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PETITIONER: PAYMENT OF WAGES INSPECTOR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SURAJMAL MEHTA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/1968

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  590            1969 SCR  (3)1051

ACT: Payment  of  Wages Act (4 of 1936), ss. 2(vi)d and  15,  and Industrial Disputes Act, (14 of 1947), ss. 25FF and  33C(2)- Retrenchment compensation under s. 25FF, Industrial Disputes Act-If wages under Payment of    Wages Act-Jurisdiction   of Authority  under s. 15, Payment of Wages Act-Scope of.

HEADNOTE:        The State Electricity . Board revoked the licence  of a  company  and  took     over  the  undertaking.   The  1st respondent,  who was the director of the     company, served notices  on the employees that their services would  not  be required.   Thereupon,  the appellant filed  an  application under  s. 15(2) of     the  Payment of Wages Act,  1936,  on behalf   of  the   employees,  for recovering  from  the  it respondent  wages  for  the notice  month  and  retrenchment compensation  under s. 25FF of the Industrial Disputes  Act. 1947.     The 1st respondent contested the claim as well  as the jurisdiction of  the     authority under the Payment  of Wages  Act to deal with the application, on      the  ground ’that he was not the person responsible for payment of  com- pensation and that the right of the workmen was defeated  by reason  of  the      proviso to s. 25FF  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act, because there was no     interruption in their employment  and the new employer (the Electricity     Board) was  responsible for payment of the compensation.   But  the Authority   held  against  the  1st  respondent.   The   1st respondent then filed a writ     petition in the High  Court and  the High Court held that s. 15 of the Act      did  not apply and that the proper forum for such an application  was the      Labour  Court  under s. 33C(2)  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In  appeal  to  this Court, on the  questions:  (1)  Whether compensation  payable  under  s.  25FF  of  the   Industrial Disputes  Act  can fall under  the   amended  definition  of wages  in s. 2(vi)d of the payment of Wages Act, as it is  a ’sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person  employed,  is  payable under any  law   ....   which provides for the PaYment of such sum whether with or without deductions  but does not provide for the time  within  which the  payment is to be made’ and  (2) Whether  the  authority under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction  to

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entertain the application,      HELD: (1) The three sections, namely  s. 25F introduced into   the Industrial Disputes Act, by Act 43 of  1951,  and ss.  25FF and 25FFF incorporated by Act 18 of 1957,  involve termination  of  service  in  consequence  of  retrenchment, transfer  and closure respectively.  In ss. 25FF  and  25FFF notice   and  compensation   have  been  provided  for   ’in accordance with the provisions of s. 25F’.  These words  are used only as a measure of compensation and are not used  for laying  down  any time within which the  employer  must  pay compensation.   Since section 25FF unlike s. 25F,  does  not contain any conditions precedent, it can be said not to have provided  any time within which such compensation is to   be paid.   Therefore,  the compensation payable under  s.  25FF read  with  s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act  would  be wages  within  the meaning of s. ’2 (vi)(d )of  the  Payment of..Wages Act. [1055 C--E] 1052     M/s. Hatisingh  Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India,  [1960] 3  S.C.R. 528 and ,Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural  and Industrial   Society Ltd. v. Workmen, [1963] Supp. 1  S.C.R. 730, followed.     (2) The words ’where. contrary  to the provisions of the Act,  in  s.  15(2) of the Payment of Wages  Act  being  the governing words, the Authority appointed under s. 15(1)  has jurisdiction  to entertain applications only in two  classes of  cases,  namely, of deductions and fines  not  authorised under ss. 7 to 13 of. the Payment of Wages Act and of  delay in payment of wages beyond the wage periods fixed under s. 4 and  time     in payment laid down in s. 5.   Section  15(1) provides  that the Authority has the power to determine  all matters incidental to the claim arising from deductions from or  delay in payment of wages, but while deciding whether  a particular  matter is incidental to the claim or  not.  care should  be  taken neither to unduly  expand or  curtail  the jurisdiction  of  the Authority, because,  the  jurisdiction is  a special  jurisdiction.  