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PETITIONER: PIONEER RUBBER PLANTATION NILAMBUR,KERALA STATE ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT24/08/1992

BENCH: THOMMEN, T.K. (J) BENCH: THOMMEN, T.K. (J) KANIA, M.H. (CJ) SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:  1993 AIR  192            1992 SCR  (3) 972  1992 SCC  (4) 175        JT 1992 (5)   144  1992 SCALE  (2)231

ACT:      Kerala  Private  Forests (Vesting and  Assignment)  Act 1971, Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B).      ‘Private  Forests’-Land set apart for Crowing  Firewood trees  used as fuel for purpose  of manufacturing rubber  or tea  in  smokehouses  or factories or for  personal  use  of estate employees-Whether excluded.      Statutory Interpretation.      Legislative intent-Aid to interpretation.

HEADNOTE:      The  appellants  in  the appeals were  owners  of  Tea, Rubber and Cardamom  estates in the State of Kerala.  For  a large umber of persons employed in the estates quarters were generally  provided and it was in the best interest  of  the estates  that  such persons were  supplied  with  sufficient firewood for cooking as well as for keeping themselves  warm particularly  in view of the high altitude at which many  of the  estates were located.  As large quantities of  firewood were  essential as fuel certain areas in the  estates  where generally   set  apart  for  growing  firewood  trees   like Eucalyptus or redgum.      The  appellants  approached  the  Forest  Tribunal  for granting  them exemption under section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of  the Kerala  Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment)  Act,  1971 for  the  lands  which were used  for  construction  of  the quarters  as  well as for growing fuel trees for  supply  of fuel  to the workers or for the smokehouses.   The  Tribunal granted the exemptions.      The State appealed to the High Court and the High Court held  the lands on which firewood trees were grown  for  the purpose  of fuel for either the smokehouses or factories  or the  employees  in  the  estates were  not  lands  used  for purposes  ancillary to the cultivation of the crops  or  for the                                                        973 preparate on of the same for the market so as to be excluded from the definition of ‘Private forests’ under section  2(f) (1)  (B) of the Act and accordingly vested in the  State  in terms of the Act.

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    Some  of the earlier decisions of this High  Court  had been  taken  the  view  that lands  set  apart  for  growing firewood  trees in the estates for the purpose of  fuel  did not  qualify for exclusion from ‘private forests’ so  as  to prevent  their vesting in the State in terms of the Act  and this  view  was  also followed by the High  Court  in  these judgements.      However,  a  Bench consisting of 5 Judges of  the  same High  Court  subsequently considered this very  question  in State of Kerala v. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT 494, on the ground that  the  law laid down in the earlier  decisions  on  this point was doubted, and this Bench expressed the view that it was  essential for an estate to grow firewood trees for  the purpose  of  fuel  for  the employees as  well  as  for  the smokehouses and factories.  In regard to the requirement  of the  employees the High Court followed the  observations  of this Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk  Land Board and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 839 and held that no  exemption could  be  claimed  in respect of  areas  utilised  for  the cultivation  of  firewood  trees  to  supply  fuel  to   the employees,  discarded the interpretation put on the  section by  earlier decisions and held that a reasonable  areas  set apart for growing firewood trees for the purpose of fuel  in the smokehouses or factories could be excluded from ‘private forests’  and such areas were held qualified as ‘lands  used for the preparation  of the (crops) for the market’.      In  the appeals to this Court on the  common  question: whether land set apart in estates for growing firewood trees such  as  eucalyptus or redgum to be used as  fuel  for  the purpose of manufacturing rubber or tea in the smokehouses or factories  or for the personal use of the employees  in  the estates  are  excluded  from  the  definition  of   ‘private forests’  as  contained in Section 2(f) (1) (i) (B)  of  the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971.      Allowing the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and remanding the cases to the appropriate Forest Tribunals, this court      HELD  : (Majority M.H. Kania, CJI, & Dr. T.K.  Thommen, J. per Thommen, J.)                                                       974      1.   The definition of ‘Private Forests’  contained  in clause  (f)  of  Section 2 of the  Kerala   Private  Forests (Vesting  and Assignment) Act, 1971 shows that  lands  which are  used  principally for the cultivation of  tea,  coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used  for  any purpose  ancillary to the cultivation of such crops  or  for the preparation of the same for the market are excluded from the definition.  [983D-E]      2.  The entire purpose of exclusion of these items from the scope of the definition of ‘Private Forest’ seems to  be not to hinder or create any difficulty in the functioning of plantations  of  tea, coffee, cocoa,  rubber,  cardamom  and cinnamon   as  viable  commercial  enterprises.   In   these circumstances,  it appears reasonable that the minimum  area required for the purpose of growing firewood trees for  fuel in  the factories and smokehouses as well as for  supply  to the  employees of the estates for their domestic use  should be  excluded  from  the  definition  of  the  term  ‘private forests. [983-G]      3.  The burden is on the appellants to show that it has been  their practice to supply firewood to the employees  of the  estates  for their domestic use.  As for  the  firewood required  for the factories and smokehouses in  the  estates there  seems  to  be  no  doubt  about  the  claim  of   the appellants. [984-A]

