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PETITIONER: PEOPLE’S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1982

BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. BENCH: BHAGWATI, P.N. ISLAM, BAHARUL (J)

CITATION:  1982 AIR 1473            1983 SCR  (1) 456  1982 SCC  (3) 235        1982 SCALE  (1)818  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1983 SC  75  (6)  R          1983 SC 328  (3)  RF         1984 SC 177  (1,6,7)  F          1984 SC 802  (10,21)  RF         1987 SC1086  (4)

ACT:      Public  Interest   Litigation,  scope   and  need  for- Violation of  various labour  laws in  relation  to  workmen employed in  the construction  work connected with the Asian Games like  Constitution of  India, 1950  Arts. 24,  Minimum wages Act,  1948, Equal  Remuneration Act. The employment of Children Act,  1938 and  1970,  Interstate  Migrant  workman (Regulation of  Employment and  conditions of  Service) Act, 1970 and  contract Labour  (Regulation and  Abolition)  Act, 1970-Locus-standi-Maintainabillty of  the writ  and remedial relief that  could  be  granted-Duties  of  Court  regarding sentencing in cases of violation of Labour Laws-Constitution of India  Articles 14,  23, 24  and 32-Scope  of Article  23 Meaning of "begar" Duty of State when violation of Arts. 17, 23 and 24 is complained.

HEADNOTE:      Petitioner No.  1, is  an organisation  formed for  the purpose of  protecting democratic  rights.  It  commissioned three social scientists for the purpose of investigating and inquiring  into  the  conditions  under  which  the  workmen engaged in the various Asiad Projects were working. Based on the report  made by  these  three  social  scientists  after personal  investigation   and  study   the  1st   petitioner addressed  a   letter  to   Hon’ble  Mr.   Justice  Bhagwati complaining of  violation of  various  labour  laws  by  tho respondents’ and/or their agents and seeking interference by the Supreme  Court to  render social  justice  by  means  of appropriate directions  to the affected workmen. The Supreme Court treated  the letter as a writ petition on the judicial side  and  issued  notice  to  the  Union  of  India,  Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.      The allegations in the petition were:      (i)  The various  authorities to  whom the execution of           the  different   projects  was  entrusted  engaged           contractors for  the purpose  of carrying  out the

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         construction work  of the  projects and  they were           registered as  principal employers under section 7           of the  Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)           Act.  1970.   These  contractors  engaged  workers           through "Jamadars" who brought them from different           parts  of   India  particularly   the  States   of           Rajasthan, Uttar  Pradesh and  Orissa and  paid to           these Jamadars  the minimum  wage of  Rs. 9.25 per           day per  worker and not to the workmen direct. The           Jamadars deducted  Rupee one per day per worker as           their commis- 457           sion with the result that there was a violation of           the provisions of A the Minimum Wages Act;      (ii) The  provisions of  Equal Remuneration  Act,  1976           were violated as the women workers were being paid           Rs. 71-  per day, the balance of the amount of the           wage was being misappropriated by the Jamadars:    (iii)  There  was   violation  of   Article  24   of  the           Constitution and  of the  - .  provisions  of  the           Employment of  Children Acts,  1938 and 1970 in as           much as  children below  the age  of 14 years were           employed by  the contractors  in the  construction           work of the various projects,      (iv) There  was violation  of  the  provisions  of  the           Contract Labour  (Regulations and  Abolition) Act,           1970   which    resulted   in    deprivation   and           exploitation of  the workers  and denial  of their           right to  proper living  condition and medical and           other facilities under the Act; and       (v)  The provisions of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen           (Regulation  of   Employment  and   Conditions  of           Service) Act,  1979, though  brought into force as           far  back  as  2nd  October  1980  in  the  Union.           Territory of  Delhi were  not implemented  by  the           Contractors.           Allowing the petition, the Court, ^      HELD:  l:1.   Public  interest   litigation  which   is strategic arm  of  the  legal  aid  movement  and  which  is intended to  bring justice  within the  reach  of  the  poor masses, who  constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a  totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation  which is essentially of an adversary character where  there is  a dispute  between two litigating parties, one  making claim  or seeking  relief  against  the other and  that other  opposing such claim or resisting such relief. Public  interest litigation  is brought  before  the court not  for the  purpose of  enforcing the  right of  one individual  against  another  as  happens  in  the  case  of ordinary litigation,  but it  is  intended  to  promote  and indicate public  interest which  demands that  violations of constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who are  poor,   ignorant  or  in  a  socially  or  economically disadvantaged  position   should  not   go   unnoticed   and unredressed. That  would be  destructive of  the Rule of Law which forms one of the essential elements of public interest in any democratic form of Government. [467 C-F]      1:2. The  Rule of Law does not mean that the protection of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law  should be  allowed to  be prostituted by the vested interests for  protecting and upholding the status quo under the guise  of  enforcement  of  their  civil  and  political rights. The poor too have civil and political rights and the Rule of  law is  meant for them also, though today it exists

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only on  paper and  not in  reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol  kings have  the Fundamental  rights to carry on their business  and to fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public, certainly the "chamaras" to belonging 458 to the  lowest strata  of society  have Fundamental Right to earn on  honest living  through their  sweat and toil. Large numbers of  men, women  and children who constitute the bulk of an  population are  today living a sub human existence in conditions of  object poverty;  utter grinding  poverty  bas broken their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in  the existing  social and  economic system. Nor can these poor  and deprived  sections  of  humanity  afford  to enforce their civil and political rights. (467 P-H; 468 A-D]      1:3. The  only solution  of making  civil and political rights meaningful  to these  large sections of society would be to  remake the  material conditions  and restructure  the social and  economic order  so that  they  may  be  able  to realise the economic, social and cultural rights. Of course, the task  of restructuring  the social and economic order so that the  social and  economic  right  become  a  meaningful reality for  the poor and lowly sections of the community is one which  legitimately belongs  to the  legislature and the executive but  mere initiation of social and economic rescue programmes by the executive and the legislature would not be enough and  it is  only through multi-dimensional strategies including public  interest litigation  that these social and economic rescue  programmes can be made effective. [468 G-H, 469 B-D]      1:4.  Public  interest  litigation,  is  essentially  a cooperative or  collaborative effort  on  the  part  of  the petitioner, the  State or  public authority and the Court to secure observance  of the  constitutional or  legal  rights, benefits  and   privileges  conferred  upon  the  vulnerable sections of  the community  and to  reach social  justice to them. The  State or  public authority  against  whom  public interest litigation  is brought should be as much interested in ensuring  basic human  rights, constitutional  as well as legal, to  those who  are in  a  socially  and  economically disadvantaged position,  as the  petitioner who  brings  the public interest  litigation before  the court.  The State or public authority  which is arrayed as a respondent in public interest litigation should, in fact, welcome it, as it would give it  an opportunity  to right  a wrong  or to redress an injustice done  to the  poor  and  weaker  sections  of  the community whose  welfare is and must be the prime concern of the State or the public authority. [469 D-F]      l:5.  The   legal  aid  movement  and  public  interest litigation  seek   to  bring   justice  to  these  forgotten specimens  of  humanity  who  constitute  the  bulk  of  the citizens of  India and  who are really and truly the "People of  India   who  gave   to   themselves   this   magnificent Constitution. Pendency of large arrears in the courts cannot be any  reason for denying access of justice to the poor and weaker sections of the community. [470 E-F]      1:6. The  time has now come when the courts must become the courts  for the  poor  and  struggling  masses  of  this country. They  must shed their character as upholders of the established  order   and  the   status  quo.  They  must  be sensitised to  the need of doing justice to the large masses of people  to whom  justice has  been denied  by a cruel and heartless society for generations. The realisation must come to them  that social  justice is  the signature  tune of our Constitution  and   it  is   their  solemn  duty  under  the Constitution to  enforce the  basic human rights of the poor

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and vulnerable  sections of  the community and actively help in the 459 realisation of the constitutional goals. This new change has to come  if the  judicial system  is to  become an effective instrument of  social justice  for  without  it,  it  cannot survive for  long.  Fortunately  this  change  is  gradually taking place  and public  interest litigation  is playing  a large part  in bringing  about this  change. It  is  through public interest litigation that the problems of the poor are now coming  to the  forefront and  the entire theatre of the law is  changing. It  holds out  great possibilities for the future. This  writ petition  is one  such instance of public interest litigation. [470 G-H; 471 A-C]      2. It  is true that construction industry does not find a place  on the  schedule to the Employment of Children Act, 1938 and  the Prohibition enacted in section 3 sub-section ( 3) of that Act against the employment of a child who has not completed his  fourteenth year cannot apply to employment in construction  industry.   But,  apart  altogether  from  the requirement of  Convention No.  59 of  C  the  International Labour organisation and ratified by India, Article 24 of the Constitution provides  that no  child below  the age  of  14 shall be  employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any  other hazardous employment. This is a constitutional prohibition which,  even if  not followed  up by appropriate legislation, must  operate propiro  vigore and  construction work being  plainly and  indubitably a hazardous employment, it  is   clear  that   by  reason   of  this  Constitutional prohibition, no  child below  the age  of 14  years  can  be allowed to  be  engaged  in  construction  work.  Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of specification of construction industry in  the Schedule  to the Employment of Children Act 1938, no  child below the age of 14 years can be employed in construction work and the Union of India as also every state Government must  ensure that  this constitutional mandate is not violated in any part of the Country [474 A-F]      3. Magistrates  and Judges  in the  country  must  view violations of  labour laws  with strictness and whenever any violations of  labour laws are established before them, they should punish  the errant  employers  by  imposing  adequate punishment. The  labour laws  are enacted  for improving the conditions of workers and the employers cannot be allowed to buy off immunity against violations of labour laws by paying a paltry  fine which  they would not mind paying, because by violating the  labour laws they would be making profit which would far  exceed the  amount of  the fine. If violations of labour laws  are to  be punished with meagre fines, it would be impossible  to ensure  observance of  the labour laws and the labour  laws would  be reduced  to nullity.  They  would remain merely  paper tigers without any teeth or claws. [476 E-H]      4:1. It  is true  that the complaint of the petitioners in the  writ petition  is in regard to the violations of the provisions of  various labour  laws designed for the welfare of workmen,  and therefore from a strictly traditional point of view  it would be only the workmen whose legal rights are violated who  would be  entitled to  approach the  court for judicial redress. But the traditional rule of standing which confines access  to the  judicial process  only to  those to whom legal  injury is  caused or legal wrong is done has now been jettisoned by the Supreme Court and the narrow confines within which  the rule  of standing  was imprisoned for long years as  a result  of inheritance of the Anglo-saxon system of jurisprudence  have been  broken and  a new dimension has