Section 15(2) postulates  that the  wages  payable by the person  responsible  for  payment under  s.  3  are  certain and  such  that  they  cannot  be disputed. [1058 B--D]     In  the  present case, (a) the claim was not  a  simple. case  of deduction/ions having been unauthorisedly  made  or payment  having been delayed beyond the wage periods or  the time of payment fixed under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act;     (b) In view of the defence taken by the 1st  respondent, the failure to pay compensation did not fall under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act; and     (c) The claim for compensation  denied by the   employer in  the circumstance could not fall within the ambit  of  s. 15(2). [1059 H]     It could not have been intended that such matters  could be  tried  by  the  Authority  under  the  Act  as   matters incidental to the claim of compensation under s. 25FF.   The proper  forum would  be the  Labour Court which  can  decide such  questions under s. 33C(2) of the  Industrial  Disputes Act,  since such court can go up into those  matters  fully, expeditiously and without expense. [1060 C]     Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Kharbanda,  [1962] Supp.  2 S.C.R.  977,  Central  Bank of India  Ltd.  v.  Rajagopalan, [1964]  3  S.C.R. 140, Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v.  Gopal  Bhiva, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709, D’Costa v. B.C. Patel, [1955] 1  S.C.R. 1353 and Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. 5. B. Bhatt [1961]  3 S.C.R. 220, referred to.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1577 of 1966.     Appeal from the judgment and order dated March 25,  1964 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 31 of 1963., I. N. Shroff for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Shelat,  J.  This appeal, by  certificate,  is  directed against  the judgment and         the High Court  of  Madhya Pradesh and 1053 raises  the  question of the scope of  jurisdiction  of  the Authority  under  the  Payment  of  Wages  Act,  4  of  1936 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) On   the  licence  of  the  Barnagar  Electric  Supply   and Industrial  Company,  of  which  respondent  1  was  at  all material  times ’the managing director, having been  revoked by   the  Madhya  Pradesh  Government  and   the   company’s undertaking  having  been taken over by the  Madhya  Pradesh Electricity  Board,  respondent  1  served  notices  on  the company’s  employees that their services would no longer  be required,as  from October 1, 1962.  Thereupon the  appellant on   behalf  of  20  employees  of  the  company  filed   an application  under  sec. 15(2) of the Act  to  recover  from respondent  1  wages for the notice month  and  retrenchment compensation  mounting  to Rs. 12,853.60P.  payable  to  the employees  under sec. 25FF of the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947.   On  respondent 1 contesting the claim  as  also  the jurisdiction of the Authority, the Authority raised  certain preliminary.   issues,   namely:  (1)   whether   the   said application  was maintainable in view of the  revocation  of the  company’s  licence,  (2)  whether  the  Authority   had jurisdiction to determine the liability of respondent 1  for retrenchment  compensation  before the  amount  thereof  was ascertained under sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and  (3) whether in view of the services of the workmen  not having  been interrupted by the said transfer and the  terms and conditions of service applicable to them after the  said transfer  being not in any way less favourable than’  before and  the said Board as the new employer being  liable  after the transfer for compensation in the event of  retrenchment, the  employees were entitled to claim any compensation.   By his  order  dated May 21, 1963 the  Authority  held  against respondent 1 on the question of jurisdiction.  Respondent  1 thereupon  filed  a  writ petition in  the  High  Court  and Division  Bench of the High Court held that sec. 15  of  the Act  did  not apply and that the proper forum  for  such  an application  was  a Labour Court under sec.  33C(2)  of  the Industrial   Disputes  Act.   This  appeal  challenges   the correctness of this order.    Mr.  Shroff  for the appellant contended that  after  the amendment of the definition of ’wages’ in the Act by Act  68 of 1957 and the amended definition having now included  "any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of  the person  employed  is  payable under any  law,.  contract  or instrument  which provides for payment of such  sum  whether with or without deductions but does not provide for the time within  which  the payment is to be made"  as  wages,  there could  be no doubt that      the legislature  has  conferred jurisdiction’  on the Authority under  the Act to  determine compensation   payable   under  sec.  25FF   of          the Industrial  Disputes Act in an application under sec.  15(2) of the Act and that therefore the High Court Was in error in

