Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.  2313 OF 2011  (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 21828 OF 2007)

  Pesara Pushpamala Reddy           …… Appellant

Versus

G. Veera Swamy and Others                          …… Respondents

WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 2314  OF 2011  

(Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 23821 OF 2008)    

R.S. Murthy                 …… Appellant

Versus

German Reddy & Anr.             …… Respondents

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

Delay in filing of SLP (C) No.23821 of 2008 is condoned.  

2. Leave granted.

3. These  appeals  are  against  two  separate  orders  dated  

04.06.2007 and 05.06.2007 passed by the Division Bench

of  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  in  Writ  Petition  

No.8613  of  2002  and  Writ  Petition  No.18642  of  2004  

respectively  and  raise  two  common  questions  of  law  

whether  it  is  mandatory  for  the  Special  Tribunal  or  the  

Special Court to call  for a report of the Mandal Revenue  

Officer before taking cognizance of a case under the Andhra  

Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)  Act, 1982 (for short  

‘the  Act’)  and  whether  it  is  mandatory  for  the  Special  

Tribunal or the Special Court to publish a notification in  

the Gazette notifying the fact of cognizance of a case under  

the Act.

4. The facts in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.23821 of  

2008  are  that  the  appellant  R.S.  Murthy  filed  L.G.O.P.  

No.570 of 1992 before the Special Tribunal, Ranga Reddy  

District, alleging that the respondents German Reddy and  

Tresa German Reddy had demolished the compound wall of  

the appellant constructed over his land measuring 606 sq.  

yards in Plot No.439 in Survey No. 33 of Guttalabegumpet  

Village in Ranga Reddy District,  with a view to grab the  

same and was raising structures thereon and prayed inter   

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alia that the appellant be declared as the owner of the land  

and be given possession of the land and the respondents be  

declared  as  land grabbers  and  punished  under  the  Act.  

Respondents  filed  a  counter  affidavit  and  denied  the  

allegations made by the appellant.  The Special  Tribunal  

framed  issues  and  commenced  the  trial.   The  Special  

Tribunal  appointed  an  Advocate  Commissioner  to  

demarcate the property of the appellant and the Advocate  

Commissioner submitted a report dated 28.12.1996 which  

revealed  that  the  respondents  had encroached  upon the  

property of the appellant.  By order dated 18.04.1996, the  

Special Tribunal declared the respondents as land grabbers  

and  directed  delivery  of  possession  of  the  land  to  the  

appellant and also directed prosecution of the respondents.  

Respondents filed an appeal along with an application for  

condonation of delay of 221 days before the Special Court.  

By order dated 13.03.1997, the Special  Court  refused to  

condone the delay and dismissed the appeal.  Aggrieved,  

the respondents filed Writ Petition No.12610 of 1997 in the  

High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the High Court allowed  

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the  Writ  Petition  and  condoned  the  delay  in  filing  the  

appeal by the respondents before the Special Court.  The  

Special Court then heard the appeal of the respondents on  

merits and dismissed the same.  The respondents filed Writ  

Petition  No.27848  of  1998  and  by  an  order  dated  

13.10.2001  the  High  Court  remanded  the  matter  to  the  

Special  Court  again  and  the  Special  Court  remitted  the  

matter to the Special Tribunal to give an opportunity to the  

respondents  to  file  objections  to  the  Advocate  

Commissioner’s  report  and  to  adduce  evidence.   The  

Special  Tribunal  again  passed  orders  on  18.09.2002  

declaring  the  respondents  as  land  grabbers.   The  

respondents filed appeal before the Special Court and by  

order  dated  16.08.2004 the  Special  Court  dismissed the  

appeal.   Aggrieved,  the  respondents  filed  Writ  Petition  

No.18642 of  2004 and by the impugned order,  the High  

Court  allowed the Writ  Petition on the  grounds that  the  

Special Tribunal had not called for a report of the Mandal  

Revenue Officer under Rule 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land  

Grabbing (Prohibition)  Rules,  1988 (for  short  ‘the Rules’)  

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and had also not issued a notification under Rule 7 of the  

Rules  in  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Gazette  after  taking  

cognizance of the case.   

5. The facts of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.21828 of  

2007 are that the appellant Pesara Pushpamala Reddy filed  

Land Grabbing Case No.5 of 1990 under the Act against  

the  respondents  G.  Veera  Swamy and  others  before  the  

Special Tribunal, Warangal, alleging that the respondents  

G. Veera Swami and others illegally grabbed and occupied  

his land measuring 0.23 guntas in Survey No.568 (old) and  

579  (new)  situated  at  Waddepalli  village  on  the  P.W.D.  

