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PETITIONER: PARSHOTAM LAL DHINGRA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/11/1957

BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1958 AIR   36            1958 SCR  828

ACT:        Union Service-Employee’s Protection under the  Constitution-        Availability-"Dismissed  or  removed or  reduced  in  rank,"        Meaning  of-Railway Servant reverted to substantive post  in        lower class, if reduced in rank-Constitution of India, Arts.        311, 31O.

HEADNOTE:        The  appellant, Parshotam Lal Dhingra, was appointed to  the        Indian Railway Service as a Signaller (Telegraphist) in 1924        and  was promoted to the post of Chief Controller  in  1950,        both the posts being in class III Service.  On July 2, 1951,        he  was appointed to officiate in class II Service as  Asst.        Superintendent  Railway  Telegraphs.   On  certain   adverse        remarks made against him in his Confidential Report for  the        year ending March 31, 1953, the General Manager on June  21.        1953,  remarked as follows-"I am disappointed to read  these        reports.   He should revert as a subordinate till  he  makes        good  the short-coming noticed in this chance of his  as  an        officer.   Portions underlined to be communicated  to  him."        Thereupon the appellant made a representation, but on        (I)  [1953] S.C.R. 730.                                    829        August  19,  1953, the General Manager issued  a  notice  as        follows:-"Shri  Bishambar  Nath Chopra,  Instructor  Railway        Training  School, Saharnpur, is transferred to  Headquarters        office  and  appointed to officiate in Class II  service  as        Assistant    Signal    and    Tele-Communication    Engineer        (Telegraphs)  vice Shri Parshotam Lal Dhingra who on  relief        reverts to Class III T appointment." Against this order  the        appellant  moved  the  High  Court under  Art.  226  of  the        Constitution.   The single judge who heard the  matter  held        that the order was invalid as the provisions of Art.  311(2)        of  the Constitution had not admittedly been complied  with.        The  Division Bench on appeal, however, set aside the  order        of  the  Single  judge and dismissed  the  appellant’s  writ        application.   The  question for decision  was  whether  the        order of the General Manager amounted to a reduction in rank        within  the meaning of Art. 311(2) of the  Constitution  and

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      the  appellant was entitled to a reasonable  opportunity  of        showing cause against the order.        Held  (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das,  A.  K.        Sarkar  jj., Vivian Bose J., dissenting) that the  order  of        reversion  made against the petitioner did not amount  to  a        reduction  in rank within the meaning of Art. 311(2) Of  the        Constitution  and he was not entitled to the  protection  of        that Article.        Like   Art.  31O  of  the  Constitution,  which   makes   no        distinction  between persons holding permanent or  temporary        posts  in the matter of their tenure being dependent on  the        pleasure of the President or the Governor, Art. 311 which is        in  the  nature  of a proviso to Art.  310,  also  makes  no        distinction  between  permanent  and  temporary  posts   and        extends  its protection equally to all  Government  servants        holding  permanent or temporary posts or officiating in  any        of them.        Laxminarayan  Chiranjilal  Bhargava v. The Union  of  India,        I.L.R.   (1955)  Nag.  893;  Engineer-in-Chief,  Army   Head        Quarters v.    C.  A.  Gupta Ram, A.I.R. (1957) Punj.  42  ;        State of Punjab v.  S.  Sukhbans Singh, A.I.R. (1957)  Punj.        191  and Chironjilal v. Union of India, A.I.R.  (1957)  Raj.        81, overruled.        But  the protection of Art. 31I can be available only  where        dismissal,  removal  or reduction in rank is  sought  to  be        inflicted  by  way of punishment and not  otherwise.   These        were the major punishments evolved by the Service Rules  and        Rules  of  the Railway Code, and  well-understood  as  such,        against  which protection was sought to be provided  by  the        Rules.  These protections were in due course incorporated in        s. 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and  reproduced        in  Art.  311  of  the  Constitution,  thus  qualifying  the        principle embodied in Art. 310(1).        Venkataraman  v.  The Union of India,  (1954)  S.C.R.  1150,        referred to.        jayanti Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.  (1951)        All. 793 ; Shrinvas Ganesh v. Union of India, A.I.R.  (1956)        Bom. 455; Jatindra Nath Biszwas v. R. Gupta, A.I.R. (1954)        830        Cal. 383 ; Rabindra Nath Das v. The General Manager, Eastern        Railway,  (1955) 59 C.W.N. 859 ; jatindra Nath Mukherjee  v.        The Government of the Union of India, (1957) 61 C.W.N.  815;        Ahmad  Sheikh  v. Ghulam Hassan, A.I.R. (1957) J. &  K.  11;        Ganesh  Balkrishna Deshmukh v. The State of  Madhya  Bharat,        A.I.R.  (1956)  M.B.  172; D. P. Ragunath v.  The  State  of        Coorg, A.I.R. (1957) Mys. 8; M. V. Vichoray v. The State  of        Madhya  Pradesh,  A.I.R.  (1952)  Nag.  288;  Kanta   Charan        Srivastava  v. Post Master General, A.I.R. (1955)  Pat.  381        and Sebastian v. State, A.I.R. (1955) Tr.  CO. 12, approved.        One test for determining whether the termination of  service        was  by  way  of punishment or  otherwise  is  to  ascertain        whether  under the Service Rules, but for such  termination,        the  servant has the right to hold the post.  In  the  three        cases  of (1) substantive appointment to a  permanent  post,        (2)  temporary  appointment  for  a fixed  term  and  (3)  a        temporary  appointment  which  has  ripened  into  a  quasi-        permanent  status under the Temporary Service  Rules,  where        such  a  right exists, the servant will be entitled  to  the        protection of Art. 311.  Conversely, where no such right can        exist,  as  in  the case of a  probationary  or  officiating        appointment  to a permanent or temporary post or  where  the        service  has not ripened into a quasi-permanent status,  and        under  the  general  law the service can  be  terminated  on        reasonable notice, the termination of service cannot  amount        to a punishment and attract the Article.  Broadly  speaking,

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      Art.  311(2) can apply to those cases where  the  Government        servant, if in private employment, could maintain an  action        for  wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in  rank.   So        where  the Government has, by contract, express or  implied,        or  under the Rules, the right to terminate the  service  at        any  time, such termination, in the manner provided  in  the        contract  or under the Rules, cannot attract the  provisions        of Art. 311.        That does not, however, mean that the termination of service        of  a  servant who has no right to the post can never  be  a        dismissal or removal by way of punishment.  Although in such        a  termination the actual motive of the Government  must  be        wholly  irrelevant, where it expressly chooses  to  penalise        the servant for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or  the        like  by  inflicting  on him the  punishment  of  dismissal,        removal  or reduction, the requirements of Art. 311 must  be        complied with.        Satish  Chander Anand v. The Union of India,  (1953)  S.C.R.        655 Shyam Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (1955) 1 S.C.R.        26 and Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India, L.R. 58 Bom. 673,        referred to.        A  reduction in rank must, similarly, be a punishment if  it        carries  penal consequences with it and the two tests to  be        applied are (1) whether the servant has a right to the  post        or  the  rank  or  (2) whether  evil  consequences  such  as        forfeiture  of pay or allowances, loss of seniority  in  his        substantive rank, stoppage or postponement of future chances        of promotion, follow as a result of the order.  Where either        of these tests applies, the reduction in        831        rank  mast be one within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of  the        Constitution and attract its protection.        In   the  instant  case,  the  appellant  was   holding   an        officiating  post  and had no right under the rules  of  the        Railway Code to continue in it.  Under the general law  such        appointment  was  terminable  at,  any  time  on  reasonable        notice, and the reduction could not operate’ as a forfeiture        of any right.  The order of the General Manager visited  him        with no evil consequences.  Consequently, he was not reduced        in rank by way of punishment.        Per  Bose  J.-While  there can be no  doubt  that  Art.  311        applies  to  all  classes  of  Government  Servants  whether        permanent,  quasipermanent,  officiating,  temporary  or  on        probation   and  that  the  words  dismissal,  removal   and        reduction in rank used therein have a special meaning,  that        Article,  properly  construed,  cannot be  confined  to  the        penalties  prescribed by the Service Rules.  The gist of  it        is neither the form of the action nor the procedure nor what        operated  in the mind of the competent authority.  The  real        test is whether evil consequences over and above those  that        would  ensue from a "contractual termination" are likely  to        ensue.  If they are, Art. 311 is attracted even though  such        evil  consequences are not prescribed as  "penalties"  under        the Rules.        Though the conditions of service prescribed by the Rules can        be  varied  unilaterally  in  some  cases  because  of   the        "pleasure" of the President, they cannot be ignored as  long        as  they  stand, and if they are infringed while  in  force,        Art. 311 will be attracted in an appropriate case.        Satish  Chandya Anand v. Union of India, (1953)  S.C.R.  655        and  Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1955) S.C.R.  26,        referred to.        Nor can the protections afforded by Art. 311 be nullified by        a splitting up of the order.        In  the  present case the General Manager’s remarks  in  the

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      confidential  file,  which formed a part  of  the  operative        order  and  was its real foundation, clearly  indicated  the        mischief,  that  the appellant was not to be promoted  to  a        like post until in the opinion of some competent Officer  he        had made good his previous short-comings.  That was an  evil        consequence,  over and above that which would follow from  a        mere  "contractual  termination" of his  engagement  in  the        higher post, and so was sufficient to attract the protection        of Art. 311.