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quashing  the  order :passed by the Authority.   Mr,  Chagla appearing for the 1054 Respondents  1 and 2 in ,the next appeal,on the other  hand, contended  (1  )  that the Authority under  the  Act  was  a special Authority with limited jurisdiction, that it has  to deal only with  the subject matters specified in the Act and its  jurisdiction must therefore be strictly construed,  and (2)  that the Act and the Industrial Disputes Act deal  with different   subjects,  provide  different   tribunals   with different jurisdictions and therefore it is not possible  to hold  that Parliament which enacted  both the   Acts   could possibly  have  contemplated that claim  arising  under  the Industrial  Disputes Act should be determined by a  tribunal set up under a different Act.     On  these contentions the first question’  which  arises for determination is whether compensation payable under sec. 25FF  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act can  fall  under  the amended  definition in sec. 2(vi)(d) of the Act and  can  be Called ’wages’.  The High Court. thought that it was not but Mr.  Shroff  relied on certain decisions of’ this  Court  to contest that part of the conclusion of the High Court.   The Industrial  Disputes  Act, which as enacted in 1947,  was  a piece  of ’legislation which mainly ’provided machinery  for investigation  and settlement of industrial‘  disputes,  has since  then undergone frequent modifications.  In  1953,  by Act 43of that year Chapter VA consisting of secs. 25A to 25J was incorporated providing therein compensation for  lay-off and   retrenchment.   It  also  provided  a  definition   of retrenchment  in sec. 2(00). Chapter VA, as it  then  stood, did  not expressly provide for compensation for  termination of  service on account of transfer of an undertaking  by  an agreement or as a result of operation of law or the  closure of   the   undertaking.   Consequently,  in  Hariprasad   v. Divikar(1)  this Court held that retrenchment as defined  in sec.  2(00)  and  the word ’retrenched’ in  sec,  25F  meant discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for any reason  whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment  inflicted by   way  of  disciplinary  action  and  did   not   include termination  of  services  of all workmen  on  a  bona  fide closure  of  an undertaking or on a change of  ownership  or management thereof.  This decision was followed first by  an ordinance  and then by Act 18 of 1957 incorporating  in  the Act  the  present ss..25FF and 25FFF.  It  will  he  noticed that -both these sections use the words "’as ’if the workman had been retrenched".  The intention of the legislature was, therefore, clear that it did not wish to place transfer  and closure ’on the same footing as retrenchment under sec. 25F. This  is  apparent  also  from the fact  that  it  left  the definition of retrenchment in sec, 2(00) untouched in  spite of  the  decision  in  Hariprasad’s   case(1).   The   three sections, ss. 25F, 25FF  and  25FFF ’also ;show’ that  while under sec. 25F.no retrenchment Can be made until  Conditions therein  set  out are Carried. out the  other  two  sections do’  not  lay  down  any such  conditions.  All  the  ,three sections  however, (1)[1957] S.C.R. 121. 1055 involve  termination  of  service  whether  it  results   in consequence  of  retrenchment or transfer  or  closure,  and notice and compensation in both ss. 25FF and 25FFF have been provided  for  "in accordance with the  provisions  of  sec. 25F".  (see M/s Harisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India(1) and  Anakapalla  Co-operative  Agricultural  and  Industrial Society  Ltd.  v.  Workmen(2).  That being  the  position  a

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workman  whose  service is terminated in  consequence  of  a transfer  of  an  undertaking, whether by  agreement  or  by operation  of law, has a statutory right under sec. 25FF  to compensation unless such right is defeated under the proviso to  that  section. The same is the position in the  case  of closure under sec. 25FFF.  Such compensation would be  wages as defined by sec. 2(vi)(d) of the Act as it is a "sum which by  reason  of the termination of employment of  the  person employed, is payable under any law  ....  which provides for the  payment of such sum whether with or without  deductions but  does not provide for the time within which the  payment is to be made."  Since ss. 25FF and 25FFF do not contain any conditions  precedent, as in the case of retrenchment  under sec.  25F, and transfer and closure can validly  take  place without notice or payment of a month’s wages in lieu thereof or  payment  of compensation, sec. 25FF can be said  not  to have provided any time within which such compensation is  to be  paid.  It  is  well  established  that  the  words   "in accordance with the provisions of sec. 25F" in ss. 25FF  and 25FFF are used only as a measure of compensation and are not used for laying down any time within which the employer must pay  the  compensation.  It would,  therefore,  appear  that compensation   payable  under ss. 25FF and 25FFF  read  with sec.  25F  would  be  ’wages’ within  the  meaning  of  sec. 2(vi)(d) of the Act.     