals for roads and highways;           (d) proposals  for reservation  of  land  for  the           purposes  of  the  Union,  any  State,  any  local           authority or  any other  authority established  by           law in India; and           (e) such  other  proposals  for  public  or  other           purposes as  may from  time to time be approved by           the local  authority  or  directed  by  the  State           Government in this behalf.      By requiring a local authority to prepare a development plan, the  Act intends that the Town Planning Schemes should form part  of a  single and cohesive plan for development of the  entire   area  over   which  the  local  authority  has jurisdiction. The  local authority is required to submit the development plan  for the  sanction of the State Government. After the receipt of the sanction of the State Government of the development  plan, the  local authority is authorised by section 11(1)  of the  Act to acquire any land designated in

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the development  plan  for  purposes  specified  in  clauses (b),(c),(d) &  (e)  of  section  7  of  the  Act  either  by agreement or  under the  Land Acquisition  Act,  1894.  Sub- Section (2)  of section 11 of the Act provides that the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 as amended by the Schedule to the Act would apply to the determination of the compensation for the acquisition of such land.      Chapter III  of  the  Act  deals  with  the  provisions relating to  the making of Town Planning Schemes. Section 18 of the  Act provides  that subject  to the provisions of the Act or  any other  law for  the time  being in force a local authority may make one or more town planning schemes for the area within  its jurisdiction  or any  part  thereof  having regard to the proposals in the final development plan. Every such Town Planning Scheme may make provisions for any of the matters such  as the  laying out  or re-laying  out of land, either vacant  or already  built upon;  the  filling  up  or reclamation  of  low-laying  swamp  or  unhealthy  areas  or levelling up  of land;  laying out  of new streets or roads; construction, diversion,  extention, alteration, improvement and stopping up of streets, roads and communications; the 1037 construction, alteration  and removal  of buildings, bridges and other  structures, the  allotment or reservation of land for roads, open spaces, gardens, recretion grounds, schools, markets, green  belts and  dairies, transport facilities and public purposes of all kinds; the preservation of objects of historical or  national interest  or natural  beauty and  of buildings  actually   used  for   religious  purposes;   the imposition of  conditions and  restrictions in regard to the open space  to be  maintained about  buildings  etc.  Before preparing a  Town Planning Scheme the local authority having jurisdiction over any such land as is referred to in Section 21 of  the Act  is required  by section  22 of  the  Act  to declare its  intention to  make a  Town Planning  Scheme  in respect of  the whole  or any  part of  such land. Within 21 days from  the date  of such declaration the local authority is required  to publish its declaration of intention to make a  scheme   in  the   prescribed  manner.  A  copy  of  such declaration is  required to be sent to the State Government. The local  authority is  also required to send a plan to the State Government  showing the  area  which  it  proposes  to include in  the Town  Planning Scheme.  Under section  23(1) within 12  months from  the date of declaration of intention to make  a scheme  the local authority shall prepare a draft scheme. Under  the proviso  to section 23 of the Act however the State  Government may  extend the  time to do so by such period specified not exceeding six months in all. Under sub- section (2) of section 23 of the Act the State Government or an officer authorised by the State Government in that behalf may make and publish the draft scheme if the draft scheme is not made  and published  by the  local authority  within the period specified in sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Act or within  the period  so extended under the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 23 of the Act within a further period of 9  months from  the date  of the  expiry of  the extended period. If  such  declaration  is  not  made  by  the  State Government within  the  further  period  specified  in  sub- section (2)  of section  23 of  the Act,  the declaration of intention to make such scheme shall elapse and until aperiod of three years has elapsed from the date of such declaration it shall  not be competent to the local authority to declare its intention  to make any Town Planning Scheme for the same area or  any part of it. Section 25 of the Act provides that the draft scheme shall contain the following particulars :

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         (a)  the   area,  ownership  and  tenure  of  each           original plot;           (b) the land allotted or reserved under sub-clause           (a) of  clause (2)  of section  18 with  a general           indication 1038           of the  uses to  which such  land is to be put and           the terms  and conditions’  subject to  which such           land is to be put to such uses;           (c) the  extent to  which it  is proposed to alter           the boundaries of original plots;           (d) an  estimate of  the net cost of the scheme to           be borne by the local authority;           (e) a  full description  of  all  details  of  the           scheme under  such sub-clauses  of clause  (2)  of           section 18 as may be applicable;           (f) the laying out or re-laying out of land either           vacant or already built upon;           (g) the  filling up  or reclamation  of  low-lying           swamp or  unhealthy areas or levelling up of land;           and           (h) any other prescribed particulars.      Section 26 deals with reconstituted plots. In the draft scheme the  size and shape of every reconstituted plot shall be determined,  so far  as may be, to render it suitable for building purposes  and where the plot is already built upon, to ensure  that the  building; as  far as possible, complies with the  provisions of  the scheme  as regards open spaces. For the  purpose of sub-section (1) of section 26 of the Act the draft scheme may contain the following proposals :-           (a) to form a reconstituted plot by the alteration           of the boundaries of an original plot;           (b) to  form a  reconstituted plot by the transfer           wholly or partly of the adjoining lands;           (c) to provide with the consent of the owners that           two or  more original  plots each of which is held           in ownership  in severality  or in joint ownership           shall hereafter,  with or  without  alteration  of           boundaries, be  held in  ownership  in  common  as           reconstituted plot;           (d) to  allot a  plot to any owner dispossessed of           land in furtherance of the scheme and; 1039           (e) to  transfer the  ownership of a plot from one           person to another. Section 27 of the Act provides for representation to be made by persons  affected by  such scheme.  Section 28 of the Act confers the powers on the State Government to grant sanction to the  scheme and  to publish it. Within one month from the date on  which the  sanction of  the State Government to the draft scheme  is published in the Official Gazette the State Government is  required to  appoint a  Town Planning Officer for the  purpose of  implementing the  scheme. The duties of the Town  Planning Officer  are set out in Section 32 of the Act. It reads thus :      "32(1) In  accordance with the prescribed procedure the Town Planning Officer shall -           (i) after  notice given  by him  in the prescribed           manner, define  and demarcate  the areas  allotted           to, or  reserved, for  a public purpose or purpose           of the local authority and the reconstituted plots           ;           (ii) after  notice given  by him in the prescribed           manner,  determine,   in  the   case  in  which  a           reconstituted plot is to be allotted to persons in

