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PETITIONER: PATHUMMA AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/01/1978

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SHINGAL, P.N. SINGH, JASWANT TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  771            1978 SCR  (2) 537  1978 SCC  (2)   1  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC 898  (66)  RF         1980 SC1789  (117)  MV         1982 SC1325  (32)  E&D        1983 SC1155  (13,23,24,26,27,29)  E          1985 SC 389  (22)

ACT: Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief Act, 1970 s. 20-Scope of- Section  20 entitles debtors to recover properties  sold  to purchasers in execution of decree passed in liquidating  the debt owed by the agriculturist-Restriction if  reasonable-If deprives the creditors of their right to property-Sub s.  3- If  purchaser of Property at auction is, stranger,  property to  be  returned to agriculturist debtor if  purchase  money paid  within  six  months-Sub-s. (6)  a  bona  fide  alienee purchasing from auction purchaser before the date of the Act exempt  from operation of the Act-Sub-s.(3)-If violative  of Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: The   statement  of  objects  and  reasons  to  the   Kerala Agriculturists’  Debt  Relief  Act,  1970  states  that  the benefits  conferred by Kerala Act 31 of 1958 were  available only  in  respect of debts incurred  by  the  agriculturists before the date of commencement of the Act, namely July  14, 1958.    And  since  even  after  this   date   agricultural indebtedness  among the poorer sections continued to  be  on the increase the legislature considered it necessary to give relief  to  the agriculturists against whom suits  had  been filed  for recovery of debts accrued after the  commencement of the 1958 Act. Section  20(1) of the Act provides that where any  immovable property in which the agriculturist had an interest has been sold  in execution of any decree for recovery of a debt  but possession has not actually passed from the judgment  debtor to the purchaser and the decree-holder is the purchaser then such  judgment-debtor may deposit one half of  the  purchase

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money  and, apply to the Court to set aside the sale of  the property and the Court shall order the sale to be set  aside and  further  order payment of the balance of  the  purchase money  in  ten  equal instalments  in  accordance  with  the procedure  set  out therein.  Subsection (2)  provides  that where any immovable property in which the agriculturist  had an  interest  has been sold in execution of any  decree  for arrears  of  rent  and the possession of  the  property  has actually  passed  from the judgment debtorto  the  purchaser during  the  periods mentioned therein  then  such  judgment debtormay  deposit one half of the purchase money and  apply to  the Court to setaside the sale of the property  and  the court shall order the setting aside of the sale and for  the payment  of the balance of the purchase money  according  to the  procedure  set  out in the  section.   Sub-section  (3) provides  that where property sold in the execution  of  any decree  for the recovery of a debt and the decree holder  is not  the  purchaser  such judgment-debtor  may  deposit  the purchase money and apply to the court to set aside the  sale of the property and the Court shall order the sale to be set aside.   Sub-section  (5) provides that  where  improvements have  been effected on the property sold after the  date  of sale  the  value of such improvement as  determined  by  the Court shall be deposited by the applicant for payment to the auction  purchaser.  Sub-section (6) provides that an  order under sub-sections (1) or (2) or (3) shall not be deemed  to affect  the  rights  of bona fide alienees  of  the  auction purchaser  deriving right before the date of publication  of the Bill. In  the  instant cases a creditor had  obtained  a  mortgage decree   against   the   judgment   debtor,   who   was   an agriculturist.   Since  the debtor was not able to  pay  the decretal  amount  in instalments, a decree for sale  of  the property was passed by the Court.  The debtor’s property was auctioned  and  purchased by the appellant who was  not  the decree-holder.   In some cases decrees were obtained by  the creditors  against the debtors and, on their failure to  pay the 538 instalments  property  was purchased at the auction  by  the decree-holders the-selves.  After the purchase, improvements were made by them in the propertieswhen the debtors launched proceedings  under the Act for restoration of possession  of the  property  on  payment  of  the  decretal  amount,   the appellants  challenged  the constitutional validity  of  the Act.   The  High  Court upheld the validity  of  s.  20  and dismissed the writ petitions. In  appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of  the appellants  that  (1) the appellants having  acquired  valid title  to  the property after purchase at  auction  sale  in execution  of a decree, s. 20 which deprives them  of  their right  to hold property was violative of Art. 19(1)(f),  (2) though  the obvious object of the Act was to give relief  to debtors  who  filed suits for recovery of  debts  after  the commencement of the 1958-Act it travels beyond the statement of objects and reasons, giving a blanket power to the  Court to  set aside the sale completed even before the passing  of the  Act and (3) s. 20(3) and (6) are violative of  Art.  14 because the stranger decree-holder was selected for  hostile discrimination whereas a bona fide alienee was exempted from the operation of the Act. Dismissing the appeals, (per  Beg,  C. J., Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza  Fazal  Ali  and Jaswant Singh, J.) HELD  : There is no constitutional infirmity on  the  ground

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that   the   Act  is  violative  of  Art.   19(1)(f).    The restrictions  imposed  are  clearly  reasonable  within  the meaning of cl. (6) of that Article. [559 A-B] 1(a)  In  interpreting  the  constitutional  provisions  for judging the impact of an enactment on the fundamental rights of  the citizens the approach of the Courts is to  interpret the constitutional provisions against the social setting  of the country so as to show a complete consciousness and  deep awareness  of the growing requirements of the  society,  the increasing needs of the nation, the burning problems of  the day  and  the  complex issues facing the  people  which  the legislature  in its wisdom, through beneficial  legislation, seeks  to  solve.  The judicial approach should  be  dynamic rather  than  static,  pragmatic rather  than  pedantic  and elastic rather than rigid.  It must take into  consideration the  changing trends of economic thought, the temper of  the times and the living aspirations and feelings of the people. This Court must strike a just balance betweenthe fundamental rights and the larger and broader interests of  society.[534 A-C] (b)  The  legislature is in a better position to  understand and  appreciate the needs of the people and to  bring  about social  reforms for the uptiftment of the backward  and  the weaker  sections and for the improvement of the lot  of  the poor.   The  Court will interfere only when the  statute  is clearly  violative of the fundamental right or when the  Act is   beyond   the  legislative  competence.    Courts   have recognised  that there is always a presumption in favour  of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus to prove its invalidity lies on the party assailing the Act. [544 A-B] Jyoti  Prashad v. The Administrator for the Union  Territory of Delhi (1962) 2 SCR 125 and Mohd.  Hanif Quareshi & Ors v. The State of Bihar (1959) SCR 629 referred to. (e)  The  object  of the Act being removal  of  agricultural indebtedness and reduction of one of the important causes of poverty,   is  undoubtedly  in  public  interest   and   the restriction must be presumed to be reasonable. [545 B-C] (b)  By  a long line of decisions this Court has  laid  down seteral tests and guidelines for judging the  reasonableness of restrictions.  They are : (i)  Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles  constitute the  "conscience" of the Constitution.  The purpose  of  the latter  is  to  fix certain social and  economic  goals  for immediate attainment by bringing about a non-violent  social revolution.   The  Constitution  aims at  bringing  about  a synthesis   between   funda.mental  rights   and   directive principles  by giving to the former a place of pride and  to the latter a place of permanence. [545 F-G] 5 3 9 Fatechand  Himmatlal  & Ors. v. State  of  Maharashtra  etc. (1977)   2  SCR  828,  His  Holiness   Kesavananda   Bharati Sripadagalavaru  v.  State of Kerala (1973)  Supp.   SCR  1, State  of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors. (1976) 2  SCC 310  and  The State of Bombay v. R.  M.  D.  Chamarbattgwala (1957) SCR 874 at 921 referred to. In the instant case the object of the Act being to eradicate rural  indebtedness and thereby secure the common  good,  of the  people  living in object poverty, clearly  fulfils  the directives in Arts. 38 and 39(b) of the Constitution.  There is  no conflict between the directives and the  restrictions sought to be placed by the Act. [545 E-F, 547 A] (ii)The  restrictions must not be arbitrary or excessive  in nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the interest of the   general  public.   What  is  required  is   that   the legislature  should  take  intelligent care  in  choosing  I

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course which is dictated by reason and good conscience so as to  strike a just balance between the freedom  contained  in Art.  19(1)(f) and the social control permitted by cll.  (5) and (6) of that Article. [547 B-E] Chintamman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1950) SCR 759 at 763 and Messrs.  Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The  State of  Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (1954) SCR 803 at  811-12  referred to. (iii)No abstract or general pattern or a fixed principle can be  laid down which can be of universal application and  the same will have to vary from case to case and with regard  to changing  conditions,  the  values  of  human  life,  social philosophy  of the Constitution, prevailing  conditions  and the surrounding circumstances, all of which must enter  into the judicial verdict. [547 F] Messrs.   Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State  of  Uttar Pradesh  & Ors. (1954) SCR 803 at 811-12 State of Madras  v. V.  C. Row (1952) SCR 597. Mohd.  Hanif Quareshi &  Ors.  v. The  State  of  Bihar (1959) SCR 629 at  660  and  The  Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Anr. (1960) 1 SCR 39 at 56 referred to. (iv)The  Court  has to examine the nature  and  extent,  the purport and content of the right, nature of the evil  sought to  be  remedied  by the statute, the  harm  caused  to  the citizen and the benefit to be conferred on the person or the community  for  whose  benefit the  legislation  is  passed, urgency  of the evil and the necessity to rectify the  same. In  so doing the Court has to strike a just balance  between the restriction imposed and the social control envisaged  by Art. 19(6). [549 A-B] Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. The Union of India & Ors. (1960)  2 SCR  375 and Bachan Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab  &  Ors. (1971) 1 SCC 713 at 718 referredto. (v)There must be direct and proximate nexus or a  reasonable connection  betweenthe  restriction imposed and  the  object sought to be achieved.  In other words, the Court has to see whether by virtue of the restriction imposed on the right of the citizen the object of the statute is really fulfilled or frustrated.   If  there  is  a  direct  nexus  between   the restriction  and  the  object  of  the  Act  then  a  strong presumption  in favour of the constitutionality of  the  Act will  arise. [549 F-G] Kavalappara Kottarrathil  Kochunni  & Ors.  v. The State o Madras & 0rs. (1960) 3 SCR 887  at  928 and  O. K. Ghosh & Anr. v. N. K. Joseph (1963) Supp.  1  SCR 789 at 705 referred to. (vi)Courts must see whether the social control envisaged  in Art.  19(6) is being effectuated by the restriction  imposed on the fundamental right.  If they look at the  restrictions only from the point of view of the citizen who is  affected, it  will not be a correct or safe approach inasmuch  as  the restriction  is  bound  to be irksome  and  painful  to  the citizen even though it may be for the public good.   However important the right of a citizen or an individual may be, it has  to yield to the larger interests of the country or  the community. [550 G-H, 551 A] Jyoti  Prashad v. The Administrator for the Union  Territory of Delhi (1962), 2 SCR 125 at 148 referred to. 540 (vii)The Court is fully entitled to take into  consideration matters  of common report, history of the times and  matters of  common knowledge and the circumstances existing  at  the time of legislation. [551 D] Mohd.   Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v. The State of  Bihar  (1959) SCR 629 referred to. In  the instant case the object of the Act being to  protect

