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PETITIONER: PEOPLE‘S UNION FOR CIVILLIBERTIES (PUCL)

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       18/12/1996

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH, S.SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T      Kuldip Singh, J. Telephone - Tapping is a serious invasion of an individual’s privacy.   With   the   growth   of   highly   sophisticated communication  technology,   the  right  to  sold  telephone conversation, in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference, is increasingly susceptible to abuse. It is no doubt correct  that every  Government, howsoever democratic, exercises some  degree of subrosa operation as a part of its intelligence outfit  but at the same time citizen’s right to privacy has to be protected from being abused by she authorities of the day.      This petition  - public  interest - under Article 32 of the Constitution  of India  has been  filed by  the People’s Union of  Civil Liberties,  a voluntary  organisation,  high lighting the  incidents of  telephone tapping  in the recent past.  The  petitioner  has  challenged  the  constitutional validity of  Section 5(2)  of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 (the Act),  in the alternative it is contended that the said provisions  be  suitably  read-down  to  include  procedural safeguards to  rule out  arbitrariness and  to  prevent  the indiscriminate telephone-tapping.      The writ  petition was  filed in the wake of the report on "Tapping  of politicians phones" by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI).  Copy of the report as published in the "Mainstream" volume XXIX dated March 26.1991 has been placed on record along with the rejoinder filed by the  petitioner. The authenticity  of the  report has  not been questioned by the learned  counsel for  the Union of India before us. Para 21 and 22 of the report are as under :      "21. Investigation has revealed the      following lapses  on  the  part  of      MTNL i)  In respect  of 4 telephone      numbers though  they were  shown to      be  under   interception   in   the      statement  supplied  by  MTNL,  the      authorisation   for   putting   the      number under interception could not      be  provided.   This   shows   that      records have  not  been  maintained

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    properly.      ii) In  respect  of  279  telephone      numbers, although authority letters      from  various  authorised  agencies      were available,  these numbers have      not been  shown in list supplied by      MTNL   showing    interception   of      telephones  to   the  corresponding      period.  This   shows  that   lists      supplied were incomplete.      iii)  In   respect  of  133  cases,      interception  of  the  phones  were      done beyond  the  authorised  part.      The GM  (0) MTNL in his explanation      has said that this was done in good      faith  on   oral  requests  of  the      representatives  of  the  competent      authorities and  that  interception      beyond authorised  periods will  be      done only  on  receipt  of  written      requests.      iv)  In   respect  of   111  cases;      interception  of   telephones  have      exceeded 180  days  period  and  no      permission   of    Government   for      keeping   the    telephone    under      interception beyond  180  days  was      taken.      v)   The    files   pertaining   to      interception    have    not    been      maintained properly.      22. Investigation has also revealed      that  various  authorised  agencies      are  not   maintaining  the   files      regarding      interception      of      telephones properly.  One agency is      not maintaining  even the log books      of interception.  The  reasons  for      keeping a telephone number on watch      have  also   not  been   maintained      properly. The  effectiveness of the      results of  observation have  to be      reported  to   the  Government   in      quarterly returns which is also not      being sent  in time  and  does  not      contain    all     the     relevant      information.   In   the   case   of      agencies  other   than  I.B.,   the      returns are  submitted to  the MHA.      The periodicity  of maintenance  of      the records  is not uniform. It has      been found  that whereas  DRI keeps      record for the last  years, in case      of  I.B.,   as  soon   as  the  new      quarterly  statement  is  prepared,      the old  returns are  destroyed for      reasons     of     secrecy.     The      desirability  of   maintenance   of      unireturn and  periodicity of these      documents needs to be examined.      Section 5(2) of the Act is as under      "5(2) -  On the  occurrence of  any      public   emergency,   or   in   the      interest  of   public  safety,  the      Central  Government   or  a   State

