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PETITIONER: POLLISETTI PULLAMMA AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KALLURI RAMESWARAMMA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/10/1990

BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) BENCH: SAIKIA, K.N. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1991 AIR  604            1990 SCR  Supl. (2) 393  JT 1990 (4)   293        1990 SCALE  (2)883

ACT:     Andhra  Pradesh  (Andhra Area)  Estates  (Abolition  and Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act, 1948: Sections  3(10)(b)(i), 15--Inam  Village --How determined--Private lands--Proof  of personal cultivation--Whether necessary.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellants are the tenants and the respondents  are the  landholders  in respect of  the  tenanted  agricultural lands  of the hitherto inam estates. After the  coming  into force of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and  Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948. the  inam  estates were abolished, the land stood vested in the Government free of all encumbrances, and the pre-existing rights, title  and interest  of  erstwhile landholders ceased except  to  claim ryotwari patta.     The respondents--landholders claimed that the lands,  in question,  were either under their personal  cultivation  or they  intended to resume those for private cultivation,  and as  such those were their private lands and they were  enti- tled  to  ryotwari pattas. The  appellants--tenants  on  the contrary  claimed  that those lands were neither  under  the personal  cultivation of the landholders nor  the  landlords intended to resume those for personal cultivation, but  were in  possession of the tenants who were entitled to  ryotwari pattas after the abolition of the estates.     The  Settlement  Officer,  after  making  inquiry  under section  15  of  the Estates Abolition Act,  held  that  the landholders  failed to establish that they  were  personally cultivating  the lands or that they intended to  resume  the lands  for personal cultivation, and as such rejected  their claims.     The landholders’ appeals to the Estates Abolition Tribu- nal  were  allowed. The Tribunal held that  the  landholders were  entitled to the grant of ryotwari pattas as the  lands were   private  lands  within  the  meaning  of  section   3 (10)(b)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates  Land Act, 1908 and that the tenants were not entitled to ryotwari pattas in respect of the same. 394     The appellants--tenants moved writ petitions before  the High  Court. The learned Single Judge observed that  it  was

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common  ground before the Subordinate Tribunal, as  well  as before  him, that the nature of the lands at the  inception, whether ryoti or private, was not known; that the burden  of establishing  that the lands were private lands was  on  the landholders;  and that it was also common ground before  him that apart from the fact that there were occasional  changes of  tenants,  and  the lands  were  sometimes  leased  under short-term  leases, there were no other circumstances  indi- cating  that the landholders intended to resume  cultivation of  the lands. The learned Single Judge held that after  the pronouncement  of  this  Court in  Chidambaram  Chettiar  v. Santhanaramaswamy  Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR 764 the decision  of the  Full  Bench of the Madras High Court  in  Periannan  v. Amman  Kovil,  AIR 1952 Mad. 323 (F.B.) could no  longer  be considered  good law, and further that the decision in  Jag- deesam Pillai v. Kuppammal, ILR 1946 Mad. 687 and in  Perish Priest of Narayar v. Thingaraja Swami Devasthanam, App. Nos. 176-178  and 493 of 1946, once more held the field.  It  was also  observed that since in all the cases the only mode  of proof  attempted by the landholders was the grant of  short- term leases and change of tenants and rent, it must be  held that the lands were not established to be private lands  and that  no attempt was made to prove personal  cultivation  or any intention to resume personal cultivation.     The  Division Bench, in writ appeals filed by the  land- holders, held that, in the first place, the observations  of this  Court  in Chidambaram’s case were in accord  with  the rule in Periannan’s case, and secondly, even if some of  the dicta in the judgment of this Court in Chidambaram suggested a contrary principle, the effect of the entire  observations did  not  support the contention that Periannan’s  case  had been impliedly overruled by this Court.      Before  this  Court,  it was inter  alia  contended  on behalf of the appellants-tenants (i) that the learned Single Judge  having found as fact that the landholders had  failed to  establish  that the lands were their  private  lands  as these were neither under their personal cultivation nor they were  intended to be resumed for personal  cultivation,  and applying the rule in Chidambaram’s case, the learned  Single Judge having held that the lands were not private lands, the Division  Bench erred in holding to the contrary; (ii)  that the  learned Single Judge correctly held  that  Perriannan’s case  was no longer good law as in Chidambaram  Chettiar  v. Santhanaramaswamy Odayar, it was held that the definition of private land in section 3(10) of the Estate Land Act of 1908 read as a whole indicated clearly that the ordinary test for private land was the 395 test of retention by the landholder for his own personal use and  cultivation by him or under his  personal  supervision, though they might be let on short leases; (iii) that it  was not  the  intention  or the scheme of the Act  to  treat  as private those lands with reference to which the only  pecul- iarity  was  the  fact that the landholder  owned  both  the varams  in the land and had been letting them out  on  short leases;  and (iv) that the Division Bench erred  in  holding that Periannan’s tests were still applicable.     On  the  other hand, it was contended that  the  correct tests  for determining what was private land had  been  laid down  in  Periannan’s case, which were  not  different  from those of Chidambaram’s case, and the Division Bench correct- ly  applied those tests to find that the lands were  private lands of the landholders.     Allowing the appeals, setting aside the judgment of  the Division  Bench,  and restoring that of the  learned  Single

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Judge, this Court,     HELD:  (1) To find out whether a village was  designated as inam village or not, prima facie the revenue accounts  of the  Government  which were there at the time  of  the  Inam Abolition  Act came into force had to be looked into. If  it was so shown, no further proof was necessary. Only when  the entries  in the revenue accounts were ambiguous, and it  was not  possible to come to a definite conclusion, it might  be necessary  to  consider other relevant  evidence  which  was admissible under the Evidence Act. [406H; 407A-B]     (2)  An interpretation of the words "private  land"  and "ryoti land" had to be made in consonance with the  legisla- tive purpose, provisions and scheme of the enactment. Inter- pretare  at Concordare leges legibus, est optimus  interpre- tundi modus. To interpret and in such a way as to  harmonize laws with laws in the best mode of interpretation. [410E]     (3) The Estate Abolition Act accepted the definitions of occupancy right and ryoti as in the Estates Land Act,  1908. The  above  provisions conferred  permanent,  heritable  and transferable  right of occupancy on the Tenant.  This  right stemmed  from  the will of the legislature and  involved  an element  of social engineering through law star pro  rationa voluntas  populi: the will of the people stands in place  of reason. The right of the landholder to keep his private land to  himself  has therefore to be interpreted in  its  proper perspective. Statuta pro publico late interpretaur.  Statute made  for the public good ought to be  liberally  construed. [425E-F] 396     (4)  The  concept of past or present  intention  of  the landholder to resume personal cultivation of land let out to a  tenant  and still in possession of the tenant has  to  be strictly  construed  against the landlord and  liberally  in favour of the tenant. [425E]       The  learned Single Judge in the instant case  rightly observed that the legislature did not use the word domain or home-farm  land without attaching to them a meaning, and  it was  reasonable to suppose that they would attach  to  those words  the meaning which would be given to them in  ordinary English, namely, to connote land appurtenant to the  mansion of  the lord of the manor kept by the lord for his  personal use  and cultivated under his personal supervision  is  dis- tinct  from  land  let to tenant to be  farmed  without  any control  from the lord of the manor other than such  control as  incident to the lease. To that extent, the  propositions of  the learned Judges in Periannan’s case can no longer  be held  to  be good law in view of this Court’s  decisions  in Chidambaram’s case and Venkataswami’s case, and the decision in Zamindar of Challapali v. Rajalapati/Jagadesan Pillai  v. Kuppamal, and in Parish Priest of Karayar Perish v.  Thiapa- rajaswami  Devasthanam mast be held to have  been  correctly decided. [421C-E]     Zamindar  of Chellapalli v. Rajalapato Somayya, 39  Mad. 341;  Jagadeesam  Pillai  v. Kuppamal, ILR  1946  Mad.  687; Parish Priest of Karayar Parish v. Thiagarajaswami Devastha- nam,  App. Nos. 176-178 & 493 of 1946; Chidambaram  Chettiar v.  Santhanaramaswamy Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR  754;  Yerlagadda Malikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya, ILR 42 Mad. 400 PC; P. Venkataswami v.D.S. Ramireddy, [1976] 3 SCC 665;  Suryanara- yana v. Patanna, [1918] 41 ILR Mad. 1012, referred to.     Periannan v. Amman Kovil, AIR 1952 Mad. 323 F.B.  partly overruled.     (6) In the instant case the pattas and the muchilkas are not claimed to have shown anything to establish the lands to be  private  lands. Only the facts of occasional  change  of

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tenants and rents have been shown. [431B]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal  Nos.  152, 153, 155,156, 158, 160 and 162 of 1972.     From  the  Judgment and Order dated 20.11. 1970  of  the Andhra  Pradesh High Court in W.A. No. 616 of 1969.  103  of 1970, 472 397 of 1970,474 of 1970,473 of 1970,99of 1970 and W.P. No.  4947 of 1968. G. Venkatesh Rao and A.V. Rangam for the Appellants.      C. Sitaramiah, B. Parthasarthi, A.D.N. Rao and A. Subba Rao the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     K.N. SAIKIA, J. These seven appeals by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution of India are from  the common  Judgment  of  the Andhra Pradesh  High  Court  dated 20.11.1970 in several appeals and writ petitions. The appel- lants are the tenants and respondents are the landholders or their legal representatives, as the case may be, in  respect of  the  tenanted agricultural lands of  the  hitherto  inam estates  of  Kukunuru and Veerabhadrapuram villages  in  the West Godavari District of Andhra Pradesh. After coming  into force of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and  Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (A.P.  Act  25  of 1948),  hereinafter  referred to as ‘the  Estates  Abolition Act’,  the  inam estates were abolished and the  land  stood vested in the Government free of all encumbrances. The  pre- existing right, title and interest of erstwhile  landholders ceased except to claim ryotwari patta. The tenants were  not liable to be evicted pending the proceedings for issuance of ryotwari  patta. The  respondents--landholders,  hereinafter referred to as ‘the landholders’, claimed that the lands  in question  were  either under their personal  cultivation  or they intended to resume those for private cultivation and as such  those were their private lands and they were  entitled to  ryotwari pattas. The appellants-tenants on the  contrary claimed that those were not private lands of the landholders as  those were neither under their personal cultivation  nor they intended to resume those for personal cultivation,  but those were in possession of the tenants who were entitled to ryotwari pattas after the abolition of the estates.     The  Settlement  Officer of  Anakappalla,  after  making inquiry under S. 25 of the Estates Abolition Act held in all the  cases in these appeals, except one (out of  which  W.P. No. 695/1968 arose) that the landholders failed to establish that  they  were personally cultivating the  lands  or  they intended to resume the lands for personal cultivation and as such  rejected their claims, except in the  aforesaid  case. The landholders’ appeals therefrom to the Estates  Abolition Tribunal were 398 allowed  relying  on. and applying the tests  formulated  in Periannan v. Amman Kovil, AIR 1952 Mad. 323 (FB) and holding that in all cases the landholders were entitled to the grant of  ryotwari pattas as the lands were private  lands  within the meaning of S. 3(10)(b)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh. (Andhra Area) Estates Land Act, 1908 (A.P. Act I of 1908), hereinaf- ter  referred  to as ‘the Estates Land Act’,  and  that  the tenants  were not entitled to ryotwari pattas in respect  of the  same.  The  appellants--tenants  moved  writ  petitions before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh impugning the  deci-