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been given to the doctrine of 460 locus standi  which has  revolutionised the whole concept of access to  justice in  a way not known before to the Western System of jurisprudence. [477 F-H]      4:2. Having  regard  to  the  peculiar  socio  economic conditions  prevailing   in  the   country  where  there  is considerable poverty,  illiteracy and  ignorance obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would result in  closing the  doors of  justice to  the  poor  and deprived sections  of the  community if the traditional rule of standing evolved by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that only a person wronged  can sue  for judicial  redress  were  to  be blindly  adhered  to  and  followed,  and  it  is  therefore Necessary  to   evolve  a  new  strategy  by  relaxing  this traditional rule  of standing  in  order  that  justice  may become easily available to the lowly and the lost. [478 A-C]      4:3. Where  a person  or class of persons to whom legal injury is  caused or  legal wrong  is done  is by  reason of poverty,   disability    or   socially    or    economically disadvantaged position  not able  to approach  the Court for judicial redress,  any member  of the public acting bonafide and not  out of any extraneous motivation may move the Court for judicial  redress of  the legal injury or wrong suffered by such  person or class of persons and the judicial process may be  set in  motion by  any public spirited individual or institution even  by addressing a letter to the court. Where judicial redress  is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong suffered by  a person  or class  of persons who by reason of poverty,   disability    or   socially    or    economically disadvantaged position  are unable to approach the court and the court  is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by addressing a letter drawing the attention of the court to such legal injury or legal wrong, court would cast aside all technical rules  of procedure  and entertain the letter as a writ Petition  on the judicial side and take action upon it. [478 C-F]      Here, the  workmen whose  rights are  said to have been violated and  to whom a life of basic human dignity has been denied are  poor, ignorant, illiterate humans who, by reason of their  poverty and  social and  economic disability,  are unable to approach the courts for judicial redress and hence the  petitioners   have,  under   the  liberalised  rule  of standing, locus standi to maintain the present writ petition espousing the  cause of the workmen. The petitioners are not acting mala  fide or  out of  extraneous motives  since  the first petitioner  is admittedly an organisation dedicated to tho protecting  and enforcement  of Fundamental  Rights  and making Directive  Principles of State Policy enforceable and justiciable.There can  be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public  service that  the  present  Litigation  has  been brought by the petitioners and it is clearly maintainable.           [478 G-H; 479 A-B]      4.4 The  Union of  India, the  Delhi Administration and the  Delhi   Development  Authority   cannot  escape   their obligation to  the  workmen  to  ensure  observance  of  the provisions of  various labour law by its contractors and for non-compliance with the laws by the contractors, the workmen would clearly  have a  cause  of  actions  against  them  as principal  employers.   So  far   as  to  Con  tract  Labour (Regulation and  Abolition) Act,  1970 is concerned, section 20 is  clear that  if any  amenity required  to be  provided under sections 16 to 18 or 19 for the 461 benefit of  the workmen  employed in an establishment is not

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provided by  the contractor,  the obligation to provide such amenity rests on the principal employer. [479 C-D]      Sections 17  and 18  of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of  Employment and  Conditions of  Service)  Act 1979 also  make principal employer liable to make payment of the wages  to the  wages to  the migrant workmen employed by the contractor  as also to pay the allowances provided under sections 14  and 15  and to provide the facilities specified in section 16 of such migrant workmen. [479 F-G]      Article 24  of the  Constitution embodies a Fundamental Right which  is plainly  and indubitably enforceable against every one  and by  reason of  its compulsive mandate, no one can employ  a child below the age of 14 years in a hazardous employment.  Since,   construction  work   is  a   hazardous employment, no  child below  the age  of  14  years  can  be employed in  constructions work  and therefore, not only are the contractors under a constitutional mandate not to employ any child below the age of 14 years, but it is also the duty of the  Union of  India, the  Delhi Administration  and  the Delhi   Development    Authority   to   ensure   that   this constitutional obligation  is obeyed  by the  contractors to whom they  have  entrusted  the  construction  work  of  the various  Asiad  Projects.  Similarly  the  respondents  must ensure compliance  with by the contractors of the Provisions of the  equal Remuneration  Act, 1946  as they  express  the principle  of   equality  embodied  in  Article  14  of  the Constitution. [479 G-H; 480 A-D]      No doubt, the contractors are liable to pay the minimum wage to  the workmen employed by them under the Minimum Wage Act 1948  but the  Union of  India, the Delhi Administration and the  Delhi Development  Authority who have entrusted the construction  work  to  the  contractors  would  equally  be responsible to  ensure that  the minimum wage is paid to the workmen by their contractors.      [480 G-H]      5:1. It  is true  that the present writ petition cannot be maintained  by the  petitioners unless they can show some violation of  a  Fundamental  Right,  for  it  is  only  for enforcement right  that a writ petition can be maintained in this Court  under Article  32. But,  certainly the following complaints do legitimately form the subject matter of a writ petition under  Article 32;  namely, (i)  the  complaint  of violation of  Article 24 based on the averment that children below the  age of  14 years are employed in the construction work  of   the  Asiad  Projects,  (ii)  allegation  of  non- observance of  the provisions  of the Equal Remuneration Act 1946, is  in effect  and substance  a complaint of breach of the principle  of  equality  before  the  law  enshrined  in Article 14; and (iii) the complaint of non-observance of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970  and the Interstate Migrant Workmen (Regulations of Employment and  Conditions of  Service) Act  1979 as it is a complaint relating  to violation  of  Article  21.  Now  the rights and  benefits conferred  on the workmen employed by a contractor under  the  provisions  of  the  Contract  Labour (Regulation and  Abolition  Act  1970  and  the  Inter-State Migrant Workmen  Regulation of  Employment and Conditions of Service) Act  1979 which  became enforceable w.e.f. 4-6-1982 are clearly intended to ensure basic 462 human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any  of these  rights and  benefits  to  which  they  are entitled under  the provisions of these two pieces of social welfare legislation,  that would  clearly be  a violation of Article 21  by the  Union of India, the Delhi Administration

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and the  Delhi Development  Authority  which,  as  principal employers, are  made statutorily  responsible  for  securing such rights  and benefits  to  the  workmen;  and  (iv)  the complaint in  regard to  non-payment of  minimum wage to the workmen under  the Minimum  Wages  Act  1948,  is  also  one relating to  breach of  a  Fundamental  Right  enshrined  in Article 23  which is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen.      [481 D-H; 482 A-F]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India,  [1978] 2  SCR  663; Francis  Coralie   Mullin  v.  The  Administrator  of  Union Territory of Delhi & Others, [1981] 2 SCR 516, applied.      5:2. Many of the fundamental rights enacted in Part III operate as  limitations on the power of the State and impose negative  obligations  on  the  State  not  to  encroach  on individual liberty and they are enforceable only against the State. But there are certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution  which are  enforceable against  the  whole world and they are to be found inter alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24. [483 C-D]      5:3. Article  23 is  clearly designed  to  protect  the individual not only against the State but also against other private  citizens.   Article  23   is  not  limited  in  its application against  the State  but it prohibits "traffic in human beings  and begar  and other  similar forms  of forced labour" practised  by anyone  else. The  prohibition against "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of forced  labour"   is  clearly   intended  to  be  a  general prohibition, total  in its  effect and  all pervasive in its range and  it is  enforceable not only against the State but also  against   any  other  person  indulging  in  any  such practice. [484 G-H; 485 A]      5:4. The  word "begar"  in Article  23 is not a word of common use  in English language, but a word of Indian origin which like  many other  words has  found its  way in English vocabulary. It  is a  form of  forced labour  under which  a person  is   compelled  to   work  without   receiving   any remuneration. Begar is thus clearly a film of forced labour. [485 E-G]      S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mittal AIR 1962 Bom. 53 applied.      5:5. It is not merely ’begar’ which is constitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other similar forms of forced labour.  Article  23  strikes  at  forced  labour  in whatever  form   it  may  manifest  itself,  because  it  is violative of  human dignity  and is  contrary to basic human values. To  contend that  exacting labour  by  passing  some remuneration, though  it be  inadequate will not attract the provisions of Article 23 is to unduly restrict the amplitude of the  prohibition against forced labour enacted in Article 23. The  contention is  not only  illfounded, but  does  not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi  v.   Union  of  India  that  when  interpreting  the provisions  of   the  Constitution   conferring  fundamental rights, the  attempt of  the Court  should be  to expand the reach and  ambit of  the fundamental  rights rather  than to attenuate 463 their meaning  and content.  The Constitution makers did not intend to  strike only  at certain  forms of  forced  labour leaving it  open to  the socially  or economically  powerful sections of  the community  to exploit  the poor  and weaker sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. There could be  no logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced  to   give  labour  or  service  to  another  without receiving any  remuneration at all, it should be regarded as

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a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it should  be outside  the inhibition  of that  Article.  To interpret Article  23 as contended would be reducing Article 23 to  a mere rope of sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or  economically dominant  class to exact labour or service  from   a  person  belonging  to  the  deprived  and vulnerable section  of the  community by paying a negligible amount of  remuneration and  thus escape  the rigour of Art. 23. It  would not  be right  to place  on  the  language  of Article 23  an interpretation  which  would  emasculate  its beneficient  provisions  and  defeat  the  very  purpose  of enacting them.  Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of forced labour. [486 E-H; 487 A-D]      5:6. The  words "other  similar forms of forced labour" are used  in Article  23 not  with a  view to  importing the particular characteristic  of ’begar’ that labour or service should be  exacted without  payment of  any remuneration but with a  view to  bringing within the scope and ambit of that Article all  other forms  of forced labour and since ’begar’ is one  form of  forced labour, the Constitution makers used the words  "other similar  forms of  forced labour".  If the requirement that  labour or  work should  be exacted without any remuneration  were imported  in other  forms  of  forced labour. they  would straight-away come within the meaning of the word ’begar’ and in that event there would be no need to have the  additional words  "other similar  forms of  forced labour."  These   words  would   be  rendered   futile   and meaningless  and   it  is   a  well   recognised   rule   of interpretation that  the court  should avoid  a construction which has  the effect  of rendering  any words  used by  the legislature superfluous redundant. [487 E-G]      The object  of adding these words was clearly to expand the reach  and  content  of  Article  23  by  including,  in addition to ’begar’, other forms of forced labour within the prohibition of  that Article.  Every form  of forced labour, ’begar’ or otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article 23 and it  makes no difference whether the person who is forced to give  his labour  or service to another is remunerated or not. Even  if remuneration  is paid,  labour supplied  by  a person would  be hit  by Article  23 if it is forced labour, that is,  labour supplied  not willingly  but as a result of force or compulsion. For example, where a person has entered into a  contract of  service with  another for  a period  of three years  and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before  the expiration  of the period of three years, if a  law were  to provide  that in such a case the contract shall be  specifically enforced and he shall be compelled to serve for  the full  period of three years, it would clearly amount to  forced labour  and such  a law  would be  void as offending Article  23. That is why specific performance of a contract of service cannot be enforced against an employee 464 and the  employee cannot  be forced  by compulsion of law to continue to  serve the  employer. Of  course, if  there is a breach of  the contract  of service,  the employee  would be liable to  pay damages  to the  employer but  he  cannot  be forced to  continue to  serve the employer without breaching the injunction of Article 23. [487 H; 488 A-D]      Baily v.  Aalabama, 219  US 219:55  Law Ed. 191; quoted with approval,      5:7. Even  if a  person has  contracted with another to perform service  and there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he

