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PETITIONER: PRABHU DAYAL DEORAH ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DISTRICT MAGISRATE, KAMRUP & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1973

BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BENCH: MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH MUKHERJEA, B.K.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  183            1974 SCR  (2)  12  1974 SCC  (1) 103  CITATOR INFO :  E&R        1974 SC 911  (2,8,9,10,13)  R          1974 SC 955  (7)  RF         1974 SC1336  (10)  E          1976 SC1207  (305)  RF         1979 SC 420  (22)  RF         1981 SC  28  (18)  R          1982 SC 949  (22)  R          1989 SC 491  (6)  R          1990 SC 231  (23)  R          1990 SC1455  (19)  RF         1992 SC 604  (60)

ACT: Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971, s.  3(2)(e)-One of  the  grounds of detention vague-Validity  of  detention- Delay  by Government in rejecting  detenu’s  representation- Effect.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner were detained by orders under s. 3(2)(a)  of the  Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.  The  first ground  of  detention  stated  that  the  petitioners   were responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy and  smuggling the  resultant  rice to Meghalaya for selling  it  at  undue profit.   The petitioners sent representations to the  State Government  raising various grounds against the validity  of the orders of detention.  The State Government rejected  the representations.  But even before that, and when the  matter was pending before the Advisory Board, the petitioners filed petitions  under Art. 32 for the issue or a writ  of  habeas corpus.  It was contended that, (i) the grounds given in the detention  orders were vague and indefinite  that  therefore the constitutional right of making a representation  against the  detention  order was defeated and hence  the  detention orders were vitiated; (ii) there was inordinate delay by the Government  in  disposing  of  the  representations  of  the petitioners;  and  (iii) the detaining authorities  had  not applied their minds to the facts or the cases with a view to determining  the  need  for detaining  the  petitioners  for preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance  of  supplies  and  services  essential  to  the

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community. HELD : (Per Mathew and Mukherjea, JJ) (i)The  first  ground of detention was vague and  hence  the detentions  orders  are  vitated  and  the  petitioners  are entitled to be released from custody. [18G-H]. (a)The  requirement of Art. 22(5) of the  Constitution  will not  be  satisfied unless the detenu is given  the  earliest opportunity to make a representation against his  detention, and  no  opportunity  to  make  the  representation  can  be effective  unless  the  detenu is  furnished  with  adequate particulars of all the grounds of detention. [20A-B]. (b)  The  first ground postulated that the petitioners  were indulging authorised milling of paddy and also in  smuggling the resultant rice to laya for earning undue profit.  It  is an  independent  ground and refers past  activities  of  the petitioners, namely, unauthorised milling of paddy smuggling of resultant rice to Meghalaya.  It was not a case where the ground  was  that  the  petitioners  were  responsible   for unauthorised  milling of paddy for the purpose of  smuggling the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit, in which  case, it could have been said that particulars  about smuggling  were  not available, but that it  was  a  natural inference  that the unauthorised milling was for  smuggling. [19D-F] (c)The period during which the unauthorised milling of paddy had  been  carried  on  was not stated  in  the  grounds  of detention nor is there anything to indicate when and how the resultant  rice  was  smuggled to  Meghalaya.   The  grounds mentioned   the   seizure  of  paddy  and  rice   from   the unauthorised  possession  of  the petitioners  but  gave  no particulars as regards the unauthorised milling of paddy or the smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya.  The, fact that  one of the grounds mentioned that paddy and  rice  had been  unearthed and seized from the unauthorised  possession of  the  petitioners  would  not  necessarily  lead  to  the inference  that  the  petitioners  had  been  indulging   in unauthorised  milling  of paddy, much less  that  they  were smuggling the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning  undue profit. [18F-G;-20E-F] (d)  As  one of the grounds communicated to the  petitioners is found to be vague the detention orders must be pronounced bad.   It could not be predicated that if the  first  ground was  excluded the detaining authority would have passed  the order of detention. [20C, E] 13 Keshav, Talpade v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 FC p. 1 (p. 8),  Dr. Ram  Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi &  Ors.;  [1953] S.C-R. p. 708, Motilal fain v. State of Bihar & Ors.  [1968] 3 S.C.R. p. 587, Mishrilal lain v. The District  Magistrate, Kamrup  &  Ors. [1971] 3 S.C.R. p. 693, State of  Bombay  v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya [1951] S.C.R. 167. (e)  This  is  not  a  case where  one  of  the  grounds  of detention was merely vague.   It   is  a  case   where   the detaining authority did not apply its mind at all to one  of the grounds of detention.  If the detaining authority had no particulars before  it as regards the smuggling it could not have been possible for the authority to have been  satisfied that  the petitioners were smuggling rice to  Meghalaya.  If there is any particular instance of smuggling of the kind in the  mind  of  the detaining authority it  would  have  been possible to specify the particular instance. [20G-21B] (f) The  fact  that  the  Advisory  Board  would   consider  the representations  of the petitioners wherein they  have  also raised  the contention that the grounds are vague would  not in any way prevent this Court from exercising its  jurisdic-

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tion under Art. 32.  The detenu has a right under Art. 22(5) to  be  afforded  the  earliest  opportunity  for  making  a representation   against  the  order  of  detention.    That constitutional  right includes within its compass the  right to be furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds  of the detention order.  If this constitutional right of theirs is  violated  they have every right to come  to  this  Court under     Art.  32 complaining that their detention is  bad. [21B-D]. (g) This  is  not  a case of where any public  interest  was involved justifying the detaining  authority   under    Art. 22(6), in not disclosing all the particulars. [22B-C] Lawrence  Joachim Joseph D’Souza v. State of  Bombay  [1956] S.C.R. 382 distinguished. (h)  If  a ground communicated to the detenu is  vague,  the fact  that  the  petitioners could have  asked  for  further particulars, but they did not do go, is immaterial and would not be enough to salvage the orders of detention.  That fact would only be relevant for considering the question  whether the ground is vague or not. [22E-F] (i)  The gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate  reason for  invading the personal liberty of a citizen,  except  in accordance  with the procedure established by the  Constitu- tion  and  the  laws.  The history of  personal  liberty  is largely   the  history  of  insistence  on   observance   of procedure.   Social security is not the only goal of a  good society.   Our  country  is taking  singular  pride  in  the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution and the most cherished  of these ideals is personal liberty.   Therefore, whatever  its  impact  on the maintenance  of  supplies  and service,essential  to the community may be, when  a  certain procedure is prescribed by the Constitution or the laws  for depriving  a citizen of his liberty, it is the duty, of  the Court  to  see that the procedure  is  rigorously  observed. [22G-23D] (2)  In view of the finding on the first question it is  not necessary  to consider the question whether the disposal  of the  representations  by  the  Government  was  inordinately delayed;  nor  is  it  necessary  to  consider  whether  the detaining authority applied its mind to the other grounds in the detention order. [22F-G] Per  Beg,  J.  The  petitioners have  not  proved  that  the detaining  authority  exceeded its power  in  detaining  the petitioner  on  the grounds alleged against them,  nor  have they  proved that their detentions had  become  subsequently illegal due to denial of their constitutional rights to make effective representations. [37D] (1)  (a)  This  Court can go into the question  whether  the grounds  are  so vague as to disable  the  petitioners  from making  effective  representations  against  the   detention orders or otherwise vitiated the detention orders.  In doing so, the totality of relevant facts ,in circumstances of each case  must be taken into account in determining whether  the opportunity  of  effective representation has  been  denied. The  alleged  vagueness  or want, of  particulars,  must  be viewed  in the context of the nature of activities  alleged, the  substance  of  the allegations,  the  contents  of  the representations made, and the effect they have actually pro- duced.  The fact that the case is still under consideration, within  the  legally  fixed  period of  10  weeks  from  the detention, before an Advisory-Board, which 14 has full power and jurisdiction to eliminate some grounds as vague  or  wanting  in  particulars  and  to  determine  the

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sufficiency  or  otherwise of the rest of  the  grounds  and particulars supplied, cannot be ignored. [29C.,36F-H] (b)  In  the  present case, particulars of  recoveries  made from  the premises of the mills were given;  particulars  of recoveries of rice and sugar said to have been hoarded in an unauthorised  manner and the times and places,  were  given; the  quantities  recovered on each occasion as well  as  the qualities of the rice recovered were given.  Therefore,  the sentences  at  the beginning and the end  of  the  detention orders,  stating  the  grounds  in  each  case,   apparently constitute  the  conclusion or inferences reached  from  the particulars  given  in the body.  A document,  in  order  to correctly understand its meaning, should be read as a whole. A perusal of the explanations submitted by the  petitioner-, to  the Government, wherein, after asserting that they  were unable  to understand, or make representations  against  the grounds  of detention, because of vagueness, the  petitioner proceeded  to  refute  the  allegations  of  fact  makes  it difficult to see how the petitioners were really  prejudiced by the alleged vagueness.  [28D-14; 29D-E] (c)  Assuming,  however,  that there was some  infirmity  or vagueness  in some parts of the detention  order  containing the grounds it could not be said that it was of such a  kind as to vitiate the detention order. [29-F] (i)  The question whether a detenu was or was not given  due opportunity  of  making  an effective  representation  in  a particular case is largely a question of fact which must  be decided  after  taking into account the totality  of  facts. [31H] (ii) It is true that the detenu has a right under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution to be afforded the earliest  opportunity of  making  a  representation against  the  order.   In  the present  case,  that opportunity had been  afforded  to  the detenus  and they have made representations  which  included the  grievance  that  some of the  grounds  were  vague  and indefinite. [31G] (iii)     The  right of making the representation cannot  be construed  so  unreasonably as to practically  demolish  the unchallenged power, under a constitutionally valid statutory provision,  to consider and decide the objections  contained in  a representation.  There may be cases where the  grounds of  detention may, prima facie, show that the  detention  is invalid or ordered for some collateral purpose in excess  of the  power to detain; or the facts indicating the denial  of the  right of making an effective representation may  be  so patent   and   clear  that  it  would  be   an   unnecessary prolongation  of  an  illegal  detention  to  wait  for  the Advisory  Board. which is given under s. 11. 10  weeks  time from  the  date of detention to make its report.   When  the Advisory  Board  has full power to consider  every  kind  of representation against the grounds of detention the using  a grievance that any grounds are too vague or indefinite to be understood  or  to enable the detenu to  make  an  effective representation  the  detenu should ordinarily wait  at  last until the report has been made by the Advisory Board  before he  complains that he has been really deprived of any  right under the Act. [32B-G]. (iv) Mere   allegation   of   vagueness   of   grounds    or insufficiency  of  particular,%, without  calling  upon  the detailing  authority to remedy the defect is not  enough  to vitiate a detention order. [30F]. Keshav  Talpadc v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 p. 1 (P.8), Dr.  Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi & Ors. [1953]  S.C.R. p.  708,  Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar &  Ors.,  [1968]  3 S.C.R. p. 587, Mishrilal Jain v. The, District  .Magistrate,

