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PETITIONER: PATEL CHUNIBHAI DAJIBHAI ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NARAYANRAO KHANDERAO JAMBEKAR ANDANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/12/1964

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1457            1965 SCR  (2) 328  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1966 SC 641  (7)  D          1969 SC 329  (9)  R          1978 SC1814  (13)

ACT: Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (67 of 1948), as amended by Act 38 of 1957, ss. 32 and 76A-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: In May 1956, the respondent gave a notice under s. 14 of the Bombay  Tenancy  and Agricultural Lands Act,  1948,  to  the appellants, who were his tenants, terminating the tenancy on the  grounds of non-payment of rent.  In December  1956,  he gave  another  notice  to  the  appellants,  under  a.   31, terminating  the  tenancy on the ground that  he  wanted  to personally cultivate the lands.  In March 1957, he filed  an application before the Mamlatdar, on the basis of the notice under s. 31 for recovery of possession of the land.  In July 1957,  he filed another application for the same  relief  on the basis of the notice under s. 14.  On September 28, 1957, s.  32 of the Act was amended by Act 38 of 1957 as a  result of which, in certain circumstances, a tenant would be deemed to have purchased, on 1st April 1957, the lands held by him, from the landlord.  In December 1957, the Mamlatdar  allowed the respondent’s application based on s. 14.  In March 1958, he withdrew his application based on s. 31.  The  appellants did not file an appeal against the order of the Mamlatdar of December 1957, but applied to the Collector in August  1958, for  revision  of that order under s.  76A.   The  Collector called  for  the  records, but before  the  receipt  of  the records,  rejected  the application.  The  appellants  again applied  and the Collector again rejected  the  application. The  orders  of rejection were passed in October  1958.   In November  1.958,  the appellants once again applied  to  the Collector.   In  December 1958, the Collector  received  the records.   He gave notice to the parties, heard them and  on 17th  February  1959  passed  an  order  setting  aside  the Mamlatdar’s  order of December 1957.  The  respondent  moved the  Revenue Tribunal but without success.  He then  applied to  the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution.   The High  Court  held that the Collector had power to  make  the

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order of 17th February 1959, but that the amended S. 32 gave no  rights  to the appellants, as it could  not  affect  the eviction application filed in July 1957 and pending when the Amending  Act  came  into force, and  therefore  decided  in favour of the respondent-landlord.  In appeal to the Supreme Court by the tenants, the appellants contended that the High Court’s view as to the applicability of s. 32 was erroneous. The  respondent, while supporting the High Court’s  decision on s. 32, contended that the High Court’s view of s. 76A was wrong  and  that the Collector had no power  to  review  his earlier  orders  of October 1958 by his  order  of  February 1959. HELD (Per Ayyangar and Bachawat, JJ.) 32(1)(b)(i), (ii)  and (iii)  do  not  lay  down  alternative  conditions  on   the satisfaction  of  any one of which, the appellant  could  be deemed  to have purchased the land on 1st April  1957.   The word  "or"  between sub-ss. (ii) and (iii),  in  conjunction with  the succeeding negatives is equivalent to, and  should be read as "nor".  Therefore, under the section, the  appel- lants,  who were not permanent tenants but were  cultivating the land personally, could become purchasers of the lands on 1st April 1957, if 329 on that date, neither an application based on s. 31, nor  an application  based on s. 14 was pending.  If an  application of  either type was pending on that date, the tenants  could not   become  purchasers  on  that  date,  though,  if   the application  were  rejected later, they  could  become  pur- chasers  on  such postponed date under the  proviso  to  the section.   Since,  on  31st  March  1957,  the  respondent’s application based on s. 31 was pending, the appellants could not  be deemed to have purchased the land on April 1,  1957. L343 F-G, H; 344 A] But  the  respondent’s application based on s.  14  was  not maintainable as it was filed after 31st March 1957.  Section 32, as amended, saves all application pending on 31st  March 1957  and by necessary implication it bars all  applications filed after that date.  The fact that the application  under s.  31  was  pending, and the  appellants  continued  to  be tenants  would not make any difference.  The High Court  was therefore in error in quashing the Collector’s order on  the ground  that  the  amended s. 32 had no  effect  on  pending applications  for  eviction.  However, since  the  Mamlatdar allowed  the  application, the appellants had ceased  to  be tenants  and  so, even though the  respondent  withdrew  his application  under  s. 31, and such withdrawal  amounted  to rejection in law, the appellants could not claim the benefit of  the proviso to s. 32 and become purchasers of the  lands on the postponed date. [344 B; 345 B, D-E, H; 349 C] The  Collector’s  order  of  February  1959  under  s.  76A, reversing the Mamlatdar’s order, did not affect the position because,  that  order was illegal, ultra vires  and  without jurisdiction.   ’Me Collector could pass the earlier  orders rejecting  the applications for revision in October 1958  on the materials before him and without calling for the record. Having called for the record, he should have waited for  its arrival, but his orders passed before such arrival were  not without jurisdiction.  The mere fact that he called for  the record is no ground for saying that he could not  thereafter examine the materials before him and pass an order  refusing to  interfere with the Mamlatdar’s order, without notice  to the  parties.  ’nose orders passed by the Collector  in  the exercise  of his revisional powers were  quasi-judicial  and final.  Even if the order calling for the record is not of a quasi-judicial  nature, the Collector having called for  the

