REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6900-6906 OF 2001

Pinninti Kistamma and Ors.                    …APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

Duvvada Parsuram Chowdary & Ors        …RESPONDENT(s)

                                         AND

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6907-6946 OF 2001

Duvvada  Parasuram  Chowdary  &  Ors            …

APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

Bodasingi Rama Rao & Ors                  …RESPONDENT(s)  

 J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J..

1. These  two  batches  of  appeals  are  directed  against  the  

judgment and decree dated 27th of March, 1997 passed by the  

High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Second Appeal  

Nos. 361 of 1996 & batch and Second Appeal Nos. 374 of 1996  

& batch and also against the judgment and order dated 10th  

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of September, 1997 of the same High Court in Review Petition  

Nos. 6980 of 1997 and batch whereby the High Court modified  

its earlier order dated 27th of March, 1997.  

2. The Appellants in CA Nos. 6900-6906 of 2001(hereinafter  

called the ‘Tenants’), filed O.S. Nos. 43 of 1980 and batch (7  

suits) claiming tenancy rights in respect of 19.80 Acres of land  

in  Kambirigam  Village  and  also  prayed  for  permanent  

injunction  restraining  the  Respondents  in  

C.A.Nos.6900-6906 of  2001,  who are  also the  appellants  in  

C.A.Nos.6907-6946  of  2001  (hereinafter  called  as  the  

‘Landlords’)  from  interfering  with  their  possession  over  the  

said land. The Landlords also filed Cross Suits being OS Nos.  

75/1980  and  batch  (13  suits)  praying  for  injunction  

restraining  the  Tenants  from  interfering  with  the  peaceful  

possession of an extent of land measuring 181 Acres which  

also included the aforementioned 19.80 Acres.  

3. The case of the Tenants in their suits was that the plaint  

schedule  lands  formed  a  part  of  the  pre-settlement  un-

enfranchised Inams in Kambirigam Mokhasa in the erstwhile  

Tarla  Estate,  Tekkali  Taluk.  They  had  been  cultivating  the  

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plaint schedule land as tenants from time immemorial under  

inamdars,  predecessors-in-interest  of  Landlords  by  paying  

Rajbhagam paddy to them. In 1804, the British Government  

granted “Sannad” to the Tarla Estate wherein Kambirigam was  

described as a Jagir which was an Estate within the meaning  

of Section 3 of the Estate Land Act, 1908. However, no patta  

was granted to the Landlords or their predecessors-in-interest.  

Therefore, according to the tenants, the rights of the Landlords  

in respect of the lands in question vested in the Government  

by  virtue  of  Madras  Estates  Abolition  and  Conversion  into  

Raiyotwari Act of 1948. (for short ‘Estates Abolition Act’). The  

tenants had complained to the Revenue Authorities  alleging  

that the Revenue records were manipulated by the Landlords.  

Pursuant  to  this,  Tehsildar,  Palasa  conducted  an  enquiry  

wherein it was found that the Tenants and other raiyots were  

occupants  and cultivators  in the  Revenue Records for  Fasli  

1389. Being aggrieved by these orders, Landlords filed a Writ  

petition, which came to be registered as W.P.No. 3189 of 1980  

before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh claiming that they  

were  not  given  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  the  enquiry  

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conducted  by  the  Tehsildar.  Allowing  the  Writ  Petition,  the  

High Court vide its order dated 24th of August, 1982 quashed  

the order of the Tehsildar. However, the High Court had given  

liberty to the Tehsildar to conduct a fresh enquiry after giving  

due hearing to the parties. Accordingly, the Tehsildar Palasa,  

conducted an enquiry again and passed an order dated 10th of  

September,  1984,  declaring  the  Tenants  and  others  as  

cultivators  in  Kambirigam village  and further  observed that  

since the time of their ancestors, the Tenants and others had  

been  cultivating  the  lands  in  dispute  separately  and  also  

making  payment  to  the  Mokhasadars.  This  order  was  

confirmed  by  the  Collector  and  Commissioner  of  Land  

Revenue.  