Main  Road  from  Hanamkonda  to  Hyderabad.   The  

Respondents  G.  Veera  Swamy  and  others  filed  their  

counter affidavits in the said case denying the allegations  

of  land  grabbing.   The  parties  produced  their  oral  and  

documentary evidence and by order dated 03.07.1996, the  

Special  Tribunal  allowed  the  land  grabbing  case  and  

directed  the  Revenue  Officer,  Warangal,  to  evict  the  

respondents  from  the  land  and  put  the  appellant  in  

possession of  the land.   Aggrieved, the respondents filed  

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appeal  before  the  Special  Court  at  Hyderabad  and  the  

Special  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  on  29.10.1997.  The  

respondents  then  challenged  the  orders  passed  by  the  

Special  Tribunal in Writ  Petition No.8613 of 2002 in the  

High Court.  The High Court after holding that no report  

had been called for from the Mandal Revenue Officer under  

Rule 6 of the Rules and no Gazette notification had been  

published  under  Rule  7  of  the  Rules  by  the  Special  

Tribunal allowed the Writ Petition by the impugned order  

dated 04.06.2007 and set aside the impugned orders of the  

Special  Court and the Special  Tribunal  and remitted the  

matter  to  the  Special  Tribunal,  Warangal,  for  a  fresh  

disposal on merits.   

6. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned counsel for the appellant in  

Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.23821 of 2008, and  

Mr.  P.  Vishwanatha  Shetty,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.21828 of  

2007, submitted that Section 7-A of the Act deals with the  

powers and procedure of the Special Tribunal and Section  

8 of the Act deals with the procedure and powers of the  

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Special Court and there is nothing in these two sections to  

show that before taking cognizance, the Special Tribunal or  

the Special  Court  has to call  for  a report  of  the Mandal  

Revenue Officer.  They submitted that sub-rule (1) of Rule  

6 of the Rules, however, provides that the Special Court or  

the Special Tribunal may refer the applications filed before  

the  Special  Court  or  the  Special  Tribunal  for  local  

inspection or verification or both by the Mandal Revenue  

Officer having jurisdiction over the area and sub-rule (2) of  

Rule  6  of  the  Rules  further  provides  that  such  Mandal  

Revenue Officer to whom the application has been referred  

under  sub-rule  (1)  shall  make  or  cause  to  be  made  an  

inspection  or  verification  or  both,  as  soon  as  may  be  

practicable,  and shall  submit  a full  and complete  report  

within  two weeks from the date  of  receipt  of  order  with  

reference to Revenue Records and facts on ground as to the  

matters enumerated in sub-rule (2).  They submitted that  

the word ‘may’ in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 indicates that it is  

not mandatory for the Special Court or the Special Tribunal  

to refer the application to the Mandal Revenue Officer and  

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call for his report.  They submitted that the High Court has  

erroneously  held  that calling for  report  from the  Mandal  

Revenue Officer was mandatory for the Special Court or the  

Special  Tribunal before taking cognizance because of the  

Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  

in  Mohd.  Siddiq  Ali  Khan & Others v.  Shahsun Finance  

Ltd.,  Chennai  & Another [2005 (2) ALD 675 (FB)]  holding  

that reference of every application under sub-section (1) of  

Section 8 of the Act or under sub-section (1) of Section 7-A  

of the Act for local inspection or verification or both by the  

Mandal  Revenue Officer  before  the  Special  Court  or  the  

Special  Tribunal  taking  cognizance  is  a  mandatory  

requirement.  They relied on a Division Bench judgment of  

the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Vonkela Subramanyam  

and  Others v.  Special  Court  under  A.P.  Land  Grabbing  

(Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad and Others [2007 (5) ALD 184  

(DB)] holding that Rule 6 of the Rules does not contain a  

mandate  to  refer  the application to  the  Mandal  Revenue  

Officer and failure to refer the application to the Mandal  

Revenue Officer for  verification and calling for his report  

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would not have any impact on the facts of that case and  

would not vitiate the entire proceedings.   

7. Mr.  Narasimha  and  Mr.  Shetty  next  submitted  that  the  

proviso to sub-Section (4) of Section 7-A of the Act states  

that the Special Tribunal shall by notification specify the  

fact  of  taking cognizance of  the  case under  the  Act  and  

accordingly Rule 7 of the Rules provides that the Special  

Court or the Special Tribunal shall after taking cognizance  

of the case under the Act give notice in Form II-A or Form  

II-B by publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, but  

the use of the word ‘shall’ in the proviso to Section 7 of the  

Act  or   in  Rule  7  of  the  Rules  does  not  make  the  

requirement of publication of the case in the Gazette after  

the Special Court or Special Tribunal takes cognizance of  

the case mandatory.  They cited the decisions of this Court  

in P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir & Ors. [(2003) 8 SCC 498] and  

Vidyawati  Gupta  &  Ors.  v.  Bhakti  Hari  Nayak  &  Ors.  