JUDGMENT:        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 65 of 1957.        Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 1, 1956, of        the  Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi  in  Letters        Patent  Appeal No. 28 of 1955, arising out of  the  judgment        and order dated April 15, 1955, of the Single Judge, of  the        Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ        332        No. 36-D of 1955.        A.   N. Grover and P. S. Safeer, for the appellant.        R.   Ganapathy lyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the Respondent.        Frank Anthony and C. P. Aggarwala, for the intervener.        1957.   November  1.  The  judgment of  S.  R.  Das  C.  J.,        Venkatarama  Aiyar,  S.  K. Das and A.  K.  Sarkar  JJ.  was        delivered  by S. R. Das C. J. Bose J. delivered  a  separate        judgment.        DAS  C. J.-This appeal has been filed with a certificate  of        fitness granted by the Punjab High court on August 20. 1956.        It  is directed against the judgment and order passed  by  a        Division Bench of that court on January 19, 1956, in Letters        Patent  Appeal  No. 28 of 1955, reversing the  judgment  and        order  of Mr. Justice Harnam Singh pronounced on  April  15,        1955,  whereby  his  Lordship had  allowed  the  appellant’s        application being Civil Writ No. 36-D of 1955 and set  aside        the order passed by the General Manager, Northern Railway on        August  19, 1953, reverting the petitioner from the post  of        Signal  and  Tele-communication  Engineer,  (Telegraphs)  in        Class II service where the appellant was officiating to  his        substantive post in Class III service.  This appeal raises a        very important question about the construction of        art. 311 of the Constitution.        The  facts  are  shortly  as  follows:-In  August  1924  the        appellant   joined  the  railway  service  as  a   Signaller        (Telegraphist).   As a result of selection, he was  promoted        as Section Controller in 1942 and as Deputy Chief Controller        in  1947  and as the Chief Controller in  1950.   All  these        posts  were in Class III service.  On March 31, 1951,  seven        candidates,  including  the  appellant,  appeared  before  a        selection  board constituted for selecting a  candidate  for        the  post  of Assistant Superintendent  Railway  Telegraphs,        which was a gazetted post in Class 11 Officer’s cadre.   The        appellant was selected out of the seven candidates for  this        post.   On July 2, 1951, a notice of appointment was  issued        from the headquarters of the East Punjab Railway,        833        Delhi, notifying that " Mr. Parshotam Lal, Officiating Chief        Controller, is appointed to officiate in Class II service as        Asstt.   Spdt.  Rly.  Telegraphs, Headquarters  Office  vice        Mr.  Sahu Ram whose term of temporary re-employment  expires        on the afternoon of 3rd July, 1951 ". The applicant actually        relieved  Mr. Sahu Ram in the afternoon of July 3, 1951.  It        appears   that  on  April  28,  1953,  one   Gouri   Shankar        S.S.T.E.I./Hd. Qrs. made certain adverse remarks against the

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      appellant  in  his confidential report for the  year  ending        March  31, 1953.  This confidential report came before  Shri        S.  Sen, C.S.T.E., on May 25,1953, who confirmed  the  views        expressed  by Shri Gouri Shankar and added his  own  opinion        which  was also adverse to the appellant.  According to  the        usual practice obtaining in the office the aforesaid remarks        were placed before the General Manager, Shri Karnail  Singh,        who on June 11, 1953, remarked thereon as follows:        " I am disappointed to read these reports.  He should revert        as  a  subordinate  till he  makes  good  the  short-comings        noticed  in  this  chance of his as  an  officer.   Portions        underlined red to be communicated."        The   adverse   remarks  against  the   appellant   in   the        confidential  report  for the year ending  March  31,  1953,        which were communicated to the appellant for his information        by a confidential letter No. E-106/180 dated June 29,  1953,        were as follows:        "............  He is, however, inclined to be hasty  in  his        decisions.   His  office work is scrappy and does  not  show        attention  to detail.  His relations with staff as  well  as        officers  have not been happy.  He has displayed a  tendency        to resort freely to transfers and punishment of staff, as  a        means  of correcting their faults and in regard to  officers        has not maintained the proper tone and approach in  official        notings, discussions and letters to Divisions.        The above short-comings have been brought to his notice on a        number  of occasions both in person and in writing,  without        any improvement."        Remarks of Shri S. Sen, C.S.T.E.        ". ...............  This officer suffers from an inflated        834        idea  of  self  importance.  His ways  and  manners  require        radical change if he desires to have a successful career  as        an officer."        Remarks of the General Manager.        "I am disappointed to read these reports ..............."        On July 24, 1953, the appellant, who had by this time earned        two  increments  on July 4, 1952 and July 4,  1953,  made  a        representation  against  the remarks made against  him.   On        August  19, 1953, however, notice No. 940-E/14 (E.I.A.)  was        issued by the General Manager (P) to the following effect:        "  Shri Bishambar Nath Chopra, Instructor  Railway  Training        School, Saharnpur, is transferred to Headquarters office and        appointed  to  officiate in Class 11  service  as  Assistant        Signal  and  Tele-communication Engineer  (Telegraphs)  vice        Shri  Parshotam Lal Dhingra, who on relief reverts to  Class        III appointment."        The  appellant on August 20, 1953, appealed to  the  General        Manager  for reconsideration and thereafter on  October  19,        1953,   appealed   to   the  Railway  Board   and   made   a        representation also to the President of India.  On  February        2,  1955, the Railway Board wrote to the General Manager  as        follows:        With  reference  to  your letter No.  3780  dated  the  30th        December,  1953,  the Board desires that you  should  inform        Shri Parshotam Lal Dhingra that his reversion for  generally        unsatisfactory work will stand, but that this reversion will        not  be a bar to his being considered again for a  promotion        in  the future if his work and conduct justify.   He  should        also  be informed that he has, in his  representation,  used        language unbecoming of a senior official, and that he should        desist from this in future.        You  may  watch his work up to the end of  March,  1955  and        judging  from  his work and conduct, you may  treat  him  as        eligible  for  being considered for promotion  as  Assistant

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      Transportation  Superintendent in the Selection that may  be        made  after  March  1955."  This  was  communicated  to  the        petitioner on February 17, 1955.        835        In  the  meantime the petitioner had on  February  9,  1955,        filed his writ petition under Art. 226 of the  Constitution.        Mr.  Justice Harnam Singh took the view that the  petitioner        had  been  punished by being reduced in rank  without  being        given  an  opportunity  to show  cause  against  the  action        proposed to be taken in regard to him and that  consequently        the order was invalid for non-compliance with the provisions        of  Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.  On a  Letters  Patent        Appeal  filed  by  the  Union of  India,  a  Division  Bench        (Bhandari C. J. and Falshaw J.) reversed the order of Harnam        Singh  J. and dismissed the petitioner’s  writ  application.        The  High Court having subsequently certified that it was  a        fit  case for appeal to this Court, the petitioner  has  now        come  up  on  appeal  before us and  the  question  for  our        decision is whether the order passed by the General  Manager        on  August 19, 1953, amounted to a reduction in rank  within        the  meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, for if  it        did  then  the  order  must be held to  be  invalid  as  the        requirements of that article had admittedly not been compli-        ed with.        Under the English Common Law all servants of the Crown  held        office  during the pleasure of the Crown and were liable  to        be  dismissed  at  any time and  without  any  reason  being        assigned  for  such dismissal.  No action  lay  against  the        Crown  in  respect of such dismissal, even  though  it  were        contrary to the express term of the contract of  employment,        for  the  theory  was that the Grown could  not  fetter  its        future  executive  action  by entering into  a  contract  in        matters which concerned the welfare of the State.  A servant        of the Crown could not at Common Law sue the Crown even  for        the  arrears of his salary, and his claim could be  only  on        the  bounty of the Crown.  The established notion  was  that        the implied condition between the Crown and its servant  was        that  the latter held his office during the pleasure of  the        Crown,  no matter whether it had been referred to  when  the        engagement  had  been  made or not and  that  public  policy        demanded this qualification. (See per Lord Blackburn in        106        836        Mulvenna v. The Admiralty(1).  This rule was applied in full        force in Lucas v. Lucas and High Commissioner for India (2),        where  it  was  held that the sterling overseas  pay  of  an        Indian Civil Servant was not a debt which could be  attached        in satisfaction of an order for the payment of alimony.   In        the  State of Bihar v, Abdul Majid (3), however, this  Court        held,  for  reasons  stated in  the  judgment  delivered  by        Mahajan  C. J. that the Indian Law has not adopted the  rule        of English Law on the subject in its entirety.         Turning to our Statute Law, we find that in the  Government        of  India Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo.  V. Ch. 61)’  as  originally        enacted,  there  was no reference to this  doctrine  of  the        English  Common  Law.  By s. 45 of the Government  of  India        Act, 1919 (9 & 10 Geo.  V. Ch. 101) read with Part I of  the        second  schedule to that Act several sections, including  s.        96-B, were introduced into the Government of India Act, 1915        (hereinafter called the " 1915 Act").  The relevant  portion        of s.     96-B was as follows:        "  96-B (1).  Subject to the provisions of this Act and  the        rules made thereunder, every person in the civil service  of        the  Crown  in  India  holds  office  during  His  Majesty’s        pleasure,  and may be employed in any manner required  by  a

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      proper authority within the scope of his duty, but no person        in   that  service  may  be  dismissed  by   any   authority        subordinate  to  that  by which he  was  appointed  and  the        Secretary  of State in Council may (except so far as he  may        provide  by rules to the contrary) re-instate any person  in        that service who has been dismissed."        Sub-section  (2) of that section empowered the Secretary  of        State   in  Council  to  make  rules  for   regulating   the        classification of the Civil Services in India, the method of        recruitment,  the conditions of service, pay and  allowances        and discipline and conduct and sub-section (4) declared that        all  service  rules  then in force had been  duly  made  and        confirmed  the same.  The point to be noted is that s.  96-B        for the first time gave a statutory recognition and force to        the English Common        (1)  (1926) S.C. 842.        (3)  [1954] S.C.R. 786.                           (2) L.R. (1943) P. 68.        837        Law  rule that the servants of the Crown held their  Offices        during  the  pleasure  of the Crown and  at  the  same  time        imposed one important qualification upon the exercise of the        Crown’s  pleasure,  namely,  that a  servant  might  not  be        dismissed by an authority sub-  ordinate to that by which he        had been appointed.        Section 96-B (1) was reproduced as sub-ss. (1) and (2) of s.        240 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. V. Ch.II),        (hereinafter  referred  to as the 1935 Act) and a  new  sub-        section  was  added to s. 240 as sub-s. (3).   The  relevant        portions of s. 240 of the 1935 Act are set out below:        "  240 (1) Except as expressly provided by this  Act,  every        person  who is a member of a Civil service of the  Crown  in        India,  or  holds any civil post under the Crown  in  India,        holds office during His Majesty’s pleasure.        (2)  No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed from the        service of His Majesty by any authority subordinate to  that        by which he was appointed.        (3)  No  such  person  as aforesaid shall  be  dismissed  or        reduced  in  rank  until  he has  been  given  a  reasonable        opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed  to        be taken in regard to him;        Then  followed a proviso which made sub-s. (3)  inapplicable        to  certain persons and then came sub-s. (4)  providing  for        compensation  for  premature termination% of  employment  in        certain  cases  which it is not necessary to set  out  here.        The  rule making power given by s. 96-B (2) of the 1915  Act        was  reproduced in s. 241 of the 1935 Act.  Section  276  of        the 1935 Act, like s. 96-B (4) of the 1915 Act, continued in        force  all  the rules made under the  last  mentioned-  Act,        while the existing laws were continued by s. 292.  It should        be  noted  that the opening words of s.  96-B  (1),  namely,        ,,Subject  to the provisions of this Act and the rules  made        thereunder  "  were  substituted by the words  "  Except  as        expressly provided by this Act." The effect of this will  be        discussed  hereafter.   Subsection (1) adopted  the  English        Common  Law  rule regarding the pleasure of  the  Crown  but        imposed on it        838        two qualifications by two separate sub-sections.  Subsection        (2)  reproduced the qualification which had been imposed  by        s.  96-B  (1), namely that a servant of  the  class  therein        mentioned must not be dismissed by an authority  subordinate        to  that  by  which he had been  appointed  and  sub-s.  (3)        introduced  a  still  more important  qualification  on  the        exercise  of  the  Crown’s pleasure, namely,  that  no  such