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the  agriculturistdebtors  from the clutches of  the  greedy creditors,  is undoubtedly a laudable object.  The Act  does not  take  away  the  property  of  the  purchaser   without compensation and, therefore, his right to hold property  has not  been destroyed.  No exception can be taken to s.  20(2) (b)  which  provides for payment of the  purchase  money  by instalments  because the debtor, on account of his  poverty, cannot  pay the debt in a lump-sum.  Secondly having  regard to the economic condition of the peasantry in the State, the object  sought to be achieved being to  remove  agricultural indebtedness  and  amelioration of the lot of  the  agricui- turists, it cannot be said that the restrictions are in  any way arbitrary or excessive or beyond the requirements of the situation. [558 B, D, F, H, 559 A] 2.   The  object of the Act mentioned in the first  part  of the  statement of objects and reasons clearly shows that  it is  comprehensive  in  nature and is  not  confined  to  any particular situation.  In view of the clear and  unambiguous provisions  of  the Act, it is not necessary to  delve  into statement of objects and reasons. [559 G-H] Section 20 is not violative of Art. 14 of the  Constitution. [562 B] 3(a)  What Article 14 forbids is hostile discrimination  and not reasonable classification.  Equality before law does not mean  that the same set of laws should apply to all  persons under   every   circumstance   ignoring   differences    and disparities between men and things.  It is for the State  to make   reasonable  classification  which  must  fulfil   two conditions  : (1) the classification must be founded  on  an intelligible  differentia  which  distinguishes  persons  or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (2) the differentia must have a reasonable  nexus to the object sought to be achieved by tile statute. [560 C- E] Shri  Ram Krishna Dalnua v. Shri Justice S. R.  Tendolkar  & Ors. (1959) SCR 279 it 296-97 and State, of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M. Thomas & Ors. (1976)2 SCC 310 referred to. (b)Having  regard  to the allowed object of the Act,  if  by reason   of  their  povertyand  economic  backwardness   the agriculturist-debtors  are treated as a separatecategory  or class  for  preferential treatment in public  interest,  the classi-fication   is  not  unreasonable.   In   making   the classification,  the  legislature  cannot  be  expected   to provide an abstract symmetry.  All that is necessary is that the  classes  have  to  be  set  apart  accordions  to   the necessities  and exige ies a, as dictated by experience  and surrounding  circumstances  and  the cl ton  should  not  be arbitrary, artificial or illusory. [561 6-H, 562 A] State  of West Bengal v. Anway Ali Sarkar (1952) SCR 284  at 321 referred to. (c) It is well settled that before a person can claim  to be discriminated  against  another he must show  that  all  the other    persons   are   similarly   situate   or    equally circumstanced.   Unless the appellant is able  to  establish that  he  is  equated  with a bona  fide  alienee  in  every respect, Art. 14 will have no application.  In other  words, discrimination violative of Art. 14 can only take effect  if there  is  discrimination  between  equals  and  not   where unequals are being differently treated. [562 C-D] State  of  J & K v. T. N. Khosa & Anr. (1974) 1 SCR  771  at 783,  Chiranjit Lal Chowadhuri v. The Union o India  &  Ors. (1950)  SCR 860 It 911 and Southern Railways Co.  v.  Greene 216 U.S. 400, 412 referred to. 541 (d)  A  stranger auction purchaser and a bona  fide  alienee

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cannot be said to be similarly situate. [563 D] In  the  instant  case the stranger  auction  purchaser  who participates  in the proceedings in execution of the  decree against  the debtor has a clear notice of the  circumstances under  which the decree was passed and of the fact that  the property  sold  was  the property of  the  debtor.   If  the legislature  at  a later stage passes a law to  restore  the property  to the agriculturist-debtor the  auction-purchaser cannot  complain.  Secondly, the stranger  auction-purchaser knows that he had purchased the property at a distress sale. Thirdly  even if the property was restored to  the  stranger auction-purchaser, he is entitled to get the entire purchase money  in  lump-sum including the cost before  parting  with possession  of  the property.  This distinguishes  the  case from that of a decreeholder-purchaser.  A bona fide  alienee on the other hand purchases, the property under negotiation; he  has  no  notice of the debt of the debtor  or  the  cir- cumstances under which the decree was passed. [563 E, H, 564 A] Per Bhagwati, Shinghal and Tulzapurkar, JJ concurring. The subject-matter of the Act is clearly within the  purview of  Entry  30 (money lending and money  lenders;  relief  of agricultural  indebtedness) and the Act which  provides  for the  "  relief of indebted agriculturists in  the  State  of Kerala"  is within the competence of the State  Legislature. [568 G, 569 A] 1(a) There is no justification for the contention that Entry 30  is confined only to subsisting- indebtedness  and  Would not  cover  the  necessity  of  providing  relief  of  those agriculturists  who  had lost their  immovable  property  by Court sales in execution of the decree against them and  had been rendered destitute.  Section 20 deals with a  liability which  had  ceased and did not subsist on the date  the  Act came  into force.  But there is nothing in Entry 30 of  List 11  to  show  that it will not be attracted  and  would  not enable  the State Legislature to make a law  simply  because the  debt  of the agriculturist had been paid  off  under  a distress sale-. [569 C-E] (b)  An agriculturist does not cease to be an  agriculturist merely  because  he  has lost his  immovable  property.   It cannot be said that the State is not interested in providing him  necessary  relief  merely  because  he  has  lost   his immovable  property.   On  the  other  ’hand  his   helpless condition  calls for early solution and it is  only  natural that  the State Legislature should think  of  rehabilitating him  by providing the necessary relief under an Act  of  the nature under consideration.  There is nothing in the working of Entry 30 to show that the relief contemplated by it  must necessarily relate to any subsisting indebtedness and  would not cover the question of relief to those who have lost  the means of their livelihood because of the delay in  providing them legislative relief. [569- F-G] (c)  It  cannot be gainsaid that agriculturists.  and  even, indebted  agriculturists,  form the bulk or, at any  rate  a considerable part of the rural population in an  essentially rural  economy.  and so if a restriction  is  reasonable  in their interest. it world squarely fall within the purview of cl. (5) of Art. 19. [570 F-G] Kavalappara  Kottarathil  Kochuni  & Ors. v.  The  State  of Madras and Ors. (1960) 3 SCR 887 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kannapalli Chinna Venkata Chalamayya Sastri (1963) 1  SCR 156 referred to. (d)  Thousands  of  suits  were  pending  against   indebted

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agriculturists in various Courts and immovable properties of a  large  number of agriculturists had been  sold  rendering them  completely  helpless.   So if  the  State  Legislature passed  the  Act in the interest of the  general  public  to provide  relief  of  the  nature  mentioned  in  s.  20  the restriction provided therein is clearly "reasonable".   Even so,  the  section  makes  provision  for  repayment  of  the purchase money, the costs of execution and the  improvements made  by  the  purchaser Their  restriction  is,  therefore, reasonable  in  every  sense  and  the  High  Court  rightly rejected the argument to the contrary. [571 A-C], Section 20 is not violative of Art. 14. [573 D] 54 2 2(a)  A comparison of sub-s-(1) with sub-s. (3)  would  show that the treatment to a decree-holder-purchaser is different and  is less advantageous than the treatment to a  purchaser who  is  not a decree-holder.  The former is  treated  as  a different  class.  Decree-holders very often  exploit  their debtors in many ways and sales to them are generally  viewed with suspicion and disfavour.  Under O.XXI, r.72 CPC, it  is not  permissible for a decree-holder to bid for or  purchase the  property without the express permission of  the  Court. The  decree holder purchaser has rightly been treated  as  a class by himself and that classification   obviously has the object of benefiting the agriculturist debtor by  permitting him  to deposit only half the purchase money and paying  the balance in instalments.[572 A-B] (b)  There  is  also justification for treating  an  auction purchaser  at  a  Court sale differently  from  a  bona-fide alienee  of  the auction purchaser who  derived  his  rights before  the date of publication of the 1968 Bill.   Such  an alienee  of  the auction-purchaser could not  possibly  have been  aware of the hazards of Purchasing the property of  an indebted   agriculturist   at   the   time   of    purchase. [572 C-D] (c)  It  is  futile to contend that if the  legislature  has protected  the interests  of an alienee by enacting  sub-s. (6) it has made a hostile discrimination against the auction purchaser as a class. [573 D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 420 of 1973. From  the Judgment and Order dated 17-8-1972 of  the  Kerala High Court in Original Petition No. 5576 of 1970. T.   S. Krishnamoorthy Iyer, S. B. Saharya, K. Ram Kumar and V.   B.  Saharya for the Appellants in C. As. 420  and  442- 445/73. V.   A.  Sayed Muhamed (In CA 420/73) and K. M. K. Nair  for R.   I in all appeals and R. 2 in C. As. 442, 443 and 445 of 1973. Miss Lilly Thomas RR. 3-10 and CA 445/73. The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by FAZAL  ALI, J.-These appeals by certificate granted  by  the High  Court  of  Kerala involve a  common  question  of  law containing  a  challenge  to the  constitutionality  of  the Kerala  Agriculturists’  Debt Relief Act, 1970  (Act  11  of 1970)  (hereinafter referred to in short as the  Act).   The appeallants have assailed particularly section 20 of the Act which entitles the debtors to recover the properties sold to purchasers  in execution of a decree passed  in  liquidating the debt owed by the agriculturists. As  the  five  appeals involve common questions  of  law  we propose to decide them by one common judgment.

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Section 20 of the Act was assailed before the High Court  on three grounds, namely.               1.    That the Act was beyond the  legislative               competence  of the State legislature  and  did               not fall within entry 30 of the State List.               2.    That  the provisions of section  20  and               the  sub-sections  thereof were  violative  of               Article  19  (1 ) (f) of the  Constitution  of               India  inasmuch as they sought to deprive  the               appellants of their right to hold property;               543               3.    That sub-sections 3 and 6 of section  20               of  the  Act were violative of Article  14  of               the,  Constitution  of India inasmuch  as  the               stranger           decree-holder           was               selected for hostile discrimination whereas  a               bona  fide  alienee  who  stood  on  the  same               footing  as  the stranger  decree  holder  was               exempted from the operation of the Act. Mr.  Krishnamoorty Iyer, learned counsel for the  appellants has  not  pressed point No. 1 relating  to  the  legislative competence  of the legislature and has fairly conceded  that in  view  of  the  decision of this Court  in  the  case  of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors’ v. State of Maharashtra  etc.(1) the  constitutionality of the Maharashtra Debt  Relief  Act, 1976 which contained similar or rather harsher provisions is the  Act was upheld by this Court.  In these  circumstances, it will not be necessary for us to examine this question any further. Before  however  taking up the other two  points  raised  by counsel  for the appellants which were pressed before us  in this Court it may be necessary to set out the approach which a Court has to make and the principles by which it has to be guided in such matters. Courts Interpret the  constitutional provisions  against the social setting of the country so  as to  show a complete consciousness and deep awareness of  the growing requirements of the society, the increasing needs of the nation the burning problems of the, day and the  complex issues  facing  the  people which  the  legislature  in  its wisdom, through beneficial legislation, seeks to solve.  The judicial  approach  should be dynamic  rather  than  static, pragmatic  and not pedantic and elastic rather  than  rigid. It  must  take  into consideration the  changing  trends  of economic  thought,  the temper of the times and  the  living aspirations  and feelings of the people.  This  Court  while acting  as a sentinel on the quivive to protect  fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of the country must try to strike a just balance between the fundamental rights and the larger  and broader interests of society, so that when  such right  clashes  with the larger interest of the  country  it must yield to the latter.  Emphasising the role of Courts in such matters this Court in the case of Jyoti Prashad v.  The Administrator  for the Union Territory of Delhi(2)  observed as follows :-               "  where the legislature fulfils  its  purpose               and  enacts  laws,  which in  its  wisdom,  is               considered necessary for the solution of  what               after all is a very human problem the tests of               "reasonableness"  have  to be  viewed  in  the               context   of  the  issues  which   faced   the               legislature.  In the construction of such laws               and particularly in judging of their  validity               the  Courts  have necessarily to  approach  it               from  the  point  of view  of  furthering  the               social interest which it is the purpose of the

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             legislation  to  promote, for the  Courts  are               not, in these matters. functioning as it  were               in  vacuo, but as parts of a society which  is               trying, by enacted law, to solve its  problems               and   achieve  social  concord  and   peaceful               adjustment  and thus furthering the moral  and               material  progress  of  the  community  as   a               whole." (1)  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 125 at 148. 544 It  is obvious that the legislature is in the best  position to  understand  and appreciate the needs of  the  people  as enjoined  by the Constitution to bring about social  reforms for the upliftment of the backward and the weak-or  sections of  the society and for the improvement of the lot  of  poor people.  The Court will therefore, interfere in this process only  when  the statute is clearly violative  of  the  right conferred on the citizen under Part III of the  Constitution or when the Act is beyond the legislative competence of  the legislature  or such other grounds.  It is for  this  reason that  the  Courts  have recognised that there  is  always  a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a  statute and the onus to prove its invalidity lies on the party which assails  the same.  In the case of Mohd.  Hanif  Quareshi  & Ors. v. The State of Bihar(1) while adverting to this aspect Das,  C.J. as he) then was, speaking for the Court  observed as follows :-               "The  pronouncement  of  this  Court   further               establish, amongst other things, that there is               always   a  presumption  in  favour   of   the               constitutionality of an enactment and that the               burden  is upon him, who, attacks it, to  show               that  there has been a clear violation of  the               constitutional principles.  The Courts, it  is               accepted,  must presume that  the  legislature               understands  and  correctly  appreciates   the               needs  of  its own people, that its  laws  are               directed   to   problems  made   manifest   by               experience  and that its  discriminations  are               based on adequate grounds". It  is  in  the light of these principles that  we  have  to approach the impact of the Act on the fundamental rights  of the   citizen   conferred  on  him  by  Part  III   of   the Constitution. The  first  plant of argument by learned  counsel  for  the, appellants  is that the Act was violative of  Article  19(1) (f) of the Constitution inasmuch as it takes away the  right to  hold  property  as guaranteed by  Article  19  (1)  (f). Article 19 (1) (f) may be extracted thus "All citizens shall have the right (f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property". It was contended that in the present case the appellants had acquired valid title to the property after having  purchased it at the auction sale in execution of a decree against  the debtors.   After  the  sale the properties  vested.  in  the appellants  and  the law which invaded their  right  to  the property  was clearly violative of Article 19(1) (f) of  the Constitution.   There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Article  19 guarantees  all  the seven freedoms to the  citizen  of  the country including the right to hold, acquire and dispose  of property.   It must, however, be remembered that Article  19 confers an absolute and unconditional right which is subject only  to reasonable restrictions to be placed by  Parliament or  the  legislature  in public  interest.   Clause  (5)  of Article 19 runs thus:

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             "Nothing  in sub-clauses (d), (e) and  (f)  of               the said clause shall   effect the:  operation               of any existing law in so far as               (1)   [1959] S.C.R. 629.               545               it  imposes, or prevent the state from  making               any  law imposing, reasonable restrictions  on               the exercise of any of the rights conferred by               the  said sub-clauses either in the  interests               of the general public or for the protection of               the interests of any Schduled Tribe". A  perusal of this clause manifestly reveals that the  right conferred,  by  Article  19(1) (f)  is  conditioned  by  the various facto rs mentioned in clause (5).  The  Constitution permits reasonable restrictions to be placed on the right in the interest of the general public or for the protection  of the  interest  of any Scheduled Tribe.  The  State  in  the, instant   case  claims  protection  under  clause   (5)   by submitting  that the provisions contained in the Act  amount to  reasonable  restrictions  for the  general  good  of  an important   part   of  the  community,  namely,   the   poor agriculturist debtors.  The object of the Act, according  to the  State,  is  to  remove  agricultural  indebtedness  and thereby to eradicate one of the important causes of  poverty in  this country.  Such an object is undoubtedly  in  public interest,  and, therefore, the restriction contained in  the Act  must be presumed to be a reasonable restriction.   This Court  has  considered this question  on  several  occasions during the last 21 decades, and has laid down several  tests guidelines to indicate what in a particular circumstance can be  regarded as a reasonable restriction.  One of the  tests laid   down   by  this  Court  is  that,  in   judging   the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by clause (5)  of Article  19,  the Court has to bear in  mind  the  Directive Principles of State Policy.  It will be seen that Article 38 contains  a  clear  directive to the State  to  promote  the welfare  of the people by securing and protecting as  effec- tively as possible a ’social order in which justice, social, economic and political ,hall inform all the institutions of national life.  Article 39(b) contains a direction to secure that the ownership and control of the material resources  of the  community  are so distributed as best to  subserve  the common  good.   Indisputably, the object of the  Act  is  to eradicate  rural  indebtedness  and thereby  to  secure  the common good of people living in abject poverty.  The object, therefore,  clearly  fulfils  the  directive  laid  down  in Articles  38  and 39(b) of the Constitution as  referred  to above. In  fact  in the case of His  Holiness  Kesavananda  Bharati Sripadagalavaru  v.  State  of  Kerala(,)  all  the   Judges constituting  the  Bench  have  with  one  voice  given  the Directive  Principles contained in the Constitution a  place of honour.  Hegde and Mukherjea.  JJ. as they then were have said   that  the  fundamental  rights  and   the   Directive Principles constitute the "conscience" of our  Constitution. The  purpose of the Directive Principles is to  fix  certain socio  and  economic  goals  for  immediate  attainment   by bringing    about   a   non-violent    social    revolution. Chandrachud,  J.  observed  that our  Constitution  aims  at bringing  about a synthesis between ’Fundamental Rights  and the ’Directive Principles of State Policy’ by giving to  the former  a  place  of  pride and to the  latter  a  place  of permanence. In  a latter case State of Kerala & Anr. v. N. M.  Thomas  & Ors.(2) (1976) 2 S.C.C. 310 one of us (Fazal Ali, J.)  after

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analysing the (1)  [1973] Supp.  S.C.R. 1. (2)  [1976] 2 S.C.C. 310. 546 Judgment  delivered  by  all the Judges  in  the  Kesvananda Bharati’s  case (supra) on the importance of  the  Directive Principles observed as follows :               "In view of the principles adumbrated by  this               Court   it   is  clear  that   the   Directive               Principles  form the fundamental  feature  and               the social conscience of the Constitution  and               the  Constitution  enjoins upon the  State  to               implement  these directive  principles.   The,               directives   thus  provide  the  policy,   the               guidelines  and  the  end  of   socio-economic               freedom of Articles 14 and 16 are the means to               implement  the  policy  to  achieve  the  ends               sought   to  be  promoted  by  the   directive               principles.    ’So  far  as  the  courts   are               concerned   where   there   is   no   apparent               inconsistency between the directive principles               contained   in   Part  III,  which   in   fact               supplement each other, there is no  difficulty               in  putting  a harmonious  construction  which               advances the object of the Constitution.  Once               this   basic  fact  is  kept  in   mind,   the               interpretation of Articles 14 and 16 and their               scope and ambit become as clear as day". In   the   case   of  The  State   of   Bombay   v.   R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala(1) this Court while stressing the  importance of  directive  principles  contained  in  the   Constitution observed as follows :               "The avowed purpose of our constitution is  to               create   a  welfare  State.    The   directive               principles  of State policy set forth in  Part               IV of our Constitution enjoin upon the,  State               the  duty to strive to promote the welfare  of               the  people  by securing  and  protecting,  as               effectively as it may, a social order in which               justice, social, economic and political, Shall               inform  all the institutions of  the  national               life". In the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maha- rashtra  etc. (supra) the Constitution Bench of  this  Court observed as follows :               "Incorporation  of  Directive  Principles  ’of               State  Policy casting the high duty  upon  the               State to strive to promote the welfare of  the               people  by securing and protecting  as  effec-               tively  as  it may, a Social  order  in  which               justice-social,  economic and political  shall               inform  all the institutions of  the  national               life.,  is  not  idle  print  but  command  to               action.   We can never forget, except  at  our               peril,  that  the Constitution  obligates  the               State   to   ensure  an  adequate   means   of               livelihood to its citizens and to see that the               health and strength of workers, men and women,               are  not abused, that exploitation, moral  and               material,  shall  be  extradited.   In  short,               State  action  defending the  weaker  sections               from   social  injustice  and  all  forms   of               exploitation  and  raising  the  standard   of               living  of the people, necessarily imply  that               economic  activities,  attired  as  trade   or

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             business or commerce, can be de-recognised  as               trade or business."               (1)   [1957] S.C.R. 874 at 921.               547               In  the  instant case, therefore, we  are  not               able to see any conflict between the directive               principles  contained in Article 38 and  39(b)               and  the restrictions placed by the  Act.   In               the  case of The State of Bombay & Anr. v.  P.               N. Bulsara(l) this Court observed as follows               "In   judging   the  reasonableness   of   the               restrictions  imposed by the Act, one  has  to               bear in mind the directive principles of State               policy   set  forth  in  Article  47  of   the               Constitution." Another test which has been laid down by this Court is  that restrictions must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so  as to go beyond the requirement of the interest  of  the general  public.  In the case of Chintaman Rao v. The  State of Madhya Pradesh(2) this Court observed as follows :-               "The phrase ’reasonable restriction’  connotes               that  the  limitation imposed on a  person  in               enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary               or  of  an excessive nature,  beyond  what  is               required in the interests of the public.   The               word ’reasonable’ implies intelligent care and               deliberation, that is, the choice of a  course               which  reason  dictates.   Legislation   which               arbitrarily  or excessively invades the  right               cannot  be  said  to contain  the  quality  of               reasonableness and unless it strikes a  proper               balance  between  the, freedom  guaranteed  in               Article  19 ( 1 ) (g) and the  social  control               permitted by clause (6) of Article 19, it must               be held to be wanting in that quality." What  is required is that the legislature takes  intelligent care and deliberation in choosing a course which is dictated by reason and good conscience so as to strike a just balance between  the  freedom contained in Article 19  (1)  and  the social  control permitted by clauses (5) and (6) of  Article 19.  This view, was reiterated in the case of Messrs. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.(3) It has also been pointed out by this Court that in order  to judge  the  quality  of the reasonableness  no  abstract  or general pattern or a fixed principle can be laid down so as to  be  of universal application and the same will  have  to vary  from  case  to  case  and  with  regard  to   changing conditions,  the value of human life, social  philosophy  of the Constitution, prevailing conditions and the  surrounding circumstances  all  of which must enter  into  the  judicial verdict.  In other words, the position is that the Court has to make not a rigid or dogmatic but an elastic and pregmatic approach  to the facts of the case and to take  an  over-all view of all the circumstances, factors and issues facing the situation.   In the case of State of Madras v. V. G.  Row(4) the Court observed as follows               It  is  important in this context to  bear  in               mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever               prescribed,   should  be  applied   to each               individual  statute impugned, and no  abstract               standard,               (1)   [1951] S.C.R 682.               (2)   [1956] S.C.R. 759 at 763.               (3)   [1954] S.C.R. 803 at 811-12.               (4)   [1952] S.C.R. 597.

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             548               or  general pattern, of reasonableness can  be               laid  down  as applicable to all  cases.   The               nature  of  the  right alleged  to  have  been               infringed,  the  underlying  purpose  of   the               restrictions  imposed, the extent and  urgency               of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the               disproportion  of  the  imposition,  the  pre-               vailing  conditions  at the time,  should  all               enter   into  the  judicial-      verdict.   In               evaluating  such elusive factors  and  forming               their own conception of what is reasonable, in               an  the circumstances of a given case,  it  is               inevitable that the special philosophy and the               scale  of values of the  judges  participating               in,the  decision  should  play  an   important               part." This view was endorsed in the case of Mohd.  Hanif  Quareshi & Ors. v. The State of Bihar(1) 1959 S.C.R. 629 at 660 where this Court observed as follows :               "Quite  obviously it is left to the court,  in               case    of   dispute,   to    determine    the               reasonableness of the restrictions imposed  by               the  law.   In determining that  question  the               court,  we  conceive,  cannot  proceed  on   a               general  notion of what in reasonable  in  the               abstract or even on a consideration of what is               reasonable  from  the  point of  view  of  the person  or pe rsons on whom  the  restrictions               are imposed." Similarly in the case of The Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr.  v.  The Union of India & Anr. (1) the  Court  observed that the Court in judging the reasonableness of a law,  will necessarily see, not only the surrounding circumstances  but all  contemporaneous legislation passed as part of a  single scheme." To the same effect is another decision of this Court in  the case of Kavalappara Kottarrathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras & Ors. (2) where this Court observed as follows :               "There   must,   therefore,   be    harmonious               balancing   between  the  fundamental   rights               declared  by  Article  19(1)  and  the  social               control  permitted  by Article 19(5).   It  is               implicit in the nature of restrictions that no               inflexible  standard can be laid down  :  each               case must be decided on its facts." In  the case of Jyoti Pershad v. The Administrator  for  the Union  Territory  of  Delhi  (supra)  at  147  Ayyangar,  J. speaking for the Court observed as follows :               "The  criteria for determining the  degree  of               restriction  on  the right  to  hold  property               which  would be considered reasonable, are  by               no  means fixed or static, but must  obviously               vary  from  age to age and be related  to  the               adjustments  necessary to solve  the  problems               which communities face from time to time." (1)  [1952] S.C.R. 597. (2)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 887 at 928. 549 The  fourth test which has been laid down by this  Court  to judge the reasonableness of a restriction is to examine  the nature  and  extent, the purport and content of  the  right, nature  of the evil sought to be remedied by  the,  statute, the  ratio of harm caused to the citizen and the benefit  to be  conferred  on  the person or  the  community  for  whose

