REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.   101-102            OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 24293-24294 of 2005]

Paul Enterprises & Ors. …Appellants

Versus

Rajib Chatterjee & Co. & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. What would be the meaning of the term ‘unemployed youth’ stated in

an advertisement issued pursuant to an ‘excise policy’ of the State of West

Bengal is involved in these appeals which arise out of a judgment and order

dated 8.06.2005 passed by the Calcutta High Court reversing the judgment

and order dated 11.06.2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said

Court in Writ Petition No. 14945 (W) of 2003.

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

An advertisement was issued on or about 18.01.2001 by the State of

West  Bengal  inviting  applications  from companies/firms/societies  formed

by unemployed youth for the purpose of grant of excise licence for country

spirit shops in certain locations.  Appellant No. 1, a partnership firm of the

appellant  Nos.  2  and  3  herein  applied  therefor.   In  terms  of  the  said

advertisement, respondent No. 1, which is also a partnership firm of which

respondent  Nos.  2  and  3  are  partners  as  also  several  others,  applied  for

allotment of the said country spirit shop.

4. In the select list, the appellant No. 1 was placed at Sl. No. 3 whereas

the  respondent  No.  1  was  placed  at  Sl.  No.  1.   The  candidature  of  the

respondent No. 1 was objected to by the appellants inter alia contending that

the  respondent  Nos.  2  and  3  were  not  ‘unemployed  youth’  within  the

meaning of  the said  advertisement  and two locations  of  the liquor shops

proposed by them were not conducive therefor.   

5. The District Magistrate, Bankura being a licencing authority directed

an enquiry to be held.  The Enquiry Officer, in his report, inter alia opined

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that whereas the respondent No. 2 carried on seasonal business in paddy,

Til, potatoes, etc.; the respondent No. 1 carried on business with his brother.

As regards, location, it was stated:

“…The proposed site of the country spirit shop is situated  within  the  market  place  of  Chatramore where  ladies  also  frequently  visit  the  spot  for shopping.  The drunken people will disturb ladies and other public if license for a country spirit shop is granted with in the market place.”

It was noticed:   

“Rajib  Chattopadhyay  has  stated  that  he  is unemployed  and  lives  with  his  brother,  Sanjib Chattopadhyay  in  a  joint  family.   His  brother, Sanjib Chbattopadhyay is the owner of the “Light House” shop at Gelia More.  Rajib Chattopadhyay has admitted that he sells  electrical goods of the said  shop.   Rajib  Chattopadhyay  submitted  a Xerox  copy  of  a  challan  showing  deposit  of profession  Tax  by  Sanjib  Chattopadhyay,  as  a token of Sanjib’s shop.  Rajib Chattopadhyay has admitted  that  there  are  decorators’  shop  and tailoring shop by the side of the proposed country spirit shop and the proposed shop is within 30/40 feet from the Bishnupur, Kotulpur metalled Road.

Another  partner,  Sri  Subhendu  Chatterjee  has admitted that he was a businessman and dealt  in potato  till  March,  2001.   They  signed  the application form for  grant  of  license  for  country spirit shop on 12.2.2001 and mentioned in column

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4  seasonal  business  –  paddy,  Til  potatoes  etc. against  business  or  sales  experience,  if  any, Subhendu Chatterjee has further admitted that he took  loan  of  Rs.  25,000/-  (Rupees  Twenty  five thousand)  for  business  from  Chatramore  co- operative Bank but he could not repay the same till 4.1.2002.  Subhendu Chatterjee has admitted that his  partner’s  name for  potato  business  has  been registered  with  Chatramore  Kshudra  Babsayee Samiti.   From  the  above,  it  transpires  that Subhendu Chatterjee, as on the date of application, was self-employed, at least, partially and the site for  the  proposed  country  spirit  shop  is  situated within the market place of Chatramore.”

6. The  Additional  District  Magistrate  (Excise),  Bankura,  however,

disagreed with the said view of the Enquiry Officer, opining:

“I  think,  this  is  not  any point  for rejecting them because  all  these  points  of  objection  were mentioned  in  the  application  form and  these  are not matters for discarding their candidature for the business in Country Spirit”

7. Admittedly,  allotment  of  the  country  liquor  shop  in  question  was

made in favour of the respondent No. 1 herein.   