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Kamrup & Ors. [1971] 3 S.C.R. p. 693, Rameshwar Lal  Patwari v. State of Bihar, [1968] 2 S.C.R. 505, The State of  Bombay v.  Atma  Ram Sridhar Vaidya, [1951]  S.C.R.  167,  Lawrence Joachim Joseph D’Souza v. The State of Bombay. [1956] S.C.R. p. 382, Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of U.P.. [1954]  S.C.R. 418, Pushkar Mukherjee & Ors. v. State West Bengal [1969]  2 S.C.R. 635, and Naresh Chandra Gonguli v. The State of  West Bengal & Ors., [1960] 1 S.C.R. 411, referred to. (d)  The  fact that a past occurrence used  for  forecasting probable future conduct  of  the detenu, could also  be  the subject matter of a prosecution for an offence    would  not affect the validity of preventive detention. [33B] (e)  The  fact  that the recovery of sugar was more  than  a year ago would not vitiate the detention order on the ground of  its irrelevance.  The recovery was not so remote ,is  to be considered irrelevant in view of the recovery of 15 hoarded  rice  on later dates.  It is the  chain  of  events which,   considered   together,   enabled   the    detaining authorities to form a reasonable apprehension regarding  the future conduct of the detenus.  Preventive detention  orders involve  forecasts.   All  that can be done  is  to  give  a statement  of an apprehension in the form of grounds  as  to what  the  detenu  is  likely to do  having  regard  to  the particulars  of past activities which may be given  so  that preventive  detention for one of the purposes for  which  it can  be  ordered is shown to have become  necessary  in  his case.   The  grounds and particulars must  have  a  rational nexus  with these purpose,. that is, they must be  relevant. [33C-D,F]. Bhim Sen v. State of Punjab, [1952] S.C.R. 18 and  Rameshwar Shaw  v.  District  Magistrate, Buradwan &  Anr.,  [1964]  4 S.C.R. 921, referred to. (f)  A  distinction between grounds which are  merely  vague and those which ,ire extraneous and irrelevant should not be overlooked.   Further  particulars can be asked for  by  the detenu  and supplied by the detaining authority to cure  the defect in a vague ground, but an extraneous ground  vitiates the   detention  order.   If  there  is  an  extraneous   or irrelevant ground, the court cannot separate the  irrelevant from  relevant.   The Court can only order  release  of  the detenu  because an extraneous or irrelevant ground  affected the decision to detain. [33G-H]. Tarapade  De  &  Ors. v. The State of  West  Bengal,  [1951] S.C.R. 212 @ 218219, followed. (g)  But,  whether  some of the grounds were only  vague  or were  irrelevant and extraneous to the purposes of the  Act, the  detenu  can make a representation against them  to  the Advisory Board.  The Advisory Board has full jurisdiction to declare a detention invalid or to recommend, after excluding what  may be vague or irrelevant, that the detention  should continue. [34F] (2)  In those cases where detention is vitiated only on  the ground  that particulars were not supplied at  the  earliest reasonably  possible  opportunity  so that the  right  of  a detenu to make a representation is held to be defeated,  the detention  would,  strictly speaking, not  be  vitiated  ab- initio, but, it would become illegal only from the time when the  infringement of the right to sufficient particulars  to make  a  representation takes place.  In the  present  case, Government  has satisfactorily explained the time  taken  in considering the detenu’s representation, and, therefore,  it could  not be said there was an undue delay  which  defeated the  right  of  the detenu to make  a  representation.   The representations show that the petitioners had disputed every

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single  fact  and made detailed allegations  justifying  the possession of the rice.  Therefore- Government naturally had to   take  some  time  to  verify  the  statements  of   the petitioners. [34G-H; 35E-F] Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal & Ors.  A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 197, Khaidam lbocha Singh etc. v. Stare of Manipur, [1972] 1 S.C.R.  1022 and Deonarayan Mandal v. State of West  Bengal, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1353, referred to. (3)(a) It could not be said that the detaining authority had not applied his mind, on the contention that the allegations made against the petitioners were not true.  It  is not  for this  Court to consider the correctness or otherwise of  the sections  made on questions of fact in the returns filed  by the Government. (b) It    could   not  also  be  said  that  the   detaining authority  had not applied its mind, because the  Government had taken nearly three weeks to verify the details, so that, it  must  be presumed that they were not  there  before  the detention was ordered.  The Government could not be presumed to  be in possession of all the facts taken into account  by the  detaining officer.   The detaining  officer  had  not consulted   the   Government  before   ordering   detention. Therefore,  the time taken by the Government in  making  the inquiries only shows that Government took care to verify the correctness of allegations made by the petitioners’, or,  in other  words, that it, on the contrary, applied its mind  to the facts of the cases. [36A-C] (4)  In a case of preventive detention where fairly  triable questions  of fact or law, which can be  more  appropriately gone  into  an, decided by an Advisory  Board,  are  pending before the Board, the petition should be dismissed as prema- ture  except in very exceptional circumstances.  The  Court, no  doubt,  must  zealously  protect  the  personal  free-of citizens against arbitrary or unconstitutional invasions  of it  by  executive authorities.  But, to do that, it  is  not necessary to 16 stultify  what  is,  in some respects,  the  more  effective method  of  consideration of the whole case by  an  Advisory Board  which  could consider the sufficiency of  grounds  or detention  also.  To allow the legally prescribed  procedure for  protection  of personal liberty to operate  freely  and consistently with the social interests preventive  detention is  meant to safeguard, appears to be the path  of  judicial wisdom.  Even if some of the grounds of detention are  vague but others could reasonably satisfy the detaining  authority that,  to  prevent much greater apprehended harm  to  social good  from the anti-social activities of an individual,  his preventive  detention is imperative, the sufficiency of  the remaining  grounds  of  detention should be  allowed  to  be determined  by those charged with the duty to  consider  the question.  The Court should not undertake to determine  what really  and substantially is only a question of  sufficiency of  grounds of detention.  It is only where a  vagueness  or indefiniteness   is   disclosed  which  either   makes   the satisfaction quite illusory and unreasonable or which really disables  a detenu from making an  effective  representation that the detention would be vitiated on such a ground. [37A- H; 38A-B]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 1496 and 1497 of 1973.

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Under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a Writ  in the nature of habeas corpus. S.   V.  Gupte, J. P. Bhattacharjee, D. N. Mukherjee,  Dilip K. Hazarika and N. R. Choudhury, for the petitioner (in W.P. 1946/ 73). J.   P.   Bhattacharjee, D. N. Mukherjee, Dilip K.  Hazarika and  N.  R.  Choudhury,  for the  petitioner  in  (W.P.  No. 1497/73). Niren  De, Attorney-General of India and Naunit Lal for  the respondents (in both the petitions). The Judgment of MATHEW and MUKHERJEA JJ. was delivered by MATHEW, J. A dissenting opinion was delivered by Beg, J. MATHIEW,  J.  The petitioners question the legality  of  the orders  of detention dated 25-7-1973 passed by the  District Magistrate,  Kamrup, under s.3(2)(a) of the  Maintenance  of Internal Security Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as  the "Act",  and pray for issue of writs in the nature of  habeas corpus. The  orders of detention state that the detaining  authority is  satisfied  that with a view to prevent  the  petitioners from  acting in a manner prejudicial to the  maintenance  of supplies  and services essential to the community in  Kamrup District,  it is necessary that they should be  detained  in Gauhati Jail with immediate effect until further orders. On 30-7-1973, the petitioners surrendered themselves  before the  Additional District Magistrate.  On the same day,  each of  the petitioners was served with the order  of  detention and  also  the grounds of detention together with  a  letter informing him of his right to make a representation  against the order of detention to the State Government. The  grounds of detention served upon the petitioner  Prabhu Dayal Deorah read as follows : "  That  you, being one of the partners and  in  the  active management  of M/s.  Deora Flour and Rice Mills,  Zoo  Road, Gauhati and M/s.  Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati are responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy in M/s.  Deora Flour  and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati and smuggling  of the  resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning  undue  profit. You are also responsible for unauthorised 17 hoarding  of rice and sugar in the, premises of M/s.   Deora Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road and M/s.  Srinivas  Basudeo at  Fancy  Bazar  for  the sole  purpose  of  selling  these commodities  at  higher prices in and  outside  Gauhati  for profiteering. "On  25-7-1973  the following quantities of paddy  and  rice were unearthed and seized from your unauthorised  possession at Zoo Road (Deora Flour and Rice Mills) premises. 1.   Sali paddy                 ....147 bags 2.   Ahiu paddy                 ....207 bags 3.   Sali Mota rice (Arua)     .....239 bags 4.   Ahu rice 5. Joha rice     .....  8 bags 5.   Joha rice                 ......14 bags "That  on  4-1-1972, 191 bags of sugar were  seized  by  the Supply   Officials   of  Gauhati  from   your   unauthorised possession at Messrs.  Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. "  That  on  16-5-1972 the supply  officials  seized  105.03 quintals  of  rice  from  your  unauthorised  possession  at Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo,. Fancy Bazar, Gauhati. "That  you indulged in such trade activities  which  created acute scarcity and high prices of rice and sugar in  Gauhati market. "You  are,  thus  acting  in a  manner  prejudicial  to  the maintenance  of  supplies  and  services  essential  to  the community  as  a whole in this district and  your  being  at