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benefit  the legislation is passed, urgency of the evil  and necessity to rectify the same.  In short, a just balance has to be struck between the restriction imposed and the  social control envisaged by clause (6) of Article 19.  In the  case of  Narendra Kumar & Ors. v. The Union ,of India  &  Ors.(1) this Court observed as follows;               "In  applying the test of reasonableness,  the               Court  has  to consider the  question  in  the               background  of  the  facts  and  circumstances               under  which order was made, taking  into  ac-               count  the nature of the evil that was  sought               to  be remedied by such law, the ratio of  the               harm  caused  to individual  citizens  by  the               proposed  remedy,  to  the  beneficial  effect               reasonably  expected to result to the  general               public.  It will also be necessary to consider               in  that  connection  whether  the   restraint               caused  by the law is more than was  necessary               in the interests of the general public."               In the case of Bachan Singh & Ors. v. State of               Punjab  &  OrS.  (2) this  Court  observed  as               follows               "The Court has in no uncertain terms laid down               the  test for ascertaining  reasonableness  of               the restriction on the rights guaranteed under               Article 19 to be, determined by a reference to               the  nature  of the right said  to  have  been               infringed,  the  purpose of  the  restrictions               sought to be imposed, the urgency of the  evil               and the necessity to rectify or remedy it  all               of  which has to be balanced with  the  Social               Welfare   or  Social  purpose  sought  to   be               achieved.   The  right of the  individual  has               therefore  to  be  sublimated  to  the  larger               interest of the general public." The  fifth test formulated by this Court is that there  must be a ,direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable  connection between  the  other words, the Court has to see  whether  by virtue of  the  restriction imposed on the  right  of  the citizen  the  object of the statute is really  fulfilled  or frustrated.   If  there  is  a  direct  nexus  between   the restriction  and  the  object  of  the  Act  then  a  strong presumption  in favour of the constitutionality of  the  Act will naturally arise.        In the case of   K.  K. Kochuni &  Ors.  v.  State  of Madras  &  Ors.  (supra)  this  Court ,observed as follows :               "But  the  restrictions sought to  be  imposed               shall   not  be  arbitrary,  but   must   have               reasonable relation to the object sought to be               achieved and shall be in the interests of  the               general public". (1)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 375. (2)  [1971] 1 S.C.C. 713 at 718. 550 Same view was taken by this Court in the case of O. K. Ghosh & Anr. v. E. X. Joseph(1) where Gajendragadkar, J.  speaking for the Court observed as follows               "A  restriction  can  be said  to  be  in  the               interests   of  public  order  only   if   the               connection  between  the restriction  and  the               public   order   is  proximate   and   direct.               Indirect  or farfetched or  unreal  connection               between the restriction and public order would               not fall within the purview of the  expression               ’in the interests of public order’."

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Another  test  of  reasonableness  of  restrictions  is  the prevailing  social  values  whose  needs  are  satisfied  by restrictions  meant to protect social welfare.  In the  case of  The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushaliya & Ors.(2)  this Court  while relying on one of its earlier decisions in  the case  of  State of Madras v. V. G. Row (supra)  observed  as follows :-               "The  reasonableness of a restriction  depends               upon  the  values of life in a  society,  the               circumstances; obtaining at a particular point               of time when the restriction is imposed,  the,               decree and the urgency of the evil sought  to               be controlled and similar others". We  have  deliberately not referred to  the  American  cases because  the conditions in our country are  quite  different and  this Court need not rely on the  American  Constitution for the purpose of examining the seven freedoms contained in Article  19 because the social conditions and the habits  of our  people are different.  In this connection, in the  case of  Jagmohan  Singh  v.  The State  of  U.P.(3)  this  Court observed as follows :               "So  far as we are concerned in this  country,               we  do  not  have,  in  our  constitution  any               provision like the Ninth Amendment nor are  we               at liberty to apply the test of reasonableness               with the freedom with which the Judges of  the               Supreme  Court of America are  accustomed,  to               apply ’the due process’ clause". Another  important  test which has been enunciated  by  this Court  is  that so, far as the nature of  reasonableness  is concerned  it  has to be viewed not only from the  point  of view  of the citizen but the problem before the  legislature and  the  object  which  is sought to  be  achieved  by  the statute.   In  other words the Courts must see  whether  the social  control  envisaged in clause (6) of  Article  19  is being  effectuated  by  the  restrictions  imposed  on   the fundamental right.  It is obvious that if the Courts look at the restrictions only from the point of view of the  citizen who is affected it will not be a correct or safe approach in as  much  as  the restriction is bound  to  be  irksome  and painful to the citizen even though it may be for the  public good.  Therefore a just Wince must be struck in relation  to the restriction and the public good that is (1)  [1963] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 789 at 705. (2)  [1964] 4 S.C.R. 1002 at 1013. (3)  [1973] 1 S.C.C. 20 at 27. 551 done  to the people at large.  It is obvious  that,  however important the right of it citizen or an individual may  be, it  has to yield to the larger interests of the  country  or the  community.   In  the  case  of  Jyoti  Pershad  v.  The Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi (supra)  this Court observed as follows :               "Where the legislature fulfils its purpose and               enacts   laws,   which  in  its   wisdom,   is               considered necessary for the solution of  what               after all is a very human problem and tests of               ,reasonableness’  have  to be, viewed  in  the               context   of  the  issues  which   faced   the               legislature.  In the construction of such laws               and particularly in judging of their  validity               the  Courts  have necessarily to  approach  it               from  the  point  of view  of  furthering  the               social interest which it is the purpose of the               legislation  to  promote, for the  Courts  are

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             not, in these matters, functioning as it  were               in  vacuo, but as parts of a society which  is               trying, by enacted law, to solve its  problems and  achieve  social  concord  and   peaceful               adjustment  and thus furthering the moral  and               material  progress  of  the  community  as   a               whole". It  has  also  been  held by  this  Court  that  in  judging reasonableness  of restrictions the Court is fully  entitled to take into consideration matters of common report, history of  the  times  and  matters of  common  knowledge  and  the circumstances existing at the time of legislation.  In  this connection, in the case of Mohd.  Hanif Quareshi & Ors. v.   The  State  of  Bihar (supra)  the  Court  observed  as follows :               "It must be borne in mind that the legislature               is  free to recognise degrees of harm and  may               confine its restrictions to those cases  where               the  need  is deemed to be  the  clearest  and               finally   that   in  order  to   sustain   the               presumption of constitutionality the Court may               take  into  consideration  matters  of  common               knowledge,  matters  of  common  report,   the               history  of  the times and may,  assume  every               state of facts which can be conceived existing               at the time of legislation". We do not mean to suggest that the tests laid down above are completely   exhaustive   but   they   undoubtedly   provide sufficient  guidelines  to  the  Court  to  determine,   the question  of  reasonableness of a  restriction  whenever  it arises. We would now like to examine the facts and circumstances  of the  present case in the light of the principles  enunciated above  in order to find whether or not restrictions  imposed by the Act on the rights of the appellants are unreasonable. Before however going into this question, it may be necessary to give a brief survey of the facts of the present case  and the  history  of the period preceding the Act  as  also  the economic position of the debtors prevailing at the time when the Act was passed.  It appears that in Civil Appeal No. 420 of 1973 the appellant was a stranger auction purchaser at  a Court  sale.   The creditor had obtained a  mortgage  decree against the debtor which was 552 to be paid by instalments but as the debtor was not able  to pay  the instalment, a decree for sale of the property  was passed  by  the  Court and the property  was  auctioned  and purchased  by the appellant who was not  the  decree-holder. The  rest  of  the facts are not disputed and  need  not  be mentioned  in  the  judgment.  In  the  other  appeals  also decrees  were obtained by the creditors against the  debtors and  on  failure of the debtors to pay the  instalments  the property  was  sold  and purchased at  the  auction  by  the decree-holders  themselves.   It is also not  disputed  that after the-purchase of the properties some of the  appellants had  built houses, wanted trees and made other  improvements in   the  property.   When  however  the  debtors   launched proceedings under the Act for restoration of the possession of  the  property  on payment of  the  decretal  amount  the appellants had challenged the Act on the ground that it  was unconsitutional  as  indicated above.  The  High  Court  has pointed out in its judgment that though the Act was preceded by Act 31 of 1958 under which benefits were conferred on the debtors for debts incurred by the agriculturists before 14th July, 1958 but as this date was considered to be  inadequate

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by an amendment in 1961 the date was extended to 14th  July, 1959.  In spite of this concession all the debtors were  not able to pay off their debts as a result of which they  lost their  property which was sold in execution of  the  decrees brought by the creditors against them.  It was also found by the  High Court that as many as 102867 suits were  filed  in various Courts in the St-ate after 14-7-1958 and in most  of them no relief could, be given to the debtors because of the expiry of the date.  The very fact that most of the  debtors were  not  able to pay debts and  save  valuable  properties which were in their possession shows the pitiable condition and  the object poverty in which they live.  The High  Court has  also given the facts, figures and statistics  to  prove the  economic  condition of the agriculturist  debtors.   In this  connection,  the High Court has pointed out  that  the All-India  Rural Credit Committee’s Report, 1954 shows  that 51.7% of the Rural families ill Kerala are indebted and  out of  this,  the  proportion  between  cultivators  and   non- cultivators  is 58.6 and 38.6 respectively.  The  All  India average  borrowing  per  rural  family  was  Rs.  160.   The corresponding  average for the cultivator and non-cultivator was Rs. 21 0 and Rs.66   respectively.        Of    the average borrowing per family of Rs. 309for            rural households,  that of the cultivators was Rs. 358 per  family as against Rs. 171 for non-cultivators i.e. almost double of that of the  cultivators. Family expenditure accounted for 49.8% in the caseof  medium cultivators, 49.2% for  large cultivators and 37.2% ’or big cultivators.  The rural credit survey of 1961-62 shows that 64% of the cultivatorsin Kerala are indebted, which is said to be the second  biggest in  India.  The average of loan borrowed by the  cultivators in Kerala was Rs. 318/- per household as against Rs. 127 for the non-cultivatorhousehold.   The  main purpose  for  the borrowing was for householdexpenditure  and  the  capital expenditure   on  cultivation  was  of   the   agriculturist households  in India have increased from Rs. 750  crores  in 1951-52 to 1034 crores in 1961-62.In other words, there has been an increase of 38% in one decade.Although  the  level of   debt per household, is comparatively low inKerala and so is the cost 553 of cultivation and yet the cultivator is living from hand to mouth  and is not able to make both ends  meet.   Consumer’s needs and distressed circumstances assume an important  role in  adding to total debt.  The High Court has then  referred to the report of Dr. C. B. Memoria and has quoted therefrom. Apart  from  these facts of history the  entire  matter  was considered  exhaustively  by a Constitution  Bench  of  this Court in the case of Fatehchand Himmatlal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra  etc.  (supra)  where  this  Court  referred  to several reports and Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the  Court and  quoting exhaustively from the various reports made  the following observations :               "Quite  recently the _report published by  the               All  India  Rural Debt and  Investment  Survey               relating   to   1971-72    also   depicts   an               increasing  trend in rural  indebtedness.   It               has   been   estimated  that   the   aggregate               borrowings of all rural households on June 30,               1971  was Rs. 3921 crores, while  the  average               per   rural   household   being   Rs.   503/-.               Fortythree per cent of the rural families  bad               reported borrowings."               Quoting Professor Panikar, this Court observed               as follows