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         ownership in common, the shares of such persons;           (iii) fix  the difference  between  the  total  of           values of  the original plots and the total of the           values of  the plots included in the final scheme,           in accordance  with the  provisions  contained  in           clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 64;           (iv) determine whether the areas used, allotted or           reserved for  a public  purpose or  purpose of the           local authority are beneficial wholly or partly to           the owners  or residents  within the  area of  the           scheme.           (v) estimate  the portion  of the  sums payable as           compensation  on   each  plot  used,  allotted  or           reserved for  a public  purpose or  purpose of the           local authority  which is beneficial partly to the           owners or  residents within the area of the scheme           and partly  to the  general public, which shall be           included in the costs of the scheme;           (vi) calculate  the contribution  to be  levied on           each plot  used, allotted or reserved for a public           purpose 1040           or  purpose   of  the  local  authority  which  is           beneficial  partly  to  the  owners  or  residents           within the  area of  the scheme  and partly to the           general public;           (vii) determine  the amount  of exemption, if any,           from the  payment of  the contribution that may be           granted in  respect of  plots exclusively occupied           for the religious or charitable purposes;           (viii) estimate the increment to accrue in respect           of each  plot included  in  the  final  scheme  in           accordance  with   the  provisions   contained  in           section 65;           (ix)  calculate   the  proportion   in  which  the           increment of  the  plots  included  in  the  final           scheme shall  be liable  to  contribution  to  the           costs  of   the  scheme  in  accordance  with  the           provisions contained in section 66           (x) calculate  the contribution  to be  levied  on           each plot included in the final scheme           (xi) determine  the amount to be deducted from, or           added to,  as the  case may  be, the  contribution           leviable from  a person  in  accordance  with  the           provisions contained in section 67;           (xii) provide for the total or partial transfer of           any right  in an  original plot to a reconstituted           plot or provide for the extinction of any right in           an original plot in accordance with the provisions           contained in section 68;           (xiii) estimate in reference to claims made before           him,  after   the  notice  given  by  him  in  the           prescribed manner  the compensation  to be paid to           the owner  of any  property or  right  injuriously           affected by  the making  of a town-planning scheme           in accordance  with the  provisions  contained  in           section 69;           (xiv) draw in the prescribed form the final scheme           in accordance with the draft scheme;           Provided that---           (a) he may make variation from the draft scheme; 1041           (b) any  variation estimated  by him to involve an           increase of  10 per  centum in  the costs  of  the           scheme as is described in section 64 or rupees one

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         lakh,  whichever   is  lower   shall  require  the           sanction of the State Government :           Provided further  that the  Town Planning  Officer           shall make  no substantial  variation and  without           the consent  of the  local authority  and  without           hearing any  objections which may be raised by the           owners concerned.           (2) If  there is any difference of opinion between           the Town  Planning Officer and the local authority           whether  variation   made  by  the  Town  Planning           Officer is substantial or not, the matter shall be           referred by  the  local  authority  to  the  State           Government  whose  decision  shall  be  final  and           conclusive.           (3) The  Town Planning  Officer appointed  for any           draft scheme  shall decide all matters referred to           in sub-section  (1)  within  a  period  of  twelve           months from the date of his appointment :      Provided that  the State  Government may  from time  to time by  order in  writing extend  the said  period by  such further period as may be specified in the order."      Section 33  of  the  Act  provides  that  excepting  in matters arising  out of clauses (v), (vi), (viii), (ix), (x) and (xiii)  of sub-section (1) of section 32, every decision of the  Town Planning  Officer shall be final and conclusive and binding  on all  persons. Section  34 of the Act however provides for appeals being preferred against any decision of the Town  Planning Officer  under clauses  (v), (vi), (viii) (ix), (x) and (xiii) of sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Act to  the Board  of Appeal constituted under section 35 of the Act.  Thereafter a  final scheme  should be prepared and submitted to  the State  Government. The State Government is authorised to  accord sanction  to such  final scheme  under section 51  of the  Act. Thus  it  is  seen  that  the  Town Planning Schemes  are to  be prepared in two distinct stages by two  different authorities.  The first  stage constitutes the preparation  of draft  town planning scheme by the local authority and  the second stage consists of the scheme to be prepared  by   the  Town  Planning  Officer.  If  the  State Government sanctions  the final  scheme under  section 51 of the Act it shall state in the 1042 notification the  place at  which the  final scheme  is kept open for the public inspection and a date which shall not be earlier than  one month after the date of the publication of the notification on which all the liabilities created by the scheme shall  take effect  and the  final scheme  shall come into force. On and after the date fixed in such notification a town  planning scheme  shall have effect as if it had been enacted in  the Act.  The effect of final schemes is set out in section 53 of the Act. Section 53 read thus :-           "53. On  the day  on which  the final scheme comes           into force,-           (a) all  lands required  by  the  local  authority           shall, unless  it is  otherwise determined in such           scheme, vest  absolutely in  the  local  authority           free from all encumbrances;           (b) all  rights in  the original  plots which have           been re-constituted  shall determine  and the  re-           constituted plots  shall  become  subject  to  the           rights settled by the Town Planning Officer."      Section 64  of the  Act specifies  what sums  should be considered as  costs of  a town  planning scheme.  Under the provisions of  the statute  the costs  of the  town planning scheme is  to be  partly met  from the contribution from the