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    4.   However, where evidence had been led to show  that firewood was steadily and adequately available in the market at reasonable rates for use of the factories or  smokehouses as  well  as  for  supply to the  workers  of  a  particular plantation,  in such a case no land could be  excluded  from the definition of the ‘private forest’ on the ground that it was  required for growing firewood trees for the purpose  of the  estate as well as for the workers.  That,  however,  is not the position in the instant case.  On the pleadings  and evidence  no  further  inquiry on the  point  is  considered necessary. [984-B-C]      5.   Section 2 (f) (1) (i) (B) should be so  understood as to grant exception in respect of lands on which  firewood trees  are  necessary  to be grown for steady  supply  of  a reasonable  quantity of fuel to the employees as well as  to the smokehouses or factories in the estates.  In the absence of satisfactory evidence to show that firewood is adequately and  steadily available in the market at reasonable  prices, such lands, qualify for exemption under section 2(f) (1) (i) (B)  of the Act as "lands used for any purpose ancillary  to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation                                                        975 of the same for the market".  This principle, must hold good in relation to all crops mentioned under the said provision. [984-D-E]      6.   What exactly is the areas which can be  reasonably regarded  as  required for growing firewood trees so  as  to qualify  for  exemption  from vesting under  the  Act  is  a question  of fact which has to be determined with  reference to various factors. [984-G]      7.   No final view is expressed as to what  factors  ar relevant  in determining the reasonable area that  qualifies for  exemption under Section 2 (f) (1) (i) (B) of  the  Act. That is a matter for consideration by  the concerned  Forest Tribunals.      8.   Ammad is an authority for the proposition  that  a reasonable extent of land can be set apart as fuel area  for the purpose of smokehouses and factories in the estates  and such  area qualifies for exemption under Section 2  (f)  (1) (i)  (B)  of the Act.  The incidental  observation  of  this Court  in Ammad that supply of firewood to estate  employees ‘cannot be said to be a purpose ancillary to the cultivation of  plantation  crops’, cannot be taken as an  authority  to disqualify  for exemption a reasonable area meant to  supply fuel to the employees living in the estate quarters.      9.  The Bench in Moosa Hali was right that it would not be  in  accordance with the legislative intent to  read  the provisions  in  question without regard to the  purpose  for which exemption is specially provided for lands  principally used  for the cultivation of certain cash-crops or  for  the preparation  of such crops for the market.  Bearing in  mind that,  in  granting the exemption, it  was  the  legislative intent  not  to disregard the legitimate  interests  of  the estates, namely, their efficient functioning as an  industry engaged  in the production of cash-crops and the welfare  of the concerned employees, it is necessary that a liberal  and purposive construction should be put on the section.      [The  Forest Tribunals to determine the extent  of  the land required, for fuel for the smokehouses or factories  as well as for the employees in the estates].      State of Kerala v. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT 494, approved.      Chettiam Veettil Ammad and Anr. v. Taluk Land Board and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 839, explained and relied on.                                                        976      (Per P.B. Sawant, J., dissenting)

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    1.   The  land  used for growing  fuel  -  whether  for supplying it to the workers or for its use in the smokehouse - would not fall within the purview of Section 2 (f) (i) (B) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment)  Act, 1971  as the said use cannot be said to be a purpose  either "ancillary  to the cultivation of the plantation  crops"  in question  or "for the preparation of the said crops for  the market".      2.   From  the  preamble  as well  as  from  the  other provisions  of  the  Act, it is clear  that  the  object  in enacting   the  Act  was  to  secure  private  forests   and agricultural lands comprised therein to promote agriculture, the  welfare  of the agricultural  population  and  purposes ancillary thereto, and also to assign lands to needy section of the society who were wither living on agriculture or  who were  willing to take up agriculture as the means  of  their livelihood.      In  the  instant  case, the claim for  exemption  of  a certain  area of land is based on the plea that the same  is required  for growing trees the wood of which is needed  for use  as fuel for the domestic use of the workmen.  There  is nothing  on  record  to show that unless  the  fuel-wood  is locally  grown  on  the estate and  made  available  to  the workmen,  they  will have no supply of fuel-wood or  of  any other  fuel,  making it impossible for them to live  in  the estates  and work there.  In the absence of such finding  on record,  it  is  not possible to concede the  claim  on  the ground that the land is used for a purpose "ancillary to the cultivation  of the crops" in question. Similar is the  case with  regard to the claim for exemption from the  provisions of  the Act, of land allegedly required for  growing  trees, the timber of which is used as fuel in the smokehouse, which smokehouse  is  needed for preparation of the crop  for  the market.      3.  In the case of claim for land for growing trees for fuel  for the workers, it is necessary to first  prove  that fuel-  wood  is actually grown in the estate  and  secondly, that  but  for the locally grown fuel, the workers  will  go without  fuel of any kind making it impossible for  them  to work on the estate.  In the case of land claimed for growing trees for fuel for smokehouses, it is likewise necessary  to prove that fuel is being grown on the estate for the purpose and  no fuel-wood is available from any other source  or  no substitute  fuel are available to run the smokehouse.   This is  more  particularly  so  when  the  respondent  -   State Government has pleaded                                                        977 that  the fuel-wood as well as substitute fuel is  available at cheaper price.  Assuming further that fuel-wood available from other sources or the substitute fuel is costlier, it is no  ground for claiming exemption of land from the  Act  for either of the two purposes.  It would only lead to  increase in  the  cost  of  production  necessitated  by  appropriate increase in wages of the workers and by use of such fuel  in the smokehouses.  Such higher cost if any, may be taken care of  by  the market or by suitable crops.  That cannot  be  a consideration for exemption of the land from the  provisions of the Act.      In  the instant appeals, the question whether the  land was  needed for the purpose for which it was  claimed  viz., for  growing fuel wood for supplying to the workers  and  to the  smokehouse  had  not  been  considered  and  a  finding recorded  thereon.   Further,  in some, there  was  also  no evidence that any land much less a specific area of land was in  fact that it was the case of the  respondent-State  that

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there was alternative source of supply of fuel-wood and that there also substitute fuel available, the said contention of the  State  Government  was not dealt  with  by  the  Forest Tribunal.   The  High court did not think  it  necessary  to consider the said contention because of its finding that the land  required  for such purpose could not be said  to  fall within the scope of Section 2(f) (1) (i) (B) of the Act.      4. This Court in Ammad case had taken the view that the area required for growing fuel was not land used for purpose "ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops"  and that it  would not fall within the definition of ‘plantation’  as an  "ancillary purpose".  This is the view of the  Court  on what  constitutes  "ancillary purpose", though the  view  is under the relevant definition under the Kerala Land  Reforms Act.  It  is  not,  therefore, correct  to  rely  upon  this decision  to  hold that this Court has taken the  view  that land  used  for  growing fuel is land  used  for  "ancillary purpose"  under the 1971 Act.  This is apart from  the  fact that even under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, the view  taken is against such contention.  It is, therefore, not  possible to  agree  with  the view taken by the large  Bench  of  the Kerala High Court in Mossa Haji case.      5.  The larger Bench of the Kerala High Court in  Moosa Haji  case rejected the claim for land for growing fuel  for supply to workers                                                        978 relying on the decision of this Court in Ammad.  However, it had  incongruously  enough accepted the claim for  land  for growing  fuel  for  use  in  the  smokehouse.   The   Judges themselves  have  described  the  view  taken  by  them   as "unorthodox"  and which may" almost amount to re-reading  of the  latter  part  of  Section  2(f)(1)(i)(B)  of  the   Act differently".      6. The view taken by the earlier Benches,  particularly by   the  Full  Bench  in  State  of  Kerala  v.   Malayalam Plantations   Ltd,   (1980)  KLT  976  (FB)   is   therefore preferable.      State  of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantations Ltd.,  (1980) KLT 976 (FB), approved.      Chettiam Veettil Ammad and another, etc, etc. v.  Taluk Land  Board  and  others,  etc.  etc.  AIR  1979  SC   1573, considered.      State  of  Kerala  v.  Moosa  Haji,  (1984)  KLT   494, disapproved.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.  106- 107 of 1982.      From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  4.1.1980  of  the Kerala High Court in M.F.A. Nos. 169 and 226 of 1977.                          WITH      Civil Appeal Nos. 2050, 557-61 and 1214-18 of 1981.      T.S.   Krishnamurthi  Iyer,  G.  Viswanatha  Iyer,   S. Sukumaran,  J.B. Dadachanji, Baby Krishnan, K.  Prabhakaran, Devan and E.M.S. Anam of the Appellants.      A.S. Nambiar and K.R. Nabiar for the Respondents.      The Judgments of the Court were delivered by      THOMMEN,  J.  A  common question arises  in  all  these cases.   Are lands set apart in the estates in question  for growing  firewood trees such as eucalyptus or redgum  to  be used as fuel for the purpose of manufacturing rubber or  tea in the smoke-houses or factories or for the personal use  of the employees in the estates excluded from the definition of