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large has jeopardized the maintenance of’ such supplies  and services to the community." The grounds of detention served on the petitioner Raj  Kumar Deorah read as follows :               "That  you  being a close  associate  of  Shri               Prabhu  Dayal Deora s/o Late Basudeo Deora  of               Zoo Road, Gauhati and in the active management               of   Basudeo,   Fancy  Bazar,   Gauhati,   are               responsible for unauthorised milling of  paddy               in Messrs.  Deora Flour and Rice Mills at  Zoo               Road,  Gauhati and smuggling of the  resultant               rice  to Meghalaya for earning  undue  profit.               You  are  also  responsible  for  unauthorised               hoarding of rice and sugar in the premises  of               Messrs.   Deora  Flour and Rice Mills  at  Zoo               Road  and Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo  at  Fancy               Bazar  for the sole purpose of  selling  these               commodities  at higher prices in  and  outside               Gauhati for profiteering.               "That on 25-7-1973 the following quantities of               paddy and rice were unearthed and seized  from               your unauthorised possession at Zoo Road Deora               ’Flour and Rice Mills premises)  1. Sali paddy                 ..147 bags  2. Ahu paddy                  ..207 bags  3. Sali Mota Rice (Arua)      ..239 bags  4. Ahu rice                   ....8 bags  5. Joha rice                  ...15 bags  -L447SupCI/74               18               "That  on  4-1-1972, 191 bags  of  sugar  were               seized by the supply officials of Gauhati from               your   unauthorised  possession   at   Messrs.               Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati.               "That on 16-5-1972 the supply officials seized               105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised               possession at Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy               Bazar, Gauhati.               "That  you indulged in such  trade  activities               which  created acute scarcity and high  prices               of rice and sugar in Gauhati market.               "You are, thus acting in a manner  prejudicial               to  the maintenance of supplies  and  services               essential to the community as a whole in. this               district  and  your being at  large  has  jeo-               pardized the maintenance of such supplies  and               services to the community." On 5-8-1973, each of the petitioners sent his representation to  the  State Government through the  jail  authorities  of Gauhati raising various grounds against the validity of  the order  of detention.  Both representations were rejected  by the State Government on 28-8-1973 and their cases,  together with their representations were sent by the State Government to the Advisory Board constituted under s.9 of the Act. Three  contentions  have  been advanced  on  behalf  of  the petitioners in this Court: (1) that the grounds of detention were  vague  and  so the petitioners were  denied  of  their constitutional  right  to  make  effective   representations against   the  orders  of  detention;  (2)that   there   was inordinate delay in disposing of the representations by  the Government and that was sufficient to vitiate the  detention of the petitioners, and (3) that the detaining authority did not  apply  its mind to the facts of the cases to  find  out whether  it  was  necessary to detain  the  petitioners  for preventing  them from acting in a manner prejudicial to  the

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maintenance  of  supplies  and  services  essential  to  the community. The  first ground for detention states that the  petitioners are  responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy in  Deora Flour  and  Rice Mills and smuggling the resultant  rice  to Meghalaya  for  selling it for earning  undue  profit.   The period  during which the unauthorised milling of  paddy  has been  carried on was not stated in the grounds of  detention nor is there anything to indicate when and how the resultant rice  was  smuggled to Meghalaya for earning  undue  profit. The  fact  that  the grounds communicated  to  each  of  the petitioners  mention the seizure of paddy and rice from  the unauthorised possession of the petitioners from the mill  in question  on  25--7-1973  gives no  particulars  as  regards unauthorised  milling  of  paddy or  the  smuggling  of  the resultant  rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit.   The first round of detention was, therefore, vague and that  is sufficient to vitiate the detention orders. The   learned.    Attorney  General,   appearing   for   the respondents  did  not  contend  that  the  first  ground  of detention,  taken by itself, was not vague, if smuggling  of rice  to  Meghalaya referred to the past activities  of  the petitioners.  But he said that the reasonable way to 19 understand  that  ground is to read it in such a way  as  to imply that the smuggling of the resultant rice to  Meghalaya was for earning undue profit and that smuggling was only the purpose  for which unauthorised milling of paddy  was  done. In  the return filed on behalf of the respondents,  this  is how the ground is read :               "Detailed  particulars have been given in  the               grounds  as to the detection  of  unauthorised               paddy and milled rice in the locked godowns of               M/s.  Deorah Rice and Flour Mills, Gauhati and               in  view  of the circumstances stated  in  the               previous  paragraphs, the purpose of  hoarding               rice and milling paddy in unauthorised  manner               was  to smuggle the goods for  undue  profits.               The  ground clearly and  unambiguously  states               that   the  petitioner  is  responsible,   for               unauthorised milling of paddy in M/s.   Deorah               Rice and Flour Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati  for               the purpose of smuggling the rice to Meghalaya               for  earning undue profits.  The materials  on               which  the  latter part of  the  grounds               i.e. smuggling of result and rice to Meghalaya               for  earning  undue profits is based  are  the               materials  which  have been mentioned  in  the               preceding  paragraphs and, as held earlier  by               this  Hon’ble Court, are not necessary  to  be               mentioned in the grounds". There can be no doubt that the first ground postulated  that the  petitioners were indulging in unauthorised  milling  of paddy and also in smuggling the resultant rice to  Meghalaya for  earning undue profit.  As already stated no  particular instance of smuggling was given, no;the period during  which the  smuggling  operation was carried on  mentioned  in  the ground.   We  could have understood the contention  of’  the learned  Attorney General if the ground had stated that  the petitioners  were  responsible for unauthorized  milling  of paddy  and  that  was  for  the  purpose  of  smuggling  the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit.   Then it  could  have  been said that  no  particulars  about  the smuggling  would  be  available as it  was  only  a  natural inference  of  the purpose of the  unauthorized  milling  of

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paddy.   We  would have to adopt the  vocabulary  of  humpty dumpty  if we are to read the ground in the way in which  it has  been  read  in  the  return  filed  on  behalf  of  the respondents.   We  have no hesitation in  holding  that  the first ground is an independent around and refers to the past activities of the petitioners namely unauthorised nothing of paddy  and the smuggling of the resultant rice to  Meghalaya for earning undue profit. It  was  said that grounds are nothing  but  "conclusion  of facts  and not complete recital of facts" and  when  article 22(5) of the Constitution says that the grounds on which the detention  order has been made must be communicated  to  the detenu  it ’Can only mean that the detaining authority  must supply  him with his conclusions of facts and the dictum  of Kania,  C.J.,  writing  for the majority, in  the  State  of Bombay  v. Atma Rant Sridhar Vaidya(1) was cited in  support of  it.  But  we think that the learned  judge  was  careful enough  to  point out that if the representation has  to  be intelligible  to meet the charges contained in the  grounds, the information conveyed must be sufficient (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 167, at 178. 20 to attain that end.      In   other  words,   the   majority decision in that case assumed that the  requirement       of article 22(5) will not be satisfied unless the detenu  is given  the  earliest opportunity to  make  a  representation against   the detention and that no opportunity to make  the representation  can  be  effective  unless  the  detenu   is furnished  with  adequate  particulars  of  the  grounds  of detention. In  Dr.  Ram  Krishan Bhardwaj v. The  State  of  Delhi  and Others(1)  Patanjali  Sastri,  J.  speaking  for  the  Court assumed  that  in  Atma Ram  Sridhar  Vaidya’s  Case(2)  the majority  decision was that the detenu has the right  to  be furnished  with  full  particulars  to  make  an   effective representation.  The Court also said that the constitutional requirement  must  be satisfied in respect of  each  of  the grounds communicated. As  one  of the grounds communicated to the  petitioners  is found  to be vague, the detention orders must be  pronounced to  be  bad on the basis of a series of  decisions  of  this Court  (see  The  State  of  Bombay  v.  Atma  Ram   Sridhar Vaidya(1);  Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State  of  Delhi and  Others(2); Motilal Jain v. The State of  Bihar(3),  and Mishrilal  Jain  ’v.  The District Magistrate,  Kamrup,  and others(4).  decisions followed the decision of  the  Federal Court in Keshav Talpade v. Emperor (5) where it was said:               "If  a detaining authority gave  four  reasons               for  detaining a man,  without  distinguishing               between  them,  and any two or  three  of  the               reasons  are held to be bad, it can  never  be               certain   to  what  extent  the  bad   reasons               operated  on  the  mind of  the  authority  or               whether  the detention order would  have  been               made  at all if only one or two  good  reasons               bad been before them." We  cannot predicate that if the first ground was  excluded, detaining  authority would have passed the order.  The  fact that  one  of the grounds mentions that paddy and  rice  had been  unearthed and seized from the unauthorized  possession of  the  petitioners from the rice mill in question  on  the date  of the detention order would not necessarily  lead  to the  inference that the petitioners have been  indulging  in unauthorized  milling  of paddy, much less  that  they  were smuggling the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning  undue