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plot-owners  and   partly  from   the  funds  of  the  local authorities. There  are provisions  in section 66 of the Act relating  to  the  contribution  towards  costs  of  scheme. Section 66 reads thus:-           "66. (1)  The costs  of the  scheme shall  be  met           wholly or  in part  by a contribution to be levied           by the  local authority  on each  plot included in           the final  scheme calculated  in proportion to the           increment which  is estimated to accrue in respect           of such plot by the Town Planning Officer :           Provided that -           (i) no  such contribution  shall exceed  half  the           increment estimated  by the  Town Planning Officer           to accrue in respect of such plot;           (ii) where  a plot  is subject  to a mortgage with           possession or to a lease the Town Planning Officer 1043           shall determine  in what  proportion the mortgages           or lessee  on the  one hand  and the  mortgagor or           lessor  on   the  other   hand  shall   pay   such           contribution;           (iii) no  such contribution  shall be  levied on a           plot used,  allotted  or  reserved  for  a  public           purpose or purpose of the local authority which is           solely for  the benefit  of  owners  or  residents           within the area of the scheme; and           (iv) the  contribution  levied  on  a  plot  used,           allotted or  reserved  for  a  public  purpose  or           purpose of the local authority which is beneficial           partly to  the owners or residents within the area           of the  scheme and  partly to  the gneneral public           shall be  calculated in  proportion to the benefit           estimated to  accrue to  the general  public  from           such use, allotment or reservation.           (2) The  owner of  each plot included in the final           scheme shall  be primarily  liable for the payment           of the  contribution leviable  in respect  of such           plot.      Section 67  of the  Act makes  provisions  for  certain adjustments and it reads thus:-           "67. The  amount by  which the  total value of the           plots included  in the  final scheme  with all the           buildings and  works thereon  allotted to a person           falls short  of or  exceeds the total value of the           original plots  with all  the buildings  and works           thereon of  such person  shall be deducted from or           added to,  as the  case may  be, the  contribution           leviable from  such person,  each  of  such  plots           being estimated at its market value at the date of           the declaration  of intention  to make a scheme or           the date  of a  notification under sub-section (1)           of   section   24   and   without   reference   to           improvements contemplated in the scheme other than           improvements  due   to  the   alteration  of   its           boundaries."      Where the  cost of  the scheme does not exceed half the increment, the  cost shall be wholly met by the contribution of the plot-holders but where it exceeds half the increment, to the  extent of  half the increment it shall be met by the contribution from plot-holders and the excess shall be borne by the local 1044 authority. The  rules for  levying incremental  contribution are set  out on section 66 of the Act, referred to above. It is seen  that the  valuation of  the land  is done  in three

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stages :-           (i) Original  value of  the land as on the date of           the first  notification which  does not  take into           account any  of the  effects  of  the  improvement           scheme that is to follow.           (ii) Semi-final  value, that  is the  value of the           reconstituted plots allotted in their new size and           shape but  in their  original condition,  ignoring           the benefit from the scheme.           (ii) Final  value, that  is the  enhanced value of           the reconstituted plots due to the scheme.      The  difference   between  the   first   two   is   the compensation that  is  due  to  the  owner.  The  difference between the  second and  third is the increment of the value of the reconstituted plots that remain with the owner on the completion of  the scheme  and  only  50  per  cent  of  the increment can  be recovered  from the owner as his increment contribution towards the cost of the scheme and no more. Any excess incurred  will have  to be met by the local authority from its funds.      Section 84  of the Act provides that if at any time the State Government is of the opinion that any land included in a town  planning scheme is needed for a public purpose other than that for which it is included in the scheme it may make a declaration  to that effect in the Official Gazette in the manner provided  in section  6 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  and   on  the  publication  of  such  declaration  the Collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the land  and the  provisions of  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894, as  amended by  the Schedule to the Act, as far as may be, shall apply to the acquisition of the said land. Thus it is seen  that there are three methods of acquisition of land under the Act which are as under:-           (i) acquisition  of land provided in section 11 of           the Act  for  development  purposes  specified  in           clauses (b),  (c), (d) and (e) of section 7 of the           Act for  which compensation  is payable  under the           provisions of  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894 as           amended  by   the  provisions   contained  in  the           Schedule to the Act ; 1045           (ii) transfer  of lands  that takes  place on  the           coming  into  force  of  the  final  scheme  under           section 53  of the  Act for  which compensation is           payable in  accordance with section 67 of the Act;           and           (iii) acquisition  of land under section 84 of the           Act which empowers the State Government to acquire           land included  in the  town planning  scheme at  a           subsequent  stage   where  again  compensation  is           payable in  accordance with  the provisions of the           Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  as  amended  by  the           Schedule to the Act.      These are broadly the features of the Act.      The first  contention urged  by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it being possible in this instant case to acquire  the land  of the appellant either under the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 which is more favourable to the owner of the  land both  from the  point of view of the procedural safeguards and  from the  point of  view of  the quantum  of compensation payable  for the  land which  includes solatium payable under  section 23(2) thereof than the Act which does not provide for appeals against many of the orders passed by the Town  Planning Officer  under section  32 of the Act and does not  authorise payment  of solatium  in addition to the

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market value  of the land, the acquisition of the land under the Town  Planning Scheme  under section  53 of  the Act  is discriminatory  and   violative  of   Article  14   of   the Constitution which  guarantees equality before law and equal protection of  the laws.  This question  is  no  longer  res integra. In  The Zandu  Pharmaceutical Works  Ltd.  v.  G.J. Desai and  Ors., Civil  Appeal No.  1034 of  1967 decided on 28th August,  1969, dealing  with the very provisions of the Act this Court observed thus :           "When  the   Town  Planning   Scheme  comes   into           operation the  land needed  by a  local  authority           vests by  virtue of  s.53(a) and  that vesting for           purposes of  the guarantee  under  Art.  31(2)  is           deemed  compulsory   acquisition  for   a   public           purpose. To lands which are subject to the scheme,           the provisions  of ss.53  and 67  apply,  and  the           compensation is  determined  only  in  the  manner           prescribed by  the Act.  There are  therefore  two           separate provisions  one for  acquisition  by  the           State Government,  and  the  other  in  which  the           statutory vesting  of land operates as acquisition           for the 1046           purpose of  town planning  by the local authority.           The State  Government can  acquire the  land under           the Land  Acquisition Act, and the local authority           only under  the Bombay Town Planning Act. There is           no option  to the local authority to resort to one           or the  other of  the  alternative  methods  which           result in  acquisition. Hence  the  provisions  of           ss.53 and  67 are  not invalid  on the ground that           they deny equal protection of the laws or equality           before the laws."      In order to appreciate the contentions of the appellant it is  necessary to look at the object of the legislation in question as  a whole.  The object  of the  Act is  not  just acquiring a bit of land here or a bit of land there for some public purpose. It consists of several activities which have as their ultimate object the orderly development of an urban area. It  envisages the  preparation of  a development plan, allocation of  land for  various private  and  public  uses, preparation of  a Town Planning Scheme and making provisions for future  development of the area in question. The various aspects of a Town Planning Scheme have already been set out. On the  final Town  Planning Scheme  coming into force under section 53  of the  Act there is an automatic vesting of all lands required  by the  local  authority,  unless  otherwise provided, in the local authority. It is not a case where the provisions of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be set in motion either by the Collector or by the Government.      The divesting of title takes place statutorily. Section 71 of  the Act  provides for  payment of compensation to the owner of an original plot who is not provided with a plot in the final  scheme, or  if the contribution to be levied from him under  section 66  of the  Act is  less than  the  total amount to  be deducted therefrom under any of the provisions of the  Act. Section  73 of the Act provides for payment due to  be  made  to  any  person  by  the  local  authority  by adjustment of  account as provided in the Act. Section 32 of the Act  lays down the various duties and powers of the Town Planning Officer  which he has to discharge and exercise for the benefit  of the  whole community.  All his functions are parts of  the social  and economic  planning undertaken  and executed for  the benefit of the community at large and they cannot be  done in  isolation. When such functions happen to