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cannot be  forced by  compulsion of  law  or  otherwise,  to continue to  perform such  service, as  that would be forced labour within the inhibition of Article 23, which strikes at every form  of forced  labour even if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person obligated to provide labour  or service,  for the reasons, namely; (i) it offends against  human dignity to compel a person to provide labour or  service to  another if he does not wish to do so, even though  it be  breach of  the contract  entered into by him;  (ii)   there  should  be  no  serfdom  or  involuntary servitude in  a free  democratic India  which  respects  the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person; (iii) in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment  and there  is no  equality  of  bargaining power,  a  contract  of  service  may  appear  on  its  face voluntary but  it may,  in reality,  be involuntary, because while entering  into the  contract the employee by reason of his economically  helpless condition,  may have  been  faced with Hobson’s  choice, either  to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms  dictated by  the powerful  employer.  It would be  a travesty of justice to hold the employee in such a case  to the  terms of  the contract  and to compel him to serve the  employer even  though he  may not  wish to do so. That would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which the employee  even  otherwise  suffers  on  account  of  his economically disadvantaged  position and  lend the authority of law  to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the economically  powerful employer.  Article 23  therefore, provides that  no one  shall be  forced to provide labour or service  against  his  will,  even  though  it  be  under  a contractor of service. [490 C-H]      Pollock v.  Williams, 322  US 4:88  Lawyers Edn.  1095; referred to.      5:8. Where  a person  provides labour  or  services  to another for  remuneration which  is less  than  the  minimum wage, the  labour or  service provided  by him clearly falls within the  scope and  ambit of  the words  "forced  labour" under Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the court  for enforcement  of his  fundamental right  under Article 23  by asking  the court  to direct  payment of  the minimum wage  to him  so that the labour or service provided by him  ceases to  be ’forced  labour’  and  the  breach  of Article 23 is remedied. [492 F-G]      5:9. Ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service to  another for  less than the minimum wage, when he knows that  under the law he is entitled to get minimum wage for the  labour or service provided by him. Therefore when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remuneration  which is  less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of 465 some compulsion  which drives  him to work though he is paid less than  what he  is entitled  under law  to receive. What Article 23  prohibits is  ’forced labour’  that is labour or service which a person is forced to provide." [491 B-D]      5:10. ’Force’  which would  make such labour or service ’forced labour’  may  arise  in  several  ways.  It  may  be physical force  which may  compel a person to provide labour or service  to another  or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case  the employee  fails to provide labour or service or it may  even be  compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and  destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice  of  alternative  and  compels  him  to  adopt  one particular course  of action  may properly  be  regarded  as

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’force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ’force’, it would be ’forced labour’. Where a person is suffering  from   hunger  or  starvation,  when  he  has  no resources at  all to  fight disease  or to feed his wife and children or  even  to  hide  their  nakedness,  where  utter grinding poverty  has broken  his back  and reduced him to a state  of  helplessness  and  despair  and  where  no  other employment is  available to  alleviate  the  rigour  of  his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes his  way, even  if the  remuneration offered to him is less than  the minimum  wage. He  would be in no position to bargain with  the employer;  he would have to accept what is offered to  him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent  with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of  economic  circumstances  and  the  labour  of service provided  by him  would be  clearly ’forced labour’. The word  ’forced’ should  not  be  read  in  a  narrow  and restricted manner  so as  to be confined only to physical or legal ’force’  particularly when the national character, its fundamental document  has promised  to build a new socialist republic where  there will be socio-economic justice for all and every one shall have the right to work, to education and to adequate  means of  livelihood. The  constitution  makers have given  us one  of  the  most  remarkable  documents  in history for  ushering in  a new socio-economic order and the Constitution which  they have  forged for  us has  a  social purpose and  an economic  mission and, therefore, every word or phrase  in the  Constitution must  be  interpreted  in  a manner which  would advance  the socio-economic objective of the Constitution.  It is a fact that in a capitalist society economic circumstances  exert much  greater pressure  on  an individual in  driging him  to a particular course of action than physical  compulsion or force of legislative provision. The word  ’force’ must therefore be construed to include not only physical  or legal  force but  force arising  from  the compulsion of  economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives  to a  person in  want and  compels  him  to provide labour  or  service  even  though  the  remuneration received for it is less than the minimum wage. Of course, if a person  provides labour  or  service  to  another  against receipt of the minimum wage, it would not be possible to say that the  labour or  service  provided  by  him  is  ’forced labour’ because  he gets  what he  is entitled  under law to receive. No inference can reasonably be drawn in such a case that he  is forced  to provide  labour or  service  for  the simple reason  that would  be providing  labour  or  service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just like any  other  person  who  is  not  under  the  force  of  any compulsion. [491 D-H; 492 A-E]      6. Wherever  any fundamental right which is enforceable against  private   individuals  such   as,  for  example,  a fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or 23 466 or 24 is being violated, it is the constitutional obligation of the  State to  take necessary  steps for  the purpose  of interdicting such  violation and  ensuring observance of the fundamental  right   by  the   private  individual   who  is transgressing the  same. The  fact  that  the  person  whose fundamental right  is-violated can always approach the court for the  purpose of  enforcement of  his fundamental  right, cannot absolve  the State from its constitutional obligation to see  that there  is no violation of the fundamental right of such  person, particularly  when he belongs to the weaker section of  humanity and  is unable  to wage  a legal battle against a  strong and  powerful opponent  who is  exploiting

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him. [493 A-D]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 8143 of 1981.      (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)      Govind Mukhoty  in person  and  A.K.  Ganguli  for  the petitioner.      Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.      N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondents Nos.5 and 6.      Sardar Bahadur  Saharya and  Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Respondent No. 7.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BHAGWATI, J.  This is a writ petition brought by way of public interest  litigation in order to ensure observance of the provisions of various labour laws in relation to workmen employed  in  the  construction  work  of  various  projects connected with  the Asian  Games. The  matter was brought to the attention of the Court by the 1st petitioner which is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting democratic rights  by  means  of  a  letter  addressed  to  one  of  us (Bhagwati, J.).  The letter  was based on a report made by a team of three social scientists who were commissioned by the 1st  petitioner   for  the   purpose  of  investigating  and inquiring  into  the  conditions  under  which  the  workmen engaged in  the various  Asiad Projects  were working. Since the letter  addressed by the 1st petitioner was based on the report  made  by  three  social  scientists  after  personal investigation and  study, it  was treated as a writ petition on the  judicial side  and notice  was issued  upon it inter alia to  the Union of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Administration which 467 were arrayed  as respondents  to the  writ  petition.  These respondents filed  their respective  affidavits in  reply to the allegations  contained  in  the  writ  petition  and  an affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioner in rejoinder to the  affidavits in reply and the writ petition was argued before us on the basis of these pleadings.      Before we proceed to deal with the facts giving rise to this writ  petition, we may repeat what we have said earlier in various  orders made by us from time to time dealing with public interest  litigation. We  wish to  point out with all the emphasis  at our command that public interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is intended  to bring  justice within  the reach of the poor masses, who  constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a  totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation  which is essentially of an adversary character where  there is  a dispute  between two litigating parties, one  making claim  or seeking  relief  against  the other and  that other  opposing such claim or resisting such relief. Public  interest litigation  is brought  before  the court not  for the  purpose of  enforcing the  right of  one individual  against  another  as  happens  in  the  case  of ordinary litigation,  but it  is  intended  to  promote  and vindicate public  interest which  demands that violations of constitutional or  legal rights  of large  numbers of people who are  poor, ignorant  or in  a socially  or  economically disadvantaged  position   should  not   go   unnoticed   and unredressed. That  would be  destructive of  the Rule of Law which forms one of the essential elements of public interest in any  democratic form  of government. The Rule of Law does

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not mean  that the  protection of  the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law should be allowed to be prostituted  by the  vested interests  for protecting and upholding the  status quo  under the guise of enforcement of their civil  and political  rights. The  poor too have civil and political  rights and  the Rule of Law is meant for them also, though  today it  exists only  on  paper  and  not  in reality. If  the sugar barons and the alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right  to carry  on their business and to fatten their purses  by exploiting  the consuming  public, have the ’chamars’ belonging  to the  lowest  strata  of  society  no Fundamental Right  to earn  an honest  living through  their sweat and  toil ?  The former can approach the courts with a formidable army  of distinguished  lawyers paid  in four  or five figures per day and if their right to exploit is upheld against the government under the label of Fundamental Right, the courts are praised for their boldness 468 and courage  and their  independence  and  fearlessness  are applauded and  acclaimed. But,  if the  Fundamental Right of the poor  and helpless  victims of injustice is sought to be enforced  by  public  interest  litigation,  the  so  called champions of  human rights frown upon it as waste of time of the highest  court in  the land,  which, according  to them, should not engage itself in such small and trifling matters. Moreover, these  self-styled human  rights activists  forget that civil and political rights, priceless and invaluable as they are  for freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast  masses of  our people. Large numbers of men, women and children  who constitute  the bulk of our population are today living  a sub-human  existence in conditions of abject poverty: utter  grinding poverty  has broken  their back and sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing social and  economic system. What civil and political rights are these  poor and  deprived sections  of humanity going to enforce ? This was brought out forcibly by W. Paul Gormseley at  the   Silver  Jubilee   Celebrations  of  the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights at the Banaras Hindu University:           "Since India  is one  of those countries which has      given a  pride of  place to  the basic human rights and      freedoms  in   its  Constitution   in  its  chapter  on      Fundamental Rights  and on  the Directive Principles of      State Policy  and  has  already  completed  twenty-five      years of  independence,  the  question  may  be  raised      whether or  not the Fundamental Rights enshrined in our      Constitution have  any meaning  to the  millions of our      people to  whom food,  drinking water,  timely  medical      facilities  and   relief  from  disease  and  disaster,      education   and    job   opportunities   still   remain      unavoidable. We,  in India,  should  on  this  occasion      study the  Human Rights  declared and  defined  by  the      United  Nations   and  compare  them  with  the  rights      available in  practice and  secured by  the law  of our      country." The only  solution for  making civil  and  political  rights meaningful to  these large  sections of  society would be to remake the  material conditions  and restructure  the social and economic  order so  that they may be able to realise the economic, social  and cultural rights. There is indeed close relationship between  civil and  political rights on the one hand and  economic, social  and cultural rights on the other and this relationship is so obvious that the International 469 Human Rights  Conference in  Tehran called  by  the  General Assembly in 1968 declared in a final proclamation:

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         "Since human  rights and  fundamental freedoms are      indivisible,  the   full  realisation   of  civil   and      political rights  without the  enjoyment  of  economic,      social and cultural rights is impossible." Of course, the task of restructuring the social and economic order so  that the  social  and  economic  rights  become  a meaningful reality  for the  poor and  lowly sections of the community  is   one  which   legitimately  belongs   to  the legislature and the executive, but mere initiation of social and economic  rescue programmes  by the  executive  and  the legislature would  not be  enough and  it  is  only  through multidimensional  strategies   including   public   interest litigation that  these social and economic rescue programmes can be  made effective.  Public interest  litigation, as  we conceive it,  is essentially a co-operative or collaborative effort on  the part  of the  petitioner, the State or public authority  and   the  court  to  secure  observance  of  the constitutional or  legal  rights,  benefits  and  privileges conferred upon  the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach  social  justice  to  them.  The  State  or  public authority against whom public interest litigation is brought should be as much interested in ensuring basic human rights, constitutional as  well as  legal, to  those who  are  in  a socially and  economically disadvantaged  position,  as  the petitioner who  brings the public interest litigation before the Court. The state or public authority which is arrayed as a respondent  in public interest litigation should, in fact, welcome it,  as it  would give  it an opportunity to right a wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor and weaker sections of  the community  whose welfare is and must be the prime concern of the State or the public authority.      There is  a misconception in the minds of some lawyers, journalists and  men in  public life  that  public  interest litigation is  unnecessarily cluttering  up the files of the court and  adding to the already staggering arrears of cases which are pending for long years and it should not therefore be encouraged  by the court. This is, to our mind, a totally perverse  view   smacking  of   elitist  and  status  quoist approach. Those  who are decrying public interest litigation do not  seem to  realise that  courts are not meant only for the rich  and the  well-to-do,  for  the  landlord  and  the gentry, for the business magnate 470 and the  industrial tycoon, but they exist also for the poor and the  down-trodden the  have-nots and the handicapped and the half-hungry  millions of  our  countrymen.  So  far  the courts have  been used  only for  the purpose of vindicating the rights of the wealthy and the affluent. It is only these privileged classes  which have  been able  to  approach  the courts for protecting their vested interests. It is only the moneyed who  have so  far had  the golden  key to unlock the doors of justice. But, now for the first time the portals of the court  are being  thrown open  to the poor and the down- trodden, the  ignorant and  the illiterate,  and their cases are  coming   before  the  courts  through  public  interest litigation which  has  been  made  possible  by  the  recent judgment delivered  by this  Court in Judges Appointment and Transfer  cases.   Millions  of  persons  belonging  to  the deprived and  vulnerable sections of humanity are looking to the courts  for improving  their life  conditions and making basic human  rights meaningful  for  them.  They  have  been crying for  justice but  their cries have so far been in the wilderness. They have been suffering injustice silently with the patience  of a  rock, without  the strength even to shed any tears.  Mahatma Gandhi  once said  to Gurudev Tagore, "I

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have had  the pain  of  watching  birds,  who  for  want  of strength could  not be  coaxed even  into a flutter of their wings. The  human bird  under the  Indian sky gets up weaker than when  he pretended  to retire.  For millions  it is  an eternal trance."  This is  true of the ’human bird’ in India even today  after more  than 30  years of  independence. The legal aid  movement and  public interest  litigation seek to bring justice  to these  forgotten specimens of humanity who constitute the  bulk of  the citizens  of India  and who are really  and   truly  the  "People  of  India"  who  gave  to themselves this  magnificent Constitution.  It is  true that there are  large arrears  pending in  the courts  but,  that cannot be  any reason  for denying  access to justice to the poor and  weaker sections  of the  community. No State has a right to  tell its  citizens that  because a large number of cases of  the rich  and the  well-to-do are  pending in  our courts, we  will not help the poor to come to the courts for seeking justice until the staggering load of cases of people who can  afford, is  disposed of. The time has now come when the  courts   must  become  the  courts  for  the  poor  and struggling masses  of this  country  They  must  shed  their character as  upholders of  the established  order  and  the status quo.  They must  be sensitised  to the  need of doing justice to  the large  masses of  people to whom justice has been  denied   by  a   cruel  and   heartless  society   for generations. The realisation must come to them that 471 social justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and it is  their solemn  duty under  the Constitution to enforce the basic  human rights  of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and actively help in the realisation of the constitutional goals.  This new  change has  to come  if the judicial system  is to  become an  effective  instrument  of social justice,  for without it, it cannot survive for long. Fortunately, this  change  is  gradually  taking  place  and public interest  litigation  is  playing  a  large  part  in bringing about  this change.  It is  through public interest litigation that  the problems  of the poor are now coming to the fore  front  and  the  entire  theatre  of  the  law  is changing. It  holds out  great possibilities for the future. This writ  petition is  one such instance of public interest litigation.      The Asian  Games take  place periodically  in different parts of  Asia and  this time  India is  hosting  the  Asian Games. It  is a  highly prestigious undertaking and in order to accomplish  it successfully  according  to  international standards, the  Government  of  India  had  to  embark  upon various construction  projects which  included  building  of fly-overs, stadia,  swimming pool,  hotels and  Asian  Games village complex.  This construction  work was  framed out by the Government  of India amongst various Authorities such as the Delhi  Administration, the  Delhi Development  Authority and the  New Delhi  Municipal Committee. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present writ petition to set out what particular project  was entrusted to which authority because it is  not the  purpose of  this writ petition to find fault with any  particular authority  for not observing the labour laws in  relation to  the workmen  employed in  the projects which are being executed by it, but to ensure that in future the labour  laws are  implemented  and  the  rights  of  the workers under  the  labour  laws  are  not  violated.  These various authorities  to whom  the execution of the different projects was  entrusted engaged  contractors for the purpose of carrying  out the  construction work  of the projects and they were  registered as principal employers under section 7

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of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. The  contractors   started  the  construction  work  of  the projects  and   for  the   purpose  of   carrying  out   the construction work,  they engaged  workers through  jamadars. The jamadars  brought the  workers from  different parts  of India  and  particularly  the  States  of  Rajasthan,  Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and got them employed by the contractors. The workers were entitled to a minimum wage of Rs. 472 9.25 per  day, that being the minimum wage fixed for workers employed on  the  construction  of  roads  and  in  building operations but  the case  of the  petitioners was  that  the workers were  not paid  this  minimum  wage  and  they  were exploited by  the contractors and the jamadars. The Union of India in  the affidavit  reply filed  on its behalf by Madan Mohan; Under Secretary, Ministry of Labour asserted that the contractors did pay the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per day but frankly admitted  that this  minimum wage  was paid  to  the jamadars through  whom the  workers were  recruited and  the jamadars deducted  rupee one  per day  per worker  as  their commission and  paid only  Rs. 8.25  by way  of wage  to the workers. The result was that in fact the workers did not get the minimum  wage of  Rs. 9.25 per day. The petitioners also alleged in  the writ  petition that  the provisions  of  the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated and women workers were being  paid only Rs. 7/- per day and the balance of the amount  of   the  wage  was  being  misappropriated  by  the jamadars.      It was  also pointed  out by  the petitioners that there  was violation  of Article 24 of the Constitution and of  the provisions  of the  Employment of  Children Act, 1938 in  as much  as children below the age of 14 years were employed by  the contractors in the construction work of the various projects.  The petitioners also alleged violation of the  provisions  of  the  Contract  Labour  (Regulation  and Abolition) Act  1970 and  pointed out  various  breaches  of those  provisions  by  the  contractors  which  resulted  in deprivation and  exploitation of the workers employed in the construction work  of most  of the projects. It was also the case of  the petitioners that the workers were denied proper living conditions  and medical and other facilities to which they were  entitled under  the provisions  of  the  Contract Labour (Regulation  and Abolition) Act 1970. The petitioners also complained  that the  contractors were not implementing the  provisions   of  the   Inter  State   Migrant   Workmen (Regulation of  Employment and  Conditions of  Service)  Act 1979 though  that Act  was brought  in force  in  the  Union Territory of  Delhi as  far back  as 2nd  October 1980.  The report of  the team  of three social scientists on which the writ  petition  was  based  set  out  various  instances  of violations of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the  Equal   Remuneration  Act   1976,  Article  24  of  the Constitution, The  Employment of  Children Act 1970, and the Inter State  Migrant Workmen  (Regulation of  Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979.      These averments  made on behalf of the petitioners were denied in  the affidavits  in reply  filed on  behalf of the Union of India, the 473 Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority. It was asserted  by these  authorities that so far as the Equal Remuneration Act  1976 and  the Contract  Labour (Regulation and Abolition)  Act 1970  were concerned,  the provisions of these  labour   laws  were   being  complied   with  by  the contractors and whenever any violations of these labour laws were brought to the attention of the authorities as a result

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of periodical inspections carried out by them, action by way of prosecution  was being taken against the contractors. The provisions of  the Minimum Wages Act 1948 were, according to the Delhi  Development  Authority,  being  observed  by  the contractors and  it was pointed out by the Delhi Development Authority in  its affidavit  in reply  that the construction work of  the projects  entrusted to it was being carried out by the  contractors under  a written  contract entered  into with them  and this  written  contract  incorporated  "Model Rules for the Protection of Health and Sanitary Arrangements for Workers  employed by  Delhi Development Authority or its Contractors" which  provided for  various facilities  to  be given to  the workers  employed in the construction work and also ensured  to them  payment of  minimum  wage  The  Delhi Administration  was   not  so   categorical  as   the  Delhi Development Authority  in regard  to the  observance of  the provisions  of  the  Minimum  Wages  Act  1948  and  in  its affidavit in  reply it  conceded that  the jamadars  through whom the workers were recruited might be deducting rupee one per day  per worker  from the  minimum wage  payable to  the workers. The  Union of  India was  however more frank and it clearly admitted in its affidavit in reply that the jamadars were deducting  rupee one  per day  per worker from the wage payable to  the workers with the result that the workers did not get  the minimum  wage of Rs. 9.25 per day and there was violation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948.      So far  as the  Employment  of  Children  Act  1938  is concerned  the  case  of  the  Union  of  India,  the  Delhi Administration and  the Delhi Development Authority was that no complaint in regard to the violation of the provisions of that Act  was at any time received by them and they disputed that there  was any  violation of  these provisions  by  the contractors. It  was  also  contended  on  behalf  of  these Authorities that the Employment of Children Act 1938 was not applicable in case of employment in the construction work of these projects, since construction industry is not a process specified in  the Schedule  and is  therefore not within the provisions of sub- 474 section (3) of section 3 of that Act. Now unfortunately this contention urged  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  is  well founded, because construction industry does not find a place in the  Schedule to  the Employment of Children Act 1938 and the prohibition enacted in section 3 sub-section (3) of that Act against  the employment of a child who has not completed his  fourteenth   year  cannot   apply  to   employment   in construction industry. This is a sad and deplorable omission which, we  think, must  be immediately  set right  by  every State Government  by amending  the Schedule so as to include construction  industry  in  it  in  exercise  of  the  power conferred under  section 3A  of the  Employment of  Children Act, 1938.  We hope  and trust  that every  State Government will take  the necessary  steps in  this behalf  without any undue  delay,   because  construction   work  is  clearly  a hazardous occupation and it is absolutely essential that the employment of  children under  the age  of 14  years must be prohibited in every type of construction work. That would be in  consonance   with  Convention  No.  59  adopted  by  the International Labour Organisation and ratified by India. But apart altogether  from the requirement of Convention No. 59, we have  Article 24  of the Constitution which provides that no child  below the  age of  14 shall be employed to work in any factory  or mine  or  engaged  in  any  other  hazardous employment. This is a constitutional prohibition which, even if not  followed up by appropriate legislation, must operate