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‘private  forests’ as contained in section 2(f)(1)(i)(B)  of the Kerala Private Forests                                                        979 (Vesting  and  Assignment)  Act,  1971  (Act  26  of   1971) (hereinafter  referred  to as ‘the Act’)?  The  Kerala  High Court   in the three judgments, which are impugned in  these appeals,  held  that such lands fell within  the  expression ‘private forest’ and accordingly vested in the State in term of  the Act.  The High Court rejected the contention of  the appellants to the contrary.          We shall now read section 2(f)(i)(B):-          "2.  In  this  Act, unless  the  context  otherwise          requires,-          (f) ‘private forest’ means -          (1) in relation to the Malabar district referred to          in      sub- section (2) of section 5 of the States          Reorganization Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956)-          (i)  any land to which the Madras  Preservation  of          Private     Forests Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXVII  of          1949),     applied immediately before appointed day          excluding -              (B)  lands which are used principally  for  the          cultivation   of  tea,  offices,   cocoa,   rubber,          cardamom  or   cinnamon  and  lands  used  for  any          purpose  ancillary  to  the  cultivation  of   such          crops  or  for  the preparation  of  the  same  for          the market."                                         (emphasis supplied)      The  High Court held that the lands on  which  firewood trees  were  grown for the purpose of fuel  for  either  the smoke-house  or  factories or the employees in  the  estates were not lands used for purpose ancillary to the cultivation of  the  crops or for the preparation of the  same  for  the market so as to be excluded from the definition of  ‘private forests’ which vested in the State.      It  is not disputed that large quantities  of  firewood are essential as fuel for the manufacture  of tea or  rubber and  certain  areas in the estates generally set  apart  for growing  firewood  trees like Eucalyptus or redgum.   It  is also not disputed that large number of persons are  employed in  the  estates where quarters are generally  provided  for them  and  it is in the best interests of the  estates  that such persons are supplied with sufficient                                                        980 firewood for cooking as well as for keeping themselves warm, particularly  in  view of the high altitude  at  which  many estates are located.      Some of the earlier decisions of the Kerala high  Court had taken the view that lands set apart for growing firewood trees in the estates for the purpose of fuel did not qualify for exclusion from ‘private forests’ so as to prevent  their vesting in the State in terms of the Act.  This was the view that was followed in the impugned judgments.  Significantly, however,  a  Bench consisting of five Judges of  the  Kerala High Court subsequently considered this very question in the State  of Kerala v. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT  494,  apparently because  the law laid down in the earlier decisions  on  the point was doubted.  The larger Bench expressed the view that it  was essential for an estate to grow firewood  trees  for the  purpose  of fuel for the employees as well as  for  the smoke-houses and factories.  In regard to the requirement of the  employees,  the  High Court  felt  constrained  by  the observations  of  this Court in Chettiam Veettil  Ammad  and Anr, v. Taluk Land Board and Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 839.  It was accordingly  held  that  no exemption could  be  claimed  in

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respect of areas utilised for cultivation of firewood  trees to  supply fuel of the employees.  However,  discarding  the interpretation  put  on the section in some of  the  earlier decisions  of  the  High Court, the learned  Judges  of  the larger  Bench  held  that a reasonable  area  set  apart  of growing firewood trees for the purpose of fuel in the smoke- houses   or  factories  could  be  excluded  from   ‘private forest’s.  Such areas, they held, qualified as  ‘lands  used for the preparation of the (crops) for the market’.      Referring to the need for growing firewood trees in  an estate, the larger Bench of the High Court observed :-          "A  practice or custom had thus grown up  with  the          industry  where  it  was  the  obligation  of   the          employers  to provide the employees  with  drinking          water, canteen, creches, umbrellas, blankets, rain-          coats,  foodgrains, provisions, fire-wood  and  the          like,  Fire-wood  in particular  was  an  important          necessity  in the cold climate on the high  ranges.          Most  of the estate managements had  been  planting          redgum  for example, to ensure a steady  supply  of          firewood to the community, and also for use in  the          smoke-houses  and estate factories.   ‘Any  purpose          ancillary to cultivation’ in S.2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the          Vesting Act was deliberate-                                                        981          ly  kept wide by the legislature, because  it  knew          that there were recognised ‘uses’ other than  those          specifically  enumerated  in the  Explanation.  The          object  of  the Act is to improve the  lot  of  the          rural population, and it should have been far  from          the  mind  of  the legislators  to  deprive  estate          employees  of the facilities they were enjoying  at          the  commencement of the Act.  Supply of  fire-wood          employees  in  accordance with  the  industry  wide          practice should therefore be taken as ancillary  to          the Cultivation of plantation crops......."                                          (emphasis supplied)      However,  the  learned Judges felt constrained  by  the decision of this Court in Ammad (supra).  They observed:-          "These   arguments   of  counsel   are   no   doubt          persuasive, but in paragraph (54) of its judgment in          C. Veettil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board, AIR (1979) SC          1573,  the  Supreme Court has held that  supply  of          fire-wood to estate employees ‘cannot be said to be          a   purpose   ancillary  to  the   cultivation   of          plantation crops’.  That decision was rendered in a          case arising from the ceiling provisions are almost          identical.  We cannot therefore permit ourselves to          be  swayed by the reasoning of counsel, and we  are          bound to hold that the claim under this sub-head is          impermissible."      This observation indicates that the larger Bench of the High  Court  might have come to the opposite  conclusion  as regards fuel for the employees had it not been for a certain observation of this Court in Ammad [1979] 3 SCR 839.      However, the learned Judges felt no such constraint  in regard  to  fuel for the smoke-houses and factories  in  the estates.   Adopting  what  they refer to as  a  liberal  and purposive  interpretation, the learned judges of  the larger Bench held that a reasonable portion of the jungle area  set apart  for  purposes of firewood could be regarded  as  land used to facilitate preparation of the crops for the market.      We have referred to the decision of the larger Bench of the High                                                        982