8. Aggrieved  by  and  dissatisfied  therewith,  appellants  filed  a  writ

application before the Calcutta High Court.  By reason of a judgment and

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order dated 11.06.2004, a learned Single Judge of the said Court allowed

the said writ  application  opining that  only a person who was sitting idle

would come within the purview of the term ‘unemployed youth’ and as the

respondents  had  been  carrying  on  business,  they  did  not  satisfy  the

conditions for allotment of country spirit shop.  It was directed:

“I accordingly allow this writ application and set aside the order dated December 9, 2002 issued by the  District  Magistrate  and  Collector,  Bankura granting  licence  in  favour  of  the  Private respondents  as  well  as  the  order  passed  by  the Appellate  Authority  dated  July  25,  2003  which affirmed  the  said  order.   The  licence  granted  in favour  of  the  Private  respondents  is  hereby quashed.   The  respondents  are  directed  to  take consequential  steps  for  setting  the  licence  for setting  up  the  country spirit  shop at  Chatramore strictly in accordance with law.  Such steps must be completed within one month from the date of communication  of  this  order  to  Collector  and District Magistrate, Bankura.

In  view  of  the  disposal  of  the  main  Writ Petition,  the  application  filed  by  the  respondent Nos.  7  and  8  for  vacating  the  ad-interim  order passed in this writ petition, becomes infructuous. The  said  application  is  also  disposed  of  as infructuous.”

9. An intra court appeal was preferred thereagainst.  By reason of the

impugned judgment, the writ appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of the

said Court, opining:

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“11. It cannot be assumed from the nature of the advertisement  that  by  'unemployed  youth'  the authorities  have  meant  a  person  who  shall  be totally  without  any  income  in  order  to  sustain himself. There is no basis for such assumption. In fact, in order to get; the licence the candidates will have  to  furnish  an  objection  free  site,  normally such a site has to be obtained either by taking it on rent  or  by  offering  such  a  site  which  is  part  of one's property. Apart from that such unemployed youths  are  supposed  to  show  some  financial strength by way of furnishing of bank balance and so on. It is not expected that a person who has no income  even  to  sustain  himself  will  be  able  to satisfy these requirements.

12.  In  the  instant  case  it  may be  noted  that  the appellants  are  earning  some  money  in  order  to sustain themselves but it is nobody's case that they have got  any permanent employment or they are serving  in  any  institution  as  regularly  paid employees.  In  fact  the  registration  of  persons' name in Employment Exchange will show that the persons  concerned have registered themselves  as unemployed  youth  for  an  employment  but  have not got the employment. The same is true of the appellants also. It is not disputed by anybody that they  are  registered  with  the  Employment Exchange. But even after such registration they are not  getting  any  employment  in  order  to  sustain themselves. But they are doing some work may be by  way  of  seasonal  business  or  by  working  in family  business  which  cannot  be  called  an employment.  Therefore  on  this  ground alone the licence which has been granted to the appellants cannot be rejected. In this connection this Court is also  constrained  to  observe  that  since  the expression 'unemployed youth' has been explained in the advertisement with the help  of expression 'mean',  there  is  no  scope  for  further  interpreting

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the  said  expression  'unemployed  youth'  with  the help  of  Black's  Law  Dictionary  or  an  ordinary dictionary.”

It was held:

“17. In view of such authoritative pronouncement of law on the subject it is difficult for this Court to accept  the  interpretation  of  'unemployed  youth' given by the learned Judge by relying on Black's Law Dictionary.  The learned Judge  possibly  fell into  an  error  by  not  holding  that,  here  the expression  'unemployed  youth'  must  receive  a contextual interpretation namely it would mean a person who has not  been substantially employed or has not been in any service even though lie is registered  as  an  unemployed  youth  with  the Employment  Exchange  and  as  has  been  so declared by the authorities and also must be within a certain  age group.  Apart  from that  there  is  no other  requirement.  If  the person concerned earns some money for subsistence, he does not go out of the category of unemployed youth if he otherwise fulfils  the  prescribed  conditions.  Going  by  this reasoning,  as  we must,  this  Court  cannot  accept the interpretation given to 'unemployed youth' by the ld. Judge of the Writ Court. As such we feel constrained to take a different view and, set aside the judgment under appeal.”