It  must,  however,  be  remembered  that  though   such compensation falls within the definition of wages, cases may arise where it would not be a simple question of recovery of wages. In the present case, for instance, the defence  taken by  respondent 1 was that he was not the person  responsible for  payment  of  compensation and that  the  right  of  the workmen  was defeated by reason of the proviso to sec.  25FF being,  according  to  him,  applicable  inasmuch  as  these workmen were continued in the employment by the said  Board, the   new  employer,  that  therefore  there  had  been   no interruption  in  their  employment,  that  the  terms   and conditions of service given to them by the new employer were in  no  way less favourable than those they.  had  when  the company  was  the employer, and that the  new  employer  was responsible for payment of compensation if any  retrenchment took  place in future.  The question, therefore, is  whether in  view of the limited jurisdiction of the Authority  under see.  15(2)  of the Act, it was intended to deal  with  such questions, which in some cases might well raise  complicated problems of both fact and law. (1) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 528.         (2) [1963] Supp. (1) S.C.R. 730. L 6Sup CI/69-16 1056     While  considering  the  scope of  jurisdiction  of  the Authority under sec. 15 of the Act it is relevant to bear in mind the fact that the right to compensation is conferred by the Industrial Disputes Act which itself provides a  special tribunal  for  trying cases of individual  workmen  to  whom compensation  payable  under  Ch.  VA  has  not  been  paid. Section  33C  of  that Act provides both  a  forum  and  the procedure  for  computing  both monetary  as  well  as  non- monetary  benefits in terms of money  and  further  provides machinery  for recovery of such claims. In  Punjab  National Bank  Ltd. v. Kharbanda(1) this Court held that  while  sub- sec. 1 of sec. 33C applied to cases where any money was  due to  a workman from an employer under a settlement, award  or under  the provisions of Ch. VA and the amount  was  already computed  or  calculated or at any rate there  could  be  no dispute  about  its calculation or computation,  sub-sec.  2

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applied to benefits including monetary benefits conferred on a workman under an award, settlement etc., but which had not been  calculated or computed and there was a dispute  as  to their  calculation or computation.  The Court  rejected  the contention  that sub-sec. 2 applied only to  a  non-monetary benefit  which had to be converted in terms of  money.   The Court  also  observed that sec. 33C was a provision  in  the nature of execution and where the amount to be executed  was worked  out  or  where it might be worked  out  without  any dispute sub-sec. 1 would apply, but where such amount due to the  workman  was not stated or worked out and there  was  a dispute  as to its calculation, sub.sec. 2 would  apply  and the  workman would be entitled to apply thereunder  to  have the  amount computed provided he was entitled to a  benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, which was capable of being paid in terms of money.  In the Central Bank  of India  Ltd. v. Rajagopalan(2) this Court held that where the right of  a workman was disputed by his employer the Labour Court  could go into the question as to whether he had a right to receive such  a  benefit.  Sub-sec. 3 of sec. 33C  under  which  the Labour Court can appoint a commissioner to take evidence for computing   the   benefit  postulates  that   it   has   the jurisdiction to decide whether the workman claiming  benefit was  entitled  to it where such right was  disputed  by  the employer.   In  Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal  Bhiva(3)  this Court  held  that the Labour Court could in  an  application under  sec.  33C(2) go even into the  question  whether  the award  under  which  the  workman had made  a  claim  was  a nullity. Being in the nature of an executing court it  could interpret  the  award and also consider the  plea  that  the award sought to be enforced was a nullity.  It is thus clear that  a  workman  whose claim,  monetary  or  otherwise,  is disputed  by  his employer can lodge such a claim  before  a specified  Labour  Court  under  sec.  33C  and  obtain   an inexpensive and expeditious remedy.  The (1)  [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 977.               (2)  [1964]  3 S.C.R. 140.                        (3) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709. 1057 question  then is whether for such a claim  the  legislature intended  to  provide alternative remedies  both  under  the Industrial  Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages Act.   For deciding  this question it is necessary to refer to some  of the  provisions  of and the scheme of the Payment  of  Wages Act.     The  Act was passed to regulate the payment of wages  to certain  classes of persons employed in any factory or by  a railway administration or by a person fulfilling a  contract with   a  railway  administration  or  in   any   industrial establishment  to which a State Government  by  notification has extended the Act. Section 3 lays down as to who shall be responsible   for payment of  wages. Section 4 provides  for the  fixation of wage periods and sec. 5 lays down the  time within  which  payment of  wages has to  be  made.   Sec.  7 provides  that  wages shall be paid without  any  deductions except those authorised by the Act and sec. 8 provides  that no  fine  shall be imposed on any employed person   save  in respect  of  such  acts  or omissions on  his  part  as  the employer with the previous approval of the State  Government or  the prescribed authority may  have specified by  notice. Sections 9 to 13  lay down the deductions which an  employer is  authorised to  make and the conditions under which  such deduction  can  be   made.  Section  13A  provides  for  the maintenance of certain registers and records by the employer and  ss.  14 and 14A provide for appointment  of  inspectors