[(2006) 2 SCC 777] in support of their argument that the  

word ‘shall’ in the proviso to Section 7 of the Act or in Rule  

7  of  the  Rules  does  not  make  the  requirement  of  

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notification or publication of notice in the Gazette of a case  

after  the  Special  Court  or  the  Special  Tribunal  takes  

cognizance  mandatory.   Mr.  Narasimha  and  Mr.  Shetty  

submitted  that  the  respondents  in  this  case  had  been  

impleaded as  parties  in  the  application  filed  under  sub-

section 1 of  Section 7-A before the Special  Tribunal  and  

had filed their replies before the Special Tribunal and had  

also  participated  in  the  proceedings  before  the  Special  

Tribunal and at the instance of the respondents, therefore,  

the High Court should not have held that the proceedings  

before  the  Special  Tribunal  were  vitiated  because  no  

notification  or  notice  of  the  case  was  published  in  the  

Andhra Pradesh Gazette under the proviso to Section 7 of  

the Act or Rule 7 of the Rules after the Special Tribunal  

took cognizance of the case.

8. Mr.  Bharat  J.  Joshi,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondents, in reply, submitted that under sub-section (1)  

of  Section  7  of  the  Act,  the  Government  has  been  

empowered to make rules and in exercise of this power the  

Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh  has  made  the  rules  

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providing in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 that every application  

filed under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act or every  

case taken cognizance of suo motu by the Special Court or  

an application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 7-A of  

the  Act  before  the  Special  Tribunal,  may be  referred  for  

local  inspection  or  verification  or  both  by  the  Mandal  

Revenue  Officer  having  jurisdiction  over  the  area.   He  

argued that the word ‘may’ used in sub-rule (1) of Rule 6  

actually means ‘shall’  relying on the decision in  State  of   

Uttar  Pradesh v.  Jogendra  Singh [1963  (2)  SCR  197]  in  

which this Court has held that the word ‘may’ is capable of  

meaning ‘must’ or ‘shall’ in the light of the context in which  

the word is used and where a discretion is conferred upon  

a  public  authority  coupled  with  an  obligation,  the  word  

‘may’  which  denotes  discretion  should  be  construed  to  

mean  a  command.   He  submitted  that  this  Court  has  

further held in the case of Jogendra Singh (supra) that the  

legislature uses the word ‘may’ out of deference to the high  

status of the authority on whom the power and obligation  

are intended to be conferred and imposed.  He also relied  

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on  Govindlal  Chhaganlal  Patel v.  The Agricultural Produce  

Market Committee, Godhra and Others [(1975) 2 SCC 482]  

wherein  this  Court  has  held  that  the  question  as  to  

whether a statue is mandatory or directory depends upon  

the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in  

which the intent is clothed and, therefore, the use of the  

word  ‘shall’  or  ‘may’  is  not  conclusive  on  the  question  

where the particular requirement of law is mandatory or  

directory.   He  cited  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  V.  

Laxminarasamma v.  A.     Yadaiah (Dead) and Others   [(2009)  

5 SCC 478] holding that a report of the Revenue Officer  

who is the man on the spot is required to be obtained by  

the Special Court or by the Special Tribunal under the Act.  

He submitted that the view taken by the Full Bench of the  

Andhra Pradesh High Court  in  Mohd.  Siddiq Ali  Khan v.  

Shahsun  finance  Ltd. (supra)  that  reference  of  every  

application under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act or  

under  sub-section (1)  of  Section  7-A of  the  Act  for  local  

inspection or verification or both by the Mandal Revenue  

Officer  before  the  Special  Court  or  the  Special  Tribunal  

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taking cognizance is a mandatory requirement, is therefore  

correct.  He submitted that this view has also been taken  

by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in  

Sekharamahanti  Nagabhushanarao  (died)  per  L.R. v.  

Andhra University, rep. by its Registrar and Others [2009 (2)  

ALT 260].

9. Regarding  publication  of  notice  in  the  Andhra  Pradesh  

Gazette after taking cognizance by the Special Court or by  

the Special Tribunal, he submitted that in sub-section (4)  

of Section 7-A of the Act and Rule 7 of the Rules it is clear  

that the Special Tribunal ‘shall’ after taking cognizance of  

the  case  publish  a  notice  in  the  prescribed  form in  the  

Andhra Pradesh Gazette.  He submitted that this provision  

has been made in the public interest and cannot be waived.  

He cited the decision of this Court in  Graphite  India Ltd.   

and Another v. Durgapur Projects Ltd. and Others [(1999) 7  

SCC 645] that where a statutory provision is made in the  

interest  of  public,  it  cannot  be  waived  by  a  party.   He  

submitted  that  even  though  the  respondents  have  filed  

their  replies  denying  the  allegations  made  in  the  

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application filed under Section 7(1)  of  the Act before the  

Special  Tribunal  by  the  appellant,  they  can  raise  the  

objection that the mandatory requirement of notification or  

publication of a notice in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette as  

provided in sub-section (4) of Section 7 of the Act and sub-

rule (1) of Rule 7 of the Rules has not been followed after  

the  cognizance  of  the  case  by  the  Special  Tribunal  and  

therefore the entire proceedings before the Special Tribunal  

stand vitiated.