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sion of the Estates Abolition Tribunal. O. Chinnappa  Reddy, J. as he then was, sitting singly, after discussing the case law  on  the  question, by a common Judgment  in  nine  writ petitions,  observing that it was common ground  before  the Subordinate  Tribunal as well as before him that the  nature of the lands at the inception, whether ryoti or private, was not known and that the burden of establishing that the lands were  private lands was on the landholders; and that it  was also common ground before him that apart from the fact  that there were occasional changes of tenants, and that the lands were sometimes leased under short-term leases, there were no other circumstances indicating that the landholders intended to  resume  cultivation of the lands, held  that  after  the pronouncement  of  this Court in  Chidambaraam  Chettiar  v. Santhanaramaswamy Odayar, [1968] 2 SCR 754, the decision  of the  Full  Bench of the Madras High Court  in  Periannan  v. Amman Kovil, (supra) could no longer be considered good  law and  that the decision in Jagdeesarn Pillai v.  Kupparnreal, ILR 1946 Mad. 687 and in Perish Priest of Karayar v. Thiaga- raja  Swami Devasthanam, App. Nos. 176-178 and 493  of  1946 once more held the field. It was also observed that since in all the cases before him the only mode of proof attempted by the  land  holders was the grant of  short-term  leases  and change  of tenants and rent, it must be held that the  lands were  not established to be private lands and that  no  ‘at- tempt  was made to prove personal cultivation or any  inten- tion  to resume personal cultivation. As the Estates  Aboli- tion Tribunal applied the tests laid down by the Madras Full Bench in Periannan’s case (supra) and since Periannan’s case was no longer good law, the writ petitions had to be allowed and  the  impugned orders of the Tribunal quashed  in  eight writ petitions. In Writ Petition No. 695 of 1968 the  orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer was quashed.     The  landholders preferred writ appeals  therefrom.  Two Writ  Petitions, namely, Writ Petition No. 4947 of 1968  and Writ Petition No. 310 of 1968 were also taken up for hearing analogously.  The  Division Bench observing  that  the  main question  for consideration in the appeals was  whether  the decision of the Full Bench in Periannan’s 399 case was good law and it turned on the effect of some impor- tant precedents and a review of the principles enunciated by them,  and after discussing the case law took the view  that in  the  first  place the e observations of  this  Court  in Chidambaram’s  case were in accord with the rule in  Perian- nan’s  case and secondly, even if some of the dicta  in  the Judgment  of this Court in Chidambaram suggested a  contrary principle,  the  effect of the entire observations  did  not support  the contention that Periannan’s case had  been  im- pliedly  overruled  by  this Court. The  writ  appeals  were accordingly allowed except Writ Appeal No. 616 of 1969 which was  dismissed.  Writ Petition No. 4947 of was  allowed  and Writ Petition No. 310 of 1968 was dismissed taking the  same view. Hence these appeals by certificate.     Mr. A.V. Rangam, the learned counsel for the appellants, submits  that the learned Single Judge having found as  fact that the landholders had failed to establish that the  lands were  their private lands as those were neither under  their personal  cultivation nor they were intended to  be  resumed for personal cultivation and applying the rule in  Chidamba- ram’s  case  the learned Single Judge having held  that  the lands  were not private lands, the Division Bench  erred  in holding  to the contrary; and that the learned Single  Judge correctly held that Periannan’s case was no longer good  law as  in  Chidambaram Chettiar  v.  Santhanaramaswamy  Odayar,

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(supra), it was held that the definition of private land  in S.  3(10)  of the Estates Land Act of 1908 read as  a  whole indicated  clearly that the ordinary test for  private  land was  the  test of retention by the landholder  for  his  own personal  use and cultivation by him or under  his  personal supervision,  though they might be let on short  leases,  it was  not the intention or the scheme of the Act to treat  as private those lands with reference to which the only  pecul- iarity  was  the  fact that the landholder  owned  both  the varams  in the land and had been letting them out  on  short leases, the Division Bench erred in holding that Periannan’s test  were still applicable. Mr. C. Sitaramiah, the  learned counsel for the respondents. submits that the correct  tests for determining what was private land had been laid down  in Periannan’s  case,  which were not different from  those  of Chidambaram’s case and the Division Bench correctly  applied those tests to find that the lands were private lands of the landholders;  and that in Chidambaram’s case  the  appellant had not adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption under  S.  185 of the Estates Land Act that the  lands  con- cerned  in the inam village were not ryoti lands as  defined in  S. 3(16) as the Tanjore Palace Estate was held to be  an ‘estate’  within  the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of  the  Estates Land Act and the widows of the Raja enjoyed both the varams, but were not personally cultivating 400 them. In the instant case, according to counsel, the  rights of the landholders were not the same as those of the  widows of  the  Raja  of Tanjore after the  relinquishment  of  the landed properties by the Government which amounted to a  re- grant. The Division Bench pointed out several misconceptions in some precedents for which they could not be said to  have laid  down the correct law. Counsel further submits that  in Chidambaram’s case, the grant of Orathur Padugai village was of the whole village and a named one and, therefore, it  was an  Estate within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of Estates  Land Act and the courts having concurrently found that the  lands in  dispute  were  ryoti lands and not  private  lands,  the landholders  claiming that the lands were private lands  had to  show  that they converted the ryoti lands  into  private lands which they could prove only by showing their  personal cultivation  and they failed to prove it, and that case  was therefore distinguishable on facts and could not be held  to have overruled Periannan’s tests.     The question to be decided in these appeals,  therefore, is  whether  in view of this Court’s decision  in  Chidamba- rarn’s  case the decision in Periannan’s case is still  good law,  and whether on application of the correct legal  tests the  lands in dispute are private lands of  the  landholders entitling  them  to ryotwari pattas in  respect  thereof  or those  are  ryoti lands in possession of the  appellants  as tenants  of the landholders and, as such, they are  entitled to  ryotwari  pattas thereof. In other  words,  whether  the appellants  or  the  respondents are  entitled  to  ryotwari pattas under the Abolition of Estates Act.     To  appreciate the rival submissions, reference  to  the relevant provisions of the Estates Land Act and the  Estates Abolition  Act is necessary, and to understand the  relevant provisions of the two Acts a little knowledge of development of  the  land  system and legislation in the  area  will  be helpful.     The Estates Land Act amended and declared the law relat- ing to the holding on land in estated in the Andhra Area  of the State of Andhra Pradesh which includes the West Godavari District  to which the two inam villages concerned  in  this

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appeal belong. It appears the scheme of the Estates Land Act divides cultivable lands in the two categories, namely,  (1) private  lands and (2) ryoti lands. The Act relates  to  the holding  of land in estates. As defined in S. 3(2)  ‘estate’ means: "(a)  any permanently settled estate or temporarily  settled zamindari; 401 (b) any portion of such permanently-settled estate or tempo- rarily  settled zamindari which is separately registered  in the office of the Collector; (c) any unsettled palaiyam or jagir; (d) (i) any inam village, or     (ii)  any  hamlet or khandriga in an  inam  village,  of which  the  grant  as an inam has been  made,  confirmed  or recognized  by the Government, notwithstanding  that  subse- quent  to the grant, such village, hamlet or  khandriga  has been  partitioned  among the grantees,  or  the  successors- intitle of the grantee or grantees. [Explanation:  (1) Where a grant as an inam is expressed  to be  of  a  named village, [hamlet of khandriga  in  an  inam village]  the  area which forms the  subject-matter  of  the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding  that: it  did not include certain lands in the village [hamlet  or khandriga]  of that name which have already been granted  on service  or other tenure or been reserved for communal  pur- poses]. [Explanation:  (1-A) An inam village, hamlet or kandriga  in an  inam village granted in inam, shall be deemed to  be  an estate,  even though it was confirmed or recognized on  dif- ferent  dates, or by different title deeds or in  favour  of different persons. Explanation:  (1-B) [If any hamlet or khandriga  granted  as inam] was at any time designated as an inam village of as  a part thereof in the revenue accounts, it shall for  purposes of item (ii) or sub-clause (d) be treated as being a  hamlet or khandriga of an inam village, notwithstanding that subse- quently  it [has come to be designated] in the  Revenue  ac- counts as a ryotwari or zamindari village or part thereof]. Explanation  (2)  Where an inam village is  resumed  by  the State  Government, it shall cease to be an estate;  but,  if any  village  so resumed is subsequently  regranted  by  the Government  as an inam, it shall from the date of  such  re- grant, be regarded as an estate. 402 Explanation  (3):  Where  a portion of an  inam  village  is resumed  by  the Government such portion shall cease  to  be part  of  the estate, but the rest of the village  shall  be deemed  to be an inam village for the purposes of this  sub- clause.  If  the portion so resumed or any part  thereof  is subsequently  regranted by the Government as an  inam,  such portion  or  part shall from the date of such  re-grant.  be regarded as forming part of the inam village for the purpose of this sub-clause; (e) any portion consisting of one or more villages of any of the  estates  specified above in clauses (a),  (b)  and  (c) which is held on a permanent under tenure ."     It  appears that the original definition  had  undergone several  amendments. Clause (d) and Explanation  (I-A)  were substituted by S. 2(i) of Act XXXV of 1956. The  Explanation (1)  was inserted by S. 2(1) of Act 1I of 1945.  Explanation (1)  and (1-B) were amended by S. 2(ii) of Act XXXV of  1956 and Explanation (2) and (3) are the renumbered old  Explana- tions (1) and (2) inserted by S. 2(1) of Act H of 1945. The respondents claim to have been ‘landholders’. As defined