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under  the  Act,  their  powers and  the  facilities  to  be afforded by the employer to such inspectors.  Section 15  (1 )  provides  for  the  appointment of a  person  to  be  the Authority under the Act to hear and decide for any specified area  claims arising out of (a) deduction from wages or  (b) delay  in  payment of wages of persons employed or  paid  in that  area including all matters incidental to such  claims. Sub-sec. 2 provides  that "Where contrary to the  provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed  person, or any payment of wages has been  delayed, such  person  himself,  or any  legal  practitioner  or  any official of a registered trade union or any inspector  under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission  of the  authority .....    may apply to such authority  for   a direction  under  sub-sec.   3."  The  first proviso to sub- sec.  2 lays down a period of limitation of 12  months  from the  date  of deduction or the due date of payment  and  the second proviso empowers the Authority to admit  applications beyond  the period of limitation on sufficient  cause  being shown. Sub-sec. 3 empowers the Authority to direct refund to the  employed person of the amount deducted, or the  payment of  the  delayed  wages  and  also  empowers  it  to   award compensation  specified  therein without  prejudice  to  any other  penalty to which the employer guilty of  unauthorised deduction  or  delay  in payment is liable  under  the  Act. Under sub-sec. 5 of sec. 15 the  amount 1058 awarded  by the authority can be recovered as if it  were  a fine  imposed  by  a magistrate.  Section  20  provides  for penalty  for offences under certain provisions of ss. 5,  7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 to 13 extending upto Rs. 500/-.     It  is  explicit from the terms of sec. 15(2)  that  the Authority  appointed  under sub-sec. 1 has  jurisdiction  to entertain applications only in two classes of cases, namely, of deductions and fines not authorised under ss. 7 to 13 and of delay  in payment  of wages beyond the wage periods fixed under  sec. 4 and the time of payment laid down in  sec.  5. This  is clear from the opening words of sub-sec. 2 of  sec. 15,  namely, "where contrary to the provisions of this  Act" any deduction has been made or any payment of wages has been delayed.   These being the governing words in  the  sub-sec. the only applications which the Authority can entertain  are those  where deductions unauthorised under the Act are  made from  wages  or there has been delay in payment  beyond  the wage  period  and  the time of payment  of  wages  fixed  or prescribed  under  ss. 4 and 5 of the  Act.   Section  15(2) postulates that the wages payable by the person  responsible for  payment under sec.  3 are certain  and such that   they cannot be disputed.     In  D’Costa  v.B.C.  Patel(1)  this  Court  held   after considering  the scheme of the Act that the jurisdiction  of the  Authority under sec. 15 was confined to deductions  and delay  in payment of the actual wages to which  the  workman was  entitled  and that the Authority under the Act  had  no jurisdiction  to enter into a question of  potential  wages, i.e.,  where the workman pleads  that he ought to have  been up-graded as persons junior to him were upgraded and that he ought  to have been paid wages on a scale paid to  those  so up-graded.    This  Court  held  that  the   Authority   had jurisdiction  to  interpret  the  terms  of  a  contract  of employment  to  find  out the actual wages  payable  to  the workman  where  deduction from or delay in payment  of  such wages is alleged, but not to enter into the question whether the  workman should have been up-graded from being  a  daily rated  worker  to a monthly rated workman.  In  Shri  Ambica