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proprio vigore  and  construction  work  being  plainly  and indubitably a  hazardous employment,  it is  clear  that  by reason of  this constitutional  prohibition, no  child below the age  of 14  years  can  be  allowed  to  be  engaged  in construction work.  There can  therefore be  no  doubt  that notwithstanding the absence of specification of construction industry in  the Schedule  to the Employment of Children Act 1938, no  child below the age of 14 years can be employed in construction work and the Union of India as also every State Government must  ensure that  this constitutional mandate is not violated  in any  part of  the country. Here, of course, the plea of the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi  Development Authority was that no child below the age of 14 years was at any time employed in the construction work of these projects and in any event no complaint in that behalf was  received by  any of  these Authorities and hence there was  no violation  of the  constitutional  prohibition enacted in  Article 24. So far as the complaint in regard to non-observance of  the provisions of the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979  was concerned,  the defence of the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority that though this Act had come into force in the 475 Union Territory  of Delhi with effect from 2nd October 1980, the power to enforce the provisions of the Act was delegated to the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhi only on 14th July 1981 and thereafter also the provisions of the Act could not  been enforced  because the Rules to be made under the Act  had not  been finalised  until 4th June 1982. It is difficult to understand as to why in the case of beneficient legislation like the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment  and Conditions of Service) Act 1979 it should have taken  more than  18 months for the Government of India to delegate  the power  to enforce the provisions of the Act to the  Administrator of  the Union  Territory of  Delhi and another almost 12 months to make the Rules under the Act. It was well known that a large number of migrant workmen coming from different States were employed in the construction work of various  Asiad projects and if the provisions of a social welfare legislation  like the  Inter State  Migrant  Workmen (Regulation of  Employment and  Conditions of  Service)  Act 1979 were  applied and  the benefit  of such provisions made available to  these migrant  workmen, it  would have  gone a long way  towards ameliorating  their conditions of work and ensuring them  a decent  living with basic human dignity. We very much  wished that  the provisions  of this Act had been made applicable  earlier to  the migrant workmen employed in the construction  work of  these  projects  though  we  must confess that  we do  not see  why  the  enforcement  of  the provisions of  the Act  should have  been held  up until the making of  the Rules.  It is  no doubt  true that  there are certain provisions  in the  Act  which  cannot  be  enforced unless there  are rules made under the Act but equally there are other  provisions which  do not need any prescription by the Rules  for their enforcement and these latter provisions could certainly  have been  enforced by the Administrator of the Union  Territory of  Delhi in  so far as migrant workmen employed in  these projects  were concerned. There can be no doubt that  in any  event from  and after 4th June, 1982 the provisions  of  this  beneficient  legislation  have  become enforceable  and   the  migrant   workmen  employed  in  the construction work  of these  projects are  entitled  to  the rights  and   benefits  conferred   upon  them  under  those provisions. We  need not point out that so far as the rights

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and  benefits  conferred  upon  migrant  workmen  under  the provisions of section 13 to 16 of the Act are concerned, the responsibility for  ensuring such  rights and benefits rests not only  on the contractors but also on the Union of India, the Delhi  Administration or the Delhi Development Authority who is 476 the principal  employer in relation to the construction work entrusted by  it to the contractors. We must confess that we have serious  doubts whether  the provisions of this Act are being  implemented   in  relation  to  the  migrant  workmen employed in  the construction  work of these projects and we have therefore  by our  Order dated  11th May 1982 appointed three  Ombudsmen   for  the   purpose  of   making  periodic inspection and  reporting to  us whether  the provisions  of this Act are being implemented at least from 4th June 1982.      We must  in fairness  point out that the Union of India has stated  in its  affidavit in  reply  that  a  number  of prosecution have  been launched  against the contractors for violations of  the provision  of various  labour laws and in Annexure I  to its  affidavit in reply it has given detailed particulars of  such prosecutions.  It is  apparent from the particulars given  in this  Annexure that  the  prosecutions launched against the contractors were primarily for offences such as  non-maintenance of relevant registers non-provision of welfare  and health  facilities such  as first  aid  box, latrines, urinals  etc. and  non-issue of  wage slips. We do not propose  to go  into the  details of  these prosecutions launched against  the contractors but we are shocked to find that in  cases of  violations of labour laws enacted for the benefit of  workmen, the Magistrates have been imposing only small fines  of Rs.  200/- thereabouts. The Magistrates seem to  view   the  violations   of  labour   laws  with   great indifference and  unconcern as if they are trifling offences undeserving of judicial severity. They seem to over-look the fact labour laws are enacted for improving the conditions of workers and  the employers  cannot be  allowed  to  buy  off immunity against  violations of  labour  laws  by  paying  a paltry fine  which they  would not  mind paying,  because by violations the labour laws they would be making profit which would far  exceed the  amount of  the fine. If violations of labour laws  are going  to be punished only by meagre fines, it would  be impossible  to ensure  observance of the labour laws and  the labour  laws would be reduced to nullity. They would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth or claws. We would  like to impress upon the Magistrates and Judges in the country  that violations  of labour  laws must be viewed with strictness  and whenever  any violations of labour laws are established  before them,  they should punish the errant employers by imposing adequate punishment.      We may conveniently at this stage, before proceeding to examine the  factual aspects  of the  case,  deal  with  two preliminary 477 objections raised  on behalf  of the respondents against the maintainability of  the writ petition. The first preliminary objection was  that the  petitioners had  no locus standi to maintain the writ petition since, even on the averments made in the  writ petition, the rights said to have been violated were those  of the workers employed in the construction work of the various Asiad projects and not of the petitioners and the petitioners  could  not  therefore  have  any  cause  of action. The  second preliminary objection urged on behalf of the respondents was that in any event no writ petition could lie against  the  respondents,  because  the  workmen  whose

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rights were said to have been violated were employees of the contractors and  not of  the respondents  and the  cause  of action of  the workmen,  if any,  was therefore  against the contractors and  not against  the respondents.  It was  also contended as part of this preliminary objection that no writ petition under  article 32  of the  Constitution  could  lie against the  respondents for  the alleged  violations of the rights of the workmen under the various labour laws, and the remedy, if any, was only under the provisions of those laws. These two  preliminary objections  were pressed before us on behalf of  the Union  of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi  Development Authority with a view to shutting out an inquiry  by this  Court into  the violations  of  various labour laws  alleged in  the writ  petition, but  we do  not think there  is any  substance in  them  and  they  must  be rejected. Our reasons for saying so are as follows:      The first  preliminary objection raises the question of locus  standi  of  the  petitioners  to  maintain  the  writ petition. It  is true, that the complaint of the petitioners in the  writ petition  is in regard to the violations of the provisions of  various labour  laws designed for the welfare of workmen  and therefore  from a strictly traditional point of view, it would be only the workmen whose legal rights are violated who  would be  entitled to  approach the  court for judicial redress. But the traditional rule of standing which confines access  to the  judicial process  only to  those to whom legal  injury is  caused or legal wrong is done has now been jettisoned by this Court and the narrow confines within which the  rule of standing was imprisoned for long years as a  result  of  inheritance  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  System  of jurisprudence have  been broken and a new dimension has been given  to   the  doctrine   of  locus   standi   which   has revolutionised the  whole concept  of access to justice in a way not known before to the Western System of jurisprudence. This Court 478 has taken  the view  that, having  regard  to  the  peculiar socioeconomic conditions  prevailing in  the  country  where there is,  considerable poverty,  illiteracy  and  ignorance obstructing  and  impeding  accessibility  to  the  judicial process, it  would result in closing the doors of justice to the poor  and deprived  sections of  the  community  if  the traditional  rule   of  standing   evolved  by   Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence  that  only  a  person  wronged  can  sue  for judicial redress were to be blindly adhered to and followed, and it  is therefore  necessary to  evolve a new strategy by relaxing this  traditional rule  of standing  in order  that justice may  became easily  available to  the lowly  and the lost. It  has been held by this Court in its recent judgment in the  Judges Appointment  and Transfer  case, in  a  major break-through which in the years to come is likely to impart new significance and relevance to the judicial system and to transform it  into as  instrument of  socio-economic change, that where a person or class of persons to whom legal injury is caused  or legal  wrong is  done is by reason of poverty, disability  or   socially  or   economically   disadvantaged position  not  able  to  approach  the  Court  for  judicial redress, any  member of  the public acting bona fide and not out of  any extraneous  motivation may  move the  Court  for judicial redress  of the  legal injury  or wrong suffered by such person or class of persons and the judicial process may be set  in motion  by  any  public  spirited  individual  or institution even  by addressing a letter to the court. Where judicial redress  is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong suffered by  a person  or class  of persons who by reason of