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in s. 3(5):  ‘Landholder’ means a person owning an estate or part there- of  and includes every person entitled to collect the  rents of  the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of  any transfer  from the owner or his predecessor-in-title  or  of any order of a competent Court or of any provision of law.            Where  there  is a dispute between  two  or  more persons as to which of them is the landholder for all or any of  the  purposes of this Act or between two or  more  joint landholders  as to which of them is entitled to proceed  and be  dealt with as such landholder, the person who  shall  be deemed  to be the landholder for such purposes shall be  the person whom the Collector subject to any decree or order  of a  competent Civil Court may recognize or nominate  as  such landholder  in  accordance with rules to be  flamed  by  the State Government in this behalf." Both  "Private land" and "ryoti land" have been  defined  in the Act. As 403 defined in S. 3(10) private land means: "(a)  in  the case of an estate within the meaning  of  sub- clauses (a), (b), (c) or (e) of clause (2) means the  domain or home-farm land of the landholder by whatever  designation known such as, kambattam, khas, sir, or pannai, and includes all land which is proved to have been cultivated as  private land  by the landholder himself, by his own servants  or  by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, for a  continuous period  of twelve years immediately before the  commencement of this Act; and (b) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subclause (d) of clause (2), means-- (i)  the  domain or home-farm land of  the  landholders,  by whatever designation known, such as kambattam, khas, sir  or pannai; or (ii) land which is proved to have been cultivated as private land  by the landholder himself, by his own servants  or  by hired stock, for a continuous period of twelve years immedi- ately  before the first day of July 1908, provided that  the landholder has retained the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti land; or (iii)  land which is proved to have been cultivated  by  the landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired  labour, with  his  own or hired stock, for a  continuous  period  of twelve  years immediately before the first day of  November, 1933, provided that the landholder has retained the  kudiva- ram  ever  since and has not converted the land  into  ryoti land; or (iv) land the entire kudivaram in which was acquired by  the landholder before the first day of November, 1933 for  valu- able  consideration from a person owning the  kudivaram  but not the melvaram, provided that the landholder has  retained the kudivaram ever since and has not converted the land into ryoti  land, and provided further that, where the  kudivaram was  acquired at a sale for arrears of rent, the land  shall not be deemed to be private land unless it is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder him- 404 self,  by his own servants or by hired labour, with his  own or  hired  stock. for a continuous period  of  twelve  years since  the acquisition of the land and before the  commence- ment of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936." As defined in S. 3(16):           ‘Ryoti  land’ means cultivable land in  an  estate other than private land but does not include--

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(a) beds and bunds of tanks and of supply, drainage  surplus of irrigation channels; (b) threshing-floor, catfie-stands, village-sites, and other lands  situated  in any estate which are set apart  for  the common use of the villagers; (c) land granted on service tenure either free of rent or on favourable rent if granted before the passing of this Act or free  of  rent if granted after that date, so  long  as  the service tenure subsists. Village is defined in S. 3(19):  ‘Village’ means any local area situated in or  constituting an  estate which is designated as a village in  the  revenue accounts  and for which the revenue accounts are  separately maintained by one or more karnams or which is now recognized by  the  State Government or may hereafter be by  the  State Government for the purposes of this Act to be a village, and includes any hamlet or hamlets which may be attached  there- to."     The  Estates Abolition Act provided for ‘the  repeal  of the permanent settlement, the acquisition of the landholders in  permanent  estate and in certain other  estates  in  the State of Andhra Pradesh and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. It extended to the whole of  the State  of Andhra Pradesh and applied to all estates  as  de- fined in S. 3 clause (2) of the Estates Land Act. This  Act, in  S.  2(3)  defined ‘estate’ to mean  a  zamindari  or  an under-tenure or an inam estate. As defined in S. 2(7)  ‘inam estate’  means an estate within the meaning of S. 3,  clause (2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. 405     The  statement  of objects and reasons  of  the  Estates Abolition Act speaks of acute discontent among estate  ryots and  good deal of agitation under  zamindari  administration which  was  considered to have outlived its  usefulness  and needed  abolition.  It  also mentioned  about  the  election manifesto  issued by the Working Committee of  the  Congress Party in December 1945 urging reform of the land system  and that such reform involved the removal of all  intermediaries between  the  peasant and the State and that the  rights  of such intermediaries should be abolished on payment of  equi- table compensation. In February 1947 the Madras  Legislative Council passed a resolution accepting the general  principle of the abolition of the zamindari system and recommending to the Government that legislation for the purpose be undertak- en  and  brought forward at an early  date.  The  Government accordingly  proposed  to abolish the  zamindari  system  by acquiring  all  estates  governed by the  Estates  Land  Act including  whole  inam  villages and  converting  them  into ryotwari  paying equitable compensation to the several  per- sons having an interest in the estates.     The Estates Abolition Act has also undergone a number of amendments.  The Amendment Act 1 of 1950 inserted S.  54(a)& S.  54(b) dealing with compensation. The Amendment Act  XVII of  1951 clarified certain positions in regard to Inam  vil- lages.  Section 17(1) of the Estates Abolition Act  provided for the grant of ryotwari patta to a person holding any land granted  on service tenure failing under S. 3(16)(c) of  the Estates Land Act irrespective of whether such land consisted of  only a portion of a village or of one or more  villages. The  reference  to one or more villages in the  section  had given rise to the misapprehension that it applied also to an entire village granted on service tenure. But the  intention was  that the provisions of the section should not apply  to such a village and clause 3 of the Act gave effect to it and clause  4 was consequential of clause 3. The  provisions  of

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the Estates Abolition Act were brought into force in certain inam villages on the assumption that they were under  tenure estates. But it had been subsequently found that the assump- tion was not correct. It was therefore necessary to withdraw the operation of the Act from those villages and the  Amend- ment Act provided for such withdrawal. The Amendment Act XXI of  1956 dealt with annual payments to any religious  educa- tional or charitable institutions. The Amendment Act XVII of 1957 made provisions for the abolition and conversion in the ryotwari  tenure  of certain categories of inams  under  the Estates Abolition Act. Under S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates  Land Act,  as originally enacted,.whole inam villages in  respect of  which  the original grant conferred  only  the  melvaram right on a person not owning the kudivaram thereof alone 406 became  ‘estates’. By virtue of Third Amendment of  the  Es- tates Land Act whole inam villages m which both melvaram and kudivaram rights vested in the inamdars also became estates. The  provisions  of the Madras Estates  Land  (Reduction  of Rent) Act, 1947 (Madras Act XXX of 1947) were applicable  to both these categories of whole inam villages. But the provi- sions  of the Estates Abolition Act were not  applicable  to the  whole  inam  villages which became  estates  under  the Madras Estates, Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, i.e. those in which the inamdars possessed both the melvaram and  kudi- varam rights. Under S. 2 of the Estates Land Amendment  Act, 1946, S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act was further amended so  as to include within the definition of ‘estate’  hamlets and  khandrigas of inam villages which were previously  held to  be not estates. Provision was also made so as  to  bring within  its purview only such of the inam hamlets  and  inam khandrigas  of  inam villages wherein  the  melvaram  rights alone  vest  in the inamdars. Thus, the only  categories  of inam  estates which now remained outside the purview of  the Estates Abolition Act were: (a) the whole inam village which became estate by virtue of the Madras Act XVIII of 1936  and (b)  inam  hamlets  and khandrigas of  inam  villages  which became estates by virtue of the Estates Land (Andhra  Amend- ment)  Act, 1956 but in respect of which both  melvaram  and kudivaram  rights vested in the inamdars. The Amendment  Act XX of 1960 dealt with all post 1936 inam villages which were also brought within the purview of the Estates Abolition Act by  the  Amendment  Act XVIII of 1957.  The  Andhra  Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,  1956 (Act XXXVII of 1956) provided for  conversion  of all inam lands other than estates into ryotwari tenure.  The Act  extended to the whole of the Andhra State, but  applied only to lands described in clause (c) of S. 2. Section  2(c) defined "inam land" to mean any land in respect of which the grant in inam has been made, confirmed or recognised by  the Government,  (Act 3 of 1964 inserted thereafter  the  words) "land includes any land in the merged territory of Banagana- palle  in respect of which the grant in inam has been  made, confirmed or recognised by any former Ruler of the  territo- ry",  but  does not include an inam constituting  an  estate under  the Estates Land Act. Section 2(d) defines  an  "Inam Village" to mean a village designated as such in the revenue accounts  of  the  Government, (and includes  a  village  so designated immediately before it was notified and taken over by the Government under the Estates Abolition Act.     Thus  to find out whether a ‘village was  designated  as inam village or not, prima facie the revenue accounts of the Government which 407 were  there at the time of the Inam Abolition Act came  into