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    Government or any Officer specially      authorised in  this behalf  by  the      Central Govt. or a State Government      may,  if   satisfied  that   it  is      necessary or  expedient so to do in      the interests  of  the  sovereignty      and   integrity   of   India,   the      security  of  the  State,  friendly      relations with  foreign  States  or      public  order   or  for  preventing      incitement to  the   commission  of      and  offence,  for  reasons  to  be      recorded  in   writing,  by  order,      direct that  any message  clear  of      messages to  or from  any person or      class of  persons, relating  to any      particular  subject,   brought  for      transmission by  or transmitted  or      received by  any  telegraph,  shall      not be  transmitted,  or  shall  be      intercepted or  detailed, or  shall      be  disclosed   to  the  Government      making  the  order  or  an  officer      thereof mentioned in the order:      Provided   that    press    message      intended to  be published  in India      of correspondents accredited to the      Central  Government   or  a  States      Government shall not be intercepted      or    detained,     unless    their      transmission  has  been  prohibited      under this sub-section".      The above provisions clearly indicate that in the event of the  occurrence of  a public emergency or in the interest of  public  safety  the  Central  Government  or  the  State Government or  any  officer  specially  authorised  in  this behalf, can  intercept messages  if  satisfied  that  it  is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of :      (i)  The sovereignty and integrity of India.      (ii) The security of the State.      (iii)     Friendly relations with foreign states.      (iv) Public order.      (v)  For preventing  incitement to the commission of an           offence.      The  CBI   report  indicates   that  under   the  above provisions of  law Director  Intelligence  Bureau,  Director General Narcotics  Control Bureau,  Revenue Intelligence and Central  Economic   Intelligence  Bureau  and  the  Director Enforcement Directorate  have been authorised by the Central Government to  do interception  for the  purposes  indicated above. In  addition, the  State Governments  generally  give authorisation to the Police/Intelligence agencies  to exercise  the powers  under the Act.      The Assistant  Director   General Department of Telecom has filed counter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India. The stand taken by the Union of India is as under :      "The allegation  that the  party in      power  at   the   Centre/State   or      officer  authorised   to  tap   the      telephone  by   the   Central/State      Government could  misuse this power      is  not   correct.     Tapping   of      telephone could be done only by the      Central/State Government  order  By

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    the      Officer       specifically      authorised  by   the  Central/State      Government in  their behalf  and it      could be  done only  under  certain      conditions  such   as      National      Emergency in the interest of public      safety security  of  States  public      order etc.  It is also necessary to      record  the   reasons  for  tapping      before tapping  is resorted  to. If      the party  whose telephone is to be      tapped is to be informed about this      and also the reasons for tapping it      will defeat  the  very  purpose  of      tapping of  telephone. By  the very      sensitive nature of the work, it is      secrecy in  the matter. In spite of      safeguards,  if  there  is  alleged      misuse  of   the  powers  regarding      tapping  of   telephones   by   any      authorised officer,  the  aggrieved      part could  represent to  the state      Government  and   suitable   action      could be taken as may be necessary.      Striking down the provision section      5(2) of  the Indian  telegraph Act,      is  not   desirable    as  it  will      jeopardise  public   interest   and      security of the State".      Section 7 (2)(b) of the Act which gives making power to the Central Government is as under :      "7. Power  to make  rules  for  the      conduct of  telegraphs --  (1)  The      Central Government  mays from  time      to time,  by  notification  in  the      official   Gazetted    make   rules      consistent with  this Act  for  the      conduct of  all or  any telegraphs,      established, maintained  or  worked      by the  Government  or  by  persons      licensed under this Act.      (2) Rules  under this  section  may      provide  for  all  or  any  of  the      following, among other matters that      is to say:      (a)          xx            xx      (b) the precautions to be taken for      preventing       the       improper      interception   or   disclosure   of      message".      No rules  have been  framed by  the Central  Government under the provisions quoted above.      Mr. Rajinder  Sachar,  Sr.  Advocate  assisted  by  Mr. Sanjay Parikh  vehemently contended that right to privacy is a fundamental  right  guaranteed  under  Article  l9(1)  and Article of  the Constitution  of  India.  According  to  Mr. Sachar to  save Section  5(2)  of  the  Act  from  to  being declared unconstitutional  it is  necessary to read down the said provision  to provide  adequate machinery  to safeguard the right to privacy. Prior judicial  sanction - ex-parte in nature -  according to  Mr. Sachar, is   the only safeguard, which  can   eliminate  the   element  of  arbitrariness  or unreasonableness. Mr.  Sachar contended  that not  only  the substantive law  but also the procedure provided therein has to be just, fair and reasonable.