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record  and  then determined that there was  no  ground  for interference, his order would be quasi-judicial.  Since  the Act  does not empower the Collector to review such an  order passed   by   him,  his  earlier   orders   dismissing   the applications  for  revision  were final  and  could  not  be repened by him subsequently. [346 B-C; 347 F-H; 348 D-H] Per Sarkar, J. (dissenting) : The conditions laid down in s. 32(1) (b) (i). (ii) and (iii) are not in the alternative and fulfilment of any one of them would not entitle a tenant  to claim  to be a purchaser.  In order to become a purchaser  a tenant  has to satisfy all the conditions laid down in  cls. (i),  (ii)  and (iii).  Therefore, when an  application  for ejectment  filed  before 31st March 1957 on the basis  of  a notice  under s. 31 was pending when the Amending  Act  came into force, the tenant had not become a purchaser on   the specified   date.   This  however  does  not  lead  to   the conclusion that in  such a case an application for ejectment on the basis of a notice unders.   14,   filed  after   31st March 1957 remained maintainable after the Amending Act  and that  an order for ejectment could Properly be made  on  it. On the coming into force of the Amending Act, the landlord’s application for ejectment filed in July 1957 on the strength of  a  notice under s. 14 became incompetent and had  to  be rejected.   The order of ejectment passed by  the  Mamlatdar would  be wholly illegal, and the order of the Collector  of 19th  February 1959, setting aside that order was valid  and proper.    Under  s.  76A  sending  for  the  record  is   a preliminary step to the judicial act concerning the right of the parties which is to follow 330 upon the perusal of the record when it arrives.  By  sending for the record, the Collector decided that the merits of the case required looking into.  Having sent for the record  his only power was to wait for its arrival and decide the merits of the case on it.  The section does not contemplate that an order  can  be made before the Collector  had  received  the record and looked into it.  As the record had not arrived by the  time he rejected the applications in October  1958,  be had  not made any order under the section.  It follows  that the  only order made by the Collector under the section  was that of 19th February 1959. [333 C-D, G; 334 C, E; 336  G-H; 337 D; 339 B-D; 340 B-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 791- 798 of 1964. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and orders  dated November  4/5,  1963 of the Gujarat High  Court  in  Special Civil Applications Nos. 428 to 430 and 432 to 436 of 1961. I.   N.  Shroff, for the appellants (in all the appeals)  S. G. Patwardhan and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondents (in all the appeals). SARKAR  J. delivered a dissenting Opinion.  The Judgment  of RAJAGOPALA  AYYANGAR  and  BACHAWAT  JJ.  was  delivered  by BACHAWAT J. Sarkar J. The appellants are tenants against whom orders for ejectment  had been passed at the instance of the  landlord. They contend that in view of a certain amendment of S. 32 of the  Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948,  these orders  were illegal and had rightly been set aside  by  the Collector  under  s. 76A of that Act.   The  questions  that arise in these appeals depend on the interpretation of these two sections.

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There  were  eight  tenants and each of them  has  filed  an appeal.   We  have  thus eight appeals before  us.   As  the landlord was the same person, the respondent in each  appeal is  the same.  The landlord took steps under ss. 14, 31  and 29 of the Act against each tenant and these have led to  the present  proceedings.  Section 14 gives a landlord power  to terminate a tenancy on the ground inter alia of the tenant’s failure to pay rent by giving the tenant a notice  informing him  of his intention to terminate the tenancy.  Section  31 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 14, a landlord may after giving notice to the tenant terminate the tenancy if he bona fide requires the land for cultivating it personally.   Section 29 of the Act states that  a  landlord shall  not  obtain possession of land from a  tenant  except under  an  order made by the Mamlatdar  on  the  application mentioned  in it. On May 1, 1956, the landlord had  given  a notice  to the tenants under s. 14.  On December  25,  1956, the landlord had 331 given  a fresh notice to the tenants under s. 31.  On  March 28, 1957 the landlord filed applications against the tenants before  the  Mamlatdar  for ejectment under  s.  29  on  the strength  of the notice under s. 31 and thereafter  on  July 10,  1957,  he filed another set of applications  for  their ejectment  on  the strength of the notice under s.  14.   By various  orders made between December 20 and 25,  1957,  the Mamlatdar allowed the landlord’s applications for  ejectment on the basis of the notice under s. 14. Thereafter on  March 1,   1958,  the  landlord  withdrew  his  applications   for ejectment  pursuant to the notice under s. 31.  The  tenants did  not file any appeal against ’the Mamlatdar’s orders  of ejectment  but moved the Collector under s. 76A of  the  Act for  setting  them  aside.  Three successive  sets  of  such applications had been made by the tenants.  The first set of applications  was  made on August 4, 1958.   On  August  14, 1958,  the  Collector  acting under s. 76A  called  for  the record  of the ejectment proceedings before  the  Mamlatdar. The  record did not arrive till December 24, 1958.   In  the meantime  however, on August 26, 1958 the tenants  made  the second  set of applications under s. 76A.  On October 3  and 4,   1958,  the  Collector  appears  to  have  made   orders purporting to reject both sets of the tenants’  applications under  s.  76A.  On or about October 6,  1958,  the  tenants preferred a joint application under s. 76A and this was also rejected by the Collector on October 17, 1958.  On  November 7,  1958, the local Congress Committee passed  a  resolution stating that the tenants were being subjected to  harassment and  demanding that justice be done to them.  A copy of  the resolution  was  sent  to the  Collector.   Subsequently  on December 24, 1958, the record of the proceedings called  for was  received  by the Collector.  The  Collector  thereafter gave notice to the parties, heard them and made an order  on February  17, 1959 setting aside the Mamlatdar’s  orders  of ejectment on the ground that in view of the provisions of s. 32  as amended by Act XXXVIII of 1957 the tenants could  not be evicted.  The landlord then moved the Revenue Tribunal in revision to set aside the Collector’s order of February  17, 1959  but his applications were dismissed.  He,  thereafter, applied to the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution to  set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the  Collector. The  High  Court allowed these applications  and  hence  the present  appeals  by the tenants.  As there was  a  separate application  to the High Court by the landlord against  each of the eight tenants, we have now eight appeals before us. The landlord had contended in the High Court that the