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poverty,   disability    or   socially    or    economically disadvantaged position  are unable to approach the court and the court  is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by addressing a letter drawing the attention of the court to such legal injury or legal wrong, court would cast aside all technical rules  of procedure  and entertain the letter as a writ petition  on the judicial side and take action upon it. That is  what has  happened in  the present  case. Here  the workmen whose  rights are  said to have been violated and to whom a life of basic human dignity has been denied are poor, ignorant, illiterate  humans who, by reason of their poverty and social  and economic  disability, are unable to approach the courts  for judicial  redress and hence the petitioners, have under the liberalised rule of standing, locus standi to maintain the  present writ  petition espousing  the cause of the workmen.  It is not the case of the respondents that the petitioners are  acting  mala  fide  or  out  of  extraneous motives and in fact the respondents cannot so allege, since 479 the first petitioner is admittedly an organisation dedicated to the  protection and enforcement of Fundamental Rights and making Directive  Principles of State Policy enforceable and justiciable. There can be no doubt that it is out of a sense of public  service that  the  present  litigation  has  been brought by the petitioners and it is clearly maintainable.      We must  then proceed to consider the first limb of the second preliminary  objection. It  is true  that the workmen whose cause  has been  championed  by  the  petitioners  are employees of  the contractors  but the  Union of  India, the Delhi Administration  and the  Delhi  Development  Authority which have entrusted the construction work of Asiad projects to  the  contractors  cannot  escape  their  obligation  for observance of the various labour laws by the contractors. So far as  the Contract  Labour (Regulation  and Abolition) Act 1970 is concerned, it is clear that under section 20, if any amenity required to be provided under sections 16, 17, 18 or 19  for   the  benefit   of  the   workmen  employed  in  an establishment  is   not  provided  by  the  contractor,  the obligation to  provide such  amenity rests  on the principal employer and  therefore if  in the  construction work of the Asiad  projects,  the  contractors  do  not  carry  out  the obligations imposed  upon them by any of these sections, the Union of  India, the  Delhi  Administration  and  the  Delhi Development Authority as principal employers would be liable and these obligations would be enforceable against them. The same position  obtains in  regard to the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1979.  In the  case of this Act also, sections 17 and 18 make the  principal employer  liable to  make payment of the wages to  the migrant  workmen employed by the contractor as also to pay the allowances provided under sections 14 and 15 and to  provide the  facilities specified  in section  16 to such migrant  workmen, in case the contractor fails to do so and these obligations are also therefore clearly enforceable against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development  Authority as  principal employers. So far as Article  24 of the Constitution is concerned, it embodies a  fundamental   right  which  is  plainly  and  indubitably enforceable  against   every  one   and  by  reason  of  its compulsive mandate,  no one can employ a child below the age of 14  years in a hazardous employment and since, as pointed out above,  construction work  is a hazardous employment, no child  below  the  age  of  14  years  can  be  employed  in construction work and there 480

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fore, not  only are  the contractors  under a constitutional mandate not  to employ  any child below the age of 14 years, but it  is also  the duty  of the  Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority to ensure that  this   constitutional  obligation  is  obeyed  by  the contractors to  whom they  have entrusted  the  construction work of  the various Asiad projects. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration  and the  Delhi  Development  Authority cannot  fold  their  hands  in  despair  and  become  silent spectators of  the breach  of a  constitutional  prohibition being committed  by their  own  contractors.  So  also  with regard to  the observance  of the  provisions of  the  Equal Remuneration  Act  1946,  the  Union  of  India,  the  Delhi Administration and  the Delhi  Development Authority  cannot avoid their  obligation to  ensure that these provisions are complied with  by the  contractors. It  is the  principle of equality embodied  in Article  14 of  the Constitution which finds expression in the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1946 and if the Union of India, the Delhi Administration or the  Delhi Development  Authority at  any time finds that the provisions  of the  Equal Remuneration  Act 1946 are not observed and  the principles  of  equality  before  the  law enshrined in  Article 14 is violated by its own contractors, it cannot  ignore such violation and sit quiet by adopting a non-interfering  attitude   and  taking  shelter  under  the executive that  the violation  is  being  committed  by  the contractors and  not by  it. If any particular contractor is committing  a   breach  of   the  provisions  of  the  Equal Remuneration Act  1946 and  thus denying equality before the law  to   the  workmen,   the  Union  of  India,  the  Delhi Administration or  the Delhi  Development Authority  as  the case may be, would be under an obligation to ensure that the contractor observes the provisions of the Equal Remuneration Act 1946  and does not breach the equality clause enacted in Article 14. The Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi  Development Authority  must also  ensure that the minimum wage  is paid  to the  workmen as provided under the Minimum Wages  Act 1948.  The contractors  are,  of  course, liable to  pay the  minimum wage  to the workmen employed by them but the Union of India the Delhi Administration and the Delhi  Development   Authority  who   have   entrusted   the construction  work  to  the  contractors  would  equally  be responsible to  ensure that  the minimum wage is paid to the workmen by  their contractors.  This obligation  which  even otherwise  rests   on  the   Union  of   India,  the   Delhi Administration  and   the  Delhi  Development  Authority  is additionally 481 re-inforced by section 17 of the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of  Employment and  Conditions of  Service)  Act 1979 in  so far  as migrant  workmen are  concerned.  It  is obvious, therefore,  that the  Union  of  India,  the  Delhi Administration and  the Delhi  Development Authority  cannot escape their  obligation to the workmen to ensure observance of these  labour laws by the contractors and if these labour laws are  not complied  with by the contractors, the workmen would clearly  have a  cause of  action against the Union of India, the  Delhi Administration  and the  Delhi Development Authority.      That takes  us to  a consideration of the other limb of the  second  preliminary  objection.  The  argument  of  the respondents under  this head  of preliminary  objection  was that a  writ petition  under Article 32 cannot be maintained unless it complains of a breach of some fundamental right or the other  and since  what were  alleged in the present writ

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petition were  merely violations  of the labour laws enacted for the  benefit of  the workmen  and not  breaches  of  any fundamental  rights,  the  present  writ  petition  was  not maintainable and  was liable to be dismissed. Now it is true that the  present writ  petition cannot be maintained by the petitioners  unless  they  can  show  some  violation  of  a fundamental right,  for it  is only  for  enforcement  of  a fundamental right  that a writ petition can be maintained in this Court  under Article  32. So  far  we  agree  with  the contention of  the respondents but there our agreement ends. We cannot  accept the  plea  of  the  respondents  that  the present writ  petition does  not complain of any breach of a fundamental right.  The complaint of violation of Article 24 based on  the averment  that children  below the  age of  14 years are  employed in  the construction  work of  the Asiad projects  is   clearly  a   complaint  of   violation  of  a fundamental right.  So also when the petitioners allege non- observance of  the provisions  of the Equal Remuneration Act 1946, it is in effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle  of  equality  before  the  law  enshrined  in Article 14  and it  can  hardly  be  disputed  that  such  a complaint can legitimately form the subject matter of a writ petition under  Article 32.  Then there  is the complaint of non-observance of  the provisions  of  the  Contract  Labour (Regulation &  Abolition)  Act  1970  and  the  Inter  State Migrant Workmen  (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act  1979  and  this  is  also  in  our  opinion  a complaint relating  to violation of Article 21. This Article has 482 acquired a new dimension as a result of the decision of this Court in  Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India  (1) and  it has received  its   most  expansive  interpretation  in  Francis Coralie Mullin  v. The  Administrator,  Union  Territory  of Delhi &  Ors,(2) where  it has  been held by this Court that the right  to life  guaranteed under  this  Article  is  not confined merely  to physical  existence or to the use of any faculty or  limb through  which life  is enjoyed or the soul communicates with  outside world but it also includes within its scope  and ambit  the right  to live  with  basic  human dignity and  the  State  cannot  deprive  any  one  of  this precious and  invaluable right because no procedure by which such deprivation  may be  effected can  ever be  regarded as reasonable, fair  and just.  Now  the  rights  and  benefits conferred on  the workmen employed by a contractor under the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970  and the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and  Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 are clearly intended to ensure basic human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these rights and benefits to which they are entitled under the provisions of these two pieces of  social welfare legislation, that would clearly be a violation  of Article  21 by the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority which, as principal employers,  are made  statutorily responsible  for securing such  rights and  benefits  to  the  workmen.  That leaves for  consideration the  complaint in  regard to  non- payment of  minimum wage  to the  workmen under  the Minimum Wages Act  1948. We  are of  the view that this complaint is also one  relating to  breach of a fundamental right and for reasons  which   we  shall   presently  state,   it  is  the fundamental right  enshrined in Article 23 which is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen.      Article 23 enacts a very important fundamental right in the following terms :

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    "Art. 23  : Prohibition  of traffic in human beings and      forced labour-           (1)  Traffic in  human beings  and begar and other                similar forms of forced labour are prohibited                and 483                any contravention  of this provision shall be                an offence punishable in accordance with law.           (2)  Nothing in  this Article  shall  prevent  the                State from  imposing compulsory  service  for                public purposes, and in imposing such service                the State  shall not  make any discrimination                on grounds  only of  religion, race, caste or                class or any of them. Now many  of the  fundamental rights  enacted  in  Part  III operate as  limitations on the power of the State and impose negative  obligations  on  the  State  not  to  encroach  on individual liberty and they are enforceable only against the State. But there are certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution  which are  enforceable against  the  whole world and they are to be found inter alia in Articles 17, 23 and 24.  We have  already discussed the true scope and ambit of Article  24 in  an earlier  portion of  this judgment and hence we  do not  propose to  say anything more about it. So also we  need not expatiate on the proper meaning and effect of the  fundamental right  enshrined in  Article 17 since we are not  concerned with  that Article  in the  present  writ petition. It  is Article  23 with which we are concerned and that Article  is clearly  designed to protect the individual not only  against the  State but  also against other private citizens. Article  23 is  not  limited  in  its  application against the  State but it prohibits "traffic in human beings and  begar   and  other  similar  forms  of  forced  labour" practised by  anyone else.  The sweep  of Article 23 is wide and unlimited  and it strikes at traffic in human beings and begar and  other similar  forms of  forced labour"  wherever they are  found. The  reason for  enacting this provision in the chapter  on fundamental  rights is  to be  found in  the socio-economic condition  of the people at the time when the Constitution came  to be  enacted. The  Constitution makers, when they set out to frame the Constitution, found that they had the  enormous task  before them  of changing  the socio- economic structure  of the country and bringing about socio- economic regeneration  with a  view to  reaching social  and economic justice  to the common man. Large masses of people, bled white  by well nigh two centuries of foreign rule, were living in  abject poverty and destitution with ignorance and illiteracy accentuating  their helplessness and despair. The society had  degenerated into a status-oriented hierarchical society 484 with little respect for the dignity of individual who was in the lower  rungs of  the social ladder or in an economically impoverished  condition.   The  political   revolution   was completed and  it had  succeeded in  bringing freedom to the country but  freedom was not an end in itself, it was only a means to  an end, the end being the raising of the people to higher levels  of achievement and bringing about their total advancement and  welfare. Political  freedom had  no meaning unless it was accompanied by social and economic freedom and it was  therefore necessary  to carry forward the social and economic revolution  with a view to creating social economic conditions in  which every  one would be able to enjoy basic human rights  and participate  in the  fruits of freedom and liberty in  an egalitarian social and economic framework. It