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Court  at some length to show that the final view which  the High  Court has taken subsequent to the  impugned  judgments supports  the  contentions  of the  appellants’  counsel  as regards fuel for the smoke-houses and factories.      We shall now refer to the observation of this Court  in Ammad  [1979] 3 SCR 839.  It is important to  remember  that the  question regarding fuel was not one of the  main  point which arose for consideration in Ammad.  The main points  of controversy  in  that case are correctly summarised  in  the headnotes as follows :-          "1.   Whether  lands  concerted  into   plantations          between April 1. 1964 and January 1, 1970 qualified          for exemption under s.81(1)(e) of the Act.          2. Whether a certificate of purchase issued by  the          Land  Tribunal under s. 72K of the Act was  binding          on  the  Taluk  Land  Board  in  proceedings  under          Chapter III of the Act.          3.  Whether the validity or invalidity of transfers          effected   by  persons  owning  or  holding   lands          exceeding  the  ceiling limit could  be  determined          with reference to the ceiling area in force on  the          date  of  the transfer or in  accordance  with  the          ceiling area prescribed by Act 35 of 1969 - whether          sub-section  (3)  of  s. 84  was  retrospective  in          operation".      These  three points are in no way  connected  with  the point  in  issue in the present cases.   That  judgment  was rendered in a batch of cases and one of the questions  which incidentally   arose was as regards firewood trees grown  in the  estates.  That question arose in C.A. No. 227 of  1978, and  it  has been discussed at page 870 of  the  judgment  : (1979) 3 SCR 839, 870.  This Court held that the ‘fuel area’ claimed for the manufacture of tea was exorbitant. The  High Court  had allowed the entire claim of 924.01 acres as  fuel area.   Setting  aside  the High  Court  order,  this  Court restored  the  original  order of the Land  Board  and  thus limited  the  exemption  to 200 acres as fuel  area for  the requirement of the factory.  Ammad is thus an authority  for the preposition that a reasonable extent of land can be  set apart  as  fuel  area for the purpose  of  smoke-houses  and factories  in  the  estates  and  such  area  qualifies  for exemption  under section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act.   At  the same time, the incidental observation of this Court in Ammad cannot be taken as an authority to disqualify for  exemption a                                                         983 reasonable area meant to supply fuel to the employees living in the estate quarters.      We agree with the learned Judges of the larger Bench of the  Kerala  High Court that it would not be  in  accordance with  the legislative  intent  to  read  the  provisions  in question  without regard to the purpose for which  exemption is  specially  provided for lands principally used  for  the cultivation of certain cash-crops or for the preparation  of such  crops  for  the  market.  Bearing  in  mind  that,  in granting the exemption, it was the legislative intent not to disregard  the legitimate interests of the estates,  namely, their  efficient functioning as an industry engaged  in  the production  of cash-crops and the welfare of  the  concerned employees,  it  is necessary that a  liberal  and  purposive construction should be put on the section.      A   perusal  of  the  definition  of  Private   Forests contained  in clause (f) of section 2 of the Kerala  Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 shows that  lands which  are  used  principally for the  cultivation  of  tea,

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coffee,  cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands  used for  any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such  crops or  for  the  preparation of the same  for  the  market  are excluded from the definition.  The observations of the  five learned  Judges of the Kerala High Court in State of  Kerala v. Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT page 494 show that all the  Judges considered  that  it  was essential for an  estate  to  grow firewood trees for the purpose of fuel for the employees  as well  as for the smoke-houses and factories.  This view  was taken particularly in the light of the fact that the estates concerned  were at a considerable height where it  was  cold and  it  would not be feasible for the employees  to  secure heating material to keep warm and for domestic purposes.      The entire purpose of exclusion of the items set out in the foregoing paragraph from the scope of the definition  of Private  Forest  seems  to be not to hinder  or  create  any difficulty in the functioning of plantations of tea, coffee, cocoa,  rubber, cardamom and cinnamon as  viable  commercial enterprises.  In these circumstances, it appears  reasonable that  the minimum area required for the purpose  of  growing firewood trees for fuel in the factories and smoke-houses as well as for supply to the employees of the estates for their domestic  use should be excluded fro1m the definition of  the term ‘private forest’.  We must, however, emphasise that the burden  is  on  the appellants to show  it  has  been  their practice to supply                                                        984 firewood to the employees of the estates for their  domestic use.   As  for the firewood required for  the factories  and smoke-houses  in  the estates, there seems to  be  no  doubt about the claim of the appellants.      However,  where  evidence  had been led  to  show  that firewood was steadily and adequately available in the market at reasonable rates for use of the factories or smoke-houses as  well  as  for  supply to the  workers  of  a  particular plantation,  in such a case no land could be  excluded  from the  definition of the private forest on the ground that  it was  required for growing firewood trees for the purpose  of the  estate as well as for the workers.  That,  however,  is not  the position in the case before us.  On  the  pleadings and evidence before us, we do not consider that any  further inquiry on the point is necessary.      In  our  view,  section  2(f)(1)(i)(B)  should  be   so understood  as  to grant exemption in respect  of  lands  on which  firewood trees are necessary to be grown  for  steady supply of a reasonable quantity of fuel to the employees  as well as to the smoke-houses or factories in the estates.  In the absence of satisfactory evidence to show  that  firewood is  adequately  and  steadily available  in  the  market  at reasonable  prices,   such lands, in our view,  qualify  for exemption  under section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act as  "lands used  for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation  of  such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market". This  principle, in our view, must hold good in relation  to all  crops  mentioned under the  aforesaid  provision.   The Tribunal  shall merely ascertain as to what is  the  minimum reasonable area of land required for growing firewood  trees to be used as fuel in the factories or smoke-houses and  for supply to the employees for their domestic purpose, if  such supply to the latter is proved, and to exclude  such area in demarcating private forest.      What  exactly  is  the area  which  can  be  reasonably regarded  as  required for growing firewood  trees  for  the aforesaid  purposes  so  as to qualify  for  exemption  from vesting under the Act is a question of fact which has to  be