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force  had to be looked into. If it was so shown no  further proof  was necessary. Only when the entries in  the  revenue accounts were ambiguous, and it was not possible to come  to a  definite  conclusion, it might be necessary  to  consider other  relevant  evidence  which was  admissible  under  the evidence Act.     Section 2-A of this Act said: "Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  this Act all communal lands  and  poramookes, grazing  lands, waste lands. forest lands, mines  and  quer- ries,  tanks,  tank-beds and irrigation works,  streams  and rivers, fisheries and ferries in the inam lands shall  stand transferred  to the Government and vest in them free of  all encumbrances."     Section 3 of the Act prescribed the procedure for deter- mination  of inam lands and provided for giving  opportunity to interested persons.     As  we have already noted the High Court found that  the basis  of the decision of the Tribunal in all the cases  was that  .sometimes the leases were for short terms with  occa- sional change of tenants and rents payable by them and  that the  nature of the lands, whether ryoti or private, was  not known and that it was the burden of the landholder to  prove that  the  lands were private lands and that  there  was  no other circumstances to show that the landholders intended to resume  cultivation of the same. It was conceded before  the Single  Bench  by the learned Advocate for  the  petitioners that  if the tests formulated by the Full Bench  in  Perian- nan’s case applied to the facts of these cases the land must be  held  to  be private land and the  landholders  must  be considered  to  have  established their claim  to  grant  of ryotwari  pattas.  The Division Bench did  not  change  this position  in  view of the provisions of Section 185  of  the Estates Land Act as amended from time to time. The  original section said: "185. When in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine  whether  any land is landholder’s  private  land, regard  shall  be had to local custom and  to  the  question whether  the  land was before the first day  of  July  1898, specifically  let as private land and to any other  evidence that may be produced, but the land shall be presumed not  to be private land untill the contrary is shown: Provided  that all land which is proved to have been cultivated as  private land by the landholder himself, by his own servants 408 or  by hired labour with his own or hired stock  for  twelve years immediately before the commencement of this Act  shall be deemed to be the landholder’s private land." Section 185 was amended in 1934, 1936 and 1955 whereafter it as follows: "185. When in any suit or proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether any land is the landholder’s private land, regard shall be had-- (1) to local custom, (2) in the case of an estate within the meaning of subclause (a) (b), (c) or (c) of clause (2) of section 3 to the  ques- tion whether the land was before the first day of July 1898, specifically let as private land- and (3) to any other evidence that may be produced:           Provided that the land shall be presumed not to be private land until the contrary is proved:           Provided  .further that in the case of  an  estate within  the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of  sec- tion 3-- (i)  any expression in a lease, patta or the like,  executed or  issued  on or after the first day of July 1918,  to  the

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effect  or implying that a tenant has no right of  occupancy or  that his right of occupancy is limited or restricted  in any  manner,  shall not be admissible in  evidence  for  the purpose of proving that the land concerned was private  land at the commencement of the tenancy; and (ii)  any  such expression in a lease, patta  or  the  like, executed or issued before the first day of July 1918,  shall not by itself be sufficient for the purpose of proving  that the  land concerned was private land at the commencement  of the tenancy."     When the Estates Abolition Act was passed, the  legisla- ture envisaged the difficulties that could arise in  respect of the estates in which the landholder would be entitled  to ryotwari patta. Section 13 409 provided as to in respect of what lands in inam estates  the landholder would be entitled to ryotwari patta and said:          13.  Lands  in inam estate in which  landholder  is entitled  to ryotwari patta: In the case of an inam  estate, the  landholder shall, with effect on and from the  notified date, be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of-- (a)  all  lands (including lanka  lands)  which  immediately before  the  notified date, (i) belonged to him  as  private land within the meaning of Section 3, clause (10)(b) of  the Estates I.and Act, or (ii) stood recorded as private land in a  record  prepared under the provisions of  Chapter  XI  or Chapter  XII of the said Act, not having  been  subsequently converted into ryoti land; and (b)(i)  all  lands which were properly  included,  or  which ought  to have been properly included, in the holding  of  a ryot  and  which have been acquired by  the  landholder,  by inheritance  or  succession under a will provided  that  the landholder  has  cultivated such lands himself, by  his  own servants or by hired labour with his own or hired stock,  in the  ordinary  course of husbandry, from the  date  of  such acquisition or the 1st day of July, 1945 whichever is  later and  has  been in direct and continuous possession  of  such lands from such later date; (ii) all lands which were properly included, or which  ought to  have been properly included in the holding of  the  ryot and which have been acquired by the landholder by  purchase, exchange or gift, including purchase at a sale or arrears of rent;          Provided  that the landholder has  cultivated  such lands himself, by his own servants or by hired labour,  with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary course of  husbandry from  the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in  direct  and continuous possession of such lands from that date; (iii)  all lands [not being (i) lanka-lands], (ii) lands  of the  description specified in Section 3, clause  (16),  sub- clauses  (a), (b) and (c) of the Estates Land Act, or  (iii) forest lands which have been abandoned or relinquished by  a ryot, or 410 which have never been in the occupation of a ryot,  provided that the landholder has cultivated such lands himself, or by his  own  servants or hired labour, with his  own  or  hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, from the 1st day of July, 1945 and has been in direct and continuous  posses- sion of such lands from that date. Explanation: ‘Cultivate’ in this clause includes the  plant- ing and rearing of topes, gardens and orchards, but does not include the rearing of topes of spontaneous growth." Section  15 dealt with the determination of lands  in  which the landholder would be entitled to ryotwari patta under the

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foregoing provisions of the Act and said: "(1)  The  Settlement Officer shall examine the  nature  and history  of  all lands in respect of  which  the  landholder claims a ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14, as  the case may be, and decide in respect of which lands the  claim should be allowed.               XX  XX  XX  XX  XX  XX  XX  XX  XX  XX An  interpretation  of the words "Private land"  and  "ryoti land"  has  to be made in consonance  with  the  legislative purpose,  provisions and scheme of the enactment.  Interpre- tare et concordare leges legibus, est optimus  interpretandi modus.  To interpret and in such a way as to harmonize  laws with laws is the best mode of interpretation.     We may now examine the question whether the tests formu- lated  in Periannan’s case (supra) can still be  applied  in face of the decision in Chidambaram’s case (supra). In other words  whether Periannan’s decision is still a good law.  In Periannan  the Full Bench of Madras High Court dealt with  a batch of second appeals and a batch of civil revision  peti- tions. The suits out which the second appeals arose. related to the village of Manamelpatti, a Dharmasanam village in the Ramnad District and those were instituted by the trustees of Airabhadeswarar Soundaranayagi Amman Temple for ejectment of the defendants from the lands in their respective possession and  for recovery of rent for faslis 1349 and 1350  and  for future profits. The village comprised 80 pangus out of which the plaint temple in this batch owned 231/2 pangus purchased from  the original owners and one pangu taken on  othi  from the owner. The plaintiffs in the batch of suits out of which the civil 411 revision petitions arose were the managers of the  Devastha- nam of Nagara Vairavapatti Valaroleeswaraswami Nagara Vaira- vaswami  Devasthanam. That temple owned 54 and 5/8th  pangus or  shares in the village and the suits were instituted  for recovery  of the balance of amounts due as  ‘irubhogam’  for faslis  1349  and  1350. In both the batches  of  suits  the plaintiffs claimed that they were the owners of meIvaram and kudivaram interests in the lands which were being enjoyed as "pannai" lands or private lands; that they were leasing  the lands  from  time to time changing  tenants  and  collecting "swamibhogam"  in  recognition  of  their  full  proprietary rights  in the lands. They claimed that the tenants  had  no occupancy  rights  in the lands; and in the  second  appeals batch  a  relief  for  ejectment of  the  tenants  was  also claimed.  The  defence  of defendants-tenants  in  both  the batches was common. They claimed that the temples owned only the  melvaram interest and that they, the tenants, were  the owners of the kudivaram which they had been enjoying heredi- tarily  paying  half varam in respect of the  nanjas  and  a fixed money rent for the punja or dry lands according to the "tharam"  (classification) of lands. They denied  that  they ever  paid  "swami bhogam" to the temple. In all  the  suits there  was the common plea that the village was an  "estate" under  Section  3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land  Act,  as amended  by  the Madras Estates Land (Amendment)  Act,  1936 (Act XVIII of 1936); that they had therefore acquired  occu- pancy  rights under the Act; and that the lands  were  ryoti and that, therefore, the civil court had no jurisdiction  to try  those suits. The plaintiffs also raised an  alternative contention  that  on  the footing that the  village  was  an "estate" the suit lands were private lands or "pannai" lands of  the temples and, therefore, the defendants  acquired  no occupancy rights in the lands under the statute and that the civil court alone had the jurisdiction to entertain and  try

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the suits.     The High Court found that the main questions that had to be  considered by the courts below were whether the  village was  or was not an estate under the Madras Estates Land  Act and, if so, whether the lands were private lands as  claimed by the plaintiffs or ryoti lands as claimed by the  tenants. The  further question that even apart from the Estates  Land Act whether the defendants had acquired occupancy rights  by prescription  was also raised and considered. The  jurisdic- tion of the civil court to entertain the suits depended upon the decision of the question whether the village was or  was not an estate. On the main questions the concurrent findings of  the Courts below were that the village was  an  "estate" under  Section  3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates  Land  Act  as amended  in 1936, that the plaint temple owned the  melvaram and kudivaram interests in the lands; that the lands were 412 private  lands  as defined by the Madras Estates  Land  Act; that the defendants had acquired no occupancy rights in  the lands  either under the Act or by prescription and that  the suits  were properly laid in the civil court which  had  un- doubted  jurisdiction  to  try the  suits.  The  Subordinate Judge,  in  appeals, agreed with the finding  of  the  trial court  but refused the plaintiff’s relief for  ejectment  on the ground that the tenancy was not lawfully terminated. The lands  in both the sets of cases were situated in  the  same village of Manamelpatti.     Before  the High Court the findings of the courts  below that  the temple owned the melvaram and kudivaram  interests in  the lands and the defendants had not acquired  permanent rights of occupancy in the lands apart from the Act had  not been disputed by the defendants. The dispute, therefore, was confined  to two questions, namely, first, whether the  vil- lage was an "estate" under the Madras Estates Land Act  and, secondly, whether the concurrent finding of the courts below that the lands were private lands of the temple was  correct or  not. While deciding the second question  and  dismissing the  second  appeals and the civil revision  petitions,  the learned Judges discussed the relevant case law and therefrom Satyanarayana  Rao,  J with whom Vaswanath  Sastri,  J  con- curred, at paragraph 49 page 346 of the report held that the following propositions were established: "1.  If the land is known to be ryoti at its  inception  the only  mode by which it could be converted into private  land is  by  proof of continuous cultivation for a period  of  12 years prior to the commencement of the Act. 2.  Even if the nature of the land is not known,  continuous cultivation  for the required period of 12 years before  the commencement  of the Act would conclusively  establish  that the land is private land. 3.  If  there is no proof of cultivation  for  a  continuous period  of 12 years before the commencement of the Act,  the land  may  be proved to be private land  by  other  methods; provided the land was not shown to be once ryoti. 4.  Cultivation of the lands or leasing of the  lands  under short-term leases may be one mode of proof. 5.  An intention to cultivate or resume for  cultivation  is also a test to decide that the land is private land and such 413 intention may be established by any other means, not  neces- sarily by cultivation and by cultivation alone. 6.  The  essence  of private land is  continuous  course  of conduct on the part of the land-holder asserting and  acting on  the  footing that he is the absolute owner  thereof  and recognition and acceptance by the tenants that the landhold-