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332 Collector having once rejected the tenants’ applications  by the order of October 3 or of October 4 or lastly of  October 17, 1958 had no power under S. 76A to reconsider the  matter and  pass his order of February 17, 1959 setting  aside  the Mamlatdar’s  order and that the Tribunal also was  wrong  in holding  that the Collector had the power.  On  the  merits, the  landlord had contended in the High Court that s. 32  as amended  by  Act XXXVIII of 1957, which came into  force  on September  28,  1957, was not applicable  to  the  ejectment proceedings.  The High Court held that the Collector had the power to make the order of February 17, 1959 but it took the view  that  the amended s. 32 did not govern  the  ejectment proceedings on the ground that that section could not affect applications which were pending on the date the amending Act came into force.  It was for this reason that the High Court set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the Collector.   It has  been  contended  in these appeals,  by  the  respondent landlord,  that the High Court’s view of s. 76A  was  wrong, and  by  the  appellant  tenants that its  view  as  to  the applicability  of  S. 32 was erroneous.  These are  the  two questions that arise in these appeals. I  will first take up the question of the interpretation  of s. 76A.  That section so far as material is in these terms :               S.    76A.   Where  no appeal has  been  filed               within   the  period  provided  for  it,   the               Collector may, suo motu or on a reference made               in  this behalf by the Divisional  Officer  or               the State Government, at any time,-               (a)   call  for the record of any  inquiry  or               the  proceedings of any Mamlatdar or  Tribunal               for  the purpose of satisfying himself  as  to               the legality or propriety of any order  passed               by,   and   as  to  the  regularity   of   the               proceedings of such Mamlatdar or Tribunal.  as               the case may be, and               (b)   pass such order thereon as he deems fit;               Provided  that no such record shall be  called               for after the expiry of one year from the date               of  such order and no order of such  Mamlatdar               or  Tribunal  shall be modified,  annulled  or               reversed unless opportunity has been given  to               the interested parties to appear and be heard. The  contention of the landlord is that power under  S.  76A can  be exercised only once and that was done by one of  the ,orders  of October 1958 earlier mentioned  and,  therefore, the 333 Collector’s   order   of  February  17,  1959   was   wholly incompetent  and a nullity.  I do not think it necessary  to decide  the correctness of the contention that  power  under the  section can be exercised only once and will proceed  on the  assumption  that  it  is  right.   The  question  still remains,  was  an order under s. 76A made by  the  Collector prior to February 17, 1959 ?  It seems to me that the  order contemplated  by the section is provided for in el. (b)  and that  order is to be made after the record has  been  called for  and  perused by the Collector.  That  clause  says  the Collector  may  "pass such order thereon" as he  deems  fit, meaning  that  the order is to be made on the  record.   The section  does  not contemplate that the order  can  be  made before the Collector has received the record and looked into it.   As  the record had not arrived by the  time  that  the Collector  rejected the applications, namely, on October  3, or  4 or 17, 1958, it can be said that he had not  made  any

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order under s. 76A on those dates.  It would follow that the only  order made by the Collector under the section was  the order of February 17, 1959. It  was  however  said on behalf of the  landlord  that  the Collector had by the earlier orders of October 1958  refused to  call for the record and had thereby fully exercised  his powers  under  the section and could not make the  order  of February  17, 1959.  The High Court held that a  refusal  to send for the record was an administrative act and it was not an  order made under the section in a judicial capacity  and such  an order did not exhaust the Collector’s  power  under the section.  I am unable to say that this view is  entirely devoid  of force.  The section does not create any right  in any  party  to move the Collector under it.   Under  it  the Collector  is either to act suo motu or at the  instance  of the  Divisional  Officer or the State Government.   The  act contemplated  by the section is to send for the  record  and make an order as to the rights of the parties after perusing it.  Therefore, sending for the record would appear to be  a preliminary  step to the judicial act concerning the  rights of  the parties which is to follow upon the perusal  of  the record when it arrives.  The Collector sends for the  record to get the materials on which alone he is under the  section to  base  his judicial act.  His only real power  under  the section  is  to do the judicial act.  He cannot be  said  to have  exhausted  that power before he has  looked  into  the record.   The proviso to the section would lend  support  to this  view,  for  it says that the  judicial  power  can  be exercised at any point of time if he has sent for the record within the period mentioned.  334 There is however another aspect of the case.  Let me  assume that if the Collector had refused to send for the record, he would  have  exhausted his power under  the  section.   This would  be only on the basis that he had formed  the  opinion that  it was not a fit case for going into the  merits  and, therefore,  refused to send for the record.  In the  present case  however he did not refuse to send for the record.   By his  earliest  order, which was of August 14, 1958,  he  had called  for  the record.  If he could not review  his  order refusing to call for the record because his power under  the section was thereby exhausted, he could not review the order calling  for  the record either.  If any of  his  orders  of October 3, 4 and 17, 1958 was to be an effective order under the  section, the result of that would have been to  review, and  thereupon  to  set aside, the  order  sending  for  the record.   By sending for the record he did decide  that  the merits  of the case required looking into it.  If  that  was not the effect of the order sending for the record, that act would  be  only a meaningless act and I am unable  to  think that  such  an  act of the Collector  could  be  within  the contemplation of the section.  The order of October 3, or 4, or 17, 1958 must be held to have decided that the merits  of the  case did not deserve to be looked into.  This would  be reviewing  the  earlier order and this,  ex  hypothesis  the Collector  had no power to do.  Having sent for  the  record his  only power was to wait for its arrival and  decide  the merits  of the case on it.  The order of October 3, or 4  or 17,  1958  which  had been made before the  arrival  of  the record  was, therefore, wholly incompetent and  ineffective. None  of them could affect the Collector’s power to  pass  a proper  order  after the record had arrived.   In  my  view, therefore, the order of February 17, 1959 had been  properly made and was a valid order. I now take up the question of the interpretation of s. 32 as

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it  stood  in December 1957 when the ejectment  orders  were made  by  the  Mamlatdar and its  applicability  to  pending ejectment procees.  Section 32 was amended from time to time but it is necessary to refer only to two of the  amendments. That section was first amended by Act XIII of 1956 which was enacted  on March 16, 1956 but came into force on August  1, 1956.  As so amended, it for the first time provided that in certain  circumstances  a  tenant would be  deemed  to  have purchased  on April 1, 1957 from his landlord the land  held by  him.   The section was again amended by Act  XXXVIII  of 1957  which came into force on September 28, 1957 and it  is with  this amendment that we are really concerned.   Section 12 of this amending Act inserted                             335 cl.(iii) in sub-s.(1) of s. 32 and s. 34 of the amending Act gave  effect to the amendment made by s. 12 from  August  1, 1956 retrospectively.   It is of some interest to point out  that Au- gust 1, 1956 is the date on which the amendment of s. 32  by Act XIII  of  1956 was brought into force.  It will  be  noticed that amending Act XXXVIII of 1957 was in force at the date of the Mamlatdar’s orders of ejectment.Now s. 32 as it stood  after the, amendment by Act XXXVIII of 1957 is in these terms :               "On   the  first day of April 1957 ....  every               tenant shall..be     deemed to have  purchased               from his land-               lord...theland held by him as tenant, if(a)  such               tenant  is  a  permanent  tenant  thereof  and               cultivates land personally;               (b)   such  tenant is not a  permanent  tenant               but  cultivates, the land  leased  personally;               and               (i)   the  landlord  has not given  notice  of               termination  of his tenancy under section  31;               or               (ii)  notice has been given under section  31,               but  the  landlord  has  not  applied  to  the               Mamlatdar  on or before the 31st day of  March               1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession               of the land; or               (iii) the  landlord  has not  terminated  this               tenancy  on  any of the grounds  specified  in               section 14,. or has so terminated the  tenancy               but  has  not applied to the Mamlatdar  on  or               before  the  31st  day  of  March  1957  under               section  29  for obtaining possession  of  the               lands : Provided that if an application made by the landlord  tinder section  29  for obtaining possession of the land  has  been rejected  by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal  or in  revision  by  the  Bombay  Revenue  Tribunal  under  the provisions  of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to  have purchased  the land on the date on which the final order  of rejection  is passed.  The date on which the final order  of rejection  is  passed  is  hereafter  referred  to  as  ’the postponed date’." The  High Court, as I have stated, said that s.  32  though, made  retrospective did not affect pending applications  for ejectment  which the applications of the landlord  resulting in the 336