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             "Perhaps,   it  may  be  that  the  need   for               borrowing  is  taken  for  granted.   But  the               undisguised fear that the oppressive burden of               debt  on Indian farmers is the main  hindrance               to  progress  is unanimous.   There  are  many               writers  who  depict  indebtedness  of  Indian               farmers as an unmixed evil.  Thus, Alal  Ghosh               quotes  with  approbation the  French  proverb                             that   ’Credit  supports  the  farmer  as   th e               hangman’s rope the hanged."               "The economic literature, official and  other,               on agricultural and working class indebtedness               is  escalating  and  disturbing.  Indeed.  the               ’money-lender’  is an oppressive component  of               the scheme."               "The  condition  of  loan  repayment  are   as               designed that the debtor is forced to sell his               produce  to  the  mahajan at  low  prices  and               purchase goods for consumption and  production               at  high  prices.   In many  other  ways  take               advantage of the poverty and the  helplessness               of  farmers and exploit them......  Unable  to               pay  high  interest  and  the  principal,  the               farmers  even  lose their land  or  live  from               generation to generation under heavy debt."               "The harmful consequences or indebtedness  are               economic and effect efficient farming,  social               in that the ’relations between the loan  given               and  loan  receivers  take  on  the  form   of               relations  of  hatred,, poisoning  the  social               life." Dr.  C.  B. Memoria in his book  ’Agricultural  Problems  of India’  has stressed that rural indebtedness has  long  been one  of the most pressing problems of India and observed  as follows : 5 54               "Rural   people   have   been   under    heavy               indebtedness of the average money-lenders  and               Sahukars.   The burden of this debt  has  been               passed on from generation to generation  inas-               much  as  the principal and interest  went  on               increasing  for  most of them.   According  to               Wold,  ’The  country has been in the  grip  of               Mahajans.   It  is the bond of debt  that  has               shackled agriculture."               Quoting the reasonableness of the restrictions               this Court observed as follows :               "There    was   much   argument   about    the               reasonableness    of   the   restriction    on               moneylenders, not the general category as suck               but  the cruel species the Legislature had  to               confront and we have at great length gone into               the    gruesome   background    of    economic               inequities,  since the test of  reasonableness               is  not  to  be applied in Vacuo  but  in  the               context  of life’s realities."  "Money-lending               and trade-financing are indubitably ’trade’ in               the  broad  rubric, but our  concern  here  is               blinkered  by  a specific  pattern  of  tragic               operations with no heroes but only anti-heroes               and victims."               "Eminent  economists  and their  studies  have               been  adverted  to  by  the  High  Court   and               reliance  has  been placed on a  report  of  a

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             Committee  which  went into  the  question  of               relief from rural and urban indebtedness which               shows  the  dismal economic situation  of  the               rural and farmer and the labourers.  It is not               merely the problem of agricultural and kindred               indebtedness, but the menacing proportions  of               the   moneylenders’   activities   that   have               attracted  the  attention  of  the  Committee.               Giving facts and figures, which are  alarming.               bearing on the indebtedness amongst industrial               workers  and small holders, the Committee  has               highlighted  the exploitative role  of  money-               lenders  and  the  high  proportion  of   non-               institutional borrowing."               "The   subject   matter   of   the    impugned               legislation is indebtedness, the beneficiaries               are  petty farmers, manual workers and  allied               categories  steeped in debt and bonded to  the               money  lending tribe.  So, in passing  on  its               constitutionality.    the    principles     of               Developmental  Juris prudence must  come  into               play.  "               "A  meaningful,  yet minimal analysis  of  the               Debt  Act, read in the light of the times  and               circumstances  which compelled its  enactment,               will  bring  out  the  human  setting  of  the               statute.   The bulk of the  beneficiaries  are               rural  indigents and the rest  urban  workers.               These  are  weaker sections for  whom  consti-               tutional    concern    is    shown     because               institutional  credit  instrumentalities  have               ignored them.  Money-lending may be ancilliary               to  commercial activity and benignant  in  its               effects. but money-lending may also be ghastly               when it facilitates no               55 5               flow  of  trade, no movement of  commerce,  no               promotion  of  inter-course, no  servicing  of               business, but merely stagnates rural  economy,               strangulates the borrowing community and turns               malignant in its repercussions."               "Every cause claims its martyr and if the law,               necessitated   by  practical   considerations,               makes  generalisations  which hurt a  few,  it               cannot be helped by the Court.  Otherwise, the               enforcement  of the Debt Relief Act will  turn               into   an   enquiry   into   scrupulous    and               unscrupulous  creditors, frustrating,  through               endless litigation, the instant relief to  the               indebted   which   is  the  promise   of   the               legislature." Having  regard  to the history of  economic  legislation  in Kerala, the sad plight of the agriculturists debtors in  the State  and  the  fact that the  agriculturist  debtors  are, living  from hand to mouth and below subsistance level,  the observations made by this Court as quoted above apply to the facts  of the present case with full force  because  similar conditions  had  prevailed in Maharashtra which led  to  the passing of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act. We  would now examine the particular provisions of  the  Act which  have been assailed before us to find out whether  the legislature  seeks  to  strike a just  balance  between  the nature  of  the  restrictions sought to be  imposed  on  the appellants  and social purpose sought to be achieved by  the Act.

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The  relevant  portions  of section 20 of  the  Act  may  be extracted thus :               "20.   Sales of immovable property to  be  set               aside  in  certain  cases  :  (1)  where   any               immovable  property in which an  agriculturist               had an interest has been sold in execution  of               any  decree  for recovery of a  debt  or  sold               under  the provisions of the Revenue  Recovery               Act  for  the  time being  in  force  for  the               recovery of a debt due to a banking company in               liquidation.               (a)   on  or  after the 1st day  of  November,               1956; or               (b)   before  the 1st day of  November,  1956,               but  the possession of the said  property  has               not  actually  passed before the 20th  day  of               November,  1957, from the judgment  debtor  to               the  purchaser, and the decree-holder  is  the               purchaser,  then, notwithstanding anything  in               the  Limitation  Act, 1963 or in the  Code  of               Civil  Procedure,  1908  or  in  the   Revenue               Recovery Act for the time being in force,  and               not  withstanding  that  the  sale  has   been               confirmed,  such judgment debtor or the  legal               representive   of  such  judgment-debtor   may               deposit   one-half  of  the   purchase   money               together  with  the costs of  execution  where               such  costs were not included in the  purchase               money,  and  apply  to the  court  within  six               months  from the date of the  commencement  of               the Act to set aside the sale of the property,               and the court shall, if satisfied that               10 - 1 146 SCI/77               556               the, applicant is an agriculturist, order  the               sale  to  be  set aside and  the  court  shall               further  order that the, balance of  the  pur-               chase  money shall be paid in ten equal  half-               yearly instalments together with the  interest               accrued due on such balance outstanding,  till               the date of payment of each instalment, at six               per cent per annum, the first instalment being               payable within a period of six months from the               date of the, order of the Court.               (2)   Where any immovable property in which an               agriculturisthad an interest has been  sold                             in execution of any decree for arrears of rent               or michavaram               (a)   during the period commencing on the  1st               day  of November-  , 1956 and ending with  the               30th  day of January, 1961 and the  possession               of the said property has actually passed on or               before  the 1st day of April, 1964,  from  the               judgment-debtor to the purchaser; or               (b)   before the 1st day of November, 1956 and               the  possession  of  the  said  property   has               actually  passed during the period  commencing               on  the 20th day of November, 1957 and  ending               with the 1st day of April, 1964 from the judg-               ment-debtor    to   the    purchaser,    then,               notwithstanding  anything  contained  in   the               Limitation  Act, 1963 or in the Code of  Civil               Procedure,  1908 and notwithstanding that  the               sale has been confirmed, such  judgment-debtor               or the legal representative of such  judgment-

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             debtor  may deposit one-half of  the  purchase               money  together with the costs  of  execution,               where  such  costs were not  included  in  the               purchase  money and apply to the Court  within               six  months from the date of the  commencement               of  this  Act  to set aside the  sale  of  the               property,  and the Court shall,  if  satisfied               that the applicant is an agriculturist,  order               the sale to be set aside, and the Court  shall               further order that the balance of the purchase               money  shall be paid in ten equal  half-yearly               instahnents together with the interest accrued               due on such balance outstanding till the  date               of payment of each instalment, at six per cent               per annum, the first instalment being  payable               within a period of six months from the date of               the order of the Court.               (3)   Where any immovable property in which an               agriculturist had no interest has been sold in               execution of any decree for the recovery of  a               debt  or  sold  under the  provisions  of  the               Revenue  Recovey  Act for the  time  being  in               force  for  the recovery of a debt due  to  a-               banking company in liquidation on or after the               14th  day of July, 1958 and the  decree-holder               is  not the purchaser,  then,  notwithstanding               anything in the Limitation Act, 1963 or in the               Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  or  in  the               Revenue  Recovery  Act for the time  being  in               force,  and notwithstanding that the sale  has               been  confirmed, such judgment-debtor  or  the               legal  representative of  such  judgmentdebtor               may,  deposit the purchase money and apply  to               the               557               Court  within six months from the date of  the               commencement of this Act to set aside the sale               of  the  property,  and the  court  shall,  if               satisfied    that   the   applicant   is    an               agriculturist, order the sale to be set aside.               (4)   No  order under sub-section (1) or  sub-               section (2) or sub-section (3) shall be passed               without  notice  to  the  decree  holder,  the               transferee of the decree, if any, the auction-               purchaser  and  any other person, who  in  the               opinion of the court would be affected by such               order   and   without   affording   them    an               opportunity to be heard.               (5)   Where improvements have been effected on               the  property sold after the date of the  sale               and  before the notice under sub-section  (4),               the value of such improvement as determined by               the court shall be deposited by the  applicant               for payment to the auction-purchaser.               (6)   An  order under sub-section (1) or  sub-               section  (2) or sub-section (3) shall  not  be               deemed  to  affect  the  rights  of   bonafide               alienees  of  the  auction-purchaser  deriving               rights  before the date of publication of  the               Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief Bill, 1963,               in the Gazette." An analysis of this section shows that the statute seeks  to create  three  different categories of  creditors  who  were liable   to   restore   property  to   the   debtors   under circumstances mentioned in the section.  In the first place,

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where  the  decree-holder has purchased the property  at  an auction sale but has not been able to get possession of  the same,  the court has been given power to set aside the  sale (1) if the applicant is an agriculturist and is prepared  to deposit half of the decretal amount immediately and pay  the balance  in 10 equal half yearly instalments; (2) where  the purchaser who purchases the property at the auction sale  is a stranger and not a decree-holder the sale can be set aside only  on the judgment-debtor depositing the entire  purchase money within six months from the date of the commencement of the  Act.   Sub-section  (5) further provides  that  if  any improvements  have  been made by the purchaser,  the  debtor will  have  to reimburse the purchaser for the same,  (3)  A bonafide  alienee  who has purchased the property  from  the auction-purchaser before the date of the publication of  the Act  is  completely  exempted  from  the  operation  of  the provisions  of the Act.  The Act lays down a  self-contained procedure for the mode in which the sale is to be set  aside and the conditions on which this is to be done.  Section  21 of  the  Act provides for an appeal to the  Appellate  Court against  any  order passed under section. 20  and  where  an order  is passed by the Revenue Court an appeal lies to  the District Court.  Thus the important features of the Act  may be summarised as follows               1.    That even if the auction-purchaser was a               stranger  and may have purchased the  property               from a debtor at an auction sale, he is liable               to restore property on payment of the decretal               amount;               558               2.    That  if  the  purchaser  has  made  any               improvement in the property the debtor has  to               deposit the cost of the improvements in  court               before the sale is set aside.               3.    That  the  debtor has  to  exercise  his               option  of setting aside the sale  within  six               months from the date of the Act. The  avowed  object  of the Act seems  to  give  substantial relief  to  the agriculturist debtors in order to  get  back their   property  and  earn  their  livelihood.    This   is undoubtedly  a  laudable object and the Act is  a  piece  of social legislation.  As the decree-holder who had  purchased the  property is fully compensated by being paid the  amount for  which he had purchased the property, it cannot be  said that  his  right to hold the property  has  been  completely destroyed.   The purchaser gets the property at  a  distress sale  and  is fully aware of the pitiable  conditions  under which  the  debtor  was  unable  to  pay  the  debt.   In  a Constitution which is wedded to a social pattern of  society the  purchaser must be presumed to have the  knowledge  that any  social  legislation  for  the  good  of  a   particular community or the people in general can be brought forward by Parliament  at  any time.  The Act, however, does  not  take away  the property of the purchaser without paying  him  due compensation.   It is true that section 20(2)  (b)  provides for  payment  of the purchase money by instalments,  but  no exception  can  be  taken to this fact as  in  view  of  the poverty of the debtor it is not possible for him to pay  the debt  in  a  lump-sum  and as  the  legislation  is,  for  a particular   community   the  provision   for   payment   by instalments cannot be said to work serious injustice to  the decree-holder  purchaser, A stranger auction  purchaser  has been  treated differently because he bad nothing to do  with the  decree  and is enjoined to return the property  to  the agriculturist debtor on payment of entire amount in  lumpsum