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      servant  must be dismissed or reduced in rank until  he  had        been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against        the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.  Reduction        in  rank was not referred to in s. 96-B (1) but was for  the        first time added to dismissal in sub-s. (3).        Then  came our Constitution on January 26, 1950.   Part  XIV        deals  with  "  Services under the Union  and  the  States".        Chapter I contains seven sections grouped under the  heading        "  Services".  Section  240(1)  of the  1935  Act  has  been        substantially reproduced in Art. 310 (1) and sub-ss. (2) and        (3) of s. 240 have become Art. 311(1) and (2), while s.  276        of  the  1935  Act, which continued the  existing  rules  in        force,  has been embodied in Art. 313.  Article  310(1)  and        Art. 311 omitting the proviso to cl. (2) are as follows:        " 310 (1) Except as expressly provided by this Constitution,        every  person who is a member of a defence service or  of  a        civil  service  of the Union or of an all-India  Service  or        holds  any  post connected with defence or  any  civil  post        under  the  Union, holds office during the pleasure  of  the        President,  and  every  person who is a member  of  a  civil        service  of  a State or holds any civil post under  a  State        holds  office  during the pleasure of the  Governor  of  the        State.        311 (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of  the        Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a  State        or  holds a civil post under the Union or a St-ate shall  be        dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that  by        which he was appointed.        (2)  No  such  person  as aforesaid shall  be  dismissed  or        removed  or  reduced  in  rank until he  has  been  given  a        reasonable  opportunity of showing cause against the  action        proposed to be taken in regard to him:        povided ................................................        839        (3)  If  any  question  arises  whether  it  is   reasonably        practicable  to  give any person an opportunity  of  showing        cause  under  clause  (2),  the  decision  thereon  of   the        authority  empowered to dismiss or remove such person or  to        reduce him in rank, as the case may be, shall be final."        To  summarise:  As under s. 96-B(1) of the 1915 Act  and  s.        240(1)  of the 1935 Act, the persons specified therein  held        office  during  the  pleasure of the Crown,  so  under  Art.        310(1)  they  hold their office during the pleasure  of  the        President  or  of  the Governor, as the case  may  be.   The        opening  words of Art. 310(1), namely, Except  as  expressly        provided by this Constitution reproduce the opening words of        s.  240(1)  of  the  1935  Act,  substituting  the  word   "        Constitution  "  for  the  word  "  Act  ".  The  exceptions        contemplated  by  the  opening words of  Art.  310(1)  quite        clearly  refer, inter alia, to Arts. 124, 148, 218  and  324        which respectively provide expressly that the Supreme  Court        Judges,  the Auditor-General, the High Court Judges and  the        Chief  Election Commissioner shall not be removed  from  his        office  except by an order of the President passed after  an        address  by  each  House of  Parliament,  supported  by  the        requisite majority therein specified, has been presented  to        him  in the same session for such removal on the  ground  of        proved  misbehaviour  or  incapacity.   These  are   clearly        exceptions to the rule embodied in Art. 310(1), that  public        servants  hold  their  office during  the  pleasure  of  the        President  or the Governor, as the case may be.  Subject  to        these  exceptions  our  Constitution, by  Art.  310(1),  has        adopted  the  English Common Law rule that  public  servants        hold  office  during  the  pleasure  of  the  President   or        Governor, as the case may be and has, by Art. 31 1,  imposed

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      two  qualifications  on  the  exercise  of  such   pleasure.        Though;  the  two qualifications are set out in  a  separate        article,  they quite clearly restrict the operation  of  the        rule embodied in Art. 310(1).  In other words the provisions        of  Art.  311  operate as a proviso  to  Art.  310(1).   All        existing  laws  have  been continued by Art.  372,  some  of        which,  e.g., the Code of Civil Procedure make, it  possible        for a public servant to enforce his claims        840        against  the  State.  It has accordingly been held  by  this        Court in the State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (supra) that  the        English  Common Law rule regarding the holding of office  by        public  servants only during the pleasure of the  Crown  has        not  been  adopted by us in its entirety and  with  all  its        rigorous implications.  Passing on to Art. 311 we find  that        it  gives a two fold protection to persons who  come  within        the article, namely, (1) against dismissal or removal by  an        authority  subordinate to that by which they were  appointed        and  (2) against dismissal or removal or reduction  in  rank        without  giving  them a reasonable  opportunity  of  showing        cause  against the action proposed to be taken in regard  to        them.  Incidentally it will be noted that the word   removed        "  has been added after the word "dismissed". in  both  cls.        (1) and (2) of Art. 311.  Upon Art. 311 two questions arise,        namely, (a) who are entitled to the protection and (b)  what        are the ambit and scope of the protection ?        Re  (a): Articles 310 and 311 are two of the articles  which        have been grouped under the heading "Services" in Chapter  I        of  Part XIV which deals with the "Services under the  Union        and the States".  It is well known that there are  different        species  of  Government  services.   In  the  absence  of  a        contract to the contrary the terms of employment of  persons        in  different  services are governed by rules  made  by  the        appropriate authorities to which reference will hereafter be        made.   The  strength of a service or a part of  a  services        actioned as a separate unit is, in the Fundamental Rules, s.        111, ch. 11, r. 9(4), called the cadre.  Each cadre consists        of a certain number of posts.  According to r. 9(22) of  the        Fundamental Rules, a permanent post means a post carrying  a        definite  rate of pay sanctioned without limit of time.   In        each  cadre there may be and often is a hierarchy of  ranks.        Due to rush of business or other exigencies some  "temporary        posts" are often created.  A temporary post is defined in r.        9(30)  to  mean  a  post carrying a  definite  rate  of  pay        sanctioned  for a limited time.  These temporary  posts  are        very  often outside the cadre and are usually for  one  year        and are renewed from year to year, although some of them may        be                                    841        created  for a certain specified period.  The conditions  of        service  of  a  Government  servant  appointed  to  a  post,        permanent  or temporary, are regulated by the terms  of  the        contract  of  employment, express or  implied,  and  subject        thereto,  by  the rules applicable to’ the  members  of  the        particular service.        The appointment of a Government servant to a permanent  post        may  be  substantive or on probation or  on  an  officiating        basis.   A  substantive appointment to a permanent  post  in        public service confers normally on the servant so  appointed        a  substantive right to the post and he becomes entitled  to        hold  a  "lien"  on the post.  This  "lien"  is  defined  in        Fundamental Rule s. 111, ch. 11, r. 9(13) as the title of  a        Government  servant to hold substantively a permanent  post,        including  a  tenure post, to which he  has  been  appointed        substantively.  The Government cannot terminate his  service

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      unless  it is entitled to do so (1) by virtue of  a  special        term  of  the contract of employment, e.g.,  by  giving  the        requisite  notice  provided by the contract or  (2)  by  the        rules  governing  the conditions of his  service,  e.g.,  on        attainment  of the age of superannuation prescribed  by  the        rules, or on the fulfilment of the conditions for compulsory        retirement  or,  subject  to  certain  safeguards’  on   the        abolition  of  the  post or on being found  guilty  after  a        proper  enquiry on notice to him, of misconduct  negligence,        inefficiency  or any other disqualification’ An  appointment        to  a  permanent  post in Government  service  on  probation        means,  as  in the case of a person appointed by  a  private        employer,  that the servant so appointed is taken on  trial.        The  period  of probation may in some cases be for  a  fixed        period,  e.g., for six months or for one year or it  may  be        expressed simply as "on probation" without any specification        of  any period.  Such an employment on probation, under  the        ordinary  law  of  master and servant, comes to  an  end  if        during  or  at  the  end of the  probation  the  servant  so        appointed  on trial is found unsuitable and his  service  is        terminated  by a notice.  An appointment to officiate  in  a        permanent   post   is  usually  made  when   the   incumbent        substantively  holding  that post is on leave  or  when  the        permanent post is vacant and no substantive        842        appointment  has  yet  been  made to  that  post.   Such  an        officiating appointment comes to an end on the return of the        incumbent  substantively holding the post from leave in  the        former  case or on a substantive appointment being  made  to        that permanent post in the latter case or on the service  of        a  notice  of  termination  as agreed  upon  or  as  may  be        reasonable under the ordinary law.  It is, therefore,  quite        clear  that appointment to a permanent post in a  Government        service,  either on probation, or on an  officiating  basis,        is,  from  the very nature of such employment, itself  of  a        transitory  character  and, in the absence  of  any  special        contract  or specific rule regulating the conditions of  the        service,  the  implied term of such appointment,  under  the        ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is terminable        at  any time.  In short, in the case of an appointment to  a        permanent post in a Government service on probation or on an        officiating basis, the servant so appointed does not acquire        any  substantive right to the post and  consequently  cannot        complain, any more than a private servant employed on proba-        tion  or on an officiating basis can do, if his  service  is        terminated  at  any  time.  Likewise  an  appointment  to  a        temporary post in a Government service may be substantive or        on probation or on an officiating basis.  Here also, in  the        absence  of any special stipulation or any specific  service        rule, the servant so appointed acquires no fight to the post        and his service can be terminated at any time except in  one        case,  namely, when the appointment to a temporary  post  is        for  a  definite  period.  In such a  case  the  servant  so        appointed  acquires  a right to his tenure for  that  period        which  cannot  be put an end to unless there  is  a  special        contract  entitling  the  employer to do so  on  giving  the        requisite notice or, the person so appointed is, on  enquiry        held  on  due notice to the servant and after giving  him  a        reasonable  opportunity to defend himself, found  guilty  of        misconduct,   negligence,   inefficiency   or   any    other        disqualification  and is by way of punishment  dismissed  or        removed  from service or reduced in rank.   The  substantive        appointment  to a temporary post, under the rules,  used  to        give the servant so appointed        843