4. In  the  cross  suits  filed  before  the  District  Munsif,  the  

Landlords  claimed  to  be  the  Mokhasadars  of  Kambirigam  

Mokhasa. According to them, the Plaint Schedule Lands are  

their absolute property which fell to their respective shares in  

the  family  arrangement  among  their  respective  family  

members inter se in or about the year 1945. Ever since such  

arrangement,  they  had  been  in  exclusive  possession  and  

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enjoyment of their respective land as described in the schedule  

of the plaint. According to the Landlords, Kambirigam village  

did  not  fall  within  the  ambit  of  Section  2(d)  of  the  Estates  

Abolition Act. No patta was granted to the Landlords because  

the village was not surveyed.

5. By its judgment and order dated 21st of July, 1987, the  

District Munsif, Palasa, decreed the suits filed by the Tenants  

praying for an order of permanent injunction, restraining the  

Landlords from interfering with their plaint schedule lands. By  

a  separate  order,  District  Munsif  dismissed  the  cross  suits  

filed  by  the  Landlords  praying  for  an  order  of  injunction  

against the Tenants.

6. Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment  of  the  District  

Munsif,  Palasa  dated  21st  of  July,  1987,  the  Landlords  

preferred two sets of Appeals before the Principal Subordinate  

Judge, Srikakulam. From the suits filed by the Tenants, i.e.  

O.S. Nos. 75 of 1980 and batch the appeals were numbered as  

A.S.No.12 of 1996 and batch (i.e. 13 appeals) and from the  

suits filed by the Landlords, i.e. O.S Nos. 43 of 1980 and batch  

the appeals were numbered as A.S. No. 11 of 1996 and batch  

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(i.e. 7 appeals). The Principal Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam,  

by two judgments dated 15th of April, 1996 delivered separate  

judgments in 13 appeals (A.S No. 12 of 1996 and batch) and 7  

appeals (A.S. No. 11 of 1996 and batch).  

7. Disposing of  the seven appeals in A.S.No.11/1996 and  

batch, the Principal Subordinate Judge noted that before the  

Trial Court, the plaintiffs and defendants in all  seven suits,  

had  taken  similar  pleas.  After  narrating  the  contentions  of  

both the parties and examining the materials on record, the  

first appellate court came to a finding of facts, inter alia, as  

follows :

8. The  tenants  did  not  dispute  the  contentions  of  the  

landlords that their ancestors became the landlords in respect  

of  the  plaint  schedule  land.  According to the  tenants,  their  

ancestors  were  inducted  into  possession of  separate  bits  of  

plaint schedule lands by the ancestors of the landlords. The  

said tenancy was alleged to have been continuing till the date  

of filing of the suit. In an enquiry conducted by the Settlement  

Officer  on  an  application  filed  by  one  of  the  landlords  to  

determine whether Kamibirgam village was an Inam Estate or  

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not,  none  of  the  tenants  appeared  before  the  Settlement  

Officer.  The  said  landlord  had  contended  that  he  and  his  

ancestors owned almost all the land in the village, though they  

let  out  a  few  bits  of  lands  to  some  raiyots  for  seasonal  

cultivation temporarily. Thus, by his order dated 29th of June,  

1950, the Settlement Officer held that Kambirigam village was  

not an Inam Estate. It was not the case of the tenants that  

they had been inducted in possession of the plaint schedule  

land after the order of the Settlement Officer. Admittedly, they  

had no documents proving their possession. That the names of  

the  landlords  were  recorded  in  the  revenue  registers  as  

personal cultivators was also not denied. The contention that  

since the tenants were not residents of Kambirigam village on  

the date of the enquiry by the settlement officer, they could  

not  appear  before  him,  could not be accepted.  If  numerous  

tenants were put in possession of tiny bits of land measuring  

300 Acres in respect of which the enquiry was conducted, at  

least one of them would have come across the notices put up  

announcing the enquiry. In a suit filed by the landlords before  

the  Subordinate  Judge,  Srikakulam  for  a  declaration  that  

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Kambirigam village was not an estate, a finding was recorded  