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    While hearing  the arguments on September 6, 1995, this Court passed the following order.      "Mr.Parikh is  on his  legs. He has      assisted  us  in  this  matter  for      about half  an hour. At this stage,      Mr. Kapil  Sibal &  Dr. Dhawan, who      are present  in Court,  stated that      according to  them  the  matter  is      important    and     they     being      responsible   members of  the  Bar,      are duty bound to assist this Court      in   a   matter   like   this.   We      appreciate the  gesture. We  permit      them to  intervene in  this matter.      They need  a short  adjournment  to      assist us.      The matter  is adjourned to October      11, 1995".      While assisting  this Court  Mr. Kapil Sibal at the out set  stated  that  in  the  interest  of  the  security  and sovereignty of  India and  to deal  with any other emergency situation for  the protection of national interest, messages may  indeed  be  intercepted.  According  to  him  the  core question for  determination is  whether there are sufficient procedural safeguards  to rule  out  arbitrary  exercise  of power under  the Act.  Mr. Sibal contended that Section 5(2) of the Act clearly lays down the conditions/situations which are sine  qua non  for the  exercise of  the power  but  the manner in   which  the said  power can  be exercised has not been   provided.  According  to  him  procedural  safeguards short of  prior judicial scrutiny - shall have to be read in Section 5(2)  of the  Act  to  save  it  from  the  vice  of arbitrariness.      Both sides  have  relied  upon  the  seven-Judge  Bench judgment of  this Court in Kharak Singh V. The State of U.P. & Ors.  (1964) 1  SCR 332.  The question  for  consideration before   this Court was whether "surveillance" under Chapter XX of the U.P.Police Regulations constituted an infringement of any  of the  fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the  Constitution.   Regulation   236(b)   which   permitted surveillance by "domiciliary visits at night" was held to be violative of  Article 21  on the  ground that  there was  no "law" under which the said regulation could be Justified.      The word  "life" and  the expression "personal liberty" in Article  21 were  elaborately considered by this court in Kharak Singh‘s case. The majority read "right to privacy" as part  of   the  right  to  life  under  Article  21  of  the Conctitution on the following reasoning:      "We  have   already   extracted   a      passage from the judgment of Field,      J. in  Munn vs  Illinois (1877)  94      U.S.  113,  142  were  the  learned      Judge Pointed  out that  "life"  in      the 5th  and 14th Amendments of the      U.S. Constitution  corresponding to      Art.21, means  not merely the right      to the  continuance of  a  person’s      animal existence,  but a  right  to      the  possession   of  each  of  his      organs-his arms and legs etc. we do      not entertain  any doubt  that  the      word "life"  in  Art.21  bears  the      same  signification.  Is  then  the      work  "personal   liberty"  to   be      constructed as  excluding from  its

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    purview an  invasion on the part of      the police of the sanctity of man’s      home  and  an  intrusion  into  his      personal security  and his right to      sleep which  is the  normal comfort      and  a  dire  necessity  for  human      existence even  as  an  animal?  It      might not be inappropriate to refer      here to  the words  of the preamble      to  the  Constitution  that  it  is      designed to  "assure the dignity of      the individual"  and  therefore  of      those cherished  human value as the      means   of    ensuring   his   full      development and  evolution. We  are      referring to  these  objectives  of      the   framers    merely   to   draw      attention    to     the    concepts      underlying the  constitution  which      would point  to such vital words as      "personal reasonable  manner and to      be  attributed   that  sense  which      would  promote  and  achieve  those      objectives  and   by  no  means  to      stretch the  meaning of  the phrase      to  square  with  any  preconceived      notions       or        doctrinaire      constitutional            theories.      Frankfurter, J. observed in Wolf v.      Colorado (1949) 338 US      "The  security   of  one’s  privacy      against arbitrary  intrusion by the      police is  basic to a free society.      It is  therefore  implicit  in  the      concept of  ordered  party  and  as      such enforceable against the States      through the Due Process Clause. The      knock at  the door,  whether by day      or by  night  as  a  prelude  to  a      search without authority of law but      solely  on  the  authority  of  the      police, did not need the commentary      of recent  history to  be condemned      as inconsistent with the conception      of human  rights enshrined  in  the      history     and      the      basic      constitutional     documents     of      English-speaking peoples   We  have      no hesitation in saying that here a      State  affirmatively   to  sanction      such police  incursion into privacy      it  would   run  counter   to   the      guaranty    of    the    Fourteenth      Amendment."      Murphy,  J.  considered  that  such      invasion  was   against  "the  very      essence  of  a  scheme  of  ordered      liberty".      It is  true that in the decision of      the U.S.  Supreme Court  from which      we have  made these  extracts,  the      Court  had  to  consider  also  the      impact of  violation of  the Fourth      Amendment which reads.      "The right  of  the  people  to  be