10.Sections 7-A, 8 and 9 of the Act and Rules 6 and 7 of the  

Rules, which are relevant to decide the two questions of law  

in this case, are extracted hereinbelow:

“Section  7-A.  Special  Tribunals  and  its  powers,  etc.:—(1)  Every  Special  Tribunal  shall  have power to try all cases not taken cognizance  of by the Special Court relating to any alleged act  of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership  and  title  to,  or  lawful  possession  of  the  land  grabbed  whether  before  or  after  the  commencement  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition)  (Amendment)  Act,  1987  and  brought  before  it  and  pass  such  orders  (including orders by way of interim directions) as  it deems fit:  

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Provided  that  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Special  Tribunal,  any  case  brought  before  it  is  prima  facie  frivolous  or  vexatious  it  shall  reject  the  same without any further enquiry:

Provided  further  that  if  in  the  opinion  of  the  Special Tribunal any case brought before it is a  fit case to be tried by the Special Court it may for  reasons to be recorded by it transfer the case to  the Special Court for its decision in the matter.

(2)  Save  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  Act,  a  Special Tribunal shall, in the trial of cases before  it, follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of  Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908).

(3)  An  appeal  shall  lie,  from  any  judgment  or  order not being interlocutory order of the Special  Tribunal, to the Special Court on any question of  law  or  of  fact.  Every  appeal  under  this  sub  section shall be preferred within a period of sixty  days from the date of Judgment or order of the  Special Tribunal;

Provided that the Special Court may entertain an  appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty  days,  if  it  is  satisfied  that  the  appellant  had  sufficient  cause  for  not  preferring  the  appeal  within the period of sixty days.

(4)  Every  finding  of  the  Special  Tribunal  with  regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall  be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing,  and  of  the  persons  who  committed  such  land  grabbing  and  every  judgment  of  the  Special  Tribunal with regard to the determination of the  title  and ownership to,  or  lawful  possession of,  any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons  having interest in such land:

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Provided  that  the  Special  Tribunal  shall  by  notification specify the fact of taking cognizance  of the case under this Act. Such notification shall  state that any objection which may be received by  the Special  Tribunal  from any person including  the  custodian  of  evacuee  property  within  the  period specified therein will be considered by it:

Provided  further  that  where  the  custodian  of  evacuee property objects to the Special Tribunal  taking  cognizance  of  the  case,  the  Special  Tribunal shall not proceed further with the case  in regard to such property:

Provided  also  that  the  Special  Tribunal  shall  cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case  under  the  Act  served on any person known or  believed  to  be  interested  in  the  land,  after  a  summary  enquiry  to  satisfy  itself  about  the  persons likely to be interested in the land.

(5) It shall be lawful for the Special Tribunal to  pass an order in any case decided by it, awarding  compensation  in  terms  of  money  for  wrongful  possession,  which  shall  not  be  less  than  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  market  value  of  the  land  grabbed  as  on  the  date  of  the  order  and  profits accrued from the land payable by the land  grabber  to  the  owner  of  the  grabbed  land  and  may direct the redelivery of the grabbed land to  its rightful owner. The amount of compensation  and profits so awarded and cost of redelivery, if  any,  shall  be  recovered  as  an  arrear  of  land  revenue if the Government are the owner and as  a decree of a Civil Court, in any other case:

Provided that the Special  Tribunal  shall,  before  passing an order under this sub-section, give to  

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the  land grabber  an opportunity  of  making his  representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in  this  regard  and  consider  every  such  representation and evidence.

(6)  Any case, pending before any Court or other  authority immediately before the commencement  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition)  (Amendment)  Act,  1987  as  would  have  been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Special  Tribunal,  shall  stand transferred to the Special  Tribunal,  having jurisdiction,  as if  the cause of  action on which such suit or proceeding is based  had arisen after such commencement.

(7)  Every  case  brought  before  the  Special  Tribunal  shall  be  disposed  of  finally  by  the  Special  Tribunal,  as  far  as  possible,  within  a  period of six months from the date of its having  been brought before it.

(8) The Special Tribunal shall have all the powers  of a Civil Court for purposes of review.

Section  8.  Procedure  and  powers  of  the  Special  Courts:—  (1)  The  Special  Court  may,  either  suo motu or on application made by any  person,  officer  or  authority  take  cognizance  of  and try every case arising out of any alleged act  of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership  and  title  to,  or  lawful  possession  of,  the  land  grabbed,  whether  before  or  after  the  commencement of this Act, and pass such orders  (including orders by way of interim directions) as  it deems fit;

(1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of  taking  cognizance  of  the  case,  consider  the  location or extent or value of the land alleged to  

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have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of  the  evil  involved  or  in  the  interest  of  justice  required or any other relevant matter:  

Provided  that  the  Special  Court  shall  not  take  cognizance of any such case without hearing the  petitioner.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil  Procedure, 1908 [the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973] or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act,  1972, (Act 9 of 1972) any case in respect of an  alleged act of land grabbing or the determination  of  question of  title  and ownership to,  or  lawful  possession of any land grabbed under this Act,  [shall,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  be  triable in the Special Court] and the decision of  Special Court shall be final.