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profit. it cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground, namely,   that   the   petitioners   are   responsible   for unauthorised milling of paddy and smuggling of the resultant rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit, is a  conclusion reached from the fact of seizure of paddy and rice on  25-7- 1973  or  the  seizure  of rice  on  16-5-1972  "from  their unauthorized possession at Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo,  Fancy Bazar, Gauhati." These  are  not  only  cases where one  of  the  grounds  of detention  was as vague, but also cases where the  detaining authority  did  not  apply its mind at all  to  one  of  the grounds  of  detention.  If the detaining authority  had  no particulars  before it as regards the  smuggling  operation, how  was it possible for it to have been satisfied that  the petitioners (1)[1953] S.C.R. 708. (2) [1951] S. C. R 167 at 178 (3) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 587. (4) [1971] 3 S.C. 693, (5)  A.I.R. 1943 F.C.1, at 8. 21 were smuggling rice to Meghalaya for earning undue profit  ? If  there  was any particular instance of smuggling  of  the kind  in the mind of the detaining authority, it would  have been  possible for it to specify the particular instance  at least in the grounds. We think that the fact that the Advisory Board would have to consider  the representations of the petitioners where  they have  also raised the contention that the grounds are  vague would not in any way prevent this Court from exercising  its jurisdiction  under  article, 32 of the  Constitution.   The detenu  has a right under article 22(5) of the  Constitution to  be  afforded  the  earliest  opportunity  of  making   a representation   against  the  order  of  detention.    That constitutional  right includes within its compass the  right to be furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds  of the detention order.  And, if their constitutional right  Is violated, they have every right to come to this Court  under article  32  complaining  that their  detention  is  bad  as violating their fundamental right.  As to what the  Advisory Board  might do in the exercise of its jurisdiction  is  not the  concern  of this Court.  This Court is  only  concerned with the question whether any of the grounds communicated to the  petitioners  was vague which would preclude  them  from making  an effective representation.  We do not  think  that because  the representations of the petitioners are  pending consideration  before  the Advisory Board and  the  Advisory Board  would also go into the question of the  vagueness  of the  grounds  communicated to them,, this Court  should  not exercise its jurisdiction under article 32.  In other  words we  cannot  agree  with the  proposition  that  because  the Advisory  Board  was  seized (if the matter  when  the  writ petitions were filed and would also consider the  contention of  the  petitioners in their representations that  the  ,,- rounds  were vague, we should not interfere with the  orders of  detention  on  the ,core  that  one  of  the   grounds communicated to the petitioners was vague. The Attorney General strongly relied on the decision of this Court  in Lawrence Joachim Joseph D’ Souza v. The  State  of Bombay(1).   There  it was held that if the  nature  of  the activity  for which detention was ordered was such  that  no better  particulars  could be given,  the,  detention  order cannot  be  struck down as bad, In that case the  ground  of detention was that with the financial help of the Portuguese Government  the petitioner there was carrying  on  espionage activities with the help of underground workers and that  he was also collecting intelligence about security arrangements

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on the border area and was making the intelligence available to the Portuguese authorities.  In answer to the  contention that the ground was vague as no particulars were  furnished, the  Court first referred to the majority decision  in  Atma Ram  Sridhar  Vaidya’s  Case(2)  as  laying  down  that  the constitutional  right  of  a  detenu  under  article   22(5) consists  of  two  components,  namely,  the  right  to   be furnished with the grounds of detention and the right to  be afforded the earliest opportunity for making  representation against  the  detention  which  implies  the  right  to   be furnished  with  adequate  particulars  of  the  grounds  of detention  to  enable proper representation being  made  and then said (at p. 391) :-               "These     rights    involve     corresponding               obligations  on  the  part  of  the  detaining               authority.  It follows that the authority               (1) [1956] S.C.R. 382.               (2) [1951]  S.C.R. 167 at 178.                22               under  a constitutional obligation to  furnish               reasonably   definite  grounds,  as  well   as               adequate   particulars  then  and  there,   or               shortly  thereafter.   But the  right  of  the               detenu to be furnished particulars, is subject               to the limitation under article 22(6)  whereby               disclosure  of facts considered to be  against               public  interest  cannot be required.   It  is               however  to  be observed  that  under  article               22(6) the facts which cannot be required to be               disclosed  are  these  "which  such  authority               considers  to  be against public  interest  to               disclose." No  question of public interest is involved in the  case  in hand.   At  any rate, no such plea has been put  forward  in the,  return.   Whether we would have harkened to  any  such plea  in this case, if put forward, is another matter.   Any general  observations in that judgment will have to be  read in  the  light  of the  paramount  consideration  of  public interest involved therein. Nor  are  we satisfied that the fact  that  the  petitioners could  have asked for further particulars but that they  did not  do  so,  would  be enough  to  salvage  the  orders  of detention.   The,  right to call for  particulars  has  been recognized in Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya’s Case (1) as  flowing from  the constitutional right to be afforded  a  reasonable opportunity  to  make representation.  This  Court  said  in Lawrence  Joachim  Joseph  D’ Souza’s Case(2)  that  if  the grounds  are not sufficient to enable the detenu to  make  a representation,  the  detenu,  if  he  likes  may  ask   for particulars   which   would   enable   him   to   make   the representation  and  the  ?act  that he  had  made  no  such application  for  particulars is, a circumstance  which  may well  be taken into consideration, in deciding  whether  the grounds can be considered to be vague. If  a ground communicated to the detenu is vague,  the  fact that  the  detenu could have, but did not, ask  for  further particulars is immaterial.  That would be relevant only  for considering the question whether the ground is vague or not. In this view of the, matter, we do not think it necessary to consider   the   question  whether  the  disposal   of   the representations  by the Government was inordinately  delayed and for that reason the detention orders are vitiated.   Nor is  it  necessary  for us to  consider  the  other  question whether  the detaining authority did apply its mind  to  the other  grounds mentioned in the grounds communicated to  the

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petitioners. The facts of the cases might induce mournful reflection  how an  honest attempt by an authority charged with the duty  of taking  prophylactic  measure to secure the  maintenance  of supplies  and services essential to the community  has  been frustrated  by what is popularly called a  technical  error. We  say,  and we think it is necessary to repeat.  that  the gravity  of the evil to the community resulting  from  anti- social  activities can never furnish an adequate reason  for invading  the  personal  liberty of  a  citizen,  except  in accordance   with   the   procedure   established   by   the Constitution and the laws.  The history of personal  liberty is  largely  the  history of  insistence  on  observance  of procedure,.  Observance  of procedure has been  the  bastion against wanton assaults (1) [1951] S.C.R. 167. at 178. (2) [1956] S.C.R, 382. 23 on personal liberty over the years.  Under our Constitution, the only, guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure   established   by  law.   The  need   today   for maintenance  of  supplies  and  services  essential  to  the community  cannot  be  over-emphasized.  There  will  be  no social security without maintenance of adequate supplies and services essential to the community.  But social security is not the only goal of a good society.  There are other values in a society.  Our country is taking singular pride in  the, democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution and the most cherished  of  these ideals is personal liberty.   It  would indeed  be  ironic if, in. the name of social  security,  we would  sanction the subversion of this liberty.  We  do  not pause  to consider whether social security is more  precious than  personal  liberty  in the scale of  values,  for,  any judgment  as regards that would be but a value  judgment  on which opinions might differ.  But whatever be its impact  on the  maintenance of supplies and services essential  to  the community,’when  a  certain procedure is prescribed  by  the Constitution  or  the laws for depriving a  citizen  of  his personal  liberty,  we think it our duty to  see  that  that procedure is rigorously observed, however strange this might sound to some ears.      The  petitioners  are  entitled  to  be  released  from custody.  We make the    rule  nisi absolute and  order  the immediate release of the petitioners from    custody. BEG,  J. The petitioners Prabhu Dayal Deorah and  Raj  Kumar Deorah,  have filed separate petitions for writs  of  habeas corpus  and orders of release after investigating  questions raised  by them against their detention orders  dated  25-7- 1913 made following a Police raid on 25-7-1973 at the stores of  the  Deorah Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo  Road,  Gauhati. The  identically worded orders of the  District  Magistrate, Kamrup,  against them state that the detaining authority  is satisfied  that, with a view to preventing them from  acting in  a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies  and services essential to the community in the Kamrup  District, it  is necessary that they be detained at Gauhati Jail  with immediate effect until further orders.  The orders mentioned that  they are being passed under Section 3 (2) (a)  of  the Maintenance  of  Internal Security  Act,  1971  (hereinafter referred  to  as ’the Act).  The orders also  intimate  that grounds  of detention will be served on the  detenus  within five days. On 30-7-1973, soon after each petitioner had surrendered  in the  Court of a Magistrate on that very date,  the  District