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    secure in  their  persons,  houses,      papers,   and    effect,    against      unreasonable searches and seizures,      shall  to   be  violated;   and  no      warrants  shall   issue  but   upon      probable cause,  supported by  oath      or  affirmation,  and  particularly      describing   the    place   to   be      searched, and the persons of things      to be seized."      and that  our constitution does not      in   terms    confer    any    like      constitutional           guarantee.      nevertheless, these  extracts would      show that an unauthorised intrusion      into  a   person’s  home   and  the      disturbance caused  to him thereby,      is as  it were  the violation  of a      common  law  right  of  a  man-  an      ultimate   essential   of   ordered      liberty, if not of the very concept      of civilisation.  An English common      Law maxim asserts that "every man’s      house  is   his  castle"   and   in      Semayne‘s case  (1604) 5  Coke  91,      where  this  was  applied,  it  was      stated that  "the house of everyone      is  to   him  as   his  castle  and      fortress as well as for his defence      against injury  and violence as for      his repose" We are not unmindful of      the fact  that Semayne’s  case  was      concerned with  the law relating to      executions  in   England,  but  the      passage extracted  has  a  validity      quite apart from the context of the      particular decision. It embodies an      abiding principle  which transcends      mere protection  of property rights      and expounds a concept of "personal      liberty" which does not rest on any      element  of  feudalism  or  on  any      theory of  freedom which has ceased      to be of value.      In our  view cl.(b)  of  Regulation      236 is  plainly violative of Art 21      and as there is no law on which the      same could  be justified it must be      struck down as unconstitutional."      Subba Rao,  J. (as  the learned  Judge then was) in his minority opinion  also came  to the conclusion that right to privacy was  a part  of Article  21 of  the Constitution but went a  step further  and struck  down Regulation  236 as  a whole on the following reasoning:      "Further,  the  right  to  personal      liberty takes  in not  only a right      to be free from restrictions placed      on his  movements,  but  also  free      from encroachments  on his  private      life. It  is true  our Constitution      does not  expressly declare a right      to privacy  as a  fundamental right      but the  said right is an essential      ingredient  of   personal   liberty      Every    democratic         country

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    sanctifies  domestic  life;  it  is      expected to give him rest, physical      happiness,  peace   of   mind   and      security. In  the  last  resort,  a      person’s house, where he lives with      his family, is his "castle" " it is      his rampart against encroachment on      his personal  liberty. The pregnant      words   of   that   famous   judge,      Frankfurter J., in Wolf v. Colorado      (1949) 338  US 25, pointing out the      importance of the security of one’s      privacy      against      arbitrary      instruction by  the  police,  could      have  no  less  application  to  an      Indian home  as to an American one.      If   physical    encroachments   on      person’s   movements   affect   his      personal     liberty,      physical      encroachments on  his private  life      would affect it in a larger degree.      Indeed, nothing is more deleterious      to a  man’s physical  happiness and      health    than     a     calculated      interference with  his privacy.  We      would, therefore,  define the right      of personal liberty in Art. 21 as a      right of  an individual  to be free      from restrictions  or encroachments      on  his   person,   whether   those      restrictions or  encroachments  are      directly  imposed   or   indirectly      brought   about    by    calculated      measures, If so understood, all the      acts    of    surveillance    under      Regulation   236    infringe    the      fundamental right of the petitioner      under Art, 21 of the Constitution."      Article 21  of the  Constitution has,  therefore,  been interpreted by  all  the  seven  learned  Judges  in  Kharak Singh’s case (majority and the minority opinions) to include that  "right   to  privacy"  is  a  part  of  the  right  to "protection of  life and  personal liberty" guaranteed under the said Article.      In Govind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 2 SCC 148, a  three-Judge   Bench  of   this   Court   considered   the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the  Madhya   Pradesh   police   Regulation   his   provided surveillance by  way of  several measures  indicated in  the said regulations.  This Court  upheld the  validity  of  the regulations by  holding that  Article 21  was  not  violated because the impugned regulation procedure established by law in terms of the said article.      In R.  Rajgopal alias  R.R. Gopal and another vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, Jeevan Reddy,J. speaking for the Court observed that in recent times right to privacy has acquired constitutional  status. The  learned Judge referred to Kharak’s  case, Govind’s  case  and  considered  a  large number of American and English cases and finally came to the conclusion that  "the right  to privacy  is implicit  in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by  Article 21.  It is  a "right to be let alone". A citizen has  a right  "to safeguard  the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters".