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be integral  parts of  a single  plan  which  in  this  case happens to  be an  urban development  plan, they  have to be viewed in their totality and not as individual acts directed against a  single person  or a  few  persons.  It  is  quite possible that when 1047 statutory provisions  are made for that purpose, there would be  some  difference  between  their  impact  on  rights  of individuals at  one stage and their impact at another stage. As we  have seen  in this  very Act there are three types of taking over  of lands-   first  under section  11,  secondly under section  53 and  thirdly under  section 84 of the Act, each being  a part  of a single scheme but each one having a specific object  and public purpose to be achieved. While as regards the determination of compensation it may be possible to apply  the provisions  of the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 with some  modification as  provided in  the Schedule to the Act in the case of lands acquired either under section 11 or under section  84 of the Act, in the case of lands which are needed for  the local  authority  under  the  Town  Planning Scheme which  authorises allotment of reconstituted plots to persons from  whom original plots are taken, it is difficult to apply  the provisions  of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The  provisions  of  section  32  and  the  other  financial provisions of  the Act  provide for the determination of the cost of the scheme, the development charges to be levied and contribution to  be made  by the  local authority etc. It is only after  all that exercise is done the money will be paid to or  demanded  from  the  owners  of  the  original  plots depending on  the circumstances  governing each  case. If in the above  context the Act has made special provisions under section 67  to 71  of the  Act for  determining compensation payable to  the owners  of original plots who do not get the reconstituted plots  it cannot  be said  that there has been any violation  of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is seen that even  there the  market value  of the land taken is not lost sight  of. The  effect of the provisions in sections 67 to 71  of the  Act has  been  explained  by  this  Court  in Maneklal Chhotalal  & Ors.  v. M.G. Makwana & Ors., [1967] 3 S.C.R.  65  and  in  State  of  Gujarat  v.  Shri  Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors. (supra).      Justice Shah (as he then was) speaking on behalf of the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shri Shantilal Mangaldas  & Ors.  (supra) while  dealing with the very Act the very Act observed at page 357 thus ;-           "The object  of s.67  is to  set out the method of           adjustment of  contribution  against  compensation           receivable by  an owner  of land.  By that section           the difference  between the  total  value  of  the           plots included  in the  final scheme  with all the           buildings and  works thereon  allotted to a person           and the  total value of the original plot with all           the buildings  and works thereon must be estimated           on the basis of the 1048           market value  at the  date of  the declaration  of           intention to  make a  scheme, and  the  difference           between  the   two  must   be   adjusted   towards           contribution payable  by the  owner  of  the  plot           included in  the  scheme.  In  other  words,  s.67           provides that  the difference  between the  market           value of the plot with all the buildings and works           thereon  at   the  date   of  the  declaration  of           intention to make a scheme and the market value of           the plot  as reconstituted  on the  same date  and

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         without reference to the improvements contemplated           in the scheme is to be the compensation due to the           owner. Section  71 which  is a  corollary to  s.67           provides, inter  alia, that  if the  owner of  the           original land  is not  allotted a  plot at all, he           shall be  paid the  value of  the original plot at           the date of the declaration of intention to make a           scheme".      Proceeding  further  the  learned  Judge  said  on  the question whether  the Act  violated clause (2) of Article 31 of the Constitution at pages 357 and 358 thus :-           "The question  that falls then to be considered is           whether the  scheme of  the Act which provides for           adjustment of the market value of land at the date           of the declaration of intention of making a scheme           against market  value of  the land  which goes  to           form the  reconstituted plot,  if any, specifies a           principle for  determination of compensation to be           given  within  the  meaning  of  Art.  31(2).  Two           arguments  were  urged  on  behalf  of  the  first           respondent  -   (1)  that  the  Act  specifies  no           principles on  which the  compensation  is  to  be           determined and  given; and (2) that the scheme for           recompense for  loss is not a scheme providing for           compensation. It  is true  that under  the Act the           market  value   of  the   land  at   the  date  of           declaration  of   intention  to   make  a   scheme           determines the  amount to be adjusted, and that is           the guiding  rule in  respect of all lands covered           by  the   scheme.  The  High  Court  was,  in  our           judgment, right  in holding  that enactment  of  a           rule determining payment or adjustment of price of           land of which the owner was deprived by the scheme           estimated on  the market  value  on  the  date  of           declaration of  the intention  to  make  a  scheme           amounted  to   specification  or  a  principle  of           compensation within  the meaning  of  Art.  31(2).           Specification of principles 1049           means laying down general guiding rules applicable           to all  persons or transanctions governed thereby.           Under the  Land Acquisition  Act  compensation  is           determined on  the basis  of "market value" of the           land on  the date of the notification under s.4(1)           of the  Act. That is a specification of principle.           Compensation determined  on the  basis  of  market           value prevailing on a date anterior to the date of           extinction of  interest is  still determined  on a           principle specified.  Whether an  owner of land is           given a  reconstituted plot  or not,  the rule for           determining what  is to  be  given  as  recompense           remains the  same. It is a principle applicable to           all cases  in which  by virtue of the operation of           the Town  Planning Act a person is deprived of his           land whether in whole or in part."      Rejecting the  second branch  of the  argument that the provision for  giving the  value of  land not on the date of extinction of interest of the owner, but on the basis of the value prevailing  at the  date of  the  declaration  of  the intention to  make a  scheme was not a provision for payment of  compensation   as  stated   in  Article   31(2)  of  the Constitution Shah, J. observed at pages 365 and 366 thus:-           "Reverting to the amendment made in cl.(2) of Art.           31 by  the Constitution  (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,           1955, it  is clear  that adequacy  of compensation