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Mills Co. Ltd. v.S.B. Bhatt(2) this Court again examined the scheme of the Act and held that the only claims which  could be  entertained by the Authority were claims arising out  of deductions  or  delay  made in the payment  of  wages.   The Court, however, observed that in dealing with claims arising out  of  deductions or delay made in payment  of  wages  the Authority  inevitably  would  have  to  consider   questions incidental to these matters, but in determining the scope of these  incidental  matters care must be taken  to  see  that under  the guise of deciding incidental matters the  limited jurisdiction  was  not  unreasonably  or  unduly   expanded. Equally, care must also be taken (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1353.               (2) [1961] 3  S.C.R. 220. 1059 to  see that the scope of these incidental matters  was  not unduly  curtailed  so  as to affect or  impair  the  limited jurisdiction conferred on the Authority.  The Court declined to  lay  down any hard  and fast rule which would  afford  a determining  test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which could be legitimately considered by the Authority  and those which could not be so considered.     It is true, as stated above, that the Authority has  the jurisdiction  to  try matters which are  incidental  to  the claim  in question. Indeed, sec. 15(1) itself provides  that the  Authority  has  the  power  to  determine  all  matters incidental to the claim arising from deduction from or delay in  payment  of wages. It is also true that  while  deciding whether  a particular matter is incidental to the  claim  or not  care  should  be taken neither  to  unduly  expand  nor curtail  the jurisdiction of the Authority.  But it  has  at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under sec.  15  is  a  special  jurisdiction.   The  Authority  is conferred  with  the power to award  compensation  over  and above the liability for penalty of fine which an employer is liable to incur under sec. 20.      The question, therefore, is whether on the footing that compensation  payable  under  ss.  25FF  and  25FFF  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act being wages within the  meaning  of sec. 2(vi)(d) of the Act, a claim for it on the ground  that its payment was delayed by an employer could be  entertained under sec. 15(2) of the Act. In our view it could not be  so entertained.  In  the  first place, the claim  made  in  the instant case is not a simple case of deductions having  been unauthorisedly  made or payment having been  delayed  beyond the  wage-periods and the time of payment fixed under ss.  4 and  5  of  the Act. In the second place,  in  view  of  the defence   taken  by  Respondent  1,  the   Authority   would inevitably  have to enter into questions arising  under  the proviso   to  sec.  25FF,  viz.,  whether  there   was   any interruption  in the employment of the workmen, whether  the conditions  of-service  under the Board were  any  the  less favourable  than  those under the company  and  whether  the Board,  as  the  new  employer, had  become  liable  to  pay compensation to the workmen if there was retrenchment in the future.  Such an inquiry. would necessarily be  a  prolonged inquiry involving questions of fact and of law. Besides, the failure  to  pay compensation on the ground of such  a  plea cannot   be  said  to  be  either  a  deduction   which   is unauthorised under the Act, nor can it fall under the  class of  delayed wages as envisaged by ss.  4 and  5 of the  Act. It  may be that there may conceivably be cases of claims  of compensation  which are either admitted or which  cannot  be disputed which by reason of its falling under the definition of  wages  the Authority may have jurisdiction  to  try  and

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determine. But we do not think that a claim for compensation under  sec.  25FF  which is denied by the  employer  on  the ground that it 1060 was  defeated by the proviso to that section, of  which  all the  conditions were fulfilled, is one such claim which  can fall within the ambit of sec. 15(2).  When the definition of wages was expanded to include cases of sums payable under  a contract,  instrument  or  a  law it  could  not  have  been intended that such a claim for compensation which is  denied on  grounds which inevitably would have to be inquired  into and  which might entail prolonged inquiry into questions  of fact  as  well  as law was one  which  should  be  summarily determined  by the Authority under sec. 15.  Nor  could  the Authority have been intended to try as matters incidental to such  a  claim questions arising under the proviso  to  sec. 25FF.   In  our view it would be the Labour  Court  in  such cases  which would be the proper forum which  can  determine such questions under sec. 33C(2) of the Industrial  Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a commissioner  to take  evidence  where  question of  facts  require  detailed evidence.   Mr. Shroff, however, drew our attention  to  the decision in Uttam  Chand v.  Kartar Singh(1) a decision of a learned  Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab, taking  a view contrary to the one which we are inclined to take.  But that decision  contains no reasons and is, therefore, hardly of any assistance.     In  the  result we agree with the High  Court  that  the Authority had no jurisdiction under sec. 15(2) of the Act to try  these applications.  The appeal consequently must  fail and is  dismissed. But we make no order as to costs. y.p.                                       Appeal dismissed. (1)[1967] 1 LL.J. 232. 1061