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determined with reference to various factors.  Some of these factors are mentioned by the larger Bench of the High  Court in the following words :-          "32. The next point is what area of the jungle land          could  be  excluded on the above basis?  A  precise          assessment  will almost be impossible, because  the          quantum of fire-wood needed for                                                        985           Smoking  purpose  will  depend on  the  volume  of          rubber to be processed,the yield of the trees,  the          quality  of the wood and other factors.   The  best          solution  seems  to  be  to  make  an   approximate          assessment  as was made by the Taluk Land Board  in          Ammad’s case(supra)."      We do not express any final view as to what factors are relevant  in determining the reasonable area that  qualifies for exemption under section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act.   That is  a  matter  for consideration  by  the  concerned  forest tribunals.      In the circumstances, the judgments of the Kerala  High Court impugned in these appeals are set aside and the  cases are  remanded to the appropriate forest tribunals :  namely, the  Forest Tribunal, Manjeri with respect to  Civil  Appeal Nos.106-107  of  1982; the Forest  Tribunals,  Palghat  with respect  to  Civil Appeal No.2050 of 1981;  and  the  Forest Tribunal, Calicut with respect to Civil Appeal Nos. 557-61 & 1214-18  of 1981.  The tribunals shall determine the  extent of the land required, as aforesaid, for fuel for the  smoke- houses  or  factories as well as for the  employees  in  the estates.      The appeals are allowed in the above terms.  We do not, however, make any order as to costs.      SAWANT,J.  I  have  gone through the  judgement  of  my learned  brother  Justice  Thommen.  Since I  am  unable  to persuade  myself  to accept the view taken there,  with  due deference, I am pronouncing this separate judgement.      2.  A common question which falls for consideration  in all  these appeals in the meaning  of the  expression  "land used  for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation  of  such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market"  in Section 2(f)(10(i)(B) of the Kerala Private Forests  Vesting and  Assignment  Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to  as  the "Act").  In  order  to appreciate  the  controversy,  it  is necessary to understand the scheme of the Act.      3.   As the preamble of the Act state, private  forests in  the  State  of Kerala are  agricultural  lands  and  the Government considered that such agricultural lands should be so utilised as to increase the agricultural-                                                       986 production  and to promote the welfare of  the  agricultural population  in the State.  It is with a view to give  effect to  this  objective  that it was  felt  necessary  that  the private  forests  which are nothing but  agricultural  lands should  vest in the Government.  With this end in view,  the Act  was  brought into force w.e.f.10th May, 1971  which  is also  the appointed day under the Act. Section 2(f)  of  the Actl defines "private forests" as follows:           "2  Definitions.  In this Act, unless the  context          requires,-           (f) ’private forest’ means-           (1)  in relation to the Malabar district  referred          to in sub-section           (2)   of  section 5 of the  States  Reorganisation          Act,1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956)           (i)   any land to which the Madras Preservation of

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        Private Forests Act,1949 (Madras Act XXVII of 1949)          applied   immediately  before  the  appointed   day          excluding-           (A)   lands which are gardens or nilams as defined          in the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1963 (1 of 1964);           (B)    lands  which are used principally  for  the          cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom          or  cinnamon  and  lands   used  for  any   purpose          ancillary  to the cultivation of such Crops or  for          the preparation of the same for the market.           Explanation.  Lands used for the  construction  of          office buildings, godowns, factories, quarters  for          workmen,  hospitals, schools and playgrounds  shall          be  deemed to be lands used for purposes  ancillary          to the cultivation of such crops;           (C) lands which  are  principally cultivated  with          cashew   or  other  fruit  bearing  trees  or   are          principally cultivated with any other  agricultural          crop and           (D)  sites of buildings and lands  appurtenant  to          and  necessary for the convenient enjoyment or  use          of such buildings;           (ii)   any forest not owned by the Government,  to          which the-                                                         987           Madras  Preservation of Private  Forests  Act,1949          did  not  apply, including waste  lands  which  are          enclaves within  wooded areas.           (2)  in  relation to the remaining  areas  in  the          State  of  Kerala,any  forest  not  owned  by   the          Government,   including  waste  lands   which   are          enclaves within wooded areas.           Explanation.  For the purposes of this Clause,   a          land   shall   be  deemed  to  be   a   waste   and          nothwithstanding the existence thereon of scattered          trees or shrubs."      Section  3  of  the Act provides  for  vesting  of  the ownership  and  possession   of  all  private  forests   [so defined]  in  the  Government free  from  all  encumbrances. However,  sub-section (2) of this section excludes from  the land  to be so vested, so much extent of land  comprised  in private  forests,  which  is held by  the  owner  under  his personal  cultivation  as  is  within  the  ceiling    limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms   Act,  1963 or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto.   The explanation  to sub-section (2)  states  that ’cultivation’would  include  cultivation of trees or  plants of  any  species.  Likewise, sub-section (3)  of  Section  3 excludes so much extent of private forests held by an  owner which  is held by him under a valid registered  document  of title  executed  before the appointed day and  intended  for cultivation by him which together with  other lands held  by him  does  not  exceed  the  extent  of  the  ceiling   area applicable  to  him  under Section 82  of  the  Kerala  Land Reforms  Act, 1963.sub-section (4) of Section 3 states  that for the purposes of sub-sections (2) and (3) private forests shall be deemed to be lands to which the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1963 is applicable and they shall be deemed to be ’other dry  lands’  for the purposes of  calculating  the   ceiling limit under that Act.      Section  4  of  the Act then States  that  the  private forests  shall  be deemed to be reserved forests  under  the Kerala  Forest  Act  so long as they remain  vested  in  the Government.  Section  8 provides for settlement of  disputes which arise with regard to (a) whether any land is a private