that  there  were  no  tenants  in  the  village.  The  Government  

which was a party to the suit, did not dispute this. An appeal  

preferred  against  the  Order  of  the  Subordinate  Judge  was  

dismissed.  Until  1976,  when  the  tenants  submitted  

applications to the Sub Collector, Tekkali stating that they had  

been  cultivating  the  lands  in  Kambirigam  Village,  paying  

‘Ambaram’ to the Mokhasadars, no case was ever made out by  

the tenants that they had been tenants in Kambirigam village.  

In 1977, one of the landlords filed a suit claiming similar relief  

as in the present case against some of the tenants and the  

tenants did not even contest the said suit.  Admittedly, they  

knew of the suit. The specious justification for not contesting  

the suit was that they were under the impression that the suit  

was  compromised.  This  plea  could  not  be  accepted.  In  the  

absence of any indication that there were tenants in the lands  

of Kambirigam village till  1977, the mere allegation that the  

names  of  the  landlords  were  wrongly  recorded  in  No.2  

Adangal, could not be accepted. The Tehsildar, Palasa by his  

order dated 18th of June, 1980 held that there were about 30  

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tenants in Kambirigam village but such an order was passed  

without giving any notice to the landlords. In the fresh enquiry  

conducted in accordance with the directions of the High Court  

issued on a writ petition filed by the landlords, applications  

filed  by  60  other  tenants  were  considered.  The  concerned  

Tehsildar by his order dated 10th of September, 1984 held that  

sizable land of Kambirigam village was under the cultivation of  

the tenants.  This  order  was confirmed by the Collector.  On  

this basis,  the tenants disputed the veracity of  the findings  

recorded  by  the  Settlement  officer  and  by  the  Subordinate  

Judge.  The Tehsildar  was of  the  opinion that  as there  was  

enough material to give rise to a doubt that the landlords had  

not  been  cultivating  the  entire  cultivable  land  in  the  

Kambirigam village, the benefit of doubt should be given to the  

hard pressed poor raiyots, as against the landlords who were  

rich and influential. Thus, the order of the Tehsildar was not  

based on any reliable and acceptable documentary evidence.  

The particulars of land, or rent or tenants were not mentioned  

in  the  findings.  The  particulars  of  land  mentioned  in  the  

applications filed before Sub-Collector by the tenants, do not  

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tally with those in the plaint schedule, based on the order of  

the Tehsildar. Hence, it is evident that the Tehsildar did not  

conduct  the  enquiry  properly.  Padi  Narayana,  the  first  

defendant in all except one suit, had denied that he had been  

a tenant in the suit lands and had averred that he had been  

falsely impleaded in the said proceedings. Yet, he appeared as  

a tenant  in the  findings given by the Tehsildar.   Thus,  the  

order of Tehsildar was found not to be based on proper and  

legal evidence. On the other hand, the names of the Landlords  

have been recorded in the revenue registers as the personal  

cultivators of the plaint schedule lands in the No.2 Adangal till  

1979, i.e.  for which these batch suits were filed. As against  

this, neither the tenants entered the witness box to support  

their  specific  cases,  nor  did  they  produce  any  reliable  

documentary evidence to rebut the entries in the record. The  

testimonies of witnesses they produced were not reliable.  