(2-A) If  the Special  Court is of the opinion that  any case brought before it, is not a fit case to be  taken cognizance of, it may return the same for  presentation  before  the  Special  Tribunal:  Provided  that  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Special  Court,  any  application  filed  before  it  is  prima  facie  frivolous  or  vexatious,  it  shall  reject  the  same without any further enquiry:

Provided further that if on an application from an  interested  person  to  withdraw  and  try  a  case  pending before any Special Tribunal the Special  Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case to be  withdrawn and tried by it, it may for reasons to  be recorded in writing withdraw any such case  from such Special Tribunal and shall deal with it  as if the case was originally instituted before the  Special Court.

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(2-B)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for  the Special  Court to try all  offences punishable  under this Act.  

(2-C) The Special Court shall determine the order  in which the civil and criminal liability against a  land grabber be initiated. It  shall be within the  discretion of the Special Court whether or not to  deliver its decision or order until both civil  and  criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence  admitted during the criminal proceeding may be  made use of  while  trying  the  civil  liability.  But  additional evidence, if  any, adduced in the civil  proceedings  shall  not  be  considered  by  the  Special  Court  while  determining  the  criminal  liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or  the  abetment  thereof  before  the  Special  Court  shall be a competent witness for the defence and  may  give  evidence  or  oath  in  disproof  of  the  charge made against him or any person charged  together with him in the criminal proceeding:

Provided that he shall not be called as a witness  except on his own request in writing or his failure  to give evidence shall be made the subject of any  comment  by  any  of  the  parties  or  the  special  court  or  give  rise  to  any  presumption  against  himself or any person charged together with him  at the same proceeding.]

(3) [* * * Omitted]

(4)  Every  case  under  sub-section  (1)  shall  be  disposed of finally by the Special Court, as far as  possible, within a period of six months from the  date of institution of the case before it.

(5) [* * *Omitted]

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(6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard  to  any  alleged  act  of  land  grabbing  shall  be  conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and  of  the  persons  who  committed  such  land  grabbing,  and  every  judgment  of  the  Special  Court  with  regard  to  the  determination  of  title  and ownership  to,  or  lawful  possession of,  any  land  grabbed  shall  be  binding  on  all  persons  having interest in such land

[* * * Omitted]  

[Provided  that  the  Special  Court  shall,  by  notification specify the fact of taking cognizance  of  the  case  under  this  Act.   Such  notification  shall  state  that  any  objection  which  may  be  received  by  the  Special  Court  from any person  including  the  custodian  of  evacuee  property  within  the  period  specified  therein  will  be  considered by it;  

Provided  further  that  where  the  custodian  of  evacuee  property  objects  to  the  Special  Court  taking cognizance of the case, the Special Court  shall not proceed further with the case in regard  to such property;  

Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a  notice of taking cognizance of the case under the  Act, served on any person known or believed to  be  interested  in  the  land,  after  a  summary  enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely  to be interested in the land.

(7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass  such  order  as  it  may  deem fit  to  advance  the  cause of justice. It may award compensation in  terms  of  money  for  wrongful  possession  of  the  

20

land  grabbed  which  shall  not  be  less  than  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  market  value  of  the  land  grabbed  as  on  the  date  of  the  order  and  profits accrued from the land payable by the land  grabber  to  the  owner  of  the  grabbed  land  and  may direct re-delivery of the grabbed land to its  rightful owner.  The amount of compensation and  profits,  so  awarded  and  costs  of  re-delivery,  if  any,  shall  be  recovered  as  an  arrear  of  land  revenue in case the Government is the owner, or  as a decree of a civil Court, in any other case to  be executed by the Special Court:

Provided  that  the  Special  Court  shall,  before  passing an order under this subsection, give to  the  land grabber  an opportunity  of  making his  representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in  this  regard,  and  consider  such  representation  and evidence.]

(8) Any case, pending before any court or other  authority immediately before the constitution of a  Special  Court,  as  would  have  been  within  the  jurisdiction  of  such  Special  Court,  shall  stand  transferred to the Special Court [omitted] as if the  cause of action on which such suit or proceeding  is based had arisen after the constitution of the  Special Court.

Section 9. Special Court to have the powers of  the Civil  Court and the Court of Sessions:—  Save  as  expressly  provided  in  this  Act,  the  provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,  (Central Act 5 of 1908), the Andhra Pradesh Civil  Courts Act, 1972 (Act 19 of 1972) and the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974),  insofar  as  they  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  apply  to  the  proceedings before the Special Court and for the  

21

purpose of the provisions of the said enactments,  Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court,  or as the case may be, a Court of Session and  shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a  Court  of  Session  and  the  person  conducting  a  prosecution  before  the  Special  Court  shall  be  deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.

Rule 6. Verification of Application:-  (1)  Every  application filed under sub-section (1) of Section  8 of the Act or every case taken cognizance of suo  motu by the Special Court or an application filed  under  sub-sect.(1)  of  Section  7-A  of  the  Act,  before the Special Tribunal, may be referred for  local  inspection  or  verification  or  both  by  the  Mandal Revenue Officer having jurisdiction over  the  area  or  by  any  other  Officer  of  the  Government  authorized  by  the  Court  in  this  behalf.