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er has absolute right in the land. 7. Mere proof that the land-holder is the owner of both  the warams  is not sufficient to prove that the land is  private land." Considered  in  light of the definition of  "private  land", sections  13  and 15 of the Estates Abolition  Act  and  the basic  concept of "domain or home-farm land", we are of  the view that the proposition 4, 5 and 6 above have to be doubt- ed.     Viswanatha  Sastri,  J.  who  concurred  summarised  his conclusions as under: "I  may now summarise my conclusion on the legal aspects  of the  case.  Where land proved or admitted to be  once  ryoti land  is claimed to have been converted into  private  land, the claim is untenable unless the land-holder proves  direct cultivation  for a period of 12 years before 1st July  1908. No  other mode of conversion is permissible. Where you  have to find out whether a land is private or ryoti its  original character  not being known, proof of direct  cultivation  of the  land  by the land-holder for 12 years before  1st  July 1908, would, without other evidence, conclusively  establish its character as private land, but this is not the only mode of  proof  permitted to land-holder. Other evidence  may  be adduced  and  looked  into and might  consist,  among  other matters,  of direct cultivation of the land at  some  period anterior to 12 years preceding 1st July 1908 but this is not indispensable.  Direct  cultivation  may  be  valuable   and weighty evidence and may be inferred from accounts and other records usually kept by large land-holders.          If,  owing to lapse of time or other reasons,  evi- dence  of direct cultivation is not forthcoming its  absence is  not fatal to the claim that the land is private. S.  185 of the Act 414 does not shut out, but on the other hand allows all evidence that  would  be  relevant and admissible under  the  law  of evidence,  to prove that fact in issue, namely, whether  the land  is  private or ryoti. Local usage or  custom  and  the letting  of the land as private land in leases  before  1898 are  specifically mentioned in Ss. 185(1) and (2)  as  being relevant evidence but other evidence is also expressly  made admissible under S. 185(3).           The  classification of lands as private  lands  at the time of the permanent settlement or in the early records of  zamindaries, the terms of the grant of  an  undertenure, the assertion and enjoyment by the land-holder of the  right to both the warams, the intention to retain with himself the kudiwaram  right and the consequent right to  resume  direct cultivation  if he chooses, leases of the lands  as  private lands  or  with terms and conditions inconsistent  with  any right of occupancy in the leases, admissions by tenants that the  land-holder is the owner of both warams and  that  they have  no occupancy rights, changes in the personnel  of  the tenants,  variations  in the rates of rent  payable  by  the tenants--these  and  kindred matters would be  relevant  and admissible  in evidence to prove that the lands are  private lands.  The probative value of such evidence depends on  the facts and circumstance of each case.           The  burden of proof that a particular land in  an estate is private land rests on the land-holder, the  statu- tory  presumption  being the other way. This burden  is  not discharged  merely  by  proving that both  the  warams  were granted  to or enjoyed by the land-holder once upon a  time. There  must  be evidence of the treatment of  the  lands  as private lands by the land-holder, either by direct  cultiva-

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tion or otherwise in the manner above stated." Considering  the statutory definition, in our  opinion,  the third  paragraph and last part of last paragraph above  have to be doubted. Raghava Rao, J. who dissented summarised  his conclusions separately.     We  are not oblivious the fact that on the basis of  the above propositions cases have been decided for a long  time. But  their tenability having been questioned in the  instant case  we proceed to examine them. The above propositions  no doubt refer to different 415 aspects including the evidentiary aspect of the question  of determination  of ‘private lands’ and ‘ryoti lands’  but  it may  be difficult to hold that each or all of them by  them- selves  laid down any rule to be invariably  followed  irre- spective of the history, location and nature of the estates, their  cultivation and the customs governing them. There  is also  no  sufficient exposition of the  central  concept  of ‘domain’  and ‘home-farm’ lands in the  above  propositions. These  words were not defined ,in the Estates Land  Act   In Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajalapati Somayya, 39 Mad.  341, Wallis  C.J.  adopted the dictionary meaning,  namely,  "the land about the mansion house of a Lord and in his  immediate occupancy". Seshagiri Aiyar, J. in the same case quoted from the  Encyclopaedia  Brittanica, Vol. III  (3):  ‘Domain’  as synonymous to ‘Domesne’ and is explained as follows: "Domesne--(Domeine, Demain, Domain etc.) that portion of the land of a manor not granted out in the freehold tenancy, but (a)  retained by the lord of the manor for his own  use  and occupation, or (b) let out as tenemental land to his retain- ers  or ‘villani.’ The domesne land originally held  at  the will  of  the landlord, in course of time  came  to  acquire fixity of tenure and developed into the modern copyhold.  It is  from  domesne as used in sense (a) that the  modern  re- stricted  use  of the word comes,  i.e.,  ‘land  immediately surrounding  the  mansion  or dwelling house,  the  park  or chase’."     In Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kupoarnmal (supra) which related to  lands in an inam village which was part of  the  Tanjore palace,  Wadsworth, Offg. C.J. accepeted the  interpretation put  upon  the word "Domain" by Wailis, C.J.  and  Sesnagiri Aiyar,  J.  In  Chellapalli case (supra)  as  meaning  "land immediately  surrounding the mansion or dwelling house,  the park  or  chase" and that connoted land appurtenant  to  the mansion  of the lord of the manor kept by the  landlord  for his personal use and cultivated under his personal  supervi- sion  as  distinct from lands let to tenants  to  be  farmed without  any control from the lord of the manor  other  than such control as in incident to the lease. The learned  Judge further observed:-"It seems to us that the sub-clause (b)(1) of  the  definition is intended to cover those  lands  which come obviously within what would ordinarily be recognised as the  domain or home-farm, that is to say, lands  appurtenant to the landholder’s residence and kept for his enjoyment and use." In Parish Priest of Karayar Parish v. Thiagarajaswami Devas- 416 thanam, (supra) Subba Rao and Chandra Reddy, JJ accepted the test laid down in Jagadeesam (supra) and the legal  position was summarised as follows: "The  legal position having regard to the provisions of  the Act  and the decisions dealing with them in so far as it  is relevant for the purposes of this case may briefly be stated thus. Private land as defined under the Madras Land  Estates Act comprises two categories, private lands, technically  so

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called  and lands deemed to be private lands. In  regard  to private  lands  strictly so called, it must be a  domain  or home  farm  land as understood in law. The  mere  fact  that particular  lands are described in popular province as  pan- nai,  kambattam, sir, khas, is not decisive of the  question unless the lands so called partake of the characteristics of domain or home-farm lands.          The  test to ascertain whether a land is domain  or home  farm  is that accepted by the  Judicial  Committee  in ‘Mallikarjuna Prasad v. Somayya’, 42 Mad 400 i.e. land which a  zamindar has cultivated himself and intends to retain  as resumable  for cultivation by himself even if from  time  to time he demises for a season. Whenever a question  therefore arises whether a land is private land technically so called, as  defined in sub-clause (1) of clause (b) to S. 3(10)  the presumption  is that it is not a private land. The  recitals in  the leases, pattas etc. after 1918 must be excluded  and the  recitals  in similar documents prior to 1918  in  them- selves  are not sufficient evidence. There must be in  addi- tion direct evidence that these lands were either domain  or home farm lands in the sense that they were in their  origin lands directly cultivated by the landlord or reserved by him for  his  direct cultivation. We are not concerned  in  this case with the question whether ryoti lands could be convert- ed into private lands."     The  trend not to confine the concept of  private  lands only to domain or home-farm lands but to include in it lands situate  outside in which land-holder had granted leases  or made arrangements for cultivation with a view to resume them for  personal cultivation did not find favour in  the  above three decisions. In Chidambaram Chettiar (supra) involved lands in Orathur 417 Padugai in Tanjore Palace Estate. The Raja of Tanjore having died  without leaving any male issue the East India  Company took possession of all his properties including his  private property.  Later, on representation of the senior  widow  of the  late Raja, the Government of India in 1962  "sanctioned the  relinquishment of the whole of the landed  property  of the  Tanjore Raja in favour of the heirs of the late  Raja." The Tanjore Palace Estate thus came into existence. In  1948 the  appellant purchased the suit lands situate  in  Orathur Padugai  within Tanjore Palace Estate and  instituted  suits for possession from the various defendants. The Trial  Court having dismissed the suits on the ground that the lands were situated in an estate as defined in S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and they were ryoti lands as defined in  S. 3(16)  in  which  the  defendants  have  acquired  occupancy rights. The Madras High Court having affirmed that decree in appeal, the appellant came to this Court contending that the lands did not form an ‘estate’ under S. 3(2)(d) because  the restoration did not amount to a fresh grant but only  resto- ration  of status quo ante; that Orathur Padugai was  not  a whole  village  to be an estate and that the widows  of  the late Raja enjoyed both the varams and the lands purchased by the  appellant were private lands under s. 3(10)(b) so  that the  defendants did not have any occupancy  rights  therein. Holding  that the relinquishment by the Government  in  1962 amounted  to a fresh grant and that since 1830 onwards  Ora- thur  Padugai was a whole village and therefore  an  estate, their  Lordships  enunciated the tests as  to  private  land thus: "Under  S. 3(10) of the Act, private land comprises  of  two categories,  private lands technically so-called, and  lands deemed  to  be  private lands. In regard  to  private  lands