9. Disposing of A.S.No.12 and batch i.e. the 13 appeals filed  

by the landlords from the Original Suits filed by the Tenants,  

the Principal Subordinate Judge, inter alia, held that none of  

the Tenants disputed the title of the Landlords over the land in  

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Kambirigam village. While the Tenants, who were the plaintiffs  

in this batch suits should have established that they had the  

possession  over  the  plaint  schedule  lands  by  virtue  of  the  

tenancy  granted  in  their  favour  by  the  predecessors  of  the  

Landlords, none of them entered the witness box in support of  

their case. The particulars of origin of the alleged tenancy were  

not  given  in  any  of  the  plaints.  The  testimony  of  the  only  

witness produced by the Tenants was self serving and was not  

corroborated by any other evidence, as he was too young to  

know  the  particulars  of  the  alleged  tenancy,  which  had  

allegedly  been  in  existence  since  time  immemorial.  Again,  

reference was made to the discrepancies in the description of  

land in plaint schedules and in the applications filed before  

the  Sub-Collector,  Tekkali.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  

Tehsildar’s report on which the Tenants had placed reliance  

was not based on legal and relevant evidence. As the burden of  

proof was on the Tenants, the mere failure of the Landlords in  

establishing  that  they  had  been  personally  cultivating  the  

plaint schedule lands alone would not enable the Tenants to  

get  a  permanent  injunction  against  them  in  respect  of  

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particular bits of plaint schedule lands.  

10 Accordingly, the first appellate court allowed the appeals  

of the landlords and dismissed the suit of the tenants against  

which second appeals were preferred by the tenants before a  

learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which  

came to be registered as S.A.Nos.361 of 1996 and batch and  

S.A.Nos.374  of  1996  and  batch.  The  second  appeals  were  

directed against both the judgments and decrees dated 15th of  

April,  1996  passed  by  the  Principal  Subordinate  Judge,  

Srikakulam in two batches  of  First  Appeals,  i.e.  A.S.Nos.11  

and batch and A.S.Nos.12 and batch. The High Court by the  

impugned  judgment  allowed  all  the  Second  Appeals,  

numbered as above.  

11. It may be noted that the Learned Judge in the impugned  

judgment,  however,  stated that  “these  second appeals  arise  

out  of  a  common  judgment  dated  15th of  April,  1996  in  

A.S.No12  of  1996  and  batch on  the  file  of  the  Principal  

Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, reversing the judgment and  

decree in O.S.No.87 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif,  

Palasa.”

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12. Before the High Court in the second appeals and batch,  

the following questions were taken into consideration:

1. Whether  the  Sannad granted in  1804 to  Tarla  Estate  

describing  Kambirigam  village  as  Jagir  assumed  the  

character  of  an “Estate”  within the meaning of  Estate  

Abolition  Act  to  the  effect  that  the  Landlords  could  

dispossess the Tenants on that count?

2. Is the Civil Court empowered to set aside the orders of  

the  three  statutory  authorities  viz.  Tehsildar,  District  

Collector and the Commissioner of Land Revenue, when  

no  challenge  was  made  to  their  orders  holding  the  

Tenants as cultivators of the land in question?

13. After  perusing  the  judgments  of  the  courts  below,  

however, the High Court was of the opinion that the question  

whether the Sannad granted in 1804 assumed the character of  

an Estate within the meaning of Estate Abolition Act was of no  

consequence at all, because factum of the grant of sannad in  

1804 itself was doubtful. The Tenants had not adduced any  

evidence to prove that the rights of the Landlords, if any, had  

vested  in  the  Government.  In  the  impugned  judgment,  the  

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High Court came to a conclusion that the issue No.1 should  

not be examined in view of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at  

by it.  For appreciation of the finding arrived at by the High  

Court, we may reproduce the same.

“However, on going through the plaint O.S No.  75/80 it appears that no plea was made in that  regard. The only averment made in the plaint is  to the effect that the plaint schedule land was  a portion of the pre-settlement unenfranchised  inam in Kambirigam Mokhasa in the erstwhile  Tarla  Estate,  and  the  Tarla  Estate  was  abolished  by  the  Government  under  the  Act  XXVI of 1948 but Kambirigam Mokhasa village  was not taken over as it was not an “Estate” or  an  Inam  Village  within  the  meaning  of  the  Abolition  Act  and that  no  patta  was  granted  either to the defendants or their predecessors  in interest either under the Abolition Act, 1948  or  Act  XXXVII  of  1956.  The  defendants  therefore lost their right, if any, in the plaint  Schedule land as it vested in the Government as  stated in the concluding part of Para 3 of the  Plaint.  The Plaintiffs,  who are the appellants  before  us  do  not  seem to  have  produced  any  document in respect of these averments made  in paragraph 3 of the plaint. I am, therefore, of  the  opinion  that  no  useful  purpose  would  be  served in examining this question whether the  respondents  acquired  nay  right  to  dispossess  the appellants.”