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      certain benefits regarding pay and leave, but was  otherwise        on  the same footing as appointment to a temporary  post  on        probation  or  on  an officiating basis,  that  is  to  say,        terminable   by   notice  except  where  under   the   rules        promulgated  in  1949 to which reference Will  hereafter  be        made,  his service had ripened into what is called a  quasi-        permanent service.        The  position may, therefore, be summarised as  follows:  In        the   absence  of  any  special  contract  the   substantive        appointment  to  a  permanent  post  gives  the  servant  so        appointed  a right to hold the post until, under the  rules,        he  attains  the age of superannuation  or  is  compulsorily        retired after having put in the prescribed number of  years’        service  or the post is abolished and his service cannot  be        terminated  except  by  way Of  punishment  for  misconduct,        negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification found        against  him on proper enquiry after due notice to him.   An        appointment  to  a temporary post for  a  certain  specified        period  also gives the servant so appointed a right to  hold        the post for the entire period of his tenure and his  tenure        cannot be put an end to during that period unless he is,  by        way  of punishment, dismissed or removed from  the  service.        Except  in  these  two  cases the  appointment  to  a  post,        permanent  or temporary, on probation or on  an  officiating        basis or a substantive appointment to a temporary post gives        to  the  servant so appointed no right to the Post  and  his        srvice   ’may be terminated unless his service  had  ripened        into what is, in the service rules, called a quasi-permanent        service.  The question for our consideration is whether  the        protections  of  Art.  311 are available to  each  of  these        several categories of Government servants.        A   number   of  decisions  bearing  on  the   question   of        construction of Arts. 310 and 311 have been cited before  us        which  indicate  that there is some  difference  of  opinion        between the Judges of the different High Courts and in  some        cases  amongst the Judges of the same High Court.   Thus  it        has  been held in some cases that Arts. 310 and 311  do  not        make  any  distinction between Government servants  who  are        employed in permanent posts and those who are employed in        107        844        temporary  posts.  See Jayanti Prasad v. The State of  Uttar        Pradesh  (1), 0. P. Oak v. The State of Bombay(2)  Kishanlal        Laxmilal  v.  The State of Madhya Bharat (3),  Gopi  Kishore        Prasad  v.  The State of Bihar (4), Punit lal  Saha  v.  The        State  of  Bihar(5) and Yusuf Ali Khan v.  Province  of  the        Punjab(6).  On the other hand it has been held in some cases        that a Government servant cannot be deemed to be a member of        a service unless he is permanently absorbed therein, nor can        he be deemed to be a holder of such post unless he holds  it        permanently  and  that  such a  Government  servant  is  not        entitled to claim the benefit of Art. 311.  See Laxminarayan        Chiranjilal Bhargava v. The Union of India (7), Engnneer-in-        Chief,  Army Head Quarters v. C. A. Gupta Ram (8), State  of        Punjab v. S. Sukhbans Singh (9) and Chironjilal v. Union  of        India  (10).  The cases cited before us also  indicate  that        the  preponderance  of  view is that  only  a  dismissal  or        removal or reduction in rank by way of penalty attracts  the        operation of Art. 311 (2), but that a termination of service        brought about otherwise than by way of punishment, e.g.,  by        the  exercise of the right under the terms of employment  or        under  the  relevant  rules  regulating  the  conditions  of        service which form part of the terms of employment does not.        See  Jayanti Prasad v. The State of Uttar  Pradesh  (supra),        Shrinivas  Ganesh  v.  Union of India  (11);  Jatindra  Nath

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      Biswas  v. R. Gupta (12), Rabindra Nath Das v.  The  General        Manager,  Eastern Railway (13), Jatindra Nath  Mukherjee  v.        The  Government  of the Union of India("), Ahmad  Sheikh  v.        Ghulam Hassan (15), Ganesh Balkrishna Deshmukh v. The  State        of Madhya Bharat (16), D. P. Ragunath v. The State of  Coorg        (17),  M. V. Vichoray v. The State of Madhya  Pradesh  (18),        Kamta  Charan  Srivastava v. Post Master  General  (19)  and        Sebastian v. State(").  The cases,        (I) A.I.R. (1951) All. 793.(2) A.I.R. (1957) Bom. 175.        (3) A.I.R. (1956) M B. 1oo.(4) A.I.R. (1955) Pat.372.        (5) A.I.R. (1957) Pat. 357(6) A.I.R. (1950) Lah. 59.        (7) 1.1,.R. (1955) Nag. 803;A. I. R. (1956) Nag.(8) A.I.R.        (1957)Punj. 42.             (9) A.I.R. (1957) Punj. 191.113.(10)  A.I.R.   (1957)        Raj. 81.             (11)  L.R.  58 Bom. 673; A.I.R.  (1956)  Bom.  455.(12)        A.I.R. (1954) Cal. 383.             (13) (1955) 59 C.W.N. 859.    (14)   (1957)   611C.W.N.        815.             (15)  A.I.R. (1957) J. & K. xi.(16) A.I.R. (1956)  M.B.        172.             (17) A.I.R. (1957) Mys. 8.    (18)  Al.R.  (1952)  Nag.        288.             (19) A.I.R. (1955) Pat. 381.(2o) A.I.R. (1955) Tr.  Co.        12,         845        however,  do not lay down or clearly indicate any  test  for        ascertaining whether in any particular case a termination of        service  is inflicted by way of penalty so as to  amount  to        dismissal,  removal or reduction in rank within the  meaning        of  Art. 311 (2) or is brought about by the exercise of  the        right to terminate it arising out of the terms of employment        agreed  upon  between  the parties  or  contained  in  rules        regulating  the conditions of service subject to  which  the        employment was made.  Further a certain amount of  confusion        arises  because  of  the indiscriminate  use  of  the  words        "temporary",  Cc  provisional ", " officiating "  and  "  on        probation ". We, therefore, consider it right to examine and        ascertain for ourselves the scope and effect of the relevant        provisions of the Constitution.        Article 311 does not, in terms, say that the protections  of        that  article  extend  only to  persons  who  are  permanent        members  of the services or who hold permanent civil  posts.        To limit the operation of the protective provisions of  this        article  to  these  classes  of  persons  will  be  to   add        qualifying  words to the article which will be. contrary  to        sound  principles ’of interpretation of a Constitution or  a        statute.   In the next place, el. (2) of Art. 311 refers  to        "such person as aforesaid" and this reference takes us  back        to cl. (1) of that article which speaks of a " person who is        a  member  of a civil service of the Union or  an  all-India        service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil  post        under the Union or a State".  These persons also come within        Art. 3 10(1) which, besides them, also includes persons  who        are  members  of  a defence service or  who  hold  any  post        connected with defence.  Article 310 also is not, in  terms’        confined  to  persons  who  are  permanent  members  of  the        specified  services  or who hold permanent  posts  connected        with  the  services therein mentioned.  To  hold  that  that        article covers only those persons who are permanent  members        of  the specified services or who hold posts connected  with        the services therein mentioned will be to say that  persons,        who  are not permanent members of those services or  who  do        not  hold  permanent  posts  therein,  do  not  hold   their        respective offices during the pleasure of the President

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      846        or  the  Governor, as the case may  be-a  proposition  which        obviously cannot stand scrutiny.  The matter, however,  does        not  rest here.  Coming to Art. 31 1, it is obvious that  if        that  article  is  limited to  persons  who   are  permanent        members  of the services or who hold permanent civil  posts,        then the constitutional protection given by cls. (1) and (2)        will not extend to persons who officiate in a permanent post        or in a temporary post and consequently such persons will be        liable   to  be  dismissed  or  removed  by   an   authority        subordinate  to  that  by which they were  appointed  or  be        liable  to be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank  without        being  given  any  opportunity to  defend  themselves.   The        latter  classes  of  servants  require  the   constitutional        protections  as  much as the other classes do and  there  is        nothing  in  the language of Art. 311 to indicate  that  the        Constitution makers intended to make any distinction between        the  two  classes.   There is no apparent  reason  for  such        distinction.   It  is  said  that  persons  who  are  merely        officiating  in  the posts cannot be said to "  hold  "  the        post, for they only perform the duties of those posts.   The        word  "  hold  "  is also used in Arts. 58  and  66  of  the        Constitution.   There  is  no  reason  to  think  that   our        Constitution  makers  intended  that  the   disqualification        referred  to  in cl. (2) of the former and cl.  (4)  of  the        latter should extend only to persons who substantively  held        permanent  posts and not to those who held  temporary  posts        and that persons officiating in permanent or temporary posts        would  be  eligible  for  election  as  President  or  Vice-        President  of India.  There could be no rational  basis  for        any such distinction.  In our judgment, just as Art. 310, in        terms, makes no distinction between permanent and  temporary        members of the services or between persons holding permanent        or  temporary  posts  in the matter of  their  tenure  being        dependent  upon  the  pleasure  of  the  President  or   the        Governor, so does Art. 311, in our view, make no distinction        between  the  two  classes, both of  which  are,  therefore,        within  its  protections  and  the  decisions  holding   the        contrary view cannot be supported as correct,.        Re:  (b) :-Clause (1) of Art. 311 is quite explicit and        847        hardly  requires discussion, The scope and the ambi of  that        protection  are  that  Government  servants  of  the   kinds        referred  to  therein  are entitled to the  judgmen  of  the        authority  by  which they were appointed or  some  authority        superior  to  that  authority and that  the  should  not  be        dismissed or removed by a lesser authority in whose judgment        they  may  not  have the same faith.   The  underlying  idea        obviously is that a provision like this will ensure to  them        a certain amount of security of tenure.  Clause (2) protects        Government  servant: against being dismissed or  removed  or        reduced in rank without being given a reasonable opportunity        of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken  in        regard to them.  It will be noted that in cl. (1) the  words        "  dismissed " and " removed " have been used while  in  cl.        (2)  the words " dismissed ", " removed " and "  reduced  in        rank " have been used.  The two, protections are (1) against        being  dismissed or removed by an authority  subordinate  to        that by which the appointment had been made and (2)  against        being  dismissed, removed or reduced in rank  without  being        heard.   What, then, is the meaning of those  expressions  "        dismissed  ", " removed " or "  reduced in rank"  ?   It has        been  said in Jayanti Prasad v. The State Of  Uttar  Pradesh        (supra)  that  these are technical words used  in  cases  in        which   a  person’s  services  are  terminated  by  way   of

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      punishment.  Those expressions, it is urged, have been taken        from  the service rules, where they were used to denote  the        three  major  punishments  and it is  submitted  that  those        expressions should be read and understood in the same  sense        and  treated as words of art.  This leads us to embark  upon        an examination of the service rules relating to  punishments        to which the Government servants can be subjected.        Rule   418  of  the  Civil  Service  Regulations   of   1902        (hereinafter  called  the 1902 Rules) provide,  inter  alia,        that  the  removal of public servants from the  service  for        misconduct,  insolvency,  inefficiency  not due  to  age  or        failure to pass a prescribed examination entailed forfeiture        of  past services.  Those 1902 Rules, however, did  not  Bay        under what circumstances or in what        848        manner  and  by  which authority public  servants  could  be        removed.        In  exercise  of the powers conferred by s. 96-B(2)  of  ,he        1915 Act the Secretary of State in Council framed the  Civil        Service   (Governor’s   Provinces)   Classification    Rules        (hereinafter  referred to as the 1920 Classification  Rules)        which came into force in December, 1920 and were  applicable        to Government servants serving in the Governor’s  Provinces.        Rule  X of these 1920 Classification Rules laid down that  a        local  Government might for good and sufficient reasons  (1)        censure, (2) reduce to a lower post, (3) withhold  promotion        from  or  (4) suspend from service, any officer of  an  all-        India  service,  provided  that no head  of  the  department        appointed  with  the  approval of the  Governor  General  in        Council  would  be  reduced  to a  lower  post  without  the        sanction  of the Governor General in Council.   Likewise  r.        XIII  provided that, without prejudice to the provisions  of        any  law for the time being in force, the  local  Government        might  for  good  and sufficient reasons  (1)  censure,  (2)        withhold  promotion  from, (3) reduce to a lower  post,  (4)        suspend,  (5) remove, or (6) dismiss any officer  holding  a        post  in  a provincial or subordinate service or  a  special        appointment.   Rule XIV laid down the procedure in cases  of        dismissal, removal or reduction in the following terms:        " Rule XIV-Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public        Servants  Inquiries  Act, 1850, in all cases  in  which  the        dismissal,  removal or reduction of any officer is  ordered,        the  order  shall,  except  when it is  based  on  facts  or        conclusions  established  at a judicial trial, or  when  the        officer concerned has absconded with the accusation  hanging        over  him, be preceded by a properly  recorded  departmental        enquiry.   At such an enquiry a definite charge  in  writing        shall be framed in respect of each offence and explained  to        the accused, the evidence in support of it and any  evidence        which he may adduce in his defence shall be recorded in  his        presence  and  his defence shall be taken down  in  writing.        Each of the charges framed shall be discussed and a  finding        shall be recorded on each charge.  " Thus we find that these        1920 Classification Rules        849        enumerated the different kind-, of punishments that could be        inflicted  on the different classes of  Government  servants        and  elaborately  prescribed the procedure which had  to  be        followed before those punishments could be inflicted.        The  Secretary  of State in Council also  promulgated,  with        effect  from January 1, 1922, what are known and  what  will        hereafter be referred to as the Fundamental Rules  governing        the  conditions  of service, leave, pay and pension  of  all        Government  servants  whose  pay  was  debitable  to   civil        estimates  in  India and to any other  class  of  Government