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technically  so-called, it must be the domain  or  home-farm land  of the landholder as understood in law. The mere  fact that  particular lands are described in popular parlance  as pannai,  kambattam, sir, khas, is not decisive of the  ques- tion unless the lands so-called partake of the  characteris- tics  of domain or home-fair lands. In our opinion the  cor- rect test to ascertain whether a land is domain or home-farm is  that  accepted by the Judicial Committee  in  Yerlagadda Malikarjuna Prasad Nayudu v. Somayya, ILR 42 Mad. 400  (PC), that  is whether it is land which a zamindar has  cultivated himself  and intends to retain as resumable for  cultivation by  himself even if from time to time he demises for a  sea- son. The Legislature did not use the words ‘domain or  home- farm  land without attaching to them ,a meaning; and  it  is reasonable to suppose that the Legislature would 418 attach  to these words the meaning which would be  given  to them in ordinary English. It seems to us that the sub-clause (b)(i)  of the definition is intended to cover  those  lands which come obviously within what would ordinarily be  recog- nised  as  the domain or home-farm, that is  to  say,  lands appurtenant  to the landholder’s residence and kept for  his enjoyment and use. The home-farm is land which the  landlord cultivates himself, as distinct from land which he lets  out to  tenants  to be farmed. The first  clause  is,  therefore meant  to include and signify those lands which are  in  the ordinary  sense  of  the word  home-farm  lands.  The  other clauses  of the definition appear to deal with  those  lands which would not necessarily be regarded as homefarm lands in the ordinary usage of the term; and with reference to  those lands there is a proviso that lands purchased at a sale  for arrears  of revenue shall not be regarded as  private  lands unless cultivated directly by the landlord for the  required period. It seems to us that the definition reads as a  whole indicates clearly that the ordinary test for ‘private  land’ is the test of retention by the landholder for his  personal use  and cultivation by him or under his  personal  supervi- sion.  No doubt, such lands may be let on short  leases  for the  convenience  of  the landholder  without  losing  their distinctive  character; but it is not the intention  or  the scheme  of  the  Act to treat as private  those  lands  with reference to which the only peculiarity is the fact that the landlord  owns  both the warams in the lands  and  has  been letting  them out on short term leases. There must,  in  our opinion be something in the evidence either by way of  proof of  direct  cultivation or by some clear  indication  of  an intent  to regard these lands as retained for  the  personal use  of  the landholder and his establishment  in  order  to place  those lands in the special category of private  lands in  which  a tenant under the Act cannot  acquire  occupancy rights."     The  concept  of home-farm does not appear  to  be  much different  from  that of domain. According  to  Black’s  Law Dictionary,  a farm means body of land under  one  ownership devoted  to agriculture, either to raising crops or  pasture or both. The word farm means a considerable tract of land or number of small tracts devoted wholly or partially to  agri- cultural purposesor pasturage of cattle but may also include woodland.  The  term does not necessarily include  only  the land 419 under cultivation and within a fence. It may include all the land  which  forms part of the tract and  may  also  include several  connected parcels under one control.  According  to Collins  English  Dictionary,  farm means a  tract  of  land

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usually with house and buildings cultivated as unit or  used to  rear  livestock. According  to  Webster’s  Comprehensive Dictionary,  International  Edition, farm means a  tract  of land  forming a single property and devoted to  agricultural stock  raising  dairing  and some allied  activity.  We  are therefore  of the view that home-farm necessarily implies  a farm with the home of the landholder.     Pollock  & Maitland in The History of English  Law,  2nd Edn. Vol. 1, at pp 362-363 describing the manorial  arrange- ment in England wrote: "Postponing  until a late time any debate as to whether  the term  manor bore a technical meaning, we observe  that  this term  is constantly used to describe a proprietary  unit  of common  occurrence:-the well-to-do landholder holds a  manor or many manors. Now speaking very generally we may say  that a  man who holds a manor has in the first place a  house  or homestead  which  is occupied by himself,  his  bailiffs  or servants. Along with this he holds cultivable land, which is in  the fullest sense (so far as feudal theory permits)  his own; it is his demesne land. Then also, as part of the  same complex  of rights, he holds land which is holden of him  by tenants,  some of whom, it may be, are freeholders,  holding in  socage  or by military service, while the  remainder  of them,  usually the large majority of them, hold in  villein- age,  by  a merely customary tenure. In the  terms  used  to describe these various lands we notice a certain instructive ambiguity.  The land that the lord himself occupies  and  of which he takes the fruits he indubitably holds ‘in demesne’; the land holden of him by his freehold tenants he  indubita- bly does not hold ‘in demesne; his freehold tenants hold  it in  demesne,  unless indeed, as may well be the  case,  they have yet other freeholders; below them. But as to the  lands holden  of him by villein tenure, the use of words seems  to fluctuate; at one moment he is said to hold and be seized of them in demesne, at the next they are sharply  distinguished from  his demesne lands, that term being reserved for  those portions of the soil in which no tenant free or villein  has any rights. In short, ‘language reflects the dual nature  of tenure in villeinage; it is tenure 420 and  yet  it  is not tenure. The king’s  courts,  giving  no protection  to  the tenant, say that the lord is  seized  in demesne;  but the manorial custom must  distinguish  between the  lands  holden in villeinage and those lands  which  are occupied  by the lord and which in a narrower sense  of  the word are his demesne. Describing the field system they wrote: "     We have usually therefore in the manor ,lands of three kinds,  (1) the demesne strictly so called, (2) the land  of the  lord’s freehold tenants, (3) the villenagium, the  land holden  of the lord by villein or customary tenure.  Now  in the  common case all these lands are bound together  into  a single whole by two economic bonds. In the first place,  the demesne lands are cultivated wholly or in part by the labour of  the  tenants of the other lands, labour which  they  are bound  to supply by reason of their tenure. A little  labour in the way of ploughing and reaping is not out of the  free- hold  tenants;  much  labour of the many  various  kinds  is obtained  from  the tenants in villeinage, so much  in  many cases  that  the lord has but small, if any,  need  to  hire labourers. Then in the second place, these various tenements lie  intermingled; neither the lord’s demesne nor  the  ten- ant’s tenement can be surrounded by one ring-fence. The lord has his house and homestead; each tenant has his house  with more  or less curtilage surrounding it; but the arable  por-

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tions of the demesne and of the various other tenements  lie mixed up together in the great open fields." In  paragraph 758 of Halsbury’s Laws of England,  4th  Edn., Vol. 9, on the destruction of customs it is said: "As manorial customs attached to the tenure as distinguished from  the mere locality of the lands, it followed that  upon the  destruction  of the tenure by  enfranchisement  of  the lands  at  common  law the customs were  also  destroyed.  A statutory  enfranchisement  must have  effect,  however,  in accordance  with  the terms of the statute,  and  where  the statute preserves rights notwithstanding the enfranchisement and  the  extent of the rights so  preserved  depended  upon custom,  the  custom remains relevant to define  the  rights preserved by the statute." 421     The  basic concept of domain or home-farm land  and  the concept  of cultivation as private land by  the  landholders used  in the definition had, therefore, to be borne in  mind in determining private land. The observation of the Division Bench  in the impugned Judgment that it is not  possible  to regard  the  pronouncement  in Zamindar  of  Chellapalli  v. Somayya,  (supra) as an authority for the  proposition  that domain  within the meaning of s. 3 (10) of the Estates  Land Act  must  be held to mean land around the mansion  home  of lord and appurtenant thereto, has therefore to be  rejected. The decision of the High Court of Madras in Chellapalli case was confirmed by the Privy Council in Yerlagadda Mallikarju- na  Prasad  Nayudu v. Somayya, (supra). The  learned  Single Judge in the instant case also relied on the observations in Chellapalli’s case (supra). The learned Single Judge rightly observed  that the test laid down by Wadsworth,  Offg.  C.J. were approved by the Supreme Court in Chidambaram’s case  in identical language and that the legislature did not use  the word  domain or home-farm land without attaching to  them  a meaning  and  it was reasonable to suppose that  they  would attach  to those words the meaning which would be  given  to them  in ordinary English, namely, to connote land  appurte- nant  to  the mansion of the lord of the manor kept  by  the lord for his personal use and cultivated under his  personal supervision is distinct from land let to tenant to be formed without  any control from the lord of the manor  other  than such  control  as  incident to the  lease.  We  respectfully agree. To this extent the propositions of the learned Judges in  Periannan’s  case  (supra) the tenability  of  which  we doubted,  can  no longer be held to be good law in  view  of this  Court’s decision in Chidambaram’s case (supra) and  P. Venkataswami v.D.S. Ramireddy, [1976] 3 SCC 665.     In P. Venkataswami v.D.S. Ramireddy (supra) the question was whether the landlord was entitled to ryotwari patta. The High Court applied the tests in Pariannan’s case.  Referring to  the provisions of Sections 13 and 15(1) of  the  Estates Abolition Act (which we have quoted earlier).and reiterating what was said in Chidambaram’s case this Court held: "Thus  even  on the provisions of the Madras Estat  is  Land Act,  1908 considered by the Madras Full Bench,  this  Court appears to have taken a different view. Apart from this, the provisions  we   are   concerned  with,   namely,    Section 13(b)(iii)  of the Madras Estates (Abolition and  Conversion into  Ryotwari) Act, 1948 requires as a condition ‘that  the landholder  has  cultivated such lands himself, by  his  own servants or hired labour’. We are unable to agree that the 422 words  ‘has  cultivated’  could imply a  mere  intention  to cultivate. Apart  from Article 141 of the Constitution of India we  are