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forest or not and (b) whether any private forest or  portion thereof  is  vested  in the Government  or  not.   The  said dispute is to be resolved by the Tribunal constituted  under Section  7 of the Act.  An appeal against the said  decision of the Tribunal lies to the High Court under Section 8 A  of the  Act.  Section 9 of the Act states that no  compensation shall  be payable for the vesting in the Government  of  any private forest or for the extinguishment of the-                                                        988 right,  title and interest of the owner or any other  person in such private forest.      Section  10 then provides firstly, for  reserving  such extent of the private forests vested in the Government under sub-section  (3)  or  the lands comprised  in  such  private forests  as may be necessary for purposes  directed  towards the promotion of agriculture or the welfare of  agricultural population  or for purposes ancillary thereto and  secondly, for   assigning on registry or lease, the remaining  private forests  or  the lands comprised in private forests  to  (a) agriculturists,  (b) agricultural labourers, (c) members  of scheduled castes or scheduled tribes who are willing to take up  agricultural  as  the means  of  their  livelihood,  (d) unemployed   young   persons  belonging   to   families   of agriculturists  and  agricultural  labourers  who   have  no sufficient  means of livelihood and who are willing to  take up  agriculture  as the means of their  livelihood  and  (e) labourers  belonging  to  families   of  agriculturists  and agricultural  labourers whose principal means of  livelihood before  the appointed day was income they obtained as  wages for  work in connection with or related  to private  forests and  who are willing  to  take  up agriculture as  means  of their livelihood.      Under  Section  11,  the  assignment  of  the   private forests  has  to be completed as far as may  be  within  two years from the date of the publication of the Act.   Section 13 bars jurisdiction of civil courts to  decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is required to be decided or dealt with or to be determined by the tribunal, the  custodian or any other officer.  Section  15   provides for the constitution of an Agriculturists Welfare Fund to be utilised  for the settlement and welfare of persons to  whom private  forests or lands comprised in private forests  have been  assigned.  It is not necessary to refer to  the  other provisions of the Act.      Thus   from  the  preamble  as  well  from  the   other provisions  of  the  Act, it is clear  that  the  object  in enacting  the  said Act was to secure  private  forests  and agricultural lands comprised therein to promote agriculture, the  welfare  of the agricultural  population  and  purposes ancillary  thereto,  and  also  to  assign  lands  to  needy sections   of  the  society  who  were  either   living   on agriculture  or who were willing to take up  agriculture  as the means of their livelihood.      4.  The aforesaid objectives and the provisions of  the Act help us-                                                         989 construe the provisions of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the  Act which  fall for consideration in the present case.  What  is meant by "ancillary to the  cultivation" has been  explained by  the Explanation to sub-clause (B) which shows  that  the lands  for  the construction of office  buildings,  godowns, factories,  quarters  for workmen,  hospitals,  schools  and playgrounds  shall be  deemed to be lands used for  purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such  crops.  No doubt,  the Explanation  contains  a  deeming  provision   and  hence  a

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purpose  similar in nature to those  mentioned  therein  may also  be  said to be included therein.  But it  is  open  to expand  the  meaning of the word  "ancillary"  beyond  it,to include  in it land which is not required directly  for  any such purpose, but for growing provisions needed by those who work  to cultivate the crops? If yes, the  land for  growing which of the provisions is to be included in the meaning  of the said word ?  It is true that the Explanation  deems land used  for schools, hospitals  and playground meant  for  the workers as land ancillary to cultivation of the crops.   But precisely   because  the   said  purposes  are  remotely  or mediately  connected  with the cultivation of the  crops  in question  that  they  are  specifically  mentioned  in   the Explanation.   It  also further appears that  the  needs  of education,  medical facilities  and sports cannot  otherwise be  satisfied  locally where the  workers  are  required  to live.   Food and clothing  are more basic needs.  It  cannot be  suggested that the land needed for growing  food  grains and  cotton  should on that account be considered   as  land used for ancillary purpose,  In the present case, the  claim for  exemption  for a certain area of land is based  on  the plea that the same is required for growing trees the wood of which is needed for use as  fuel for the domestic use of the workmen. There is nothing on record to show that unless  the fuel-wood is locally grown on the estate and made  available to the workmen, they will have no supply of fuel-wood or  of any other fuel, making it impossible for them to live in the estates of and work there.  In the  absence of such  finding on record, it is not possible to concede the  said  claim on the ground that the land is used for a purpose "ancillary to the cultivation of the crop" in question.      Similar  is  the  case with regard  to  the  claim  for exemption,  from  the  provisions  of  the   Act,  of   land allegedly required for growing trees, the timber of which is used as fuel in the smoke-house, which smoke-house is needed for  the  the preparation of the crop for the  market.   The claim  is  based on the  second leg of the  same  expression namely"....or  for the preparation of the same  (i.e.  crops) for the market".  There is again nothing on-                                                        990 record  to  show that unless the trees for  fuel  are  grown captively on the estates, no fuel-wood would be available or no  other substitute fuel can be used for the purpose.   The land  needed for the smoke-house is admittedly exempted from the  Act.   The exemption sought is for the land  needed  to grow  trees,the timber of which can be used as fuel  in  the smoke-house.   The  fuel,  it is claimed  is  necessary  for drying  the crop to prepare it  for the market.  Apart  from the fact that the relationship between the land required for growing  fuel trees and preparation of crops for the  market is remote, the absolute  need  for the land for the  purpose as  stated  above,  is  not proved. It  has  further  to  be remembered  in  this connection that the  Explanation  while including in it land for such remote purposes as  hospitals, schools  and  playgrounds  has chosen not  to  include  land required for fuel whether for the workers or for the  smoke- house.  What is further, while expressly exempting the  land for  the smoke-house, it has made not reference to the  land needed for growing fuel for use in the smoke-house.  By  the normal rule of interpretation, therefore, it will have to be held  that the what is not included is deemed to  have  been excluded.      Hence in the case of claim for land for  growing  trees for  fuel  for the workers, it is necessary to  first  prove that fuel-wood  is  actually  grown  in  the  estate   and

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secondly,that but for the locally grown fuel, the  workers will go without fuel of any kind making it  impossible  for them to work on the estate.  In the case of land claimed for growing  trees for fuel for smoke-houses, it  is  likewise necessary  to prove that fuel is being grown on  the  estate for the purpose and no fuel-wood is available from any other source or no substitute fuel are available to run the smoke- house.   This is more particularly so when  the  respondent- State  Government has pleaded that the fuel-wood as well  as substitute  fuel  is available at cheaper  price.   Assuming further  that fuel-wood available from other sources or  the substitute  fuel is costlier, it is no ground  for  claiming exemption  of  land  from  the Act for  either  of  the  two purposes.  It  would only lead to increase in the  cost  of production  necessitated   by appropriate increase in  wages of the workers and by use of such fuel in the   smoke-house. Such higher cost if any, may be taken care of by the  market or  by suitable crops.  That cannot be a  consideration  for exemption  of the land from the provisions of the Act.      In Civil appeal Nos.106-107 of 1982, before the  Forest Tribunal  the  applicant  was the  present  appellant.   The appellant had made two claims.                                                   991 One related to the land allegedly planted with rubber  which land was cut off from the rest of the plantation and   which had been trespassed upon by the Survey authorities as having been vested in the Government.  The second claim related  to 25 per cent of the total area of plantation estimated at  44 acres which was required  as "ancillary land".  The Tribunal on  the admission of the respondent-authorities granted  the said  claim  although in the body of the  judgement,  it  is observed  that the claim except that for 5.50 acres of  land was  being  accepted.   As regards  the  second  claim,  the Tribunal found that no land had been specifically  earmarked or allotted to the appellant as ancillary land; there was  a play-ground,  smoke-house  and  workers’  quarters  in   the estate, though the accommodation required by the labourers was not sufficient for accommodating all the labourers.  The Plantation  Officer had issued a notice to provide  quarters to  all the labourers.  The Tribunal, in the  circumstances, found  that  the  land for providing  further  quarters  was necessary.   The Tribunal  thereafter granted an  extent  of land which would make  up the total area of  the  plantation to  200  acres  as being sufficient and  necessary  for  the purpose.   That came to, according to the Tribunal,  in  all 23.92 acres.  What is necessary to note from the  Tribunal’s decision  is that no claim for growing fuel trees either for supply  of  fuel to the workers or for the  smoke-house  was made before the Tribunal.  The only claim was for more  area for   constructing   sufficient  number   of   quarters   to accommodate all the labourers.      Against this decision of the Tribunal, both the present appellants and the respondent-State Government had preferred appeals  to  the  High Court which in  paragraph  3  of  its judgment observed as follows:           "The  Forest  Tribunal  found  on  the  plea   for          exclusion  of  44 acres as ancillary land  that  so          much  extent  of  land was  not  required  for  the          purpose  of planting trees to be used  as  firewood          and for construction of quarters of the labourers."      However, in the Tribunal’s decision there is no mention of  any  claim for land required for firewood.   It  appears that  the  High  Court  while  deciding  the  appeals   had extracted the case of the petitioner from the petition   and the  statement accompanying the  petition filed  before  the