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Magistrate,  Kamrup, sent the grounds of detention  to  each petitioner  with a letter informing the detenu of his  right to  make a representation against the order by which he  had been  detained  and  also  that he has a  right,  if  he  so desires,  to appear before the Advisory Board, to which  his case  would  be submitted within before thirty days  of  the detention. 24 Th  grounds of detention served upon Prabhu Dayal Deorah  on the afternoon of 30-7-1973 read as follows               "That  you, being one of the partners  and  in               the active management of M/s.  Deora Flour and               Rice   Mills,  Zoo  Road,  Gauhati  and   M/s.               Srinivas  Basudeo,  Fancy Bazar,  Gauhati  are               responsible for unauthorised milling of  paddy               in  M/s.   Deora Flour and Rice Mills  at  Zoo               Road,  Gauhati and smuggling of the  resultant               rice  to Meghalaya for earning  undue  profit.               You  are  also  responsible  for  unauthorised               hoarding of rice and sugar in the premises  of               M/s.  Deorah Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo  Road               and M/s.  Srinivas Basudeo at Fancy B@ for the               sole  purpose of selling these commodities  at               higher  prices  in  and  outside  Gauhati  for               profiteering.               That  on 25-7-73 the following  quantities  of               paddy and rice were unearthed and seized  from               your  unauthorised  possession  at  Zoo   Road               (Deora Flour and Rice Mills) premises.           1.    Sali Paddy               ...147               bags.           2.    Ahu Paddy                ...207               begs                         3.    Sali mota rice (Arua)    ...239               begs.           4.    Ahu rice                 .....8               bags.           5.    Joha rice                ..   15               bags.            That on 4-1-1972191   bags   of               sugar  were seized by the Supply officials  of               Gauhati  from your unauthorised possession  at               Messrs.    Srinivas  Basudeo,   Fancy   Bazar,               Gauhati.               That  on 16-5-72 the Supply  officials  seized               105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised               possession at Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy               Bazar, Gauhati.               That  you  indulged in such  trade  activities               which  created acute scarcity and high  prices               of rice and sugar in Gauhati market.               You  are, thus acting in a manner  prejudicial               to  the maintenance of supplies  and  services               essential to the community as a whole in  this               district  and your being at large has  jeopar-               dised  the  maintenance of such  supplies  and               services to the community.                               sd/- Illegible                                    30-7-72                               District Magistrate,                                    Kamrup". The  grounds of detention served on the, afternoon of  30-7- 1,973 upon Raj Kumar Deorah read as follows:               "That  you  being a close  associate  of  Shri               Prabhu  Dayar Deora S/o Late Basudev Deora  of

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             Zoo   Road.    Gauhati  and  in   the   active               management Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati,  are               responsible for unauthorised milling of paddy.               in Messrs.  Deora Flour and Rice Mills at  Zoo               Road, Gauhati, and smuggling of the  resultant               rice to Meghalaya for earning un-               25               due-profit.   You  are  also  responsible  for               unauthorised hoarding of rice and sugar in the               premises  of  Messrs.  Deora  Flour  and  Rice               Mills  at  Zoo  Road  and  Messrs.    Srinivas               Basudeo  at  ties  at  higher  prices  in  and               outside Gauhati for profiteering.               That  on 25-7-73 the following  quantities  of               paddy and rice were unearthed and seized  from               your  unauthorised  possession  at  Zoo   Road                             (Deora Flour and Rice Mills premises).               1.    Sali paddy                        ...147               bags.               2. Ahu paddy                     ...207 bags.               3.Sali Mota rice (Arua) ..239 bags.               4. Ahu rice                      ....8 bags.               5. Joha Rice                       ..15 bags.               That on 4-1-72, 191 bags of sugar were  seized               by  the supply officials of Gauhati from  your               unauthorised  possession at Messrs.   Srinivas               Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati.               That  on 16-5-72 the supply  officials  seized               105.03 quintals of rice from your unauthorised               possession at Messrs.  Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy               Bazar, Gauhati.               That  you  indulged in such  trade  activities               which  created acute scarcity and high  prices               of ’rice and sugar in Gauhati market.               You  arc, thus acting in a manner  prejudicial               to  the maintenance of supplies  and  services               essential to the community as a whole in  this               District and your being at large has jeopardi-               zed  the  maintenance  of  such  supplies  and               services to the community.                               Sd/-                                         District Magistrate                               Kamrup" On 5-8-1973, Prabhu Dayal Deorah sent his representation  to the  State  Government  through  the  Jail  authorities   of Gauhati.  He alleged in his Habeas Corpus petition dated 13- 8-1973  to this Court that his representation had  not  been disposed of by the State Government till then.  Apart  from complaining  that the grounds served upon him were so  vague and  devoid of particulars as to nullify his  constitutional right  of  making  a representation  against  the  order  of detention,  he also alleged that, as a criminal  prosecution had  commenced  against him on 28-7-1973,  for  the  alleged unauthorised  possession  of hoarded rice  on  25-7-1973,  a detention   order  against  him,  on  the  basis   of   this allegation,  was illegal as the charge against him could  be dealt  with in the course of the criminal prosecution.   The petitioner denied the correctness of the allegation that  he had hoarded rice in an unauthorised fashion.  He claimed  to have  the  authority. to keep the rice in  question  at  Zoo Road, Gauhati, on the ground:               "That the aforesaid Deorah Rice and Flour Mill               used  to  get paddy from Food  Corporation  of               India for the purpose                26

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             of milling and the said mill did rice  milling               job only as a licencee under the Rice  Milling               (Regulation) Act of paddy allotted by the Food               Corporation of India and given for the purpose               of milling by other authorised persons". As  regards 191 bags of sugar seized on 4-1-1972  from  M/s. Srinivas Basudeo, Fancy Bazar, Gauhati, of which also Prabhu Dayal  Deorah was a partner, the petitioner claimed that  it was covered by a licence (Annexure ’g’ to the petition), the annexed  copy  of  which showed that it  was  a  provisional licence  renewed on 27-3-1973 retrospectively for the  years 1971  and  1972.  Accordingly to the  detaining  authorities this  did  not prevent the possession of sugar  seized  from being  unauthorised at the time of its seizure.  As  regards 105.03  quintals of rice seized on 16-5-72,  the  petitioner denied "any seizure of rice from the unauthorised possession of  M/s.   Srinivas  Basudeo on 16-5-72F.   He  went  on  to explain that, as the firm had a licence for dealing in rice, the  possession  of it could not be unauthorised.   In  this way,  at least the seizure of rice was admitted,  but,  what was disputed was that its possession was unauthorised on 16- 5-72.   The reply of the detaining authorities, set  out  in the  affidavit of the Joint Secretary to the  Government  of Assam, was that there was no licence for this rice and  that this  was released only after a warning and directions  were given to the petitioner as to how it should be dealt with. Raj  Kumar  Deorah  had  denied  connection  with  both  the partnerships  mentioned above.  It is, however,  clear  from the  affidavit  filed  in reply that he  was  found  at  the premises at the time of the seizure on 25--7-1973.  He  also repeated the explanations given by Prabhu Dayal Deorah  such as that the rice was held on behalf of the Food  Corporation of India or of M/s.  P. K. Gogoi & Co., or "other authorised persons’.    The  detaining,  authorities  had   found   the allegations   to   be  false  after  contacting   the   Food Corporation  and M/s.  Gogoi & Co. It was also  revealed  by the  returns  made in this Court that the  petitioners,  who were present when the stores were raided, had run away  from the premises on one pretext or another and that nobody there could explain how the storage of all the rice found  boarded was  authorised.   The replies filed also  showed  that  the sources   of  the  total  quantities  seized  had   remained unexplained and that the quantities recovered were not shown to  be covered by required authority or licences  under  the law. The petitioners had tried to controvert the allegations made against  them  by  the  detaining  authority  but  had   not succeeded  in satisfying the Government of Assam  about  the correctness  of their stands either on questions of fact  or of  law  raised  by  them.   Their  lengthy  representations submitted  to  the Govt. on 6-8-1973 had  been  rejected  on 28-9-1973,  by the Govt. of Assam after due  inquiries  into allegations  made  by the petitioners.   Their  cases,  with their  representations, had been sent by the  Government  of Assam  to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9  of the Act.  The Advisory Board, before which the  petitioners’ cases are pending, had the jurisdiction to consider all  the contentions  of  the detentes on questions of fact  and  law arising  in  their cases.  The Board had to  report  to  the Government  within ten weeks from the date of detention  "as to whether there is or not 27 sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned". The recommendation of the Advisory Board to release a detenu was binding on the Government.

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The relevant provisions of the Act regulating the  procedure and, powers of the Board may be set out here:               "Sec.  10.  Reference to Advisory  Board.-Save               as  otherwise expressly provided in this  Act,               in every case where a detention order has been               made   under   this   Act,   the   appropriate               Government shall, within thirty days from  the               date  of  detention  under  the  order,  place               before  the Advisory Board constituted  by  it               under Section 9 the grounds on which the order               has been made and the representation, if  any,               made by the person affected by the order,  and               in  case where the order has been made  by  an               officer, also the report by such officer under               subsection (3) of Section 3.               11.   Procedure  of Advisory  Boards.-(1)  The               Advisory  Board  shall after  considering  the               materials placed before it and, after  calling               for  such  further  information  it  may  deem               necessary  from the appropriate Government  or               from any person called for the purpose through               the appropriate Government or from the  person               concerned, and if, in any particular case,  it               considers  it  essential so to do  or  if  the               person  concerned desires to be  heard,  after               hearing  him in person, submit its  report  to               the  appropriate Government within  ten  weeks               from the date of detention.               (2)   The, report of the Advisory Board  shall               specify  in  a  separate  part  thereof   the,               opinion  of the Advisory Board as to,  whether               or  not  there  is sufficient  cause  for  the               detention of the person concerned.               (3)   When  there is a difference, of  opinion               among the, members forming the Advisory Board,               the  opinion of the majority of  such  members               shall  be  deemed to be the  opinion.  of  the               Board.               (4)   Nothing  in this section  shall  entitle               any person against whom a detention order  has               been made to appear by any legal  practitioner               in any matter connected with the reference  to               the  Advisory Board, and the proceedings  of               the  Advisory Board and its report,  excepting               that part of the report in; which the  opinion               of  the Advisory Board is specified, shall  be               confidential.               12.   Action  upon  the  report  of   Advisory               Board.-(1)  In  any case  where  the  Advisory               Board  has  reported  that there.  is  in  its               opinion sufficient cause for the detention  of               a  person,.  the  appropriate  Government  may               confirm  the detention order and continue  the               detention  of  the person concerned  for  such               period as it thinks fit.               28               (2)   In any case where the Advisory Board has               reported  that  there  is in  its  opinion  no               sufficient  cause  for the  detention  of  the               person  concerned, the appropriate  Government               shall revoke the detention order  and  cause               the person to be released forth with". Three  contentions  have  been advanced  on  behalf  of  the petitioners  in an attempt to assail the legality  of  their detentions.   They are : firstly, that the grounds  are  too