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of  the opinion that the decision in Chidambaram and  Venka- taswarni are in consonance with the objects and purposes  of the  Estates  Land Act, the Estate Abolition Act,  the  Inam (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act and the accept- ed objectives of the land reforms legislation.     We  now take up the question as to who were entitled  to ryotwari pattas in this case. The landholders admitted  that if the Pariannan’s tests were not applicable, they would not be entitled to ryotwari patta. Even so we proceed to examine the question on the facts on record. As defined in S.  3(15) of the Estates Land Act, "ryot" means a person who holds for the purpose of agriculture ryoti land in an estate on condi- tion  of paying to the landholder the rent which is  legally due  upon it. Under the Explanation, a person who has  occu- pied ryoti land for a continuous period of 12 years shall be deemed  to be a ryot for all the purposes of this Act.  This Explanation  was  added by the Estates Land  Amendment  Act, 1934  (Act VIII of 1934). The conferment of occupancy  right on the ryot in ryoti land was an object of the Estates  Land Act. The original Section 6 dealing with occupancy right  in ryoti land was substituted by Section 5 of the Amendment Act VIII  of  1934.  Thereafter also it  has  undergone  several amendments. At the relevant time it stood as follows: "6. Occupancy right in ryoti land: (1) Subject to the provi- sions of this Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have  a permanent right of occupancy in his holding. Explanation:  (1) For the purposes of this sub-section,  the expression  ‘every  ryot now in  possession’  shall  include -every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues  in possession of such land at the commencement of this Act. Explanation:  (2) In relation to any inam village which  was not an estate before the commencement of the Andhra  Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936,  but became  an estate by virtue of that Act, or in  relation  to any land in an inam village which ceased to be part 423 of  an estate before the commencement of that Act,  the  ex- pression  ‘now’ and ‘commencement of this Act’ in this  sub- section  and Explanation (1) shall be construed  as  meaning the thirtieth day of June, 1934, and the expression ‘hereaf- ter’  in this sub-section shall be construed as meaning  the period after the thirtieth day of June, 1934. Explanation: (3) In relation to any hamlet, or khandriga  in an inam village which was not an estate before the commence- ment  of  the  Andhra Pradesh  (Andhra  Area)  Estates  Land (Amendment)  Act,  1936, but became an estate by  virtue  of that  Act, the expressions ‘now’ and ‘commencement  of  this Act’,  in  this  sub-section and Explanation  (1)  shall  be construed  as meaning the Seventh day of January  1948,  and the  expression  ‘hereafter’ in this  sub-section  shall  be construed  as  meaning the period after the seventh  day  of January, 1948. Explanation:  (4) Every landholder who receives or  recovers any payment under Section 163 from any person unauthorizedly occupying ryoti land shall be deemed to have thereby  admit- ted such person into possession unless within two years from the  date of receipt of recovery of payment or the first  of such  payments, if more than one, he shall file a suit in  a Civil Court for ejectment against such person.          (2)  Admission to waste land under a  contract  for the pasturage of cattle and admission to land reserved  bona fide  by  a landholder for raising a garden or tope  or  for forest under a contract for the temporary cultivation there-

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of  with agricultural crops shall not by itself confer  upon the  person so admitted a permanent right of occupancy;  nor shall such land, by reason only of such letting or temporary cultivation, become ryoti land." (3, 4, 5 and 6 are not extracted)     Section 6-A which was inserted by the Amendment Act VIII of  1934 provided that a person having a right of  occupancy in land does not lose it by subsequently becoming interested in the land as landholder or by subsequently holding land as an ijaadar or farmer of rent. Section 8 provided for  merger of occupancy rights and said: 424          "Whenever before or after the commencement of  this Act  the  occupancy  right in any ryoti land  vests  in  the landholder,  he  shall have no right to hold the land  as  a ryot but shall hold it as a landholder, but nothing in  this sub-section  shall  prejudicially affect the rights  of  any third person.          (2)  Whenever before or after the  commencement  of this Act the occupancy right in any ryoti land vests in  any co-landholders,  he shall be entitled to hold the land  sub- ject to the payments to his co-landholders of the shares  of the rent which may from time to time payable to them and  if such  co-landholder  lets the land to a third  person;  such third person, shall be deemed to be a ryot in respect of the land.          (3)  The  merger, if any, of  the  occupancy  right under sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not have the effect  of converting ryoti land into private land.          (4) Where after the passing of the Act, the  inter- est  of the ryot in the holding passes to the landholder  by inheritance,  the landholder shall notwithstanding  anything contained in this Act have the right, for a period of twelve years  from the date of succession, of admitting any  person to  the  possession  of such land on such terms  as  may  be agreed upon between them.          (5)  If before the first day of November 1933,  the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in an  estate within  the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of  Sec- tion  3 a final decree or order of a competent  Civil  Court establishing that the tenant has no occupancy right in  such land, and no tenant has acquired any occupancy right in such land  before the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh  (Andhra Area)  Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936,  the  land- holder  shall,  if the land is not private land  within  the meaning  of this Act, have the right,  notwithstanding  any- thing  contained in this Act, for a period of  twelve  years from  the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh  (Andhra  Area) Estates Land (Third Amendment)  Act, 1936, of admitting  any person  to the possession of such land on such terms as  may be agreed upon between them; 425          Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall  be deemed during the said period of twelve  years  or any  part  thereof to affect the validity of  any  agreement between  the  landholder and the tenant  subsisting  at  the commencement  of  the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Area)  Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936". Section  9  provided  that no landholder shall  as  such  be entitled to eject a ryot from his holding or any part hereof otherwise  than  in accordance with the provisions  of  this Act.  Section  10 made the occupancy  rights  heritable  and transferable  providing that "all rights of occupancy  shall be  heritable,  and shall be transferable by sale,  gift  or otherwise."  If  a ryot dies intestate without  leaving  any

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heirs except the Government, his right of occupancy shall be extinguished but the land.   in respect of which he has such right of occupancy shall not cease to be ryoti land.     The Estates Abolition Act accepted the same  definitions of  occupancy right and ryot as in the Estate Land Act.  The above  provisions conferred permanent, heritable and  trans- ferable right of occupancy on the tenant. This right stemmed from the will of the legislature and involved an element  of social  engineering  through law star pro  ratione  voluntas populi: the will of the people stands in place of a  reason. The  right  of the landholder to keep his  private  land  to himself  has therefore to be interpreted in its proper  per- spective.  Statuta pro publico late  interpretatur.  Statute made  for the public good ought to be  liberally  construed. The  concept of past or present intention of the  landholder to  resume personal cultivation of land let out to a  tenant and  still  in possession of the tenant has to  be  strictly construed  against the landlord and liberally in  favour  of the  tenant. The aforesaid doubtful propositions  formulated by  the learned Judges in Periannan’s case must,  therefore, be held to be erroneous. For the same reason the observation of  the  Division Bench in this case that  the  decision  in Periannan’s  case is still good law in face of the  decision of  this Court in Chidambaram (supra), and subsequent  deci- sion  in  Venkataswami’s  case (supra) must be  held  to  be equally  erroneous and to that extent must be overruled  and the  decisions  in  Zamindar of  Chellapalli  v.  Rajalapati Somayya,   (supra); Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal,  (supra) and  in Parish Priest of Karayar Parish  v.  Thiagarajaswami Devasthanam,  (supra)  must be held to have  been  correctly decided.     We  have no doubt that the formation and development  of the  land revenue system in Madras will justify the view  we have  taken in the facts of this case. The formation of  the Madras Presidency was by 426 successive acquisitions by the East India Company. The State of Andhra Pradesh was curved out of Madras. Baden Powell  in Land System of British India, Vol. 3 p. 5 wrote in 1892: "In tracing the progress of the Madras Land Revenue  System, it will be advisable in the first place to review the gener- al  course  of  acquisition, by which  the  Madras  district became British, and next to describe, in a brief and general manner,  the  various  stages of the history  of  the  early revenue  management. Commencing with the  settlement  (above alluded  to)  in  the Baramahal (1792-98),  which  was  soon followed by those of Coimbatore (1799), the ceded  districts (1800), and the Carnatik Districts (1801), we shall see  how the  first raiyatwari system, or rather systems, were  over- thrown for a time by an attempt to make a general  zamindari settlement (1801-1808); how on the failure of the attempt, a proposal for ‘village settlements’ (in the sense of granting leases  for the whole village, to a renter, a headman, or  a joint  body of inhabitants) was tried with  various  success for  a few years; and how, in the end, a raiyatwari  assess- ment was finally ordered ( 18 12-18 18)."     Ryotwari indicates a system where each field or  holding is  dealt with separately, and where the holder is  free  to pay  the  revenue  and keep the field, or  free  himself  by giving it up, as he pleases.     The  first general acquisition of territory by the  East India  Company--the first from a revenue point of view,  was the country around Madras,--known as ‘Jagir’ because it  was originally granted by the Nawab of the Karnatik as a  Jagir; the  revenue  thus assigned was intended as  a  contribution