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without  insisting  on  instalments.  Thus,  in  short,  the position  is  that the object of the Act is to  protect  the poor  distressed agriculturist debtors from the clutches  of greedy creditors who have grabbed the properties of  debtors and deprived the debtors of their main source of sustenance. Another object which is said to be fulfilled by the  statute is to eradicate and remove agricultural indebtedness in  the State by amelioration and improvement of the lot of  debtors by bringing them to the subsistence level and reducing their borrowings.   The  Act does not provide for any  drastic  or arbitrary  procedure  as  the property is  restored  to  the debtor  only  on payment of the purchase money.   The  Maha- rashtra Debt Relief Act of 1976 contained such more  drastic provisions and in spite of that it was upheld by this  Court as the restrictions were hold byus   to   be   reasonable restrictions  in  the  interest of the  general  public.  To remove  poverty by eradicating rural indebtedness is one  of the very important social purposes sought to be achieved  by our Constitution and it cannot be said that the invasion  of the right of the appellants is so excessive as to be branded by  the quality of unreasonableness.  Having regard  to  the economic conditions prevailing in Kerala before the  passing of the Act, it cannot be said that the 559 restrictions are in any way arbitrary or excessive or beyond the requirements of the situation.  Thus, all the tests laid down  by  this, Court for determining  reasonableness  of  a restriction  have been amply fulfilled in this case  and  we are unable to find any constitutional infirmity in this case on  the  ground that the Act is violative of  Article  19(1) (f).   We are clearly of the opinion that the provisions  of the  Act are reasonable restrictions within the  meaning  of clause  (6)  of  Article 19.  It is  true  that  Article  31 confers a guarantee on a citizen against deprivation of  his property except by authority of law.  In other words,  under Article 31 the property of the citizen cannot be taken  away without. there being a valid law for that purpose.  The  law must  not only be valid but it also must not contravene  any of  the  provisions of Article 19 (1) (f).  In  the  instant case, in view of our findings that the Act is a valid  piece of  legislation  and  amounts to  a  reasonable  restriction within the meaning of sub-clauses (5) and (6) of Article  19 the  law  passes the test of  constitutionality.   In  these circumstances,  therefore,  Article 31 is not  infringed  or violated by the Act. Before  closing  this part of the case we might  mention  an argument  faintly  submitted  by  learned  counsel  for  the appellants,  that having regard to the statement of  objects and reasons of the Act, the provisions of the Act appear  to be  in  direct  conflict with the same.   The  statement  of objects and reasons as published in the Kerala Gazette dated 13th December, 1968 may be extracted thus:               "The  Kerala Agriculturists Debt  Relief  Act,               1958 (31 of 1958) provides for some relief  to               the indebted agriculturists in the State.  But               the   benefits  conferred  by  that  Act   are               available only in respect of debts incurred by               the agriculturists before the 14th July, 1958,               on  which date the Act came into force.   Even               after this date the agricultural  indebtedness               in  the  state,  especially  among  the   poor               sections of the people continued to be on  the               increase  due  to  various  factors.   Several               suits have been Mod in courts for the recovery               of  debts  accrued after 14-7-1958  from  poor

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             indebted  agriculturists.   It  is  considered               necessary  to give some relief to  such  agri-               culturists   also.   It  is  also   considered               necessary to limit the benefit to any indebted               agriculturist whose total amount of debts does               not  exceed  twenty thousand rupees.   It  is,               therefore,   proposed  to  bring  in  a   more               comprehensive   legislation  on  the   subject               repealing the existing enactment". It was contended that the main object of the Act appears  to give  relief only to those debtors who had filed  suits  for recovery  of  debts  after 14th July,  1958.   But  the  Act travels  beyond the domain of the statement of objects  ’and reasons by giving a blanket power to the Court to set  aside the sales which have been completed even before the  passing of  the  Act.  We are, however, unable to  agree  with  this argument  because  in  view of  the  clear  and  unambiguous provisions of the Act, it is not necessary for us, to  delve into  the  statement  of objects and reasons  of-  the  Act. Moreover,  though  the main purpose may have  been  to  give relief to the agriculturist debtors 560 after   14-7-1958  the  object  was  to  bring   forward   a comprehensive  legislation on various aspects of the  matter in  order  to give relief to  the  indebted  agriculturists. This  object  is  mentioned in the very first  part  of  the statement  of objects and reasons.  The words  clearly  show that  the  Act  was  comprehensive in  nature  and  was  not confined   to   any   particular   situation.    In    these circumstances, therefore, the contention of learned  counsel for the appellants on this score is over-ruled. This brings us to the second branch of the argument relating to  the applicability of Article 14 of the  Constitution  of India.    In  this  connection,  Mr.   Krishnamoorthy   Iyer submitted  in  the first place, that the  special  treatment afforded  to  the  debtors under section 20 of  the  Act  is wholly  discriminatory  and  is  violative  of  Article  14. Secondly, it was argued on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal  No.  420 of 1973 that they  being  stranger  auction purchasers  were  selected  for  hostile  discrimination  as against  a  bonafide  alienee who has  been  given  complete exemption  from the operation of the provisions of the  Act. It  is  now  well settled that what Article  14  forbids  is hostile  discrimination and not  reasonable  classification. Equality before ’law does not mean that the same set of  law should  apply  to  all  persons  under  every   circumstance ignoring differences and. disparties between men and things. A reasonable classification is inherent in the very  concept of  equality, because all persons living on this  earth  are not alike and have different problems.  Some may be wealthy; some  may  be  poor; some may be educated;  some  I  may  be uneducated  some  may be highly advanced and others  may  be economically  backward.   It  is for the  State  to  make  a reasonable classification which must fulfil two  conditions: (1)  The classification must he founded on  an  intelligible differentia  which distinguishes persons or things that  are grouped together from others left out of the group. (2)  The differentia  must  have  a reasonable nexus  to  the  object sought  to be achieved by the statute.  In the case of  Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.   R. Tendolkar &  Ors. (1).  The Court after considering a large number of    its previous decisions observed as follows :               "It is now well established that while Article               14  forbids  class legislation,  it  does  not               forbid   reasonable  classification  for   the

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             purposes  of legislation.  In order,  however,               to,    pass    the   test    of    permissible               classification   two   conditions   must    be               fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification               must   be   founded   on   an    intelligible-               differentia  which  distinguishes  persons  or               things  that are grouped together from  others               left  out  of the group; and (ii)  that  that               differentia  must have a rational relation  to               the  object  sought  to  be  achieved  by  the               statute  in question.  The classification  may               be   founded  on  different   basis,   namely,               geographical,  or  according  to  objects   or               occupations or the like, what is necessary  is               that  there must be a nexus between the  basis               of  classification and the object of  the  Act               under consideration". (1)  [1959] S.C.R. 279 at 296-97. 561 This  case has been relied upon in a large number  of  cases right  from  1959 upto this date.  In the case of  State  of Kerala  &  Anr.  v. N. M. Thomas & Ors. (supra)  one  of  us (Fazal  Ali,  J.) while delivering the  concurring  judgment observed  as  follows regarding the various aspects  of  the concept of equality :               "It  is also equally well-settled  by  several               authorities  of this Court that Article 16  is               merely  an incident of Article 14. Article  14               being  the genus is of  universal  application               whereas Article 16 is the species and seeks to               obtain equality of opportunity in the services               under  the  State.  The theory  of  reasonable               classification is implicit and inherent in the               concept  of equality for there can  hardly  be               any  country where all the citizens  would  be               equal   in   all   respects.    Equality    of               opportunity   would  naturally  mean  a   fair               opportunity  not  only to one section  or  the               other  but  to all sections  by  removing  the               handicaps  if  a  particular  section  of  the               society  suffers from the same.  It has  never               been  disputed in judicial  pronouncements  by               this Court as also of the various High  Courts               that    Article    14    permits    reasonable               classification.    But  what  Article  14   or               Article  16 forbid is  hostile  discrimination               and  not reasonable classification.  In  other               words, the idea of classification is  implicit               in  the concept of equality  because  equality               means  equality to all and not merely  to  the               advanced and educated sections of the society.               It  follows,  therefore,  that  in  order   to               provide   equality  of  opportunity  to all               citizens  of  our  country,  every  class   of               citizens   must   have  a   sense   of   equal               participation  in building up  an  egalitarian               society,  where  there, is peace  and  plenty,               where  there is complete economic freedom  and               there   is  no  pestilence  or   poverty,   no               discrimination and oppression, where there  is               equal  opportunity to education, to  work,  to               earn  their  livelihood so that  the  goal  of               social justice is achieved". In  view  of  these  authorities  let  us  see  whether  the selection of the agriculturists debtors by the State for the

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purpose of improving and ameliorating their lot can be said to be a permissible classification.  While dealing with  the first  argument  we have already pointed  out  the  economic conditions prevailing in the State and the abject poverty in which  the agriculturist debtors were living.  We have  also referred  to  the Directive Principles of  State  Policy  as contained  in the Constitution and have held that it is  the duty  of  the  legislature to  implement  these  directives. Having  regard,  therefore,  to  the  poverty  and  economic backwardness   of  the  agriculturist  debtors   and   their miserable  conditions in which they live, it cannot be  said that  if they are treated as a separate category  or  class for preferential treatment in public interest then the  said classification  is unreasonable.  It is also clear  that  in making the classification the legislature cannot be expected to  provide an abstract symmetry but the classes have to  be set apart according to the necessities and exigencies of the society   as   dictated  by   experience   and   surrounding circumstances.  All that is necessary is that the classify- 562 cation  should  not be arbitrary,  artificial  or  illusory. Having  regard to the circumstances mentioned above, we  are unable  to hold that the classification does not  rest  upon any  real and substantial distinction bearing a  reason-able and just relation to the thing in respect of which the  same is  made.  This view was taken in the case of State of  West Bengal  v.  Anwar Ali Sarkar.(1) In our  opinion,  both  the conditions of reasonable classification indicated above  are fully  satisfied in this case.  For these reasons,  we  hold that section 20 of the Act is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and reject the first branch of the argument on this point. It  was lastly contended that the appellant in Civil  Appeal No. 420 of 1973 (who originally was the appellant and  after his  heirs have been brought on record appellants  No.  1-8) had  been selected for hostile discrimination as  against  a bonafide  alienee  who also being in the same  position  has been exempted from the provisions of the Act.  We have given our anxious consideration to this argument and we find  that it is not tenable.  It is well settled that before a  person can  claim to be discriminated against another he must  show that all the other persons are similarly situate or  equally circumstanced.   The pleading of the appellant does  not  at all  contain  any facts to show how the  two  are  similarly situate.  Unless the appellant is able to establish that  he is  equated  with  the bonafide alienee  in  all  and  every respect,  Article  14 will have no  application.   In  other words, discrimination violative of Article 14 can only  take effect  if  there is discrimination between equals  and  not where unequals are being differently treated vide State  of J & K v. T. N. Khosa & Anr. (2). In the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India & Ors     (3)this Court observed as follows:-               "It  must  be  admitted  that  the   guarantee               against the denial of equal protection of  the               laws  does not mean that identically the  same               rules of law should be made applicable to  all               persons within the territory of India in spite               of    differences   of    circumstances    and               conditions.   As has been said by the  Supreme               Court of America, equal protection of laws  is               a  pledge  of the protecting of  equal  laws".               Yick  Co. V. Hopkins (23) 118 U.S. at 369  and               this means "subjection to equal laws  applying               like to all in the same situation".   Southern