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    We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that right to privacy  is a  part of  the right to "life" and "personal liberty" enshrined  under Article  21 of  the  Constitution. Once the  facts in  a  given  case  constitute  a  right  to privacy; Article  21 is  attracted. The said right cannot be curtailed "except  according  to  procedure  established  by law".      The right privacy - by itself - has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be  claimed or  has been infrigned in a given case would depend on  the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone  conversation in  the privacy  of ones  home  or office without  interference can  certainly  be  claimed  as "right to privacy". Conversations on the telephone are often of  an   intimate  and   confidential  character.  Telephone conversation  is   a  part  of  modern  man’s  life.  It  is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation  is an  important facet  of  a  man’s private life.  Right  to  privacy  would  certainly  include telephone-conversation in  the  privacy  of  one’s  home  or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution  of India  unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.      Right to freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under Article  19(1) (a)  of the  Constitution. This freedom means the  right to  express ones  convictions and  opinions freely by  word of  mouth, writing, printing, picture, or in any other  manner. When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression. Telephone-tapping unless  it comes  within  the  grounds  of restrictions  under  Article  19(2)  would  infract  Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.      India is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil  and Political Rights, 1966. Article 17 of the said covenant is as under:      "Article 17      1.  No  one  shall  be  subject  to      arbitrary or  unlawful interference      with his  privacy, family, human or      correspondence,   nor   to   lawful      attacks   on    his   honour    and      reputation.      2. Every  one has  the right to the      protection of  the law against such      interference or attacks."      Article  12  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights, 1948 is almost in similar terms.      International law  today is  not confined to regulating the relations between the States. Scope continues to extend. Today matters  of social  concern, such as health, education and economics  apart from human rights fall within the ambit of International   Regulations.  International law  is  more than ever aimed at individuals.      It is almost accepted proposition of law that the rules of customary international law which are not contrary to the municipal law  shall be  deemed to  be incorporated  in  the domestic law.      Article 51  of the  Constitution direct  that the State shall  endeavour   to  inter   alia,  foster   respect   for international law  and treaty  obligations in  dealings   of organised peoples  with one  another. Relying  upon the said Article, Sikri,  C.J in  Kesavananda Bharathi  vs. State  of Kerala (1973) Supp. SCR 1 observed as under:

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    "it seems  to me  that, in  view of      Article   51   of   the   directive      principles,   this    Court    must      interpret    language     of    the      Constitution, if  not  intractable,      which is  after all a municipal law      in the  light of the United Nations      Charter and  the solemn declaration      subscribed to by India."      In A.D.M.  Jabalpur vs.  S. Shukla,  Khanna J.  in  his minority opinion observed as under:      "Equally well  established  is  the      rule of  construction that if there      be a conflict between the municipal      law   on    one   side    and   the      international law or the provisions      of any  treaty obligations  on  the      other the  Courts would give effect      to municipal  law. If,  however two      constructions of  the municipal law      are  possible,  the  Courts  should      lean in  favour  of  adopting  such      construction  as   would  make  the      provisions of  the municipal law to      be    in     harmony    with    the      international   law    on    treaty      obligations.     Every     statutes      according     to      this     rule      interpreted, so far as its language      permits.   so    as   not   to   be      inconsistent  with  the  comity  of      nations on the established rules of      international law,  and  the  court      will  avoid  a  construction  which      would    give    rise    to    such      inconsistency unless  compelled  to      adopt it  by plain  and unambiguous      language."      In Jolly George Varghese vs. Bank of Cochin AIR 1980 SC 470, Krishna Iyer, J. posed the following question:      "From    the     perspective     of      international  law   the   question      posed is  whether it  is  right  to      enforce a  contractual liability by      imprisoning a  debtor in  the teeth      of Article  11 of the International      Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political      Rights. The Article reads:      No one  shall be  imprisoned merely      on  the   ground  of  inability  to      fulfil a contractual obligation."      The learned Judge interpreted Section 51 of the Code of Civil  Procedure   consistently  with   Article  11  of  the International Covenant.      Article 17 of the International Covenant - quoted above - does  not go  contrary to  any part  of our Municipal law. Article  21   of  the   Constitution  has,  therefore,  been interpreted in conformity with the international law.      Learned counsel  assisting us  in this  case  have  not seriously challenged  the constitutional  vires  of  Section 5(2) of the Act. In this respect it would be useful to refer to the  observations of  this Court in Hukam Chand Shyam Lal vs. Union of India & Ors. 1976 (2) SCC 128:      "Section    5(1)     if    properly      construed,does not  confer unguided