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orders  of ejectment were.  The matter was put in this  way. "A  retrospective  provision cannot, in my  view,  have  any effect  to  pending  proceedings  where  such  retrospective provision  provides that an application or proceeding  shall be started not later than a particular date when proceedings have  already been filed by the time that the said  amending Act comes into force." I am unable to say that I have  fully understood  this  observation but learned advocate  for  the landlord assures us that it can only mean that the amendment made does not affect pending proceedings.  Learned  advocate for  the landlord, was however, unable to support  the  view taken  by the High Court.  I also think that the High  Court fell into an error.  Now, there is, of course, no doubt that the  legislature can validly make a law so retrospective  as to affect a pending proceeding.  The question is, did it  do so in the present case ? I think it clearly did.  Section 32 after  the  amendment  provided  that  a  tenant  personally cultivating  land would on the date of the amending  Act  be entitled  to  claim to have become a purchaser of  the  land held  by  him  with  effect  from  April  1,  1957,  if   no application  for his ejectment on the strength of  a  notice under s. 14 or under s. 31 had been filed on or before March 31,  1957.   Any such application made after that  date  and pending  when the amending Act came into  force,  therefore, could  not affect the right of the tenant under the  amended section to claim to be a purchaser; such application  would, therefore,  on  the  passing  of  the  amending  Act  become in  fructuous for the tenant having been made the  owner  of the  land was no longer a tenant who could be evicted.   The amended  section, therefore,, necessarily  affected  pending proceedings.  The Act could not be read in the way the  High Court  did  without  refusing to give  full  effect  to  the language   used.   An  interpretation  doing  so  would   be unsupportable.   Hence  I am unable to agree with  the  view taken by the High Court. I  pass  on to consider whether the amended s. 32  made  the Mamlatdar’s  order  of ejectment illegal.  In order  that  a tenant  may  claim  to have become  a  purchaser  under  the section,  he has to satisfy the conditions mentioned in  it. Those conditions are set out in two sets.  The first set  of conditions is in cls. (a) and (b).  These two conditions are obviously  in the alternative though between them  the  word "or" does not occur, for it is not possible for a tenant  to fulfil  both the conditions; he cannot be both  a  permanent tenant and not a permanent tenant at the same -time.  It  is not  in  dispute that the tenants in the present  case  per- sonally  cultivated  the  lands held by  them  on  the  date mentioned 337 in  the section.  So one of the conditions in the first  set can  be  said to have been fulfilled.The arguments  in  this case  have turned on the second set of conditions which  are contained  in cls. (i), (ii) and (iii).  I think  cl.  (iii) really  contains two conditions, namely, first a failure  to terminate the tenancy by notice under s. 14 and secondly, if there  has  been such a termination, failure  to  apply  for ejectment  on  the basis of such termination  on  or  before March   31,  1957.   So  this  set  really   contains   four conditions.   Now,  Mr.  Shroff appearing  for  the  tenants contended that the conditions in these clauses in the second set  are alternative conditions and that it is enough for  a tenant  to satisfy any one of them.  If this  contention  is well founded, then it cannot be disputed that the tenants in the  present  case had become purchasers  because  the  last condition had been fulfilled as the landlord had not applied

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to the Mamlatdar for ejectment before March 31, 1957 on  the strength of a notice under s. 14. I am however unable to agree that the conditions are in  the alternative and fulfilment of any one of them would  entitle a  tenant  to claim to be a purchaser.  The fallacy  of  Mr. Shroff’s  contention  can  be  shown  by  an   illustration. Suppose  cl.  (iii)  is fulfilled but at the  same  time  it appears  that the landlord had before March 31,  1957,  both given  a  notice  under s. 31 and made  an  application  for ejectment under s. 29 on the basis of that notice which  was pending when the amending Act came into force.  That is what happened in the present case.  If Mr. Shroff is right,  then the  tenant must be held to have become a purchaser  on  the passing  of the amending Act with effect from April 1,  1957 notwithstanding the pending application.  Such a reading  of the section would however make the proviso ineffective.  The application  mentioned in the proviso must be of one of  the kinds mentioned in cls. (ii) and (iii) for under the section in the absence of such an application, the tenant becomes  a purchaser.    Now  the  proviso  says  that  when  such   an application  is  pending when the amending  Act  comes  into force,  the tenant would not become a purchaser unless  that application is rejected and then only on the date when it is rejected.  According to Mr. Shroff’s contention, the  tenant in the case supposed has become a purchaser on the enactment of the amending Act.  But the proviso obviously contemplates that the application contemplated in it might succeed for it says  "if  an  application  ....  has  been  rejected".   By contemplating that the application may succeed, the  proviso is  laying down that the tenant against whom it is made  may be  evicted.   This  could not be done  if  the  tenant  had already become the purchaser as he 338 would  be if Mr. Shroff is right.  Neither could it for  the same  reason be, as the proviso also contemplates,  that  if the application fails the tenant would become the  purchaser on  the  date when the application is rejected.   The  plain effect of the section obviously is that a tenant  fulfilling its conditions is to be deemed to have become a purchaser on the passing of the amending Act, with effect from an earlier date and where an application for his ejectment on the basis of a notice either under S. 14 or S. 31 had been made on  or before March 31, 1957 and was pending when the amending  Act came  into force, the tenant was to become a purchaser  only if that application was rejected and then on the date of the rejection.   It follows that where there is such  a  pending application,  the tenant does not become a purchaser on  the passing of the amending Act though another condition of  the section  is  found  to  have  been  fulfilled.   Hence   the conditions set out cannot be in the alternative. In  the present case the tenants relied principally  on  the second condition contained in cl. (iii) for their contention that  the Mamlatdar’s order for ejectment was illegal.   The applications  on  which that order was made had  been  filed after  March 31, 1957.  In fact they had been filed on  July 10,  1957 and were pending when the amending Act  came  into force.  If these applications constitute the only step  that the  landlord  had taken for ejectment of the  tenants  then obviously the conditions in cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) had all been  fulfilled and in that case the tenants must be  deemed to have become purchasers of the lands on April 1, 1957  and this  was the position which existed on September  28,  1957 when  Act XXXVIII of 1957 had come into force.  The  Mamlat- dar’s  order  of ejectment had been made subsequent  to  the coming  into  force of that Act.  These orders,  as  I  have