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vague  and  indefinite  so that  the  detention  orders  are vitiated  particularly because the Constitutional  right  of making  an  effectual representation against  the  detention orders  is  defeated; secondly, that  there  was  inordinate delay in disposing of the representations of the petitioners which,  by  itself,  was enough  to  vitiate  the  continued detention of the petitioners; and, thirdly that the  detain- ing authorities had not applied their minds to the facts  of the cases with a view to determining the need for  detaining the  petitioners  for  preventing them from  acting  in  any manner  prejudicial  to  the "maintenance  of  supplies  and services  essential to the community".  I will take up  each of these three grounds seriatim. On the first question, there is considerable dispute between the two sides as to whether any ground is really vague.  The learned  Attorney  General  conceded  that  the  first   two paragraphs  of  the grounds would be vague if they  were  to constitute  separate  grounds and were to be  considered  in isolation from the succeeding paragraphs giving particulars. This,  however, is not, according to the  Attorney  General, the  correct  way of reading the document  constituting  the grounds with their particulars.  It is submitted that it  is obvious  that the first two sentences are conclusions  based upon the particulars of recoveries made from the premises of M/s.  Deorah Flour and Rice Mills at Zoo Road, Gauhati,  and of  M/s.   Srinivas Basudeo at Fancy  Bazar,  Gauhati.   The alleged  responsibility of the petitioners for smuggling  to Meghalaya, where it was being sold at higher rates, was said to  be nothing more than a reasonable inference from  patent facts,   Similarly,  the  last  two   paragraphs,   alleging indulgence  in "trade activities which created scarcity  and high  prices  of rice and sugar in Gauhati Market"  and  the prejudice  caused  to  the  "maintenance  of  supplies   and services  essential  to  the community as a  whole  in  this district"  and  the effect of leaving  the  petitioners  "at large"  are  said to be inferences and  forecasts  resulting from  particulars  of recoveries of rice and sugar  said  to have  been  found boarded in an unauthorised manner  at  the times  and.  places shown there.  The three dates  on  which recoveries  of hoarded sugar and rice were made, that is  to say,  4-1-1972, 16-5-1972, and 25-7-1973, were stated.   The places from which the recoveries were made ,ire also clearly specified.   The quantities of rice and sugar  recovered  on each occasion are given.  So far as the recovery of rice  on 25-7-1973 is concerned, the five qualities of rice recovered are also mentioned.  It was this particular, about qualities of  rice which made it possible to say that no part  of  the rice  recovered  could  be a part  of  "Winter  Lahi  Paddy" allotted  to  the Deorah Flour and Rice Mills  by  the  Food ’Corporation of India at Gauhati. It has been very fairly and properly conceded by the learned Counsel for petitioners that seriously disputed questions of fact cannot be 29 Properly  decided by this Court upon a writ  petition  under Article  32 of the Constitution.  Moreover, it  lies  within the  power  and  province of the  detaining  authorities  to investigate and consider the correctness of the explanations given by the detenus of the recoveries made.  It is apparent that they have not accepted the versions of the  petitioners either  about the sources of supplies of the  quantities  of sugar  and  rice shown to have been recovered or  about  the alleged  authority. or licence possessed by the  petitioners at  the times when the recoveries were made.  They had  also not  accepted the correctness of the assertion of Raj  Kumar

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Deorah  that he had nothing to do with the  two  partnership firms involved.  We are unable, upon the materials on record and  in the proceedings before us now, to declare  that  the allegations  constituting  the  grounds  of  detention   are baseless.   Nor doe,-, that really fall within our  province to determine.  We can, however, go into the question whether the grounds are so vague as to disable the petitioners  from making  effective  representations  against  the   detention orders or otherwise vitiate the detention orders. If we accept the interpretation put by the Attorney  General upon the grounds of detention, they could not be said to  be vague although they could be said to be badly drafted.   The sentences  at the beginning and end of the document  stating the   grounds  in  each  case  apparently   constitute   the conclusions or inferences reached from the particulars given in  the body. of the document.  I do not see why  the  basic principle that a document,, in order to correctly understand its  meaning, should be read as whole should not be  applied here.  After perusing the copies of the lengthy explanations submitted by the petitioners to the Government, where, after asserting  that  they  were unable to,  understand  or  make representations against the grounds of detention, because of vagueness,  they proceed to refute the allegations  of  fact contained  in the particulars of the recoveries made, it  is difficult  to see how the petitioner were really  prejudiced by  the  alleged  vagueness or infirmity  in’  drafting  the grounds, Assuming,   however,  that  there  was  some  infirmity   or vagueness  in  some parts of the  documents  containing  the grounds,  can  it be said that it was of such a kind  as  to vitiate  the  detention orders?  This Court,  following  the principles  laid down in Keshav, Talpade v. Emperor,(1)  has held  in  some cases that even if some of the  grounds  ,ire vague the detention is vitiated.  I am, respectfully, unable to concur with this view. The  principle laid down in Talpade’s case (Supra) was  with reference to grounds, some of which were good and the others extraneous  to  the purposes for which  detention  could  be ordered.   Moreover,  there  was  no  question  there  of  a scrutiny  of  grounds  by  an  Advisory  Board  which  could separate the good from the bad.               The Federal Court said (at page 8)               "If  a detaining authority gives four  reasons               for  detaining a man,  without  distinguishing               between them, and any two               (1)   A.I.R. [1943] F.C. p. 1 and p. 8.               30               or three of the reasons are held to be bad, it               can  never be certain to what extent  the  bad               reasons operated on the mind of the  authority               or whether the detention order would have been               made  at all if only one or two  good  reasons               had been before them. The  cases  cited  before us to contend  that  vagueness  of grounds  given for detention would vitiate detention  orders were,:  Dr.  Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State  of  Delhi  & Ors.(1) Motilal fain v. State, of Bihar & Ors.;(2) Mishrilal fain v. the District Magistrate, Kamrup & Ors.(3)  Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. State of Bihar;(4) and the State of Bombay v. Alma Ram Sridhar Vaidya.(5). In Vaidya’s case (Supra) the Bombay High Court had allowed a Habeas Corpus petition because the grounds did not give  the time, place, and nature of the activities indulged  in  by the  petitioner so that his right to make  a  representation was defeated, although, the Bombay High Court had also  held

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that  the particulars, which were subsequently  supplied  to the  detenu  by the Commissioner of Police, were  enough  to enable him to make an effective representation.  A Bench  of five  Judges  of  this Court held that  there  had  been  no contravention   of  the  constitutional  right  to  make   a representation.  It was explained there that grounds  which have to be communicated to the detenu were conclusions  from facts,  constituting particulars, all of which need  not  be conveyed  to  the detenu  simultaneously.   The  particulars supplied subsequently were enough to remove the  uncertainty from  the  grounds.  If what may appear vague  can  be  made definite by supplying particulars afterwards,  it  follows that, a fortiori vagueness in the earlier ,or any other part of a document may be removed by the particulars contained in the remaining parts of the very document containing grounds. It  was also held by this Court in Lawrence  Joachim  Joseph Disouza  v.  The State of Bombay.(6) that the detenu  has  a right  to  call  for particulars.  This  implied  that  mere alleged   vagueness   of   grounds   or   insufficiency   of particulars, without calling upon the detaining authority to remedy this defect, may not be enough to vitiate a detention order. In Rameshwar Lal Patwari’s case (Supra) reliance was  placed on  Shibban  Lal  Saksena v.State  of  U.P.,(7)  and  Keshav Talpade- v. King Emperor’s case (Supra), but all the grounds were found to be vitiated.  It was held after examining  one ground after another page 514) :               "In this case at least two grounds are  vague,               one  ground  is found to be false and  of  the               remaining  in one there is no explanation  and               in  the other there is a lame excuse that  the               driver  of the truck did not furnish the  full               information.               (1) [1953] S.C.R. p. 708.(2) 119681(3) S.C.R.               p. 587               (3) [1971](3) S.C.CI p. 693.(4)   [1968](2)               S.C.R. 505.               (5) [1951] S.C.R. 167,           (6)    [1956]               S.C.R. p 382               (7)   [1954] S.C.R. 418,               31               The  case is thus covered by our  ruling  that               where some grounds arc found to be nonexisting               or  are cancelled or given up,  the  detention               cannot be justified.  It is further covered by               our  decisions  that if the  grounds  are  not               sufficiently precise and do not famish details               for   the   purpose   of   making    effective               representation  the  detention  can  be  ques-               tioned". Similarly,  in Mishrilal Jain’s case (Supra), although  each of  the  two  grounds was found to be vague,  it  was  held, relying  upon  the cases of Rameshwar Lal  Patwari  (Supra), Pushkar  Mukherjee  & Ors. v. State of West  Bengal(1),  aid Motilal  Jain’s  case  (Supra), and  Keshav  Talpade’s  case (Supra), that, even if one of the two grounds was vague,  it would vitiate the detention.  It was noticed, in this  case, that  the  petitioner’s  contention  was  that  he  had   no effective opportunity of making a representation because the grounds  were  vague.   His complaint to  the  Govt.,  which included the grievance that the grounds were vague, had been rejected. In Motilal Jain’s case (Supra), after examining the  various cases  decided  by this Court, Bench of six Judges  of  this Court  held  that  the  grounds  under  consideration  there