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    and unbridled  power on the Central      Government/State      Government/specially     authorised      officer to  take possession  of any      telegraph. Firstly,  the occurrence      of a "public emergency" is the sine      qua non  for the  exercise of power      under   this    section.    As    a      preliminary step to the exercise of      further  jurisdiction   under  this      section  the   Government  or   the      authority concerned must record its      satisfaction as to the existence of      such  an   emergency.   which   the      existence of the emergency which is      a pre-requisite for the exercise of      power under  this section must be a      ’public  emergency’   and  not  any      other  kind   of   emergency.   the      expression ’public  emergency’  has      not been  defined in  the  statute,      but  contours  broadly  delineating      its   scope    and   features   are      discernible from  the section which      has to  be read as a whole. in sub-      section (1)  the phrase ’occurrence      of   any   public   emergency’   is      connected with  and is  immediately      followed by  the phrase  "or in the      interests of  the  public  safety".      These two  phrases appear  to  take      colour  from  each  other.  in  the      first part of sub-section (2) those      tow   phrases    again   occur   in      association with  each  other,  and      the context  further clarifies with      amplification   that    a   ’public      emergency’ within the contemplation      of this section is one which raises      problems concerning the interest of      the public  safety, the sovereignty      and  intergrity   of   India,   the      security  of  the  State,  friendly      relations with  foreign  states  or      public order  or the  prevention of      incitement to  the commission of an      offence. It  is in  the context  of      these matters  that the appropriate      authority has  to form  an  opinion      with regard  to the occurrence of a      ’public emergency’  with a  view to      taking further  action  under  this      section. Economic  emergency is not      one  of   those  matters  expressly      mentioned  in   the  statute.  Mere      ’economic emergency’-  as the  High      Court   calls    it   -   may   not      necessarily  amount  to  a  ’public      emergency’ and justify action under      this  action   unless   it   raises      problems relating  to  the  matters      indicated in the section."      As mentioned  above, the  primary contention  raised by the learned  counsel is  to lay-down necessary safeguards to rule-out the arbitrary exercise of power under the Act.

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    Section 5(2)  of the  Act permits  the interception  of messages in  accordance with  the  provisions  of  the  said Section. "Occurrence  of any  public emergency"  or "in  the interest of  public safety"  are the  sine qua  non for  the application of  the provisions  of Section  5(2) of the Act. Unless a  public emergency  has occurred  or the interest of public safety  demands, the authorities have no jurisdiction to  exercise  the  powers  under  the  said  Section  Public emergency would mean the prevailing of a sudden condition or state of  affairs affecting  the people at large calling for immediate action.  The expression  "public safety" means the state or  condition of  freedom from  danger or risk for the people at large, When either of these two conditions are not in existence,  the Central  Government or a State Government or the authorised officer cannot resort to telephone tapping even though  there is  satisfaction that  it is necessary or expedient so  to do  in the  interests of it sovereignty and integrity of  India etc. In other words, even if the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do  in the  interest of  the sovereignty and integrity of India or  the security  of the  State or  friendly relations with sovereign  States or  in public order or for preventing incitement to  the  commission  of  an  offence,  it  cannot intercept the message, or resort to telephone tapping unless a public  emergency has  occurred or  the interest of public safety or  the existence  of the  interest of  public safety requires. Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest  of  public  safety  are  secretive  conditions  or situations. Either  of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable person.      The  first   step  under   Section  5(2)  of  the  Act, therefore, is  the occurrence of any public emergency or the existence  of   a  Public-safety  interest.  Thereafter  the competent  authority   under  Section  5(2)  C  the  Act  is empowered to  pass at  order of interception after recording its satisfaction  that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the  interest of  (i) sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) the security of the State (iii) friendly relations with foreign States,  (iv) public  order or  (v)  for  preventing incitement to  the commission of an offence. When any of the five   situations mentioned above to the satisfaction of the competent authority require then the said authority may pass the order  for interception of messages by recording reasons in writing for doing so.      The above analysis of Section 5(2) of the Act show that so far  the power  to  intercept  messages/conversations  is concerned    the     Section    clearly     lays-down    the situations/conditions under  which it  can be exercised. But the substantive  law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the Act must have  procedural backing  so that the exercise of power is fair  and reasonably.  The said  procedure itself must be just, fair and reasonable. It has been settled by this Court in Maneka  Gandhi vs.  Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621, that "procedure which  deals with  the modalities  of regulating, restricting or  even rejection;  a fundamental right falling within Article  21 has   to  be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to  effectuate, not  to  subvert,  the  substantive right itself".  Thus, understood,  "procedure" must rule out anything  arbitrary,   freakish  or   bizarre.  A   valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by canalised processes".      We are  of the view that there is considerable force in the contention  of Mr.  Rajinder Sachar, Mr. Kapil Sibal and Dr. Rajiv  Dhawan that  no procedure has been prescribed for the exercise  of the power under Section 5(2) of the Act. It