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      servants in India to which the Secretary of State in Council        might  by  general  or  special order  declare  them  to  be        applicable.   Like  r. 418 of the 1902 Rules, r. 52  of  the        Fundamental  Rules provided that the pay and  allowances  of        Government  servants,  who were dismissed  or  removed  from        service,  would  cease  from the day of  such  dismissal  or        removal.   Thus  the penal consequences of loss of  pay  and        allowances continued to follow dismissal or removal.        On  May  27,  1930,  the Secretary of  State  for  India  in        Council,  in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 96  B(2)        of  the  Government  of  India Act,  1919,  made  the  Civil        Services   (Classification,  Control  and   Appeal)   Rules,        (hereinafter  called  the 1930 Classification  Rules)  which        superseded   the  1920  Classification  Rules.    The   1930        Classification  Rules, by r. 3, applied to every  person  in        the  whole  time civil employment of a Government  in  India        (other  than a person so employed only occasionally or  sub-        ject  to discharge at less than one month’s  notice)  except        certain classes of persons therein specified which included,        inter  alia,  railway  servants.  Under  r.  14  the  public        services  in India were classified under six heads,  namely,        (1)  All-India Services, (2) Central Services Class  I,  (3)        Central  Services  Class  II,  (4)Provincial  Services,  (5)        Specialist Services and (6) the Subordinate Services.  Under        r.  15  read with sch.  I the following were  the  all-India        services:-(I)  Indian  Civil  Service,  (2)  Indian   Police        Service,   (3)  Indian  Agricultural  Service,  (4)   Indian        Educational Service,        850        (5)  Indian  Forest Service, (6) Indian  Forest  Engineering        Service,  (7) Indian Medical Service, (8) Indian Service  of        Engineers,  (9)  Indian Veterinary Service and  (10)  Indian        General  Service.   The  Indian  Railway  ,Service  was  not        included  in  the  list.  Rule  49,  as  originally  framed,        provided as follows:        "The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason        and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon members of  the        services comprised in any of the class (1) to (5)  specified        in  rule  14,  namely:-(i)  Censure,  (ii)  Withholding   of        increments or promotion, including stoppage at an efficiency        bar, (iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to  a        lower  stage in a time scale, (iv) Recovery from pay of  the        whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government  by        negligence or breach of orders, (v) Suspension, (vi) Removal        from  the  civil  service  of  the  Crown  which  does   not        disqualify from future employment, (vii) Dismissal from  the        Civil  Service of the Crown, which, ordinarily  disqualifies        from future employment.        Explanation, The discharge-        (a)  of  a person appointed on probation, during the  period        of probation, (b) of a person appointed otherwise than under        contract to hold a temporary appointment, on the  expiration        of  the period of the appointment, (c) of a  person  engaged        under  contract,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  -his        contract, does not amount to removal or dismissal within the        meaning of this rule."        The  Explanation to r. 49 was amended on March 28, 1948,  on        February 28, 1950, and finally on January 28, 1955, when the        Explanation  was numbered as Explanation I and the words  in        cl.  (ii)  of  r. 49, namely, "  including  stoppage  at  an        efficiency  bar" were deleted and Explanation II was  added.        So amended the Explanations read as follows:        "  Explanation  I-The termination of  employment--(a)  of  a        person  appointed on probation during or at the end  of  the        period  of  probation, in accordance with the terms  of  the

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      appointment   and  the  rules  governing  the   probationary        service; or        (b)  of a temporary Government servant appointed        851        otherwise than under contract, in accordance with rule 5  of        the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,  1949;        or        (c)  of a person engaged under a contract does not amount to        removal  or dismissal within the meaning of this rule or  of        rule 55.        Explanation  II  :  Stopping  a  Government  servant  at  an        efficiency bar in the time scale of his pay on the ground of        his   unfitness  to  cross  the  bar  does  not  amount   to        withholding of increments or promotion within the meaning of        this rule.  "        Like  r. XIV of the 1920 Classification Rules, r. 55 of  the        1930  Classification  Rules, as originally framed  in  1930,        provided  that,  without prejudice to  the  Public  Servants        Enquiries  Act,  1850,  no order of  dismissal,  removal  or        reduction  should be passed on a member of a service  (other        than  an  order  passed  on  facts  which  had  led  to  his        conviction in a criminal court or by a court martial) unless        he  had been informed in writing of the grounds on which  it        was  proposed  to  take  action and  had  been  afforded  an        adequate   opportunity   of   defending   himself   Detailed        provisions  were  made  as to the grounds on  which  it  was        proposed  to  take  action being reduced to the  form  of  a        definite charge or charges and for the communication thereof        to the officer together with a statement of the  allegations        on  which each charge was based and further provisions  were        made  as  to  the procedure relating to the  filing  of  the        defence, the right to cross-examine and to give evidence  in        person or to have such witnesses called as he might wish  to        examine  in  his defence.  Thus in the  1930  Classification        Rules, as in the 1920 Classification Rules, were  enumerated        the different kinds of punishments which could be  inflicted        on the Government servants of the class to which those rules        were  applicable and out of those varieties  of  punishments        mentioned  in  r.  49, three  of  them,  namely,  dismissal,        removal and reduction in rank, were treated as major punish-        ments and some special procedural protection was  prescribed        in the interest of the Government servants.        At  the  date of the commencement of  the  Constitution  the        railway servants were governed by a separate set        108        852        of rules collected in the two volumes of the Indian  Railway        Establishment Code.  The petitioner is a railway servant and        as such is governed by the rules of the Indian Railway Code.        Chapter  XVII, which is in Volume I, regulated  the  conduct        and  discipline  of  the railway servants  and  the  Railway        Fundamental  Rules  collected in Volume 11  regulated  their        conditions  of  service,  pay  and  deputation.   These  are        similar   to  and  are  in  pari  materia  with   the   1930        Classification Rules.  Rule 1702 of Chapter XVII  prescribes        eleven distinct penalties which may for good and  sufficient        reasons  be  imposed  upon  railway  servants,  namely,  (1)        censure,  (2) withholding of the privilege of passes  and/or        privilege  ticket order, (3) fines, including forfeiture  or        reduction  of  running allowances in the case of  train  and        running  staff, (4) withholding of increments  or  promotion        including stoppage at an efficiency bar, (5) reduction to  a        lower  post  or  time-scale or to a lower stage  in  a  time        scale,  (6)  recovery from pay of the whole or part  of  any        pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or  breach

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      of orders, (7) suspension, (8) removal from the service, (9)        dismissal from the service, (10) withholding of the whole or        part of Provident Fund and Gratuity Rules (Chapters XIII and        XV)  and  (11) reducing or withholding the  maximum  pension        admissible  in accordance with the provisions of  the  rules        governing the grant of pensions.  There is a Note below this        rule  to  the  effect that the discharge  (a)  of  a  person        appointed on probation, during the period of probation,  (b)        of a person engaged under contract for a specific period, on        the  expiration of such period in accordance with the  terms        of  his contract, (c) of a person appointed in  a  temporary        capacity otherwise than under a contract, in accordance with        the  general conditions of service applicable  to  temporary        employment and of some other persons enumerated therein,  do        not amount to removal or dismissal within the meaning of  r.        1702.   Rule 1703 states that while dismissal  from  service        disqualifies  a  railway  servant  from  future  employment,        removal  from  service is not to be considered  an  absolute        disqualification.  Rule 1704 specifies the , authority        853        competent  to  impose penalties.  Rule 1706  enumerates  the        causes  for  which a railway servant may be  dismissed  from        service, namely, (1) conviction by a criminal court or by  a        court  martial, (2) serious misconduct, (3) neglect of  duty        resulting in or likely to result in loss to Government or to        a Railway administration, or danger to the lives of  persons        using   the   railway,  or  (4)   insolvency   or   habitual        indebtedness,   and   (5)  obtaining   employment   by   the        concealment  of his antecedents, which would have  prevented        his employment in railway service had they been known before        his appointment to the authority appointing him.   Procedure        for dismissal is set out in r. 1707.  "Removal from Service"        is  dealt with by r. 1708 and the procedure for  removal  is        regulated by r. 1709.  "Suspension" is the subject matter of        r.  1711 and the procedure for imposing the other  penalties        is  contained  in  r. 1712.  "Reduction to  lower  post"  is        governed  by  r.  1714 which enjoins  that  when  a  railway        servant is reduced for inefficiency or misconduct to a lower        post in timescale or to a lower grade or to a lower stage in        a time-scale the authority ordering the reduction must state        the  period for which it will be effective and  whether,  on        the  expiry  of  that period, it will  operate  to  postpone        future  increments  or  to  affect  the  railway   servant’s        seniority  and, if so, to what extent.  Rule  2310  provides        that no pension is to be granted to an officer dismissed  or        removed for misconduct, insolvency or inefficiency  although        compassionate allowances may be granted in deserving  cases.        Thus  the Indian Railway Establishment Code also,  like  the        1930   Classification   Rules,   provides   for    different        punishments and the procedure to be followed for  inflicting        the  same  and the three graver  punishments  of  dismissal,        removal and reduction are dealt with separately, and special        provisions  are made regulating the procedure which must  be        followed  before  those graver forms of punishments  can  be        inflicted.        In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-s. (2) of s.  241        of  the  1935 Act, the Governor-General made  certain  rules        called the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service)  Rules,        1949 (hereinafter referred to as        854        the  1949 Temporary Service Rules).  These rules applied  to        all  persons who held a civil post under the  Government  of        India  and  who  were under the rulemaking  control  of  the        Governor-General,  but who did not hold a lien on  any  post        under the Government of India or any Provincial  Government,