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was with  this end  in view  that  the  constitution  makers enacted the  Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting out the constitutional goal of a new socio-economic  order. Now  there was one feature of our national life  which was  ugly and  shameful and which cried for urgent attention and that was the existence of bonded or forced labour  in large  parts of the country. This evil was the relic  of feudal exploitative society and it was totally incompatible with  the new  egalitarian socio-economic order which, "We the people of India" were determined to build and constituted a gross and most revolting denial of basic human dignity.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  eradicate  this pernicious practice  and wipe  it out  altogether  from  the national scene  and this  had to be done immediately because with the  advent of  freedom, such  practice  could  not  be allowed to  continue to blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it  would not  have been enough merely to include abolition of  forced labour  in the  Directive Principles of State Policy,  because then  the outlaying  of this practice would not  have been  legally enforceable  and it would have continued to  plague our  national life  in violation of the basic constitutional norms and values until some appropriate legislation could  be brought  by the legislature forbidding such practice.  The Constitution makers therefore decided to give teeth  to their resolve to obliterate and wipe out this evil practice by enacting constitutional prohibition against it in  the  chapter  on  fundamental  rights,  so  that  the abolition  of  such  practice  may  become  enforceable  and effective as  soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the  reason why  the provision  enacted in Article 23 was included  in   the  chapter   on  fundamental   rights.  The prohibition against  "traffic in  human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour" 485 is clearly  intended to  be a  general prohibition, total in its effect  and  all  pervasive  in  its  range  and  it  is enforceable not  only against the State but also against any other person indulging in any such practice.      The question  then is  as to what is the true scope and meaning of the expression "traffic in human beings and begar and other  similar forms  of forced  labour" in  Article 237 What are  the forms  of ’forced  labour’ prohibited  by that Article and  what kind of labour provided by a person can be regarded as  ’forced labour’  so  as  to  fall  within  this prohibition ?      When the  Constitution makers  enacted Article  23 they had before  them Article  of the  Universal  Declaration  of Human  Rights   but  they  deliberately  departed  from  its language and  employed words  which would make the reach and content of  Article 23 much wider than- that of Article 4 of the Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights.  They  banned ’traffic in  human beings  which is  an expression  of  much larger  amplitude   than  "slave   trade"  and   they   also interdicted  "begar   and  other  similar  forms  of  forced labour". The  question is what is the scope and ambit of the expression ’begar  and other  similar forms of forced labour ?"  In   this  expression   wide  enough  to  include  every conceivable form of forced labour and what is the true scope and meaning of the words ’’forced labour ?" The word ’begar’ in this  Article is  not a  word of  common use  in  English language. It  is a  word of  Indian origin  which like  many other words  has found its way in the English vocabulary. It is very  difficult to  formulate a precise definition of the word begar’  but there  can be no doubt that it is a form of forced labour  under which  a person  is compelled  to  work

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without receiving  any  remuneration.  Molesworth  describes ’begar’ as  "labour or  service exacted  by a  government or person  in   power  without  giving  remuneration  for  it." Wilson’s glossary  of Judicial  and Revenue  Terms gives the following meaning  of the  word ’begar’: "a forced labourer, one pressed to carry burthens for individuals or the public. Under the  old system,  when pressed  for public service, no pay was given. The Begari, though still liable to be pressed for public  objects, now  receives pay:  Forced  labour  for private service  is prohibited."  "Begar" may  therefore  be loosely described  as labour  or service  which a  person is forced to  give without  receiving any remuneration for ’it. That was  the meaning  of the  word ’begar’  accepted  by  a Division Bench 486 of the  Bombay High  Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital.(1) ’Begar’ is  thus clearly  a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely ’begar’ which is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23  but also  all  other  similar  forms  of  forced labour. This  Article strikes  at forced  labour in whatever form it  may manifest  itself, because  it is  violative  of human dignity  and is  contrary to  basic human  values. The practice of  forced labour  is  condemned  in  almost  every international instrument  dealing with  human rights.  It is interesting to find that as far back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration  of  Human  Rights  came  into  being, International Labour  organisation adopted Convention No. 29 laying down  that every  member of  the International Labour organisation which  ratifies this convention shall "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms" and this  prohibition  was  elaborated  in  Convention  No.  105 adopted by  the International  Labour organisation  in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of  course a  limited meaning but that was so on account of the restricted definition of these words given in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights  and Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil  and   Political  Rights   also  prohibit   forced  or compulsory labour.  Article 23  is in the same strain and it enacts a  prohibition against forced labour in whatever form it may  be found. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent  laid some emphasis on the word ’similar’ and contended that  it is  not every form of forced labour which is prohibited  by Article  23 but  only such  form of forced labour as  is similar  to ’begar’  and since  ’begar’  means labour or  service which  a person is forced to give without receiving any  remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is  limited only  to those  forms of  forced labour where labour or  service is  exacted from  a person without paying any remuneration  at all  and if  some remuneration is paid, though it  be inadequate, it would not fall within the words ’other similar forms of forced labour. This contention seeks to unduly  restrict  the  amplitude  of  the  prohibition  . against forced  labour enacted  in Article  23 and is in our opinion not  well founded.  It  does  not  accord  with  the principle enunciated by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(2)  that when  interpreting the  provisions of  the Constitution conferring  fundamental rights,  the attempt of the court  should be  to expand  the reach  and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their      (1) AIR 1962 Bom. 53:      (2) [1978] 2 SCR 621. 487 meaning and  content. It  is difficult  to imagine  that the Constitution makers  should have  intended to strike only at

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certain forms  of forced  labour  leaving  it  open  to  the socially or  economically powerful sections of the community to exploit  the poor  and weaker  sections by  resorting  to other forms  of forced  labour. Could  there be any logic or reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service  to another without receiving any remuneration at all  it   should  be   regarded  as  a  pernicious  practice sufficient to attract the condemnation of Article 23, but if some remuneration  is paid for it, then it should be outside the inhibition  of that  Article ?  If this  were  the  true interpretation, Article  23 would  be reduced to a mere rope of sand,  for it  would then  be the  easiest  thing  in  an exploitative society for a person belonging to a socially or economically dominant  class to exact labour or service from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section of the community  by paying a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Article 23. We do not think it would be  right to  place on  the language  of Article 23 an interpretation  which   would  emasculate   its   beneficent provisions and  defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear of the view that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form  of forced labour. The words "other similar forms of forced  labour are  used in Article 23 not with a view to importing the  particular  characteristic  of  ’begar’  that labour or  service should  be exacted without payment of any remuneration but  with a  view to  bringing within the scope and ambit  of that  Article all other forms of forced labour and  since  ’begar’  is  one  form  of  forced  labour,  the Constitution makers  used the  words "other similar forms of forced labour."  If the  requirement  that  labour  or  work should be  exacted without any remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they p would straightaway come within the  meaning of  the word  ’begar’ and  in that event there would  be no  need to have the additional words "other similar forms  of  forced  labour."  These  words  would  be rendered futile  and meaningless and it is a well recognised rule  of  interpretation  that  the  court  should  avoid  a construction which as the effect of rendering any words used by the  legislature superfluous  or redundant. The object of adding these  words was  clearly to  expand  the  reach  and content of  Article 23 by including, in addition to ’begar’, other forms  of forced labour within the prohibition of that Article. Every  form of  forced labour ’begar’ or otherwise, is within  the inhibition  of Article  23 and  it  makes  no difference whether the per- 488 son who  is forced  to give his labour or service to another is remunerated  or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by  a person  would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is, labour supplied not willingly but as a result  of force  or compulsion.  Take for  example a case where a  person has  entered into a contract of service with another for  a period  of  three  years  and  he  wishes  to discontinue serving  such other person before the expiration of the  period of three years. If a law were to provide that in such  a case  the contract shall be specifically enforced and he  shall be  compelled to  serve for the full period of three years,  it would  clearly amount  to forced labour and such a law would be void as offending Article 23. That    is why specific  performance of a contract of service cannot be enforced against  an employee  and the  employee  cannot  be forced by  compulsion  of  law  to  continue  to  serve  the employer. Of course, if there is a breach of the contract of service, the  employee would be liable to pay damages to the employer but  he cannot  be forced  to continue to serve the

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employer without  breaching the  injunction of  Article  23. This was  precisely the  view taken  by the Supreme Court of United States  in Bailv  v. Alabama(1)  while dealing with a similar provision  in the  Thirteenth  Amendment.  There,  a legislation enact  ed by  the Alabama  State providing  that when a  person with intent to injure or defraud his employer enters into  a contract  in writing  for the  purpose of any service  and  obtains  money  or  other  property  from  the employer and  without refunding  the money  or the  property refuses or  fails  to  perform  such  service,  he  will  be punished with  of fine.  The constitutional validity of this legislation was  challenged on  the ground  that it violated the Thirteenth Amendment which inter alia provides: "Neither slavery nor  involuntary servitude  shall exist  within  the United States  or any  place subject to their jurisdiction". This challenge was upheld by a majority of the Court and Mr. Justice Hughes delivering the majority opinion said:           "We cannot escape the conclusion that although the      statute in  terms is to punish fraud, still its natural      and inevitable  effect is  to expose  to conviction for      crime those  . who  simply fail  or refuse  to  perform      contracts for  personal service  in  liquidation  of  a      debt, and  judging its  purpose by  its effect  that it      seeks in  this way  to provide  the means of compulsion      through which performance of such service may      (1) 219 U.S. 219: 55 L. Ed. 191. 489 be secured.  The question  is  whether  such  a  statute  is constitutional".      The learned  Judge proceeded  to explain  the scope and ambit of  the  expression  ’involuntary  servitude’  in  the following words:           "The plain  intention was  to abolish  slavery  of      whatever  name   and  form   and  all  its  badges  and      incidents, to  render impossible  any state of bondage,      to make  labour free  by prohibiting  that  control  by      which the personal service of one men is disposed of or      coerced for  another’s benefit, which is the essence of      involuntary servitude." Then, dealing  with the contention that the employee in that case had voluntarily contracted to perform the service which was sought  to be  compelled  and  there  was  therefore  no violation of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, the learned Judge observed:           "The fact  that the  debtor contracted  to perform      the labour  which is  sought to  be compelled  does not      withdraw   the    attempted   enforcement    from   the      condemnation of  the statute.  The full  intent of  the      constitutional provision could be defeated with obvious      facility if  through the guise of contracts under which      advances had  been  made,  debtors  could  be  held  to      compulsory service. It is the compulsion of the service      that the  statute inhibits,  for when  that occurs, the      condition of  servitute is  created which  would be not      less involuntary  because of  the original agreement to      work out  the indebtedness.  The contract  exposes  the      debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but      not to enforced labour." and proceeded to elaborate this thesis by pointing out:           "Peonage is  sometimes classified  as voluntary or      involuntary, but  this implies  simply a  difference in      the mode  of origin,  but none  in the character of the      servitude. The  one exists where the debtor voluntarily      contracts to  enter the  Service of  his creditor.  The      other is  forced upon  the debtor  by some provision of