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         fixed by  the Legislature  or awarded according to           the principles  specified by   the Legislature for           determination  is   not  justiciable.  It  clearly           follows from  the terms  of Art.  31(2) as amended           that the  amount of compensation payable, if fixed           by the  Legislature, is  not justiciable,  because           the challenge  in such a case apart from a plea of           abuse  of  Legislative  power,  would  be  only  a           challenge to  the  adequacy  of  compensation.  If           compensation fixed by the Legislature - and by the           use of  the expression "compensation" we mean what           the Legislature  justly regards as proper and fair           recompense   for   compulsory   expropriation   of           property and  not  something  which  by  abuse  of           legislative power  though called  compensation  is           not a recompense at all or is something illusory -           is not  justiciable, on  the plea that it is not a           just  equivalent   of  the  property  compulsorily           acquired, is  it open  to the Courts to enter upon           an  enquiry   whether  the  principles  which  are           specified  by   the  Legislature  for  determining           compen- 1050           sation do  not award  to the  expropriated owner a           just equivalent  ? In our view, such an enquiry is           not open  to the Courts under the statutes enacted           after the  amendments made  in the Constitution by           the Constitution  (Fourth Amendment)  Act. If  the           quantum of  compensation fixed  by the Legislature           is not  liable to be canvassed before the Court on           the ground  that it  is not a just equivalent, the           principles   specified    for   determination   of           compensation will also not be open to challenge on           the plea  that the  compensation determined by the           application of  those principles  is  not  a  just           equivalent. The right declared by the Constitution           guarantees that compensation shall be given before           a  person  is  compulsorily  expropriated  of  his           property for  a public  purpose. What  is fixed as           compensation by  statute, or by the application of           principles   specified    for   determination   of           compensation  is  guaranteed:  it  does  not  mean           however that  something fixed or determined by the           application  of   specified  principles  which  is           illusory  or  can  in  no  sense  be  regarded  as           compensation must  be upheld by the Courts for, to           do  so,   would  be   to  grant   a   charter   of           arbitrariness, and  permit a  device to defeat the           constitutional guarantee.  But compensation  fixed           or  determined  on  principles  specified  by  the           Legislature can  not be permitted to be challenged           on the  somewhat indefinite  plea that it is not a           just  or   fair  equivalent.   Principles  may  be           challenged on  the ground that they are irrelevant           to the  determination of  compensation, but not on           the plea  that what  is awarded as a result of the           application of  those principles  is not  just  or           fair compensation.  A challenge  to a statute that           the principles specified by it do not award a just           equivalent will  be  in  clear  violation  of  the           constitutional  declaration   that  inadequacy  of           compensation provided is not justiciable."      The learned Judge also rejected the contention based on Article 14  of the  Constitution. Justice  Shah observed  at pages 371 and 372 thus :-

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         "One more  contention  which  was  apparently  not           raised on  behalf of  the first  respondent before           the High Court may be briefly referred to. Counsel           contends that  ss.53 and  67 in any event infringe           Art.14 of the 1051           Constitution  and   were  on  that  account  void.           Counsel relies  principally upon  that part of the           judgment in  P. Vajravelu Mudaliar’s case [1965] 1           S.C.R. 614,  which deals  with the infringement of           the equality  clause of  the Constitution  by  the           impugned Madras  Act. Counsel  submit that  it  is           always open  to the  State Government  to  acquire           lands for  a public  purpose of  a local authority           and after  acquiring the lands to vest them in the           local authority.  If that  be  done,  compensation           will be  payable under  the Land  Acquisition Act,           1894, but  says counsel, when land is acquired for           a public  purpose of  a local  authority under the           provision of  the Bombay  Town  Planning  Act  the           compensation which  is payable  is determine  at a           rate prevailing  many years  before  the  date  on           which the  notification  under  s.4  of  the  Land           Acquisition Act  is issued.  The argument is based           on no  solid foundation. The method of determining           compensation in respect of lands which are subject           to the  Town Planning Schemes is prescribed in the           Town Planning  Act. There  is no option under that           act to  acquire the  land either  under  the  Land           Acquisition Act  or under  the Town  Planning Act.           Once the  draft town  planning scheme  is sanction           ed, the  land becomes subject to the provisions of           the Town Planning Act, and the final town planning           scheme being  sanctioned, by  statutory  operation           the title  of the various owners is readjusted and           the lands  needed for a public purpose vest in the           local authority.  Land required  for  any  of  the           purpose  of  a  Town  Planning  Scheme  cannot  be           acquired otherwise  than under  the Act, for it is           settled rule  of interpretation  of  statues  that           when power  is given  under  a  statute  to  do  a           certain thing  in a  certain way the thing must be           done in  that way  or  not  that  all:  Taylor  v.           Taylor, (1875)  1 Ch.D.  426. Again  it cannot  be           said that because it is possible for the State, if           so minded,  to acquire  lands for a public purpose           of a  local authority,  the statutory effect given           to   a    town-planning    scheme    results    in           discrimination    between     persons    similarly           circumstanced."      Thus it is seen that all the arguments based on Article 14 and  Article 31(2)  of the  Constitution against  the Act were of  repelled by  the Constitution Bench in the State of Guajart v.  Shri Shntilal Mangaldas Ors. (supra). With great respect, we  approve of  the decision  of the  Court in this case. 1052      But the  learned counsel for the appellant however drew our attention  to certain subsequent decisions of this Court to persuade  us to  differ from  the above  view.  First  he referred us  to the decision of this Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530 which is popularly known as the Bank Nationlisation Case, in which again the majority judgment was  written by  Shah, J.  Then the learned counsel referred us  to the  decision in Kesvaoanda Bharati v. State