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earlier stated, were made between December 20, and 25, 1957. Before  these  dates the tenants, on the assumption  that  I have made, having become purchasers had ceased to be tenants and  there  was no question therefore of  evicting  them  as such.   The  Mamlatdar  should  on  this  supposition   have dismissed  those  applications and his orders  of  ejectment were therefore illegal. But the facts here are different.  The landlord had made  an application  for  ejectment  before March 31,  1957  on  the strength  of a notice under s. 31 and that  application  was pending  when the amending Act came into operation.  It  was then  said that it followed from this that the condition  in cl.  (ii) had not been satisfied and so the tenants had  not become purchasers under the 339 section.  It was contended that that being so, the Mamlatdar could  treat them as tenants and make an order of  ejectment on the landlord’s applications pursuant to the notices under s.  14 even though they were made after March 31, 1957.   In my opinion, this contention is ill founded.  It is true that in  order to become a purchaser a tenant has to satisfy  all the  conditions  laid  down in cls.  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii). Therefore  when  an application for ejectment  filed  before March  31,  1957 on the basis of a notice under  s.  31  was pending  when  the amending Act XXXVIII of  1957  came  into force, as happened in this case, the tenant had not become a purchaser on the date of the enactment if the amending  Act. This however does not lead to the conclusion that in such  a case  an application for ejectment on the basis of a  notice under s. 14 filed after March 31, 1957 remained maintainable after  the  amending Act and an order  for  ejectment  could properly  be  made on it.  In my view, such  an  application became  incompetent on the passing of that Act.  The  reason is  that  if it remained maintainable,  then  the  situation would be anomalous.  Assume that the application filed prior to  March 31, 1957 was rejected after the amending Act  came into force, as happened in this case, for the withdrawal  of the  application  in law amounts to its rejection,  then  by virtue  of the proviso the tenant would become purchaser  on the  date  of  the  rejection.   If  in  such  a  case   the application   filed  after  March  31,  1957  had   remained competent after the amending Act had come into force and had succeeded,  the  position  would be  curious.   If  the  the application filed prior to March 31, 1957 had failed  before the  application filed after that date came up for  hearing, then the tenant having become the owner under the proviso on the   failure   of  the  earlier  application,   the   later application could not thereafter be decided in favour of the landlord  giving him a right to eject the tenant  for  there was  then  no tenant to eject.  If, on the other  hand,  the application filed after March 31, 1957 had succeeded  before the  earlier application came to be heard, then the  earlier application   would  become  infructuous  for  the   proviso contemplates  a  pending  application  for  ejectment   and, therefore,  against  one who is still a tenant.   In  either case    the   proviso   would   become   ineffective.     An interpretation of the section producing such a result  would be  most unnatural.  The proviso clearly intends that if  an application filed before March 31, 1957 is pending when  the amending  Act comes into force, the tenant who could not  in such  a case have become a purchaser when the  amending  Act came  into  force can do so if that application  fails,  and then only on the date of the rejection.  The tenant’s  right to  become  a  purchaser  in the  case  of  such  a  pending application is

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340 not  intended to depend on anything but the result  of  that application.   That  right  cannot be affected  in  any  way except  by  the success of that application;  it  cannot  be affected  by an order made on an application  for  ejectment filed  subsequent  to March 31, 1957.   No  application  for ejectment  either pursuant to a notice under s. 14 or s.  31 filed  after  March 31, 1957 can effect the  tenant’s  right under  s.  32 at all.  That application, therefore,  if  not disposed of prior to the coming into force of Act XXXVIII of 1957  becomes  thereafter dead and infructuous.   For  these reasons,  I  think  that on the coming  into  force  of  Act XXXVIII  of 1957 the landlord’s applications  for  ejectment filed on July 10, 1957 on the strength of notice under s. 14 became  incompetent  and had to be rejected.   An  order  of ejectment made on such an application after the coming  into force  of  the amending Act would be  wholly  illegal.   The Mamlatdar in the present case was in error in passing orders of  ejectment on those applications.  They were rightly  set aside by the Collector and the Tribunal. It might be somewhat unfortunate that the landlord  withdrew the applications filed before March 31, 1957 pursuant to the notice  under  s. 31.  It might be that the  landlord  would have  succeeded on merits in them.  As they were  withdrawn, they  must in law be deemed to have been rejected.  It  does not  appear  why the landlord  withdrew  these  applications which he did on March 1, 1958.  Neither does it appear  that the  tenants  had  in any way induced him  to  do  so.   The landlord  might have made a mistake; he might  have  thought that  the orders of ejectment by the Mamlatdar earlier  made were legal and sufficiently protected his rights.  For  that mistake   however  he  alone  is  responsible.    That   the applications had been withdrawn by the landlord and had  not been  rejected  on merits does not  improve  the  landlord’s position under s. 32. I, therefore, think that the High Court was wrong in setting aside  the order of the Tribunal.  In my view. the order  of the  Tribunal upholding the Collector’s order setting  aside the  orders of ejectment passed by the Mamlatdar was in  all respects  correct  and should in my view be  maintained.   I would,  therefore, allow the appeals and restore the  orders of the Tribunal. Bachawat,  J. These appeals raise questions of  construction of ss. 32(1) and 76-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands  Act, 1948 (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948).  The  facts  in all the appeals are similar, In this judgment, we will refer to  the  relevant  facts in Civil Appeal No.  791  of  1964. Respondent No. 1 was the landlord and the appellant was  the tenant of the 341 disputed  lands.  On May 1, 1956, respondent No. 1  gave  a, notice to the appellant under s. 14 terminating the tenancy. On December 25, 1956 respondent No. 1 gave another notice to the appellant under s. 31 terminating the tenancy.  On March 28,  1957 respondent No. 1 filed an application under s.  29 read with s. 31 for recovery of possession of the lands.  On July  10, 1957, respondent No. 1 filed  another  application under  s. 29 read with,, s. 14 for the same relief.   By  an order   dated  December  25,  1957  the  Mahalkari   allowed respondent  No 1’s application under s. 29 read with  s.  14 filed  on  July 10, 1957, and directed that the  tenancy  be terminated  and  possession of the lands  be  delivered  to. respondent  No. 1. On March 1, 1958, respondent No. 1  with- drew  the application under s. 29 read with s. 31  filed  on March  28, 1957.  The appellant applied to the Collector  of