10. Mr. Joydeep Mazumdar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellants,  would  contend  that  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court

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committed a serious error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that

the  definition  of  the  term  ‘unemployed  youth’  as  contained  in  the

aforementioned advertisement dated 18.01.2001 was decisive inasmuch as

not only a person who was to apply for allotment of country liquor shop was

to be registered with the employment exchange, but also a certificate was

required to be obtained from the persons specified therein.  It was urged that

grant of such certificate having an impact on the factual aspect in regard to

the person being  employed or  not  and having an element  of  subjectivity

wherefor no parameter or guidelines having been laid down, the impugned

judgment cannot be sustained.

11. Mr. Tara Chandra Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

State of West Bengal, on the other hand, would draw our attention to Clause

5(3) of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of Person for grant of License at

New Sites for Retail Sale of Spirit and Certain other intoxicants other than

Foreign Liquor on categories of licensee and licenses for Denatured Spirit)

Order, 2000 [For short “the said Order”] to contend that some income or

some property at  the hands of the applicants  was necessary as otherwise

they would not be in a position to carry out any business in liquor.

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12. Mr.  Rana  Mukherjee,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the

respondent Nos. 1 to 3, submitted:

(i) Appellants themselves having obtained a certificate granted by the

persons  specified  in  the advertisement  cannot  now question  the

correctness or otherwise of the certificate (s) granted in favour of

the partners of the respondent No. 1.   

(ii) In any event,  no such contention  having been raised before  the

High Court,  this  Court  should  not  permit  the appellant  to  raise

such contention for the first time before this Court.   

(iii) Validity and/or legality of the advertisement and/ or the said Order

having not been challenged by the appellants, the contentions of

the appellants in that behalf are wholly misplaced.

13. The matter relating to grant of licence is governed by the provisions

of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of New Sites and Grant of license for

Retail  Sale of Spirit  and certain other Intoxicants) Rules, 1993 (for short

“the Rules”).  

In the said Order, it is stated that “unless there is anything repugnant

in the subject or context, words and expressions used in this Order and not

defined, shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the West

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Bengal Excise (Selection of New Sites and Grant of License for Retail Sale

of Spirit and Certain Other Intoxicants) Rules, 1993”.  

Clause 3 of the said Order provides that “the State Government may

reserve  any  new  site  or  sites  for  settlement  amongst  firms  or  societies

formed by unemployed youths under the provisions of any law for the time

being in force”  Explanation appended thereto reads as under:

“'Unemployed youth' shall mean any person of or above the age of 21 years but not above 37 years, registered  as  unemployed  in  any  Employment Exchange in the State of West Bengal and certified to  be  unemployed  by  any  of  the  authorities mentioned  hereunder  in  whose  jurisdiction  such person resides:-  

a) Member of Parliament  

b) Member of Legislative Assembly  

c) Sabhadhipati of a Zilia Parishad  

(d) Sabhadhipati, Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad;  

(e) Chairman, Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council,  

f)  Chief Executive Officer of a notified area;  

(g)  Mayor  or  Commissioner  of  a  Municipal Corporation;  

(h) Chairman of a Municipality”

The relevant portion of Clause 5(3) of the said Order reads as under:

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“(3) To be eligible for a license, an applicant-

i) must  have  sufficient  education  to  enable him to make and follow the calculation necessary for conducting the business and writing accounts appertaining  thereto  correctly.   Knowledge  of English is essential  only in the case of a foreign liquor shop;

ii) must  be in  a  position  to  invest  the  capital necessary for financing the shop properly without borrowing from others;”

14. The question posed before us must be answered inter alia keeping in

view the aforementioned rule.

15. There  are  three  criteria  attached  thereto,  viz.,  (i)  the  age  of  the

applicant, (ii) they have to be registered as unemployed in any employment

exchange in the State of West Bengal and (iii) they have to be certified to be

unemployed by any of the authorities specified therein.

16. The meaning of the term ‘unemployed youth’ must be culled out from

the text and context in which the same appeared.   

17. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, ‘Unemployment’ is defined as

‘state of being not employed; lack of employment’.  The word ‘unemployed’

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has been explained in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993 as

‘not  made  use  of,  use  for  a  particular  purpose,  not  engaged  in  any

occupation, idle, out of paid employment, redundant’.

18. The  main  thrust  in  this  case,  however,  appears  to  be  on  the

registration  of  a  person  as  unemployed  in  the  employment  exchange.

Certificate  is  required  to  be given  by the authorities  specified therein as

despite  such  registration  and/  or  continuation  thereof,  a  person  may  be

employed with a private person or in some other districts or in some other

states.

19. In a case of this nature, a person cannot be said to be employed only

because  he  earns  his  bare  subsistence  livelihood by engaging  himself  in

some work.  In this case, one of the respondents was helping his brother

who was owner of the shop.  He was not the owner of the shop.  The other

respondent used to carry on business which is of seasonal nature.  He was,

therefore, also not a full fledged businessman.  Nothing has been brought on

record  to  show  that  they  were  income  tax  payees  or  were  otherwise

established in their life.  It may be true that the authorities specified in the

Explanation appended to Clause 3 of the said Order were required to issue

certificate on the basis of their own concept in regard thereto.  It is true that

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no guideline had been issued, but, probably no guideline was required to be

issued, as the said authorities concerned, keeping in view the legal position,

would be presumed to be aware of the financial status as also the fact as to

whether they remained unemployed.  Furthermore, the said Order does not

contemplate that the applicants would be absolutely poor or they would not

have  any property  at  all.   They were  required  to  establish  a  business  in

liquor.  They were required to make substantial investment.  Their financial

capacity  was  required  to  be  such  so  as  to  enable  them to  carry  out  the

business  and  furthermore  fulfill  their  obligations  both  contractual  and

statutory in  terms of  the provisions  of  the  Excise  Act,  the  Rules  framed

thereunder as also the conditions of licence.

20. In  the  instant  case,  the  Division  Bench  satisfied  itself  that  the

respondents were to be considered as ‘unemployed youth’ in terms of the

aforementioned advertisement.

21. In a situation of this nature, the interpretation clause should be given

a contextual meaning.  It is not exhaustive.  It is trite that when a statutory

enactment  defines  its  terms,  the  same  should  govern  what  is  proved,

authorized or done under or by reference to that enactment.  It is also trite

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that  all  statutory  definitions  have  to  be  read  subject  to  the  qualification

variously expressed in the interpretation clause, which created them.

In Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani and Others [(2003) 1 SCC

433], this Court held:

“11.  It  appears  that  the legislature only intended that  in  cases  where  the  landlord  residing  in  a premises, parts  with possession of a part  of it,  it would  always  be  open  to  him  to  regain  the possession of the whole as and when the licensor may so deem necessary. The question of acquiring common lease right by a person not a member of the family may not arise. This is a plain and simple meaning flowing from the definition of the words “paying  guest”  under  the  Act.  Introducing  any other element or ingredient to give meaning to the words “paying guest” as may be prevalent under any other law or under English law will be doing violence  to  the  definition  of  the  words  “paying guest” as defined under the Act.”

In  State of Maharashtra v.  B.E. Billimoria [(2003) 7 SCC 336], this

Court observed:

“32.  It  is  well  settled  that  the  provisions  of  the statute  are  to  be  read  in  the text  and context  in which  they have  been  enacted.  It  is  well  settled that in construction of a statute an effort should be made to give effect to all the provisions contained therein.  It  is  equally  well  settled  that  a  statute

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should  be  interpreted  equitably  so  as  to  avoid hardship…”

In  P.  Kasilingam v.  P.S.G. College of  Technology [1995  Supp (2)

SCC 348], this Court held:

“A particular  expression  is  often  defined  by the Legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’.  Sometimes  the  words  ‘means  and includes’ are used.  The use of  the word ‘means’ indicates  that  “definition  is  a  hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition”. (See  :  Gough  v.  Gough;  Punjab  Land Development  and  Reclamation  Corpn.  Ltd.  v. Presiding  Officer,  Labour  Court)  The  word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such  things  as  they  signify  according  to  their natural  import  but  also  those  things  which  the clause declares that they shall include. The words “means and includes”, on the other hand, indicate ‘an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for  the  purposes  of  the  Act,  must  invariably  be attached to these words or expressions’.”  