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towards  the expenses of the wars undertaken in aid  of  the Nawab.     The  next acquisition in point of time was that  of  the Northern Sirkars (often written ‘Circar’). These territories were  granted in 1765 by the Delhi Emperor; but  the  Madras Government,  looking to the practical claim of the Nizam  of Dakhan,  who was hardly even in name subject to Delhi,  also obtained  a grant from him in 1768. The five  administrative divisions known to the Mughal system as ‘Sirkar’ were  those of chicacole (chikakol) Srikakulam, Rajahmundry  (Rajamahen- driveram), Eliore (Alur), Mustafanagar .(or Kandafiti),  and Murtazanagar  (Gantur  or Kandavid). Later they  formed  the districts of Vizagapatam (Visakhapatnam), Gangam, Kishna and Godavari. 427 The northern Sikars had been brought under Muhammadan domin- ion  first in 1471 A.D., and had various fortunes under  the different  contending dynasties. In 1687, Aurangazeb’s  con- quest  of  the Dakhan added them to the Mughal  empire,  and they were ultimately taken over by the Subedar of the Dakhan (Nizam-ul-Mulk) nominally from the Emperor Karukhsir in 1713 A.D.     "These came at once under British administration. It was found that they consisted (1) of lands settled under  zamin- dars, as in Bengal, (2) of haveIi lands, those reserved  for the  support of the royal family and its  immediate  depend- ants, and therefore ‘crown’ property. Such a state of things invited the application of the Bengal system; the  zamindars were  accordingly  left in possession and the  haveIi  lands were parcelled out and leased to revenue farmers for a  term of years. The Jagir lands were in 1780, divided into  blocks and put under a similar system of revenue leases."     When the Board of Revenue issued instructions to adopt a system  of village lesses so as to prepare for some form  of zamindari settlement, i.e. one man should be made answerable for  the revenue of each village or other estate  after  the passing  of Permanent Settlement Regulations in Bengal.  The Zamindari Regulation No. XXV was passed in 1802 and by  1805 introduction  of  the system was effected. In  the  Northern Sirkars land was permanently settled with the zamindars; and the  ‘HaveIi’ lands were made into percels or  mutthas,  and sold  to the highest bidder. The Mutthadars  (or  Mittadars) became  the  proprietors and  permanent  settlement-holders. Each  settlement  became an estate. In  some  districts  the ‘poligars’ became landlords holding sanad-i-milkiat-i-istim- rar  or  title-deed of  perpetual  ownership--their  estates being  called ‘settled polliems’. According to Paden  Powell the zamindari estates were found chiefly in the  North-East- ern  districts and especially in the Ganjam and  Vizagapatam districts.  There were also few Feudatory States which  paid only a fixed tribute.     The village leases continued with some form of joint  or individual  middlemen with varying periods of 3 to 10  years made with a view to eventual permanency. But the system  was not  successful.  Between  the ryotwari  and  village  lease system  the  general difference was that the  ryotwari  only assessed  the ‘field’ or survey-unit, and left the  ryot..to hold it or not as he pleased, provided he gave notice of his intention  in proper time; if he kept the field he must  pay the  assessment  that  was all. The  lease  system  involved payment of a certain sum for a fixed area, whether the  land was cultivated or not. It was no use 428 for  the  middlemen lease-holder to throw up his  land,  for that  would not relieve him of his contract  liability.  The

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idea was to make the villagers jointly and severally respon- sible, though the lease was to the head inhabitants of  each village. Desire was to see a system under which the proprie- tary inhabitants at large of each village should enter  into engagements  with  the Government, and derive a  common  and exclusive  interest  in the cultivation of  their  lands  in proportion of their right of property.     Ultimately  the Ryotwari system was adopted. The end  of the lease proposals and the village system inquiry was  that the home authorities, as Baden Powell says, probably  influ- enced by the opinion of Munro, who visited England in  1807, finally  decided for the Ryotwari system as it was  believed that the village system failed. Hence the Estates  Abolition Act  protected the rights of the ryots by  defining  private land on the one hand and preserving the occupancy rights  of the  ryots  on the other. In doing so the  two  concepts  of ‘private land’ and ‘ryoti’ land along with those of ‘estate’ and ‘occupancy’ assumed significance.     The two villages concerned in the instant case are  said to  be inam viiages. But the origin of the lands in  dispute was  admittedly not known. The characteristics of  the  inam estates and the rights and liabilities of the Inamdars  from time to time have therefore to be taken into account.  Baden Powell wrote at pp.78-80 Vol. 3: Section Ill--Settlement of inam Claims. "The  Settlement,  as we have seen, only assesses  the  land under  raiyatwari tenure. If, however, there is land in  the village,  consisting of a few fields or even a  division  of the  village, held revenue-free, or at a reduced rate,  such an area is shown in the village registers.           But  it may be that a whole village is ‘inam’.  If so,  it constitute a separate estate, like a Zamindari or  a ‘pollam’, and does not come within the scope of the  Settle- ment. Government has no claim to the land or to the revenue, unless  there is a fixed quit-rent, which is recorded as  is the permanently settled revenue or ‘peshkash’ of the Zamind- ari or pollam estate. There was accordingly a special proce- dure under which the right and title of the holders of these favoured estates was elucidated and put on a sound 429 basis; and the quit-rent, Or reduced rate, where the  estate is not entirely revenue-free, determined by rule.          All native governments were in the habit of reward- ing  favourites, providing for the support of mosques,  tem- ples, religious schools, shrines, and for almsgiving and the maintenance of Brahmans or Muhmmadan saints, & C., by grant- ing  the revenue on the land, whether they granted the  land itself or not."     The  Inam Commission of Madras appointed on 16.11.  1858 had the task of validating and issuing title deeds for inams lawfully  in  possession  for fifty years  and  in  resuming others, or commuting them for money pensions. The Commission dealt with all kinds whether they included right in the lard or only Government revenue; they were:        (1) Inams proper, where the land granted, was  either a field, or a village, or a group of villages.        (2) Muhammadan jagirs, which were personal grants and might or might not include the land.        (3)  Shrotriyams (Srotriyam) and  agraharams,  grants certain  (different) classes of Branmans which did not  give more  than  the revenue, leaving the land  in  its  original occupancy,  unless it could be shown that the occupancy  was also granted.     The following nine kinds of inams (classified  according to their object or purpose) were enumerated:

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      (1) For religious  institutions and services connect- ed therewith.        Nearly  a million and a half acres were so  assigned, including temples, pagodas, and mosques. The largest  grants were in the southern districts.        (2)  For purposes of public utility. Such as  support of chatrams (places where refreshment was given  gratuitous- ly),  water  pandais  (drinking places),  topes  or  groves, flower-gardens  for  temple  service  (mandavanam),  schools (Patshalas), for maintaining bridges, ponds and tanks, etc. 430        (3) ‘Dasabandham’ inams for the construction, mainte- nance,  and  repair of irrigation works in  the  Ceded  dis- tricts, in Kistna, Nellore, North Arcot and Salem.       (4) To Brahmans and other religious persons for  their maintenance called ‘Bhatavritti’ and (Muhammadan  ‘Khairat’. They  formed  nearly half the inams of the  Presidency,  and covered more than three and a half million acres.        (5)  Maintenance grants for the families of  poligars and ancient land-officers. These were grants to families  of dispossessed poligars in Baramahal and the ceded  districts; to Kanungos (Chingleput), and to Deshmukhs etc.        (6) Lands alienated for the support of members of the family (also for religious persons) by poligars, etc.  These were  the ‘bisai’ (bissoye), doratanam,  mukhasa,  jivitham, arearam (North Arcot) umlikai, etc.        (7)  Grants connected with the general police of  the country under former rulers: Such were ‘kattubadis’.        (8)  Grants to village headmen, karnams, and  village police (Gramamaniyam, etc. ).        (9)  Grants to village artisans, where they were  not paid by the fees called merai (or in addition to them).     The  Commission  also  took up  enfranchisement  of  the inams,  i.e.  to convert into his own  private  property  by payment  of a moderate quit-rent. From this the inams  could be classified as (1) still unenfranchised; (2)  enfranchised but  liable  to jodi or quit-rent as the case  may  be;  (3) enfranchised,  the  rent  being commuted  or  redeemed.  The Commission work was closed in November 1869. A member of the Board of Revenue continued thereafter. The nature and histo- ry of the inam villages would, therefore, have been  helpful in deciding the claims.     It  was perhaps easier for the landholders to trace  the origin  of the inam villages than for the tenants to do  so. Admittedly that was not done. We  have also considered the question of practice  and  pre- sump- 431 tions  if any in this regard. By Madras Act VIII of 1865  it was enacted that inamdars and other landholders should enter into written agreements with their tenants, the  engagements of the land-owners being termed pattas and those of  tenants being  termed  Muchlika. The patta should  contain,  amongst other  things,  "all  other special terms by  which,  it  is intended the parties shall be bound. The muckhlika should at the option of the landholders, be counterpart of the  patta, or a simple engagement to hold according to the terms of the patta. In the instant case the pattas and the muchlikas  are not claimed to have shown anything to establish the lands to be  private  lands. Only the facts of occasional  change  of tenants and rents have been shown.     The Privy Council in Suryanarayana v. Patanna, [1918] 41 ILR  Madras 10 12, where the decision of the  appeal  mainly depended  on the question whether the Agraharam  Village  of Korraguntapalem  in the Northern Circars of then  Presidency

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of  Madras was an estate, observed that the "term  kudivaram is not defined in the Act. It is a tamil word, and literally signifies  a cultivator’s share in the produce of  the  land held  by him as distinguished from the landlord’s  share  in the  produce  of the land received by him as the  rent.  The landlord’s share is sometimes designated ‘melvaram"     The Privy Council held that there was no presumption  of law  to the effect that in the case of an inamdar it  should be  presumed,  in the absence of inam grant under  which  he held,  that the grant was of the royal share of the  revenue only. "In their Lordships’ opinion there is no such presump- tion of law. But a grant of a village by or on behalf of the Crown under the British rule is in law to be presumed to  be subject to such rights of occupancy, if any, as the cultiva- tors  at  the time of grant may have had."  As  against  the above,  we  now have the statutory presumptions  in  Section 185(3) of the Estates and Act, namely, "that the land  shall be  presumed  not to be private land until the  contrary  is proved,"  and in case of estate within the meaning  of  sub- clause (d) of clause (2) the second proviso (i) and (ii).     This  evolution of the land revenue system concerned  is likely  to remind one of what Sir Henry Maine showed in  his Ancient  Law, "that in early times the only social  brother- hood  recognised was that of kinship, and that almost  every form  of  social organisation, tribe, guild,  and  religious fraternity, was conceived under a similitude of it.  Feudal- ism,  converted  the village community based on  a  real  or assumed consanguinity of its members, into the fief in which the  relations  of tenant and lord were those  of  contract, while those of the 432 unfree  tenant rested on status." It also reminds  one  what was  said in the context of rights over land. "This  earth", says  Jagannatha, "is the cow which grants every  wish;  she affords  property of a hundred various kinds  (inferior,  if the owner need the assent of another proprietor-superior, if his right precede assent); while she deludes hundred owners, like  a deceiving harlot, with the illusion of false  enjoy- ment;  for, in truth, there is no other lord of  this  earth but one, the Supreme Lord."     For  the  foregoing reasons we set  aside  the  impugned Judgment, restore that of the learned Single Judge and allow the appeals. We leave the parties to bear their own costs in these appeals. R.S.S.                                  Appeals allowed. 433