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             Railway Co. v. Greene (24) 216 U.S. 400,  412.               fit   other   words,  there   should   be   no               discrimination between one person and  another               it  as  regards  the  subject-matter  of   the               legislation their position is the same". A similar view was taken in the case of Southern Railway Co. v.  Greene  (supra)  where the  Supreme  Court  observed  as follows :-               "The legislature undoubtedly has a wide  field               of  choice in determining and classifying  the               subject of its laws, and if the               (1)   [1952] S.C.R. 284 at 321.               (2)   [1974] 1 S.C.R. 771 at 783.               (3)[1950] S.C.R. 869 at 911.               5 63               law  deals alike with all of a certain  class,               it is normally not obnoxious to the charge  of               denial   of   equal   protection;   but    the               classification should never be arbitrary.   It               must   always   rest  upon   some   real   and               substantial  distinction bearing a  reasonable               and just relation to the things in respect  of               which   the   classification  is   made,   and               classification  made without  any  substantial               basis should be regarded as invalid".               To the same effect is another decision of this               Court in the case of The State of West  Bengal               v.  Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) where this  Court               observed as follows :               "It  can be taken to be well settled that  the               principle underlying the ’guarantee in Article               14  is not that the same rules of  law  should               be,  applicable  to  all  persons  within  the               Indian  territory  or that the  same  remedies               should be made available to them irrespective,               of  differences  of  circumstances.   It  only               means that all persons similarly circumstanced               shall  be  treated alike  both  in  privileges               conferred and liabilities imposed.  Equal laws               would  have to be applied to all in  the  same               situation,    and   there,   should   be    no               discrimination between one person and  another               if   as  regards  the  subjectmatter  of   the               legislation  their position  is  substantially               the same." Having  regard to the nature of the rights acquired  by  the stranger  auction  purchaser  and the  bonafide  alienee  it cannot be said that they are similarly situate or happen  to be  in  exactly the same position.  So far as  the  stranger auction  purchaser  like the appellant  is  concerned  three facts  stare  in  the face.   First,  the  stranger  auction purchaser  participates in the proceedings in  execution  of the decree passed against the debtor and which culminate  in the  auction  sale which is knocked down in  favour  of  the purchaser.  Thus, such a purchaser has a clear notice of the circumstances under which the decree was passed as also  the fact that the property sold was the property of the  debtor. If,  therefore,  the legislature at a later  stage  for  the amelioration  of  the  lot of the debtors passes  a  law  to restore  the  property to the debtor  the  stranger  auction purchaser  cannot  be  heard  to  complain.   In  fact,  his position  is  more or less the same as that of  the  decree- holder.   Second, the stranger auction purchaser knows  that be  has  purchased the property at a distress sale  and  the element of innocence is completely eliminated.  Third, under

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the  provisions of the Act even if the property is  restored to  the stranger auction purchaser unlike the  decree-holder the  purchaser is entitled to get the entire purchase  money in  lump-sum  including  the cost before  parting  with  the possession of the property.  This clearly distinguishes  the case from that of the decree-holder purchaser and shows that he  is  not  seriously prejudiced.  On  the  other  hand,  a bonafide  alienee  does not purchase the  property  under  a distress  sale but under sale which is negotiated  with  the vendor on the terms acceptable to the purchaser.  Secondly a bonafide alienee has absolutely no notice of the debt or the debtor or the circumstance 564 under  which  the  decree was passed and  the  property  was purchased by the vendor. A  bonafide alience acquires a new title under a  negotiated and completed sale and in case the sale is allowed to be re- opened  by  the Act it will lead  to  complicated  questions which may cloud the real issues, and frustrate the object of the  Act.  That apart  even our common law as a  matter  of public   policy  protects  the  interests  of   a   bonafide transferee   for  value  without  notice  against   voidable transactions.   For instance, transfers which could  be  set aside  under section 53 of the Transfer of Property  Act  or under  section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act,  cannot  be set aside or enforced as against such transferees.  The  Act follows  more  or  less the same  policy  and  protects  the bonafide   alienee  because  his  purchase   is   absolutely innocent.   While it is true that the provisions of the  Act operate rather harshly on the stranger auction purchaser but the  rigours of the law have been softened by the fact  that under  the provisions of the Act the auction purchaser  gets his full purchase money with costs for any improvement  that he may have made, At any rate, any discomfort that he  might have  suffered as an individual has to be sublimated to  the public good of the community at large, in the instant  case, the  poor  agriculturist debtors.  ’Indeed if  the  bonafide alienee was also brought within the fold of the Act then the classification might have been arbitrary end unreasonable so as  to smack of a draconian measure and might have  exceeded the  permissible  limits of discrimination  contemplated  by Article 14.      For the reasons given above we are unable to accept the argument  of Mr. Krishnamoorty Iyer that the  appellant  has been   selected   for  hostile  discrimination   under   the provisions of section 20 of the Act.  The argument is  over- ruled.  The result is that the judgment of the High Court is upheld  in all the cases and the appeals are dismissed.   In the  peculiar  circumstances of these cases, we  leave  the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. SHINGHAL,  J.  These  appeals against the  judgment  of  the Kerala  High Court dated August 17, 1972 are by  certificate under  article  133(1)(c) of the Constitution  as  it  stood before  the  Constitution (Thirtieth Amendment)  Act,  1972. Appeals Nos. 442-445 (N) of 1973 arise out of the  dismissal of some petitions on the basis of the Judgment in the  other petitions  which is the subject-matter of appeal No.  420(N) of 1973.  It will therefore be enough to refer to the  facts which have given rise to that appeal. Civil Appeal No. 420(N) of 1973 relates to the dismissal  of O.Ps. No. 5576 and 6466 of 1970 and C.R.P. No. 124 of  1971. O.P. No. 5576 of 1970 was filed by Pathumma who had obtained a  decree  in  1953, on the basis of a  registered  deed  of mortgage,  and had brought about the sale of some  immovable properties. of the judgment-debtors who were agriculturists,

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as they were not able to pay the instalments 565 which  were payable under the debt-relief legislation  which was  then  in  force.   The  properties  were  purchased  by Pathumma ’benami, in the name of his son.  Possession of the properties  was taken from the judgment-debtors  during  the period  May  16,  1961 to March 15,  1967.   Pathumma’s  son executed a deed of surrender in his father’s favour on April 18,   1969   who  built  a  house  and   effected   valuable improvements  on  the lands.  In the  meantime,  the  Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief Act, 1970, hereinafter  referred to  as  the Act, came into force, and  the  judgment-debtors filed  a petition for setting aside the sale and  redelivery of properties under section 20(7).  Pathumma therefore chal- lenged the constitutional validity of section 20 of the  Act by O.P. No. 5576 of 1970. In  O.  P. No. 6466 of 1970 the judgment debtors,  who  were agriculturists,  committed  defaults in the payment  of  the instalments  for  the discharge of the debt under  the  debt relief law which was then in force.  The creditor  purchased the properties under a Court sale on October 18, 1964, which was  duly  confirmed, and took delivery of the  lands.   The judgment-debtors applied for setting the sale aside and  for redelivery of the lands, when the Act came into force.   The auction  purchaser,  in his turn, filed the  aforesaid  writ petition to challenge the constitutional validity of section 20 of the Act. In C. R. P.- No. 124 of 1971 the decree-holder purchased the land of the judgment-debtor, who was an agriculturist.   The sale  was  confirmed on July 5, 1968.  The delivery  of  the land was taken on August 19, 1968 and the decree-holder made substantial  improvements.  The judgment-debtor applied  for redelivery  of the land under the provisions of the Act  and his  petition  was allowed.  On appeal, the  District  Judge remanded   the   case  for  evaluating  the  cost   of   the improvements.   While the matter was pending at that  stage, the aforesaid petition (124 of 1971) was filed to  challenge the  constitutional validity of the relevant  provisions  of the Act. As  the High Court upheld the validity of section 20 of  the Act  by  the  judgment  dated  August  17,  1972,  and  also dismissed  the petitions which are the subject of the  other appeals  Nos. 442-445, the appellants have come up  to  this Court as aforesaid. The  controversy  in  these  appeals  thus  relates  to  the constitutional  validity  of  section 20 of  the  Act  which provides,  inter alia, for the setting aside of the sale  of immovable  property  in  execution of  any  decree  for  the recovery of a debt. The section reads as follows,-               20-Sales  of  property  to  be  set  aside  in               certain cases.-- (1) Where    any    immovable               property in which an agriculturist had   an               interest  has  been sold in execution  of  any               decree  for recovery of a debt or  sold  under               the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act for               the time being in force for the recovery of  a               debt due to a banking company in liquidation-               (a)   on  or  after the 1st day  of  November,               1956; or               566               (b)   before  the 1st day of  November,  1956,               but  the possession of the said  property  has               not  actually  passed before the 20th  day  of               November,  1957, from the  judgment-debtor  to

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             the  purchaser,  and the decreeholder  is  the               purchaser,  then notwithstanding  anything  in               the  Limitation Act, 1963, or in the  Code  of               Civil  Procedure,  1908,  or  in  the  Revenue               Recovery Act for the time being in force,  and               notwithstanding   that  the  sale   has   been               confirmed,  such judgment-debtor or the  legal               representative  of  such  judgmentdebtor   may               deposit   one-half  of  the   purchase   money               together  with  the costs of  execution  where               such  costs were not included in the  purchase               money,  and  apply  to the  court  within  six               months  from the date of the  commencement  of               this  Act  to  set  aside  the  sale  of   the               property,  and the court shall,  if  satisfied               that the applicant is an agriculturist,  order               the sale to be set aside, and the court  shall               further   order  that  the  balance,  of   the               purchase  money  shall be paid  in  ten  equal               halfyearly   instalments  together  with   the               interest   accrued   due   on   such   balance               outstanding  tiff the date of payment of  each               instalment,  at  six per cent per  annum,  the               first instalment being payable within a period               of  six months from the date of the  order  of               the court.               (2)   Where any immovable property in which an               agriculturist had an interest has been sold in               execution of any decree for arrears of rent or               michavaram--               (a)   during the period commencing on the  1st               day of November, 1956 and ending with the 30th               day of January, 1961 and the possession of the               said property has actually passed on or before               the 1st day of April, 1964, from the judgment-               debtor to the purchaser; or               (b)   before the 1st day of November, and the,               possession  of the said property has  actually               passed  during  the period commencing  on  the               20th  day of November, ’1957 and  ending  with               the 1st day of April, from the judgment-debtor               to the purchaser;               then,  notwithstanding anything  contained  in               the  limitation  Act, 1963 or in the  Code  of               Civil  Procedure,  1908,  and  notwithstanding               that   the  sale  has  been  confirmed,   such               judgment-debtor or the legal representative of               such  judgment-debtor may deposit one-half  of               the purchase money together with the costs  of               execution, where such costs were not  included               in  the purchase money and apply to the  court               within  six  months  from  the  date  of   the               commencement of this Act to set aside the sale               of  the  property,  and the  court  shall,  if               satisfied    that   the   applicant   is    an               agriculturist,               567               order the sale to be, set aside, and the court               shall  further order that the balance  of  the               purchase  money  shall be paid  in  ten  equal               half-yearly  instalments  together  with   the               interest   accrued   due   on   such   balance               outstanding  till the date of payment of  each               instalment,  as  six per cent per  annum,  the               first instalment being payable within a period

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             of  six months from the date of the  order  of               the court. (3)  Where  any  immovable  property in  which  an  agricul- turist  had  an interest has been sold in execution  of  any decree for the recovery of a debt, or sold under the  provi- sions of the Revenue Recovery Act for the time being inforce for  the  recovery  of a debt due to a  banking  company  in liquidation, on or after the 16th day of July, 1958 and  the decree-holder  is not the purchaser,  then,  notwithstanding anything  in  the, Limitation Act, 1963 or in  the  Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908 or in the Revenue Recovery Act for the time  being in force, and notwithstanding that the sale  has been confirmed, such judgment-debtor or the legal  represen- tative  of  such judgment-debter may, deposit  the  purchase money and apply to the court within six months from the date of the commencement of this Act to set aside the sale of the property,  and  the  court  shall,  if  satisfied  that  the applicant  is  an agriculturist, order the sale  to  be  set aside, (4)No  order under sub-section (1) or sub-section  (2)  or sub-section  (3)  shall  be passed  without  notice  to  the decree-holder,  the  transferee of the decree, if  any,  the auctionpurchaser and any other person who in the opinion  of the  court  would  be affected by  such  order  and  without affording them an opportunity to be heard. (5)Where  improvements have been effected on the  property sold after the date of the sale and before the notice  under sub-section (4), the value of such improvement as determined by the court shall be deposited by the applicant for payment to the auction-purchaser. (6)An  order under sub-section (1) or sub-section  (2)  or sub-section (3) shall not be deemed to affect the rights  of bonafide  alienees of the auction-purchaser deriving  rights before the date of publication of the Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief Bill, 1963, in the Gazette. (7)Where a sale is set aside under sub-section (1) or sub- section (2) or sub-section (3), in case the applicant is out of  possession of the property, the court ’shall  order  re- delivery of the property to him. (8)In respect of any sale of immovable property which  has not  been confirmed, the judgment-debtor if he is  an  agri- culturist  shall  be  entitled to pay  the  decree  debt  in accordance 568 with  the provisions of sections 4 and 5 and on the  deposit of  the  first  instalment thereof, the sale  shall  be  set aside. (9)Where  the  judgment-debtor fails to deposit a  of  the subsequent instalments, the decree-holder shall be  entitled to  execute the decree and recover the defaulted  instalment or  instalments  in accordance with the provisions  of  this Act. Explanation 1-For the purposes of this section,-               (a)   the  expression "court" shall include  a               revenue  court or authority exercising  powers               under  the Revenue Recovery Act for  the  time               being in force; and               (b)   the  expression "judgment-debtor"  shall               include-               (i)   a  debtor from whom money was due  to  a               banking company in liquidation; and               (ii)a person from whom the entire amount due               under  a decree has been realised by  sale  of               his immovable property.               Explanation  II.-For  the  purposes  of   this