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Tribunal.  In that petition,the  petitioner had made a claim for land for planting trees to use the timber thereof in due course as firewood in addition to the land for  construction of workers’ quarters in future.  The-                                                        992 High  Court  rejected the claim for both on the ground  that the Act did not envisage exemption of  land for the  purpose of  construction of quarters and for growing fuel  trees  in future.  According to the High Court, the Act envisaged  the exemption  of   the  land  which was  being  used  for  such purposes  on  the appointed day, viz., 10th  May,1971.  The High Court also gave an additional reason for rejecting  the said  claim  pointing  out  that  there  was  no  claim  for exclusion   of any specific area of land but  the  exemption was  claimed  vaguely to the extent of 25 per  cent  of  the plantation anywhere adjoining the plantation.      In  Civil  Appeal No. 2050 of 1981 the  crop  concerned again  was rubber and before the Tribunal the exemption   of land  was  sought  on the ground that it  was  required  for growing green manure for the crop and for growing fuel trees for  collecting firewood for use in the smoke-house.   There was  no  claim  for growing fuel for  supplying  it  to  the workers.  The  stand of the Government was that  the  lands claimed were never brought under cultivation at any point of time  and that since the lands were six miles away from  the rubber  estate, they did not form part of the  estate.  The Tribunal allowed  the said claim.  On appeal by  the  State Government, the High Court rejected the claim relying upon a decision  of the Full Bench in state of Kerala v. Malayalam Plantations Limited, (1980) KLT 976 (FB).      In  Civil  Appeal Nos. 557-61 and 1214-18 of  1981  the crop involved is tea.  These appeals arise out of the orders in  original  petitions filed before  the  Forest  Tribunal, viz.,  Petition Nos. 3,4,5,6 and 26 of 1975.  The facts  are as follows:      In  the original petitions the  petitioners’[appellants herein] claim was that the firewood was required for  smoke- house  because furnace oil was costly.  Against   this,  the respondent-State  Government’s case  was that  firewood  and other fuel were available elsewhere and  secondly the  claim for  land was vague since no particular area was  specified. The Tribunal allowed the claim of the petitioners.  However, in appeal before the High Court by the State Government, the High Court relying upon a decision of this Court in Chettiam Veettil Ammad and another, etc. etc. v. Taluk Land Board and others, etc. etc., AIR 1979 SC 1573 pointed out that  supply of fuel wood could not be said to be a purpose ancillary  to the  cultivation  or  plantation of crops.  The  High  Court repelled  the  contentions  of the  present  appellant  that Eucalyptus  trees were fruit bearing trees and therefore-                                                   993 exempt  under  Section 2(f)(1)(i)(C) of the Act.  The  High Court thus  allowed the appeals of the State Government  and rejected  the  claim  of  the appellants.  It  also  appears from the certificate granted by the High Court under Article 133(1)  of  the  Constitution, that it was  granted  on  the ground  that  a  substantial  question  of  law  of  general importance    concerning   the  interpretation   of  Section 2(f)(1)(i)(C) of the Act was involved.  It thus appears that the certificate was not asked for and granted on the  ground that  the  land  was required for  a  purpose  mentioned  in Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act.      These are the facts in different appeals before us.  It is, therefore, clear as far as the facts involved   in  the appeals  before us are concerned, the question  whether  the

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land  was  needed for the purpose for which it  was  claimed viz.,  for  growing fuel wood for supplying to  the  workers and  to  the  smoke-house as stated earlier,  had  not  been considered and a finding recorded thereon.  Further, in some of  the  matters, there was no claim for  land  for  growing fuel-wood  for supplying to the workers.  There was also  no evidence that any land much less a specific area of land was in fact being used for growing fuel-wood.  It must be  noted that  in  spite  of the fact that it was  the  case  of  the respondent-State that there was alternative source of supply of  fuel-wood  and  that  there  was  also  substitute  fuel available,  the said contention of the State Government  was not  dealt with by the Forest Tribunal.  The High Court  did not  think  it  necessary to consider  the  said  contention because  of  its  finding that the land  required  for  such purpose  could  not  be said to fall  within  the  scope  of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act.      The  High  Court in support to its view that  the  land required  for  growing  fuel-wood for supplying  it  to  the workers or for using in the smoke-house did not fall  within the  scope  of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Act,  as  stated above,  has also relied upon the decision of this  Court  in chettiam Veettil Ammad & Anr. etc. etc. v. Taluk Land  Board &  Ors.  etc. etc., AIR 1979 SC 1573.  It  is  necessary  to briefly  deal  with the said decision and  the  observations made  in the said decision which are relevant to  the  point before  us  since  the appellants have also  tried  to  take support  from  the  very  same  decision  to  advance  their contentions.  The controversy  in the said case  related  to the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.  It was not  a decision under the Act which falls for  consideration before  us.  This  Court by the  said  common  decision  had disposed of a large number-                                              994 of  civil appeals arising under that Act.   The  controversy related to three main points which were as follows:           "1. Whether  lands  converted  into   plantations          between  April 1, 1964 and January 1, 1970  qualify          for exemption under Section 81 (1)(a) of the Act?           2.  Whether a certificate of purchase  issued  by          the  Land Tribunal under Section 72K of the Act  is          binding  on  the Taluk Land  Board  in  proceedings          under Chapter III of the Act?           3.    Whether  the  validity  or   invalidity   of          transfers  effected  by persons owning  or  holding          lands   exceeding  the  ceiling  limit  should   be          determined  with reference to the ceiling  area  in          force on the date of the transfer or in  accordance          with the ceiling area prescribed by Act 36 of 1969-          Whether sub-section (3) of Section 64 is          retrospective in operation?"       The Court negatived the contentions of the  appellants on  Points 1 and 3 and then proceeded to examine the  merits of each of the appeals with regard to Point No. 2 where  the said point was raised.  Only in two appeals, viz., C.A.  No. 2811  of  1977  and  C.A. No. 227  of  1978  dealt  with  in paragraphs 53 and 54 respectively of the decision, the claim for  the  exemption of land used for growing fuel  fell  for consideration under that Act and this is how the Court dealt with the said claim in the two appeals:           "C.A. No. 2811 of 1977           .......................          53. Mr. Bhatt has argued that the  High Court erred          in  not granting the exemption for the entire  area          as  a  coffee plantation; but the finding  of  fact