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Baroda on, August 9, 1958 and again on August 26, 1958 under s. 76-A for revision of the Mahalkari’s order dated December 25, 1957.  On or about August 14, 1958 the Collector  called for the records from the Mahalkari, but the records did  not reach  the office of the Collector until December 24,  1958. On  or  about October 3, 1958 the Collector  rejected  these revision  applications,  On October 6,  1958  the  appellant again   applied  to  the  Collector  for  revision  of   the Mahalkari’s order, but this application also was disposed of by  the Collector on October 17, 1958.  It is said that  the letter  of the Collector dated October 17, 1958 was only  an intimation  of the previous rejection, but we think,  though the,  point  is not important, it amounted to  an  order  of rejection  of the application made on October 6,  1958.   On November 7, 1958, the local Congress Mandal Samiti passed  a resolution  requesting  the  Collector  to  reconsider   his previous orders.  A copy of this resolution was sent to  the Collector  on November 10, 1958.  On November 14, 1958,  the appellant  again applied to the Collector under s. 76-A  for revision  of the Mahalkari’s order.  On February  17,  1959, the Collector acting under s. 76-A reversed the  Mahalkari’s order, and directed that possession of the disputed lands be restored  to  the appellant.  An  application  for  revision preferred  by  respondent  No.  1  on  March  24,  1959  was dismissed  by  the  Tribunal  on  February  23,  1961.    An application under Art. 227 of the Constuitution preferred by respondent  No. 1 on June 15, 1961 was allowed by  the  High Court  on  November 5, 1963.  The appellant now  appeals  to this Court by special leave. The contention of the appellant is that in view of s. 32(1), -is  amended retrospectively by Bombay Act XXXVIII of  1957. he  must  be deemed to have purchased the land on  April  1, 1957, 342 and  consequently the application of respondent No. 1  filed under  s.  29  read with s. 14  was  not  maintainable,  and alternatively,  the aforesaid application being filed  after April  1,  1957 was not maintainable and  should  have  been dismissed by the Mahalkari on that ground, and  subsequently on  March  1,  1958, the appellant must be  deemed  to  have purchased   the  lands  in  view  of  the   withdrawal   and consequential  rejection of the previous  application  filed under  s. 29 read with s. 14 and in the  circumstances,  the Collector rightly set aside the order of the Mahalkari. Section  32(1),  as amended by Bombay Act XXXVIII  of  1957, reads thus : "32(1).   On  the  first  day  of  April  1957  (hereinafter referred  to  as  ’the tillers’ day’)  every  tenant  shall, subject  to  the other provisions of this  section  and  the provisions  of  the next succeeding sections, be  deemed  to have  purchased from his landlord, free of all  encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held -by him as tenant, if- (a)  such  tenant is a permanent tenant thereof  and  culti- vates land personally; (b)  such  tenant is not a permanent tenant  but  cultivates the land leased personally; and (i)  the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or (ii) notice  has  been  given  under  section  31,  but  the landlord  has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before  the 31st  day  of  March 1957 under  section  29  for  obtaining possession of the land; or (iii)     the  landlord has not terminated this  tenancy  on any  of  the  grounds specified in section  14,  or  has  so

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terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the  Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands : Provided that if an application made by the "landlord  under section  29  for obtaining possession of the land  has  been rejected  by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal  or in  revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal  under  the provisions  of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to  have purchased the land on 343               the date on which the final order of rejection               is passed.  The date on which the final  order               of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred               to as ’the postponed date’ :               Provided further that the tenant of a landlord               who is entitled to the benefit of the  proviso               to  sub-section  (3) of section  31  shall  be               deemed  to have purchased the land on the  1st               day  of  April 1958, if no separation  of  his               share  has  been  effected  before  the   date               mentioned in that proviso." It  may be recalled that amendments to s. 32 were made  from time  to time, and the Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957  added  to sub-s ( 1 ) (b) cl. (iii) and the preceeding "or".  It is to be noticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-ss ( 1  )(a) and (1) (b) are mutually exclusive.  In spite of the absence of the word "or" between sub-ss (1) (a) and (1) (b), the two subsections  lay  down alternative conditions.   The  tenant must  be deemed to have purchased the land if  he  satisfies either  of  the  two conditions.  The  appellant  is  not  a permanent  tenant,  and  does  not  satisfy  the   condition mentioned  in  sub-s  ( 1 ) (a).   Though  not  a  permanent tenant,  he  cultivated  the lands  leased  personally,  and therefore   satisfies  the  first  part  of  the   condition specified in sub-s ( 1 ) (b).  The appellant’s contention is that  sub-ss.  ( 1 ) (b) (i), ( 1 ) (b) (ii) and ( 1  )  (b) (iii)  lay down alternative conditions, and as he  satisfies the condition mentioned is sub-s ( 1 ) (b) (iii), he must be deemed to have purchased the land on April 1, 1957.   Colour is  lent  to this argument by the word  "or"  appearing  be, tween  sub-s (1) (b) (ii) and sub-s (1) (b) (iii).  But,  we think that the word "or" between sub-ss ( 1 ) (b) (ii) and ( 1  ) (b) (iii) in conjunction with the succeeding  negatives is  equivalent  to and should be read as  "nor".   In  other words, a tenant (other than a permanent tenant)  cultivating the lands personally would become the purchaser of the lands on  April  1, 1957, if on that date neither  an  application under  s. 29 read s. 31 nor an application under s. 29  read with  s. 14 was pending.  If an application either under  s. 29  read  with  s. 31 or under s. 29 read  with  s.  14  was pending  on April 1, 1957, the tenant would become the  pur- chaser  on  "the postponed date", that is to say,  when  the application   would  be  finally  rejected.   But   if   the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not  become the  purchaser.   The  expression "an  application"  in  the proviso  means not only an application under s. 31 but  also an  application  under  s.  29  read  with  s.  14.  If   an application of either type was pending on April 1, 1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that date. p.165-6 344 Now,  on April 1, 1957 the application filed  by  respondent No   .1   under  S.  29  read  with  S.  31   was   pending. Consequently,  the  appellant could not be  deemed  to  have purchased the lands on April 1, 1957.