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of Kerala,  [1973] Suppl.  S.C.R. 1  and to  the decision in State of  Karnataka & Anr. v. Ranganatha Redy & Anr., [1978] 1 S.C.R.  641 in  support of  his plea  that the decision in Shantilal Mangaldas’s  case (supra) stood overruled. We have gone through  these decisions  carefully.  Before  embarking upon the  examination of  these decisions  we should bear in mind that  what is  under consideration is no a statute of a legislation  but   a  decision  of  the  Court.  A  decision ordinarily is  a decision on the case before the court while the principle  underlying the decision would be binding as a precedent  in   a  case   which  comes   up   for   decision subsequently. Hence  while applying  the decision to a later case, the  Court which  is dealing  with it should carefully try to  ascertain  the  true  principle  laid  down  by  the previous decision.  A decision  often takes  its colour from the questions  involved in the case in which it is rendered. The scope  and authority  of a  precedent  should  never  be expanded  unnecessarily   beyond  the   needs  of   a  given situation. We  have earlier  seen what Justice Shah has laid down in  Shantilal Mangaldas’s  case (supra).  The very same Judge  delivered   the  majority   judgment  in   the   Bank Nationalisation Case  (supra) in  which he observed at pages 303 & 304 thus :-           "There was  apparently  no  dispute  that  Article           31(2) before and after it was amended guaranteed a           right to  compensation for  compulsory acquisition           of property  and that  by giving to the owner, for           compulsory   acquisition    of    his    property,           compensation which  was illusory, or determined by           the   application   of   principles   which   were           irrelevant,  the   constitutional   guarantee   of           compensation was  not  complied  with.  There  was           difference of  opinion on  the matter  between the           decisions in  P. Vajravelu Mudaliar’s case (supra)           and Shantilal  Mangaldas’s case  (supra).  In  the           former   case    it   was    observed   that   the           constitutional guarantee  was satisfied  only if a           just equivalent  of the  property was given to the           owner :  in the  latter  case  it  was  held  that           "compensation ,  being  itself  incapable  of  any           precise determination, no definite connotation 1053           could be  attached  thereto  by  calling  it  just           equivalent or  full indemnification  ,  and  under           Acts enacted  after the amendment of Article 31(2)           it is  not open  to the  Court to call in question           the law  providing for  compensation on the ground           that it  is  inadequate,  whether  the  amount  of           compensation is  fixed by  the law  or  is  to  be           determined  according   to  principles   specified           therein.  It  was  observed  in  the  judgment  in           Shantilal Mangalda’s case (supra) at p.651 :           ’Whatever  may   have  been  the  meaning  of  the           expression  compensation"   under  the   unamended           Article 31(2),  when the  Parliament has expressly           encated under the amended clause that ’no such law           shall be  called in  question in  any court on the           ground that  the compensation provided by that law           is not  adequate’,  it  was  intended  clearly  to           exclude from  the jurisdiction  of  the  court  an           enquiry that  which is  fixed or determined by the           application  of   the  principles   specified   as           compensation does  not award  to the  owner a just           equivalent of what he is deprived.      That after  discussing the  decision  in  P.  Vajravelu

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Mudaliar’s case Shah, J. observed thus :-           "The compensation  provided  by  the  Madras  Act,           according to  the principles specified was not the           full market  vale at  the date  of acquisition. It           did not amount to full indmnification of the owner           : the Court still held that the law did not offend           the guarantee  under  article  31(2)  as  amended,           because the  objection was  only as to be adequacy           of  compensation.  In  Shantilal  Mangldas’s  case           (supra),  the   Court  held   that   (after)   the           constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, Article 31(2)           guarantees a  right to  receive  compensation  for           loss  of   property  compulsorily   acquired,  but           compensation does  not mean  a just  equivalent of           the property.  If compensation  is provided by law           to be  paid and the compensation is not a illusory           or is  not  determinable  by  the  application  of           irrelevant principles,  the law  is  not  open  to           challenge on the ground that compensation fixed or           determine to be paid is inadequate.           Both the  lines of  thought which  converge in the           ultimate  results,   support  the  view  that  the           principles 1054           specified  by   the  law   for  determination   of           compensation is  behind the  pale of challenge, if           it   is   relevant   to   the   determination   of           compensation  and   is  a   recognised   principle           applicable in  the determination  of  compensation           for  property   compulsorily  acquired   and   the           principle is  appropriate in determining the value           of the class of property sought to be acquired. On           the  application  of  the  view  expressed  in  P.           Vajravelu Mudliars’s  case (supra) or in Shantilal           Mangaldas’s  case   (supra),  the   Act,  in   our           judgment, is  liable to  be struck down as it face           to provide  to the expropriated banks compensation           determined according to relevant principles.      It is  seen that  Shah, J.  relied on  the decision  in Shantilal Mangalda’s  case (supra) also in deciding the Bank Nationalisation Case.  The learned  Judge does  not say that the earlier decision rendered by him in Shantilal Mangadas’s case stood  overruled. In  Kesvananda Bharati’s case (supra) no  doubt  Shantilal  Mangaldas’s  case  was  discussed  and considered in the serveral judgments delivered in that case. But it  is seen that the said decision was not overruled. It is true  that in  some of the judgments Kesvananda Bharati’s case (supra)  there are  observations to the effect that the case of  Shantilal Mangaldas (supra) was virtually overruled or in  substance overruled in the Bank Nationalisation case. (supra). Some of the observations are:           "In State  of Gujarat  v. Shantilal Mangaladas and           Ors.   [1969] 3  S.C.R. 341, the decision in Metal           Corporation of  India  [1967]  1  S.C.R.  255  was           overruled which  itself was virtually overruled by           R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530           (Per Shelat and Grover, J. P.282).           "In the  Bank Nationalisation  case  the  majority           decision  virtually   overruled  the  decision  in           Guajart v. Shantilal. (Per Methew J. P.845).           "But soon thereafter came the majority decision in           R.C. Cooper  v. Union  of India,  [1970] 3  S.C.R.           530.  Cooper   in  substance  overruled  Shantilal           Mangaldas and  restored the  old position  .  (Per           Dwivedi, J. P.929).