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included  one, ground which was vague and another which  was non-existent with the result that the detenu did not get  an effective  opportunity to satisfy the Advisory  Board  about the insufficiency of the grounds of detention. In  Dr.  Ram Krishan Bhardwaj’s case (Supra),  a  detention, under.   Section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act of  1952, was  held  to  be vitiated on the ground  that  one  of  the grounds  was vague so that his constitutional safeguard,  by getting  an opportunity of making a  representation  against his detention had been impaired.  This was a decision  under the provisions of an enactment of 1952. In none of the cases cited before us was the question raised or   decided  whether,  in  a  case  where   representations including those against vagueness of grounds, were made  and were pending before an Advisory Board, which had full  power to consider all objections on questions of fact and law  and to reject any particular ground or grounds for vagueness  or irrelevance  and  to  recommend  appropriate  action   after considering   whether   the  residue  was   sufficient   for detention,  the  detenu could be held to  have  been  really deprived of the right to make a  representation.  It is true that  the  detenu  has a right under Article  22(5)  of  the Constitution  to  be afforded the  earliest  opportunity  of making a representation against the order.  That opportunity had been afforded to the detenus before us and they had made representations  which included the grievance that  some  of the  grounds  were so vague and indefinite so as not  to  be intelligible. With  great  respect for the views of my  learned  brethren, with  which  I regretfully differ, it seems to me  that  the question  whether  a  detenu  was  or  was  not  given   due opportunity  of  making an effective  representation,  in  a particular case, is largely a question of fact which must (1)  [1969] (2) S.C.R. 635. 32 be decided after taking into account the totality of  facts. It cannot be satisfactorily decided by merely looking at the grounds of detention in every case.  There can be no  really binding  authority unless some principle is laid down  on  a question  which  has  to  be  determined  primarily  on  the particular facts of each case. The Advisory Board is given ten weeks’ time from the date of detention,  by  provisions  of Section 11(1),  to  make  its report.   The  validity  of  Section  11(1)  has  not   been challenged before us on the ground of conflict with  Article 22(5).   The right of being afforded the  earliest  possible opportunity of making a representation is one thing and  the right  of having it considered and decided within  a  parti- cular  time  is  another.   But, the  right  of  making  the representation  cannot  be construed so unreasonably  as  to practically   demolish  the  unchallenged  power,  under   a constitutionally valid statutory provision, to consider  and decide the objections contained in a representation.   There may  be, occasionally, cases where the grounds of  detention may,  prima  facie, show that the detention  is  invalid  or ordered  for some collateral purpose in excess of  power  to detain,  or;  the facts indicating denial of  the  right  of making  an  effective representation may be  so  patent  and clear  that  it would be an unnecessary prolongation  of  an illegal  detention to wait for the opinion of  the  Advisory Board.  Such cases would, however, be exceptional. When  the  Advisory Board has full power to  consider  every kind   of  representation  against  grounds  of   detention, including  a  grievance that any grounds are  too  vague  or indefinite to be understood or to enable a detenu to make an

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effective representation, the detenue should ordinarily wait at  least  until the report has been made  by  the  Advisory Board  before  complaints that he has been really.  deprived of  any right under the Act.  If the provisions  of  Section 11(1)  of the Art ,ire valid he could not complain  that  he has   been  denied  a  constitutional  right  of  making   a representation merely because his case could remain  pending for decision before an Advisory Board for ten weeks.   More- over,  that is not a ground for assailing either of the  two detentions before us. As  the matter is pending before the Advisory Board,  it  is not  really  necessary for us to give a  definite  or  final opinion on the question whether any of the grounds  supplied to  the petitioners is vague.  I also think that it  is  not necessary to give a decision, at this stage, on the  correct interpretation  to be placed upon the grounds of  detention. I will content myself by indicating the lines on which cases like the ones before us should be decided. I  may mention here two cases cited by the Attorney  General to  submit how the grounds supplied may be interpreted.   In Naresh  Chandra  Ganguli  v.  The State  of  West  Bengal  & Ors.,(1)  a  distinction  was made between  the  objects  of detention, which sometimes find a place in grounds, and  the particulars  which  contain facts on which the  grounds  are based.  It was held here that the grounds., read in the 1)   [1960] (1) S.C.R. 411. 33 context  of  particulars supplied, were  neither  vague  nor irrelevant.   In  Lawrence  Joachim  Joseph  DSouza’s   case (Supra),  it was held that, having regard to the  nature  of the activity for which preventive detention was ordered,  no better particulars could be given. It has to be borne in mind that preventive detention is  not punitive  detention.   Hence,  the mere  fact  that  a  past occurrence, used for forecasting probable future conduct  of the   detenu,  could  also  be  the  subject  matter  of   a prosecution for an offence, would not affect the validity of preventive detention. Preventive  detention orders involve forecasts,  in  general terms,  based  on past conduct of which particulars  can  be given.  It is certainly not possible to give particulars  of future anticipated conduct.  All that can be done is to give a statement of an apprehension in the form of grounds as  to what  the  detenu  is likely to do,  having  regard  to  the particulars  of past activities which may be given, so  that preventive  detention, for one of the purposes for which  it can  be, ordered, is shown to have become necessary  in  his case.   The grounds and particulars must necessarily have  a rational nexus with these purposes, or, in other words, must be relevant. One  of  the questions argued was whether the  reference  to recovery  of sugar so long ago as 4-1-1972 did  not  vitiate the  detention order on the ground of its  irrelevance.   In reply , reliance was placed upon two decisions of this Court where  it was held that mere references to  past  activities would  not  vitiate  a  detention  order  as  that  is   not irrelevant in forecasting future conduct.  These cases  were : Bhim Sen Vs.  State of Punjab, (1) and Rameshwar Shaw  Vs. District Magistrate, Burdwan & Anr.(2) The  recovery  of 199 bags of sugar on 4-1-1972 was  not  so remote  as  to  be considered  irrelevant,  particularly  as hoarded  rice  was also recovered on  16-5-1972,  and  then, finally, came the discovery of hoarded rice on 25-7-1973. it is this chain of events which, considered together,  enabled the detaining authorities to form a reasonable  apprehension

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as to the future conduct of the detenus. A  distinction  between grounds which are merely  vague  and those  which are extraneous or irrelevant often tends to  be over-looked.   Particulars of vague grounds can be, as  seen already, supplied even later so as to show that the  grounds were  justified.  If not supplied, the detenu can  also  ask for them.  But no amount of particulars of it would cure the defect of a ground given which is extraneous to the purposes for  which  preventive detention may be ordered.   Any  such ground  would vitiate the detention order at its  inception. At any rate, this Court could not separate the extraneous or irrelevant ground from the proper and the relevant ones.  it could  only  order the-release of detenu  because  something extraneous  to the legally authorised objects  of  detention had also affected the decision to detain. (1) [1952] S.C.R. 18. (2)  [1964] (4) S.C.R. 921. -L447Sup.Cl/74 34 In  Tarapade  De & Ors. v. the State of West Bengal,  (1)  a Bench of five Judges of this Court explained the distinction between  the vague grounds and irrelevant grounds  and  said that they do not stand on the same footing.  It Said at page 218-219) :               "We  are unable to accept the contention  that               ’vague  grounds’ stand on the same footing  as               ’irrelevant  grounds’.  An  irrelevant  ground               has no connection at all with the satisfaction               of  the Provincial Government which makes  the               order of detention.  For the reasons stated in               that judgment we are also unable to accept the               contention  that if the grounds are vague  and               no representation is possible there can be  no               satisfaction  of  the  authority  as  required               under  Section 3 of the  Preventive  Detention               Act.  This argument mixes up two objects.  The               sufficiency  of the grounds, which gives  rise               to   the   satisfaction  of   the   Provincial               Government, is not a matter for examination by               the Court.  The sufficiency of the grounds  to               give   the  detained  person   the,   earliest               opportunity  to make a representation  can  be               examined  by  the court, but  only  from  that               point  of  view.  We are therefore  unable  to               accept  the  contention that the  quality  and               characteristic  of the grounds should  be  the               same  for  both  tests.  On  the  question  of               satisfaction,  as has been often  stated,  one               person  may  be,  but  another  may  not   be,               satisfied  on the same grounds.   That  aspect               however  is not for the determination  of  the               court, having regard to the words used in  the               Act.   The  second  part  of  the  enquiry  is               clearly open to the court under article 22(5).               We are therefore unable to accept the argument               that  if  the grounds are  not  sufficient  or               adequate  for  making the  representation  the               grounds   cannot   be   sufficient   for   the               subjective satisfaction of the authority". It,  however, seems to me that whether some of  the  grounds are  merely  vague or are irrelevant and extraneous  to  the purposes  of the, Act, the detenu can make a  representation against them in such a way that it may be considered by  the Advisory  Board.  The Advisory Board has full  jurisdiction- to  declare a detention invalid or to recommend that,  after