(2)  The  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  or  the  other  Officer to whom the application has been referred  under  sub-rule  (1)  shall  make  or  cause  to  be  made  an  inspection  or  verification  or  both,  as  soon as may be practicable and shall submit a  full  and complete report within two weeks from  the  date  of  receipt  of  order  with  reference  to  Revenue Records and facts on ground as to the  following:-

(i) the correctness of the statements made in the  application with regard to columns 1 to 15 and  19 in Forum-1;

(ii)  the  facts  relating  to  ownership,  actual  possession and use of the land concerned; and

22

(iii)  such  other  particulars  and  information  as  would be useful to the Court to arrive at a correct  decision on the claims made in the application.

(3)  The  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  or  the  other  Officer to whom the application has been referred  under sub-rule (1) shall also furnish copies of the  extracts of the Government records to show the  survey  number  and  sub-division  number  and  proof  of  possession,  ownership  and  use  of  the  land and the payment of dues to the Government.

(4) A copy of the report referred to in sub-rule (2)  may  be  furnished  to  the  applicant,  to  the  respondents  and  other  persons,  if  any  having  interest  in  the  land  on  payment  of  copying  charges.

Rule 7. Notice of taking cognizance of a case:-  (1)  The  Special  Court  shall  after  taking  cognizance of the case under the Act give notice  in  Form  II-A  by  publishing  it  in  the  Andhra  Pradesh Gazette.

(2)  The  Special  Tribunal  shall  after  taking  cognizance of the case under the Act give notice  in  Form-II-B  by  publishing  it  in  the  Andhra  Pradesh Gazette.”

11. A reading of the provisions of Sections 7-A and 8 of the Act  

would show that neither of the two Sections requires the  

Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  to  refer  any  

application or a case for local inspection or verification or  

both  by  the  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  having  jurisdiction  

23

over the area.  Sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the Rules, however,  

provides that every application filed under sub-section (1)  

of Section 8 of the Act or every case taken cognizance of  

suo motu by the Special Court or an application filed under  

sub-section (1) of Section 7-A of the Act, before the Special  

Tribunal,  ‘may’  be  referred  for  local  inspection  or  

verification or both by the Mandal Revenue Officer having  

jurisdiction  over  the  area  or  by  any other  Officer  of  the  

Government authorized by the Court in this behalf.  This  

Court has held in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh  

(supra) that the word ‘may’ is capable of meaning ‘must’ or  

‘shall’ in the light of the context in which the word is used  

and where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority  

coupled  with  an  obligation,  the  word  ‘may’  should  be  

construed to mean a command.  Hence, we are called upon  

to decide whether the word ‘may’ used in sub-rule (1) of  

Rule  6  of  the  Rules  confers  only  a  discretion  upon  the  

Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  to  refer  an  

application filed before it or a case to the Mandal Revenue  

Officer or whether this discretion of the Special Tribunal or  

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the  Special  Court  is  coupled  also  with  a  duty  or  an  

obligation to refer the application filed before it or the case  

to the Mandal Revenue Officer and we have to decide this  

question by examining the context in which the word ‘may’  

has been used and the context would mean Rule 6 of the  

Rules and Sections 7-A and 8 of the Act and the object of  

these statutory provisions.

12. A reading of Rule 6 of the Rules and, in particular, sub-

rules (1) and (2) thereof, indicates that the object of referring  

the application under sub-section (1) of Section 7-A or sub-

section  (1)  of  Section  8  of  the  Act  to  the  Mandal  Revenue  

Officer  is  to  get  full  and  complete  report  from the  Mandal  

Revenue Officer  after  local  inspection  or  verification  on the  

correctness of the statements made in the application and the  

facts relating to ownership, actual possession and use of the  

land concerned and such other particulars and information as  

would be useful to the Court to arrive at a correct decision on  

the claims made in the application.  Sub-rule (3) of Rule 6 of  

the Rules further indicates the nature of the report the Mandal  

Revenue Officer is required to submit and it states that the  

25

Mandal  Revenue  Officer  or  the  other  Officer  to  whom  the  

application  has  been  referred  under  sub-rule  (1)  shall  also  

furnish  along  with  his  report  copies  of  the  extracts  of  the  

Government  records  to  show  the  survey  number  and  sub-

division number and proof of possession, ownership and use  

of the land and the payment of dues to the Government.  The  

report of the Mandal Revenue Officer, therefore, is to be based  

on Government records and on proof of possession, ownership  

and  use  of  the  land  and  the  payment  of  dues  to  the  

Government  and/or  local  inspection.   Where  an  applicant  

before  the  Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  furnishes  

certified  copies  of  Government  records  to  show  proof  of  

possession, ownership and use of the land and also payment  

of dues to the Government, in support of the statements made  

in  the  application  and  the  Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  

Court is satisfied about the truth of the statements made in  

the  application,  it  may  not  be  necessary  for  the  Special  

Tribunal or the Special Court to refer the application to the  

Mandal  Revenue  Officer  for  inspection  or  verification.  