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But  the  application under S. 29 read with S.  14  was  not maintainable, as it was filed after April 1, 1957.  On  this point,  we  adopt the reasoning and conclusion of  the  Full Bench  of  the  Bombay High Court  in  Ramchandra  Anant  v. Janardan(1).  We agree with the following observations of Chainani, C. J.  in the aforesaid case : "It has been contended that as there is no provision in  the Act  that an application on the grounds mentioned in  s.  14 cannot be made after April 1, 1947, such an -application  is maintainable,  for since the Legislature has  preserved  the right  to  make  such  an application,  it  could  not  have intended that it should not be availed of in any case) There is  undoubtedly force in this argument, but it seems  to  us that  the  intention of the Legislature in  enacting  s.  32 clearly  was to transfer the ownership of the lands  to  the tenants on April 1, 1957, except in cases where applications for  possession had been made by the landlords before  April 1, 1957.  Where such an application had been made, the right of  purchase  given to the tenant is  postponed  until  that application is rejected.  It is clear from this section that the  Legislature  did not intend that the right given  to  a tenant  by this section should be destroyed or  affected  by any application made after April 1, 1957.  If an application for possession made under S. 29 read with s. 14 after  April 1,  1957  is decided in favour of the  landlord  before  the application  made by him prior to April 1, 1957 is  disposed of,  it  will affect the right of the tenant to  become  the owner  of  the land on the postponed date.  It seems  to  us that  this  was not intended by the Legislature.   The  fact that  the Legislature has provided that only an  application made prior to April 1, 1957, should affect the right of  the tenant to become the purchaser of the land on April 1,  1957 clearly indicates that the Legislature contemplated that  no such application should be made after April 1, 1957." (1) [1962] 64 B.L.R. 635. 345 On  this construction of s. 32(1) it would appear  that  the application  under s. 29 read with s. 14 filed on  July  10, 1957 was not maintainable since September 22. 1957. when the amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force.  It  is true that on July 10, 1957 the other application under s. 29 read with s. 31 was pending, and consequently the  appellant was still a tenant and had not become the purchaser.  But s. 32  bars all applications filed after April 1, 1957, and  it matters  not that the application is made against  a  person who is still the tenant.  But respondent No. 1 contends that the  Bombay  Act XXXVIII of 1957 could  not  retrospectively amend  s. 32 so as to affect pending  applications.   Though this  contention  found favour with the High Court,  we  are unable  to accept it.  Section 34 of Bombay Act  XXXVIII  of 1957  provided that the aforesaid amendment of s. 32  "shall be deemed to have been made and should have come into  force on  the  date on which the Bombay Tenancy  and  Agricultural lands  (Amendment)  Act,  1955 came into  force."  Now,  the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act,  1955 came into force on August 1, 1956.  The amended s. 32  must, therefore. be deemed to have been made and to have come into force on August 1, 1956.  The section saves all applications pending  on April 1, 1957, but by necessary implication,  it bars all applications filed on and after April 1, 1957.  The bar  takes  within its sweep all applications filed  on  and after  April 1, 1957 whether or not such an application  was pending  on  September  22, 1957; no exception  is  made  in favour  of applications filed between April 1 and  September

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22,  1957 and pending on September 22, 1957.   Consequently, the  application filed on July 10, 1957, though  pending  on September  22, 1957, was not maintainable and ought to  have been dismissed by the Mahalkari. But  by  his order dated December 25,  1957,  the  Mahalkari allowed  the  application.   This order  of  the  Mahalkari, though  erroneous,  was  an order of  a  competent  tribunal terminating the tenancy and directing delivery of possession of  the  lands  to the landlord.  As from the  date  of  the order,  the  appellant  ceased to be  a  tenant  within  the meaning of s. 32 read with s. 2(18); he was neither a person lawfully  cultivating the lands, nor a person who  held  the lands  on  lease  and  neither  a  protected  tenant  nor  a permanent tenant.  Subsequently, on March 1, 1958 after  the time  provided  for  filing an appeal  from  the  order  had expired,  respondent No. 1 withdrew the pending  application for eviction filed by him on March 28, 1957.  As a result of the  withdrawal, that application stood finally disposed  of and rejected.  But on 346 March   1,  1958,  the  appellant  was  not  a  tenant   and consequently  he could not then claim the benefit of  S.  32 and become the purchaser of the lands.  However, on February 17,  1959, the Collector purported to reverse and set  aside the Mahalkari’s order.  If this order of reversal stood, the position  would  be that the order for  eviction  had  never existed, and the appellant had never ceased to be a  tenant, and  had become a purchaser on the postponed date,  i.e.  on March  1,  1958.   But the point in  issue  is  whether  the Collector  had in the circumstances the power to revise  the Mahalkari’s  order under S. 76-A.  Now, S. 76-A provides  as follows:               "Where  no  appeal has been filed  within  the               period provided for it, the Collector may, suo               motu or on a reference made in this behalf  by               the   Divisional   Officer   or   the    State               Government, at any time,-               (a)   call  for the record of any  enquiry  or               the  proceedings of any Mamlatdar or  Tribunal               for the purpose of any order passed by, and as               to  the regularity of the proceedings of  such               Mamlatdar  "or Tribunal, as the case  may  be,               and               (b)   pass such order thereon as he deems fit               Provided  that no such record shall be  called               for after the expiry of one year from the date               of  such order and no order of such  Mamlatdar               or  Tribunal  shall be modified,  annulled  or               reversed unless opportunity has been given  to               the  interested  parties  to  appear  and   be               heard." The  order  of  the  Mahalkari under S.  29  was  passed  on December 25, 1957 and was appealable under S. 74.  By S. 79, the  appeal could be filed within 60 days from the  date  of the  order.  No appeal was filed within the period  provided for  by  it.   The Collector could at  any  time  thereafter exercise  his  revisional powers under S.  76-A  either  suo motu, i.e., of his own motion or on a reference made by  the Divisional Officer or the State Government.  In the exercise of  his revisional powers, the Collector could call for  the record  of  the proceedings of the Mahalkari and  pass  such order as he deemed fit.  There were two limitations on  this power of revision.  Firstly, the record could not be  called for after the expiry of one year from the date of the order. Secondly,  the  order could not be  modified,  annulled,  or