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        in  this   respect is against the  appellant.   The          conversion  of  the land has also been held  to  be          illegal.   On  the  claim that the  land  used  for          growing  fuel  was  exempt as it  fell  within  the          definition  of ’plantation’ under S.2(44)(a) as  it          was an ’ancillary purpose’ also, there is a finding          of  fact against the Company.  The appeal  has  no          merit and is dismissed.          C.A. No. 227 of 1978                                                      995          .....................          54. The controversy before us relates to  exclusion          of ’fuel area’ and ’rested area’.  The Company  has          claimed  that  it has planted red gum  as  fuel  in          924.01   acres   as  it  was   required   for   the          ’manufacture  of tea’. The Taluk Board found it  to          be  an  exhorbitant  claim and reduced  it  to  200          acres,  but the High Court has restored the  entire          claim.   The  General Manager of  the  Company  has          stated  that  firewood  is being  supplied  to  the          employees  free of cost. So the claim to plant  red          gum  all over is  belied by its  General  Manager’s          statement.  Moreover supply of fuel wood cannot  be          said to be a purpose ’ancillary to the  cultivation          of plantation crops’. The Land Board has disallowed          the  claim for exemption of  136.17 acres,  but  it          has  been allowed in full by the High Court.   Here          again   the  High  Court  was  not   justified   in          interfering  with the Board’s finding of  fact  for          there was nothing to show that it was an area  from          which crop was not  gathered at the relevant  time.          If  that  had been so, it might have been  an  area          within the plantation.  In fact it appears from the          order  of the Board that no other estate  had  made          any such claim.  The appeal is therefore allowed to          the   extent that the Board’s decision is  restored          in both these matters."      It  will  be  apparent that in C.A. No.  2811  of  1977 the Court held that there was a finding of fact against the appellant-Company  and that the land used for growing  fuel was  not  exempt from the provisions of the said  Act  since such use of land was not for ’ancillary purpose’ and did not,also, fall within the definition of ’plantation’ under Section 2(44)(a) of the said Act.      Similarly, in C.A. No.227 of 1978 the controversy  was whether "fuel area" among other areas, had to  be  excluded from the operation of the Act.  The Company’s claim was that it  had  planted red gum as fuel in 924.01 acres as  it  was required for the manufacture of tea.  The General Manager of the  Company, however, had stated that firewood  was  being supplied  to  the employees free of cost.  This  Court  held that  on the General Manager’s statement the  earlier  claim for  exemption, viz., that   the  area  was  required  for manufacture  of  tea, stood belied.  But  the  Court  also further  held "moreover  supply of fuel-wood cannot be  said to be a purpose ’ancillary to the cultivation of  plantation crops."  The Land Board, as is clear from the-                                                   996 discussion, had disallowed the claim to the extent of 136.17 acres  but  the High Court had allowed the  claim  in  full, i.e., 924.01 acres.  This Court held that the High Court was not  justified  in interfering with the Board’s  finding  of fact for "there was nothing to show that it was an area from which  crop was not gathered at the relevant time...In  fact it appears from the order of the Board that no other  estate

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had made any such claim.  The appeal is   therefore  allowed to the extent that the Board’s decision is restored in  both these  matters".   It  would  thus  appear  from  the   said discussion that after having held that supply  of  fuel-wood could  not  be  said  to  be  a  purpose  ancillary  to  the cultivation of plantation crops, the Court merely  proceeded to restore the finding of the Land Board on the  ground that the  High  Court’s interference with  the  Board’s   finding whereby the Board had disallowed the claim for exemption  of certain acreage was not justified.      Thus from paragraphs 53 and 54 of the said decision  it is obvious that this Court had taken the view that the  area required  for  growing fuel was not land  used  for  purpose "ancillary  to  the cultivation  of  plantation  crops"  and that  it  would  not  fall  within  the  definition  of ’plantation’  as an  "ancillary purpose".  This is the  view of the Court on what constitutes "ancillary purpose", though the  view  is under the relevant definition under  the  said Act.  It  is  not,  therefore,correct  to  rely  upon  this decision  to  hold that this Court has taken the  view  that land  used  for  growing fuel is land  used  for  "ancillary purpose"  under our Act.  This is apart form the fact  that, as  pointed  out above, even under the Kerala  Land  Reforms Act, the view taken is against such contention.      In view of what I have discussed above, I am unable  to agree with the view taken by the larger Bench of Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v.Moosa Haji, (1984) KLT 494.   The Bench  rejected  the  claim for land for  growing  fuel  for supply to the workers relying on the decision of this  Court in  Chettiam Veettil Ammad’s case [supra].  However, it  has incongruously  enough  accepted  the  claim  for  land   for growing fuel for use in the smoke-house.  The learned Judges themselves  have described the view taken by them  there  as "unorthodox" and which may "almost  amount  to  re-reading of  the  latter  part of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B)  of  the  Act differently".   Instead,  I  prefer the view  taken  by  the earlier  benches, and particularly by the Full Bench of  the High  Court  in  State of Kerala  v. Malayalam  Plantations Ltd., (1980) KLT 976 (FB) which supports the  interpretation that I have placed-                                                   997 on the said provisions.      For the reasons indicated above,I am of the view   that the  land used for growing fuel-whether for supplying  it to the workers or for its use in the smoke-house-would not fall within  the purview of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the  Act  as the  said  use  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  purpose  either "ancillary  to the cultivation of the plantation  crops"  in question, or "for the preparation of the said crops for  the market".  In the result, I dismiss all the appeals.      The appellants will pay cost to the respondent-State in separate sets. V.P.R.                                   Appeals allowed.