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excluding  what  may be vague or irrelevant,  the  detention should  continue.  So far as the Courts  considering  Habeas Corpus  petitions  are  concerned, they  cannot  enter  into sufficiency of grounds for detention.  They can only declare the  detention  vitiated  on the ground  that  some  of  the grounds  supplied  are irrelevant or are so  vague  that  no effective representation is possible against them.  In those cases  where detention is vitiated because particulars  were not   supplied   at   the   earliest   reasonably   possible opportunity,  so  that  the  right of a  detenu  to  make  a representation  is  held  to be defeated  and  on  no  other ground,  the  detention  would, strictly  speaking,  not  be vitiated  ab initio, but, it would become illegal only  from the  time when the infringement of the right  to  sufficient particulars  to  make a representation  takes  place.   This takes  us  to  the question whether  the  alleged  delay  in considering the petitioners’ representations was suffi- (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 212 @ 218-219 35 cient   to  vitiate  their  detentions  on  the  ground   of infringement   of   their  constitutional  right   to   make representations against them. In support of the second ground of attack-that the period of nearly  three  weeks  taken by the Govt.  in  rejecting  the petitioners  representations  was so long as to  defeat  the right of petitioners to make a representation-the  decisions cited  before us on-behalf of the petitioners were  :  Babul Mitra  v.  State of West Bengal &  Ors.,(1)  Khaiden  Ibocha Singh  etc. v. State of Manipur.(2) On the other  hand,  the learned Attorney General has relied on Deonarayan Mondal  v. State of West Bengal(3) in which it was held that where  the Govt.  has  satisfactorily  explained  the  time  taken   in considering the detenue’s representation, there could not be said  to  be an undue delay which defeated the  right  of  a detenu to make a representation. In the cases before us, there is no complaint that the Govt. had  not forwarded the petitioners’ representations  to  the Advisory Board within a reasonable time or that the Advisory Board  had taken an unduly long time over  the  petitioners, cases.   As already indicated above, the Advisory  Board  is given  ten  weeks’ time, under Section 1 1 (1) of  the  Act, within which to make the report on a detenu’s case.  If this provision is valid (it may be repeated that its validity  is not  challenged  here), it could not be said that  there  is under  delay in deciding a case if there is no  infringement of this provision.  And, if there is an infringement of this provision in a case that would provide an independent ground for invalidating the detention. The  only grievance of the petitioners id, this  respect  is that  the Govt. had deprived them of their rights of  making representations  because  it took too long to  reject  their representations  on 28-8-1973 during the pendency  of  their petitions in this Court.  Copies of their representations to the  Govt.  filed by the petitioners show  that,  they  have disputed  every single fact, alleged illness,  absence  from Gauhati,  given  names  of persons from whom  the  rice  was alleged-to have come, set up possession of licences to cover the  quantities recovered in addition to taking the plea  of the  vagueness  of the grounds of detention.  The  Govt.  of Assam  would  naturally  take sometime to  verify  the  cor- rectness of the allegations of fact made by the petitioners. I find that the affidavits filed on behalf of the Govt. have sufficiently explained the delay. Coming  to  the last and third ground of  attack,  that  the detaining  authorities  had not applied their minds  to  the

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facts of the petitioners’ cases, the basis of this attack is two  fold : firstly, that the allegations made  against  the petitioners were not true; secondly, that the Govt. of Assam had taken nearly three weeks to verify the details, so  that it  must  be presumed that they were not  there  before  the detention was ordered. As  regards the first of the two grounds, I have  to  repeat that  it is not for this Court to consider, as a  rule,  the correctness or otherwise of the assertions made on questions of fact in the returns field.  The (1) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 197.  (2) [1973] (1) S.C.R. 1022. (3) A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1353. 36 matter is still pending before the Advisory Board which  can examine  them.   We cannot, by holding  that  the  detaining authorities  had  come to some incorrect  conclusion,  infer that  they  must  have failed to apply their  minds  to  the allegations  made  and  facts  ascertained  by  them.    The detailed affidavits filed in reply show that they had  fully applied their minds to the conflicting versions on questions of  fact.   As regards the second ground, it  is  enough  to point  out that the Govt. of Assam could not be presumed  to be in possession of all the, facts taken into account by the detaining officer.  The detaining officer had not  consulted the  Govt. of Assam before ordering  detention.   Therefore, the  reasonable time taken by the Govt. of Assam  in  making enquiries  only  shows  that  it took  care  to  verify  the correctness  of allegations made by the petitioners, or,  in other  words, that it really applied its mind to the,  facts of their cases. As  the  petitioners’  cases are still  pending  before  the Advisory Board, I think we ought to observe that any opinion which we may have expressed, in the course of discussion  of matters  argued before us, on questions pending  before  the Advisory Board, would not preclude the Board from going into either questions of fact or of law raised by the petitioners before the Advisory Board All that we could and should  hold here  is  that  the  petitioners  have  not  established  an infringement  of  their constitutional right  under  Article 22(5)  to  be afforded the earliest  opportunity  of  making effective representations against their detention orders  on the facts of the cases before us.  They have, in fact,  made representations,  including those against alleged  vagueness of  some  grounds, to the Advisory Board.   Power  has  been expressly  ,given to the Board by Section 1 1 ( 1 )  of  the Act,  to can for further information, even suo  moto,.  from the  appropriate Government, if it deems it necessary to  do so.   The  whole opinion of the Board  is  not  confidential under  Section 11(4) of the Act.  The effectiveness  of  the representations  made by the detenues could only  be  guaged after the Advisory Board has given its opinion. The question whether the grounds of detention show that  the detention is ab initio illegal must, it seems to me, be kept distinct  from  the question whether they are so  vague  and devoid of particulars as to amount to a denial of the  right to   make  an  effective  representation  at  the   earliest opportunity.   The  totality of relevant facts  and  circum- stances of each case must be taken into account to determine whether the opportunity of effective representation has been denied.  The alleged vagueness or want of particulars,  must be  viewed  in  the  context of  the  nature  of  activities alleged, the substance of the allegations made, the contents of actual representations made, and, last but not the least, the effect they have actually produced.  And, in considering the  last  mentioned question, the, fact that  the  case  is

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still  under consideration, within the legally fixed  period of  ten weeks from the detention, before an Advisory  Board, which  has  full power and jurisdiction  to  eliminate  some grounds as vague or wanting in particulars and to  determine the sufficiency or otherwise of the rest of the grounds  and particulars supplied, cannot be ignored. if matters in dispute, including disputed questions of fact, relating  to the validity of a detention had necessarily  to be determined in this 37 Court  whenever  a Habeas Corpus petition is  filed,  it  is difficult to see why the principle could not be extended so that an under trial prisoner, charged with the commission of an offence, could insist that the, question of his innocence or  guilt  be tried and determined by  this  Court  directly pending his trial by a court of competent jurisdiction.   In a   case  of  preventive  detention  where  fairly   triable questions  of fact or law, which can be  more  appropriately gone  into  and decided by an Advisory  Board,  are  pending before  the  Board,  the petition  should  be  dismissed  as premature barring very exceptional circumstances as  already indicated above. I In Halsbury’s "Law of England (1111 Edn. (Vol. II) p. 46), wefind :               "Although the Habeas Corpus Act, 1816, enables               the  return  to be controverted, and  a  total               absence of jurisdiction, or matters in  excess               of jurisdiction, may be alleged and proved  by               affidavit,  facts alleged on the return  which               were within the jurisdiction of a court cannot               be controverted".               I  find  that the petitioners before  us  have               neither proved an excess of power to detain on               grounds alleged against them nor that their ed               by  affidavit,  facts alleged  on  the  return               which were within the jurisdiction of a  court               cannot be controverted". No  doubt  this Court must zealously  protect  the  personal freedom  of citizens against arbitrary  or  unconstitutional invasions of it by executive authorities.  But, it does  not appear  to  me  to be necessary, in order  to  do  that,  to stultify  what  is,  in some respects,  the  more  effective method  of  consideration of the whole case by  an  Advisory Board  which  could  consider  sufficiency  of  grounds   of detention.  In this respect the Board could do more than  we could  ordinarily  do  in  exercise  of  our  writ   issuing jurisdiction.  To allow the legally prescribed procedure for protection  of  personal  liberty  to,  operate  freely  and consistently with the social interests preventive  detention is  meant  to safeguard appears to be the path  of  judicial wisdom. A  Habeas  Corpus proceeding should test the legality  of  a detention  and  not  the draftsmanship of  the  officer  who passes  a  detention  order  or sends  the  grounds  of  his satisfaction.  Even if some of the grounds of detention  are vague  but  others could reasonably  satisfy  the  detaining authority that, to prevent much greater apprehended harm  to social   good   from  the  anti-social  activities   of   an individual,  his  preventive detention  is  imperative,  the sufficiency of the remaining of detention should be  allowed to be determined by those charged with the duty to  consider this  question.   We  cannot  indirectly  do  what  we  have repeatedly  held  to be not possible for this  Court  to  do directly,  or,  in other words, we should not  undertake  to determine what is, really and substantially only a  question

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of sufficiency of grounds of detention. Some  vagueness  seems  often  unavoidable  and  can  almost invariably  be  discovered if we search assiduously  for  it among  grounds of satisfaction relating to future course  of conduct of an individual about which the detaining authority has to attempt a reasonable and honest 38 forecast.  It is only where a vagueness or indefiniteness is disclosed which either makes the satisfaction quite illusory and  unreasonable  or which really disables  a  detenu  from making  an  effective  representation that  a  detention  is vitiated  on such a ground.  I am not at all satisfied  that this is the position in the case before us. The consequence of the views held and expressed by me  above is that I would dismiss these writ petitions.                            ORDER In  view  of the majority judgment, the rule  nisi  is  made absolute.    We  direct  the  immediate,  release   of   the petitioners from custody. V.P.S. 39