14. We have carefully  examined these findings of the High  

Court and after carefully examining the same, we do not find  

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any reason to differ  from the  conclusions arrived at  by the  

High Court on such question. Accordingly, we agree with the  

views expressed by the High Court on the question No.1 as  

noted herein above.  

15. Let us now consider the question No.2 as noted herein  

earlier.  The  said  question  is  whether  the  Civil  Court  was  

justified  in  setting  aside  the  orders  of  three  statutory  

authorities,  namely the Tehsildar,  the District  Collector  and  

the Commissioner of Land Revenue without there being any  

challenge to these orders.

16. On this question, the High Court, after considering the  

relevant  statutes  on  the  subject  and  after  considering  the  

material  evidence  on  record  came  to  a  conclusion  that  the  

decision of the Tehsildar which came subsequent to the filing  

of the suit i.e. on 10th of September, 1984, which was affirmed  

by  the  District  Collector  and  the  Commissioner  of  Land  

Revenue, had achieved the status of finality. The High Court  

even came to  the conclusion that  even independent  of  that  

proposition  the  evidence,  however,  thin  it  may  be,  has  

weighted  in  favour  of  the  persons  who  claimed  to   be  the  

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cultivators of the disputed lands. In the impugned judgment,  

the  High  Court  had  accepted  the  finding  of  the  Tehsildar  

which  stood  in  favour  of  the  tenants  that  they  had  been  

cultivating the lands in question  since time immemorial.  In  

view of the findings arrived at, the Appeals of the Tenant were  

allowed by the High Court in S.A.Nos.361, 365, 366, 374, 383,  

384, 391, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401,402,  

403,  404 of  1996,  and the judgment  of  the  First  Appellate  

Court in A.S.No.12 was set aside.  

17. While accepting the order of the Tehsildar dated 10th of  

September, 1984, the High Court referred to the provisions of  

Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971 and after  

considering the decisions of Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa, [AIR  

1985 SC 577], State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal  

Nadam, [AIR 1986 SC 794],  Sangubhotla Venkataramaiah  

v. Kallu Venkataswamy, [AIR 1976 AP 402], which discussed  

the principles relating to exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil  

Courts by Statutory Tribunals,  came to the conclusion that  

the  order  of  the  Tehsildar  dated  10th of  September,  1984  

having achieved the status of finality cannot be upset by the  

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Civil  Court.  The High Court  further found that the Tenants  

were cultivating the land in question and, therefore, they were  

entitled  to  a  decree  for  permanent  injunction  against  the  

landlords  and  accordingly  the  High  Court  allowed  

S.A.Nos.361,  365,  366,  374,  383,  384,  391,  393,  394,  395,  

396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401,402, 403, 404 of 1996, and the  

judgment  of  the  First  Appellate  Court  in  A.S.No.12 was set  

aside.   

18. That apart, from the impugned judgment, it is found that  

the High Court concluded in the following manner :  

“…. the fact remains that the decision of  the  Revenue  Authorities  which  came  subsequent to the filing of the Civil Suits  stood unchallenged and not contradicted.  The  Tehsildar  order  dated  10th of  September  1984,  therefore,  achieved  the  status  of  finality.  On  that  account,  therefore,  the  Landlords  lost  complete  ground for denying the tenancy rights of  the  Tenants-Appellants  over  the  disputed  lands. However, even independent of that  proposition the evidence howsoever thin it  may  be,  has  weighed  in  favor  of  the  persons who claim to be cultivators of the  disputed  land.  The  Tehsildar’s  second  report speaks volumes about the tenant’s  case  that  they  have  been cultivating  the  disputed  lands  since  the  times  of  their  

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ancestors and I am loath to disregard the  same.  