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    But Hegde  and Mukherjee, JJ. observed at page 336 thus :           "Then came  the  Bank  Nationalisation  case.  The           majority judgment  in that  case was  delivered by           Shah, J. (as he 1055           then was).  In that  judgment he referred somewhat           extensively   to   the   decision   in   Shantilal           Mangalda’s case  and other  cases rendered by this           Court. He did not propose to deviate from the rule           laid  down   in  Shantilal   case.  (Per  Hegde  &           Mukherjee, JJ P.336)      In the  State of  Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (supra) also there  are observations  made by  Untwalia  J.  to  the following effect at page 652 :-           "Then came  the decision  in State  of Gujarat  v.           Shri Shantilal  Mangaldas Ors.  where Shah, J., as           he then  was in  his leading judgment to which was           appended a  short concurring  note by Hidayatullah           C.J., made  a conspicuous departure from the views           expressed in  Vajravelu’s case and the case of the           Metal Corporation  (supra) and  the said decisions           were overruled. Thereafter came the decision of 11           Judges of this court the leading judgment being of           Shah, J. on behalf of himself and 9 others in what           is known  as the  Bank    Nationalisation  case in           Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India. Although           in terms the decision of this Court in the case of           Shantilal Mangaldas  (supra) was merely explained,           in substance it was over-ruled.      Expressions like ’virtually overruled’ or ’in substance overruled’  are   expressions  of   inexactitude.  In   such circumstances, it  is the  duty of  a Constitution  Bench of this Court which has to consider the effect of the precedent in question  to read  it over  again and  to  form  its  own opinion instead  of wholly  relying upon the gloss placed on it in  some other  decisions. It is significant that none of the learned Judges was decided the subsequent cases has held that  the   Act  had   become  void   on  account   of   any constitutional informity.  They allowed the Act to remain in force and  the State Governments concerned have continued to implement  the   provisions  of  the  Act.  What  cannot  be overlooked is  that the  decision in  Shantilal  Mangaldas’s case (supra)  was quoted in extenso with approval and relied on  by   the  very   same  judge  while  deciding  the  Bank Nationalistion case  (supra). He  may  have  arrived  at  an incorrect or  contradictory conclusion  in striking down the Bank Nationalisation  Act. The result achieved by him in the subsequent case  may be  wholly wrong but it cannot have any effect  of   the  efficacy  of  the  decision  in  Shantilal Mangaldas case (supra). An inappropriate purpose for which a precedent is  used at  a later  date does  not take away its binding character as a precedent. In 1056 such cases  there is  good reason  to  disregard  the  later decision. Such  occasions in  judicial history are not rare. The history of the law relating to the right of labourers to strike in  a factory  is one  such  instance.  Temperton  v. Russell, [1893]  1 Q.B.  715 (C.A.),  Allen v.  Flood [1898] A.C. 1,  Quinn v.  Leathem, [1901]  A.C. 495 and other cases belonging  to   that  group  show  the  ambivalence  in  the attitudes of  courts with  regard to  certain matters  which vitally affect society. As long as the Act, i.e., the Bombay Town Planning  Act, 1954  which was  upheld by this Court in Shantilal Mangaldas  case has  not been  struck down by this

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Court in  any subsequent  decision it would be wholly unjust to declare  it inferentially as having been declared as void in a subsequent decision which depends mostly on the reasons in Shantilal  Mangaldas’s case  for its survival. With great respect  to  the  learned  Judges  who  decided  Kesavananda Bharati’s case and the case State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy, we  are not  prepared to  hold that  the decision  in Shantilal  Mangaldas’s   case  is   overruled  by  the  Bank Nationalisation case  which  has  only  explained  Shantilal Mangaldas’s case but does not overrule it particularly after the nation  has first expressed itself in favour of the 25th (Constitution) Amendment  and then  decided to delete Art.31 altogether  from  the  Constitution.  We  cannot  upset  the Constitution Bench  decision in  Shantilal Mangaldas’s  case when  no   subsequent  Constitution   Bench  has   expressly overruled it.  We do not therefore find any substance in the contention that  the  Act  violated  Article  31(2)  of  the Constitution as  it stood  at the  time  when  the  Act  was enacted or at any time thereafter.      Then it  is contended  that  the  Act  which  does  not provide for  an appeal from some of the decision of the Town Planning Officer taken under section 32 of the Act, while it has provided  appeal to  the Board  of Appeal  against  some other decisions  taken  under  the  very  same  section  was discriminatory. There  is no  rule that  every  decision  of every officer  under a statute should be made appealable and if it is not so made appealable the statute should be struck down. It  may be  salutary if  an appeal is provided against decisions on  questions which are of great importance either to private  parties or to the members of the general public, but ordinarily  on such  matters the Legislature is the best judge. Unless  the Court finds that the absence of an appeal is  likely  to  make  the  whole  procedure  oppressive  and arbitrary,   the    Court   does    not   condemn    it   as unconstitutional. On going through the provisions of section 32 and  other cognate  provisions of the Act and considering the status  of the  officer   who is  appointed  as  a  Town Planning Officer, we are of the view 1057 that it  is not  possible to hold that section 32 of the Act is a provision which confers uncanalised and arbitrary power on the   Town  Planning Officer merely because of the denial of the right of appeal in some cases. Dealing with a similar contention advanced  against section  54 of the Act and Rule 27 of  the Bombay Town Planning Rules, 1955 framed under the Act which  authorised summary  eviction of  the occupants of land vesting  in the local authority under section 53 of the Act, this Court has held in M/s Babubbai & Co. Ors. v. State of Gujarat,  [1985] 2  S.C.C. 732,  that the  absence  of  a corrective machinery  by way  of an  appeal does  not always make a provision unreasonable. We agree with the above view. In  any   event  the   remedy  under   Article  226  of  the Constitution of  India is avaliable to a person aggrieved by such orders.      We do  not  also  find  any  substance  in  the  allied contention that  if the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been applied, the  appellant would  have had  the benefit  of the machinery provided  under section  18 and  54  of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 and  since it  is not available under the procedure  prescribed by  the Act  is the  case of lands taken under section 53 thereof the Act is discriminatory. If the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 had been applicable, then all the procedural  and substantive  provisions  would  have  no doubt become  applicable. We  have already held that the Act is not  bad for  not extending  the procedure  of  the  Land