Moreover,  the  Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  can  

26

ascertain the truth or otherwise of the statements made in the  

application made under Sections 7(1) or 8(1) of the Act on the  

basis  of  oral  and  documentary  evidence  adduced  before  it.  

Sub-section (2) of Section 7-A provides that save as otherwise  

provided in the Act,  a Special  Tribunal shall,  in the trial  of  

cases before it, follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of  

Civil Procedure, 1908.  Hence, all the provisions of the Code of  

Civil  Procedure, 1908 relating to trial including examination  

and  cross-examination  of  witnesses  and  production  and  

acceptance  of  documentary  evidence  are  available  to  the  

Special Tribunal to be followed for the purpose of ascertaining  

the  truth  or  otherwise  of  the  statements  made  in  the  

application under  sub-section (1)  of  Section  7-A of  the  Act.  

Similarly, Section 9 of the Act provides that save as expressly  

provided  in  the  Act,  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure,  1908 and the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  

insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the  

Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court.  

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to trials, such as  

27

examination  and  cross-examination  of  witnesses  and  

production and acceptance of documents are also available to  

the Special Court for ascertaining the truth or otherwise of the  

statements made in the application.   

13. We are thus of the considered opinion that the object of  

Rule 6 of the Rules is to assist the Special  Tribunal  or the  

Special Court to arrive at a correct decision on the claims and  

allegations made in the application under sub-section (1)  of  

Section 7-A and sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act to the  

Special Tribunal or the Special Court and if this very object  

can be achieved without referring the application of the case to  

the Mandal Revenue Officer, it may not be necessary for the  

Special Tribunal or the Special Court to make a reference to  

the  Mandal  Revenue  Officer  and  therefore  there  is  no  

compelling duty on the Special Tribunal or the Special Court  

to refer the application under Section 7-A (1) or under Section  

8 to the Mandal Revenue Officer.  In other words, under the  

Act and the Rules, it is not mandatory for the Special Tribunal  

or the Special Court to call for a report of the Mandal Revenue  

Officer.  We, however, hasten to make it clear that while there  

28

is nothing in the statutory provisions in Section 7-A or Section  

8-A of the Act or Rule 6 of the Rules to indicate that the power  

vested in the Special Tribunal or the Special Court is coupled  

with a duty to refer the application filed before it to the Mandal  

Revenue  Officer,  the  facts  of  a  particular  case  before  the  

Special Tribunal or the Special Court may cast a judicial duty  

on  the  Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  to  refer  the  

application filed before it to the Mandal Revenue Officer for the  

purpose of verifying the truth of the statements made in the  

application and deciding the land grabbing case before it in a  

just  and  reasonable  manner.   In  The  Official  Liquidator v.  

Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. [(1977) 2 SCC 166], this Court referring to  

the  word  ‘may’  used  in  Sections  442  and  446  of  the  

Companies Act, 1956 held:

“If  the applicant can make out, on facts, that the  objects of the power conferred by Sections 442 and  446 of the Act, can only be carried out by a stay  order, it could perhaps be urged that an obligation  to do so has become annexed to it by proof of those  facts.  That would be the position not because the  word “may” itself must be equated with “shall” but  because  judicial  power  has  necessarily  to  be  exercised justly, properly, and reasonably to enforce  the principle that rights created must be enforced.”

29

14.   The next question, which we are called upon to decide in  

this case, is whether it was mandatory for the Special Tribunal  

or the Special Court to issue notification specifying the fact of  

taking  cognizance  of  the  case  under  the  Act  in  accordance  

with the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 7 or sub-section  

(6) of Section 8 of the Act and Rule 7 of the Rules.  The proviso  

to sub-section (4) of Section 7-A and the proviso to sub-section  

(6) of Section 8 of the Act provide that the Special Tribunal  

and the Special Court shall by notification specify the fact of  

taking cognizance of the case under the Act.  Similarly, sub-

rules (1) and (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules provide that the Special  

Court and the Special Tribunal shall after taking cognizance of  

the  case  under  the  Act  give  notice  in  Form  II-A/II-B  by  

publishing it in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette.  The word ‘shall’  

used in the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section   7-A and the  

proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act as well as in  

sub-rules  (1)  and  (2)  of  Rule  7  of  the  Rules  indicates  that  

compliance with requirement of notification or publication of  

the notice in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette of the case after the  

30

Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  takes  cognizance  is  

mandatory.  The use of the word “shall”  in these provisions,  

however,  is  not  conclusive  of  the  mandatory  nature  of  the  

provisions and we must look at the main provisions of sub-

section (4) of Section 7-A and sub-section (6) of Section 8 of  

the Act to find out the purposes for which such notification or  

publication of notice is to be made.  As has been explained by  

Justice  G.P.  Singh in  Principles  of  Statutory  Interpretation,  

12th Edition 2010 at page 406-407:

“The use of word ‘shall’  raises a presumption that  the  particular  provision  is  imperative;  but  this  prima  facie inference  may  be  rebutted  by  other  considerations  such  as  object  and  scope  of  the  enactment and the consequences flowing from such  construction.”

