REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1240  OF 2005

Phool Patti & Anr. ..     Appellant (s)

-versus-

Ram Singh (Dead) through Lrs. & Anr. ..         Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

MARKANDEY KATJU, J.

1. This  appeal  by special  leave  has  been  filed  against  the  impugned

judgment  of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  dated  22.10.2003  in

Regular Second Appeal No.2176 of 1985.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

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3. The appellants are the daughters of one Bhagwana.  They along with

one Shobha Ram filed Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 against the respondents

challenging the decree in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 regarding certain land

and a house filed by Ram Singh against Bhagwana on the ground that the

said suit  was a collusive suit  and hence the decree was illegal  and void.

Accordingly the prayer in Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 filed by the appellants

was to set aside the decree in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980.  The trial court on

31.5.1983 decreed Civil Suit No.234 of 1982 and set aside the judgment and

decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 on the ground that the

same was collusive.  However, in the first appeal under Section 96 C.P.C.

the  learned  Additional  District  and  Sessions  Judge,  Sonepat  allowed  the

appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit by

his judgment dated 21.3.1985.  

4. Aggrieved against the judgment of the learned Additional District and

Sessions Judge dated 21.3.1985 the appellants filed a second appeal before

the  High  Court  which  was  dismissed  by  the  impugned  judgment  dated

22.10.2003.  Hence this appeal by special leave.   

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5. The finding of the First Appellate Court that the judgment and decree

dated 24.11.1980 in Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 was not collusive is a finding

of fact.  It may be noted that Bhagwana who was the defendant in the said

Civil Suit No.630 of 1980 was alive when the Suit No.18 of 1982 was filed

and he had supported the judgment and decree dated 24.11.1980 in Civil

Suit No.630 of 1980 by giving his evidence on oath as DW2.   

6. On the other hand the appellants did not appear at any stage of the

trial  of  the suit  being No. 234 of 1982 before the trial  court  to stake or

affirm or claim any right in the disputed land.

7. It  has  come  in  evidence  that  Bhagwana  was  residing  with  the

respondents for the last several years and Bhagwana treated the respondent

as his real son.  As regards the appellants who are daughters of Bhagwana,

they had been married long back, and had left for their maternal home, and

hence Bhagwana was living with the respondent alone.  Bhagwana is said to

have had great love and affection for the respondent.  There was a family

arrangement  in  which  the  disputed  property  fell  exclusively  to  the

respondent.

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9. Since the consent decree dated 24.11.1980 had been held by the First

Appellate Court to be not collusive, the High Court in our opinion rightly

refused to interfere with that findings of fact.

10. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there

was violation of the Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

11. In  this  connection,  it  may  be  noted  that  Section  17(2)(vi)  of  the

Registration Act states that “nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section(1)

of Section 17 applies to :

“any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject- matter of the suit or proceeding.”

(emphasis supplied)   

12. In our opinion the exception mentioned in Section 17(2)(vi)  means

that if a suit is filed by the plaintiff in respect of property A, then a decree in

that suit  in respect of immovable property B (which was not the subject-

matter of the suit at all) will require registration.  This is the view taken by

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this Court in  K. Raghunandan & Ors.  vs.  Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors.

2008(9) Scale 215.  

13. However, a different view was taken by this Court in  Bhoop Singh

vs.  Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that :

“……We would  think  that  the  exception  engrafted  is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which  declares  the  pre-existing  right  and  does  not  by itself  create  new right,  title  or  interest  in  praesenti in immovable  property  of  the  value  of  Rs.100  or upwards.…………….”  

(emphasis supplied)

14. In our opinion there seems to be inconsistency between the decisions

of this Court in  Bhoop Singh’s case (supra) and  K. Raghunandan’s case

(supra)  in  so  far  as  the  interpretation  to  the  exception  in  clause  (vi)  of

Section 17(2) of the Registration Act is concerned.  Prima facie it seems to

us that the decision in  Bhoop Singh’s case (supra) does not lay down the

correct law since Section 17(2)(vi) on its plain reading has nothing to do

with any pre existing right.  All that seems to have been stated therein is that

if  a decree is  passed regarding some immovable property which is  not  a

subject-matter  of  the  suit  then  it  will  require  registration.   As  already

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explained above, if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in

respect  of  immovable  property B,  then  the  decree  so  far  as  it  relates  to

immovable property B will require registration.  This seems to be the plain

meaning of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.   

15. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add

words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain

reading the meaning seems to be clear.  Since there is no mention of any

pre- existing right in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult

to accept the views in Bhoop Singh’s case (supra).

16. It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in

Bhoop Singh’s case (supra) and K. Raghunandan’s case (supra), and since

we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop

Singh’s case (supra), the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of

this Court.

17. Let the papers be laid before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for

constituting a larger Bench for interpreting the exception in clause (vi) of

Section 17(2) of the Registration Act.

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…….. ………………… …..J.

(Markandey Katju)

……………………………J. (Asok Kumar Ganguly)

New Delhi; 31st March, 2009                     

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