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      but  they  did not apply to several categories  of  persons,        including  the  railway  servants.   By  those  rules   some        protection  had  been  given even to  persons  who  did  not        substantively  hold  permanent posts.  Thus under r.  6  the        services  of those persons whose services had  ripened  into        what  was therein defined as quasi-permanent  service  could        only be terminated in the same circumstances and in the same        manner as those of Government servants in permanent  service        could  be  terminated  or  when  the  appointing   authority        certified that reduction had occurred in the number of posts        available to Government servants -not in temporary  service.        Further  protection  was given by the two provisos  to  that        rule.   By r. 5, however, the employment of persons  holding        temporary  service  could  be terminated at any  time  by  a        month’s notice.        Just to complete the history of the service rules  reference        may be made to the all-India Service (Discipline and Appeal)        Rules, 1955 which were promulgated by the Central Government        in  September,  1955,  after  consultation  with  the  State        Governments.   For our present purpose it is enough  to  say        that  rr.  49 and 55 of the 1930 Classification  Rules  were        substantially  reproduced  in rr. 3 and  5  respectively  of        these  1955 Rules except that the Explanation to r.  49  has        been  elaborated and the results of the  judicial  decisions        have  been  incorporated  therein.  In  exercise  of  powers        conferred  by Art. 309 and Art. 148 (5) of the  Constitution        the President, on February 28, 1957, made the Central  Civil        Services  (Classification, Control and Appeal)  Rules  1957.        Rule  13  of these Rules corresponds to r. 49  of  the  1930        Classification  Rules, and r. 3 of the 1955 Rules and r.  15        substantially  reproduces r. 55 of the  1930  Classification        Rules and r.   5 of the 1955 Rules.        The  scheme  of  the  Service  Rules  may  now  be   broadly        summarised as follows: They enumerated different        855        punishments which, for good and sufficient reason, might  be        inflicted on Government servants and they prescribed special        procedure  which had to be followed before the  three  major        punishments,  of  dismissal, removal or  reduction  in  rank        could be meted out to the Government servants.  Thus rr.   X        and XIII of the 1920 Classification Rules prescribed several        kinds  of  punishments  to which the  different  classes  of        Government  servants could be subjected and r. XIV of  those        rules laid down certain special procedure for cases in which        the  three  major  punishments  of  dismissal,  removal   or        reduction  of an officer were contemplated.  Likewise r.  49        of  the  1930  Classification  Rules  reproduced  with  some        additions the punishments prescribed in rr.  X and XIII  and        r.  55  of the 1930 Classification  Rules  provided  similar        procedural  protection as had been prescribed by r.  XIV  of        the 1920 Classification Rules before the punishments of dis-        missal,  removal  or reduction in rank could  be  inflicted.        The  scheme of the rules applicable to the railway  servants        was similar in substance.  Thus rr. 1702 to 1714 and 2310 of        the   Indian  Railway  Code  substantially   reproduce   the        provisions  of  rr.  49 and 55 of  the  1930  Classification        Rules.   In  short, the service rules, out  of  the  several        categories   of  punishments,  selected  the  three   graver        punishments of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank  and        laid  down  special procedure for giving protection  to  the        Government  servants against the infliction of  those  three        major punishments.        It will be recalled that the opening words of s. 96-B (1) of        the  1915 Act were-" Subject to the provisions of  this  Act        and the Rules made thereunder " and subs. (4) confirmed  the

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      service rules that were then in force.  In spite of this  it        was  held in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for  India        (1)  with reference to the rules made under s. 96-B  of  the        1915 Act that, while that section assured that the tenure of        office,  though  at  pleasure,  would  not  be  subject   to        capricious or arbitrary action but would be regulated by the        rules,  it  gave no right to the appellant,  enforceable  by        action,  to hold his office in accordance with those  rules.        It        (I)  (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55.        856        was  held  that s. 96-B of the 1915 Act and the  rules  made        thereunder only made provision for the redress of grievances        by administrative process.  As if to reinforce the effect of        that  decision, the opening words quoted above were,  in  s.        240(1)  of the 1935 Act, replaced by the words "  Except  as        expressly otherwise provided by this Act".  The position  of        the Government servant was, therefore, rather insecure,  for        his  office  being held during the pleasure of  His  Majesty        under  the 1915 Act as well as under the 1935 Act the  rules        could  not  over-ride or derogate from the statute  and  the        protection  of the rules could not be enforced by action  so        as to nullify the statute itself.  The only protection  that        the  Government  servant had was that, by virtue of  s.  96-        B(1),   they  could  not  be  dismissed  by   an   authority        subordinate  to  that  by which they  were  appointed.   The        position,  however, improved to some extent under  the  1935        Act  which,  by  s. 240(3), gave  a  further  protection  in        addition to that provided in s. 240(2) which reproduced  the        protection  of s. 96-B(1) of the 1915 Act.  In  other  words        the  substance  of the protection provided by r. 55  of  the        1930 Classification Rules which required a special procedure        to  be  followed  before  the  three  major  punishments  of        dismissal,  removal or reduction in rank out of the  several        punishments  enumerated  in r. 49 was bodily lifted,  as  it        were, out of the Rules and embodied in the statute itself so        as  to  give  a  statutory  protection  to  the   Government        servants.   These  statutory  protections  have  now  become        constitutional  protections as a result of the  reproduction        of  the  provisions of s. 240 in Arts. 310 and  311  of  our        Constitution.        It  follows from the above discussion that both at the  date        of the commencement of the 1935 Act and of our  Constitution        the  words " dismissed ", " removed " and " reduced in  rank        ",  as  used in the service rules, were well  understood  as        signifying  or  denoting the three major  punishments  which        could  be inflicted on Government servants.  The  protection        given  by  the  rules to  the  Government  servants  against        dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which could not  be        en. forced by action, was incorporated in sub-ss. (1) and        857        (2)  of  s.  240  to give them  a  statutory  protection  by        indicating  a procedure which had to be followed before  the        punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank could        be  imposed  on  them and which could be  enforced  in  law.        These protections have now been incorporated in Art. 311  of        our  Constitution.   The effect of s. 240 of  the  1935  Act        reproduced in Arts. 310 and 311, as explained by this  Court        in S. A. Venkataraman v. The Union of India (1), has been to        impose  a fetter on the right of the Government  to  inflict        the several punishments therein mentioned.  Thus under  Art.        311(1)  the punishments of dismissal, or removal  cannot  be        inflicted  by an authority subordinate to that by which  the        servant was appointed and under Art. 311(2) the  punishments        of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank cannot be  meted

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      out  to the Government servant without giving him a  reason.        able opportunity to defend himself.  The principle  embodied        in  Art.  310(1) that the Government  servants  hold  office        during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the        case  may  be, is qualified by the provisions  of  Art.  311        which  give protection to the Government servants.  The  net        result  is  that  it  is  only  in  those  cases  where  the        Government   intends  to  inflict  those  three   forms   of        punishments  that  the Government servant must  be  given  a        reasonable  opportunity of showing cause against the  action        proposed  to  be  taken  in  regard  to  him.   It  follows,        therefore, that if the termination of service if; sought  to        be  brought about otherwise than by way of punishment,  then        the Government servant whose service is so terminated cannot        claim the protection of Art. 311(2) and the decisions  cited        before us and referred to above, in so far as they lay  down        that principle, must be held to be rightly decided.        The foregoing conclusion, however, does not solve the entire        problem,  for  it has yet to be ascertained as  to  when  an        order for the termination of service is inflicted as and  by        way  of punishment and when it is not.  It has already  been        said  that  where a person is appointed substantively  to  a        permanent post in        (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1 I50-        858        Government service, he normally acquires a right to hold the        post   until  under  the  rules,  he  attains  the  age   of        superannuation or is compulsorily retired and in the absence        of  a  contract, express or implied, or a service  rule,  he        cannot  be turned out of his post unless the post itself  is        abolished or unless he is guilty of misconduct,  negligence,        inefficiency  or  other  disqualifications  and  appropriate        proceedings are taken under the service rules read with Art.        311(2).   Termination  of  service  of  such  a  servant  so        appointed must per se be a punishment, for it operates as  a        forfeiture  of  the  servant’s rights  and  brings  about  a        premature  end of his employment.  Again where a  person  is        appointed  to a temporary post for a fixed term of say  five        years his service cannot, in the absence of a contract or  a        service   rule  permitting  its  premature  termination   be        terminated  before the expiry of that period unless  he  has        been  guilty of some misconduct, negligence, in.  efficiency        or  other disqualifications and appropriate proceedings  are        taken under the rules read with Art. 311(2).  The  premature        termination  of the service of a servant so  appointed  will        prima facie be a dismissal or removal from service by way of        punishment  and  so  within  the  purview  of  Art.  311(2).        Further, take the case of a person who having been appointed        temporarily  to  a post has been in continuous  service  for        more than three years or has been certified by the  appoint-        ing  authority  as fit for employment  in  a  quasipermanent        capacity,  such  person, under r. 3 of  the  1949  Temporary        Service  Rules,  is to be deemed to  be  in  quasi-permanent        service which, under r. 6 of those Rules, can be  terminated        (i)  in  the circumstances and in the manner  in  which  the        employment  of a Government servant in a  permanent  service        can  be  terminated or (ii) when  the  appointing  authority        certifies  that  a reduction has occurred in the  number  of        posts  available  for Government servants not  in  permanent        service.   Thus  when the service of  a  Government  servant        holding  a  post temporarily ripens into  a  quasi-permanent        service  as defined in the 1949 Temporary Service Rules,  he        acquires  a right to the post although his  appointment  was        initially temporary and, therefore,        859