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    law.  But   peonage  however   created,  is  compulsory      service, involuntary  servitude. The  peon can  release      himself therefrom, it is true, by the pay- 490      ment  of   the  debt,  but  otherwise  the  service  is      enforced. A  clear distinction  exists between  peonage      and the voluntary performance of labour or rendering of      services in  payment of  a debt. In the latter case the      debtor though  contracting to  pay his  indebtedness by      labour  of   service,  and   subject  like   any  other      contractor to  an action for damages for breach of that      contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law      or force  compels performance  or a  continuance of the      service." It is  therefore clear  that even if a person has contracted with another  to perform  service and there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he  cannot be  forced by  compulsion of law or otherwise to continue to perform such service, as that would be forced  labour within  the inhibitian of Article 23. This Article strikes  at every  form of  forced labour even if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person obligated  to provide  labour or service Vide Pollock v. Williams.(1)  The reason is that it offends against human dignity to  compel a  person to provide labour or service to another if  he does  not wish to do so, even though it be in breach of  the contract entered into by him. There should be no serfdom  or involuntary  servitude in  a free  democratic India which  respects the  dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Moreover, in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality  of bargaining  power, a contract of service may appear on  its face  voluntary but  it may,  in reality,  be involuntary, because  while entering  into the contract, the employee, by  reason of his economically helpless condition, may have  been faced  with Hobson’s choice, either to starve or to  submit to  the exploitative  terms  dictated  by  the powerful employer. It would be a travesty of justice to hold the employee in such a case to the terms of the contract and to compel  him to  serve the employer even though he may not wish to  do so.  That would  aggravate  the  inequality  and injustice from  which the employee even otherwise suffers on account of  his economically disadvantaged position and lend the authority  of  law  to  the  exploitation  of  the  poor helpless employee  by the  economically  powerful  employer. Article 23 therefore says that no one shall be forced to      (1) 322 U.S. 4:88 Lawyers Edition 1095. 491 provide labour  or service  against his will, even though it be under a contract of service.      Now the  next question that arises for consideration is whether there  is any  breach of  Article 23  when a  person provides labour  or service  to the  State or  to any  other person and  is paid less than the minimum wage for it. It is obvious that ordinarily no one would willingly supply labour or service  to another  for less than the minimum wager when he knows  that under  the law  he is entitled to get minimum wage for  the labour  or service  provided by  him.  It  may therefore  be  legitimately  presumed  that  when  a  person provides labour  or service  to another  against receipt  of remuneration which  is less  than the  minimum wage,  he  is acting under  the force  of some compulsion which drives him to work  though he  is paid  less than  what he  is entitled under law  to receive.  What Article 23 prohibits is ’forced labour’ that  is labour  or service which a person is forced

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to provide  and ’force’  which would  make  such  labour  or service ’forced labour’ may arise in several ways. It may be physical force  which may  compel a person to provide labour or service  to another  or it may be force exerted through a legal provision such as a provision for imprisonment or fine in case  the employee  fails to provide labour or service or it may  even be  compulsion arising from hunger and poverty, want and  destitution. Any factor which deprives a person of a choice  of alternatives  and  compels  him  to  adopt  one particular course  of action  may properly  be  regarded  as ’force’ and if labour or service is compelled as a result of such ’force’, it would we ’forced labour’. Where a person is suffering  from   hunger  or  starvation,  when  he  has  no resources at  all to  fight disease  or feed  his  wife  and children or  even  to  hide  their  nakedness,  where  utter grinding poverty  has broken  his back  and reduced him to a state  of  helplessness  and  despair  and  where  no  other employment is  available to  alleviate  the  rigour  of  his poverty, he would have no choice but to accept any work that comes hims  way, even  if the remuneration offered to him is less than  the minimum  wage. He  would be in no position to bargain with  the employer;  he would have to accept what is offered to  him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a free agent  with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of  economic  circumstances  and  the  labour  or service provided  by him  would be  clearly ’forced labour.’ There is no reason why the word ’forced’ should be read in a narrow and 492 restricted manner  so as  to be confined only to physical or legal ’force’  particularly when  the national  charter, its fundamental document  has promised  to build a new socialist republic where  there will  be socioeconomic justice for all and every one shall have the right to work, to education and to adequate  means of  livelihood. The  constitution  makers have given  us one  of  the  most  remarkable  documents  in history for  ushering in  a new socio-economic order and the Constitution which  they have  forged for  us has  a  social purpose and  an economic mission and therefore every word or phrase in  the Constitution  must be interpreted in a manner which would  advance the  socio-economic  objective  of  the Constitution. It  is not  unoften that in capitalist society economic circumstance  exert much  greater  pressure  on  an individual in  driving him  to a particular course of action than physical  compulsion or force of legislative provision. The word  ’force’ must  therefore be  constructed to include not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the compulsion  of economic  circumstance  which  leaves  no choice of  alternatives to  a person in want and compels him to provide  labour or  service even  though the remuneration received for  it is less than the minimum wage of course, if a person  provides labour  or  service  to  another  against receipt of the minimum wage, it would not be possible to say that the  labour or  service  provided  by  him  is  ’forced labour’ because  he gets-  what he  is entitled under law to receive. No inference can reasonably be drawn in such a case that he  is forced  to provide  labour or  service  for  the simple reason  that he  would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is lawfully payable to him just like any  other  person  who  is  not  under  the  force  of  any compulsion. We are therefore of the view that where a person provides labour or service to another for remuneration which is less  than  the  minimum  wage,  the  labour  or  service provided by  him clearly falls within the scope and ambit of the words  ’forced labour’  under Article  23. Such a person

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would be  entitled to  come to  the court for enforcement of his fundamental  right under  Article 23 by asking the court to direct  payment of  the minimum  wage to  him so that the labour or  service provided  by him  ceases  to  be  ’forced labour’ and  the breach  of Article  23 is  remedied. It  is therefore clear  that  when  the  petitioners  alleged  that minimum wage  was not  paid to  the workmen  employed by the contractors,  the   complaint  was   really  in  effect  and substance a  complaint against  violation of the fundamental right of the workmen under Article 23. 493      Before leaving  this subject, we may point out with all the emphasis  at our  command that  whenever any fundamental right, which is enforceable against private individuals such as, for example a fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or 23 or  24  is  being  violated,  it  is  the  constitutional obligation of  the State to take the necessary steps for the purpose  of   interdicting  such   violation  and   ensuring observance of  the fundamental  right by the private indivi- dual who  is transgressing  the same.  Of course, the person whose fundamental  right is violated can always approach the court for  the purpose  of enforcement  of  his  fundamental right,  but   that  cannot   absolve  the   State  from  its constitutional obligation  to see that there is no violation of the  fundamental right of such person, particularly. when he belongs  to the  weaker section humanity and is unable to wage a  legal battle  against a strong and powerful opponent who is  exploiting  him.  The  Union  of  India,  the  Delhi Administration and  the  Delhi  Development  Authority  must therefore be  held to  be  under  an  obligation  to  ensure observance of  these various  labour laws by the contractors and if  the provisions  of any  of  these  labour  laws  are violated by  the contractors, the petitioners indicating the cause of the workmen are entitled to enforce this obligation against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development  Authority  by  filing  the  present  writ petition. The  preliminary objections urged on behalf of the respondents must accordingly be rejected.      Having disposed of these preliminary objections, we may turn to  consider whether  there was  any violation  of  the provisions of  the Minimum Wages Act 1948, Article 24 of the Constitution, the  Equal Remuneration Act 1976, the Contract labour (Regulation  and Abolition)  Act 1970  and the  Inter State  Migrant   Workmen  (Regulation   of  Employment   and Conditions of  Service) Act  1979 by  the  contractors.  The Union of India in its affidavit in reply admitted that there were certain  violations committed  by the  contractors  but hastened to  add that for these violations prosecutions were initiated against the errant contractors and no violation of any of  the labour  laws was  allowed to  go unpunished. The Union of  India also conceded in its affidavit in reply that Re. 1/-  per worker per day was deducted by the jamdars from the wage  payable to  the workers  with the  result that the workers did  not get  the minimum  wage of Rh. 9.25 per day, but stated  that proceedings  had been taken for the purpose of recovering  the amount  of the short fall in minimum wage from the contractors. No particulars were however given of 494 such proceedings  adopted by the Union of India or the Delhi Administration or  the Delhi  Development Authority.  It was for this reason that we directed by our order dated 11th May 1982 that whatever is the minimum wage for the time being or if the  wage payable is higher than such wage, shall be paid by the  contractors to  the  workmen  directly  without  the intervention of the jamadars and that the jamadars shall not

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be entitled to deduct or recover any amount from the minimum wage payable  to the  workmen as and by way of commission or otherwise. He  would also  direct in  addition that  if  the Union of  India or  the Delhi  Administration or  the  Delhi Development Authority finds and for this purpose it may hold such inquiry as is possible in the circumstances that any of the workmen  has not  received the  minimum wage  payable to him, it  shall take  the necessary  legal action against the contracts whether  by  way  of  prosecution  or  by  way  of recovery of  the amount  of the  short-fall. We  would  also suggest that hereafter whenever any contracts are ’ given by the government or any other governmental authority including 2 public  sector corporation,  it should be ensured by intro ducing a suitable provision in the contracts that wage shall be paid  by the  contractors to the workmen directly without the intervention  of any  jamadars or thekadars and that the contractors shall ensure that no amount by way of commission or otherwise  is deducted  or recovered by the Jamadars from the wage  of the  workmen. So far as observance of the other labour laws  by the  contractors is  concerned, the Union of India, the  Delhi Administration  and the  Delhi Development Authority disputed  the claim  of the  petitioners that  the provisions of  these labour  laws were not being implemented by  the   contractors  save   in  a   few  instances   where prosecutions had  been  launched  against  the  contractors. Since it  would not  be possible  for  this  Court  to  take evidence for  the purpose  of deciding  this factual dispute between the parties and we also wanted to ensure that in any event the  provisions of  these various laws enacted for the benefit  of   the  workmen   were  strictly   observed   and implemented by  the contractors,  we by our order dated 11th May 1982  appointed three  ombudsmen and  requested them  to make periodical inspections of the sites of the construction work for  the purpose of ascertaining whether the provisions of these  labour laws were being carried out and the workers were receiving  the benefits and amenities provided for them under these  beneficient statutes  or whether there were any violations  of  these  provisions  being  committed  by  the contractors so that on the basis of the reports of the three ombudsmen, this  Court could  give further  direction in the matter if found necessary. We may 495 add that whenever any construction work is being carried out either departmentally or through contractors, the government or any  other  governmental  authority  including  a  public sector corporation which is carrying out such work must take great care to see that the provisions of the labour laws are being strictly  observed and  they should  not wait  for any complaint to  be received  from the  workmen  in  regard  to nonobservance of  any such  provision before  proceeding  to take action  against the  erring officers or contractor, but they  should  institute  an  effective  system  of  periodic inspections coupled  with occasional surprise inspections by the higher  officers in  order to  ensure that  there are no violations of  the provisions of labour laws and the workmen are not  denied the  rights and  benefits to  which they are entitled under  such provisions  and if  any such violations are  found,   immediate  action   should  be  taken  against defaulting officers  or contractors. That is the least which a government  or a governmental authority or a public sector corporation is expected to do in a social welfare state.      These are the reasons for which we made our order dated 11th May 1982. S.R.                                       Petition allowed. 496

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