The Tenants-Appellants’ appeals therefore  deserve to be allowed. Hence the appeals  bearing  no.  361,  365,  366,  367,  374,383,384,392,  393,  394,  395,  396,  397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 401,403 and 404  of  1996  are   allowed  and the  impugned  judgement and the order dated 15.04.96 in  A.S.  No.  12  of  1996  and  batch  of  lower  appellate court is quashed and set aside.  No costs.”  

19. In view of our discussions made herein above and in view  

of  the  fact  that  the  High  Court  had  granted  a  decree  for  

permanent injunction in favour of the tenants mainly on the  

basis that the tenants were in possession and cultivation of  

the disputed lands and after considering the fact the landlords  

had failed to prove their possession and cultivation in respect  

of  the lands in question by producing reliable and material  

evidence before the court. Accordingly, as noted herein above,  

by the impugned judgment, the High Court had allowed the  

second appeal and granted a decree for permanent injunction  

in  favour  of  the  tenants/appellants  who  are  respondents  

before us. Such being the position, we do not find any merit in  

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these  appeals  so  far  as  the  Landlords/appellants  are  

concerned.  However,  the  Landlords  filed  a  review  petition  

being Review Petition No.6980 of 1997 and batch against the  

group  of  second  appeals,  namely,  S.A.No.361  of  1996  and  

batch under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of  the  

Code of Civil Procedure. Among the many grounds that were  

taken, the High Court found merit only in one ground which is  

as follows-

1) When there was no defence and no proof emerging from the  

documentary or oral evidence, the suits filed by the Landlords  

could  not  be  dismissed  as  the  extent  claimed  by  the  

Tenants/appellants was only 19.80 Acres.

20. Accordingly,  the  Court  found  it  proper  to  insert  a  

clarification  in  the  operative  part  of  the  judgment  under  

review:  

“The Tenants appeal covering a total extent  of  Ac  19.80  cents  therefore  deserved  to  be  allowed.  Hence  the Appeals  bearing  Nos.  361/96,  365/96,  366/96,  367/96,  384/96,  392/96,  393/96,  394/96,  395/96,  396/96,  399/96,  400/96  and  401/96  are  allowed,  covering a total extent of Ac. 19.80 cents as  mentioned in the schedules in the respective  plaints filed by the tenants out of the total   

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extent of Ac. 181.90 cents of lands claimed  in  the  respective  plaints  filed  by  the  landlords in their respective plaints and the  impugned judgment and order dated 15th of  April 1996 in A.S. No. 12 of 1996 and batch  of the Lower Appellate Court is quashed and  set  aside.  The  Landlords’  claim  to  the  aforesaid extent of A.C No. 19.80 cents, thus,  stands dismissed and to that extent only the  Second Appeals Nos. 374/96, 383/96, 397/96,  398/96,  402/96,  403/96  and  404/96  stand  partly allowed. No costs.”  

21. So  far  as  the  order  of  the  High  Court  in  the  review  

petition and batch is concerned, we do not find any ground to  

upset the order passed in review petition as we find that the  

High Court in the original judgment in the second appeals had  

considered not only the second appeal being A.S.No.12 of 1996  

and batch but also the second appeal filed against A.S.No.11  

of 1996 and batch. That apart, the tenants/respondents filed  

their suit for permanent injunction limiting their claim to the  

extent of 19.80 Acres of land and, therefore, the High Court  

was fully justified in reviewing the said judgment allowing the  

second appeal of the tenants only to the extent of 19.80 Acres  

of land. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to interfere  

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with the order of the High Court reviewing the second appeals  

and batch in the manner indicated above in the exercise of our  

discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution.   

22. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in  

these  appeals  filed  before  this  Court  and,  accordingly,  the  

appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

…..………………..J.  [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi; ……………………..J. January 08, 2010.  [Harjit Singh Bedi]      

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