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      the   termination  of  his  employment  otherwise  than   in        accordance with r. 6 of those Rules will deprive him of  his        right  to  that post which he acquired under the  rules  and        will prima facie be a punishment and regarded as a dismissal        or  removal from service so as to,. attract the  application        of  Art.  311.  Except in the three cases just  mentioned  a        Government  servant  has  no  right  to  his  post  and  the        termination  of  service of a Government servant  does  not,        except  in those cases, amount to a dismissal or removal  by        way  of punishment.  Thus where a person is appointed  to  a        permanent  post  in a Government service on  probation,  the        termination  of  his  service during or at the  end  of  the        period  of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be  a        punishment, for the Government servant, so appointed, has no        right  to  continue to hold such a post any  more  than  the        servant  employed  on  probation by a  private  employer  is        entitled  to do.  Such a termination does not operate  as  a        forfeiture of any right of the servant to hold the post, for        he  has no such right and obviously cannot be  a  dismissal,        removal  or  reduction in rank by way of  punishment.   This        aspect of the matter is recognised in the Explanation to  r.        49 of the 1930 Classification Rules which correspond to  the        Note  to r. 1702 of the Indian Railway Code and r. 3 of  the        1955 Rules and r. 13 of the 1957 Rules, for all those  rules        expressly  say that the termination of such  an  appointment        does  not amount to the punishment of dismissal  or  removal        within the meaning of those rules.  Likewise if the  servant        is  appointed to officiate in a permanent post or to hold  a        temporary  post  other than one for a  fixed  term,  whether        substantively  or_on probation or on an  officiating  basis,        under the general law, the implied term of his employment is        that his service may be terminated on reasonable notice  and        the  termination of the service of such a servant  will  not        per  se amount to dismissal or removal from  service.   This        principle also has been recognised by the Explanations to r.        49 of the 1930 Classification Rules correspoding to the Note        to  r. 1702 of the Indian Railway Code and r. 5 of the  1949        Rules and r. 3 of        109        860        the  1955 Rules and r. 13 of the 1957 Rules.  Shortly  -put,        the principle is that when a servant has right to a post  or        to  a  rank  either  under the  terms  of  the  contract  of        employment,  express  or  implied,  or  under  ,,the   rules        governing the conditions of his service, the termination  of        the  service of such a servant or his reduction to  a  lower        post  is  by  itself and prima facie a  punishment,  for  it        operates  as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post  or        that  rank  and  to get the emoluments  and  other  benefits        attached  thereto.  But if the servant has no right  to  the        post  as  where  be is appointed to  a  post,  permanent  or        temporary either on probation or on an officiating basis and        whose  temporary  service  has not  ripened  into  a  quasi-        permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules,        the  termination of his employment does not deprive  him  of        any right and cannot, therefore, by itself be a  punishment.        One  test  for determining whether the  termination  of  the        service  of a Government servant is by way of punishment  is        to ascertain whether the servant, but for such  termination,        had  the right to hold the post.  If he had a right  to  the        post  as  in  the three cases  hereinbefore  mentioned,  the        termination  of his service will by itself be  a  punishment        and  he will be entitled to the protection of Art. 311.   In        other  words and broadly speaking, Art. 311 (2), will  apply        to  those  cases where the Government servant, had  he  been

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      employed by a private employer, will be entitled to maintain        an  action for wrongful dismissal, removal or  reduction  in        rank.   To put it in another way, if the Government has,  by        contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right        to   terminate  the  employment  at  any  time,  then   such        termination  in the manner provided by the contract  or  the        rules is, prima facie and per se, not a punishment and  does        not attract the provisions of Art. 311.        It does not, however, follow that, except in the three cases        mentioned above,, in all other cases, termination of service        of a Government servant who has no right to his post,  e.g.,        where  he was appointed to a post, temporary  or  permanent,        either  on probation or on an officiating basis and had  not        acquired a quasi.        861        permanent   status,   the   termination   cannot,   in   any        circumstance, be a, dismissal or removal from service by way        of  punishment.   Cases may arise where the  Government  may        find  a  servant  unsuitable  for the  post  on  acconut  of        misconduct,     negligence,    inefficiency    or,     other        disqualification.   If  such a servant was  appointed  to  a        post,  permanent or temporary, either on probation or on  an        officiating basis, then the very transitory character of the        employment implies that the employment was terminable at any        time on reasonable notice given by the Government.  Again if        the servant was appointed to a post, permanent or temporary,        on  the express condition or term that the employment  would        be  terminable  on say a month’s notice as in  the  case  of        Satish  Chander  Anand v. The Union of India (1),  then  the        Government might at any time serve the requisite notice.  In        both cases the Government may proceed to take action against        the servant in exercise of its powers under the terms of the        contract  of  employment, express or implied, or  under  the        rules  regulating  the  conditions of  service,  if  any  be        applicable,   and  ordinarily  in  such  a   situation   the        Government  will take this course.  But the  Government  may        take  the view that a simple termination of service  is  not        enough  and  that the conduct of the servant has  been  such        that he deserves a punishment entailing penal  consequences.        In such a case the Government may choose to proceed  against        the  servant  on the basis of  his  misconduct,  negligence,        inefficiency  or the like and inflict on him the  punishment        of  dismissal,  removal or reduction carrying  with  it  the        penal  consequences.   In such a case the  servant  will  be        entitled to the protection of Art. 311(2).        The  position may, therefore, be summed up as  follows:  Any        and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal        or  reduction  in rank.  A termination  of  service  brought        about  by the exercise of a con’. tractual right is not  per        se  dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court  in        Satish  Chander  Anand  v.  The  Union  of  India   (supra).        Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement        in terms of a        (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 655.        862        specific  rule regulating the conditions of service  is  not        tantamount  to the infliction of a punishment and  does  not        attract Art.; 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in        Shyam  Lal v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (I). ,In either  of        the two abovementioned cases the termination of the  service        did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay,        or  allowances under r. 52 of the Fundamental Rules.  It  is        true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or  other        disqualification  may be the motive or the  inducing  factor        which  influences  the Government to take action  under  the

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      terms of the contract of employment or the specific  service        rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or        the rules, to terminate the service the motive, operating on        the  mind of the Government is, as Chagla C.J. has  said  in        Shrinivas   Ganesh  v.  Union  of  India   (supra),   wholly        irrelevant.   In  short, if the termination  of  service  is        founded  on the right flowing from contract or  the  service        rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment        and  carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 3 1  1        is  not  attracted.   But even if  the  Government  has,  by        contract  or  under the rules, the right  to  terminate  the        employment  without going through the  procedure  prescribed        for  inflicting  the punishment of dismissal or  removal  or        reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless,  choose        to  punish the servant and if the termination of service  is        sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency        or  other disqualification, then it is a punishment and  the        requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.  As  already        stated  if  the servant has got a right to continue  in  the        post,  then, unless the contract of employment or the  rules        provide  to the contrary, his services cannot be  terminated        otherwise  than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency  or        other  good  and  sufficient cause.  A  termination  of  the        service  of  such  a  servant on  such  grounds  must  be  a        punishment  and,  therefore, a dismissal or  removal  within        Art.  311, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right  and        he is visited with the evil consequences of loss of pay  and        allowances.  It puts an indelible stigma on the officer        (1)  [1955] I S.C.R. 26.                                    863        affecting  his future career.  A reduction in rank  likewise        may  be  by  way of punishment or it  may  be  an  innocuous        thing.’  If  the  Government  servant  has  a  right  to   a        particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will        operate  as a penalty, for he will then lose the  emoluments        and  privileges of that rank.  If, however, he has no  right        to  the particular rank, his reduction from  an  officiating        higher  rank  to  his sub-: stantive  lower  rank  will  not        ordinarily  be  a punishment.  But the mere  fact  that  the        servant  has  no  title  to the post or  the  rank  and  the        Government  has, by contract, express or implied,  or  under        the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does  not        mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post        or  rank cannot in any circumstances be a  Punishment.   The        real  test  for determining whether the  reduction  in  such        cases  is or is not by way of punishment is to find  out  if        the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any        penal  consequences.  Thus if the order entails or  provides        for  the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss  of        his  seniority in his substantive rank or, the  stoppage  or        postponement  of his future chances of promotion, then  that        circumstance   may  indicate  that  although  in  form   the        Government bad purported to exercise its right to  terminate        the  employment  or to reduce the servant to  a  lower  rank        under  the terms of the contract of employment or under  the        rules,  in truth and reality the Government  has  terminated        the  employment  as and by way of penalty.  The use  of  the        expression  "  terminate  " or " discharge  "  is  not  con,        elusive.  In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions,        the  court  has  to apply the  two  tests  mentioned  above,        namely,  (1) whether the servant had a right to the post  or        the  rank  or  (2) whether he has  been  visited  with  evil        consequences  of the kind hereinbefore referred to ? If  the        case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be  held        that  the servant has been punished and the  termination  of

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      his  service  must be taken as a dismissal or  removal  from        service  or  the reversion to his substantive rank  must  be        regarded  as a reduction in rank and if the requirements  of        the  rules and Art.311, which give protection to  Government        servant        864        have not been complied with, the termination of the  service        or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and  in        violation of the constitutional right of the servant.        Applying  the principles discussed above it is  quite  clear        that  the petitioner before us was appointed to  the  higher        post  on  an  officiating  basis, that is  to  say,  he  was        appointed  to  officiate in that post  which,  according  to        Indian  Railway Code, r. 2003 (19) corresponding to  F.R.  9        (19) means, that he was appointed only to perform the duties        of that post.  He had no right to continue in that post  and        under  the general law the implied term of such  appointment        was that it was terminable at any time on reasonable  notice        by  the  Government and, therefore, his  reduction  did  not        operate  as  a  forfeiture of any right  and  could  not  be        described  as reduction in rank by way of  punishment.   Nor        did  this  reduction under Note 1 to r. 1702 amount  to  his        dismissal  or removal.  Further it is quite clear  from  the        orders passed by the General Manager that it did not  entail        the forfeiture of his chances of future promotion or  affect        his   seniority   in  his  substantive   post.    In   these        circumstances  there is no escape from the  conclusion  that        the petitioner was not reduced in rank by way of  punishment        and,  therefore, the provisions of Art. 311 (2) do not  come        into play at all.  In this view of the matter the petitioner        cannot  complain that the requirements of Art. 311 (2)  were        not  complied with, for those requirements never applied  to        him.  The result, therefore, is that we uphold the  decision        of  the  Division  Bench,  although  on  somewhat  different        grounds.   This  appeal must, therefore, be  dismissed  with        costs.        BosE.  J.-With great respect I cannot agree that Art. 311 is        not attracted in this case.        I agree with my Lord that Art. 311 applies to all classes of        Government  servants  mentioned in it and that it  makes  no        difference  whether  they  are  permanent,  quasi-permanent,        officiating,  temporary or on probation.  There may be  good        reasons  for  having all these shades of difference  in  the        civil services and        865        among those who bold civil posts in the Union and the States        but I am clear that the protections afforded by Art. 311 and        other  parts  of  the Constitution cannot  be  nullified  or        whittled down by clever phrasing and subtle ingenuity.        I am also clear that                  "  Except as expressly provided by this  Constitu-        tion,  every person etc............ holds office during  the        pleasure of the President............... "        These words are absolute and leave no room for inference  or        deduction.  The " pleasure " can only be controlled by  some        express  provision in the Constitution.  One of them  is  in        Art.  310(2), another in Art. 31 1. There are  also  others,        such as Arts. 124(4) and 217(1)(b), but it is not  necessary        to enumerate them because I am only concerned with the broad        principle here.        I also agree with my Lord that the words, dismissal, removal        and  reduction  in  rank,  used in  Art.  311  have  special        meaning.   I  would not have said this had it not  been  for        ambiguities  that arise otherwise.  We were faced with  that        in Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (1), where we  had