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is not disputed that no rules have been framed under Section 7(2)(b) of the Act for providing the precautions to be taken for preventing  the improper  interception or  disclosure of messages, In  the absence  of just  and fair  procedure  for regulating the  exercise of  power under Section 5(2) of the Act, it  is not  possible to  safeguard the  rights  of  the citizens guaranteed  under Articles  l9(1)(a) and  21 of the Constitution of  India. The  CBI investigation  has revealed several lapses  in the  execution of the orders passed under Section 5(2)  of the Act, Paras 21 and 22 of the report have already been quoted in the earlier part of this judgment.      The Second  Press Commission  in paras 164, 165 and 166 of its  report has  commented on the "tapping of telephones" as under:      "Tapping of Telephones      164. It  is felt  in some quarters,      not  without   reason,   that   not      infrequently the  Press in  general      and  its   editorial  echelons   in      particular have  to suffer  tapping      of telephone.      165. Tapping  of  telephones  is  a      serious invasion  of privacy.  is a      variety      of       technological      eavesdropping, Conversation  on the      telephone are  often of an intimate      and  confidential   character.  The      relevant   statue,   i.e.,   Indian      Telegraph Act,  1885,  a  piece  of      ancient   legislation,   does   not      concern   itself    with   tapping.      Tapping cannot  the regarded  as  a      tort because  the law  as it stands      today does  not know of any general      right to privacy.      166. This  is a hardly satisfactory      situation.  There   are   instances      where appprehensions  of disclosure      of sources  of information  as well      as the character of information may      result in constraints on freedom of      information    and    consequential      drying  up   of  its   source.  We,      therefore,      recommend      that      telephones may not be tapped except      in   the   interest   of   national      security    public     order     of      investigation. of crime and similar      objectives, under  orders  made  in      writing by  the Minister concerned,      or an  officer of  rank to whom the      power in  that behalf is delegated.      The order  should disclose reasons.      An order  for tapping of telephones      should expire after three months in      from  the   date  of   the   order.      Moreover within  a period,  of  six      weeks the  order should come up for      review before  an Board constituted      on the  lines prescribed in statues      providing for preventive detention.      It  should  be  for  the  Board  to      decide   whether   tapping   should      continue any  longer. The  decision      of the  Board should  be binding on

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    the Government.  It  may  be  added      that the  Minister or his delegates      will be  competent to issue a fresh      order for  tapping of the telephone      if circumstances  call for  it. The      Telegraph  Act   should  contain  a      clause  to   give  effect  to  this      recommendation."      While dealing  with Section 5(2) of the Act, the Second Press  Commission   gave  following   suggestions  regarding "public emergency" and "interest of public safety":      "160. It  may be  noticed that  the      public emergency   mentioned in the      sub-section  is  not  an  objective      fact. Some  public functionary must      determine its  existence and  it is      on the  basis of the existence of a      public emergency that an authorised      official should  exercise the power      of  withholding   transmission   of      telegrams.  We   think   that   the      appropriate     government   should      declare the existence of the public      emergency   by    a    notification      warranting  the  exercise  of  this      power and  it  is  only  after  the      issue of  such a  notification that      the       power   of    withholding      telegraphic  messages   should   be      exercise   by    the      delegated      authority.     When      such     a      notification   is    issued,    the      principal officer  of the telegraph      office can be required to submit to      be the District Magistrate, whom we      consider to be the proper person to      be the delegate for exercising this      power, such  telegrams brought  for      transmission which are likely to be      prejudicial to  the interest sought      to be protected by the Sub-Section.      Thereupon the  District  Magistrate      should pass  an  order  in  writing      withholding   or    allowing    the      transmission of  the  telegram.  We      are suggesting  the safeguard  of a      prior  notification  declaring  the      existence  of  a  public  emergency      because the  power of  interception      is drastic  power and  we are loath      to  leave   the  determination   of      existence of  a public emergency in      the hands of a delegate".      "We are  of the  view that whenever      the  power   is  exercised  in  the      interest  of   public  safety.   it      should,  as  far  as  possible,  be      exercised   bag    the    concerned      Minister   of    the    appropriate      government for  one month at a time      extendible  by  Government  if  the      emergency  continues.   However  in      exceptional circumstances the power      can be  delegated to  the  District      Magistrate.