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             section, an applicant shall be deemed to be an               agriculturist  if he would have been  such  an               agriculturist   but  for  the  sale   of   the               immovable property in respect of which he  has               made the application." It has beenargued  by  counsel for the  appellants  that section 20 is invalid as theLegislature   of  the   Kerala State was not competent to make the Act. It   has   been urged  that  section 20 can not be said to fall  within  the purview  of Entry 30 of List II of the Seventh  Schedule  to the Constitution inasmuch as it deals with a debt which  had been  paid off by sale of the property in execution  of  the decree  against  the  agriculturist and  was  no  longer  in existence. It  is article 246 of the Constitution which deals with  the subject-matter  of the laws to be made by  the  Parliament and the Legislatures of  the States. Clause (3)  of  the Article provides that subject to clauses  (1) and  (2)  of the Article (with which we are not concerned)the Legislature of a State has "exclusive power to make laws with respect  to any of the matters enumerated in List  II."Entry 30 of the List specifically states the following matters  as being within the competence of the State Legislature, "30-Money-lending and money-lenders; relief of  agricultural indebtedness." It is therefore quite clear, and is beyond controversy, that the   Act  which  provides  for  "the  relief  of   indebted agriculturists  in  the  State  of  Kerala"  is  within  the competence of the State Legislature.  Clause (1) of  section 2 of the Act defines an "agriculturist", clause (4)  defines a "debt", clause (5) defines a "debtor" and the two Explana- tions  to  section 20 define the  expressions  "court",  and "judgment-debtor"  and  give  an  extended  meaning  to  the expression "agriculturist" 569 so   as  to  include  a  person  who  would  have  been   an agriculturist  but for the sale of his  immovable  property. The  other  sections  provide  for  the  settlement  of  the liabilities  and  payment  of  the  debt  (along  with   the interest)  of an agriculturist, including the setting  aside of the sale in execution of a decree, and the bar of  suits’ The  subject-matter of the Act is therefore  clearly  within the purview of Entry 30 and counsel for the appellants  have not been able to advance any argument which could justify  a different view.  Reference in this connection may be made to this Court’s decision in Fatehchand Himmatlal and others  v. State of Maharashtra etc.(1) It has however been argued that the  entry would not permit the making of a law relating  to the debt of an agriculturist which has already been paid  by sale  of his property in execution of a decree and is not  a subsisting debt. It  is  true  that section 20 of the Act  provides  for  the setting aside of any sale of immovable property in which  an agriculturist  had’  an interest, if the property  had  been sold,  inter  alia,  in  execution of  any  decree  for  the recovery of a debt (a) on or after November 1, 1956, or  (b) before  November  1, 1956, but possession  whereof  has  not actually passed before November 20, 1957, from the judgment- debtor  to  the  purchaser, and  the  decree-holder  is  the purchaser,  on  depositing one-half of  the  purchase  money together  with the cost of the execution etc.   The  section therefore  deals with a liability which had ceased  and  did not subsist on the date ’when the Act came into force.   But there is nothing in Entry 30 of List 11 to show that it will not be attracted and would not enable the State  Legislature

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to  make a law simply because the debt of the  agriculturist had been paid off under a distress sale.  The subject-matter of  the entry is "relief of agricultural  indebtedness"  and there  is  no justification for the contention  that  it  is confined only to subsisting indebtedness and would not cover the  necessity of providing relief to  those  agriculturists who  had  lost their immovable property by  court  sales  in execution of the decrees against them and had been  rendered destitute.   Their  problem  was  in  fact  more  acute  and serious,  for  they  had  lost  the  wherewithal  of   their livelihood   and   reduced  to  a  state  of   penury.    An agriculturist  does not cease to be an agriculturist  merely because he has lost his immovable property, and it cannot be said  that  the  State is not interested  in  providing  him necessary  relief merely because he has lost  his  immovable property.   On the other hand his helpless condition  calls for  early  solution and it is only natural that  the  State Legislature should think of rehabilitating him by  providing the  necessary  relief  under an Act  of  the  nature  under consideration  in these cases.  There is in fact nothing  in the   wordings  of  Entry  30  to  show  that   the   relief contemplated by it must necessarily relate to any subsisting indebtedness  and would not cover the question of relief  to those who have lost the means of their livelihood because of the delay in providing them legislative relief.  It is well- settled,  having been decided by this Court in  Navinchandra Mafatlal  v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay  City,(2) that  "in  construing words in  a  constitutional  enactment conferring  legislative power the most liberal  construction should be put upon the words (1)  [1977] 2 S.C.R. 828. (2)  (1955) 1 S.C.R. 829. 570 so that the same may have effect in their widest amplitude". This has to be so lest a legislative measure may be lost for a mere technicality. The   High  Court  has  made,  a  mention  of  the   earlier legislation in the same field.  It has also made a reference to Act 31 of 1958 which was quite similar to the Act and has pointed out how the Amending Act of 1961 became  infructuous because of the unintended delay    in amending it suitably.Great distress was therefore caused to the    indebted agriculturistsbecause  of  the  sale  of  their   immovable proper-ties by court auctions.Such agriculturists  were rendered completely      helpless and it was onlyproper that the State Legislature should have thought of coming  to their rescue by enacting a law with the avowed intention  of providing  them some relief from the difficulties  in  which they  were  enmeshed as a result of their  indebtedness,  by devising  the necessary means for the restoration  of  their immovable  properties.  The plight of  those  agriculturists was  in fact worse than that of an agriculturist who,  while he  was  groaning  under the burden of  his  debt,  had  the satisfaction of having his immovable property with him as  a possible  means  of redeeming the future some day.   If  ,he Legislature  could provide relief to agriculturists  against their subsisting debts, by legislation under Entry 30, there is  no reason why it should find itself disabled from  doing so  in the, case of these agriculturists who had lost  their immovable  properties in the process of the  liquidation  of their debts by court sales even though their case called for greater sympathy and speedier relief. It  has  next  been argued that section 20  of  the  Act  is unconstitutional as it impinges on the fundamental right  of the decree-holder, or other auction-purchaser, under article

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19(1)  (f)  of  the  Constitution  to  "hold"  the  property acquired  by him at a Court sale and of which he had  become the owner by the express provision of section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  It has thus been argued that by  virtue of article 13 of the Constitution, section 20 is void as  it is inconsistent with, or is in derogation of, a  fundamental right. As has been urged on behalf of the State, an answer to  this argument  is to be found in clause (5) of Article  19  which specifically  provides,  inter alia, that  nothing  in  sub- clause  (f) of clause (1) of article 19 shall  "prevent  the State  from making any law imposing reasonable  restrictions on the exercise of any of the. rights" conferred by the said sub-clause in the interest of the general public.  It cannot be   gainsaid   that  agriculturists,  and   even   indebted agriculturists,   from   the  bulk  or,  at  any   rate,   a considerable part of the rural population, in an essentially rural  economy  like  ours,  and  so  if  a  restriction  is reasonable in their interest, it would squarely fall  within the purview of clause (5).  Reference in this connection may be made to this Court’s decision in Kavalappara  Kattarathil Kochuni and Others v. The State of Madras anti others(1) and State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  v.  Khapperelli  Chinna  Venkata Chalamayya Sastri(2) where it has been held that the redress (1 [1960] 3 S.C.R. 837. (2)  [1963] 1 S.C.R. 155. 571 of  a  real  and  genuine grievance  of  a  section  of  the community  is  a  measure in the  interest  of  the  general public. As  has been stated, the High Court has made a reference  to the history of the debt relief legislation and the facts and circumstances which  led  to  the  passing  of  the   Act. Thousands   of   suits   were   pending   against   indebted agriculturists  in various courts and immovable  _properties of a large number of agriculturists had been sold  rendering them  completely  helpless.   So if  the  State  Legislature passed  the Act, in the interest of the general  public,  to provide relief of the nature mentioned in section 20 in view of  the rampant agricultural indebtedness in the State,  and the  urgency  of  the  malady,  it  does  not  require  much argument  to  hold that the restriction  provided  by  that section  was  clearly "reasonable".  Even  so,  the  section makes provision for the repayment of the purchase money, the costs  of  the execution and the improvements  made  by  the purchaser.   The  restriction provided under section  20  is therefore  reasonable  in  every sense and  the  High  Court rightly rejected the argument to the contrary. It  has  lastly been argued that section 20 of  the  Act  is violative   of  article  14  of  the  Constitution   as   it discriminates without reason between-               (a)   a decree-holder, auction-purchaser and a               stranger  auction-purchaser  (sub-section  (1)               (b) and subsection (3) ), and               (b)   an auction-purchaser at a court sale and               a  bona fide alienee of  an  auction-purchaser               [sub-section (6) ]. What  Article  14  guarantees is the right  to  equality  in directing  that  the  State shall not  deny  to  any  person equality before the law or the equal protection of the  laws within  the  country.   The  prohibition  is however   not absolute in as much as this Court has taken the view that it incorporates  the doctrine of "classification"  (See  Makhan Lal  Malhotra  and others v. The Union of India(1).   It  is therefore  equally  well settled that Article  14  will  not

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prevent  the  making  of  a  law  which  gives  rise  to   a classification based on an intelligible differentia having a rational relation with the object to be achieved thereby. Now sub-section (1) of section 20 provides that if a decree- holder is the purchaser at a court sale, the judgment-debtor (or  his legal representative) may deposit one-half  of  the purchase  money together with the costs of execution  (where the costs were not included in the purchase money) and apply to the court within six months from the date of commencement of  the Act to set aside the sale, and the court  shall  set aside  the  sale and make an order for the  payment  of  the balance  of  the  purchase money in  ten  equal  half-yearly instalments  together with accrued interest on the  balance till the date of payment of each instalment at six per  cent per  annum.  As against this, sub-section (3) provides  that if  the  decree-holder is not the purchaser,  the  judgment- debtor  (or  his  legal  representative)  may  deposit   the purchase (1) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 120. 11-1146SCI/77 572 money and make an application for setting aside the sale and the  court  shall set aside the sale.  The  treatment  to  a decree-holder  purchaser is therefore different and is  less advantageous than the treatment to a. purchaser who is not a decree-holder.  The decree-holder purchaser is treated as  a different  class (for it is well-known that)  decree-holders very  often exploit their debtors in many ways and sales  to them  are generally viewed with suspicion and  disfavour  so much  so that, as has been expressly provided in  Order  XXI rule  72  of  the Code of Civil Procedure, it  is  not  even permissible  for a decree-holder to bid for or purchase  the property  without the express permission of the Court.   The decree-holder  purchaser has thus rightly been treated as  a class  by himself and that classification obviously has  the object  of benefiting the agriculturist  judgment-debtor  by permitting him to deposit only half. the purchase money  and paying  the balance in instalments.  It cannot therefore  be said that the impugned provision violates article 14 of  the Constitution  on that account.  There is also  justification for:   treating  an  auction-purchaser  at  a   court   sale differently  from  a  bona  fide  alienee  of  the   auction purchaser  who  derived  his  rights  before  the  date   of publication  of the Kerala Agriculturists’ Debt Relief  Bill 1968, in the State Gazette.  Such an alienee of the auction- purchaser could not possibly have been aware of the  hazards of  purchasing the property of an indebted agriculturist  at the  time of the purchase, and it is futile to contend  that if the Legislature has protected his interest by an  express provision  in sub-section (6) of section 20, it has  thereby made a hostile discrimination against the auction-purchasers as a class. There  is  thus no force in the arguments  which  have  been advanced  on  behalf of the appellants and the  appeals  are dismissed with costs. P. B. R.            Appeals dismissed- 573