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Acquisition Act,  1894 to  the proceedings  under  the  Town Planning Scheme. For the reasons already given above in this judgment we  do not  find it  possible to  strike  down  the scheme on this ground.      It was  next contended  that the denial of the solatium of 15  per cent  (or 30  per cent, as the law now is) of the market value  of the  land in  addition to  the compensation payable for  lands taken by the local authority for purposes of the  Scheme makes  the Act  discriminatory.  Reliance  is placed on  the decision  of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust and  Anr. v.  Vithal Rao  Ors., [1973] 3 S.C.R. 39, in which it  is held  that the  different terms of compensation for land acquired under two Acts would be discriminatory. In that case  the petitioner  was a  tenant of  some field in a village. He  had applied  to the  Agricultural Land Tribunal under a  local Act for fixing the purchase prise of the said field. The  land in  question however was acquired under the Nagpur Improvement  Trust Act,  1936. Aggrieved  by the said acquisition he  filed a  Writ Petition  in the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, challenging the validity of the Nagpur Improvement Trust  Act, 1936  on various  grounds one of the grounds being that the said 1058 Act empowered  the acquisition  of the  land at prices lower than  those payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. He urged that  the denial of the solatium at 15 per cent of the market value was discriminatory. The High Court held that as the acquisition  was by  the State  in all  cases where  the property was  required to  be acquired for the purposes of a scheme framed  by the  Trust and such being the position, it was not  open to the State to acquire any property under the provisions of  the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by the Improvement  Trust Act without paying the solatium also. It was  therefore held by the High Court that the paragraphs 10(2) and  10(3) insofar  as they added a new clause 3(a) to section 23  and a  proviso to subs-section (2) of section 23 of the  Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  were  ultra  vires  as violating the  guarantee of  Article 14 of the Constitution. On appeal  the judgment  of the  High Court  was affirmed by this Court  by  the  above  decision.  The  provision  under consideration in  the above  decision corresponds to section 11  and  to  section  84  of  the  Act,  which  we  are  now considering. Section 59 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 provided  that  the  Trust  might,  with  the  previous sanction of  the State  Government acquire  land  under  the provisions of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as modified by the provisions  of the  said Act for carrying out any of the purposes of  the said  Act. But  the  provisions  which  are questioned before  us are of a different pattern altogether. They  deal   with  the  preparation  of  a  scheme  for  the development of  the land.  On the  final scheme  coming into force the  lands affected by the scheme which are needed for the local authority for purposes of the scheme automatically vest in  the local  authority. There  is no  need to  set in motion the  provisions of  the Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894 either as  it is  or as  modified in the case of acquisition under section  11 or  section 84  of the  Act. Then the Town Planning Officer  is authorised  to  determine  whether  any reconstituted plot  can be  given to  a person whose land is affected by  the scheme.  Under section 51(3) of the Act the final scheme  as sanctioned  by the  government has the same effect as  if it  were enacted in the Act. The scheme has to be read  as part of the Act. Under Section 53 of the Act all rights of  the private  owners in  the original  plots would determine and  certain consequential rights in favour of the

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owners  would   arise   therefrom.   If   in   the   scheme, reconstituted or  final plots  are  allotted  to  them  they become owners  of such  final plots  subject to  the  rights settled by the Town Planning Officer in the final Scheme. In some cases the original plot of an owner might completely be allotted to  the local  authority for a public Purpose. Such private owner  may be  paid compensation  or a reconstituted plot in  some other  place. It  may be a smaller or a bigger plot. It may be that in some cases it 1059 may not  be possible  to allot a final plot at all. Sections 67  to    71  of  the  Act  provide  for  certain  financial adjustments  regarding   payment  of   money  to  the  local authority or  to the  owners  of  the  original  plots.  The development and  planning  carried  out  under  the  Act  is primarily for  the benefit of public. The local authority is under an  obligation to  function according  to the Act. The local authority  has to  bear a  part  of  the  expenses  of development.  It  is  in  one  sense  a  package  deal.  The proceedings relating  to the scheme are not like acquisition proceedings under  the Land  Acquisition Act,  1894. Nor are the provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  made applicable either  without or  with modifications  as in the case of  the Nagpur  Improvement Trust  Act, 1936. We do not understand the  decision in  Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case (supra) as laying down generally that wherever land is taken away by the Government under a separate statute compensation should be paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only and if there  is any difference between the compensation payable under the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894  and the Compensation payable under  the statute  concerned the  acquisition under the  statute   would  be   discriminatory.  That   case   is distinguishable from  the present  case. In  State of Kerala and Ors.  v. T.N.  Peter &  Anr., [1980]  3 S.C.R. 290, also section 34 of the Cochin Town Planning Act which came up for consideration was  of the  same pattern as the provisions in the Nagpur  Improvement Trust  Act, 1936 and for that reason the Court  followed the  decision in  the Nagpur Improvement Trust s  case (supra). But in that decision itself the Court observed at pages 302 & 303 thus :-           "We are not to be understood to mean that the rate           of compensation may not vary or must be uniform in           all cases.  We need  not investigate this question           further as  it does not arise here although we are           clear in  our mind  that under given circumstances           differentiation even  in the scale of compensation           may comfortably  comfort with  Article 14. No such           circumstances are present here nor pressed."      The decision  in P.C. Goswami v. Collector of Darrange, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1214, also belongs to the category of State of Kerala  & Ors.  v. T.N.  Peter and  Anr., (supra) both of which are again distinguishable from the present one.      It cannot  also be  said as a rule that the State which has got  to supply  and maintain  large public  services  at great cost  should always  pay in  addition to  a reasonable compensation some 1060 amount by  way of  solatium. The  interest of  the public is equally important.  In any  event it  is not  shown that the compensation payable in this case is illusory and unreal.      We do  not find  any constitutional  infirmity  in  the provisions under  challenge before us. There is no ground to declare  the   Act  which   has  been  upheld  in  Shantilal Mangaldas’s   case   (supra)   about   17   years   ago   as unconstitutional   now   and   to   unsettle   all   settled

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transactions  drawing   inspiration   from   certain   vague observations made in some subsequent decisions.      In the  result, this  appeal fails  and it is dismissed but without any order as to costs. S.R.                                       Appeal dismissed. 1061