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      to  construe the words " dismissal " and " removal " and  to        determine  whether they were merely tautologous or bad  been        introduced to emphasise a difference in meaning.   According        to the dictionary, they mean the same thing or, at any rate,        have  subtle shades of distinction that are  meaningless  in        the  context  in  which they are  used.   It  was  therefore        necessary  to  look  to the  surrounding  circumstances  and        determine  whether  they  had  acquired  special   technical        significance  at  the date of the  Constitution.   For  that        purpose,  it  was necessary to examine the  history  of  the        conditions  of  service  under the Crown  and  look  to  the        various statutes and rules then in force.  Except for  that,        I  do  not think it would have been proper to  look  at  the        rules  for  I  cannot agree that  the  Constitution  can  be        construed by reference to Acts of the Legislature and  rules        framed by some lesser authority and, in particular, to rules        made and Acts passed after the Constitution.        (1)  [1953] S. C. R. 655.        866        I  agree  with  my Lord that Art.  311  applies  when  penal        consequences   ensue  from  the  dismissal  or  removal   or        reduction  in rank, though I prefer to phrase this in  wider        terms  and  say that the Article is attracted whenever  a  "        right " is infringed in the way in which I shall proceed  to        explain,  for a right can be infringed in that sort  of  way        even when no penal consequences follow.        I  have  used the word " right" but must hasten  to  explain        that  I use it in a special sense.  The " right "  need  not        necessarily be justiciable nor need it necessarily amount to        a  contract  but, broadly speaking, it must be the  sort  of        "right  "  which, even when not enforceable in  the  courts,        would  form a good foundation for a "Petition of  Right"  in        England.        It  is  as  difficult to speak of "rights  "  (except  those        expressly conferred by the Constitution) when one holds at "        pleasure  "  as  to  speak  of  "contracts."  But  they  are        convenient  expressions  to  convey  a  particular  thought,        provided  the  limitations imposed by the  context  are  not        forgotten.        The word " contract" is used in Art. 310(2), but as these  "        contracts  " are as much subject to "pleasure" as any  other        engagement  of service (except as otherwise provided by  the        Constitution)  they are not contracts in the usual sense  of        the  term; nor are the conditions of service that  apply  to        Government  servants  who  do  not  serve  under  a  special        "contract".   A  contract  that can be  determined  at  will        despite  an express condition to the contrary (and  that  is        what Art. 310(2) contemplates) is not a contract as  usually        understood;  nor  are  conditions of  service  that  can  be        unilaterally  varied  without the consent of  the  other  it        contracting party ", and even behind his back.  But they are        convenient  terms to convey a thought and that is the  sense        in  which " contract " is used in Art. 310(2) and the  sense        in which it has been used in some Privy Council rulings.        Now these " conditions of service " (and of course special "        contracts  "  as  well) confer " rights  "  and  though  the        conditions  can  be  varied unilaterally because  of  the  "        pleasure ", they cannot be ignored so        867        long as they are in force ; and if a dismissal, or  removal,        or reduction in rank infringes one of these rights ",  then,        in my judgment, Art. 311 is attracted.        I  said  in  Satish  Chandra  Anand’s  case  (1),  that  the        President  and Government are as free to enter into  special        contracts  as any other person provided they are  consistent

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      with  the Constitution.  That also applies to conditions  of        service  where there are no special " contracts ".  Anything        else  would  be anomalous especially as  anyone  who  serves        under the Union or under a State serves at " pleasure ".  It        is,  therefore,  possible  for  the  President  to  make   "        contracts " that are terminable in a particular way or at  a        particular  time  or  on the happening  of  a  given  event,        provided,  they  do not offend the Constitution ;  and  when        they  are  so  determined, they can,  broadly  speaking,  be        called contractual terminations".        Two  such  cases  have already been before  this  court.  In        Satish  Chandra  Anand’s case (supra), it was  a  special  "        contract " terminable with a month’s notice on either  side.        In  Shyam  Lal  v.  State of Uttar  Pradesh  (2)  it  was  a        condition of service that permitted compulsory retirement at        a particular age.  Any other variation that does not  offend        the  Constitution  would  be  equally  permissible.    These        conditions confer a " right" on one side and correspondingly        reduce  the  ambit  of the " rights "  conferred  by  the  "        contract  "  on  the  other.   Therefore,  when   Government        exercises  one of their " rights " there is no  infringement        of  the other party’s " rights " because to that  extent  he        has none.  It follows that when, in a given case, Government        has  an option to adopt one of two courses as, for  example,        to " dismiss " or " reduce " for misconduct and at the  same        time to terminate or alter the service under a term of the "        contract  " or because of a condition of the service,  then,        if  it  chooses to act under the right conferred  by  the  "        contract ", Art. 311 is not attracted even though misconduct        is also present and even though that is the real reason  for        the action taken.  But, if Government chooses to adopt  such        a   course,  it  must  be  careful  to  see  that  no   evil        consequences        (1) [1953] S.C.R. 655.           (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 26.        110        868        will  ensue  over  and beyond those  that  would  ordinarily        follow from a normal termination or alteration when there is        no  misconduct or blame on the part of the person  affected.        But  I  repeat that any such condition must  be,  consistent        with  the  Constitution  and  that  no  clever  artifice  or        juggling  with  words  can  destroy  or  whittle  down   the        guarantees  of  Art.  311, or any  other  Article  for  that        matter.        To   my  mind,  the  test  must  always  be   whether   evil        consequences over and above those that would ensue from a  "        contractual  termination  " are likely to follow.   Were  it        otherwise,  the blameless man against whom no fault  can  be        found would be at a disadvantage.  It would be anomalous  to        bold  that  a man who has been guilty of  misconduct  should        have  greater protection than a blameless  individual.   But        any man who is visited with evil consequences that would not        ensue in the case of another similarly placed, but free from        blame, can, in my opinion, claim the protection of Art.311.        Now what happened in this case?  The appellant was appointed        to  an All-India service of the Union in August,  1924.   He        has  not  been removed or dismissed from service, so  he  is        still a member of an All-India service.        On  July 2, 1951, he was appointed Assistant  Superintendent        of  Railway Telegraphs in class II service.  On  August  19,        1953,  he was relieved of this appointment and  reverted  to        his substantive post in a class III appointment.  There  can        be  no  doubt that this was a reduction in rank.   The  only        question is whether it was so within the meaning of Art. 311        for, as I said earlier, these words have special meaning and

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      do not apply in every case where a person is removed from  a        higher to a lower post.        The  argument  on behalf of the Union of India is  that  the        higher  post  to  which  the  appellant  was  appointed  was        temporary and that the appellant was only officiating in it;        and rules were cited to show that Government had the  right,        under those rules, to shift the appellant from a higher to a        lower  post.  I need not consider this argument  because  we        are all        869        agreed  that Art. 311 applies even when the  appointment  is        temporary,  or officiating and, on the view I take, it  does        not  matter  whether Government had what I might  call  a  "        contractual  right  " to reduce because even if it  had,  it        exercised it in a way that evoked evil consequences over and        above  those that would have ensued in a similar case  where        there was neither misconduct nor blame.        Our  attention  was directed to remarks in  the  appellant’s        confidential  reports and to various administrative  notings        on his files.  All these are, in my opinion, irrelevant.  We        are  only  concerned with the operative order  made  by  the        proper   authority  competent  to  make  it  and  with   the        consequences that ensue from that order.        In this case, the order of reversion dated August 19,  1953,        is  non-committal.  It merely says that Shri Bishambar  Nath        Chopra  is appointed to officiate in the  appellant’s  place        and  that  on relief the appellant will revert  to  a  lower        rank.   That in itself might be harmless but the order  does        not  stand  alone  and  though  the  various  administrative        notings  are  irrelevant, the General Manager’s  remarks  on        them, which form the real foundation of the order, cannot be        ignored  because  the  sting lies there and  the  evil  con-        sequences of which I speak flow from them.  They are  really        part  and  parcel  of the order and the  two  must  be  read        together.    I  say  this  because,  quite  obviously,   the        constitutional  guarantees of Art. 311 cannot be  evaded  by        passing  a non-committal order that is innocuous and at  the        same  time  making another order in secret that  would  have        attracted  Art.  311  had it been made  openly.   I  am  not        suggesting that that was done here or that the object was to        evade Art. 311 by a secret manoeuvre.  All I am pointing out        is  that  the consequences of Art. 311 cannot be  evaded  by        cleverly splitting up an order into two parts.        Now  what  were those remarks?  They were  endorsed  on  the        appellant’s  file  on June 11, 1953.   The  General  Manager        said:        " I am disappointed to read these reports.  He        870        should  revert  as  a subordinate till  he  makes  good  the        ,short-comings  noticed  in  this  chance  of.  his  as   an        officer."        What does that mean ? In plain English it means that ,he  is        not  to  be  promoted to a like post  until  some  competent        officer  chooses  to  think he has made  good  his  previous        short-comings.   That is an evil consequence over and  above        that which would ensue in the case of what I may call  again        a  "  contractual termination " of the  engagement  in.  the        higher post.        It was virtually admitted in the arguments before us that  a        man  who is reduced in rank for misconduct for a  particular        period,  say, one year or two years, is being "  punished  "        and therefore Art. 311 will apply.  What difference is there        if the reduction is for an unspecified period instead of for        one  that  is certain ?  In both cases, the  possibility  of        promotion is stayed and whether that is a " punishment" or a

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      "penalty"  it is, in my judgment, an evil  consequence  over        and  above  that which would ensue in a case where  the  man        "reduced" is faultless.        In  view  of the almost frivolous resort that  is  sometimes        made  to  Art.  311  1 want to guard  against  too  wide  an        interpretation of what I have said.  I do not mean to  imply        that  the  reasons that lead to an order  of  reduction  are        relevant  when  there is a "contractual right" to act  in  a        particular way; nor do I mean to imply that a mere recording        of disappointment or dissatisfaction would attract Art.  311        even  if it is followed by a contractual termination of  the        engagement.  All that is not of the essence.  The real  test        is whether additional evil consequences are implicit in        the order.        It is here that I venture to dissent, with the very greatest        respect, from my Lord’s construction of Art. 311.  If I read        his judgment aright, I gather that his view, and that of  my        learned  brothers,  is  that Art. 311  is  confined  to  the        penalties prescribed by the various rules and that one  must        look  to  all the relevant rules to  determine  whether  the        order is intended to operate as a penalty or not.  With deep        respect,  I  do  not think that the gist of  the  matter  is        either the form        871        of  the action or the procedure followed; nor do I think  it        is  relevant  to determine what operated in the  mind  of  a        particular  officer.  The real hurt does not lie in  any  of        those things but in the consequences that follow and, in  my        judgment, the protections of Art. 311 are not against  harsh        words but against hard blows.  It is the effect of the order        alone  that matters ; and in my judgment, Art.  311  applies        whenever  any  substantial  evil follows over  and  above  a        purely "contractual one".  I do not think the article can be        evaded  by  saying  in  a set of  rules  that  a  particular        consequence is not a punishment or that a particular kind of        action is not intended to operate as a penalty.  In my judg-        ment,  it does not matter whether the evil consequences  are        one of the "penalties" prescribed by the rules or not.   The        real test is, do they in fact ensue as a consequence of  the        order made ?        I would allow the appeal with costs.        BY  THE  COURT.-In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of   the        majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.        Appeal dismissed.