The object of the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 7-A will  

be  clear  from  the  main  provision  which  states  that  every  

judgment  of  the  Special  Tribunal  with  regard  to  the  

determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession  

of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having  

interest in such land.  Similarly, the object of the proviso to  

sub-section  (6)  of  Section  8  will  be  clear  from  the  main  

31

provision  which  states  that  every  judgment  of  the  Special  

Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership  

to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding  

on  all  persons  having  interest  in  such  land.   Hence,  all  

persons who may not have been impleaded as a party in the  

applications filed under sub-section (1) of Section 7-A or sub-

section (1) of Section 8 of the Act are sought to be given notice  

by a notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette of the fact of  

the Special Tribunal or the Special Court taking cognizance of  

a case to enable them to appear before the Special Tribunal or  

the Special Court and protect their interest in the land, if any.  

Considering this object of Sections 7-A and 8 of the Act, we are  

of the opinion that the notification or the publication of the  

notice of the fact that cognizance of a case has been taken in  

the Andhra Pradesh Gazette as required by the proviso to sub-

section (4) of Section 7-A and the proviso to sub-section (6) of  

Section 8 and sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 7 is mandatory and  

cannot  be  dispensed  with  by  the  Special  Tribunal  and  the  

Special Court.  

32

15. This requirement of a notification or publication of notice  

in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette of the fact that cognizance of a  

case has been taken by the Special  Tribunal  or the Special  

Court has been made mandatory by the Act and the Rules not  

in the public interest but in the interest of persons who may  

claim title, ownership or lawful possession of the land which is  

the  subject-matter  of  the  proceedings  under  Section 7-A or  

Section 8 of the Act before the Special Tribunal or the Special  

Court.  If, therefore, a person who claims title, ownership or  

lawful possession of any such land is already a party in the  

proceedings under Sections 7-A or 8 of the Act in the Special  

Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  and  he  has  notice  of  such  

proceedings and has had due opportunity to participate in the  

said  proceedings  and  assert  his  title,  ownership  or  lawful  

possession over the land, he cannot challenge the proceedings  

of the Special Tribunal or the Special Court on the ground that  

the notification or the publication of the notice has not been  

made in accordance with the Act and Rules.   In State Bank of   

Patiala & Ors. v.  S. K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] this Court  

33

relying on Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh [AIR  

1964 SC 1300] has held in para 29 at page 387:

“But then even a mandatory requirement can be  waived by the person concerned if such mandatory  provision is  conceived in his interest  and not in  public interest.”

In the aforesaid case at para 33 at page 389, this Court has  

further held:

“33. ……………..

(1) ……………….

(2) ……………….

(3)   In  the  case  of  violation  of  a  procedural  provision,  the  position  is  this:  procedural  provisions  are  generally  meant  for  affording  a  reasonable  and  adequate  opportunity  to  the  delinquent  officer/employee.  They  are,  generally  speaking,  conceived in his  interest.   Violation of  any and every procedural provision cannot be said  to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order  passed. Except cases falling under – “no notice”,  “no opportunity” and “no hearing” categories, the  complaint  of  violation  of  procedural  provision  should  be  examined  from  the  point  of  view  of  prejudice.”       

  16.  The provisions of the Act and Rules mandatorily requiring  

notification or publication of the notice of the case after the  

Special  Tribunal  or  the  Special  Court  takes  cognizance  are  

34

procedural provisions and the law laid down by this Court in  

State  Bank of Patiala & Ors. v.  S. K. Sharma (supra) is that  

violation  of  such  procedural  provisions  will  not  vitiate  the  

proceedings  unless  prejudice  is  caused  to  the  party  

complaining of the violation.  The respondents in the two cases  

before us not only had notice of the application under Section  

7-A of the Act before the Special Tribunal but also filed their  

replies to the application and got the opportunity to adduce  

evidence in support  of  their  case and had not suffered any  

prejudice for non-compliance of the provisions of the proviso  

to sub-section (4) of Section 7-A of the Act or Rule 7 of the  

Rules.  The High Court was, therefore, not right in quashing  

the proceedings before the Special Tribunal in the present case  

on the ground that a notification or notice in terms of Rule  

7(2) of the Rules had not been issued after the case was taking  

cognizance of by the Special Tribunal.

17.   In  the  result,  we  allow these  appeals,  set  aside  the  

impugned orders of the High Court and remand the matter to  

the High Court for consideration whether in the facts of the  

two cases reference to the Mandal Revenue Officer was at all  

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necessary to ascertain the truth of the statements made in the  

applications  and  to  arrive  at  a  just  decision  and  for  

consideration of the Writ Petitions on merits.  There will be no  

order as to costs.        

.……………………….J.                                                                (R. V. Raveendran)

………………………..J.                                                                (A. K. Patnaik) New Delhi, March 04, 2011.    

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