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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8818-8830 of 2003

PETITIONER: Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel and Ors.

RESPONDENT: State of Gujarat through Deputy Collector Modasa and Anr.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2005

BENCH: B. P. SINGH & S. B. SINHA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

B.P. SINGH, J.

       These appeals by special leave are directed against the  common judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat at  Ahemdabad dated         November 7, 2000 in First Appeals Nos.7957 to  7969 of  1999 whereby the High Court held that the application for  making a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act  was barred by limitation.   

The facts of the case are few and undisputed. Pursuant to  acquisition proceeding taken under the Land Acquisition Act, an  award was declared under Section 11 of the Act on January 17,  1982.  The respondents filed an application for making a reference  under Section 18 of the Act on September 22, 1988.  The High  Court held that since the application for making a reference under  Section 18 of the Act was filed beyond the period of six months  from the date of declaration of the award, the same was barred by  limitation.  Hence, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by  the State of Gujarat and quashed the judgment and awards passed  by the Reference Court in Land References Cases referred to it for  adjudication.

       The High Court considered the case in the light of the  provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.  It, firstly,  held that the claimants were not present when the award was made  and, therefore, Section 18 (2) (a) was not attracted.  It, then, held  that the State had not been able to establish that a notice under  Section 12 (2) of the Act was issued and served upon the claimant.   Thus, the first part of Section 18(2)(b) was also not attracted.  It,  therefore, held that the limitation prescribed under the latter part of  Section 18 (2) (b) applied in the case and held that the application  under Section 18 ought to have been filed within six months from  the date of the declaration of the award. Since the application for  reference was made beyond the period of six months from the date  of declaration of the award, the same was barred by time.

       Counsel for the claimants-appellants urged that the High  Court clearly erred in law in holding the reference application to be  barred by time inasmuch as the appellants were not present when  the award was made nor were they served with notices under  Section 12(2) of the Act.  In fact the appellants had no knowledge  of the date of declaration of the award till July, 1988 when  compensation was paid to them.  It was only then that they came to  know that the award had been declared on January 17, 1982.

       The learned Assistant Judge, Sabarkantha District at

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Himmatnagar by his judgment and order of April 21, 1999  recorded a finding that the application under Section 18 of the Act  made on September 22, 1988 was not barred by limitation.  This  finding is based on the fact that the claimants had been paid  compensation in July, 1988 and the application under Section 18  was made on September 22, 1988.  There was no evidence to prove  that notice under Section 12(2) was even served on the appellants.   In these circumstances, he held that the application under Section  18 of the Act was within time.  In sum and substance, the Assistant  Judge computed the period of limitation from the date of  knowledge of the award in July, 1988.   

       Learned counsel for the appellant rightly placed reliance  upon the judgment of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh  Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another : AIR 1961  SC 1500 and submitted that since the appellants were not present  when the award was made, and no notice was given to them under  Section 12(2) of the Act, the application for making a reference  under Section 18 of the Act must be held to be within time if it is  filed within six months of the date of knowledge of the declaration  of the award.  In our view, the submission is sound and must be  accepted.  This Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra)  was dealing with a case in which an award was declared under the  Act on March 25, 1951.  No notice under Section 12(2) of the Act  was given to the claimants.  It was only on January 12, 1953 that  the claimants came to know about the declaration of the award  whereafter they filed an application claiming a reference under  Section 18 of the Act on February 24, 1953.  The High Court of  Allahabad held that the case fell under the latter part of  Clause (b)  of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application made by the  appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming a  reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the  date of the award in question, it was beyond time.  This view of the  High Court was overruled by this Court and in doing so the Court  made the following pertinent observations:-

"Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is  in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the  Government to the owner of the property then the  making of the award as properly understood must  involve the communication of the offer to the party  concerned.  That is the normal requirement under  the contract law and its applicability to cases of  award made under the Act cannot be reasonably  excluded.  Thus considered the date of the award  cannot be determined solely by reference to the  time when the award is signed by the Collector or  delivered by him in his office: it must involve the  consideration of the question as to when it was  known to the party concerned either actually or  constructively.  If that be the true position then the  literal and mechanical construction of the words  "the date of the award" occurring in the relevant  section would not be appropriate.

       (6) There is yet another point which leads to  the same conclusion.  If the award is treated as an  administrative decision taken by the Collector in  the matter of the valuation of the property sought  to be acquired it is clear that the said decision  ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the  property and in that sense, like all decisions which  affects persons, it is essentially fair and just that  the said decision should be communicated to the  said party.  The knowledge of the party affected by

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such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an  essential element which must be satisfied before  the decision can be brought into force.  Thus  considered the making of the award cannot consist  merely in the physical act of writing the award or  signing it or even filing it in the office of the  Collector; it must involve the communication of  the said award to the party concerned either  actually or constructively.  If the award is  pronounced in the presence of the party whose  rights are affected by it it can be said to be made  when pronounced.  If the date for the  pronouncement of the award is commnunicated to  the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the  date previously announced the award is said to be  communicated to the said party even if the said  party is not actually present on the date of its  pronouncement.  Similarly if without notice of the  date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced  and a party is not present the award can be said to  be made when it is communicated to the party  later.  The knowledge of the party affected by the  award, either actual or constructive, being an  essential requirement of fair-ply and natural justice  the expression "the date of the award" used in the  proviso must mean the date when the award is  either communicated to the party or is known by  him either actually or constructively.  In our  opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to  construe the words "from the date of the  Collector’s award" used in the proviso to S.18 in  literal or mechanical way".

       This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter  part of section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having  regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the  declaration of the award either actual or constructive.  This  principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant  was not present or represented when the award was made, or where  no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him.  It will also  apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award  is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on  the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are  not actually present on the date of its pronouncement.   Coming to  the facts of the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea  of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when  compensation was being paid to them in July, 1988.  They had  admittedly no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act.  They had  therefore filed the application under Section 18 of the Act on  September 22, 1988 well within the period of limitation.  The  Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but  the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the  principle laid down in  Raja Harish Chandra (supra).  Moreover,  we find from the grounds of appeal filed before the High Court that  the assertion of the claimants that they came to know of the  declaration of the award only when compensation was being paid  to them in July, 1988, has not even been challenged.    

We are, therefore, of the view that these appeals must be  allowed.  We, accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the  finding of the High Court that the application for reference under  Section 18 of the Act was barred by limitation.  However, since the  appeals have not been disposed of on merit, we remit the matter to  the High Court for disposal of the appeals on merit in accordance  with law.

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