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reversed 347 unless opportunity had been given to the interested  parties to  appear and be heard.  In the instant case, there was  no reference  by  any  authority.  The  Collector  could  still exercise his revisional powers, but he seldom exercises such powers unless some irregularity or illegality is brought  to his  notice by the aggrieved party.  Though s. 76-A,  unlike s.  76, does not provide for an application for revision  by the  aggrieved  party,  the  appellant  properly  drew   the attention  of the Collector to his grievances and asked  him to  exercise  his revisional powers under s.  76-A.   Having perused   the  applications  for  revision  filed   by   the appellant,  the Collector decided to exercise his  suo  motu powers  and called for the record on August 14, 1958  within one  year  of the order of the Mahalkari.   But  before  the record  arrived  and without looking into  the  record,  the Collector passed orders on October 3, October 4 and  October 17, 1958 rejecting the applications for revision.  By  these orders,  the Collector decided that there was no ground  for interference  with  the Mahalkari’s  order.   The  Collector observed  that  the appellant had not paid  rent  for  three consecutive years, and his tenancy had been duly  terminated by the requisite notice and the findings of the Mahalkari on these  points had not been challenged by a  regular  appeal. The  Collector  thus upheld and  confirmed  the  Mahalkari’s order.   He did not specifically deal with the point  as  to the  non-maintainability of the application for eviction  in view of the amended s. 32, as the point was not taken either before  him or before the Mahalkari.  All these orders  were passed  by  the Collector in the exercise of  his  suo  motu power of revision.  These orders as also the previous  order calling for the record could be passed by the Collector only in  the exercise of his revisional power under s. 76-A.   As he  refused  to modify, annual or reverse the order  of  the Mahalkari, he could pass these orders without issuing notice to  the  respondent  No.  2.  These  orders  passed  by  the Collector  in  the exercise of his  revisional  powers  were quasi-judicial,  and were final.  The Act does  not  empower the Collector to review an order passed by him under s.  76- A.   In  the absence of any power of review,  the  Collector could not subsequently reconsider his previous decisions and hold that there were grounds for annulling or reversing  the Mahalkari’s order.  The subsequent order dated February  17, 1959  reopening  the  matter was illegal,  ultra  vires  and without jurisdiction.  The High Court ought to have  quashed the  order of the Collector dated February 17, 1959 on  this ground. The  High Court was of the opinion that the Collector  could exercise  his  revisional  power under s.  76-A  only  after looking 348 into the record of the impugned order of the Mahalkari.   We have  come to the opposite conclusion.  In exercise  of  his revisional  powers under S. 76-A, the Collector may  or  may not call for the record.  Without calling for the record and without  looking into them, the Collector may, on a  perusal of  the order, along with the representation to him  by  the aggrieved  party or the reference by the Divisional  Officer or the State Government, as the case may be, with such other documents as may be submitted to him, come to the conclusion that  there is no ground for interference with the  impugned order  and that, therefore, the order should  be  confirmed. The contention of the appellant was that the word  "thereon" in  s. 76-A supports the opinion of the High Court.   We  do

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not  think  so.   We think that s. 76-A(b)  means  that  the Collector  is empowered to pass such orders as he deems  fit on  the  legality or propriety of any order  passed  by  any Mamlatdar  or  tribunal  and as to  the  regularity  of  the proceedings before them.  The Collector can, in our opinion, pass such orders on the materials before him without calling for  the  record.   But having called for  the  record,  the Collector should properly have waited for its arrival before passing  any  orders.  The orders passed by him  before  the arrival   of   the   record  were,   however,   no   without jurisdiction.  The mere fact that he called for the  records is no ground for saying that he could not thereafter examine the materials before him and pass an order that the order of the Mahalkari or tribunal did not call for interference.  By way of analogy, we might point out that if in the case of an application  or petition before a Court notice is issued  to the  respondent to show cause why it should not be  granted, the Court is not debarred from dismissing the application or petition  without hearing the respondent on the day when  it is  called  for hearing.  The calling for the record  is  no decision which compels the Collector to look into the record before  dismissing the petition, though of course he  cannot allow  the  petition  without  considering  the  record  and hearing the party supporting the order sought to be revised. However  erroneous those orders of the Collector  dismissing the revision might be, they were final and could not be  re- viewed and reopened by him subsequently. The High Court also observed that only the act of the  final determination by the Collector could be said to be a  quasi- judicial  act and that his order calling or not calling  for the record was not an act of a quasi-judicial nature.   But, in  the instant case, the collector not only called for  the record  but  also determined that there was  no  ground  for intereference with the Mahalkari’s 349 order.  The subsequent order of the Collector dated February 17,  1957  reversing  the  Mahalkari’s  order  was   without jurisdiction and was liable to be quashed by the High  Court on this ground. In the result, the order of the Mahalkari remained the final and operative order, the appellant ceased to be a tenant and could  not  become the purchaser of the lands  on  March  1, 1958,  when  the application filed on March 28,  1957  stood rejected. The High Court set aside the Collector’s order on the ground that the amended s. 32 could not affect the application  for eviction  filed  on  July  10, 1957  and  pending  when  the amending Bombay Act XXXVIII of 1957 came into force; and the application  was rightly allowed by the Mahalkari.  We  have already  pointed  out that the High Court was  in  error  in quashing the Collector’s order on this ground.  But the High Court  should  have set aside the Collector’s order  on  the ground that having already decided that there was no  ground for  interference with the Mahalkari’s order, the  Collector could  not subsequently revise that order.   We,  therefore, hold  that the Collector’s order was liable to  be  quashed, though  on  grounds different from those on which  the  High Court  proceeded.  On this ground, in all these appeals  the order  of  the  High Court setting aside the  order  of  the Collector  and  restoring that of the  Mahalkari  should  be affirmed. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs.   There will be one hearing fee.                            ORDER In accordance with the Opinion of the majority, the  appeals

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are dismissed with costs.  There will be one hearing fee. 350