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    163 We  also think  that as soon as      order is  passed  by  the  District      Magistrate     withholding      the      transmission   of   a   telegraphic      Message, it  should be communicated      to the Central or State Governments      as the case may be, and also to the      sender and  the  addressee  of  the      telegram. The  text  of  the  order      should be  placed on  the table  of      the respective  State  legislatures      after three  months.  We  recommend      that, as   suggested  by the  Press      Council  of  India  in  its  annual      report covering  1969, the  officer      in charge  of  a  telegraph  office      should maintain  a register  giving      particulars of the time of receipt,      the sender  and  address  of  every      telegram which  he  refers  to  the      district      Magistrate       with      recommendation of  its withholding.      Similarly, the  District Magistrate      should maintain  a register  of the      time receipt, content and addressee      of each  telegram  and  record  his      decision thereon  together with the      time of  the decision. Data of this      nature  will help courts, if called      upon, to  determine the presence or      absence  of  a  mala  fide  in  the      withholding of  telegrams".      According to  Mr. Sachar  the only way to safeguard the right of  privacy of  an individual  is that there should be prior judicial  scrutiny before  any  order  for  telephone- tapping is  passed under  Section 5(2) of the Act. He states that such  judicial scrutiny  may  be  exparte.  Mr.  Sachar contended that  the judicial  scrutiny alone would take away the apprehension of arbitrariness or unreasonableness of the action. Mr.  Kapil Sibal,  on the  other hand  has suggested various other  safeguards short of prior judicial scrutiny - based on the law on the subject in England as enacted by the Interception of the Communications Act, 1985.      We agree  with Mr.  Sibal that  in the  absence of  any provision in  the statute, it is not possible to provide for prior judicial scrutiny as a procedural safeguard. It is for the Central  Government to make rules under Section 7 of the Act. Rule  7(2)(b) specifically  provides that  the  Central Government may  make rules laying down the precautions to be taken for preventing the improper interception or disclosure of messages. The Act was enacted in the year 1885. The power to make  rules under Section 7 of the Act has been there for over a century but the Central Government has not thought it proper to frame the necessary rules despite severe criticism of the manner in which the power under Section 5(2) has been exercised. It is entirely for the Central Government to make rules on  the subject but till the time it is done the right to privacy  of an individual has to be safeguarded. In order to rule-out  arbitrariness in  the exercise  of power  under Section 5(2)  of the  Act and  till  the  time  the  Central Government lays  down just,  fair and  reasonable  procedure under Section  7(2)(b) of  the Act,  it is  necessary to lay down procedural  safeguards for  the exercise of power under Section 5(9)  of the  Act so  that the right to privacy of a person is protected.

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    We, therefore, order and direct as under: 1.   An order for telephone-tapping in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act shall not be issued except by the Home Secretary, Government  of   India   (Central   Government)   and   Home Secretaries of  the State Governments. In an urgent case the power may  be delegated to an officer of the Home Department the Government  of India and the State Governments not below the rank of Joint Secretary. Copy of the order shall be sent to the  Review Committee  concerned with  one  week  of  the passing of the order-. 2.   The order  shall require  the  person  to  whom  it  is addressed to  intercept in  the course of their transmission by   means   a   public   telecommunication   system,   such communications as  are described in the order. The order may also require  the person to whom it is addressed to disclose the intercepted  material to such persons and in such manner as are described in the order. 3.   The matters  to be  taken into  account in  considering whether an  order is necessary under Section list of the Act shall include  whether the  information which  is considered necessary to  acquire could  reasonably be acquired by other means. 4.   The interception required under Section 5(2) of the Act shall be the interception of such communications as are sent to or  from one  or more  addresses specified  in the  order belong an  address or  addresses likely  to be  used for the transmission  of   communications  to   or  from,  from  one particular person specified or described in the order or one particular set of premises described in the order. 5.   The order  under Section  5(9) of the Act shall, unless renewed, case to have effect at the end of the period of two month from the date of issue. The authority which issued the order may,  at any  time before  the end of two month period renew the order if it by the State Government.      (a)  The Committee shall on its own, within two months of the passing of the order by the authority concerned, investigate whether there is or has been a relevant order under Section 5(2) of the Act. Where there is or has been an order whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act.      (b) If on an investigation the Committee concludes that there has  been a contravention of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act, it shall set aside the order under scrutiny of the Committee. It shall further direct the destruction of the copies of the intercepted material.      (c) If  on investigation,  the Committee  comes to  the conclusion that  there has  been  no  contravention  of  the provisions of  Section considers  that it  is  necessary  to continue the  order in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. The total period for the operation of the order shall not exceed six months. 6.   The authority which issued the order shall maintain the following records:      (a) the intercepted communications,      (b)  the   extent  to   which   the      material is disclosed,      (c) the number of persons and their      identity  to   whom  any   of   the      material is disclosed.      (d)  the   extent  to   which   the      material is copied and      (e) the  number of  copies made  of      any of the material. 7.   The use of the intercepted material shall be limited to the minimum  that is  necessary in  terms of Section 5(2) of

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the Act. 8.   Each copy made of any of the intercepted material shall be destroyed  as    soon  as  its  retention  is  no  longer necessary in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act. 9.   There shall be a Review Committee consisting of Cabinet Secretary,   the    Law   Secretary   and   the   Secretary, Telecommunication at  the level  of the  Central Government. The Review  Committee at  the State  level shall  consist of Chief Secretary,  Law Secretary  and another  member,  other than the Home Secretary, appointed 5(2) of the Act, it shall record the finding to that effect.      The writ petition is disposed of. No costs.