In K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal [(1997) 2 SCC 53], this Court

held:

“10.  Apparently,  it  appears  that  the definition  is conclusive as the word “means” has been used to specify  the  members,  namely,  spouse,  son, daughter,  grandchild  or  dependant  parent,  who

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would constitute the family. Section 2 of the Act in which various terms have been defined, opens with  the  words  “in  this  Act,  unless  the  context otherwise  requires”  which  indicates  that  the definitions, as for example, that of “family”, which are indicated to be conclusive may not be treated to be conclusive if it was otherwise required by the context.  This  implies  that  a  definition,  like  any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act as also the object  for  which  the  Act  was  made  by  the legislature.

11.  While  interpreting  a  definition,  it  has  to  be borne in mind that the interpretation placed on it should not only be not repugnant to the context, it should also be such as would aid the achievement of the purpose which is sought to be served by the Act.  A construction  which  would  defeat  or  was likely to defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted.

12.  Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words “unless the context otherwise requires”, the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.”

In  Bharat  Coop.  Bank  (Mumbai)  Ltd. v.  Coop.  Bank  Employees

Union [(2007) 4 SCC 685], this Court held:

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“23.  Section  2(bb)  of  the  ID  Act  as  initially introduced  by  Act  54  of  1949  used  the  words “means  … and  includes”  and was  confined to  a “banking company” as defined in Section 5 of the Banking  Companies  Act,  1949,  having  branches or other establishments in more than one province and  includes  Imperial  Bank  of  India.  Similarly, Section 2(kk), which was also introduced by Act 54  of  1949,  defines  insurance  company  as  “an insurance company as defined in Section 2 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), having branches or  other  establishments  in  more  than  one province”.  It  is  trite  to  say  that  when  in  the definition  clause  given  in  any  statute  the  word “means” is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word “means” is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher, M.R.  in  Gough  v.  Gough it  is  a  “hard-and-fast” definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also  see  P.  Kasilingam  v.  P.S.G.  College  of Technology.) On the other  hand,  when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the  definition  enumerative  but  not  exhaustive. That  is  to  say,  the  term  defined  will  retain  its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to  bring  within  it  matters,  which  in  its  ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use  of  the  word  “means”  followed  by the  word “includes” in Section 2(bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative  of  the  legislative  intent  to  make  the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other.”

22. Even if we apply the standards which are applicable in the industrial

law meaning thereby Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as

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also a situation where the question arises as to grant of back wages for not

being  able  to  gainfully  employed,  a  person  living  on  mere  subsistence

earning as of necessity is not considered to be gainfully employed.  [See

Novartis  India Ltd. v.  State of West Bengal and Ors. [2008 (15) SCALE

470]  

Keeping in view the interpretative tools required to be used in a case

of this nature, we are of the opinion, despite the fact that the respondents

had been earning some money, the same would not disentitle them to take

part in the selection process for grant of a license in terms of the order.

The advertisement in question keeping in view the text and context in

which it was issued clearly go to show that for the purpose of applying for

grant  of  a  liquor  shop,  the  respondents  were  qualified  having  been

continuing to be registered in the Employment Exchange and having been

granted  a  certificate  in  that  behalf  by  the  person  specified  in  the

advertisement.

It is not a case where the word ‘unemployed’ should be given a literal

or even the dictionary meaning.  In our view, it is required to be given a

purposive meaning; a meaning which is capable of being translated in the

action,  a  meaning  which  would  not  lead  to  an  anomaly  or  absurdity;  a

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meaning which satisfies the text and context in which the word has been

used.

23. Furthermore,  the  appellant  No.  1  applied  for  and  was  granted  the

similar certificate.  It is, therefore, too late in the day for him to contend

now that the provisions relating to grant of certificate being devoid of any

guideline or objective criteria should be declared ultra vires.

In any event, even otherwise, the validity and/or legality of the said

Order has not been challenged.

24.  For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are dismissed.  In the

facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to

costs.

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J.     [J.M. Panchal]

New Delhi; January 13, 2009

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